Participatory budgeting in a local government in a vertical society: A Japanese story

Abstract

This article examines a case of participatory budgeting in Japanese local government. The article demonstrates how cultural values interact with stages of budgeting (in our case, the co-planning or consultation phase of budgeting). We find three key stakeholders – councillors, administrators and citizens – have varying degree of participation in the budget process. While direct citizen participation has been limited and challenging, we find that local associations and councillors work as lobbyists to influence the budget less publicly. The budget desk led by the mayor plays the dominant role. This article contributes to the broader debate on local government reforms and their translation into varied contexts by problematising such a linear adoption of knowledge from a cultural perspective.

Points for practitioners

We offer caution to policymakers about the wholesale adoption of knowledge from one context to the other. In the Japanese context, we urge them to draw on the strengths of grouping behaviour. Hence, engagement with associations, communities and various interests groups must be emphasised instead of simply relying on direct yet remote communications to citizens. Political engagements by the departments – perhaps via political parties – can be adopted before budget proposals are made to the local authority council. This will allow more space for the councillors to make their case to citizens, and maintain harmony (wa) within and between political groups.

Keywords

culture Japan local government participatory budgeting

Introduction

Over the last decade, participatory budgeting (PB)¹ has been one of the most widespread reforms undertaken by local governments, with 1500 PB instances in various countries (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014). PB in local governments has been subject to scrutiny in many countries, mainly in Europe and the US (Gusmano, 2013; Rossmann and Shanahan, 2011). A number of studies have been carried out to explain key stakeholders’ engagement (or lack thereof) in the local budgeting process, citing both economic and non-economic reasons, for instance, budgetary constraints and the perceptions of citizens (Barbera et al., 2016). However, fewer studies have examined how the budgetary participation process operates and interacts with local cultural conditions, which may provide deeper explanations for why reforms such as PB often produce a variety of unanticipated consequences (Christensen and Fan, 2016; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

PB instances in local government in Asian countries have been limited (Kuruppu et al., 2016). Japanese local governments are of particular interest due to their relatively recent interest in wider stakeholder engagement (Tanaka, 2010). Political participation has long been in place in Japan through the direct election of mayors and councillors. This has been further strengthened by the idea of direct citizen participation in the selection of local priorities (Sintomer et al., 2012). While some forms of PB are claimed to be in place in a number of Japanese city councils, including Abiko, Siki, Nabari and Osaka-Sayama (Fukushima, 2014; JMRC, 2012; Kanemura et al., 2016), academic research on PB processes in Japan is scarce (Masujima, 2005).

PB, which advocates an Anglo-Saxon attitude towards governance, is likely to raise interesting issues given that prevailing social and cultural values in Japan are significantly different from those of Western countries (Christensen, 2000; Eshima et al., 2001; Jun and Muto, 1995; Kudo, 2003; Norton, 2007). Our Japanese case presents us with an excellent opportunity to study and theorise the dynamics of PB processes in a non-Western context. Thus, we intend to focus² on the interactions of stages of the PB process and cultural norms.

Empirically, the article investigates the nature and extent of participation in the budgeting process of a Japanese local government – Kitakyushu Council – frequently cited for championing citizens’ participation (JMRC, 2012). We investigate participation in budgeting, taking a broader perspective involving citizens, administrators and councillors. Analytically, the article examines how cultural conditions shape the intended PB process.

The next section provides a brief review of local government budgeting and participation, followed by an introduction to the theoretical framework and the research method section. Empirical findings are then presented and set in the context of the cultural norms of Japanese society. The article finishes with some concluding remarks.

Participatory budgeting and cultural perspectives

In Western democracies, PB³ has increasingly been seen as an important tool for a deliberative or participative form of democracy in which stakeholders have opportunities to engage in local authority decision-making processes (Ariely, 2013). This has given rise to numerous PB instances, leading to academic interests in scrutinising the extent of stakeholder engagement. Some studies have highlighted the success of PB. For instance, Baiocchi and Lerner (2007) discuss the success of PB in balancing resource allocation in some ethnically diverse Canadian local communities. Similarly, PB in Ichikawa, Japan, has been credited with supporting non-profit projects (Sintomer et al., 2012).

