Cutback management literature in the 1970s and 1980s: taking stock

Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to take stock of the literature on public sector cutback management in the 1970s and the 1980s, with a specific focus on cutback strategies and the contents of cutbacks. Both theoretical and empirical studies, focusing either on the central or local government level or different policy fields, have been reviewed. The study shows that when governments face cutbacks, they need to address the fundamental choice between across-the-board and targeted cutback strategies. Cutbacks do not occur as one-off single actions but are usually carried out in a number of cutback rounds. The longer-lasting and the more severe is fiscal stress, the more likely it is that the governments will start imposing targeted cuts rather than implementing across-the-board strategies. Looking at the patterns of cutback management in the past is expected to provide useful insights for systematizing the approaches to cutback management and for researching the current crisis.

Points for practitioners

This article provides an overview of cutback management practices in the 1970s and the 1980s with the expectation that it will contribute to addressing the current fiscal crisis. The pros and cons of targeted versus across-the-board cutback strategies are discussed. The article also looks at various cutback measures including operational cuts (hiring freeze, pay freeze, lay-offs), programme and capital cuts. The study shows that the longer-lasting and the more severe the fiscal stress, the more likely it is that the governments will begin to impose targeted rather than across-the-board cuts. It is found that personnel costs are cut rather reluctantly, and hiring freeze is a dominant measure compared to salary cuts or lay-offs.

Keywords

budgeting crisis decision-making cutback management fiscal crisis retrenchment

Introduction

In light of the large-scale impact that a fiscal crisis can have on government and society, it is somewhat surprising how little systematic analysis one can find in the scholarly literature of public administration on the topic of cutback management. As Dunsire and Hood (1989: 1) put it: ‘a great deal of academic thought has been given to explaining the problem of government growth, but there has been no comparable attention to explaining how the difficulties of cutting back government might best be approached …’. Still, despite the relative lack of systematic research on the topic, there is by now a sufficient body of studies dealing with cutback management to provide input for some stock-taking.

All in all, the existing public administration literature on cutback management falls into three categories – studies on cutback management of the late 1970s and 1980s, contemporary public administration literature on managing austerity, and generic management research on organizational decline (Bozeman, 2010; Cepiku and Savignon, 2012). The cutback management literature in public administration began with the seminal article by Levine (1978), followed by a surge of publications dealing with the topic. The public administration scholarship on cutbacks ‘reached its zenith in the early 1980s’ but then vanished (Bozeman, 2010: 558) to rise again with the recession of the early 2000s, followed by a major spurt of cutback management research in the post-2008 fiscal environment. The contemporary public administration literature on managing austerity is diverse, being especially rich in studies labelled ‘preliminary’ and ‘paving the way for more elaborate theorizing’ (e.g. Lodge and Hood, 2012; Peters et al., 2011; Pollitt, 2010). The academic studies on the current crisis show that up to now, government responses to the crisis have been divergent (see Bideleux, 2011; Kickert, 2012; Lodge and Hood, 2012; Peters, 2011; Peters et al., 2011; Pollitt, 2010).

The main purpose of this article is to take stock of the literature on public sector cutback management in the 1970s and the 1980s. A few prominent authors (Bozeman, 2010; Pandey, 2010) have already found it useful to look back at that era; however, their focus has been different from this study. While Pandey (2010) focused on the paradox of publicness in cutback management, and Bozeman studied the (ir)relevance of generic decline literature, in this article the focus is on managing expenditure cuts. In fact, in the cutback management literature of the 1970s and 1980s, various approaches for coping with fiscal crisis have been put forth. The most general taxonomy points to the choice between revenue increases, productivity enhancements and expenditure cuts (see, e.g. Higgins, 1984; Levine et al., 1982; Morgan and Pammer, 1988; Pammer, 1990; Weinberg, 1984). This particular article will focus on the decisions that are made after the decision has been made to consolidate and to use expenditure cuts for that purpose. We narrow our focus to an in-depth study of cutbacks because these have the clearest bearing on ‘cutback management’ (which, by definition, entails ‘cuts’), and space limitations would not allow us to thoroughly explore all possible consolidation options. More specifically, the review at hand focuses on cutback strategies and contents of cutbacks because these pertain to the most basic choices public organizations have to face when cutting expenditure. The delineation used in this article of the various cutback strategies and measures can contribute to the systematization of existing approaches to cutback management.

In addition, this article is distinguished from similar work because it draws a line between normative discussions and empirical studies. Whereas previous articles on the cutbacks in the 1970s and 1980s have only referred to occasional empirical evidence, this study aims to provide a thorough overview and systematization of the empirical findings from the previous era of fiscal stress. Looking back at almost two decades of cutbacks also allows us to explore the dynamics of specific cutback strategies over a longer time period than studying the contemporary crisis would allow.

To compile the review, the search words ‘cutback management’, ‘managing cutbacks’ and related terms (e.g. fiscal crisis, fiscal stress management, retrenchment) were used to identify the relevant studies. In addition, all the reference lists of the studies found were examined to ensure that all relevant academic studies examining cutbacks would be included in the review. The focus was primarily on the academic literature in the scholarly field of public administration and on those studies that dealt with cutback strategies and contents of cutbacks. In order to keep the overview of the literature sufficiently focused, the studies on cutback management, undertaken in the related fields of social work, higher education and health care management and in the more generally oriented organizational decline literature, were not included in this article. Also, the studies from the literatures of political economy and welfare state retrenchment were left out for three reasons. First, literature reviews on the political economy of welfare state retrenchment have already been undertaken (e.g. Starke, 2006) and the politics of austerity has been extensively discussed, for example, by Posner and Sommerfeld (2013). Second, many studies in these fields do not deal with issues directly connected with managing cutbacks. And third, including studies from these streams of literature would have made the scope of the literature review too broad.

Both theoretical and empirical studies addressing either the national, state and local government level were made use of. In total, 60 studies are covered in this review (43 of which are empirical articles). The cut-off year for including the studies was 1990, although a few studies that specifically analyse the cutbacks in the 1970s and 1980s were included (e.g. Berne and Stiefel, 1993; Braun et al., 1993). The review is not restricted to any particular country or group of countries. However, it should be noted that most of the empirical studies on cutback management have been written about the US (especially about US local governments) and the UK. Substantially fewer studies of the 1970s and the 1980s address the other OECD countries. The Appendix provides a summary of the empirical studies that are covered in this article.

The literature review proceeds as follows. First, the general cutback strategies are outlined and the main characteristics of the two main strategies – across-the-board and targeted cuts – discussed. Thereafter, the contents of cutbacks are addressed more specifically. Throughout the article, theoretical conjectures and empirical findings are presented hand in hand.

