The state and the reconstruction of civil society

(Governmental) Expectations towards a diverse and changing civil society

Governments, from the local to the central level, increasingly express their desire to engage civil society, which is regarded as instrumental in dealing with contemporary societal issues. Well-known examples are the Big Society in the UK and the ‘Doe-Democratie’ in the Netherlands (Van de Wijdeven, 2012), as well as the many efforts that local governments in a lot of countries put into participation or co-production. Whether these intentions are politically/ideologically driven, or whether the rationale is financial austerity, these governments all have to face the fact that civil society is not a homogeneous artefact to deal with. Rather, contemporary civil society is diverse and continuously changing.

Developments that condition the nature of contemporary state–civil society relations

Although some of the issues in the relationship between the state and civil society are old and even timeless, it is important to locate our discussion on the relationship between civil society and the state in the specific social context where it originated. Arguably, the discussion over the relationship between the state and civil society ² is as old as scholarship itself and there is a high risk of overstating the similarity between present and past debates. For a start, the sharp distinction between the two concepts presupposed in our present discussion is of relatively recent origin. Traditionally, civil society and political society were regarded as more integrated. In the Aristotelian view of politics, participation in civil society inevitably meant participation in political life and the only alternative was to withdraw to a secluded existence. There was no public life separate from politics. The notion of a third domain next to the state and market originated in the political philosophy of the 18th century, with an increasing emphasis on its autonomy – especially from the state (Hall and Trentmann, 2005). Also, the notion of government is now very different from how it has been perceived during most of history. It is no overstatement to say that in the past century, the role of states has changed fundamentally. Despite measures towards re-privatization, they are still more dominant in society than they have been at any time in human history. Although past issues keep recurring, the current conditions of state–civil society relationships are quite distinct and have given rise to a new type of debate.

Two different developments weave together here: one is the evolution of governance paradigms from a centralist to a more pluralist approach; the other is the liquefaction of social life, as described by prominent sociologists. Both developments link to various disciplinary and interdisciplinary traditions; both are more complex and contradictory than we could here do justice to by any measure. They come together in a specific way, creating a new dynamic in state–civil society relations that is specific to our time. Where this dynamic leads to is a question for empirical research. The effects of efforts to recreate or reshape civil society seem to hinge on the interfaces between the institutional architecture of modern society (with a dominant position of the state and quasi-state institutions) and the emerging dynamics of a late-modern network society, with a diverse and heterogeneous civil society with hybrid relationships with government, as a result of public management paradigms that have shifted over time (Evers, 2005).

The complications of regenerating civil society

As a result of these two trends, public authorities are increasingly inclined to define social relations and responsibilities as something that can be manufactured and managed. Fear over weakening or changing social relations and the loss of values are, of course, far from new. They are at the core of 2500-year-old plays and are presumably as old as man itself, so that is, in itself, hardly historically unique. Nor is it unusual for states to try to regulate social life and turn society away from perceived moral degeneration. In that sense, current efforts to revitalize civil society are a new phase in a continuous process.

There are two respects, though, in which they are historically distinct, if not unique. First, as noted earlier, the role of the state in society has changed essentially from where it was even a hundred years ago. Barring some exceptions, it has rarely been as powerful as it is today. Second, its ambition is not only to co-opt or integrate, but also to recreate, civil society. To put it provocatively: public governance in modern welfare states is looking for methods to reinvent (or revitalize) ‘the social’. Ambitions include a large-scale reconstruction of local communities, civil society and citizenship by giving public responsibilities to citizens and civil society organizations. As a consequence, relationships with citizens, communities and third sector organizations are cast within the mould of public management.

This restoration is fraught with complications. For a start, the state is not separate from society, but part of it, if only because its own mechanisms of control rest partly on the social relations that are in meltdown. The solid state, intervening in society with powerful social technologies, is no more. Governance instruments that rely on authority, hierarchy and bureaucracy increasingly suffer from a lack of effectiveness and legitimacy. As a consequence, we witness the emergence of new modes of public governance, aiming at the recovery of solid ground for state intervention. One of the strategies involved in this process is the use of social capital as a source for public governance. Community initiatives, local social practices and third sector organizations are appointed a position and function within public governance. In Flanders (Belgium), for example, with the decree on local social policy, local governments are expected to engage third sector organizations and organized civil society in the development and implementation of local social policies (De Corte and Verschuere, 2014). Waardenburg and Van de Bovenkamp (2014), in a study on Dutch sports and patient associations, show that such civil society organizations can be ‘manufactured’ by government as means to implement public policy. This governmental control of organizations can be achieved through at least four mechanisms: financially; through accountability procedures; via demands for partnerships; and via the use of symbolic policy language (Waardenburg and Van de Bovenkamp, 2014: 89). In other words, the involvement of civil society cannot, in itself, be seen as a way to give citizens more control. It is also a manner used by government to steer governmental policies. These two examples of increased government–civil society cooperation, among many others, leave us with a paradox, as we noted earlier: if social and cultural erosion is the problem, how can it be launched as part of the solution?

