Quality of governance and political support in China,Japan,and South Korea

Abstract

Based on the theoretical distinction between specific and diffuse support, this study examines and compares the effects of governance quality on political support in China, Japan, and South Korea. As regime type is an important contextual factor, the three countries provide ideal cases for testing how the effects of governance on political support vary across different political systems in East Asia. The results show that both economic and political governance affects specific support in the three countries. Political governance is more important for specific support in Japan and South Korea than in China, though regime type does not moderate the effect of political governance on diffuse support. In addition, economic governance is more important for diffuse support in China than in Japan and South Korea. In the field of specific support, economic governance is more important for support for government officials in Japan and South Korea than in China.

Points for practitioners

Public support is critical to a political system’s effectiveness, stability, and even survival. Quality of governance determines the fate of authoritarian regimes. It is because of bad governance that the masses cannot continue to tolerate the authorities and take actions to overthrow authoritarian leadership. Echoing Fukuyama’s (2013) argument that an authoritarian regime can be well governed, the Chinese government attempts to improve the quality of governance so as to sustain autocratic leadership by promoting technical innovation in administrative management. However, the intrinsic defects in authoritarian systems, such as the absence of constitutional constraints on power, undermine their capacity to improve political governance. It is questionable how much good political governance in an authoritarian system can achieve without democratic reform of the political system.

Keywords

authoritarianism democracy East Asia governance governmental performance political support regime continuity

Introduction

Quality of governance is of relevance to citizens’ evaluation of government, and better governance helps the authorities earn public support. Even though there is a long debate over the relationship between government and governance (Hysing, 2009; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 2007), the government is still viewed to be the key agent in governance. Following Rotberg’s (2004, 2007, 2014) definition of governance, the quality of governance is evaluated by government performance in different policy domains. Improving the quality of governance is essential to any kind of political system. As governance is multifaceted, the effects of economic governance on public support may be different from the effects of political governance on public support (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Park, 2017). The separate effects that governance in different policy domains has on the public’s political support need to be examined.

The argument concerning a link between better governance and higher levels of political support among the masses has become so commonplace that little attention has been paid to variations in political support. There has been a theoretical tradition of distinguishing specific support from diffuse support because the two types of political support are different in nature (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 1999). Nevertheless, there is insufficient research on whether the effects of governance quality on specific support are the same as its effects on diffuse support. In addition, any existent difference may vary in different political systems. The importance of contextual factors in the research on political support has not obtained sufficient attention until recent years. Regime type is an important contextual factor and the effect of governance quality in different policy domains on political support is contingent on regime type. Cross-national studies find that political governance is more important for public support in democratic countries (Mishler and Rose, 2002; Park and Shin, 2006).

Drawing on insights into the role of contextual factors, the present study takes further steps to examine contextual variations in the effect of governance quality on political support by dividing it into specific and diffuse support based on Easton’s seminal theorization of political support. On the one hand, the People’s Republic of China (China), Japan, and the Republic of Korea (Korea) are three East Asian countries that share cultural legacies; however, on the other hand, they have undergone divergent political development after the Second World War. According to Freedom House ratings, Japan and Korea are liberal democracies, while China is an authoritarian country. The institutional perspective stresses that institutions determine the quality of governance (Kenny, 2012). As the three countries differ in the nature of their regimes, they provide ideal cases to compare how the effects of governance quality on political support vary between a democracy and an authoritarian system.

Specific and diffuse support

Political support reflects evaluative and affective orientations toward politics, linking ordinary citizens to politics (Hetherington, 1998; Mishler and Rose, 2001). It indicates the degree of subjective evaluation, commitment, and voluntary acceptance of the authority’s rule. Political support has a hierarchical structure, and the object of political support shifts from politicians to the political process, or from institutions to general political principles (Budge and Newton, 1997; Norris, 1999). Easton’s (1965, 1975) influential theorization of political support distinguished specific support from diffuse support. Specific support refers to public approval for incumbent government officials or support for political institutions. Diffuse support is attachment to a political system for its own sake and is independent of the governance outputs of political systems. Easton’s theorization of specific and diffuse support laid the foundation for contemporary studies on political support.

