Public governance tensions: a managerial artefacts-based view

Abstract

The aim of this article is to categorise the factors of tension in public organisational settings. The context of the administrative reforms undertaken in Tunisia has been chosen as an empirical illustration of the public governance tensions associated with managerial artefacts. The study focuses on three types of factors. An analysis of these factors confirms the theories on the appropriation of management tools and helps raise the existing level of knowledge in relation to the processes to mitigate public governance tensions within public organisations.

Points for practitioners

Today, the modernisation of public governance goes hand in hand with the introduction of new public management tools in administrative settings. On a practical level, the appropriation of these tools generates a tense relationship between political decision-makers and public managers. Often perceived from the perspective of paradoxical demands and antagonistic relationships that disrupt the daily life of state organisations, public governance tensions can be managed as long as they are identified and categorised in the light of the factors of tension associated with the reforms undertaken.

Keywords

administrative reforms appropriation management tools results-based management tension

Introduction

It has been demonstrated that bureaucracies within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are seeing a questioning of the ‘new’ benchmark values and management practices hinged on the results of public policy. Public managers (PMs) and public policy stakeholders are concerned, in particular, about the purpose of public action, the preservation and future of the common good, the priority given to the public interest, and the improvement of services to citizens (Emery and Giauque, 2012; Kristiansen, 2016). These concerns result from (potentially) confrontational relationships, attesting to the existence of public governance tensions (PGTs).

By definition, PGTs arise in relations between public leaders and managers of state organisations when governments decide to transform their national public governance systems (NPGS).¹ They come about when reformers appear to: (1) depart from existing public values; (2) want to reorganise public service delivery structures; (3) implement administrative frameworks that focus on public policy outcomes (Thomas and Davies, 2005); and/or (4) force administrators to use managerial artefacts² from the private sector (Hudon and Mazouz, 2014).

In the case of public administrations in OECD countries, it has been shown that there are logical links between the introduction of new managerial artefacts and the emergence of tensions within organisations (Bartoli et al., 2011). We can refer to these as artefactual PGTs (A-PGTs) (see later). These are caused by factors such as the ideological prescriptions of the management tools (MTs) and the complexity of the appropriation processes (De Vaujany, 2006; Eynaud et al., 2016; Mériade, 2017). In the case of countries undergoing a democratic transition, and facing pressure from international financial and non-financial organisations, reformers invoke the imperatives of a managerial instrumentation applied to public administration.

MTs are imposed on governments in the throes of crises and socio-political tensions to cope with budgetary emergencies (Comeau and Mazouz, 2009). Studies on the tensions generated by this managerial instrumentation (Ben Hassine et al., 2012; Chaker, 1997; Dahmani, 2015; Laroussi, 2009; Noomane-Bejaoui, 2014) have not made it possible to categorise these factors. It is therefore important to ask and attempt to find answers to the following question: what are the main attributes of the PGT factors associated with managerial artefacts (A-PGTs)? In public management, this question also links up with a research programme on the rates and processes of propagation or mitigation of PGTs within NPGS.

A-PGTs make for an interesting research subject due to their recurrence in the everyday tasks of PMs and the risks of their propagation to other levels of NPGS. PMs are faced with ongoing problems related to the management of operational activities but that could affect formal management frameworks, structures and institutions (see Figure 1). Our research explored, in particular, PGTs arising in administrations and other state organisations in countries undergoing a democratic transition. The idea is that in these countries, the extent of reforms undertaken in a context of far-reaching change allows for a more acute perception of PGTs, their manifestations and their triggering factors.

The first section of this article presents the Tunisian administrative context of the study. The second section sets out a conceptual framework that defines and categorises the PGTs. The third section describes the selected research methodology. The fourth and fifth sections present the results of the study and their discussion, respectively.

Context of the study: Tunisia, a country undergoing political transition

In 1986, the international financial institutions paved the way for Tunisia to take a liberal turn with the adoption of a structural adjustment plan that significantly narrowed the economic sphere of the state to the benefit of private operators (Chaker, 1997: 151). The first reforms in this framework targeted the privatisation of several public companies (Laroussi, 2009; Noomane-Bejaoui, 2014). Reforms also affected the management of state organisations by institutionalising management by objectives (MBO) in 1996. This reform was intended to improve the performance of public action by increasing transparency and improving public finance management. Emphasis was placed on the design and implementation of MTs that were to enable the various Tunisian administrations to achieve results despite constrained budgetary resources (Fakhfakh, 2013).