A second complication is that it is unclear how relations that are inherently built bottom-up can be constructed with help from the top down. The search for civil society from above may lead to what Trommel (2009) has described as ‘greedy governance’, aiming to manufacture a civil sphere by means of public interventions. This may easily destroy what it wants to promote: a lively, self-governing civil society. The recreated communities may not be able to exist without government support. It is an intriguing question whether new forms of ‘civility’ are identical or even comparable to their classic predecessors. The very fact that states are involved in shaping civil society organizations, by means of financial instruments, accountability procedures, performance management or otherwise, may imply that organizations lose their original identity. Indeed, in the worst cases, efforts to integrate the state with bottom-up organizations and networks may be an expression of totalitarianism (Tilly, 2005). Even in cases of weak state intervention, one must wonder whether ‘civility’ still has the meaning it had before.

A third problem is that different paradigms of governance continue to coexist, which sometimes leads to contradictory pressures. NPM also involves civil society, but with a narrower focus on performance and management. The risk is then that government (and society) starts to overemphasize management indicators to judge civil society organizations, or that civil society organizations are forced into competition with commercial organizations. Ultimately, this may lead to mission drift and goal displacement (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2014). In the UK, Harlock (2014) has shown in the context of elderly care how organizations from civil society try to negotiate and manage changes in their public service environment in a condition of high dependence on local officials for funding, and often struggle to maintain their goals. Verschuere and De Corte (2014) show that non-profit organizations in the Flemish (Belgian) welfare sector perceive decreased autonomy (concerning the choice of processes, results and target groups) vis-a-vis government in cases of large public resource dependence. Moreover, it can already be observed that the cross-national variety in state–civil society relationships has diminished as a result of the application of NPM principles (Bode, 2006).

Finding a new balance between bottom-up and top-down initiatives

Our analysis of top-down efforts to reconstruct civil society is not meant to suggest that bottom-up initiatives have been replaced. To the contrary, some recent studies have shown that in European cities (Evers et al., 2014) and in Belgian cities (De Rynck and Verschuere, 2014), a lot of initiatives emerge, often from within society, to address new societal problems. These initiatives are often very concrete (single-issue), are not always part of established and institutionalized civil society, and develop various relations with local government: sometimes adversarial (advocating issues and policies that may not be political priorities), sometimes complementary to what government does, and sometimes filling in public service delivery gaps in domains in which government is not active (Young, 2000). Thus, although the process of social liquefaction has affected classical communities and types of participation, they are far from gone. There are also indications of new, emerging kinds of social relationships. In other words, top-down civil society meets bottom-up. The question is how these two driving forces relate to one another in practice. This is ultimately a question for empirical research, but in the literature, one can observe various expectations about how the relationship will develop.

An optimistic view, often found in the literature on social innovation, would suggest that they are complementary or even synergetic. Top-down efforts to restore civil society do not necessarily frustrate bottom-up initiatives. National policy agendas such as the Big Society in England do promote such initiatives, but leave a lot of space for agency ‘from beneath’. Food banks, voluntary care associations and local safety projects all have in common that they are problem-driven rather than ideologically motivated, that they involve actors with various ‘identities’, and that they have flexible organizational forms. In conditions of increasing public austerity, and a flowering ‘glocal’ landscape, a large variety of local social innovations emerge that shape new civil responsibilities, but in novel ways different from traditional organizations (Evers et al., 2014). Governments at various levels have (if only temporarily) supported such initiatives.

Yet, of course, it is also possible that there is friction or even outright competition over resources between initiatives with different backgrounds. At the very least, the parties involved will have to fundamentally reconsider their roles. An interesting example is the German Federal Volunteer Service, which was created when conscription was abolished in 2011 (Beller and Haß, 2014). Until then, many young men had refused military service and instead opted for a year of civilian duty, usually within the non-profit sector. The effect of the reform was that about 90,000 young men who had supported the welfare state in a broad range of social and health services and health institutions, as well as organizations in civil protection and sports, were suddenly no longer available. As compensation, the government founded a new volunteer service, which operated next to a similar service organized by the non-profit sector. It has led to a complicated relationship. Although the state has adopted a stronger role in volunteering, for the implementation of its policy, it still depends on voluntary organizations to recruit, motivate and supervise the volunteers. Although, in the end, this may lead to more effective arrangements, in the short term, it has channelled a lot of energy towards negotiation and administrative processes, rather than to the core business of the organizations.