Not only is the distinction between specific and diffuse support meaningful in theory; empirical studies also find that ordinary people do, indeed, evaluate politics in everyday life by distinguishing specific support from diffuse support. The public’s attitudes toward incumbent politicians or governmental institutions are independent from their commitment to a political system (Klingemann, 1999). Such a distinction in the public’s political support has important implications. On the one hand, the “crisis of democracy” thesis may overstate problems in a democratic system. Public dissatisfaction with politicians and the decline of support for political institutions are within the field of specific support, which has nothing to do with diffuse support for the democratic system. Conversely, the lower level of specific support in democracies indicates a flourishing emancipative spirit and critical citizenship, from which a liberal democracy draws energy and develops (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 253; Norris, 1999). On the other hand, a higher level of specific support in authoritarian regimes generates a false picture in which autocrats enjoy legitimacy among the public. Public support is important for authoritarian regimes, and these regimes want to maintain a monopoly over power by delivering satisfactory economic outputs. In such a case, the public is willing to temporarily tolerate the oppressive regime for an exchange of tangible economic benefits (Feldmann and Mazepus, 2018; Zhai, 2016). However, this never means that the masses regard the political system as a just and legitimate one; thus, it is characterized by low levels of diffuse support.

Most prior studies conceptualize political support in authoritarian regimes by the indicators of specific support and pay less attention to overall support for a political system. Specific support is important but tends to fluctuate with changes in the economic situation or political scandals. Even though economic governance can yield specific support, it is unclear whether diffuse support is independent from economic governance in authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian regime would be fragile and vulnerable to economic crisis if diffuse support was established on the basis of economic governance. In addition, it is unclear whether the sources of specific support are the same as those of diffuse support. As the studies on specific support (public support for government officials and political institutions) are dominant and show high levels of political support in China, examining the effect of governance quality on diffuse support in authoritarian regimes helps unveil the other side of authoritarian “resilience.”

The effects of governance quality on political support

Governance in different policy domains and political support

Governance is a concept of varied definition and explanation, like Fukuyama’s (2013) bureaucratic capacity and autonomy, Rothstein and Teorell’s (2008) impartiality, Rotberg’s (2004) performance, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, and so on. We adopt Rotberg’s (2004, 2007, 2014) definition that equates governance with government performance. As Rotberg (2014) states, good governance should be assessed by tangible performance and results. Only by evaluating actual performance can we distinguish governments from other actors that do not produce political goods. Government performance in different policy domains determines the quality of governance. Prior studies stress the positive effects of economic governance on political support (Chen, 2004; Tang, 2005; Yang and Holzer, 2006). Economic governance is important but not the whole story. Higher governance quality stresses good performance in the implementation of laws and policies, as well as good outputs of government (Park, 2017). Along with economic growth, governance in the fields of environmental protection, the rule of law, and social fairness equally affects citizens’ political support (Dickson, 2013; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Zhai, 2016). Quality of governance may vary significantly in different policy domains. Meanwhile, there is also the difference between specific and diffuse support. The separate effect of governance quality in different fields on specific and diffuse support needs to be examined to identify this difference.

As specific support reflects public opinion on incumbent government officials and political institutions, it fluctuates over time. Economic governance will affect the public’s approval of office-holders or administrations. Similarly, the characteristics of social and political governance, such as corruption, the failure of public policy, or political scandals, will also worsen specific support. Regardless of political systems, specific support in a democratic or authoritarian regime is subject to short-term fluctuations in government performance. Therefore, we posit that governance in both the economic and political fields matters for specific support in China, Japan, and Korea:

Hypothesis 1: Both economic and political governance affect specific support in the three countries.

In contrast, the effects of governance quality on diffuse support may vary significantly across different political systems. Studies find that economic governance affects specific support rather than diffuse support in democracies (Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999). Citizens’ diffuse support is independent from economic situations in democracies and economic governance does not directly cause the breakdown of a democracy. A democracy falls only when poor economic governance disappoints people in a country where the political system has already lost its legitimacy (Finkel et al., 1989). In a consolidated democracy, even if economic governance is less satisfactory, the public hardly lose faith in democracy as their basic political system.¹ It is the same in emerging democracies. Studies find that less satisfactory economic governance causes citizens’ discontent with government officials and the practice of a democracy but the public has never wanted to return to the authoritarian era (Chang et al., 2007; Gherghina and Klymenko, 2012; Mishler and Rose, 1996).