Contrary to official statements, the reforms proved slow and difficult to implement. This meant that MBO was not implemented until more than 10 years after the decision to introduce it. Moreover, at the time of their implementation, the reforms undertaken produced undesirable and unforeseen effects, such as the crumbling of decision-making powers and the pre-eminence of external versus internal legitimacy (Hibou, 1998). At the same time, new economic and social crises emerged, leading to rising unemployment and poverty (Laroussi, 2009; Mokadem, 2002). In the field, these crises provoked widespread social protests in the Gafsa mining basin in 2008 (Chouikha and Gobe, 2009) and spread throughout the country at the end of 2010, to such an extent that they brought down the political regime in place since 1957.

Following the transition to a new political system in 2011 and the dawn of a representative and participatory democracy, implementing administrative reforms became a matter of urgency to respond to socio-economic demands and correct the dysfunctions of the public administration inherited from the dictatorship (Hibou et al., 2011). However, stumbling blocks were encountered, for example, the first political attempts to develop objectively verifiable performance indicators and appropriate means of verification came up against complex questions about the bureaucratic powers that administrators need to maintain and the managerial skills they need to develop (Ben Hassine et al., 2012: 61). At that time, the PMs effectively found themselves facing paradoxical demands from the political authorities. Under penalty of being punished, the latter asked them alternately to take initiatives and show creativity but also to comply scrupulously with the bureaucratic rules in force.

The notion of tension revisited from the perspective of public governance

From a public management perspective, underlying the PGTs, two fundamental notions deserve clarification: ‘tension’ and ‘national public governance systems’. In fact, the escalation of the rhetoric and practices associated with new public management (NPM)³ is accompanied by empirical findings that point, among other things, to the ‘compromises, balances, limits, dilemmas, contradictions and paradoxes’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 159–181) that accompany the roll-out of organisational changes. These changes are often instigated and conducted under the auspices of international financial and non-financial institutions with neoliberal ideological leanings. Analyses focus on the presence of problematic factors, such as budgetary difficulties (Larry, 1998), and their repercussions, such as conflicting perceptions or behaviours within public organisations undergoing continuous transformation (Ashcraft and Trethewey, 2004; Goodsell, 2003; Reay and Hinings, 2009).

However, few attempts at conceptualisation have been made to categorise tensions in public organisational settings and to gain a better understanding of how they are propagated, mitigated or amplified within the organisations concerned. In this article, tensions in public organisational settings are studied through the feelings of discomfort that PMs experience in the wake of important decisions or large-scale actions taken by their politico-administrative hierarchy and leading to problems against a backdrop of perceived or actual contradictions or paradoxes at four levels of the NPGS. These are feelings prompted by the confrontation between: (1) public values versus market transactions; (2) bureaucratic structures versus entrepreneurial structures; (3) administrative versus managerial frameworks; and (4) formal instruments versus results-based management tools (Hudon and Mazouz, 2014).

Towards a theoretical and conceptual framework of PGTs

As Smith and Lewis (2011) point out, there is a certain theoretical vagueness surrounding the notion of tension within organisations. This is due to the sheer variety of terms used to describe it, for example, ‘paradox’, ‘dilemma’, ‘dialectic’, ‘contradictions’, ‘conflict’, ‘incoherence’, ‘ambiguity’ and ‘ambivalence’ (Commeiras et al., 2009; Djabi and Perrot, 2014; Royal and Brassard, 2010). However, one thing is clear: without exception, each of these eight concepts refer to the feelings of discomfort that managers experience when faced with principles, practices or MTs that, despite being contrary (or perceived to be contrary), must coexist within the same organisational structure.

