The challenges of coordination in national security management – the case of the terrorist attack in Norway

Abstract

The article addresses a ‘wicked problem’: Organizing for internal security and societal safety. It examines the central emergency and crisis management under the terrorist attack in Norway in July 2011, with a special focus on the coordinating role of the Ministry of Justice (MJ). Our analysis is based on an in-depth qualitative analysis of relevant official documents and interviews with government officials, using a structural-instrumental and a cultural-institutional perspective to understand outcomes. There is a consensus when it comes to diagnosing the problems, identified as fragmentation, pulverization of accountability and weak coordination arrangements. The organizational changes have been cautious and incremental, however. A gradual upgrading of the MJ as an overarching coordinating ministry does not challenge the existing principles of ministerial responsibility. Suggested solutions are beset with ambiguity and conflicts, and there is a mismatch between problems and available solutions.

Points for practitioners

Challenges of coordination are evident in modern public administration, related to both vertical and horizontal coordination, and particularly so within the field of internal security and crisis management. New Public Management (NPM)-related reforms have created further coordination problems, especially in policy areas and public services that cross sector boundaries. New arrangements, labeled post-NPM reforms, have tried to counter the alleged increasing fragmentation. The challenges are quite evident when it comes to crisis management, where a combination of organizing for coordination and flexibility is necessary. Major crises do not always lead to radical changes, however. Instrumental and formal changes are often mediated by the existing culture. The result is a rather hybrid and multi-layered modern public administration.

Keywords

22 July central government coordination crisis management internal security organizational change wicked problems

Introduction

On 22 July 2011, Norway was struck by two terrorist attacks of unprecedented magnitude. A bomb explosion in the Central Government Complex destroyed several central government buildings. Later that day, the same terrorist shot a large number of young people from the Labor Party's youth organization attending a camp on the island of Utøya. In total, 77 people died. Many were seriously injured. The attacks were a terrible shock in a country normally seen as a peaceful and open democracy (Fimreite et al., 2013; Rykkja et al., 2011). They struck at the very core of the country's democratic institutions, thus putting the Government and Cabinet under particular pressure (Christensen et al., 2013).

The policy area of internal security and societal safety can be characterized as a typical ‘wicked problem’ (Harmon and Mayer, 1986; Head, 2008), transcending political-administrative levels, ministerial areas and public organizations. It is a highly complex field involving unpredictable and in some cases unknown cause-and-effect relationships. Added to this, crises are increasingly transboundary (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin, 2008). Earlier research highlights that coordination is crucial for emergency preparedness and crisis management (Brattberg, 2012; Fimreite et al., 2014; Kettl, 2003). Increased capabilities, advanced coordination and collaboration are measures adopted to reform the internal security structures after terrorist attacks (Kettl, 2004; Reinares, 2009). Norway, however, is characterized by weak horizontal coordination in emergency and crisis management, especially at the central government level (Lango et al., 2011). The terrorist attack in 2011 revealed significant coordination problems in both national and local crisis management (Lango et al., 2013; NOU 2012:14).

A report issued by a government inquiry commission – the 22 July Commission (hereafter, the Commission) – a year after the attacks (NOU 2012:14) seriously criticized the country's state of emergency preparedness and crisis management. Lacking coordination was a central issue. We analyze the main coordination problems and solutions that the Commission pointed to, and ask what institutional changes were suggested. What characterized the change process and the preliminary outcome(s)?

We are particularly interested in examining coordination at the central government level. Over recent years, governments across Europe have increasingly introduced innovative coordination practices and related steering instruments to counter public sector fragmentation, deliver public value and deal with certain complex problems. We will focus on the coordinating capacity of the Ministry of Justice (MJ) relevant to the crisis in 2011. The Ministry is responsible for overall coordination and is expected to act as a driving force in internal security and crisis management. A study of the practices that are established due to the MJ's particular coordination responsibilities, and its experience with and development of this overarching role, is interesting both from the point of view of emergency preparedness and crisis management, but also in a more general sense considering the organization of central government.

Coordination has become a central keyword in the wake of the New Public Management (NPM)-based reforms (Peters, 1998, 2006), which encouraged decentralization and structural devolution (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Christensen and Lægreid, 2008; Lægreid et al., 2013). Structures introduced to provide more coordination across sectors and levels, labeled ‘post-NPM’, imply hybrid structures that combine different organizational principles across policy areas (Bogdanor, 2005; Bouckaert et al., 2010; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). In addition, a greater awareness of the threat posed by natural disasters, pandemics and terrorism has politicized this policy field (Ansell et al., 2010).

Our analysis is based on two perspectives from organization theory. The main assumption is that both formal organization and cultural traits are crucial to understanding how public administrations prepare for, respond to and manage crises. A structural-instrumental perspective posits the importance of formal organization, while a cultural-institutional perspective focuses on historical traditions and path-dependency (Christensen et al., 2007).