In the authoritarian context, studies conducted so far have exclusively focused on support for government officials or political institutions (Chen, 2004; Tang, 2005; Zhai, 2018, 2019); however, it remains unclear how the quality of governance affects the public’s general support for a political system. There are two theoretical predictions that can be made. First, satisfactory economic governance increases specific support but does not have an effect on diffuse support in authoritarian regimes. Some authoritarian countries have achieved economic success but the rule of law, social fairness, and checks on and balances of power are not properly performed. There are no constitutional constraints on power; thus, the abuse of power harms ordinary people’s human rights and dignity in daily life. Good economic governance can help an authoritarian government earn instrumental support but it hardly makes the political system legitimate. If the public in authoritarian regimes can distinguish support for incumbent officials and political institutions from support for a political system as citizens do in democracies, better economic governance will merely enhance specific support but have little influence on public support for authoritarian systems. Second, as administrative authorities are not separated from the political system in the authoritarian political socialization process, the public is inclined to equate governmental approval with the legitimacy of the political system. Consequently, economic governance affects both specific and diffuse support. In such cases, authoritarian regimes can sustain their diffuse support through good economic governance. However, the other side of the coin is that public support for the authoritarian system will become unstable when economic crises occur.

Both of the theoretical predictions outlined earlier are reasonable. Without evidence, we cannot approve one and deny the other. Therefore, we propose two conflicting hypotheses. One posits that Chinese citizens can distinguish specific support from diffuse support, and that better economic governance does not make the overall political system legitimate. The other adopts the reasoning that the Chinese public does not make a distinction between specific and diffuse support, which differs from the pattern in democracies. Economic governance in China not only boosts specific support, but also generates a spillover effect on diffuse support:

Hypothesis 2: Economic governance affects specific support but does not affect diffuse support in Japan and Korea.

Hypothesis 3.1: Economic governance affects specific support but does not affect diffuse support in China.

Hypothesis 3.2: Economic governance not only affects specific support, but also affects diffuse support, in China.

Comparing specific and diffuse support in the three countries

Cross-national studies find that political support is relatively lower in Japan and Korea than in China (Chu et al., 2008; Dalton and Shin, 2006); however, there is no systematic study comparing the three countries based on the theoretical distinction between specific and diffuse support. There are several tentative explanations for a high level of specific support in China. First, the fairly rapid economic growth improves ordinary Chinese people’s standards of living and satisfaction with life, which causes widespread public support for the current government. Second, Chinese society is dominated by materialist values and the masses focus excessively on their personal lives and become indifferent to political issues. Third, the Chinese government also seeks to improve its governance capability in order to maintain public popularity without replacing the political system. Fourth, state-led patriotic education generates surging nationalism and loyalty to the authorities (Zhai, 2017). Even though previous studies state that government performance generates political support among the Chinese population, we know little about whether such political support is protean specific support or stable diffuse support. In addition, so far, studies on distinctions between citizens’ specific and diffuse support have mostly been conducted in the context of democracies. It is unclear whether the citizens who are part of authoritarian systems can distinguish their evaluation of incumbent politicians and political institutions from their attitudes toward the overall political system. Both specific support and diffuse support, and the relationship between them in China, need to be examined separately.

The lower level of political support in Japan and Korea is limited to specific support. There are some reasons for this. First, economic performance is less satisfactory in the two countries and citizens have higher expectations of improvements in national and individual economic conditions. Less satisfactory economic governance causes low government approval. Second, the media has more freedom and independence. The media’s supervision makes it possible for the public to be informed about government corruption and political scandals that are more easily hidden or selectively exposed in authoritarian systems. Such negative information about government officials undermines specific support in Japan and Korea. Third, in accordance with critical citizenry theory (Dalton and Welzel, 2014; Norris, 1999), citizens in Japan and Korea are more critical of politicians and government performance. Therefore, the present study posits that public support for government officials and political institutions is lower in Japan and Korea than in China.