Cutback strategies

Across-the-board versus targeted cuts

In the literature on cutback budgeting and cutback management, a number of categorizations of cutback strategies have been put forth. However, the most basic distinction that emerges from this literature is the distinction between across-the-board and targeted cuts: across-the-board measures refer to cuts in equal amounts or percentages for all institutions, while targeted cuts imply that some institutions and sectors face a larger cut than others.

This dichotomy has been labelled in various ways. The across-the-board tactic has also been called ‘decrementalism’ (e.g. Levine, 1985; Levine et al., 1981a), ‘equal misery’ approach (Hood and Wright, 1981), ‘cheese-slicing’ (Tarschys, 1985), ‘lawn-mowing’ (Banner, 1985) and ‘pro rata cuts’ (Wolman, 1983). The ‘targeted’ or ‘selective’ cuts approach has been conceived of as involving an array of possible tactics, ranging from ‘strategic prioritization’ and ‘managerial’ to ‘ad hoc’ or even ‘random’ (or garbage can) cuts (see, e.g. Behn, 1980; Hendrick, 1989; Levine, 1978, 1979).

It is important to keep in mind that these two cutback strategies can be applied at either macro (or national policy) level (e.g. when the cutback decisions are made by the cabinet of ministers) or at the organizational level (i.e. within the individual ministries or agencies). Selective cuts at the national policy level imply political prioritization between different institutions and/or policy fields, while targeted cuts at the organizational level entail decisions concerning the distribution of cuts between the subunits and the services provided by the organization. At the organizational level, one can distinguish between strategic and managerial approaches when applying the targeted cuts. Strategic response to fiscal stress could mean, for example, that, keeping in mind the organization’s mission, low-priority programmes would be cut more than high-priority programmes (Levine, 1985: 691; Levine and Rubin, 1980: 15). In the managerial approach, the cuts are also selective, but instead of using comprehensive and rational analysis for making the cuts, the officials use ‘programmatic criteria related to mandatory and non-mandatory expenditures to determine requests and appropriations’ (Hendrick, 1989: 30).

Normative discussion: advantages and disadvantages of across-the-boad versus targeted cuts

In normative discussions about how to proceed the cutbacks, two lines of argument can be found. Most call for more rational approaches (see, e.g. Levine, 1985; McTighe, 1979) implying the making of cutbacks on the basis of comprehensive analysis and strategic prioritization, while some – out of pragmatic considerations – argue that ‘rational’ approaches may not necessarily be the most feasible option in the midst of a fiscal crisis and hence decremental approaches could be more advisable. Indeed, as Hood and Wright (1981: 203) put it, ‘The equal misery approach may have a very strong element of rationality about it.’ In the following we give a brief overview of the advantages and disadvantages of the decremental or across-the-board approach to making cutbacks. The mirror images of these arguments can be viewed as cons and pros of targeted cuts.

The main advantages of decrementalism (entailing across-the-board cuts) are the following: (1) it reduces decision-making costs; (2) it minimizes conflict and (3) it is perceived as being equitable (Banner 1985; Biller, 1980; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Hood and Wright, 1981; Levine, 1978, 1979; Schick, 1983; Tarschys, 1985). First, across-the-board cuts do not require extensive ex ante analysis for identifying the expenditure categories that will be cut (Hood and Wright, 1981: 204; Levine, 1978: 320). Thus, such cuts can be imposed quickly and relatively ‘easily’ (Banner, 1985; Hood and Wright, 1981; Schick, 1988). Further, because of the nature of the public sector, comprehensive analysis for identifying the objects of cuts can be complicated. As Levine (1978: 320) notes, targeted cuts ‘involve costly triage analysis because the distribution of pain and inconvenience requires that the value of people and subunits to the organization have to be weighed in terms of their expected future contributions’. This is all the more difficult because ‘in government there is substantial complexity, uncertainty, and differences of opinion about means and ends that convert into disagreements about priorities’ (Levine, 1984: 252). Second, the decremental approach minimizes conflicts (at both the macro and micro levels) since it avoids ‘specifying the victims’ or ‘stigmatization’ of specific programmes (Hanushek, 1986; Hood and Wright, 1981: 206; Schick, 1983; Tarschys, 1985: 40). As Schick (1988: 528) explains, selective cuts based on strategic prioritization assume systematic evaluation of the existing programmes but ‘evaluations stir up conflict at the time that government officials desperately need support for the tough choices they face. Budget targets and ceilings mask the programmatic impacts of cuts; review and evaluation highlight these consequences.’ Third, the ‘equal misery’ entailed in decremental cuts makes them seem equitable – at both the macro and micro levels – and enables the ‘cutters’ to appeal to ‘common sense ideals of justice’ (Levine, 1978: 320) and hence increase the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the cuts (Banner, 1985; Biller, 1980; Hanushek, 1986; Schick, 1983; Tarschys, 1985). Further, ‘sharing the pain’ implied by across-the-board cuts may even ‘integrate’ (Biller, 1980: 607) and ‘help to maintain morale’, ‘build a good team spirit’ (Levine, 1979: 182) and unify the members of the organizations (Hood and Wright, 1981: 206).

Despite its apparent advantages, the decremental approach has also been extensively criticized in the literature on cutback budgeting and cutback management. Specifically, the main drawbacks of across-the-board cuts are considered to be the following: (1) such cuts may not reflect the public needs and preferences; and (2) may penalize efficient organizations; further, they (3) may ignore varying needs of different units and (4) lead to a decline in service levels and quality. First, as Levine (1985: 692) puts it, ‘decrementalism at the margins of units and programs does not reflect a realistic assessment of public needs and preferences for services’. Banner (1985: 55) also notes that across-the-board cuts do not take into account ‘differences in the importance and urgency of tasks of the various administrative areas’. In other words, across-the-board cuts would be a reasonable response only if ‘the present budget reflects perfectly the community’s desired mix of government services’ (Lewis and Logalbo, 1980: 186) and the initial allocation of spending is ‘optimal’ (Hanushek, 1986: 9) which may not always be the case (Tarschys, 1985). Second, a serious shortcoming of across-the-board cuts is that they are likely to penalize more efficient organizations, units and individuals, because ‘they will be forced to make much tougher decisions about who, what, and how cuts will be distributed’ (Levine, 1979: 181). Third, across-the-board cuts can be ‘insensitive to the needs, production functions, and contributions of different units’. Indeed, such cuts may have differential impacts on units with different sizes and different levels of specialization. As Levine (1978: 322) argues, across-the-board cuts may not be ‘felt’ by large unspecialized units, but for small specialized units, across-the-board cuts may prove ‘immobilizing’. Finally, Levine (1985: 692, 697) points out that the problems caused by decrementalism may accumulate and lead to declining service levels and service quality or even to ‘general service default’. Indeed, beyond a certain threshold, across-the-board cuts may lead to effects or unforeseen impacts on organizational performance. Behn (1980: 615) argues that when ‘across-the-board cuts exceed a certain threshold (i.e. the point where organizational slack can be used to absorb the cuts without reducing output significantly), a budgetary cutback of Y percent will reduce production by more than Y percent’. Put more generally, as Levine (1978: 317) argues, ‘organizations cannot be cut back by merely reversing the sequence of activity and resource allocation by which their parts were originally assembled. … Therefore, to attempt to disaggregate and cut back on one element of such an intricate and delicate political and organization arrangement may jeopardize the functioning and equilibrium of an entire organization.’

