The weight of service delivery: administrative and rules burdens in street-level bureaucracy

Abstract

This article explores the factors that shape perceptions of administrative and rules burdens among street-level bureaucrats in Romania. Recent research examining the concept of administrative burden has focused on burdens experienced by a citizen or client. We argue here that national context shapes the features of public service delivery, and that burdens must also be understood from the perspective of bureaucrats in transitioning post-communist countries. Street-level bureaucrats represent an important category of public servants given their main characteristics in implementing policy. Findings of two analyses—one examining broader concepts of administrative burden and one looking at the narrower concept of rules burdens—indicate that rule complexity, autonomy, conformity, job satisfaction, educational attainment, and perceived corruption impact perceptions of administrative burden, while perceptions of rules burdens are impacted by rule-abiding tendencies, discretionary latitude, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and supervisory status.

Points for practitioners

A major practical implication of this study derives from our findings on the factors that impact attitudes and perceptions of street-level bureaucrats in Romania. Managers that aim to improve public service delivery in this context will be able to disseminate the fact that reduced rule complexity and increased autonomy, among other organizational variables, positively impact perceptions on administrative and rules burdens. In this sense, our study provides evidence for new and current structures to improve organizational performance and service delivery.

Keywords

administrative burden Romania rules burdens street-level bureaucracy

Introduction

Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) are the face of public organizations, serving in positions that require expertise and an ability to reconcile rules and situations while exercising discretion. Bureaucrats must consider service recipient needs and the appropriateness of rules, and act in situations characterized by information asymmetry and without supervision. Existing research in this area has examined issues of discretion, decision-making, organizational and occupational culture, and the nature of the political and administrative context (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Riccucci, 2005). However, much of this literature has neglected the unique context of street-level public services in transitioning post-communist countries, where rules, behavior, context, organizational characteristics, and expectations for service are different (Hall, 2004). This article focuses on important aspects of front-line work—the perceptions of both administrative and rules burdens—among SLBs in Romania.

Recent research has examined the concept of “administrative burden” as a central aspect of a citizen’s experience with a government or contracted bureaucratic function (Heinrich, 2016; Herd et al., 2013; Jilke et al., 2018; Moynihan et al., 2014). We argue that it is important to understand the concept of administrative burden from the perspectives of those who provide services (Burden et al., 2012). This research focus is especially important in Romania, which is a unique setting given the combination of a legalist approach to public services, institutional design, and political cultures. A recent study by Henderson, Ticlau, and Balica (2017) revealed that SLBs in Romania enjoy a high level of discretion, highlighting the importance of this area of inquiry given the discretionary latitude and poor regulatory quality that governs day-to-day activity.

Concepts of perceived work-related burdens are important in examining front-line professions as both the myriad sources of influence that shape bureaucratic behavior and individual responses are magnified. May and Winter (2007) note that political principals and direct managers influence the behavior of SLBs, both through direct rule creation and by signaling preferences for behavior. This suggests that stakeholders may create or reduce burdens in specific areas according to their own interests, even if the outcomes are undesirable (Moynihan et al., 2014), and may influence the knowledge, values, and discretionary behavior of SLBs (May and Winter, 2007).

This article uses original survey data collected from Romanian SLBs to answer a central research question: in what ways do SLBs’ perceptions of their core function impact their feelings of administrative and rules burdens? The next section offers an overview of administrative burden and rules, and a discussion of the Romanian context of SLBs. Data and methods are presented, followed by the results of the two ordered logistic models. The regression models are based on the exploration of five hypotheses that test the relationships between autonomy, rule complexity, rule abidance, discretion, conformity, job satisfaction, corruption, and administrative and rules burdens. Limitations and concluding comments follow.