However, low levels of specific support do not indicate that citizens lose their faith in democracy as a fundamental political system. Prior studies confirm that diffuse support in established democracies is maintained at a higher level (Dalton, 2004; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013). In democracies, diffuse support is usually evaluated by the degree of public support for democracy. Empirical studies find that there is persistent support for democracy among the public in Japan and Korea (Chu et al., 2008; Shin, 2011). Nevertheless, Chinese citizens also show a higher level of support for democracy and tend to regard the current regime as a democracy (Shi, 2008; Zhai, 2019). Therefore, measures of public support for democracy cannot capture the nature of diffuse support in the three countries. To avoid measuring diffuse support as support for democracy, we need to assess the public’s general support for a political system as an indicator of diffuse support. So far, it is unclear whether there is a statistically significant difference in public support for a general political system across the three countries. A democracy ought to be preferable to an authoritarian system but how the masses perceive and evaluate their political systems is another matter. At the least, there is no evidence indicating that diffuse support in China is lower than that in Japan and Korea. Given that the issue remains to be explored, we tentatively posit that there is no significant difference in diffuse support across the three countries:

Hypothesis 4: Specific support is lower in Japan and Korea than in China, while there is no difference in diffuse support across the three countries.

The effect of governance on political support across political systems

Governance is performed in a specific context, and regime type is just such a contextual factor. The effect of governance quality on political support varies across different political systems. Prior studies find that political governance is important for political support in democracies (Huhe and Tang, 2017; Mishler and Rose, 2002; Park and Shin, 2006). Citizens’ general evaluation of a democracy is based on whether the rule of law, checks on and balances of powers, and elections perform properly in their societies. If political governance falls behind citizens’ expectations, governments face a crisis of legitimacy. Considering the effect of regime type, political systems may moderate the effect of political governance on public support. In oppressive authoritarian systems, people are in a passive and submissive position, and the quality of political governance is relatively less important. We posit that political governance is more important for political support in democracies than in authoritarian regimes.

However, authoritarian regimes have bad political governance and they suffer from the abuse of power, rampant corruption, the absence of the rule of law, and so on. Authoritarian regimes have fairly limited sources of legitimacy and have to primarily depend on good economic governance to earn public support (Chen, 2004; Feldmann and Mazepus, 2018; Tang, 2005). Meanwhile, citizens in societies dominated by materialism are willing to temporarily tolerate authoritarian regimes for tangible economic benefits (Zhai, 2016). As long as the regime can deliver a satisfactory level of economic outputs, citizens in authoritarian regimes maintain their support for the system. Therefore, we posit that economic governance is more important for political support in authoritarian regimes than in democracies:

Hypothesis 5: Political governance is more important for public support in Japan and Korea than in China.

Hypothesis 6: Economic governance is more important for public support in China than in Japan and Korea.

Data and methods

Data

This study uses the data set from the third round of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS).² The survey was carried out in the three countries by a standard questionnaire, and all samples were selected by a method of probability random sampling which ensures that every citizen in each country has an equal chance of being selected to participate in the survey. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents, and all interviewers had undergone intensive training before the surveys. In mainland China, there were 3473 samples, with a mean age of 45.06 years (standard deviation (SD) = 15.55 years). Of these, 47.38% of respondents were female and 52.62% of respondents were male. The Japanese sample comprised 1880 valid cases, with a mean age of 55.73 years (SD = 16.98 years). The majority of respondents (52.66%) were female, and 47.34% of respondents were male. There were 1207 Korean samples, with a mean age of 45.34 years (SD = 14.55 years). Of these, 49.88% of respondents were female and 50.12% of respondents were male.

Dependent variables

As stated previously, political support is multifaceted and requires a distinction to be made between specific and diffuse support. Following previous studies (Park, 2017; Tang, 2005), we measure specific and diffuse support separately. Public support for government officials and for political institutions constitutes specific support. This study measured support for government officials by asking respondents whether they agreed that incumbent officials were generally trustworthy. The responses were coded on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Support for political institutions was measured by asking respondents whether they are supportive of political institutions (parliament) in their country. The responses were coded on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not trust) to 4 (very trust). Public support for political systems is diffuse support. We measured regime support by asking respondents whether they were proud of their political system. The responses were coded on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not proud) to 4 (very proud).

Independent variables

As stated previously, the quality of governance is evaluated by government performance in different policy domains. There are two commonly used methods (objective versus subjective). Rotberg (2014) stresses the advantages of using publicly available objective data like life expectancy, homicide numbers, and so on. However, subjective measures are more suitable to the present study’s research theme. The purpose of the study is to examine the effects of governance quality on political support in different political systems. Ordinary citizens evaluate governance quality with subjective criteria and different people may make distinct evaluations of governance quality based on the same objective statistical figures. Their specific and diffuse support is also a result of their subjective evaluation of politics. Considering the importance of cognitive processes, the subjective measure of governance quality is more suitable for examining its effect on the level of citizens’ political support.