However, most of the current studies on PB are critical of wider stakeholder engagement, reporting unintended consequences such as: mistrust between councillors and citizens (Im et al., 2014); low and unrepresentative participation (Ebdon and Franklin, 2006); the domination of technocrats (Gusmano, 2013); and merely being a legitimacy tool, with no direct consequences for the final budget (Bräutigam, 2004). Studies have cited underlying economic and institutional impediments, such as poor budgetary allocations for citizens and economic austerity discouraging the engagement of wider stakeholders in the PB process (Cepiku et al., 2016; Rossmann and Shanahan, 2011).

While economic and institutional reasons are important, cultural variables are also critical in shaping wider stakeholder engagement, including of citizens (or the lack thereof), in the PB process (Van Helden and Uddin, 2016). Culture has long been considered in the New Public Management (NPM) literature to be a key determinant of the process, consequences and outcomes of reforms (Christensen et al., 2007). Different cultural frameworks, for instance, Hofstede’s national culture (Kim, 2017), grid-group culture (Simmons, 2016) and Douglasian theory (Linsley et al., 2016), among others, have been drawn on to explain public sector reforms and their implementation. Japanese studies have discussed the cultural context in relation to the adoption of Western-centric administration and local government reforms (Jun and Muto, 1995; Norton, 2007). Some argued that the culture of collectivism has been a positive force in making successful reforms in the public sector of Japan (Christensen, 2000; Eshima et al., 2001).

Nevertheless, cultural perspectives of PB processes are relatively under-researched, despite the calls for studying culture in public engagement (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Irvin and Stansbury (2004) have argued that low and unrepresentative participation in the budget process may be indicative of a local culture characterised by citizens’ undisputed acceptance of decisions undertaken by councillors. In a similar vein, some Japanese studies have reported challenges in getting individuals involved in the PB process (Fukushima, 2014; Nakatani, 2013). Building on the aforementioned literature, this article draws on Nakane’s (1970) work⁴ to offer some understanding of the challenges of PB processes in Japanese local government.

Vertical society – the Japanese way

Nakane’s main focus was to understand Japanese society by examining the Japanese individual, group formation and the relationships between the group and individual, as well as between groups. These relationships have serious implications for how participation occurs at the level of organisation and beyond. We have also employed recent studies on Japanese culture and society (Abe, 1995; Benedict, 1988; Kokami, 2009; Van Wolferen, 1989) to complement Nakane’s work.

Nakane (1970) employed the concepts of ‘frame’ (‘ba’ in Japanese) and ‘attribute’ to capture how individuals see themselves in a group and in society at large. ‘Frame’ indicates a location or belongingness, while ‘attribute’ indicates profession or position. Identifying with a particular frame – a company, family or group, in other words, a collective – is considered to be the primary means of introduction. Social grouping in Japan is often constructed on the basis of a frame of group members (workplace, village, etc.), with differing attributes. In order to sustain the group, coherence is crucial (Benedict, 1988). In Nakane’s view, this is done in two ways: by influencing members with a feeling of oneness or unity; and/or by creating an internal structure that ties individuals in the group to each other and thus strengthens the internal structure of the group. In practice, these two modes occur, are bound and progress together. This is further elaborated upon later.

In order for members to have a feeling of oneness or unity with the group, people with different attributes are led to feel that they are members of the same group consciousness of ‘us’. Japanese emotional investment in groups is manifested in the way they speak about their groups. Oneness is frequently expressed – ‘our company’, ‘us’ – in everyday private and public conversations. As Nakane (1970: 4) puts it: ‘latent group consciousness in Japanese society is expressed in the traditional and ubiquitous concept of ie, the household, a concept which penetrates every nook and cranny of Japanese society’. The Japanese usage uchi-no, referring to one’s workplace, indeed derives from the concept ie. The term ie also has implications beyond those to be found in the English words of household or family. ‘Oneness’ is also strengthened by differentiating the group from other groups/frames (‘us’ versus ‘them’). Hence, there is often fierce rivalry and hostility towards other groups. The entire society is composed of numerous competing but independent groups. This rivalry and competition between groups and organisations is also reflected in the public sector literature (Christensen, 2000).