The analysis is based on an in-depth qualitative document analysis. A main source is the final report from the Commission. The findings are also informed by evaluation reports from the public authorities involved, relevant government white papers, parliamentary debates and hearings, and documents from the affected agencies and ministries. Another important source is interviews with top civil servants and ministers carried out by the Commission and publicized after its report. A limitation is that the data sources only provide a snapshot of the crisis and the suggested solutions in the first year after the attacks rather than more long-term developments that could indicate institutional changes over time.

The article proceeds in four parts. First, we present the central concepts and the two theoretical perspectives. Second, we lay out contextual factors, crucial principles and organizational arrangements. Third, we describe the state of emergency preparedness, crisis management and the lessons learned in the wake of the terrorist attacks. Fourth, we analyze and explain the process. The article closes with a section discussing the main findings and implications.

Theoretical framework

Central concepts

We see crisis as ‘a serious threat to the basic structures and the fundamental values and norms of a system which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions’ (Boin et al., 2005: 5). Thus, a crisis is characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity and unpredictability, making optimalization and rational decision-making difficult. Decisions have to be made in complex, disorganized and dynamic circumstances. Transboundary crises transcend the borders of administrative levels, ministerial areas and organizational borders, and challenge existing interfaces between organizations, thereby creating coordination problems (Fimreite et al., 2014; Kettl, 2003).

Table 1

Different dimensions of coordination

	Vertical coordination	Horizontal coordination
Internal (intra-organizational) coordination	Between political and administrative executives, or between top civil servants and lower-level officials	Between departments within a ministry
External (inter-organizational) coordination	Between ministries and subordinate agencies	Between ministries or agencies

In an administrative system with strong line ministries, departmentalization and silo arrangements, coordination is often limited to ‘negative’ coordination where the actors agree to avoid encroaching on each other's programs and policies (Scharpf, 1994). This ‘minimum coordination’ implies non-interference to minimalize conflicts between administrative domains. Each minister controls policy and administration within his/her policy area. To move from negative towards positive coordination by building integrated and coherent programs, arrangements and services is a major challenge (Bouckaert et al., 2010).

Structurally we distinguish between an external–internal and a vertical–horizontal dimension of coordination (Table 1) (Verhoest et al., 2010). Recently, both vertical and horizontal coordination problems have received renewed attention through the initiation of ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘joined-up government’ programs (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). The main goal has been to move public sector organizations back from the disintegration of NPM to more integration and coordination (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). The fragmentation brought about by NPM has led to a recognition that many societal problems cannot be compartmentalized along existing sectoral lines and solved within one ministerial area alone. Political executives found that they lacked the necessary control, influence and information, but were still held accountable. This resulted in new efforts to strengthen central capacity and control, especially in politically salient sectors (Dahlstrøm et al., 2011). When confronted with an increasingly insecure world threatened by terrorism, financial and environmental concerns, natural disasters and pandemics, national states often seek to strengthen central political control while at the same time looking for contingent coordination and network approaches (Christensen and Painter, 2004; Kettl, 2003; Wise, 2002).

Challenges within the policy area of internal security put existing forms of government coordination on the agenda. According to Kettl's (2003) concept of contingent coordination, coordination should be adapted to existing problems. However, the fact that no crises will be identical creates a need for flexibility and collaboration. Especially in unpredictable and complex situations, vertical and hierarchical coordination has to be supplemented by horizontal coordination through networks.

An instrumental and a cultural perspective

Gulick (1937) stressed the dynamic relationship between specialization and coordination. The more specialization in a public organization, the more pressure for increased coordination, or vice versa. The challenges of coordination vary between organizations depending on whether the structural specialization is based on purpose, process, clientele or geography.

Gulick (1937) distinguishes between coordination by formal organization and by ideas, the latter alluding to culture. An instrumental organizational perspective directs our attention towards formal arrangements (Christensen et al., 2007). Formal organization is here seen as an instrument for achieving goals, and channels and influences the models of thought and decision-making behavior of civil servants (Egeberg, 2012; Simon, 1957). The underlying behavioral logic is a ‘logic of consequence’ (March and Olsen, 1989), where ‘bounded’ rational actors can predict the consequences of their choices and find the appropriate means (Simon, 1957). This implies that leaders score high on rational calculation and political control (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953). They have relatively clear intentions and goals, choose structures that correspond with these goals, and have insight into the potential effects and have the power to implement their decisions. A distinction can be made between a hierarchical variant where the leaders’ control and rational calculation is central and a negotiation variant allowing for a variety of interests and compromises (March and Olsen, 1983).