This study measured governance in economy, politics, and social policy by analyzing four items: economic security, rule of law, freedom of speech, and social fairness. Economic security was measured by asking respondents to evaluate governance quality in providing basic necessities such as food, clothes, and shelter to the people. Rule of law was measured by asking respondents to evaluate governance quality in the enforcement of laws in situations where government leaders break the law. Freedom of speech was measured by asking respondents to evaluate the quality of governance in protecting people to speak freely without fear. Social fairness was measured by asking respondents to evaluate the quality of governance in treating rich and poor people fairly. The responses to these four items were separately coded on a four-point Likert scale (reversed) ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

The effect of a contextual factor—the political system—was tested by the interaction of regime types and the quality of governance. The variable of regime type was measured on a binary scale, with 0 indicating an authoritarian regime and 1 indicating a democratic regime.

Control variables

Citizens’ interest in politics and political efficacy may affect regime support levels. We controlled for them in the analyses. Following previous studies (Dyck and Lascher, 2009), political interest was measured by asking respondents to evaluate how interested they are in politics. The responses were coded on a four-point Likert scale (reversed) ranging from 1 (not at all interested) to 4 (very interested). Political efficacy was measured by asking respondents whether they agreed with the statement that politics was too complicated to understand. The responses to these four items were coded on a four-point Likert scale (reversed) ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree).

The demographic variables of age, gender, and education were controlled in the multivariate regression analyses. Age and education were two continuous variables. Education was measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (no formal education) to 10 (post-graduate degree). Gender was coded on a dummy scale, with 0 indicating female and 1 indicating male.

Analytical strategies

The independent variables measured different sorts of governance. If the independent variables highly correlated with one another, they could be suppressing one another, explaining some of the weak or absent effects in the regressions. We test the variance inflation factors of variables in regressions to check multicollinearity. All indicators are below 2, which indicates low multicollinearity.

Findings

Variations in the effect of governance quality on political support

The research purpose of this study is to examine differences in the effects of governance quality on specific and diffuse support. Table 1 (available online) shows the effects of the quality of governance on public support for government officials in the three countries. In Japan, economic security, the rule of law, and social fairness were positively correlated with support for government officials (β = 0.202, p < .01; β = 0.222, p < .001; β = 0.253, p < .01, see model 1). In Korea, economic security and social fairness were positively correlated with support for government officials (β = 0.253, p < .05; β = 0.337, p < .01, see model 2). In China, public support for government officials was negatively correlated with the rule of law (β = –0.153, p < .05, see model 3) but positively correlated with social fairness (β = 0.527, p < .001, see model 3). Public support for government officials is specific support and is subject to fluctuations in the quality of governance. The results show that both economic and political governance affect public support for government officials in Japan and Korea, while only political governance is significant in China.

Table 2 (available online) displays the effects of governance quality on public support for political institutions. In Japan, the rule of law, social fairness, and freedom of speech were positively correlated with support for political institutions (β = 0.224, p < .05; β = 0.529, p < .001; β = 0.264, p < .05, see model 5). In Korea, social fairness and freedom of speech were positively correlated with support for political institutions (β = 0.510, p < .001; β = 0.363, p < .05, see model 6). In China, economic security, the rule of law, social fairness, and freedom of speech were positively correlated with support for political institutions (β = 0.489, p < .01; β = 0.680, p < .001; β = 0.504, p < .01; β = 0.393, p < .05, see model 7). The results show that only political governance affected public support for political institutions in Japan and Korea, while both economic and political governance affected public support for political institutions in China.

In general, governance in different policy domains had a significant influence on specific support—support for government officials and political institutions—in all three countries. It is understandable that specific support is more easily affected by fluctuations in the quality of governance. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported.

Table 3 (available online) displays the effects of governance quality on public support for a political system (diffuse support). In Japan, the rule of law and social fairness were positively correlated with support for a political system (β = 0.298, p < .001; β = 0.515, p < .001, see model 9). In Korea, social fairness and freedom of speech were positively correlated with support for a political system (β = 0.312, p < .01; β = 0.360, p < .001, see model 10). In China, economic security, the rule of law, social fairness, and freedom of speech were positively correlated with support for a political system (β = 0.411, p < .01; β = 0.421, p < .001; β = 0.446, p < .001; β = 0.612, p < .001, see model 11). The results show that economic governance did not affect diffuse support in Japan and Korea. Hypothesis 2 was supported. In contrast, economic governance not only affected specific support, but also significantly affected diffuse support, in China. Hypothesis 3.2 was supported. Hence, Hypothesis 3.1 was not confirmed. In addition, the effect of political governance on diffuse support was significant in China, which indicates that political governance was as important as economic governance for citizens’ diffuse support in authoritarian systems. We will discuss the implications of this finding in the last section.