The internal structuring of the group is very important for group coherence and survival (Aoki, 1988). In general, groups share a common structure: an internal organisation by which the members are tied vertically into a delicately graded order (Nakane, 1970: 39). A vertical relationship emphasises differences between members, or develops a very delicate and intricate system of ranking within it (Jun and Muto, 1995). In vertical group formation, three categories of relationship are found to exist: sempai (seniors), kohai (juniors) and doryo (equal). These differentiations are clear, they are expressed both publicly and privately, and the order is maintained irrespective of an individual’s status, qualifications, popularity or frame (Mizutani et al., 1995). As Nakane (1970: 28) puts it, ‘there is a deeply ingrained reluctance to change the established order. The relative rankings are thus centered on an ego and everyone is placed in a relative locus within the firmly established vertical system.' The vertical organisation, fixing the ranking of participants from its beginning, is also reflected in prior work (Jun and Muto, 1995; Yashiro, 2013).

The Japanese word seken perhaps expresses more accurately the role of the individual in the group, and, indeed, in Japanese society (Abe, 1995). Being in seken means that all members of the group should act cohesively or seken will purge individual differences to impose wa (‘oneness’ or ‘unity’) (Kitamura, 2013). Nevertheless, the iron hold of seken has been losing its grip in modern society. Kokami (2009) has termed this kuki, in other words, a loosely coupled seken. Whatever the form seken takes, it still contributes to maintaining wa (harmony) within the group. Van Wolferen’s (1989: 196) comment on Japanese political power reflects this: ‘Japanese who disagree with the way in which the system works and who translate their discontent into political actions are considered subversive and looked upon as potential bomb-throwers.'

In summary, the primacy of the group over individuals (and of the frame over attributes), group rivalries and a deeply embedded Japanese consciousness of vertical relationships and oneness, or wa, have serious implications for how an organisation works. It is therefore interesting to examine how notions such as ‘participation’ are implicated in the everyday lives of Japanese organisations. We examine these cultural norms in relation to the participation of citizens, administrators and councillors in budgeting in the Kitakyushu case.

Research methods

Data for this case study were collected in 2014–15 over a span of one year, including multiple visits to the city council and the collection of documents. Important data sources for the identification of societal and cultural conditions included a preliminary review of the historical literature on local government and Kitakyushu Council, as well as the broader politico-economic and historical literature. As a next step, in order to develop a better understanding of the structural conditions faced by the key actors in Kitakyushu, we collected media reports, annual statements and official documents relating to Kitakyushu.

Semi-structured interviews were one of most important sources of data contributing to an understanding of local government budgeting practices. Two authors (one native speaker) were involved in facilitating the interviews. In total, we have spoken to 20 key stakeholders (in two stages), comprising one community leader (user of local government services), one ward administrator, five councillors, 10 local government administrators and one professor (retired from the city government, with experience in the budgetary department). The second round of interviews at the local council was based on knowledge acquired from the first round. Two interviews were held, with the deputy mayor and a consultant working for local government reforms. Most interviews took place in the workplace, while some, especially those with councillors, were held in different locations, including one in a cafe.

The interviews were conducted mainly in Japanese, but were translated immediately into English so that the non-Japanese author could follow them. Most interviews lasted around 60 minutes and were digitally recorded. Issues discussed during the interviews included: the nature of budgeting; the level of participation; the role of departments, councillors, community members and the general public in influencing budget decisions; and the role of central government and civil servants. After completing each interview, the authors discussed the interview data and reflected on the findings to prepare themselves for the next interview. We presented our initial findings at two seminars attended by Japanese and UK local government researchers (60 participants). In addition to the interviews, one author attended two council meetings and watched council meetings on YouTube.

Having collected the data, the next stage was an analysis of the interviews in two forms: understanding the cultural conditions and the key actors’ perceptions of the practices. In order to do this, we drew on Nakane’s work on the vertical society and identified key themes to interpret the findings and key actors’ interpretations of the budgeting practices. As we interpreted our findings, we constantly reworked our themes to capture deeper explanatory nuances of participation in budgeting.