Bartoli et al. (2011) state that these discomforts are accentuated by transformations that put into question bureaucratic purposes, structures, operating procedures and instruments. In particular, role tensions have emerged following the introduction within public organisations of new management methods and tools traditionally associated with private sector companies (Rivière et al., 2013: 142). According to these authors, the adoption of NPM tools in hospitals in France has changed the roles and functions of managers working in the health sector. This means that they are now obliged to answer to both public service values and economic and organisational performance logics (Rivière et al., 2013: 143).

Research on tensions in public organisational settings has focused primarily on the factors triggering tension and their repercussions. This makes sense in that it makes it possible to gauge the extent of the behaviour causing tension and the relevance of the actions to be taken to remedy it. However, while some of the so-called factors and repercussions of tension are identified methodically and in an objectively verifiable manner, others that are more complex are attributed to the irrationality of the actors (Fairhurst et al., 2002). The latter do not always allow a diagnosis to be made or effective solutions to be found. On this matter, Stohl and Cheney (2001: 352) make an empirical observation marked by the predominance of the factors involved and repercussions, and consider that ‘organisational tensions are a clash of ideas, principles or actions, from which some discomfort may result’. This has also been confirmed by Ashcraft and Trethewey (2004), who associate tensions with ideological antagonisms, inappropriate structural configurations, questionable practices or MTs deemed inappropriate by those who use them.

Furthermore, since the publication of Das and Teng’s (2000) research, it has become clear that more theoretical studies on tensions must take into account the complexity generated by the juxtaposition and superimposition of the factors of tensions and their repercussions within organisations. With this approach, the study of tensions in public organisational settings can prove to be of managerial interest from the perspective of ‘contradictions and attempts to resolve these contradictions’ (Das and Teng, 2000: 84). It should make it possible both to categorise PGTs on the basis of the factors that generate them, and to manage them through the processes that lead to their amplification, propagation or mitigation within NPGS.

PGTs: definitions and typology

Taking a widely shared empirical observation as our starting point, institutional reform programmes are generally designed in contexts marked by endemic budgetary crises and proven democratic deficits (Bartoli et al., 2011; Garzon et al., 2012; Hood, 1991; Hudon and Mazouz, 2014; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). As for their deployment, this is often characterised by the opposition between the institutional values of the (so-called traditional) Weberian bureaucracy and the entrepreneurial logics and practices advocated by the proponents of NPM. Consequently, this research into the tensions (represented by an ‘X’ in Figure 1) refers to the factors, processes and repercussions of tension arising from institutional reforms on the structuring, functioning and efficiency of the administrations and public bodies that make up any given NPGS.

From a methodological point of view, in this article, we consider that PGTs are linked to the implementation of reforms under the pretext of better public governance (Hudon and Mazouz, 2014). From a conceptual point of view, the reading, analysis and interpretation grid used allow us to identify PGTs at four distinct levels of analysis of the NPGS concerned: institutional, organisational, managerial and artefactual (MTs).

At the first level of analysis of NPGS – that of institutions (Scott, 2002) – institutional PGTs are caused by a clash of values: incompatibilities emerge between public ethics, fairness and solidarity, which define the very essence of public service, and the values conveyed by NPM designed to drive the performance of public organisations (Bartoli et al., 2011; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006). At the second level of NPGS analysis – that of structures – we find the organisational PGTs. They arise when, for example, the results-oriented managerial responsibility of programme managers is hampered by a structural obstacle, such as centralisation.

These PGTs are generated by the juxtaposition or superimposition of two logics: one focused on the means of public action and the other focused on the outcomes (Yatim, 2014). Moreover, organisational PGTs can also derive from the complexity of decision-making in a partnership structure offering public services by one or more private partners. Mouline (2018: 145) thus reveals the organisational change to which French universities are subject under the budgetary constraint of the state, finding themselves forced to develop a ‘managerial culture and academic capitalism’.