On the other hand, a cultural perspective emphasizes informal norms, values and practices that have developed over time through a process of institutionalization. Central organizational features result from mutual adaptation to internal and external pressure and create cultural identities (Selznick, 1957). A crucial argument concerns path-dependency: Contexts, norms and values surrounding the establishment of a public organization – the ‘roots’ – will strongly influence the ‘route’ or path it takes (Krasner, 1988). Also related to core organizing, competence, goals and services is the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989). A high level of mutual trust tends to enhance appropriate behavior and vice versa. In civil service systems characterized by strong vertical sector relations, such as Norway, civil servants know what they are supposed to do and how to act. This maintains trust relations within the individual sectors and can constrain trust and coordination across sectors (Fimreite et al., 2007).

Within this perspective, although change is constrained, major crises can produce a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ implying a shock effect that can alter institutionalized beliefs and routines and open the way for more radical change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). These institutional changes may differ depending on whether they are incremental or abrupt, and whether the result is continuity or discontinuity (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).

The Norwegian context

Strong sectoral ministries and weak super-ministries responsible for coordination across ministerial areas characterize Norwegian central government. The PMO (Prime Minister's Office) has traditionally been small with weak coordination power. Individual ministerial responsibility, meaning that the minister bears the ultimate responsibility for actions within the ministry and of subordinate agencies, is a core concept. Specialization by purpose or tasks is a dominant principle, making it difficult to establish cross-cutting arrangements. Ministries thus operate as separate ‘silos’ with limited ability to apprehend intersecting policy issues (Bouckaert et al., 2000). Consequently, vertical coordination dominates over horizontal coordination.

Norway is also characterized by a consensus-oriented and collaborative decision-making style that modifies both vertical and horizontal fragmentation. Cooperative arrangements, such as consulting, participating and compromises, are more common than confrontation. Norway is furthermore a high trust society (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003), where generalized trust between citizens, as well as citizens' trust in government and mutual trust relations within public bodies, is generally high. High trust also characterizes the field of emergency preparedness and crisis management (Christensen et al., 2011). Added to this, Norway is regarded as a safe haven on the periphery of Europe, and until 2011 had not experienced any major terrorist attacks (Fimreite et al., 2013; Rykkja et al., 2011).

Principles for internal security

Three crucial principles have guided the authorities who are responsible for internal security in Norway (St. meld. 22, 2007–2008). The liability principle implies that each authority is responsible for internal security and safety within its own sector. This is closely related to the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility, and results in strong sector ministries and vertical coordination. The decentralization principle, on the other hand, emphasizes that a crisis should be managed at the lowest operational level possible. Here, specialization by geography is an important organizing concept. The principle of conformity (or similarity) creates further organizational pressure. It stresses that the organizational forms in a crisis situation should be as similar to the daily organizational forms as possible. This can be particularly difficult in ‘extraordinary’ crises. When a major disaster happens, it is crucial to supplement existing formal organizations with improvisation and temporary organizations (Czarniawska, 2009).

A reluctant reformer

The most important developments in Norwegian internal security policy since the Cold War have been a gradual strengthening of the Minister of Justice's overall coordination responsibilities and the establishment of new agencies and more ad hoc organizational arrangements (Lango et al., 2011). Included are a Government Emergency Management Council and a Government Emergency Support Unit within the MJ. Lango et al. (2013) emphasize that the principle of ministerial superiority over the years has set distinct limitations on how legislative and organizational proposals are formed, followed up and implemented. This has resulted in a somewhat cautious adaptation to a new situation after the end of the Cold War.

The development reveals important coordination issues. The relationship between the military defense and the civil sector has been strained, characterized by a lack of communication and turf wars (Lægreid and Serigstad, 2006). At the same time, there has been a shift of attention away from military defense towards the civil sector (Fimreite et al., 2014; NOU 2006:6). Coordinating agencies subordinate to the MJ, such as the Directorate for Civil Protection (DCP) and the National Security Authority (NSA), have been developed and strengthened and a ‘light version’ of a lead ministry approach was introduced. The MJ's coordinative role, both vertically and horizontally, has been a constant challenge.

Experiences with certain crises have revealed that the authorities are not always well prepared. The principle of liability creates important tensions between organizational units, sectors and administrative levels. The Tsunami disaster in South East Asia in 2004, for example, revealed serious coordination problems within and between the responsible ministries and prompted central administration reorganization (Jaffery and Lango, 2014). Still, it did not result in completely new arrangements, but rather in incremental adjustments to the existing structure.

The terrorist attacks

Emergency preparedness

The terrorist attacks in 2011 exposed serious shortfalls in the government's emergency preparedness and ability to handle such a crisis. The Commission attributed this to a lack of risk awareness, an inability to learn from previous experiences, and lacking implementation capacity, especially related to crisis planning (NOU 2012:14). The crisis exposed a fragmented policy area, accountability pulverization, structural fragmentation, and weak coordination. This diagnosis agrees with the conclusions of previous research (Fimreite et al., 2014). The permeating coordination problems of the policy area can be illustrated by looking, first, at the implementation of a security project in 2004 and, second, at the auditing procedures within the policy area.