In light of these drawbacks, Behn (1980: 617) puts it rather strongly when he states, ‘During retrenchment, ad hoc decision making, which is responsive only to crises and pressures, not any overall plan, is dangerous.’ Most other authors are somewhat more pragmatic and argue that decrementalism may be appropriate for dealing with small cuts, whereas achieving deeper cuts necessitates selective cutbacks (Levine, 1984; Schick, 1983: 21). As Schick (1983: 19) observes, small across-the-board cuts usually allow organizations to continue ‘business as usual’. Levine (1984: 252) puts it in more specific terms, when he notes that decrementalism would be ‘probably appropriate when a downturn is in fact cyclical and cuts are not very deep (e.g. 7% or less of the budget in any one year or 15% over a three-year period)’. Beyond this level, however, problems arise and the decremental approaches may take ‘a heavy toll in the effectiveness of organizations.’ (1984: 252)

Which approaches dominate in reality? Theoretical predictions and empirical evidence

Based on the cutback management literature in the 1970s and 1980s, it is possible to point to four theoretical lines of reasoning, each making somewhat different predictions about the choice by the budget actors between across-the-board and targeted strategies. Theories proceeding from the assumption of rational choice by the budget actors predict the making of targeted cuts on the basis of strategic priorities and the performance of the various organizations (in the case of macro-level cuts) and on the basis of the performance of organizational subunits and the programmes they deliver (in the case of cuts within organizations) (Jick and Murray, 1982; Lewis, 1984; Straussman, 1979; Tarschys, 1981). Theories focusing on political behaviour and party politics – dealing with the macro-level cutbacks – predict that cuts would be selective since decision-makers would want to minimize the opposition of the public and interest groups to the cuts and hence focus the cuts on those expenditure areas that hurt them the least (and hence ‘cost’ the least amount of votes) (Downs and Rocke, 1984; Hood et al., 1988; Jick and Murray, 1982; Lewis, 1984; Pammer, 1990; Rubin, 1985; Wolman and Davis, 1980). According to the incrementalist theory of budgeting (see, e.g. Davis et al., 1966; Wildavsky, 1964), which focuses on bureaucratic processes in the context of bounded rationality, the cutbacks would be decremental, essentially taking the form of ‘incrementalism’ in reverse, with cuts amounting to ‘decrements’ from the base. Thus, the incrementalist framework would predict that among cutback strategies, the use of across-the-board cuts would prevail (Downs and Rocke, 1984; Lewis, 1984; Schick, 1983). Theoretical approaches focusing on managerial behaviour (at the organizational level) argue that across-the-board cuts would be difficult because significant portions of the budget entail mandatory expenditures; thus, decision-makers would make cuts to those areas where expenditures are controllable (Downs and Rocke, 1984; Pammer, 1990). More specific predictions have been made by authors who discuss the systematic links between environmental factors (like the severity and duration of fiscal stress) and cutback tactics chosen; these will be reviewed in the following section.

With regard to the question of which of these two general cutback tactics – across-the-board or targeted approaches – dominate in reality, the existing empirical studies of the 1970s and the 1980s offer rather mixed evidence. Table 1 provides an overview of the empirical studies that have examined this question. As can be seen from the table, there are a number of studies that point to the dominance of across-the-board cuts (at different levels of government). The predominance of targeted cuts has only been observed by three studies (and all of them deal with local governments). The majority of the empirical studies find that a mix of the two strategies has been used in cutback management. The prevalence of the ‘mixed’ strategy can reflect a number of different issues. First, as will be discussed below, different ‘rounds’ of cutbacks can be characterized by different strategies. Second, the cuts to different expenditure categories can follow different strategies: for example, across-the-board cuts are more likely to be used in the case of operational expenditures, whereas transfers would be subjected to more selective cuts. Third, while cuts can be undertaken as ‘across-the-board’ at the most general level (e.g. for ministries, departments or agencies), the effects of translating them into actual cuts within organizations may be more targeted and selective.

Table 1.

Prevalence of across-the-board vs targeted cutbacks: findings of empirical studies

	Predominantly across-the-board cuts	Predominantly targeted cuts	Mix of across-the-board and targeted cuts
Local government	Banner (1985) Levine (1985) Lewis (1984)	Downs and Rocke (1984) Lewis (1988) Koven (1985)	Hendrick (1989) Higgins (1984) Glassberg (1978) Levine et al. (1981a) Levine et al. (1981b) Levine et al. (1982) MacManus and Pammer (1990) Morgan and Pammer (1988) Pammer (1990) Rickards (1984) Wolman and Davis (1980) Wolman (1983)
Sub-national state-level government	Braun et al. (1993)		Caiden and Chapman (1982) Duncombe and Kinney (1984)
National-level government	Schick (1983) Schick (1988)		Hartley (1981) Dunsire and Hood (1989) Tarschys (1986)

Factors influencing cutback strategies

A number of studies in the cutback management literature also discuss the factors that are likely to influence the general cutback strategy (i.e. across-the-board vs targeted) chosen by the decision-makers.

Two factors that have received extensive attention are: the duration and severity of fiscal stress on the cutback decisions taken by decision-makers (at both the macro and micro levels). It is conjectured that the longer-lasting and the more severe the fiscal stress is, the more likely it is that the authorities will begin to impose targeted cuts (rather than implementing the across-the-board approach) (Banner, 1985; Levine, 1979, 1985; Levine et al., 1981a, 1981b, 1982; Wright, 1981). Levine (1979: 182) argues that at the beginning of the austerity, across-the-board cuts are more likely (as the ‘sharing the pain’ option is likely to be perceived as more equitable and hence to generate less conflict and resistance), but if these measures are not sufficient, more targeted cuts on the basis of prioritization will be adopted (see also Hood and Wright, 1981; Pammer, 1990). Similarly, in their ‘administrative response model’ of cutback budgeting, Levine et al. (1981a, 1981b) predict that governments would respond to fiscal stress in a systematic way, depending on the duration and severity of the fiscal stress. They conjecture that in the initial phases of revenue decline, the cutbacks would be decremental, but the larger and longer-lasting the revenue declines are, the more likely the adoption of targeted cuts becomes.