The dynamics between top-down and bottom-up initiatives can, indeed, be complex. Even when spontaneous initiatives are successful and self-sustaining, they may have a ‘dark side’ that invites public intervention, for instance, when they are seen as undermining or contradicting institutionalized public values. Another contemporary example may be the existence of grassroots organizations that organize soup kitchens for homeless or otherwise vulnerable people, with the underlying aim of recruiting fighters that can be deployed in the Middle East. A well-known example is the tension between equality and exclusion. If new civil society networks are too closed, they may come to resemble ‘gated communities’ that are at odds with public values of open access and equality. In a study on housing cooperatives, Brandsen and Helderman (2012) noted that the benefits of lively communities often come at the cost of high barriers against intrusions from the outside. Other instances of such ‘voluntary failure’ are a lack of resources, a narrow scope of action with a focus on single issues while ignoring others, a lack of accountability that leads to a focus on narrow interests while neglecting larger social needs, or a lack of professional competence (Anheier, 2005; Salamon, 1987). Yet, when state interference to correct for or prevent such dynamics is too strong, initiatives may not get off the ground at all, and the autonomy of civil society may be compromised.

Towards intermediary communities of public craftsmanship

It can be argued that new concepts and practices emerge that seek to overcome the distinction between adversarial and collaborative relationships (Young, 2000). As Hecksher and Adler (2006) have argued for the private sector, new forms of collaboration can be observed, challenged by conditions of increasing (global economic) complexity and (informational) uncertainty. Supported by the opportunities of Internet-based interaction, professional workers join in (virtual) communities that embrace the value of knowledge-sharing, being a vital precondition for innovation. The collaborations that emerge transgress organizational hierarchies (in the classic words of Tönnies, Gemeinschaft) and, at the same time, challenge the logic of markets and politics (Gesellschaft). Rather, it seems a logic capable of developing ‘togetherness’ both at a distance, in an abstract, anonymous space, and at the familiar level of a concrete place. A similar argument is plausible for the public sector (Trommel, 2013). In between the institutional logic of the national welfare state and the newly emerging social dynamics at local levels, collaborations develop between actors who have one foot in the ‘old world’ (professionals, managers, civil society organizations, local politicians, interest organizations, etc.) and the other in improvised social ground (cf. Boutellier, 2013). The overarching value that binds these actors together might be characterized as a problem-driven search for ‘public craftsmanship’ (cf. Sennett, 2008). Bannink, Bosselaar and Trommel (2012) have spoken of ‘crafting communities’, aiming at making sound connections between the different spheres on which public governance rests. As such, this type of public collaborative might be regarded as a new social-political vehicle that can ‘ride the global–local axis’, or, in the words of Sassen, a novel assemblage that better fits the requirements of a post-national world. It is, of course, much too early to verify this and to identify the characteristics of a new type of civil society. Yet, we conclude our argument by exploring a little deeper as to what this new social realm between the state and the citizen may look like.

Increasingly, contemporary social problems have global antecedents and local manifestations. Crucial developments and critical events in global economic networks impact upon employment and migration issues everywhere in the world, but in a different way in Berlin than in Hamburg or in Munich, or in Amsterdam. This trend points at two political vacuums, respectively, on a transnational and local level. While these are the levels on which new public problems develop – from financial crises to welfare, security and integration issues in neighbourhoods – the political apparatus of the nation-state seems unable to reach these levels adequately. It can be argued that the lack of ‘community’ at transnational and local levels underlies this political incapacity. However, one may also theorize that the new challenges for political action in ‘glocalized’ contexts function as a driver behind the emergence of new forms of social (and political) community, both at transnational and local levels (a trend also noted in the policy learning literature; see Radaelli, 1995; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Consider the following example. The growth of economic interdependencies within global value chains, for instance, through processes of outsourcing and transferring work, brings together a variety of actors sharing a particular interest in crafting a rudimentary form of social security (and thus stability) within the value chain. That is, employers, representatives of international unions, local public authorities, anthropologists and insurance companies may work together in an effort to arrange transnational welfare transfers (cf. Bannink et al., 2011). At the local level, one can observe a similar mechanism: actors from different spheres (politics, management, civil society, professions) are increasingly willing to share their knowledge and skills for the sake of problem-solving outside the domain of formal political decision-making. Thus, at both levels – transnational and local – one can observe community-like activity oriented at developing public policies, though not in formalized institutional contexts.