In 2004, the Government Security Council in Norway launched new measures to secure the Government complex against potential attacks through ‘The Government Complex Security Project’. One action was to block certain streets to general traffic. The work was claimed to have high priority. Nevertheless, seven years later, the terrorist could place a car bomb at the entrance to the building hosting the PMO and the MJ. According to the Commission, no professional routines or provisional measures were established to ensure the implementation of the project. This was attributed to a deadlock between central authorities: the PMO, the Ministry for Government Administration (MGA), the MJ, the City of Oslo and the Police Agency (NOU 2012:14: ch. 14). According to the Commission's analysis, the MJ seemed to have a rather ‘laid back’ approach to the project, lacking commitment and willingness to act as a coordinating body and driving force.

Our analysis of interviews with centrally placed public servants reveals internal criticism of the Ministry, portraying a general lack of initiative on a strategic level and insufficient follow-up on the operational level. The leaders of the MJ were ‘listening, but were not dynamic and proactive’ (interview, Secretary to the Government, PMO). This lack of initiative and risk awareness made it difficult to get the Minister of Government Administration's attention. Being responsible for security in the Government complex, she was heavily criticized for lack of involvement (NOU 2012:14). Instead, the PMO took on a more active role. Officials from the PMO also criticized the MJ for its weak coordination:

In spite of the fact that the Ministry of Justice's responsibility for emergency preparedness has been underlined by several white papers, its role is still ambiguous. An important lesson after July 22 is that the Ministry of Justice has to become more clear and specific and powerful in its coordinating role for emergency preparedness. (interview, Secretary to the Government, PMO)

The audit and control systems within the field expose further coordination problems. The DCP had considerable trouble in its hierarchical relationship with the Ministry. Interviews reveal that the Director felt that the DCP had been more proactive than the Ministry. The DCP took a number of initiatives that it felt did not get the attention of the Ministry's leadership. The Ministry's Rescue and Emergency Planning Department, superior to the DCP, struggled to get access upwards in the Ministry (interview, Secretary-General MJ and Director, DCP). The following quote confirms these vertical tensions:

DCP experiences that the contact with MJ still has clear potential for improvement. Generally it is difficult to get the ministry's attention in matters where it would be natural to have a tighter dialogue between DCPEP and MJ. It is absolutely necessary that the dialogue with the MJ is strengthened. (DCPEP letter to the MJ, 25 September 2012)

The DCP is responsible for periodic auditing of the different line ministries' emergency plans. It does not have any strong regulatory instruments, however, and the audit reports are not made public. The DCP also audits its parent ministry, the MJ. Audit reports on other line ministries are submitted to the MJ, which is then responsible for handling any issues. The DCP itself finds that it is a major problem that the principle of liability and ministerial responsibility tend to trump inter-organizational auditing activities (interview, Director DCP, and current Minister of Justice).

These problems are related to the MJ's assigned role as a ‘driving force for internal security’, a role that does not seem quite clear. In general, there is a lack of strong steering instruments and enforcement tools within the field. Generally, The audit reports have been rather cautious, and the MJ seems reluctant to criticize other ministries (interview, Secretary-General MJ). This results in an auditing system based on ritual and symbolic action rather than effective enforcement.

The organization of the NSA adds to these coordination problems. The NSA has a hybrid organizational form, being administratively subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (MD), but reporting to the MJ in civil matters. Collaboration between the two ministries is strained. According to both the Minister of Justice and the Director of the NSA, reporting to two ministers is not a good solution, and there is ambiguity concerning what the two ministries are supposed to follow up (interview, Minister of Justice and Director, NSA). The joint arrangement results in tensions concerning allocation of resources, establishment of central goals and priorities, and steering measures. The principle of liability is seen as a barrier to coherent security, and the line ministries are reluctant to let the MJ take the lead (interview, Director, NSA).

The MJ is responsible for ensuring that the NSA meets the requirements of the Security Act of 1998 on the civil side such as auditing the securing of vital objects. A great number of stakeholders raised concerns when the act was prepared, and it took 13 years to develop more detailed regulations. Until then, there was no oversight to identify security issues concerning central objects (people or buildings). In its remarks to the Commission, the NSA states:

… one did not have a minimum level of specific regulations to control against. In the hearings there was significant opposition to important parts of the regulations. Added to that, there was significant overlap and border difficulties related to sector specific regulations, the tasks of the police and DCP. All this constrained the NSA's audit capacity. (Letter to the Ministry, 7 September 2012)

This situation illustrates the major coordination problems. The principle of ministerial responsibility makes those involved reluctant to bring up cross-boundary issues. Vertical coordination prevails, although there are also challenges in the relationship between the Ministry and the subordinate agencies.