At the third level of analysis of NPGS, we find managerial-type PGTs. These are linked to the effects of challenges to administrative rules, procedures and protocols by new actionable forms of public innovation and by the diversity of new operating procedures (Coblence and Pallez, 2015). Finally, at the fourth level of analysis of NPGS, which is the subject of the present research, we find A-PGTs. They are associated with the contradictory effects of the use of new management tools (NMTs) within administrations. In particular, A-PGTs come about when private sector MTs are introduced hastily to public institutions with little or no justification. Indeed, a growing number of researchers are looking at the tensions associated with the implementation of reform projects aimed at introducing management instruments within public organisations (Dahmani, 2015) and at the reaction of PMs (Alcaras et al, 2014). Examples include the issues arising from the design and implementation of performance management indicators (PMIs), their complexity, and their inconsistency with the purpose and object they are supposed to measure or the objectives they are supposed to monitor (Benzerafa et al., 2011; Bohte and Meier, 2000; Matelly and Mouhanna, 2007; Speers, 2004). In particular, we can highlight the effects of a lack of efficiency or relevance of PMIs in respect of the scope for action available to programme managers and their non-measurable or non-auditable character (Benzerafa et al., 2011). We also highlight the impact of tensions caused by goal displacement, for example, when PMs adopt PMIs whose targets are relatively easy to reach or that support the activity of the service and the means at their disposal (Benzerafa et al., 2011; Bohte and Meier, 2000).

These four levels of analysis of PGTs are interdependent. For example, a recurrent ethical tension (of an institutional nature) can lead to organisational tensions in the medium and long term. In this case, institutionalised corrupt practices cause dysfunctions in the decision-making bodies of state-owned companies.⁴ Conversely, a recurrent organisational tension can affect the institutional level. This occurs, for example, in professional bureaucracies such as universities or hospitals. Indeed, as the reforms undertaken by states in these areas are politically or ideologically driven, they inevitably give rise to organisational blockages with internal university or health administrative bodies.

Theoretically, formal administrative frameworks inspired by NPM aim at the sound management of public policy outcomes. In practice, however, the institutionalisation and appropriation of certain MTs, such as management dashboards, are still considered from the perspective of administrative compliance requirements (De Vaujany, 2006; Grimand, 2006; Mériade, 2017) and there is a real risk of organisational irregularities (Garzon et al., 2012). These considerations are tension-related to the extent that PMs perceive that they are obliged to come up with the ‘right figures’ to meet the expectations of the administrative hierarchy (Douillet et al., 2014; Matelly and Mouhanna, 2007). According to Facal and Mazouz (2013), PMs feel the pressure of the imperatives of accountability and the delimitation of the roles and responsibilities of agents, particularly when the results (figures) associated with PMIs are escalated to all politico-administrative levels.

Methodology

The investigations were carried out in a Tunisian socio-political and administrative context marked by revolutionary demands and an intensification of administrative reforms (2011–2017). During this period, PGTs took on a scale not seen since the change of political regime led to an increase in public denunciations, mediatised revelations relayed by social networks, administrative complaints, repeated recourse to the administrative courts, journalistic investigations, actions brought by members of civil society and whistle-blowers. As a result, it was possible to identify PMs and administrations willing to contribute to research on PGTs.

The approach adopted is abductive. It is justified by the complexity of the phenomena studied (Hallée and Garneau, 2019: 133), notably, the change of political regime, the acceleration of administrative reforms and the complexity of their implementation in a context of widespread crisis. The qualitative methodology resulting from the abductive approach has led to constant cross-checking between the literature and the specificities of the Tunisian context. It has made it possible to capture not only empirical data collected in Tunisia, but also literature devoted to theoretical approaches and models developed for other countries (Dubois and Gadde, 2002: 556). This abduction begins, moreover, with what Pierce (quoted in Dumez, 2012: 4) calls a ‘surprising fact’: the introduction of management tools intended to modernise public administration and improve its performance is proving to be a source of tension for the PMs who use them.

The research data were collected through exploratory investigations conducted within various Tunisian public organisations, followed by a case study conducted within the Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture, documentary analyses (of official internal and external reports⁵) and content analysis of 70 semi-directive interviews. The latter were conducted throughout the four phases of Tunisia’s democratic transition (2011–2017). Senior civil servants, PMs, experts and researchers involved in the implementation and use of MTs in public organisational settings agreed to participate in this study. Table 1 (available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/ras) illustrates the key stages of the research.