Variations in political support across the three countries

Models 4, 8, and 12 included all pooled samples and added the variable of country. Regression models set China as a reference group and compared the Chinese case with Japan and Korea. The results show that citizens in Japan and Korea had lower levels of support for government officials, support for political institutions, and support for a political system than Chinese people. We further conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test differences in the means of specific and diffuse support across the three countries. There was a significant difference in support for government officials across the three countries (F (2, 6234) = 98.59, p < 0.000). The difference in the means of public support for political institutions was significant across all three countries (F (2, 6209) = 5611.71, p < 0.000). There was also a significant difference in support for a political system across the three countries (F (2, 5938) = 1223.76, p < 0.000). Hypothesis 4 posits that specific support is lower in Japan and Korea than in China but there is no difference in diffuse support across the three countries. However, the evidence shows that both specific and diffuse support among Chinese citizens were higher than that of their Japanese and Korean counterparts. Hypothesis 4 was partially supported.

Testing the effects of regime type

One of the primary substantive interests of the analysis is whether political systems matter in terms of the effects of governance quality on political support. It will be problematic to simply compare the regression coefficients of each model because error variances are not the same for all cases in the three countries. This study examines the effect of political systems by heterogeneous choice models. Table 4 (available online) shows the results. Models 13, 14, and 15 include interaction items of regime type and the quality of governance.

First, we compare the effect of regime type on specific support across different political systems. Model 13 shows that public support for government officials was positively correlated with the interaction item of economic security and regime (β = 0.101, p < .01), and with the interaction item of the rule of law and regime (β = 0.145, p < .001). The interaction item of social fairness and regime was negatively correlated with support for government officials (β = –0.089, p < .05). The results indicate that economic security and the rule of law were more important for public support for government officials in Japan and Korea, while social fairness was more important for public support for government officials in China. Model 14 shows that public support for political institutions was negatively correlated with the interaction item of economic security and regime (β = –0.135, p < .01) but positively correlated with the interaction item of freedom of speech and regime (β = 0.116, p < .01). The results indicate that economic governance was more important for public support for political institutions in China, while political performance was more important for public support for political institutions in Japan and Korea.

Second, we compare the effect of regime type on diffuse support for different political systems. Model 15 shows that public support for a political system was negatively correlated with the interaction item of economic security and regime (β = –0.105, p < .05). The results indicate that economic governance was more important for diffuse support in China than in Japan and Korea. However, none of the interaction items of political governance and regime were significant. Political governance was as important for diffuse support in Japan and Korea as it was in China.

To sum up, Hypotheses 5 and 6 were partially supported and new insights were provided. Political governance was, indeed, more important in Japan and Korea (see models 13 and 14) but such a contextual effect was significant only for specific support. Regime type did not moderate the effect of political governance on diffuse support (see model 15). In addition, the argument that economic governance was more important in authoritarian regimes than in democracies is merely valid for diffuse support (see model 15). In the field of specific support, economic governance was more important for support for government officials in Japan and Korea than in China (see model 13). By decomposing political support into specific and diffuse support, the empirical results display a more sophisticated picture.

Discussion and conclusion

Quality of governance is relevant for political support in both democracies and authoritarian regimes but the mechanism of its impact is different. As political support is divided into fluctuated specific support and more stable diffuse support, the effects of governance in different policy domains on specific and diffuse support differ between democracies and authoritarian regimes. This study seeks to address this research question by comparing the effect of the quality of governance on political support in three East Asian countries—China, Japan, and Korea—which represent different political systems.

Economic governance does not affect diffuse support, but affects specific support, in Japan and Korea. Prior studies stress that economic governance is less important for political support in democracies (Huhe and Tang, 2017; Mishler and Rose, 2002; Park and Shin, 2006). Our study is partially consistent with this statement. It is true that public support for the political system in Japan and Korea is independent from economic governance. Rule of law, social fairness, and freedom of speech are decisive factors for the public evaluation of the overall political system. However, the present study shows that economic governance is as important as political governance for citizens’ specific support in democracies. Further, when considering the contextual factor of regime type, economic governance is more important for specific support in Japan and Korea than in China. Economic voting theory states that because of the electoral cycle in democracies, citizens punish the incumbents for bad economic governance, and economic governance matters more for government leaders’ approval. The achievement of satisfactory economic governance is vital for improving public support for government officials in democracies.