Crisis management

In addition to the problems related to effective emergency preparedness, the Commission report revealed critical problems concerning crisis management. Importantly, the MJ did not operate in accordance with the principle of a ‘lead ministry’ during the crisis. The Ministry itself was heavily damaged in the bomb explosion and the Government Emergency Support Unit had to take over several of the crisis management tasks originally assigned to the MJ (interview, Director and leader of the Government Emergency Support Unit, MJ). According to the MJ's emergency plans, it should have established emergency response staff. This did not happen. Furthermore, the existing ‘Civil Emergency Preparedness System’ was not implemented. This made it difficult to separate the crisis management tasks from efforts to safeguard the Ministry's own operations and staff.

The Commission's investigation further revealed that the Government Emergency Management Council had operational problems. According to the Commission, the Council concentrated on the wrong issues. There was too much focus on the respective ministries' situation and how to get the government apparatus back to work, rather than how to handle the unfolding crisis. The overall strategic crisis management and coordination problems between central government and the police were not adequately addressed when the situation escalated (interview, Deputy Secretary-General, MD). At the same time, the crisis was seen as so extensive that all ministries were invited to participate in the Council. Thus, the threshold for bringing up issues that were not core tasks was lowered. Also, because the MJ had not established emergency response staff, the Council had to handle tasks beyond its mandate.

An internal evaluation of the Government Emergency Management Council revealed further management and coordination failures (MJ, 2012a). Information from the police to the Council, the MJ and the Cabinet, and eventually to the public, was slow and inadequate. Media reports were more up to date than the information emanating from government. This eventually led to the establishment of a direct communication line between the Police Directorate and the PMO, circumventing established communication lines.

The medicine—what is to be done?

The Commission stated that the lessons learned after the attacks were more related to deficient leadership, culture and attitudes than to a lack of resources or a need for new legislation, organizational changes or value choices (NOU 2012:14: 16). Despite its criticism, the Commission seemed content with the more incremental adjustments over the past 10 years. Formal organization was largely not seen as a limiting factor (NOU 2012:14: 456), and the recommendations did not include major changes to the existing organizational structure (NOU 2012:14: 257).

The most important advice from the Commission was that the leaders at all levels should work systematically to strengthen core attitudes and culture related to risk awareness, implementation capacity, interaction, ICT utilization and result-oriented leadership. Furthermore, it recommended that the Government Security Council and the Emergency Council should have regular meetings, a modernized set of plans should be established, drilled and implemented, and better routines facilitating communication and information flow should be developed. This raises two significant problems, however. First, a paradox arises when the Commission on the one hand revealed that the formal organization failed, both in terms of prevention and crisis management, and on the other hand stated that organizational changes were not essential. Second, the Commission pointed to problems of fragmentation, coordination, communication, administrative culture and leadership, but failed to link this to the formal organization structure. The Commission argued that formal responsibility combined with good management would result in effective exercise of responsibility. But lack of ability to execute formal responsibility is not necessarily a consequence of bad management or culture. It can also simply be a result of basic organizational dilemmas in public administration that are difficult to solve (Allison, 1971; Christensen, 2013)

Lessons learned—institutional changes?

After the terrorist attacks the MJ's preparedness and crisis management capacity was heavily debated. An internal report on the MJ's responsibility recommended a strengthening of its coordinative role and crisis management functions. This was to be done through internal restructuring, the establishment of the MJ as a permanent lead ministry, strengthening of the Government Emergency Support Unit, and a tightening up of supervision and control of emergency preparedness and crisis management within central government (MJ, 2012b). Signaling a renewed focus on preparedness, the MJ was renamed the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in January 2012. The top two civil servants in the Ministry were replaced, and a new Department for Crisis Management and Security was created within the Ministry.

Rearrangements within central crisis management structures followed. The Council was renamed to emphasize its non-political role. The Support Unit was made permanent and operative 24/7, and given more personnel and resources. It was also made responsible for a new Civil Situation Centre (CSC) with designated office facilities and technical equipment; set up to monitor incidents, crises and exercises within the civil sector. After 22 July, it reported directly to the Secretary-General within the Ministry, and from 2013 it was placed within the new Department of Crisis Management and Security. The Support Unit was also given the role of being a permanent secretariat to the Government Emergency Management Council.

Eleven months after the terrorist attack, shortly before the report from the Commission was ready, the government presented a white paper on internal security (St. meld. 29, 2011–2012). It did not suggest any fundamental changes, but proposed initiatives to strengthen the Ministry's role as a coordinator and driving force within the area. One measure was the introduction of a general principle of cooperation. The principle had been a core strategy for involving private and civil sector organizations in emergency preparedness and crisis management for a long time, but was now (re-)introduced to enhance transboundary coordination within central government. However, it is difficult to ascertain what this means in practice. Somewhat paradoxically, according to the white paper, it would not change existing responsibility relations, or alter the principle of ministerial responsibility (St. meld. 29, 2011–2012: 40). The white paper underscores that (St. meld. 29, 2011–2012: 51):

The single agency is still responsible for crisis management within its own portfolio, and the primary line of reporting is still to the superior responsible ministry and from there onwards to the lead ministry … The coordination role (of the MJ) does not trump the professional auditing or responsibility that belongs to the respective line ministries and their subordinate agencies.