The raw data from the transcripts of the semi-directed interviews and from internal and external documents were processed semantically and condensed to give them a real meaning (Miles and Huberman, 2003). Striking and recurring expressions were underlined, keywords were coloured, comments were noted, and extracts with similar meanings were selected in order to assign coding nodes (categories and subcategories) to them. A condensation of the narrative presentations and the graphs and tables from the semantic analysis of the data was carried out in order to synthesise the main emerging ideas. Finally, preliminary conclusions were drawn, which were verified, clarified and established as the analysis of the results progressed.

Analysis and interpretation of the results

The study categorised three types of factors of tension associated with managerial artefacts in the Tunisian administrative context:

factors of tension associated with the implementation of the MTs;

factors of tension associated with the purpose of the MTs; and

factors of tension associated with the managerial framework and political leadership.

With regard to the factors associated with the implementation of the MTs, the analyses show that MTs that are not explicit enough, are difficult to understand or are highly complex and demanding generate tensions. On this subject, the respondents specify that an MT is sometimes earmarked for uses other than the initially explicit objectives. This situation suggests the potential for tension in the case of easily manipulated MTs. Indeed, some PMs may divert the use of tools from their primary function. For example, this is the case for performance indicators, with some PMs eliminating, adding or modifying reference values when it suits them. As for the failures at the level of support measures during the implementation of the MTs, they are considered by Tunisian PMs as sources of discomfort. The lack, and sometimes even the absence, of training and/or information relating to institutionalised MTs is also singled out. Finally, for tools that often require substantial technological equipment and software, the lack of material resources has also been identified as a factor of tension, as well as the lack of staff and time needed to appropriate the MTs, particularly when they are first rolled out.

The exploratory survey also reveals the tension generated during the implementation of the MTs by the incompatibilities perceived by respondents between results-oriented MTs and the means and other institutional, organisational and managerial components of the Tunisian NPGS. The fact is that the MTs are rolled out in a Tunisian NPGS torn between the plurality of the ideological bases of the institutions. The latter are challenged on a daily basis by Islamism, conservatism, nationalism, socialism and liberalism. All these tendencies are visible and their political factions are forced to form alliances that are sometimes unnatural in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Tunisian NPGS. In this politically effervescent context, the values embodied by PMs and the means they mobilise, including MTs, are not immune to the media excesses triggered by ideological controversies. Therefore, a sound management of the political–administration interfaces is necessary if public programmes and projects are to make any headway against the background of societal debates and high-profile controversies.

Furthermore, the PMs interviewed agreed that the implementation and use of modern MTs is at odds with Tunisia’s bureaucratic structures. In their organisational circles, classical postulates and procedures of public administration still persist. In particular, they suffer from administrative rigidity, such as the difficulty of escalating management information or taking initiatives in this area. Indeed, the majority of the respondents explain how the roll-out of new MTs has to contend with bureaucratic red tape, a lack of precision in procedures, complex laws and corruption. They also claim that the prevalence of these factors hampers the progress and success of their initiatives to modernise public management in Tunisia.

Again, according to the PMs interviewed, the paradoxical demands to which they are subjected on a daily basis further exacerbate the discordance between the institutional and managerial levels of the Tunisian NPGS. The overriding impression is that they are caught between the imperatives of formalised control exercised by their hierarchical superiors and the requirements of efficiency in terms of the choice and use of MTs. For one of them, ‘without management autonomy, we cannot talk about setting up NMT without them generating tensions’.

The incompatibility between the technical characteristics of the MTs and the skills or even the profile of the user is also a significant factor of tension pointed out by the respondents. Some PMs say that they feel helpless and incompetent in the face of MTs institutionalised by administrative reforms. As one respondent said: ‘It’s tedious to work on tools that are not part of my set of skills and knowledge.’

Finally, it was also noted that the MTs generate tensions when their implementation is entrusted to new public officials with a background in the private sphere or Tunisian civil society. According to one of the respondents, the latter are ‘not very familiar with the habits and customs of the Tunisian public administration’. The transition (2011–2017) was marked by the fact that most of the public officials in office were discredited because of their membership of the fallen political regime. Thus, as Ben Hassine (2012) reports in her study on the Ministry of Public Works, to a large extent, senior management consisted of profiles that were completely foreign to the Tunisian political and administrative world. The minister was a former businessman, his chief of staff was a banker on secondment from his post at the Société Générale in France and several of his advisers were, until recently, employees of private consulting firms.