In at least four respects, the emergence of these problem-oriented communities points at new directions in which civil society may develop. First, ‘affinity to the public domain’ seems to establish a new motivational complex behind community development, next to traditional (religious, ideological or cultural) motives. Second, such communities may share a sense of ‘togetherness’ or even solidarity, but not necessarily in a durable and/or fixed manner. Over time, communities may change in terms of members, social ties, scope and problem focus. This flexibility, enabled and supported by contemporary social technologies, may be referred to as ‘electronic solidarity’ (Trommel, 2013). Third, the focus on public problem-solving involves a turn to ‘pragmatism’ and practical knowledge. In the pursuit of ideological motives, trial-and-error approaches and careful crafting seem to replace blueprint politics and policy solutions. Following Sennett (2008), it may be argued that the virtues of craftsmanship establish a new common ground for collective action in which established rules for institutional and/or professional conduct are linked to innovative social experiments. Among these virtues are modesty, patience, devotion to practical wisdom and knowledge-sharing. Finally, one could assume that these crafting communities are eventually capable of building bridges into a post-national political future. Due to the tentative nature of crafting practices, though, it is hard to tell what this future will look like. The turn to localism or other forms of socio-economic isolationism and NIMBY (‘not in my back yard’) behaviour is a risk, but also the resort to mere technocratic policymaking. However, if crafting communities succeed in organizing spaces in which social innovators cooperate with representatives of democratic institutions and professional associations, then they may smartly govern a true renewal of our socio-political landscapes.

In sum, a new future for civil society seems plausible, though not through spontaneous revival and neither as a ‘product’ of institutional manufacturing. Rather, it seems that a distinct mix of negative drivers (the erosion of national political institutions; professional inabilities) and positive drivers (the rearrangement of global–local interdependencies; the rapid growth of information technology networks) underlies the emergence of communities that seek to find pragmatic answers to the public problems of our time. It is impossible to tell whether crafting communities will continue to exist as the means of post-national policymaking in the longer run. One cannot exclude a gradual growth of new and sustainable governance structures in which ‘electronic solidarity’ will be embedded as only one of the binding mechanisms in society. However, in the short run, crafting communities are likely to increasingly occupy the political vacuums at the local and transnational levels as the vehicles potentially able to connect the institutional architecture of the ‘modern’ nation-state to the emerging realm of local and transnational politics.

Conclusion: implications for the research agenda

In the years to come, civil society revitalization is likely to be a hot issue on the political and social research agendas. Although we have primarily discussed the European situation, it is a trend that is also visible in other parts of the world (for examples in this journal, see Birner and Wittmer, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2006). This article has argued that two perspectives dominate the current debates and practices in this area: one drawing on the assumption that revitalization is a matter of institutional ‘production’; the other revolving around the idea of new social dynamics, driven by the problems that follow from a novel (‘glocalized’ and ‘post-national’) social order. Both perspectives relate to civil society patterns that are inherently problematic, at least in their ideal-typical forms. Attempts to manufacture civil society may easily undermine the very essence of civil self-organization. On the other hand, embracing every bottom-up initiative as a useful contribution to public governance practices may yield a degree of ‘localism’ that is destructive to established public values. The question is where that leads. In a worst-case scenario, civil society will be ground between a state aiming at reshaping traditional organizations that have lost inspiration and stability, and a new civil society emerging in the shape of ‘gated communities’ developing outside the public sphere.

New research efforts are needed to understand how the complex relationship between governments and civil society organizations is currently unfolding. What exactly is the logic of this ambitious ‘manufacturing project’: how does it work, which (side) effects occur, and what sense does it make in terms of ‘revitalization’? Furthermore, what is the logic of these new social dynamics: to what extent do they feed the establishment of isolated communities and a related decline of collective solidarity, and how do they contribute to public governance? More and better knowledge on these issues may help public authorities to develop smarter civil society policies, whereas civil actors may get inspired to innovate their practices in such a way that they better fit the concerns of public governance agendas. A challenging research question is whether new socio-political communities are emerging that connect the institutional traditions of the national and local welfare systems to newly developing initiatives at the local level. If so, it is an exciting development that will bring together research agendas in public management, social policy and civil society research.