Local government in Japan and Kitakyushu

Local government units in Japan provide a wide range of services to citizens, covering virtually everything except diplomacy, defence, currency and justice. Three-fifths of total tax revenues are spent at local government level, employing 3 million people. Japan’s local autonomy system has a two-tier system of local government: prefectures and municipalities. Prefectures are regional government units and municipalities are basic local government units. The largest city within a municipality is often formally ‘designated’, and its power and functions are similar to those of prefectures in core areas such as social welfare, public health and urban planning. Kitakyushu, our case study, is a formally ‘designated’ city.

There are two governance structures at the heart of all local government units: legislative and executive. The legislative branch is composed of representatives from local communities elected through adult suffrage, and makes decisions on the budget and local ordinances. It comprises the mayor or governor, plus councillors, all of whom are directly elected by local residents for four years. The executive branch implements the policies decided by the legislative branch. The mayor is the head of both the legislative and executive branches. The mayor has the power of veto over the local city council, mirroring the powers of the US presidency.

The local government reforms in Japan since 1990 have significantly shaped local councils, including Kitakyushu Council. In the context of economic decline compounded by an ever-increasing elderly population, a restriction of local council’s spending power, cost cuts and outsourcing have been common to all councils during the last two decades, including Kitakyushu (Tanaka, 2010). The economic decline is reflected in Table 1. Revenue has been decreasing and almost 55% of the total budget appears to be under the local government’s discretionary power. Further scrutiny reveals that half of the unconditional revenues are, in fact, committed to fixed costs such as personnel, public assistance and the cost of public debt. In theory, the remainder is not fixed and may be influenced by stakeholders.

Table 1.

Kitakyushu revenue budget for the 2011 to 2013 financial years.

	2013		2012		2011
	1000JPY	%	1000JPY	%	1000JPY	%
Unconditional revenues	278,868,408	54.4	284,884,855	54.1	286,988,330	54.9
Locally raised	200,187,639	39.1	203,059,556	38.5	203,981,586	39.0
National grants	56,473,462	11.0	60,064,649	11.4	61,823,800	11.8
Prefecture grants	22,207,308	4.3	21,760,650	4.1	21,182,944	4.1
Conditional revenues	233,359,820	45.6	241,941,918	45.9	236,011,073	45.1
Locally raised	122,572,387	23.9	136,873,043	26.0	130,319,892	24.9
National grants	91,118,624	17.8	85,843,707	16.3	85,906,002	16.4
Prefecture grants	19,668,809	3.8	19,225,168	3.6	19,785,179	3.8
Total	512,228,229	100.0	526,826,773	100.0	522,999,403	100.0

The current mayor, who was first elected in December 2006, made the citizen participation agenda one of his election pledges for more transparency and accountability in decision-making processes. Thus, citizens’ participation was launched in 2008 in Kitakyushu.⁵ Given the mayoral election pledge and the claims regarding PB as a success story in Kitakyushu, promoted by local government associations and the media, we have sought to examine the elements of participation in the budgeting process. The budget cycle comprises three key phases in Kitakyushu. The interaction of key stakeholders, including citizens, administrators and councillors, in each of these phases are discussed later. At the same time, the article draws on Nakane’s cultural framework to provide some explanations of those interactions.

Budgetary proposals: vertical negotiation

The annual budget – a part of a three-tier planning system: strategic, master and implementation plans – begins with the mayor setting the principles for the year. The mayor has overall authority to prioritise or ignore the specific policies or projects set in strategic plans. The budget desk representing the mayor does not engage with any active consultation for setting out budget principles. However, this goes further, as the interviews revealed. The budget desk often changes the allocations to the departments with little or no explanation. Departmental interviewees, accepting the power and authority of the budget desk, suggested that it is the budget desk’s remit to make final decisions. In preparing the departmental annual budgets, especially regarding the inclusion of new capital items, high priority is given to reflect mayoral election promises.

The budget desk has overall responsibility for the budget. For instance, in response to our question of whether the mayor asks them to pursue specific projects and proposals, the finance officer in the budget desk responded: ‘He does not need to tell us. We know what he wants and we must be prepared for this.' Here, direct influence is unnecessary; as Nakane (1970) puts it, ‘junior must know what senior wants and work accordingly’. The embedded vertical relationship does not require undue direct intervention.