Administrative burden and street-level services

The concept of administrative burden has received a great deal of attention (Moynihan et al., 2014), highlighting the importance of how recipients of public services experience bureaucratic action. Burden et al. (2012: 741) define administrative burden as “an individual’s experience of policy implementation as onerous.” The literature on administrative burden begins with early studies on bureaucratic encounters, reflecting the interactions between agencies and clients (Heinrich, 2016). The work of Kahn, Katz, and Gutek (1976) is relevant not only for the understanding of bureaucratic encounters, but also for differentiating between administrative burden and red tape. While administrative burden studies are directed toward “bureaucratic responses—at individual and organizational levels—to individuals outside the organization seeking public services and benefits (service, client relations, admissions)”, red tape studies are directed specifically toward how “rules affect administrative employees” (Heinrich, 2016: 405; see also Bozeman et al., 1992). Rules burdens are therefore seen as a subset of administrative burden. Of note, not all rules can create burdens, and the literature advances the difference between legitimate and illegitimate rules (Bozeman, 2000).

From a bureaucrat’s perspective, administrative burden is linked to a preference for past administrative responsibilities, to other individuals and their behavior, and with perceiving a specific policy as flawed (Burden et al., 2012). Moynihan et al. (2014) discuss the costs that are associated with administrative burden, including: learning costs, focused on collecting information about a specific public service in relation to the individual’s needs; psychological costs, or “the stigma of applying for or participating in a program with negative perceptions, a sense of loss of power or autonomy in interactions with the state, or the stresses of dealing with administrative processes” (Moynihan et al., 2014: 45–46); and compliance costs, the burdens on end users created by various bureaucratic rules. Despite this interest, there are still a number of aspects of the concept that remain relatively unexplored (Burden et al., 2012; Heinrich, 2016; Moynihan et al., 2014), including a focus on burdens experienced by SLBs.

Bureaucrats develop formal and informal working routines, and the extent to which these bureaucrats have some amount of control over their daily routines and decision-making is likely to shape their general perceptions of administrative burden. Preferences for autonomy suffuse front-line positions, and a loss of autonomy increases perceptions of burden and reduces job satisfaction (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Moynihan et al., 2014). Bureaucrats with some amount of autonomy are less likely to see work as difficult, onerous, or burdensome. Thus, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1a: SLBs who have greater feelings of autonomy are likely to perceive less administrative burden.

Rules are a central matter of consideration for street-level workers, and experience with administrative burden and rules burdens are shaped by organizational regulatory quality and rule effectiveness (DeHart-Davis, 2009a). This need is striking, especially in Romania, a country with a strong legalistic culture (Ticlau and Hintea, 2016). The ambiguous and interpretable character of rules not only shapes behavior and levels of corruption, but also defines the administrative and political culture of the country.

Different street-level functions require different rules, which may be more or less technical, more or less extensive, and more or less legitimate or appropriate for service provision. This rule complexity may be a function of the particular service area, but may also be influenced by regulatory complexity as determined by political ends. Although the sources of rules matter to some extent, a bureaucrat’s general conceptualization of rules as complex is likely to shape their more general feelings of administrative burden as they enact rules in the course of their duties. We hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1b: SLBs who experience more rule complexity are likely to perceive more administrative burden.

Examinations of rules, through theories of green tape and red tape, are prevalent in public administration research, and this research is directly related to the world of street-level public services (Bozeman and Feeney, 2011; DeHart-Davis, 2009a, 2009b; Moynihan and Herd, 2010). Red tape is defined as “organizational procedures that are viewed as wasteful, unnecessary, self-serving, and vexing” (Scott and Pandey, 2000: 616), and represents a type of formalization (Bozeman and Feeney, 2011). In contrast, DeHart-Davis’s (2009a: 901) theory of green tape “argues that rule effectiveness … depends on technical proficiency as well as stakeholder cooperation.” Rule-abiding behavior is viewed as “a set of general attitudes and intentions related to individually held ideas about rules and rule effectiveness” (Henderson, 2013: 801). The literature indicates that rule understanding increases rule abidance, and thus rules are perceived as less burdensome and more acceptable (DeHart-Davis, 2009b).

SLBs also exhibit varying desires to abide by rules, either as an individual tendency or as a result of their assessments of rules relative to expertise. Regardless of reason, these individuals are less likely to perceive rules as a burden. Abidance is likely driven by a desire for conformity; thus, rules will not be seen as burdensome regardless of the amount of work that abidance requires. Similarly, those who are more rule abiding will likely see those rules as necessary, thus decreasing the view of those rules as burdensome. We hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2a: SLBs who are more rule abiding are likely to perceive less rules burdens.