The existing empirical studies point to mixed evidence with regard to the systematic relations between factors such as the duration and severity of the fiscal stress and the specific cutback tactics chosen. Several studies (e.g. Glassberg, 1978; Hartley, 1981; Higgins, 1984; Levine, 1985; Levine et al., 1981a, 1981b, 1982; Tarschys, 1986; Wolman, 1983; Wolman and Davis, 1980) do find evidence of the shift from across-the-board to targeted measures as the fiscal stress deepens. Some studies, however, have found no evidence on the systematic impact of the length and severity of the fiscal stress on the cutback measures chosen (e.g. Downs and Rocke, 1984; Pammer, 1990).

In addition to the fiscal factors that are likely to influence the choice between decremental or selective cutback strategies, there are also a number of organizational features that may influence this choice at the micro level. Glassberg (1978), for example, argues that in organizations with more fixed tasks, decremental strategies are likely to dominate, whereas those with more flexible tasks would be able to opt for more targeted cuts. As he explains, the cutback strategy chosen in an organization would depend on the leadership style that emerges in the organization during fiscal stress. He conjectures that ‘cut the fat tough guy’-type leadership (focused on cutting overhead costs and constraining labour costs) is more likely to emerge in organizations with fixed functions, whereas ‘revitalizing entrepreneur’-type leadership (which seeks to ‘redirect the organization into a narrower scope of activity, hoping to create a new equilibrium between resources and costs’) is more likely to emerge in organizations with flexible functions. Levine (1985: 695) argues that the ability of the departments and agencies to undertake more strategic approaches depends on their strategic capacities, including, for example, financial forecasting, cost accounting and planning capacity. Levine et al. (1981a, 1981b, 1982) note that authorities with more centralized and less politicized decision-making are better able to impose targeted cuts. Pammer (1990) has also pointed to the ‘administrative sophistication’ as an explanatory variable behind the choice of cutback strategies. McTighe (1979: 89) argues that ‘rational’ approaches to cutback budgeting and management would be hampered by the following factors: decentralization of an organization, an unclear mission, contentious politics and a strong clientele.

Contents of cutbacks

The fundamental question of cutback management is the contents of cutbacks: what should be cut. This issue is addressed in the following section by looking at different cutback measures, their corresponding advantages and disadvantages and surveying the prevalence of these cuts in different expenditure categories (and within personnel costs in more detail) as portrayed in the cutback management literature. Because of space limitations, the review below is confined to the ‘functional’ categorization of cutback measures (and does not thus include ‘sectoral’ categorization).

Main cutback measures

The cutback management literature is rich in depicting different measures for dealing with reduced public sector resources and cutting public expenditures. For a systematic overview we classify the different measures in three categories as follows: (1) measures for cutting operational expenditure (running costs); (2) measures for cutting programmes (i.e. cuts to transfers and public services) and (3) measures for cutting capital expenditure (investment) (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Main cutback measures

Category	Measure
Operational expenditure
Personnel costs Non-personnel costs	Reduced overtime or working time
	Slowing-down of promotion
	Early retirement
	Wage freeze
	Reduction in the rate of salary increase
	Reduction or elimination of fringe benefits and bonuses
	Filling positions with less qualified, lower-paid staff
	Reducing pay grades of vacated job lots
	Salary cuts
	Reshuffling of staff (e.g. making increased use of temporary staff)
	Furloughs
	Hiring freeze
	Lay-offs
	Spending limits and bans on utilities, supplies, equipment, travel, communications, etc.
Programme expenditure
	Cut service provision
	Shorten the reception time, limit service hours
	Reduce the frequency of service provision, reduce the number of service outlets
	Reduce the quality requirements for service provision
	Programme termination
	Engage voluntary, part-time and third-party counterparts in service provision
	Reduce transfers
	Change indexation rules for entitlement programmes
	Shift part of the entitlement costs to the private sector or citizens
Investments/capital expenditure
	Elimination of capital spending
	Capital spending freeze for new capital projects
	Postponement of non-essential capital projects
	Deferral of maintenance, cuts to maintenance spending

Reductions in operational expenditure are commonly categorized by the object of expenditure, distinguishing between personnel and non-personnel expenditure (Wolman and Davis, 1980: 232). The measures for cutting personnel costs can be geared at reducing the number of workers, working time or remuneration. In the literature the measures referred to for cutting personnel expenditure are the following: reduced (over)time; furloughs; wage freeze or reduction in the rate of salary increase; elimination of (merit) bonuses; slowdown or freeze of promotion; salary cuts; filling positions with less qualified, lower-paid staff; reducing pay grades of vacated job lots; early retirement; reshuffling of staff; hiring freeze and lay-offs (Downs and Rocke, 1984; Levine, 1978, 1985; MacManus et al., 1989; Rubin, 1985; Wolman and Davis, 1980).

In the normative discussions on specific cutback measures, the strengths and weaknesses of a hiring freeze and lay-offs have attracted most attention. On the one hand, using hiring freezes to achieve cutbacks has been criticized on several counts. For example, it has been seen as ‘a convenient short-run strategy to buy time and preserve options’ that is neither an efficient nor an equitable cutback measure in the longer run (Levine, 1978: 321; Wright, 1981). Further, it is argued that it hinders the management from making appropriate decisions on where to cut and impedes intelligent long-term planning (Greenhalgh and McKersie, 1980; Levine, 1978: 322). During a hiring freeze, organizations may fall short of critically needed skills and yet be unable to hire people with the necessary skills, because attrition most probably occurs at different rates in various specialties and resignations are most likely among employees with the best opportunities for employment elsewhere (Cayer, 1986). In addition, attrition may punish managers who have already reduced waste compared to managers who have not (Cayer, 1986). On the other hand, Rubin (1980: 169) argues that the advantage of attrition lies in its conflict-mitigating nature that ‘does not stir up too much antipathy between departments and too much resentment against administrators’. Also Dunsire and Hood (1989: 38) see non-replacement as a ‘relatively painless’ method because it avoids redundancies, dismissals, appeals and other attendant procedures.

Diverging assessments have also been made of lay-offs. On the one hand, laying off personnel is seen as a useful tool when the speed of reducing costs is important to the manager (Cayer, 1986). On the other hand, however, Greenhalgh and McKersie (1980: 582) warn that lay-offs have costly side-effects: increase in job insecurity and voluntary quitting, disrupted teamwork, poorer work morale and lower productivity that could lead to a system more costly to operate. Levine (1978) also argues that with lay-offs the state loses substantial investment in human capital (since recruiting and training replacement is costly). Hood and Wright (1981: 211) claim that dismissals cause the loss of youthful talent (vs ‘the old wood’), as low-paid, short-service and younger workers (who are the cheapest to fire) are dismissed first of all. All in all, lay-offs may weaken the organization by damaging the reputation of the public sector and leading to lower-quality job applicants (Greenhalgh and McKersie, 1980). Thus, lay-offs have been viewed ‘only as a last resort measure’ that managers should try to avoid when adjusting the workload (Greenhalgh and McKersie, 1980).