Verticality is, in particular, reflected in the way in which negotiations unfold between the budget desk and departments. For instance, commenting on the cost-cutting policy, an executive director of the budget desk claimed that they do not anticipate much resistance to its cost-cutting announcements. The usual practice is to send a letter to each department detailing the percentage to be cut, together with the rules and principles of the budget, at the beginning of the budget cycle. The budget desk confirmed that there is some negotiation but little resistance from departments because they know that this has to be done. One administrator from the budget desk said:

We negotiate this with the managers, directors and even the chief executive of each department and ask them to adhere to the budget policy. If a compromise is not reached, it goes up to the deputy mayor in charge of the budget desk.

Negotiation begins at the managerial level and, if unresolved, goes up to the director level, followed by the head at the department level. Ultimately, the deputy mayor’s decision is final. Although there may be some discomfort within departments, promoting oneness and maintaining ‘wa’ is much more important (Abe, 1995; Nakane, 1970).

Citizens’ participation: individual and group

The budget desk compiles budget proposals from departments and opens them up for citizens. We find that a summary of budget proposals from all departments is made available on the city’s websites, at the city’s central office and in ward offices. Citizens are able to submit their opinions by email, post or fax, or bring them directly to the city council or ward office. Seeking wider engagement by using a variety of ways is usual, as depicted in the literature (Oh and Lim, 2016 ). Nevertheless, the level of response received from citizens in Kitakyushu is very minimal. For instance, in the 2014 financial year, out of a population of more than 1 million in Kitakyushu City, only 71 people submitted 167 opinions. The number of opinions posted by citizens was even less in previous financial years. The interview with the finance director of the budgetary division was quite revealing. His candid reply to our question on participation was:

This citizen participation is simply a distraction. Budgets are made up of a master plan, an implementation plan, debates in council and daily negotiations between related organisations. Honestly speaking, it is hard for lay people to understand. It is a professional task.

This interview strikes a chord with the way in which the council responds to the opinions expressed by citizens. Most of the responses are brief and negative such as ‘the council does not agree’. Our study of citizen responses, from 2009 to 2014, fails to identify any response that has led to any significant changes to the budget. The deputy mayor conceded: ‘I try not to rely too much on public opinions as the policymakers can better reflect the situation than the citizens.' Administrators also commented that this process itself provides necessary legitimacy to the budget. This was evident in the following statement of a senior staff member of the budget desk: ‘These public comment procedures are intended to attract citizens’ interest, not to change the budget, so we handle them with much care and answer them very carefully.' The budget desk has therefore pursued a policy of encouraging citizens to express their responses relating to budgetary issues, despite the fact that such voices are rarely heard. This is not dissimilar to previous studies in which researchers have argued that participation in the budget process has merely become a legitimacy tool, with hardly any direct consequences for the final budget (Adams, 2004; Bräutigam, 2004).

While the budget desk largely ignores citizen responses, other departments engage with local groups and associations before drafting the budget proposals. These long-established but informal connections between local communities and local government units were operating well before the citizen participation launched in Kitakyushu. A director of the general affairs division of the construction department/bureau mentioned: ‘We are close to the citizens in several ways and communicate with them through comment letters, directly responding to them in public lectures, and organising meetings with them’. This contact with citizens is not well-publicised, but is conducted mainly through various associations/groups. The chairman of the federal association of the neighbourhood stated: ‘The city and associations have maintained an intimate relationship. We have frequent meetings with the city and the departments and sometimes we are asked about our needs and proposals’. Citizen disengagements are reported in prior studies (Cepiku et al., 2016; Gusmano, 2013), but social group/association engagement with the budget is surprising. These local associations seem to work as lobby groups and have been successful in influencing budgets on a small scale. The chairman of the federation explained various ways in which the association can exert subtle or direct pressures on the council, exploiting their established links with departments. Group lobbying of members to the council is understandable from Nakane’s articulations of the significance of groups/frame in Japanese society.

Political participation: maintaining oneness or ‘wa’

The council, an elected body, is an important vehicle to ensure wider political participation. There are 61 councillors elected from six wards for a term of four years. The local council deals with the budget in three stages. First, at a general meeting, the mayor explains his propositions in terms of budget Bills, closing Bills and other ordinances, and councillors discuss the mayor’s propositions in the six permanent committees. Second, three special committees consisting of pairs of the permanent committees deliberate on the budget and closing Bills. Third, based on the deliberations, the council decides whether or not to approve the Bills in the general meeting. We sought to establish to what extent the council influences budgetary documents and provides checks and balances to mayoral power.