The inability to craft policies that fully and completely determine how bureaucrats do their job results in some amount of discretion (Lipsky, 1980). An individual’s perceived discretion is a function of their relationship with rules and their individual level of comfort with discretion. Discretion is a critical organizational element because it enhances “experienced responsibility with outcomes” (Tummers and Bekkers, 2014: 533) and experienced meaningfulness of work, leading to increased internal motivation (Hackman and Oldham, 1980). Front-line workers who perceive that they have more discretion are less likely to view rules as burdensome or onerous. Thus, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2b: SLBs who perceive that they have more discretion are likely to perceive reduced rules burdens.

Similar to the variability of perspectives of individual discretion are individual tendencies to conform (DeHart-Davis, 2009a; Kohn, 1977; Moynihan et al., 2014). Conformity is focused on the extent to which an individual’s internal behavior is driven by external standards, and is associated with increased rule abidance (Gordon, 1970; Kohn, 1977). General issues of conformity affect perceptions of rules and administrative structures as burdensome; individuals with a greater desire to conform may be less likely to perceive either administrative structures or rules as burdensome given the intrinsic motivation to think or behave in a manner that matches with others (DeHart-Davis, 2009a). We hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3: SLBs who are higher in conformity are likely to express reduced feelings of administrative and rules burdens.

Last, perceptions of both administrative and rules burdens are also closely linked to general individual job-related attitudes (Burden et al., 2012; Moynihan et al., 2014). Moynihan et al. (2014) note that an increased amount of administrative burden that contradicts an individual’s intrinsic preferences leads to low job satisfaction. On the one hand, job satisfaction represents a positive emotional state that is determined by “consistent rule application, optimal rule control, and rule formalization” (DeHart-Davis et al., 2015: 853). On the other hand, red tape theory points to higher perceptions of red tape among alienated workers because they seek justification for the inconsistency between their motivations and the work environment. Global feelings of individual job satisfaction are likely to color the way in which employees view key aspects of the job, including the legitimacy, necessity, and appropriateness of administrative procedures and rules. We hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 4: SLBs who express higher levels of job satisfaction are less likely to express feelings of administrative or rules burdens.

The environment in which SLBs operate is influenced by complex political, administrative, and socio-economic factors. These factors contribute to the existence of administrative burden in bureaucracies but their influence varies depending on the context. Even though the study of administrative burden is dominated by US-based studies, there is a need for researchers in developing countries to address the challenges brought by administrative burden in efficiently implementing programs (Heinrich, 2016).

SLBs: the Romanian context

The Romanian context is important in shaping norms and beliefs in street-level jobs, rules, and organizational culture. Romanian accession to the European Union (EU) in 2007 encouraged professional training and strong formal education for bureaucrats (Lee, 2009). The country’s communist past did not allow for a civil service tradition; thus, Romanian bureaucracy is often seen as fragile and heavily influenced by politics. A number of challenges exist, including issues with public sector reform, the changing roles of elites, changing demographics, the erosion of trust, systemic corruption, and authoritarian tendencies (Anheier, 2017). Corruption and inefficient public services continue to hamper the economic environment in Romania; regulatory burden, the lack of predictability of legislation, and the poor enforcement of legal and technical regulations are major barriers for development (European Commission, 2017). Although progress has been made for civil service reform, doubts remain about institutional capacity (European Commission, 2017). Studies of civil service reform indicate that civil servants were excluded from designing public services, and the policy process relies heavily on external political advisors (Ionita, 2007).

A study by Dzhumashev (2008) identifies a positive association between highly corrupt environments with poor governance quality and high red tape costs and regulatory burden. Corruption creates regulatory barriers in order to attract bribes from private agents, while increasing the effective burden of the regulation (Dzhumashev, 2008). Corruption continues to be a significant issue in the Romanian public sector. SLBs’ perceptions of corruption are likely to influence how they understand, interpret, and implement policies and rules, as well as how they think about the legitimacy of the administrative structures and processes. A lack of perceived legitimacy or appropriateness is likely to increase perceptions that administrative structures and rules are not purposeful or goal driven, and increase perceived burdens. Thus, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 5: SLBs who hold perceptions of increased corruption are more likely to express feelings of administrative or rules burdens.

