Abstract
Georgakakis Didier (ed.), Le champ de l'Eurocratie. Une sociologie politique du personnel de l'UE. Paris: Économica (coll. Études politiques), 2012, 356 pp. [Eurocracy: A political sociology of EU staff]. ISBN9782717861327.
The distinguished contribution made by this collective work – comprising an introduction, ten chapters, an epilogue and a conclusion – is that it not only focuses on the officials of the European institutions (Parliament, Commission, Permanent Representatives, European Central Bank and the CSDP actors), but also considers those who, in different ways (semi-permanent experts, information producers, lobbyists, trade unionists, employers), participate directly or indirectly in defining the EU's public policies. Instead of taking a normative or neo-institutionalist approach, the aim of the authors is to conduct a sociological analysis of the attributes of these officials with very different statuses, of their positions and their redeployments within the European social area to show the European institutions as ‘a space of negotiation and struggle, filled with officials and groups whose affinities and antagonisms are not so much arranged according to national and institutional affiliation but according to the structure of the capital they have accumulated in the course of their career’ (p. 311). The result of quantitative and qualitative surveys, an examination of the social characteristics of these officials, of their careers and of the internal baggage, both national and transnational, which they build up or already hold, helps to understand the tensions and interdependencies between the different players in this sphere of power. As space does not allow an exposition of the very valuable details yielded by each chapter, only a few results will be mentioned.
In the Parliament, we note that the distribution of leadership positions (presidents, vice-presidents of the assembly, groups, committees, etc.) plays in favour of elected officials who have served at least two terms (on average), with a European – rather than national – legitimacy, who are well versed in the networks and boast Community and sectoral expertise. These key strengths help – over and beyond the considerations regarding the individuals themselves – not only to increase the mediating role of the elected representatives among social partners, but also to place them at an equivalent level to senior officials of the Commission. The careers of the latter – and their access to the highest ranking positions – is dependent upon their long-term investment in the EU institutions. As a ‘status group’ that is legally established and characterized by its permanence, they differ greatly from the Commissioners who, after a national career, are vested by the EU as its political representatives without having accumulated European capital as such. The time spent within the institution – and the resulting legitimacy – is a key variable for understanding the tensions between these two classes of officials. As for diplomats representing their countries, it appears that, depending on the issues at stake, they defend a national or Community position. The cohesion of the COREPER that results from social networking proves to be necessary in the competitive game with the sectoral technical committees, and also in dealing with the lobbies. Given the impossibility of directly observing their decision-making, the sociography of the bankers of the ECB makes it possible to shed some light on them. The comparison between the social composition indicators of the ECB and the FED shows a strong similarity. The ‘ideological’ references of the governors of central banks, including those of the board members, are Anglo-Saxon, and unlike Commission officials, they do not have close ties with the European institutions. CSDP players are also a closed and secret circle. However, the survey does clarify, on the one hand, the national stance of the French military that is pro-EU, the British military that is pro-NATO British, and the German military with its combined point of view, and, on the other hand, the antagonism between officials working in conflict prevention and the professional soldiers and diplomats working in crisis management.
The European information environment, which, from the outset, was marked by rivalry between the policy spokesperson and the Joint Service, transformed into a DG in 1967 in charge of this technical activity, is today characterized by the adoption of a professionalism adopted from commercial communication and the streamlining of its production method. In this sector, the porosity between the EU institutions and journalists, communicators and external experts is significant because of the convertibility of positions and the multipositionality of a number of individuals who operate there. The pattern is similar for semi-permanent experts recruited into the Commission's advisory groups, who manage to make full-time careers out of their position through, inter alia, their familiarity with the European institutions and its codes, the return on investment resulting sometimes in recruitment by the EU services themselves. The study into lobbying shows that, depending on the nature of the interests involved, different forms of representation and action are implemented, which vary from one sector to another and over time. Individuals who have turned Europe into a profession in its own right, lobbyists move from one organization to another, from one industry to another, or are recruited by an EU institution, according to approaches hinged around their mode of entry into this space and the types of organization in which they operate. The role of the social partners, trade unions and employers is, for its part, institutionalized, as the Commission is obliged to consult them before putting forward any proposal in the social field. It appears from the investigation into the European Trade Union Confederation, which represents the employees, that its technocratic and diplomatic working methods serve to empower an elite around a depoliticized specific culture. While the actual trade union and militant capital itself is devalued, the attributes of European trade unionists are similar to those of other ‘professionals of Europe’. As for the bosses, they are far from being a homogeneous group and have the same characteristics, as evidenced by the composition of the European Round Table of Industrialists, created in 1980 with the support of the Commission. The social space of the economic elite overlaps with that of the European institutions, as evidenced by certain multiposition careers, but it is a sphere of power under construction.
The epilogue of the book draws lessons from a survey conducted among European personalities no longer in office who, very proud of the success of the Single Market and of the EMU, express their pessimism about the withdrawal of Member States, about intergovernmentalism, etc.
In his conclusion to this work, which offers fascinating insights from start to finish, Didier Georgakakis maps the sphere of power of the European elites. His representation of them reveals in particular that the process of integration of the officials is measured against the Europeanization of the capital they have managed to amass. The next step would be to open up avenues to study which changes are on the cards for the EU regime.