Legally, the council and the mayor/city council office should stand on an equal footing. The council is recognised as a guardian but interviews suggested otherwise. Councillors do not wish to raise awkward questions to the committee or at council meetings. The chair of the council defended: ‘It is not our weakness, but the Japanese way of problem solving. In our tradition, we do not want to fight, nor do we like confrontation.’ All budget and financial closing Bills are passed almost unchanged every year.

There are also pressures on councillors not to delay the process. Some councillors argued that proposing an amendment to the budget would not only protract the discussions, but also lead to uncertainty in its execution. One councillor remarked: ‘The convention is that only the positive side of the budget should be mentioned during approval meetings and speeches.’ This is clearly visible from the YouTube videos of many council meetings.

Political parties often attempt to shape the budget less publicly. The council meeting is seen as a formality rather than a debating house. Councillors discuss the budget within their parties and groups. During such discussions, concerns are often raised about the inadequacy of the policies and the budget. However, such voices are seldom heard during the council’s budget meetings. On behalf of the political party that they represent, they negotiate with the mayor’s party rather than the mayor, and indirectly persuade the latter to consider their budget proposals in exchange for political or electoral support. There is no guarantee that such institutional proposals will receive the mayor’s approval. The political groups accept the mayor’s decisions but keep on pushing their party’s proposals for the next year. This acceptance of mayoral power can perhaps be explained by Nakane’s reflections on how state power is organised in the context of hostile political groupings:

Once the state’s administrative authority is accepted, it can be transmitted without obstruction down the vertical line of a group’s internal organisation. In this way the administrative web is woven more thoroughly into Japanese society than perhaps any other in the world. (Nakane, 1970: 102)

Knowing that it is difficult to influence the budget through the council, councillors often work in lobby groups and visit the city council office prior to the budget proposals from the departments. Members commented that there are also regulatory restrictions in place to inhibit true engagement. For instance, the budget Bill has to be voted with a blanket ‘yes’ or ‘no’, with no opportunity for partial agreement or disagreement with budget items. There is also no opportunity for members to scrutinise individual items as most members follow the party line and find it uncomfortable to go against the party to disagree publicly with Bills.

Despite mentioning some regulatory loopholes, councillors argued that they find it difficult to raise any substantial issues in public or in council because ‘this is not the Japanese way’. This is not only because the mayor has full political support from the leaders of other political parties, but also because councillors find it difficult to gainsay the political arrangements, especially against their own political group. This may be true, to some extent, in every cultural context, but the extent to which resentment or differences are shown here is particularly low. Fear of being a disruptive individual within the Japanese seken (society), or fear of being purged from the seken, contributes to their inability to raise concerns publicly (Abe, 1995; Kitamura, 2013).

We argue that the internal organisational structure of political parties, the primacy of groups over individuals and the maintenance of oneness inhibit councillors from debating in the council. One interviewee – who was only a representative from her party to the council – was free to raise issues but found no support. Although other councillors privately supported her, they publicly remained silent. She understood the predicament that these councillors face when it comes to raising issues not supported by the party.

The nature of political participation (or lack thereof) is understandable if we see it in terms of Nakane’s (1970) understanding of Japanese society. The mayor is seen as the leader, and public disagreement in the council is not seen as good practice. In contrast, it is much easier to maintain oneness and vertical relationships by influencing the mayor’s budget through administrators. Most councillors are keen to maintain the political group’s position, and strong group consciousness plays a pivotal role. There is no need for the whipping system of Western democracy. Members of a political group almost inevitably go along with the political position unless they resign from political parties. The impossibility of raising issues close to their hearts leads them to lobbying council offices before the budget proposal to the council.

Concluding remarks

To sum up, three key stakeholders – councillors, administrators and citizens – have varying degrees of participation in the budget process. First, like many other cases in Japan (JMRC, 2012; Kanemura et al., 2016; Nakatani, 2013; Sintomer et al., 2012) and Western countries (Ebdon and Franklin, 2006), citizen participation has been limited and challenging. Nevertheless, we find that local groups and associations do have some influence or some form of engagement with budgeting. Second, we also find that engagement between departments and the budget desk is vertically constituted. The budget desk, representing the mayor, remains the powerful element of the budgetary process. Third, the council works as an official rubber stamp rather than presenting a counter-power to the mayor. Councillors work as lobbyists to influence the budget less publicly.