When looking at the non-personnel expenditure and related measures for making cuts to operational expenditure, restricting or banning spending on utilities, supplies, equipment, travel and communication are listed by several authors as possible options for achieving cutbacks (see, e.g. Lewis and Logalbo, 1980; Wolman and Davis, 1980).

Programme measures for achieving cuts include decreases in transfers to the citizens and firms (e.g. entitlements and subsidies), but also changes in expenditure that lead to reduced levels of public services provided (Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Kogan, 1981; Lewis and Logalbo, 1980; Tarschys, 1985). Among the cutback measures that deal with transfers, the options involve straightforward cutbacks in the coverage or size of the entitlement payments, changes to the indexation rules, restrictions to qualification rules, and shifting part of the entitlement costs to the private sector (e.g. making the employers pay part of the sickness fund payments; see, e.g. Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Hood and Wright, 1981: 188, 211; Tarschys, 1985). Cuts to public services can also be achieved via different pathways. On the one hand, the quantity of public services offered can be curbed (and hence the associated costs cut) through ceasing to provide a specific service but also by reducing service hours, decreasing the number of service outlets, diminishing the frequency of service provision, imposing quotas and restricting access (Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Lewis and Logalbo, 1980: 187). On the other hand, the quality of the services offered can be diminished (with corresponding reductions in costs) by reducing the variety of service tasks, fixing the level of quality, and standardizing forms and treatments (Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Lewis and Lobalgo, 1980). In addition, changing the nature of service providers (using part-time, third-party or volunteer counterparts) could be used to achieve cutbacks (Dunsire and Hood, 1989). Lee (1981: 47) also mentions transforming the services required to be provided by law into discretionary services.

Capital expenditure can take drastic forms like elimination of capital spending from the budget, but also softer measures like a spending freeze on new projects, ‘postponing’ nonessential capital projects and cutting or deferring maintenance (Lewis and Logalbo, 1980). In normative discussions, several authors warn against cutting and postponing maintenance as the related future costs might be far in excess of today’s savings and may lead to subsequent and more costly capital acquisition in the long term (Lewis and Logalbo, 1980; McTighe, 1979; Tarschys, 1981).

The main expenditure categories cut: theoretical predictions and empirical evidence

In the cutback management literature of the 1970s and 1980s, one can find a number of competing and contradictory theoretical predictions about which expenditure categories would be cut more and/or first in line during retrenchment.

Some studies, focusing on party politics and political decision-making, conjecture that politicians would generally prefer cuts to operational expenditure over cuts to transfers and services, because cuts to administrative costs are less visible to the public and have fewer vocal opponents (Banner, 1985; Downs and Rocke, 1984; Glennerster, 1981; Lewis and Logalbo, 1980; MacManus et al., 1989). Hood et al. (1988) take a more differentiated stance and hypothesize that left-leaning parties would be less likely to focus cuts on operational expenditure, given that an important share of their voters work in the public sector, whereas right-leaning parties would be more predisposed to cutting operational expenditure (especially wages).

Theories focusing on bureaucratic politics and bureaucratic processes make somewhat contradictory predictions about the prevalence of cuts in different expenditure categories. On the one hand, if bureaucracies are assumed to act in a self- interested way (as assumed by public choice, for example), it can be conjectured that officials would try to protect operational expenditure, especially at the expense of capital spending, and, among operational expenditure, spending on salaries would be cut less than other operational expenditure (Crecine, 1970; Downs and Rocke, 1984; Hood et al., 1988). On the other hand, theories focusing on bureaucratic processes and managerial aspects would predict that cuts would focus on those expenditure categories that are ‘controllable’ and ‘cuttable’ (see, e.g. Downs and Rocke 1984; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Schick, 1980, 1983; Wolman and Davis, 1980). Further, Dunsire and Hood (1989: 93) argue that officials would first apply whatever quick-acting levers of control they could before deploying controls that are slower to take effect. According to these perspectives, the first target of cuts would be capital expenditure and operational expenditure as opposed to spending on transfers, given that these are the types of expenditure that officials have most direct control over and can be implemented most swiftly. Also, these perspectives would predict that measures such as a hiring freeze, reducing pay grades of vacated slots and cuts to capital expenditure and maintenance would be preferred to more drastic measures such as lay-offs (see, e.g. Downs and Rocke, 1984; Wolman, 1983). If cuts to programmes are to be made, the focus would be on discretionary programmes, whereas mandatory programmes would be spared (Downs and Rocke, 1984; Schick, 1980; Wolman and Davis, 1980).

The empirical results of different studies looking at the distribution of cuts among expenditure categories and the sequence of cuts point to diverging results (see Table 3).

Table 3.

The main cutback measures applied: findings of empirical studies

Author	Dominant cutback measures
Berne and Stiefel (1993)	Capital and maintenance expenditure was cut more than operating costs.
Glassberg (1978)	Cuts to capital expenditures and maintenance, cuts to the quality and quantity of services.
Duncombe and Kinney (1984)	Pay cut, elimination of vacant positions, deferral of capital and maintenance expenditure.
Higgins (1984)	Hiring freeze, lay-offs, small reductions in service delivery and some terminations of programmes.
Levine (1985)	Programme termination used more extensively than lay-offs and decreased overtime use.
Levine et al. (1981a, 1981b)	Deferral of capital expenditure and maintenance, reduced overtime, wage freeze, cuts to personnel, use of volunteers in service provision.
MacManus et al. (1989)	Pay cuts, hiring freeze, lay-offs; use of volunteers in service provision.
Marando (1990)	Cuts in operating expenditures, capital expenditures, service levels.
May and Meltsner (1981)	Hiring freeze, attrition, wage freeze, cuts to less visible aspects of service delivery.
MacManus and Pammer (1990)	Cuts to capital expenditure used more frequently than personnel reductions and service reductions.
Morgan and Pammer (1988)	Attrition, reduced expenditures on supply/travel, reduced capital expenditures, hiring freeze, reduced overtime.
Pammer (1990)	Attrition, hiring freeze, reduced overtime.
Schick (1988)	Hiring freeze, attrition, small cuts to transfers.
Weinberg (1984)	Cuts to capital expenditure, cuts to positions, attrition.
Wolman (1983)	Cuts to maintenance spending, attrition, reduced overtime; cuts to operational expenditure preferred to cuts in services
Wolman and Davis (1980)	Cuts in capital and maintenance expenditure; maintaining employment preferred to making cuts to public services.
	Sequence of cutback measures
Caiden and Chapman (1982)	Cuts to capital spending preceded cuts to operational spending and transfers.
Dunsire and Hood (1989: 90–93); Hood and Wright (1981)	Cuts in capital spending were carried out before cuts in current spending.
Dunsire and Hood (1989: 93)	Purchases (of goods and services) were cut before transfers (pensions, grants, benefit payments).
Hood and Wright (1981: 186)	Administrative costs cut first.
Levine et al. (1981a,1981b)	Deferring maintenance and capital expenditure, wage freeze, hiring freeze were followed by cutbacks in personnel, reduced hours of service provision and termination of some programmes.
Levine et al. (1982)	Attrition, delaying maintenance followed by lay-offs and reductions in service levels.
Wolman and Davis (1980)	Workforce was usually reduced in two phases, first hiring freeze and then lay-offs.