Thus, there is still a need to clarify the coordination responsibilities of the MJ and the steering instruments and instruction rights of the DCP.

A new coordination resolution was launched in 2012 to clarify the Ministry's role (Kgl. res. 15 June 2012). It recognized the MJ's lead role in civil national crises and urged a strengthening of its supervision of other ministries' responsibilities, the introduction of more management-by-objectives-and-results, and a stronger training and exercise regime. The resolution established that the MJ should take the lead in all national crises unless decided otherwise and emphasized the importance of an enhanced focus on auditing. Nevertheless, these changes did not alter the fundamental principles of ministerial responsibility (Kgl.res 15 June 2012):

Appointing a lead ministry does not imply any changes in constitutional responsibility and all ministries keep their responsibility and decision-making power within their respective task portfolios.

A new white paper was presented in 2013 (St. meld. 21, 2012–2013). It emphasized the importance of changing the leadership philosophy, culture and attitudes. In terms of organization, the white paper encouraged minor shifts rather than major changes. The MJ's coordinating and encouraging role, its supervision of subordinate units and its crisis management capacity was to be strengthened, but largely within the existing organizational structure. The issue of coordination was addressed in more general terms, and the dilemma concerning the principle of responsibility and the ministerial rule was not discussed. The white paper underscored that the main responsibility for implementing coordination was with each individual ministry, department or unit. This implied ‘having an active and aware relation to mutual dependencies and which actors one should cooperate with’ (St. meld. 21, 2012–2013: 120).

To sum up, the MJ's coordination responsibilities are still unclear. The intention to strengthen horizontal coordination is there, but the chosen instruments seem ambiguous and contested. Some formal organizational changes have been made but the main approach seems to follow the Commission's suggestions to change culture and attitudes rather than organization.

Instrumental and cultural interpretations

How can we understand this development of internal security measures? According to an instrumental perspective, formal organization and plans matter. Here, emergency preparedness and crisis management are seen as a process of deliberate and strategic choices. When the terrorist attacks hit Norway, however, the established command structures and plans were only followed to a limited extent. Improvisation and chance was crucial, and unfortunate and unforeseen situations hindered optimal crisis management. Consequently, the response cannot be seen as the result of a coherent, planned and coordinated procedure. This is not atypical for crisis management (Czarniawska, 2009). On the contrary, crisis and risk management typically take place under uncertain and ambiguous conditions (Boin, 2008; Head, 2008). In these situations, the prevalence of rational choices characterized by clear, stable and consistent goals, a fair understanding of available goals and means, and an apparent center of authority and power, is not realistic. Flexible political and administrative coordination based on institutionally fixed rules, routines and roles may be a reasonable alternative to calculated planning (Olsen, 1997). The Norwegian crisis response thus demonstrates the limitations of planning, corresponding to what Boin (2008) has labeled ‘the planning syndrome’: Plans may work well in predictable and routine events, but in crisis situations characterized by deep uncertainty and urgency, they often prove inadequate.

Another problem was the paralyzing quest for more information, which is crucial for making sense of events and deciding what to do. This is a typical challenge in crises (Boin et al., 2005). Central actors are reluctant to make crucial decisions unless they have a complete picture of the situation, but facts tend to be in short supply and are often uncertain or inaccurate. On 22 July, information was based on multiple sources, but was quickly outdated and had to go through many levels of authorization before it reached central decision-makers. The result was a conflicting and confusing picture.

The terrorist attacks further revealed leadership challenges and severe capacity, communication and coordination problems. This supports our claim that internal security is a ‘wicked problem’ transcending organizational and sectoral areas. Serious vertical and horizontal coordination problems became apparent, between central and local authorities, between ministries and agencies, and within and between ministries. We have illustrated this by examining two cases -- that of the failed implementation of the Security project and the ambiguous responsibilities and powers of the main government authorities in the field.

The Norwegian example illustrates that internal security is a policy area that has to fight for sufficient attention and resources. It is normally hard to obtain adequate resources to prevent crises, and often easier to get access to resources after a crisis. Budget allocations in the aftermath of the attacks clearly demonstrate this. In the state budget for 2012 there was a significant increase in the budget for internal security and the police.