In democracies, citizens are discontented with government officials and the practices of political institutions but maintain adherence to the fundamental principles of democracy (Dalton, 2004; Dalton and Welzel, 2014; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013; Norris, 1999). Economic governance has little influence on diffuse support in Japan and Korea, which suggests the stability of the democratic system in those countries. In contrast, our study clearly shows that economic governance affects specific and diffuse support in China. Such findings have relevant implications. They indicate that the Chinese public’s support for the overall political system is dependent on economic governance. When economic governance drops, it can be predicted that not only will specific support deteriorate, but diffuse support will also decline drastically. Normally, a political system will be more stable if diffuse support is independent of economic governance. In other words, the Chinese political system is less stable than it appears.

Conventional wisdom states that political governance is less important for political support than economic governance in authoritarian regimes (Gilley, 2006; Tang, 2005). Indeed, in reality, political governance is terrible. Abuses of power and violations of the rule of law take place every day, infringing on ordinary people’s human rights and dignity. A recent case is that of a Chinese physician in Guangzhou who criticized a traditional medical tonic as toxic on social media and was subsequently detained without charge by the police for three months. Police from Northern Inner Mongolia traveled to Guangzhou, a southern city, arrested the physician and escorted him back to Liangcheng, a place 2300 km away from his home. Without sufficient evidence, the abuse of power by local police triggers nationwide anger and seriously undermines the public’s political support (Cyranoski, 2018; Zhai, 2019). The findings of our study show that political governance is as important as economic governance for political support in China. Other studies also offer evidence that governance in terms of the rule of law, human rights protection, and social fairness significantly affects regime support in non-democratic South-East Asian regimes (Chang et al., 2013). Merely focusing on economic governance is not sufficient; political governance also matters for specific and diffuse support in China. Social unfairness, abuses of power, corruption scandals, and violations of the rule of law draw public attention, and poor political governance worsens citizens’ political support in authoritarian regimes.

Governance in the aforementioned fields is affected by regime type. From an institutional perspective, institutions determine the quality of governance (Kenny, 2012). The present study indicates that political systems lie behind the different effects of governance on political support. Governance is a global issue and democracies still face the challenge of improving the quality of governance. Even though East Asian democracies suffer governance deficits (Park, 2017), it cannot be denied that governance in authoritarian regimes is worrisome (Saich, 2016). Our study shows that both authoritarian and democratic regimes risk losing the public’s diffuse support because of poor political performance.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-ras-10.1177_0020852320921473 - Supplemental material for Quality of governance and political support in China, Japan, and South Korea

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-ras-10.1177_0020852320921473 for Quality of governance and political support in China, Japan, and South Korea by Yida Zhai in International Review of Administrative Sciences

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author is indebted to the anonymous reviewers for their most helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) through grant ref: 71874109.

ORCID iD

Yida Zhai

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Yida Zhai is an Associate Professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China. He received his PhD from the University of Tokyo. He studies political psychology, civic engagement, and East Asian comparative politics. His research has appeared in International Political Science Review, Pacific Review, Politics and Religion, and other Chinese and Japanese journals.

References

Bratton

Mattes

(2001) Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or instrumental? British Journal of Political Science 31(3): 447–474.

Budge

Newton

(1997) The Politics of the New Europe: Atlantic to Urals. Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman.

Chang

Chu

, and Welsh

(2013) Southeast Asia: Sources of regime support. Journal of Democracy 24(2): 150–164.

Chang

Chu

, and Park

C-M

(2007) Authoritarian nostalgia in Asia. Journal of Democracy 18(3): 66–80.

Chen

(2004) Popular Political Support in Urban China. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Chu

Diamond

Nathan

, et al. (2008) How East Asians View Democracy. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Cyranoski

(2018) Chinese physician released after 3 months in jail for criticizing a traditional medicine. Nature, April 26. Available at: https://www-nature-com-s.web.bisu.edu.cn/articles/d41586-018-04886-8 (accessed May 26, 2018).