There are many studies which demonstrate that capital spending and expenditure on maintenance are the first and/or the predominant target of cuts both at the central government and the state/local level – hence providing evidence for those theoretical arguments that emphasize the ‘controllability’ of expenditure in making the cutbacks (e.g. Berne and Stiefel, 1993; Caiden and Chapman 1982; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Glassberg, 1978; Hood and Wright, 1981; Levine et al., 1981a, 1981b, 1982; Lewis, 1984; MacManus and Pammer, 1990; Marando, 1990; Midwinter and Page, 1981; Wolman, 1983).

With regard to operational expenditure, some studies show that maintaining employment and maintaining salary levels is preferred to maintaining the status quo of public services (Glassberg 1978; Levine, 1985; MacManus and Pammer, 1990; Wolman and Davis, 1980). There are, however, more studies which demonstrate that when cutbacks are made, operational expenditure (including salaries) do bear a significant burden – thus providing evidence against the ‘bureaucratic self-interest’ hypotheses (Banner, 1985; Duncombe and Kinney, 1984; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Hood et al., 1988; Hood and Wright, 1981; Levine et al., 1981a, 1981b, 1982; MacManus et al., 1989; Marando, 1990; Morgan and Pammer, 1988; Weinberg, 1984, Wolman, 1983).

When looking at the cuts within the category of personnel costs, the reviewed literature demonstrates that a hiring freeze has been a very prominent measure for cutting personnel expenditure, and has also been commonly applied as the first remedy during a crisis to achieve cutbacks (Banner, 1985; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Higgins, 1984; Lee, 1981; Levine et al., 1981a, 1981b, 1985; MacManus et al., 1989; May and Meltsner 1981; Morgan and Pammer, 1988; Pammer, 1990; Schick, 1988; Tarschys, 1985; Wolman, 1983; Wolman and Davis, 1980). With regard to salary reductions and lay-offs, the studies point to diverging results, however. A number of studies have found that salary reductions have been enacted only when hiring freeze and lay-offs have not provided sufficient savings (e.g. Berne and Stiefel, 1993; Wolman and Davis, 1980). Lewis (1988), however, observes that in making cutbacks to personnel, lay-offs were more widely used than salary decreases. Hood et al. (1988) find that in the UK context, Labour governments tended to increase staffing levels (but cut wages), whereas the Conservatives focused on cutting staff numbers (but increased wages). Some authors note that lay-offs have been avoided or only been applied as a last resort (Banner, 1985; Hood and Wright 1981; Marando, 1990; Wolman and Davis, 1980), whereas others claim that it has been one of the most prominent methods for budget cutbacks (Lewis, 1988).

Concluding remarks

The review of the studies on cutback management in the 1970s and 1980s shows that although there are no easily discernible rules of thumb, some patterns do emerge, which can contribute to the systematization of the existing knowledge on cutbacks. First, when governments face cutbacks, they need to address the choice between across-the-board and targeted cutback strategies. Second, cutbacks do not occur as one-off single actions, but are usually carried out in a number of cutback rounds. Both cutback strategies and the contents of cutbacks may vary from one round to another. Third, the longer-lasting and the more severe the fiscal stress is, the more likely it is that governments will begin to impose targeted cuts rather than implementing across-the-board strategies. Fourth, during fiscal stress, capital spending tends to be cut first (i.e. before operating costs or transfers). Fifth, personnel costs are more likely to be cut than transfers. Sixth, in cutting operational expenditure, a hiring freeze seems to be the first (and often dominant) measure utilized (rather than salary cuts or lay-offs). Still, it is worth emphasizing that not all empirical studies confirm the above-mentioned patterns and hence one should be cautious when attempting to generalize these findings across space and time.

While systematic comparison of the cutback management literature from the 1970s–80s and the emerging literature on the post-2008 environment is beyond the scope of the current review, we can conjecture that the challenges faced by cutback management nowadays are even more complex than those faced in the 1970s and 1980s – and these challenges should be kept in mind when future studies on cutback management are undertaken. First, because of the highly complex linkages between states, markets and citizens in the contemporary world, the countries are less ‘isolated’ and the role, power and authority of the international institutions regulating the global financial market must be considered more than ever before when managing cutbacks. Second, the nature of contemporary cutback management is more challenging because of ‘cyclical volatility’, characterized by rapid reoccurrence of cycles of decline (vs the ‘normal’ cyclical fluctuations) (Pandey, 2010). Therefore, both the crisis itself and cutback management to deal with it are getting more complex. Third, when compared to the economic recessions in previous decades, many governments have acquired vast new assets in the form of major investments in banks and other financial institutions, implying the need of governments to acquire new capacities to administer these (Lodge and Hood, 2012; Pollitt, 2010). Hence, besides the need to cut back, the contemporary public organizations are saddled with additional tasks when addressing the new responsibilities of government (see, e.g. Dabrowski, 2009; Gieve and Provost, 2012). Finally, numerous authors (Boin et al., 2008; Pollitt, 2010) also draw attention to the fact that the democratic context has dramatically changed over the last few decades. For example, the citizens’ trust in governments has declined (Van de Walle and Jilke, 2012), the role and influence of the mass media has significantly increased, citizens have become more demanding, have ‘little patience for imperfections’ (Boin et al., 2008: 8), and ask for quick and easy solutions (Pandey, 2010: 566).

Another set of questions stems from the dimension of space and concerns the comparability of cutback management between different countries. As the overview of the existing empirical research shows, most of the studies reviewed are single-country cases addressing the US or the UK, which makes it hard to draw broader generalizations. Pollitt (2010: 20) claims that although today all countries face the same storm of fiscal crisis ‘… we are travelling in different kinds of vessels’. This means that the contextual factors that define the depth of the crisis and hence shape the cutback environment are vastly different due to country-specific features. Confirmation for this is also provided by several provisional academic studies demonstrating that up to now the governments’ responses to the crisis have been divergent (see Bideleux, 2011; Kickert, 2012; Peters, 2011; Peters et al., 2011; Pollitt, 2010, 2012). Consequently, when analysing cutback strategies, the specific country context has to be elaborated when undertaking comparative research.