We have sought to understand how participation agendas interact with the Japanese way of doing things. Although the influence of cultural norms such as ‘being in seken’ is waning in Japanese society, the primacy of the group over the individual is still manifest in the everyday lives of people (Norton, 2007). Nakane’s claims about vertical relationships in groups/organisations, maintaining or performing ‘wa’ or oneness in the group, and the primacy of groups over individuals are useful in shedding light on the nature of participation. For instance, negotiations following hierarchy are an interesting example of superior (sempai) versus junior (kohai). Subordinates of the mayor and his offices working for the mayor and trying to take on projects anticipating his wishes also reveal a classic case of vertical relationships – a form of internal organisational structure within the groups. The importance of maintaining social order through ‘wa’ or oneness is reflected in the monologues of council meetings. Traditional engagement between departments and citizens is much more effective and still continues, even though public comments through websites are encouraged. Traditional department engagement with local leaders and associations allows for vertical relationships and group characteristics. We do not wish to claim that all Japanese local government budgeting emanates exactly the same feature of verticality, but the general pattern of interactions between and among key stakeholders in relation to the budgeting process would perhaps be shaped by some form of verticality.⁶

This article contributes to the public administration literature in several ways. First, the article provides deeper explanations of how local cultural conditions interact with the PB process in general and in Japan in particular. In so doing, the article contributes to cultural studies on local government reforms and their implementation (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004; Kim, 2017; Linsley et al., 2016; Simmons, 2016). This article, in particular, drawing on Nakane’s work, has demonstrated how the prevailing local cultural conditions give rise to a unique form of participation in the local government budgeting process. Without denying the impact of economic crises, regulatory loopholes and institutional contexts (Barbera et al., 2016), the article argues that local cultural norms in Japan do not match the conditions required for wider participation. Instead, departmental engagement with local associations and community leaders, and councillors lobbying away from the wider public eye, are consistent with local cultural conditions.

Second, the article offers a critique of unquestioning assumptions about the transfer of knowledge such as PB from one context to another and contributes to the wider debate on PB (Ashraf and Uddin, 2013). We concur with the arguments that reforms may have unexpected consequences, cultural variations being an important variable (Christensen and Fan, 2016; Masujima, 2005). Researchers have already highlighted such risks (Andrews and De Vries, 2007), warning that countries often do not have the necessary structural (material and cultural) conditions for the intended participation. It might be argued that, in Japan, material conditions necessitating reforms are similar to other developed nations. However, cultural conditions influencing reforms (be they NPM or PB) are unique, not just to each country, but also to individual organisations within a single country (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Appreciation of these unique cultural conditions is key to a better understanding of the (un)intended consequences of local government reforms across countries (Ashraf and Uddin, 2016). Thus, this article suggests that caution should be exercised in the wholesale adoption of such programmes.

Finally, we would call for further studies to detail the role of budgetary participation efforts in different local governments. Such a study of budget participation in other Japanese local governments may provide further insights into the verticality and its perpetuation at a time when the country is experiencing a flux in its socio-economic conditions (Christensen, 2000). Cross-country research on budgetary participation should perhaps also be encouraged to shed light on the narrowness of local government reforms around the world, demonstrate cultural variations and raise caution as regards the unquestioning adoption of globalised reform ideas.

Footnotes

Notes

Shahzad Uddin is a Professor of Accounting and the Director of the Essex Accounting Centre, University of Essex, UK. Shahzad has published on New Public Management, corporate governance and CSR in varied research sites located in four continents: Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. Methodologically, his research is in qualitative traditions, drawing from sociology, anthropology, development economics and philosophy.

Yuji Mori is an Associate Professor of Accounting and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Health Services Management Studies at the University of Shizouka, Japan. Yuji has published on the public sector and local government in Japan. His current research investigates governance in health care.

Dr Pawan Adhikari is a Senior Lecturer in Accounting at the Essex Business School, University of Essex, UK. His recent publications cover different aspects of public sector accounting in emerging economies.

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