A recent study by Ticlau and Hintea (2016) examined a number of pressures on public organizations that impact front-line workers, including fiscal pressures, pressures from adapting to external environments, and pressures from citizens to increase service quality. The Romanian bureaucratic environment is therefore a dynamic system in which SLBs need to function regardless of the system’s unpredictability and instability. The next section discusses data collection from front-line Romanian government workers.

Data and methods

This study focuses on four organizations that use SLBs in varying capacities, including: county-level offices for territorial labor inspectorates, primarily concerned with labor law enforcement; county-level commissions for consumer protection, which manage issues related to consumer laws; national environmental protection agency offices, which provide oversight for environmental laws; and county administrations for public finance, which assess and collect taxes and fees. These agencies were selected because of the significance of the services provided, and also for the frequent and sustained interactions between constituents and front-line providers.

Data collection

The survey used here was created in English by the second, third, and fourth authors, and then the third and fourth authors, both fluent in English and Romanian, translated the completed survey into Romanian. Unaffiliated researchers back-translated the survey into English to ensure that any issues of translation were identified. Any questions resulting from the back-translation process were discussed, and the survey was edited to account for any of these considerations of language or meaning.

Data were collected using both paper and web-based surveys. Paper surveys were mailed to the primary contact for each agency with a letter asking the contact to distribute the survey to subordinates in front-line positions. A total of 672 surveys were sent to 168 organizations. Identical web-based surveys were emailed to the publicly listed email addresses for agency contacts. A pre-notification, initial invitation, and two reminder emails were sent over a two-week period. The methods of survey distribution used, which were necessary to contact a substantial number of government workers in a wide variety of organizations, do not allow for the creation of a sampling frame or the calculation of a response rate.

Estimators and models

Two ordered logistic regression models are estimated here: one that examines the more general concept of administrative burden; and one that examines the more specific rules burdens. In both cases, these are individual subjective perceptions of burden. Predictors for the general administrative burden model include broader individual perceptions of the work environment, including rule complexity and autonomy, along with conformity, perceived corruption, and job satisfaction. The second more specific model examining perceived rules burdens employs predictors that are similarly more specific, including rule abidance and discretion, and also includes the other key job-related characteristics of conformity, perceived corruption, and job satisfaction.

Measurement

Administrative burden was measured as agreement with the following statement: “There is a significant amount of administrative burden on officials like me.” Rules burdens was measured as the level of agreement with the following statement: “Daily rule application is made difficult because of technical complexity.” The specificity and concrete nature of these concepts allows for the use of single-item measures as dependent variables.

Rule complexity was measured using a single item that asked about the extent to which the rules used for core tasks are complex. Autonomy was measured using three items (α = 0.89) adopted from Hackman and Oldham (1980) that examine perceptions of and opportunity for freedom in making work-related choices. The measure for rule abidance was adopted from DeHart-Davis (2009a) and includes eight items (α = 0.62) that ask about perspectives of rules, effectiveness in the face of rules, and rule bending. Discretion was measured using a single item from Tummers and Bekkers’s (2014) policy alienation scale, which asks about individual feelings of freedom in using rules or policies. Conformity was measured using four items (α = 0.83) adopted from DeHart-Davis (2009a) that ask about tendencies to accept or question authority, and the general tendency to conform or rebel. Government corruption was measured using two items (α = 0.88) that ask about the vulnerability of the public sector and local government to corruption. Job satisfaction was measured using a single item adopted from Hackman and Oldham (1980). Additional information for all measures, including source, question text, and scale reliability, is included in the online appendix.

Control variables for both models for administrative burden and rules burdens include organizational commitment (α = 0.72) (from Moynihan and Pandey, 2007), years in the organization, supervisory status, education, and income. Organizational commitment is important in that it may concretely color perceptions of job functions, and may temper even negative aspects of roles like administrative and rules burdens. Additional experiential and demographic variables like tenure in the organization and supervisory status are likely to affect both individual perceptions of rules and administrative processes, and may reflect individual participation in processes that create both. Both education and income may have an impact on perceptions of burden by altering individual abilities to assess the necessity or appropriateness of services, as well as via an impact on satisfaction and motivation. Cronbach’s alphas for all indices are above a threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994), with the exception of rule abidance (0.62); we argue that this is acceptable given the exploratory nature of this research.