Despite the differences in cutback management across space and time, the literature of the 1970–80s points to some useful insights that deserve particular attention when analysing the current management of cutbacks. In addition to the taxonomies and theoretical propositions outlined above – which can be used as a starting point for undertaking case studies or comparative studies − ongoing and future research on cutback management should keep in mind the main paradoxes brought out by the literature of the 1970s and 1980s. Analyses of how governments address these paradoxes could be especially useful for reaching a deeper understanding of cutback management and also for generating normative recommendations for practice. First, short-term savings during the crisis may lead to long-term costs. As the experience of the 1970s and 1980s cutback literature shows, a number of measures that generate quick short-term savings may bring about significant costs in the future. This is most clearly the case with cuts made to capital spending that may necessitate higher maintenance costs in the future. Consequently, cutback management is likely to require difficult trade-offs between short-term and long-term goals, and between organizational present and future capacity. It is crucial not to limit cutback management to short-term budget cuts but to approach it as the management of the organizational resources for the long term (also including the post-crisis period), as the short-sighted approach may lead to solving the wrong problem or making the current problem even worse (see also Pandey, 2010).

Second, there is an urgent need to make rational decisions during the cutbacks, but meanwhile, the needed resources (time, people, finances) for rational decision-making may not be available. During retrenchment, organizations often fall short on critically needed (new) skills but are at the same time unable to hire (or train) people with these necessary skills. There is a need for high-level expert advice when the best experts can be overburdened and/or demotivated. Hence, the paradox is that when public organizations need the analytical capacity the most, they may not be able to afford it. Thus, although normatively speaking, it would be rational to impose cuts in a systematic and targeted fashion, this tension may lead to pressures to take the simpler route of across-the-board cuts.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 266887 (Project COCOPS), Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities, from the Estonian Science Foundation grant no. 9435, and from the Estonian Research Council IUT-19-13.

Ringa Raudla is Professor of Public Finance and Government at Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia. Her main research interests are fiscal governance, fiscal policy, public budgeting, social insurance, institutional economics, fiscal sociology, institutional economics and constitutional political economy. Her recent publications include articles in Governance, Public Administration, Journal of Public Policy, Policy Studies, European Journal of Law and Economics, Constitutional Political Economy and Europe-Asia Studies.

Riin Savi is Junior Research Fellow at Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia. Her main research interests are comparative public policy, policy transfer and transitional societies and the impact of fiscal crisis on public administration. Her recent publications include articles in Public Administration and Development, and International Journal of Health Planning and Management.

Tiina Randma-Liiv is Professor and Chair of Public Management and Policy at Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia. Her research interests include civil service reforms, transitional administration, small states, coordination and performance management.

Appendix: Empirical studies on cutback management included in the literature review

References

Banner

(1985) Budgetary imbalance and the politics of cutback management in German local government. Local Government Studies 11(4): 43–61.

Behn

(1980) Leadership for cut-back management: The use of corporate strategy. Public Administration Review 40(6): 613–620.

Behn

(1985) Cutback budgeting. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 4(2): 155–177.

Berne

Stiefel

(1993) Cutback budgeting: The long-term consequences. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 12(4): 664–684.

Bideleux

(2011) Contrasting responses to the international economic crisis of 2008–2010 in the 11 CIS countries and in the 10 post-communist EU member countries. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27(3–4): 338–363.

Biller

(1980) Leadership tactics for retrenchment. Public Administration Review 40(6): 604–609.

Boin

Hart

Stern

Sundelius

(2008) The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bozeman

(2010) Hard lessons from hard times: Reconsidering and reorienting the ‘managing decline’ literature. Public Administration Review 42(6): 509–515.

Braun

Johnson

Ley

(1993) State revenue shortfalls: Budget restraints and policy alternatives. American Journal of Economics & Sociology 52(4): 385–397.

10.

Caiden

Chapman

(1982) Constraint and uncertainty: Budgeting in California. Public Budgeting & Finance 2(4): 111–129.

11.

Cayer

(1986) Management implications of reduction in force. Public Administration Quarterly 10(1): 36–49.

12.

Cepiku

Savignon

(2012) Governing cutback management: Is there a global strategy for public administrations? International Journal of Public Sector Management 25(6/7): 428–436.

13.

Crecine

(1970) A simulation of municipal budgeting: The impact of problem environments. In: Sharkansky

(ed.) Policy Analysis in Political Science, Chicago, IL: Markham.

14.

Dabrowski

(2009) The global financial crisis: Lessons for European integration. . CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 384.

15.

Davis

Dempster

Wildavsky

(1966) A theory of the budgetary process. American Political Science Review 60: 529–547.

16.

Downs

Rocke

(1984) Theories of budgetary decision-making and revenue decline. Policy Sciences 16: 329–347.

17.

Duncombe

Kinney

(1984) Cutbacks – Idaho style. Public Budgeting & Finance 4(2): 87–98.

18.

Dunsire

Hood

(1989) Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies. Popular Theories and Observed Outcomes in Whitehall, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

19.

Gieve

Provost

(2012) Ideas and coordination in policymaking: The financial crisis of 2007–2009. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 25(1): 61–77.

20.

Glassberg

(1978) Organizational responses to municipal budget decreases. Public Administration Review 38(4): 325–332.

21.

Glennerster

(1981) Social service spending in a hostile environment. In: Hood

Wright

(eds) Big Governments in Hard Times, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 174–196.

22.

Greenhalgh

McKersie

(1980) Cost-effectiveness of alternative strategies for cut-back management. Public Administration Review 40(6): 575–584.

23.

Hanushek

(1986) Formula budgeting: The economics and analytics of fiscal policy under rules. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 6(1): 3–19.

24.

Hartley

(1981) Defence: A case study of spending cuts. In: Hood

Wright

(eds) Big Governments in Hard Times, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 125–151.

25.

Hendrick

(1989) Top-down budgeting, fiscal stress and budgeting theory. American Review of Public Administration 19(1): 29–48.

26.

Higgins

Jr (1984) Strategies for management of decline and productivity improvement in local government. Public Productivity Review 8(4): 332–352.

27.

Hood

(1981) Axeperson, spare that quango…. In: Hood

Wright

(eds) Big Governments in Hard Times, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 100–122.

28.

Hood

Wright

(1981) From decrementalism to quantum cuts? In: Hood

Wright

(eds) Big Governments in Hard Times, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 199–227.

29.

Hood

Dunsire

Huby

(1988) Bureaucracies in retrenchment: Vulnerability theory and the case of UK central government departments 1975–85. Administration & Society 20(3): 275–312.

30.

Jick

Murray

(1982) The management of hard times: Budget cutbacks in public sector organizations. Organization Studies 3(2): 141–169.

31.

Kickert

(2012) State responses to the fiscal crisis in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. Public Management Review 14(3): 299–309.

32.