Structural arrangements within the central government apparatus in Norway constrain external horizontal coordination. The primary structures, based on hierarchy and specialization by purpose and tasks, and the principle of ministerial and constitutional responsibility, enable vertical coordination within distinct policy areas, but put strong constraints on horizontal coordination across ministerial areas. The constraints on horizontal coordination are enhanced by the existing organizational principles for emergency preparedness and crisis management. This lack of horizontal coordination is especially critical in the face of wicked problems that cut across the boundaries of organizations, ministerial areas and administrative levels.

Coordination problems within the field are largely met by applying secondary structures based on collegial bodies, boards, councils, networks, informal areas and collaborative arrangements. Such supplementary arrangements often work in the shadow of hierarchy, and challenge existing organizational forms. Normally they lack resources, capacity, authority and strong steering instruments, however. They are often temporary and without a clear mandate. They are aimed at handling problems surfacing between organizations, and designed to avoid negative coordination and move towards positive coordination. Through them, not only hierarchy but also negotiations matter. Political conflicts over ideas and underlying assumptions of policy issues in this field are important for motivating change (Peters et al., 2005). Thus it seems that the lead organization approach is constrained by actors with their own interests and authority.

A cultural perspective would predict emergency preparedness and crisis response according to the established institutional culture. Our analysis has shown that the response from the Norwegian government and the MJ after the crisis seems to be very much in line with the existing historical path of organizing for emergency preparedness and crisis management. The institutionalized tradition of separate ministerial responsibility continues to stand strong within the Norwegian polity. This constrains efforts to strengthen horizontal coordination. Thus far, there have been only minor organizational changes, in line with the previous cautious approach. The Commission's report pointed out a number of areas for improvement, but did not propose any major organizational restructuring.

Our analysis indicates that established arrangements and institutions are infused with values, identities, traditions, culture and established routines and rules (Selznick, 1957) and that these features have a significant influence on emergency preparedness and crisis management. The relevant institutions and the civil servants who work in them do not easily adjust to changing external pressure or to shifting signals from political executives. Thus, path-dependent processes and political and institutional conflicts characterize the policy area (Peters et al., 2005). At the same time, this is a policy area that often does not get attention from politicians unless there is a major crisis. Thus, political conflicts tend to play out within the institutional structures and among civil servants who defend their institutional territory.

In line with the concept of bounded rationality, the executives in these organizations seem more preoccupied with minimizing decision-making costs than with maximizing goal attainment. The consequence of such behavior favors the status quo and actors search for solutions close to previous ones (Cyert and March, 1963). New organizational solutions have to pass a cultural compatibility test, and tend to choose solutions that do not break fundamentally with existing arrangements (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). Previous decisions represent an administrative policy heritage that constrains choices at a later stage. Embedded institutional arrangements, such as the principle of ministerial responsibility, therefore constrain possible future administrative arrangements. The principle of ministerial responsibility has produced strong line ministries that defend their portfolio from external intruders. At the same time the MJ has had only little discretion and enforcement authority. This indicates a change process characterized by strong veto players (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The interpretational leeway concerning the Ministry's role as a coordinator and driving force has only been exploited to a small extent. The MJ seems to have had a more relaxed approach to the policy field, interpreting its mandate rather narrowly. The result is institutional change characterized by layering, where new, but cautious, organizational arrangements have been added to existing ones. Whether the changes after 22 July will leave the Ministry with more discretion, more enforcement power and stronger steering instruments, thereby moving away from the previous arrangements, remains to be seen.

Conclusion

Our analysis reveals a strong consensus in the diagnosis of the problems within the policy area of emergency preparedness and crisis management in Norway. These are broadly identified as fragmentation, accountability pulverization and weak coordination. At the same time, the suggested solutions are beset with ambiguity and conflicts, and there is a mismatch between problems and available solutions. The organizational changes have been cautious and incremental, in spite of the serious external shock, following a typical pattern. We have observed a reluctant and gradual upgrading of the MJ as an overarching coordinating and lead ministry, a development that does not challenge the fundamental principles of ministerial and constitutional responsibility.

A main conclusion is that organizing for emergency preparedness and crisis management is to a great extent path-dependent (Krasner, 1988; Selznick, 1957). Established governance doctrines such as ministerial and constitutional responsibility constrain which organizational solutions are possible, even after a serious terrorist attack that revealed significant shortcomings in the existing organizational arrangements. The solution has thus far been sought in efforts to combine coordination through hierarchy with coordination through network arrangements, collegial bodies and councils and the principle of collaboration. The principle of responsibility, contributing to the rather fragmented structure, still dominates. A major challenge is to render the principle of collaboration enough authority to avoid it becoming a non-binding symbolic tool. Providing the MJ with more authority and powers to encourage more risk awareness and coordinated behavior in crisis situations would be one way to ensure this, although resistance from the authorities involved would be expected.