We assessed both models for issues of multicollinearity and violations of the assumption of parallel regression, and neither is problematic. A Brant test (Brant, 1990) returned a non-significant test statistic, indicating that the ordered logit model is preferable over a multinominal logit model.

Results

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all study variables. Median scores for administrative burden were on the higher end of the scale, while the median for rules burdens was slightly lower. Despite strong feelings as regards both general administrative and rules burdens, respondents indicated that they had some amount of autonomy in the job, and the median for discretion was near the higher end of the scale. Scores for organizational commitment were toward the higher end of the scale and, related to this, respondents noted that they had been part of their organization for a significant period of time: the median time in the organization was 16 years.

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics for study variables.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Median	Std Dev.	Min.	Max.
Administrative burden	402	3.48	4	1.10	1	5
Rule complexity	388	3.77	4	0.89	1	5
Autonomy	400	4.42	4.67	1.10	1	6
Rules burdens	388	3.21	3	1.02	1	5
Rule abidance	388	14.94	15	3.09	6	24
Discretion	403	3.45	4	1.05	1	5
Conformity	396	9.65	9	3.48	1	16
Government corruption	406	3.24	3	0.66	1	4
Job satisfaction	401	4.90	5	0.98	1	6
Organizational commitment	405	20.41	21	4.84	4	28
Years in the organization	395	15.98	16	6.97	0	61
Supervisor	402	0.75	1	0.44	0	1
Education	402	6.40	7	0.97	3	8
Income	385	3.76	4	1.29	1	5

Although acting as street-level government workers, approximately 75% of respondents were in some type of supervisory role. Respondents were highly educated, with the median level of education being a master’s degree.

Regression model for administrative burden

Table 2 presents the ordered logistic regression model for administrative burden. Both rule complexity and perceived government corruption had a positive relationship with administrative burden: a one-unit increase in rule complexity resulted in a 123% increase in the likelihood of being in a higher level of administrative burden relative to other categories of the dependent variable (OR = 2.23, z = 5.6, p < 0.01); and a one-unit increase in perceived corruption increased chances of being in a higher category of administrative burden by 54% (OR = 1.54, z = 2.27, p < 0.05). The remaining key predictors of autonomy, conformity, and job satisfaction were all negatively related to administrative burden: a one-unit increase in autonomy results in a 21% reduction in the chances of being in a higher category of administrative burden (OR = 0.79, z = –1.94, p < 0.10); a one-unit increase in conformity reduces the chances of being in a higher level of perceived administrative burden by 10% (OR = 0.90, z = –2.9, p < 0.01); and a one-unit increase in job satisfaction results in a 32% reduction in the chances of being in a higher category of administrative burden (OR = 0.68, z = –2.42, p < 0.05). Education also had a positive relationship with administrative burden: a one-unit increase in education resulted in a 28% increased chance of being in a higher level of administrative burden relative to other levels (OR = 1.28, z = 2.17, p < 0.05).

Table 2.

Ordered logistic regression model for administrative burden.

		Robust
	Odds ratio	Std Err.	z	P > z
Independent variables
Rule complexity	2.23	0.32	5.6	***
Autonomy	0.79	0.09	–1.94	*
Conformity	0.90	0.03	–2.9	***
Government corruption	1.54	0.29	2.27	**
Job satisfaction	0.68	0.11	–2.42	**
Control variables
Organizational commitment	1.01	0.03	0.41
Years in the organization	1.02	0.02	1.26
Supervisor	0.79	0.21	–0.88
Education	1.28	0.15	2.17	**
Income	0.89	0.09	–1.23
Number of obs	=	338
Wald χ²(13)	=	86.11
Prob > chi²	=	***
Pseudo R²	=	0.106
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R²:	=	0.285

Significance levels: ***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.1.