Dalton

(2004) Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dalton

Shin

(2006) Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific Rim. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

10.

Dalton

Welzel

(2014) The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

11.

Dickson

(2013) Who wants to be a communist? Career incentives and mobilized loyalty in China. China Quarterly 217: 42–68.

12.

Dyck

Lascher

(2009) Direct democracy and political efficacy reconsidered. Political Behavior 31(3): 401–427.

13.

Easton

(1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York, NY: Wiley.

14.

Easton

(1975) A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British Journal of Political Science 5(4): 435–457.

15.

Feldmann

Mazepus

(2018) State–society relations and the sources of support for the Putin regime: Bridging political culture and social contract theory. East European Politics 34(1): 57–76.

16.

Finkel

Muller

, and Seligson

(1989) Economic crisis, incumbent performance and regime support: A comparison of longitudinal data from West Germany and Costa Rica. British Journal of Political Science 19(3): 329–351.

17.

Fukuyama

(2013) What is governance? Governance 26(3): 347–368.

18.

Gherghina

Klymenko

(2012) Why look back? Problems of Post-Communism 59(1): 55–65.

19.

Gilley

(2006) The determinants of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries. International Political Science Review 27(1): 47–71.

20.

Hetherington

(1998) The political relevance of political trust. American Political Science Review 92(4): 791–808.

21.

Huhe

Tang

(2017) Contingent instrumental and intrinsic support: Exploring regime support in Asia. Political Studies 65(1): 161–178.

22.

Hysing

(2009) From government to governance? A comparison of environmental governing in Swedish forestry and transport. Governance 22(4): 647–672.

23.

Inglehart

Welzel

(2005) Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

24.

Kenny

(2012) Does governance matter? Governance 25(1): 1–3.

25.

Klingemann

H-D

(1999) Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis. In: Norris

(ed.) Critical Citizens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

26.

Lewis-Beck

Stegmaier

(2013) The VP-function revisited: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years. Public Choice 157(3/4): 367–385.

27.

Mishler

Rose

(1996) Trajectories of fear and hope: Support for democracy in post-communist Europe. Comparative Political Studies 28(4): 553–581.

28.

Mishler

Rose

(2001) What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies 34(1): 30–62.

29.

Mishler

Rose

(2002) Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes. European Journal of Political Research 41(1): 5–36.

30.

Norris

(1999) Critical Citizens: Support for Democratic Government. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

31.

Park

C-M

(2017) Quality of governance and regime support: Evidence from East Asia. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 2(2): 154–175.

32.

Park

C-M

Shin

(2006) Popular support for democracy and its institutions in Korea. International Review of Sociology 16(3): 665–681.

33.

Peters

Pierre

(1998) Governance without government? Rethinking public administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8: 223–243.

34.

Rhodes

(2007) Understanding governance: Ten years on. Organization Studies 28(8): 1243–1264.

35.

Rotberg

(2004) Strengthening governance: Ranking countries would help. Washington Quarterly 28: 71–81.

36.

Rotberg

(2007) On improving nation-state governance. Daedalus 136: 151–155.

37.

Rotberg

(2014) Good governance means performance and results. Governance 27(3): 511–518.

38.

Rothstein

Teorell

(2008) What is quality of government? A theory of impartial government institutions. Governance 21(2): 165–190.

39.

Saich

(2016) How China’s citizens view the quality of governance under Xi Jinping. Journal of Chinese Governance 1(1): 1–20.

40.

Shi

(2008) China: Democratic values supporting an authoritarian system. In: Chu

Diamond

Nathan

, et al. (eds) How East Asians View Democracy. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, pp. 209–237.

41.

Shin

(2011) Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

42.

Tang

(2005) Public Opinion and Political Change in China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

43.

Yang

Holzer

(2006) The performance–trust link: Implications for performance measurement. Public Administration Review 66(1): 114–126.

44.

Zhai

(2016) Remarkable economic growth, but so what? The impacts of modernization on Chinese citizens’ political satisfaction. International Political Science Review 37(4): 533–549.

45.

Zhai

(2017) Values of deference to authority in Japan and China. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 58(2): 120–139.

46.

Zhai

(2018) Traditional values and political trust in China. Journal of Asian and African Studies 53(3): 350–365.

47.

Zhai

(2019) Popular democratic perception matters for political trust in authoritarian regimes. Politics 39(4): 411–429.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.23 MB