With regard to the tension factors associated with the purpose of the MTs, several respondents insisted on the mimicry that prevailed at the time of their adoption and their legitimacy. According to some respondents, the MTs are ‘copied from other contexts, especially French, without taking into account local specificities’, are motivated by ‘trends’ or are even ‘parachuted in’. This observation ties in with that of Emery and Giauque (2012), who state that organisations tend to resemble each other and adopt the same practices implemented in countries more or less close to their context.

Moreover, tensions are associated with professional legitimation rather than with the desire for better organisational performance on the part of certain politicians or senior officials. One respondent stated that ‘the reports we produce are nothing more than paperwork; they force us to prepare these reports just to show to the world and especially international donors that they are carrying out reforms’.

As regards the factors associated with the managerial framework and political leadership, they reveal the tensions created by the politicians’ interference in operational activities and the choice and institutionalisation of the MTs. At this level of analysis, one respondent pointed out that ‘political actors do not always understand the administrative world’. This statement suggests that Tunisian politicians cannot hold PMs responsible for the failure to implement certain MTs. The perception of the value and relevance of an MT is assessed in the light of the socio-political agenda of the moment: ‘Unfortunately, the annual performance programmes are not managed properly by the political leaders; senior civil servants do not appropriate these management tools because they have other priorities linked to the socio-political context of the country.’ This is an element of analysis that refers to the effects of less than satisfactory political–administration relations. In particular, some PMs claim that they have no real impact with regard to their influence in the elaboration of policies concerning managerial instrumentation. This weak influence, without them considering it as a factor of tension, is close to the description of the model of the separation of roles between politicians and administrators. This separation is due to the institutional pressures that politicians have to comply with in order to benefit from a legitimacy that can maximise their chances of being re-elected (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002). Other PMs felt obliged to follow the guidelines set by political actors when implementing NMTs: ‘I am in the service of the minister … and sometimes he puts pressure on me to write things that contradict my principles … and I have to obey, that’s the hardest part.’

The results of the study indicate a dynamic relationship between A-PGT factors, for example, the mimetic nature of the introduction of certain MTs (factors associated with the purpose of the MTs) makes their deployment deficient (factors associated with the implementation of MTs) due to a lack of adaptation or appropriation to the specificities of the Tunisian context. In other cases, this failure can be explained by the lack of involvement of PMs in the choice and design phase of the MTs (factors associated with the managerial framework and political leadership) (see Table 2, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/ras).

Discussion and conclusion

It has already been empirically demonstrated that the institutionalisation of MTs has a deep impact on PMs, state employees and public stakeholders (Bartoli et al., 2011; Garzon et al., 2012; Mériade, 2017). The analytical grid proposed in this article allows for more in-depth investigations into the repercussions of this impact in terms of the tensions provoked. More specifically, the proposed grid offers the possibility of identifying and categorising the factors of tension associated with the reforms (Hood, 1991) and to better manage the resulting tensions (Bejerot and Hasselbladh, 2013; Garzon et al., 2012; Lindberg et al., 2015).

While the phenomenon of PGTs was first identified within Western public bureaucracies, where multiple reforms (Hood, 1991) aim to introduce or consolidate results-oriented formal administrative frameworks (Bartoli et al., 2011; Hudon and Mazouz, 2014), the results presented in this article shed light on PGTs from another context, namely, post-2011 Tunisia. The scale of the programmes aimed at modernising the administrations – launched in the wake of the change in the political regime – offers ripe conditions for the intensification of PGTs. Emphasis is placed, in particular, on three types of factors of tension revealed by the study. They are associated with managerial artefacts institutionalised by administrative reforms undertaken by the Tunisian state: A-PGT factors associated with the implementation of the MTs, the purpose of the MTs and the managerial framework and political leadership. While these factors are also to be found in other contexts – due to the inevitable gap between the reforms as they are conceived and the way they are implemented in the different administrative fields (Aucoin, 1995; Halligan, 2001) – the post-2011 Tunisian context still seems conducive to their study. Indeed, the rethinking of the Tunisian politico-administrative system allows a greater number of experiments and openness to the introduction of NMTs, thus favouring the coexistence of MTs operating according to two antagonistic management modes: the re-appropriation of the initial prescription of MTs through their hijacking and simplification, and the proliferation of new A-PGTs. The results of the study confirm the theory of appropriation (De Vaujany, 2006; Grimand, 2006) and contribute to a better understanding of the MT's configuration (Chiapello & Gilbert, 2016) as well as effects and processes of artefactual simplification (Mériade, 2017).