Calculating predicted probabilities for combinations of independent variables allows us to examine realistic categorizations of hypothetical respondents. Table 3 presents the predicted probabilities for each of the categories of the dependent variables for single or paired combinations of the statistically significant independent variables in our model. These include variables related to rules and feelings of freedom (rule complexity and autonomy), the perspectives of individual preferences as related to broader organizational and government systems (corruption and conformity), and the single variables of job satisfaction and education. Respondents high on rule complexity and low on autonomy were much more likely to perceive work as burdensome, with more than half (51%) of respondents predicted to respond “strongly agree” and an additional 35% predicted to respond “agree.” Reversing responses to low rule complexity and high autonomy produces a significant change in predicted probabilities, with 57% falling into the “strongly disagree” and “disagree” categories combined.

Table 3.

Probability of responses for categories of administrative burden.

Variables	SD	D	N	A	SA
High rule complexity, low autonomy	1%	2%	12%	35%	51%
Low rule complexity, high autonomy	29%	28%	31%	10%	2%
Difference	28%	26%	19%	–24%	–49%
High perceived corruption, low conformity	2%	4%	17%	38%	40%
Low perceived corruption, high conformity	18%	24%	36%	17%	5%
Difference	17%	20%	19%	–21%	–35%
Low satisfaction	1%	3%	15%	35%	45%
High satisfaction	7%	13%	34%	32%	14%
Difference	6%	10%	19%	–4%	–31%
Low education	11%	17%	36%	26%	10%
High education	4%	8%	27%	37%	25%
Difference	–7%	–9%	–9%	10%	15%

Note: SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neither agree nor disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree.

Respondents perceiving high corruption and having a low desire to conform were much more likely to agree with sentiments about administrative burden: approximately 40% are predicted to fall into the “strongly agree” category; and an additional 38% are predicted to fall into the “agree” category. Conversely, SLBs low in satisfaction were much more likely to perceive some amount of administrative burden, with 80% falling into the “agree” or “strongly agree” categories, while those high in satisfaction were more evenly distributed and showed some ambivalence. Results for the ordered logistic regression model for rules burdens are presented next.

Regression model for rules burdens

Table 4 presents the ordered logistic regression models for rules burdens, which demonstrates a number of similar relationships to the more general concept of administrative burden. Rule-abiding tendencies were negatively related to perceived rules burdens: a one-unit increase in rule abidance results in a 16% reduction in the likelihood of being in a higher category of rules burdens (OR = 0.84, z = –4.5, p < 0.01). As with autonomy in the previous model, perceived discretion was negatively related to rules burdens: a one-unit increase in perceived discretion results in a 34% reduction in the likelihood of being in a higher level of rules burdens (OR = 0.66, z = –3.22, p < 0.01). Job satisfaction was negatively related to perceived rules burdens: a one-unit increase in satisfaction results in a 26% reduction in perceived rules burdens (OR = 0.74, z = –2.68, p < 0.01). Among control variables, organizational commitment was positively related to rules burdens (OR = 1.07, z = 2.74, p < 0.01), while supervisory status was negatively related to rules burdens (OR = 0.57, z = –2.17, p < 0.05).

Table 4.

Ordered logistic regression model for rules burdens.

		Robust
	Odds ratio	Std Err.	z	P > z
Independent variables
Rule abidance	0.84	0.03	–4.5	***
Discretion	0.66	0.09	–3.22	***
Conformity	0.98	0.03	–0.6
Government corruption	1.17	0.20	0.87
Job satisfaction	0.74	0.08	–2.68	***
Control variables
Organizational commitment	1.07	0.03	2.74	***
Years in the organization	1.01	0.02	0.32
Supervisor	0.57	0.15	–2.17	**
Education	1.02	0.12	0.15
Income	1.11	0.11	1.12
Number of observations	=	327
Wald chi²(12)	=	47.55
Prob > chi²	=	***
Pseudo R²	=	0.0598
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R²:	=	0.169

Significance levels: ***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.1.