Our case illustrates that major reorganizations are difficult, even in situations where significant problems are understood and agreed upon. Specialization is necessary to secure essential experience, knowledge and expertise, as well as singular responsibilities and tasks. This, on the other hand, means that coordination is a perpetual challenge. Our analysis shows that coordinating measures are mainly introduced in response to certain problems perceived by key politico-administrative actors and generally not resulting from systematic analyses of existing structural arrangements. Their success, or whether they are implemented at all, largely depends on the urgency of the matter and on the resources of those who want to implement new measures. Even in the face of major crises, significant changes are difficult to carry through. The choice of new coordination arrangements seems to happen in a rather ad hoc and pragmatic way – often as a result of failed crisis management. Existing institutional structures, established roles and relations between the different actors and organizations related to resources and inherited authority have a strong influence on the way new arrangements emerge, develop and function.

The relationship between the MJ and other stakeholders seems largely to be characterized by ‘negative coordination’, limited to oversight over areas where other line ministries have no specific responsibility. Follow-up and initiative have been neglected, and the Ministry seems equipped with weak steering instruments and ineffective instruction tools, making it difficult to overrule the line ministries. The main challenges concern matching place-based problems with functionally organized services, balancing the internal security mission with existing missions that remain important, and to meet citizens’ expectations in a fragmented system. These challenges demand a new system of contingent coordination that flexibly develops and matches government's capacity to handle new and unpredictable crises and situations with high impact but low probability (Kettl, 2003). Thus far, coordination by hierarchy has taken priority, although it is increasingly supplemented by coordination through network arrangements.

The response to the terrorist attack in Norway was characterized by complex interactions between mutually influential factors. The external shock had a profound impact on all actors. At the same time, institutional and contextual constraints seem to be a central dimension for understanding the outcome so far. The response was, to a large extent, shaped by established organizational arrangements, doctrines and principles constraining central leaders' scope for action. Deliberate political action was important, but has not resulted in any major changes. Furthermore, the process and outcome cannot be characterized as a result of rational planning alone, but has clear negotiation-based features revealed through elements of conflict and compromise in line with a negotiation-based version of the instrumental perspective.

The policy area of emergency preparedness and crisis management is indeed a wicked problem that transcends the boundaries of organizations, policy areas and administrative levels. From our perspective, it seems that there is more room for further systematic knowledge about how to organize for handling such challenges in order to reduce some of the apparent ‘wickedness’. Understanding and recognizing the legacy and established roles, codes and practices that exist within the structure instead of relying on more limited rational-technical solutions alone, seems a fertile route. Exceptional events, such as disasters, may require new types of policy response.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The research leading to these results was funded partly by the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 266887 (Project COCOPS), Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities.

Tom Christensen is Professor of Public Administration and Policy at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, and also senior researcher at the Uni Research Rokkan Centre, Bergen and Adjunct Professor at the City University of Hong Kong. His current research interests deals with comparative public sector reforms, in particular accountability questions, in policy areas such as welfare, immigration, university governance, hospitals, policy, security management. Among his recent publications are: The Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management (2012), co-edited with P. Lægreid; ‘Global ideas and modern public sector reforms: A theoretical elaboration and empirical discussion of a neoinstitutional theory’, American Review of Public Administration 42(6): 635–653 (2012), and ‘New Public Management and beyond – the hybridization of public sector reforms’, in G. Drori, M. Høllerer and P. Walgenback (eds) Global Themes and Local Variations in Organization and Management: Perspectives on Glocalization (Routledge, 2013)

Per Lægreid is Professor at the Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen and senior researcher at the Uni Research Rokkan Centre, Bergen. His research interests include studies of public administration from a broad institutional perspective combining political science and organizational studies, in particular studies of institutional changes in central government organizations, democratic governance, administrative reform, welfare state reforms, internal security and crisis management and administrative policy in a domestic and comparative perspective. His recent publications include Organizing for Coordination in the Public Sector (edited with K. Sarapuu, L.H. Rykkja and T. Randma-Liiv) (Palgrave Macmillan 2014), Government Agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries (edited with K. Verhoest, S. van Thiel and G. Bouckaert) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and The Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management (edited with T. Christensen) (2012) and articles in Governance, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, International Review of Administrative Sciences and Public Organization Review.

Lise H. Rykkja is post doc at the University of Bergen, Department of Administration and Organization Theory and senior researcher at the Uni Research Rokkan Centre. Her research concentrates on the development of public administration, governance and public policies, oriented towards the organization of internal security and crisis management within the public sector. Her recent publications include Organizing for Coordination in the Public Sector (edited with K. Sarapuu, P. L妲eid and T. Randma-Liiv) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) ‘After Oslo and Utøya: A shift in the balance between security and liberty in Norway?’, with A.L. Fimreite, P. Lango and P. Lægreid, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36: 839–856 (2013), and ‘After a terrorist attack – challenges for political and administrative leadership in Norway’, with T. Christensen and P. Lægreid, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 21: 167–177 (2013).

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