Kogan

(1981) Education in ‘hard times’. In: Hood

Wright

(eds) Big Governments in Hard Times, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 152–173.

33.

Koven

(1985) Budgetary response to scarcity: The cases of New York and Cleveland. International Journal of Public Administration 7(3): 329–340.

34.

Lee

(1981) Whitehall and retrenchment. In: Hood

Wright

(eds) Big Governments in Hard Times, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 35–55.

35.

Levine

(1978) Organizational decline and cutback management. Public Administration Review 38(4): 316–325.

36.

Levine

(1979) More on cutback management: Hard questions for hard times. Public Administration Review 39(2): 179–183.

37.

Levine

(1984) Retrenchment, human resource erosion, and the role of the personnel manager. Public Personnel Management Journal 13(3): 249–263.

38.

Levine

(1985) Police management in the (1980s): From decrementalism to strategic thinking. Public Administration Review 45: 691–700.

39.

Levine

Rubin

(1980) Introduction. In: Levine

Rubin

(eds) Fiscal Stress and Public Policy, London: Sage, pp. 4–17.

40.

Levine

Rubin

Wolohojian

(1981a) Resource scarcity and the reform model: The management of retrenchment in Cincinnati and Oakland. Public Administration Review 41(6): 619–628.

41.

Levine

Rubin

Wolohojian

(1981b) The Politics of Retrenchment:. How Local Governments Manage Fiscal Stress, Beverly Hills, CA and London: Sage.

42.

Levine

Rubin

Wolohojian

(1982) Managing organizational retrenchment preconditions, deficiencies, and adaptations in the public sector. Administration & Society 14(1): 101–136.

43.

Lewis

Logalbo

(1980) Cutback principles and practices: A checklist for managers. Public Administration Review 40(2): 184–188.

44.

Lewis

(1984) Municipal expenditures through thick and thin. Publius 14(2): 31–39.

45.

Lewis

(1988) The consequences of fiscal stress: Cutback management and municipal employment. State & Local Government Review 20(2): 64–71.

46.

Lodge

Hood

(2012) Into an age of multiple austerities? Public management and public service bargains across OECD countries. Governance 25(1): 79–101.

47.

MacManus

Pammer

Jr (1990) Cutbacks in the country: Retrenchment in rural villages, townships, and counties. Public Administration Quarterly 14(3): 302–323.

48.

MacManus

(1989) A decade of decline: A longitudinal look at big city and big county strategies to cope with declining revenues. International Journal of Public Administration 12(5): 749–796.

49.

McTighe

(1979) Management strategies to deal with shrinking resources. Public Administration Review 39(1): 86–90.

50.

Marando

(1990) General revenue sharing: Termination and city responses. State and Local Government Review 22: 98–107.

51.

May

Meltsner

(1981) Limited actions, distressing consequences: A selected view of the California experience. Public Administration Review 41: 172–179.

52.

Midwinter

Page

(1981) Cutting local spending: The Scottish experience, 1976–80. In: Hood

Wright

(eds) Big Governments in Hard Times, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 56–76.

53.

Morgan

Pammer

(1988) Coping with fiscal stress: Predicting the use of financial management practices among US cities. Urban Affairs Review 24(1): 69–86.

54.

Pammer

(1990) Managing Fiscal Strain in Major American Cities:. Understanding Retrenchment in the Public Sector, New York: Greenwood Press.

55.

Pandey

(2010) Cutback management and the paradox of publicness. Public Administration Review 70(4): 564–571.

56.

Peters

(2011) Governance responses to the fiscal crisis: Comparative perspectives. Public Money & Management 31(1): 75–80.

57.

Peters

Pierre

Randma-Liiv

(2011) Economic crisis, public administration and governance. Do new problems require new solutions? Public Organization Review 11(1): 13–27.

58.

Poister

McGowan

(1984) The contribution of local productivity improvement efforts in a period of fiscal stress. Public Productivity Review 8(4): 386–394.

59.

Pollitt

(2010) Cuts and reforms: Public services as we move into a new era. Society and Economy 32(1): 17–31.

60.

Pollitt

(2012) Politics, administration and performance: A continuing search, but no one best way? Den Effectiva Staten. En Antologi fran Statskontoret, Stockholm: Statskontoret, pp. 118–161.

61.

Posner

Sommerfeld

(2013) The politics of fiscal austerity: Democracies and hard choices. OECD Journal on Budgeting 13(1): 1–34.

62.

Rickards

(1984) How the spending patterns of cities change: Budgetary incrementalism re-examined. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 4(1): 56–74.

63.

Rubin

(1980) Universities in stress: Decision making under conditions of reduced resources. In: Levine

(ed.) Managing Fiscal Stress: The Crisis in the Public Sector, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, pp. 167–179.

64.

Rubin

(1985) Shrinking the Federal Government:. The Effect of Cutbacks on Five Federal Agencies, New York: Longman.

65.

Schick

(1980) Budgetary adaptations to resource scarcity. In: Levine

Rubin

(eds) Fiscal Stress and Public Policy, London: Sage Publications, pp. 113–134.

66.

Schick

(1983) Incremental budgeting in a decremental age. Policy Sciences 16(1): 1–25.

67.

Schick

(1988) Micro-budgetary adaptations to fiscal stress in industrialized democracies. Public Administration Review 48(1): 523–533.

68.

Starke

(2006) The politics of welfare state retrenchment: A literature review. Social Policy & Administration 40(1): 104–120.

69.

Straussman

(1979) A typology of budgetary environments: Notes on the prospects of reform. Administration & Society 11(2): 216–226.

70.

Tarschys

(1981) Rational decremental budgeting: Elements of an expenditure policy for the (1980s). Policy Sciences 14(1): 49–58.

71.

Tarschys

(1985) Curbing public expenditure: Current trends. Journal of Public Policy 5(1): 23–67.

72.

Tarschys

(1986) From expansion to restraint: Recent developments in budgeting. Public Budgeting & Finance 6(3): 5–37.

73.

Van de Walle

Jilke

(2012) Savings in public services: A multilevel analysis of public preferences in the EU27. . COCOPS Working Paper No. 8.

74.

Weinberg

(1984) Budget retrenchment in small cities: A comparative analysis of Wooster, Athens and Ohio. Public Budgeting & Finance 4(3): 46–57.

75.

Wildavsky

(1964) The Politics of Budgetary Process, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

76.

Wolman

(1983) Understanding local government responses to fiscal pressure: A cross national analysis. Journal of Public Policy 3(3): 245–263.

77.

Wolman

Davis

(1980) Local government strategies to cope with fiscal pressure. In: Levine

Rubin

(eds) Fiscal Stress and Public Policy, London: Sage Publications, pp. 231–248.

78.

Wright

(1981) Big governments in hard times: The restraint of public expenditure. In: Hood

Wright

(eds) Big Governments in Hard Times, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 3–31.