Table 5 presents the predicted probabilities for categories of the dependent variable of rules burdens for statistically significant variables found in the second model. Respondents high in rule abidance and low in perceived discretion were much more likely to answer “agree” (37%) or “strongly agree” (53%). A shift to low rule abidance and high discretion produced only relatively small changes: both the “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” categories grew by 10%, while “strongly agree” decreased by 22%. Changes in individual perspectives of the organization—including job satisfaction and organizational commitment—also produced relatively small changes in predicted probabilities for the categories of the dependent variable. Finally, supervisory status was found to be significant in the model. Approximately one-third of non-supervisory personnel are predicted to fall into the “neither agree nor disagree” category, while half are expected to fall into the “agree” or “strongly agree” categories combined. Slight increases for the “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” and “neither agree nor disagree” categories for those who self-identified as supervisors offset the reductions in both categories of agreement.

Table 5.

Probability of responses for categories of rules burdens.

Variables	SD	D	N	A	SA
High rule abidance, low discretion	0%	2%	8%	37%	53%
Low rule abidance, high discretion	1%	4%	18%	46%	31%
Difference	0%	3%	10%	10%	–22%
Low job satisfaction, low organizational commitment	5%	19%	37%	32%	8%
High job satisfaction, high organizational commitment	4%	16%	35%	35%	10%
Difference	–1%	–3%	–2%	4%	2%
Non-supervisory position	3%	14%	33%	38%	12%
Supervisor	5%	20%	37%	30%	8%
Difference	2%	6%	4%	–7%	–5%

Note: SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neither agree nor disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree.

Discussion

In the models specified here, both administrative and rules burdens among street-level workers are shaped by individual perspectives of job characteristics, related psychological traits, perspectives of government corruption, and, in some cases, education and status within an organization. Autonomy was related to reduced perceptions of administrative burden, indicating support for hypothesis 1a. Thus, despite potentially complex and demanding jobs, it may be that autonomy reduces negative characterizations of work by making workers feel necessary, empowered, and expert. Conversely, increased rule complexity produced positive and substantial changes in perceptions of administrative burden, indicating support for hypothesis 1b. This makes intuitive sense in that more voluminous rule sets or more cognitively demanding jobs may reduce the abilities of bureaucrats to routinize or standardize behavior. This is also expected given that Romania is known to have an administrative system that suffers from high rule complexity and poor-quality legislation. This is an important finding since efforts to reduce perceptions of administrative burden must focus on improving regulatory quality by simplifying organizational rules. Together, reduced rule complexity and increased autonomy were associated with a substantial shift in perceptions of administrative burdens.

Rule-abiding tendencies among SLBs reduced the chances of viewing rules as burdensome, providing support for hypothesis 2a. It is possible that those front-line workers who are more attuned to rules and who favor close rule following may both seek out information about rules and internalize rule content, thus viewing rules as less burdensome. Those perceiving some amount of individual discretionary decision-making abilities also perceived reduced rules burdens, providing support for hypothesis 2b. Increased discretion may open the door for increased feelings of agency and individual impact, thus reducing feelings that rules are weighty or imposing.

Results for general job-related tendencies and perspectives common to both models were mixed. Conformity was found to reduce perceptions of administrative burden but not rules burdens, providing partial support for hypothesis 3. Front-line workers may view conformity as a broader, systemic concept; it may be that the operative mechanism here is that those workers who tend to conform are less likely to question any aspect of the work experience. Conformity may not impact perceived rules burdens in that rules may be seen as aspects of the job that are not to be questioned: rule sets promulgated by strong central government agencies are seen as unchanging job attributes rather than something that generates a feeling of being a burden. The direction of the relationships between conformity and perceived rules burdens was as hypothesized.

Agreement was more consistent for job satisfaction: SLBs who were more satisfied perceived both administrative and rules burdens to be lessened, providing support for hypothesis 4. The mechanism here may be similar to that of autonomy previously: satisfaction may color the street-level worker’s general perceptions of the job in a manner that reduces perceived burdens despite being difficult or complex. Changes in perceptions of administrative burden for high and low job satisfaction, when paired with organizational commitment, were modest: changes in perceived rules burdens for high and low job satisfaction were much stronger, perhaps due to more tangible linkages between the assessment of job satisfaction and specific aspects of jobs.

Finally, perceptions of corruption were significant in increased perceptions of administrative burden but not rules burdens, indicating partial support for hypothesis 5. Bureaucrats may view corruption as a more abstract concept that characterizes the state, thus shaping broader, more general conceptions of “administration,” but may not translate this to more granular views of rules that touch on their daily lives. It may be that the bureaucratic perception of corruption shapes broader views of how organizations function in society but does not translate to concrete differences in seeing everyday aspects of the job as burdensome.

Among control variables, organizational commitment was positively related to perceived rules burdens, though the magnitude of the change to the odds ratio was small. Front-line workers who internalize strong connections to an organization’s core function—and are thus more committed—may also be more willing to critically examine or question rules, thus being more sensitive to rule characteristics and perceiving rules as burdensome. Similarly, education and perceived administrative burden were positively related, and shifts in predicted probabilities indicate more of a tendency to agree or strongly agree with statements on burden. Those with advanced educational attainment may be more able to critically examine aspects of administrative functioning and perceive increased administrative burden. Last, supervisory status was negatively related to rules burdens, which is potentially a result of organizational leaders harboring a reduced desire to criticize a system that they are charged with managing.

Limitations

A number of limitations are worthy of discussion. The methods of data collection used here created a non-representative sample, which was necessitated by the lack of a formal sampling frame and differentiated email systems used by various county and national agencies. Although a representative sample would be preferable, we argue that the exploratory nature of this research allows for the recognition of this limitation as a consideration while foregrounding the compelling results. Second, this study uses a cross-sectional survey design, which does not allow us to make any arguments about causality. Additional research is necessary to more fully understand both the directionality of relationships and causality. Using longitudinal data or experimental research designs in the future would be beneficial, especially given the nature of this perceptual and behavioral topic.

Conclusions

Shaping front-line positions to reduce perceived administrative and rules burdens is an important step in improving service provision in Romania. These findings are particularly connected to the administrative context in Romania, which is dominated by loyalty to the Constitution and the law, and can be applied to other Eastern European countries with a strong authoritarian governance culture. Although there is a general desire to standardize behavior in street-level positions as much as possible, it may be that focused efforts to reduce rule complexity and increase autonomy and discretion may reduce the weight on the bureaucratic role. This may be a virtuous cycle: autonomy and discretion may then increase job satisfaction, thus further reducing feelings of burden. The improved design and implementation of rules may then allow organizations to hire and retain rule-abiding personnel who adhere to better rules while enjoying purposefully integrated autonomy and discretion.

Both administrative and rules burdens are important concepts in understanding how front-line bureaucrats perceive their work, and in shaping their interactions with managers and citizens at the interface of state and society. This study brings to the fore a number of individual, organizational, and contextual determinants of both administrative and rules burdens. Both are essential in that they make up the daily realities of both bureaucrats and citizens using the services of the state.

Supplemental Material

RAS895095 Supplemental Material - Supplemental material for The weight of service delivery: administrative and rules burdens in street-level bureaucracy

Supplemental material, RAS895095 Supplemental Material for The weight of service delivery: administrative and rules burdens in street-level bureaucracy by Cristina M. Stanica, Dan Balica, Alexander C. Henderson and Tudor C. Ţiclău in International Review of Administrative Sciences

Footnotes

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Cristina M. Stanica

Supplemental material

Supplementary material can be found at:

Cristina M. Stanica is a Visiting Lecturer in the School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University, USA. She holds a PhD in Urban Affairs and Public Policy from the University of Delaware. Her main research interests are in comparative governance and co-production.

Dan Balica, PhD, is a market and UX research manager at Zalando SE, Romania. Previously, he was adjunct lecturer at Babeș-Bolyai University, Fulbright Scholar at Michigan State University and Visiting Fellow at KU Leuven.

Alexander C. Henderson is an Associate Professor in the Department of Public and Nonprofit Administration at Marist College, USA. His current research examines administrative discretion, rule-breaking, and personnel management in public and nonprofit organizations. He is a fellow of the Center for Organizational Research and Design (CORD), and previously served as chief administrative officer, operational officer, director, and volunteer with several nonprofit organizations in suburban Philadelphia.

Tudor C. Ţiclău is a member of the Public Administration and Management Department, Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania, with over 10 years of experience in research and teaching and a PhD in Sociology. His main research interests are in administrative reform, strategic planning, and public leadership.

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