De Vaujany (2006) and Grimand (2006) demonstrate that beyond their technical foundation and the managerial philosophy behind them, MTs are constructed or adopt a new meaning in practice or in use, thus moving away from the objective of their actual use. For Mériade (2016), it has been shown that simplification of meaning occurs when indicators are converted or replaced by others, whereas quantitative simplification occurs when one of the indicators is removed. When the MTs are simplified, they become easy to manipulate and, in this case, can ‘be used to display good results in order to satisfy the administrative hierarchy’, as one of the respondents to the study confirmed. This organisational deviance, due to cumulative tensions (Garzon et al., 2012), is also highlighted by Matelly and Mouhanna (2007) in relation to the accuracy of crime figures and police performance.⁶ David (1996) also mentions the difficulties experienced by managers when the tool is only defined in broad terms. Moreover, when an MT is complex or demanding (Divay, 2016), it leads to a quantitative and qualitative work overload that can spread to the organisational level of public governance (see Figure 1). Finally, Ceccato (2019: 95) reveals how tensions associated with the introduction of a patient care telephone platform affect the entire structure of a French public hospital.

Regarding the tension associated with the temporal dimension, according to the study published by Emery and Giauque (2003), PMs experience upheavals during administrative changes. Seen from the perspective of A-PGTs, the temporal tension felt by the Tunisian PMs interviewed is explained by the fact that political leaders and senior civil servants often want to obtain convincing results quickly. After all, some of them use MTs to contend with institutional pressures (Eynaud et al., 2016), to justify their position as modern actors in public life (Laufer and Burlaud, 1980), to improve their visibility and/or to serve their political or careerist interests. Here, the failure to seek internal coherence between the MTs and specificities linked to the Tunisian NPGS ties in with the idea of caution value, which is one of the forms of appropriation proposed by De Vaujany (2006). It also fits in with the socio-political perspective of the appropriation of the MTs (De Vaujany, 2006), considering the simplified representations of reality as an opportunity to legitimise the decisions and actions of the actors. Several researchers (Bartoli et al., 2011; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006) have also shown that the rampant instrumentation of public management affects the value reference system of public action of PMs. Thus, the study confirms the incompatibility perceived by Tunisian PMs between the goals of the results versus means-oriented MTs and the underlying values of the Tunisian NPGS. In this regard, Mazouz and Gagnon (2019) remind the importance of carefully identifying contextual factors, particularly political, ideological and economic, as well as the reality of public organizations before implementing MTs aimed at improve their performance.

Finally, Peters (1987), Romzek and Ingraham (2000), Svara (2001), Audette-Chapdelaine (2014) and Dahmani (2015) have already highlighted the effects on PMs of having to comply with binding administrative policies and directives. However, none of these authors had approached this issue from a PGT perspective. In the case of Tunisian PMs, the obligation to comply with guidelines that are contrary to their own public service ideals is considered to be a source of tension.

This study calls for the development of further research on the overall dynamics between the three factors identified to explain the A-PGT phenomenon. It is also important to point out that the research presented in this article studies only one category of PGTs: the so-called artefactual PGTs. It focuses on a single NPGS: a Tunisia marked by a change of political regime and undergoing a reconfiguration of public structures, responsibilities and roles of political leaders and PMs. Crucial questions remain open concerning the PGT factors associated with the other three levels of NPGS analysis (see Figure 1) or their processes and rates of propagation, as well as their repercussions. Further studies should lead to a better understanding of PGTs, taking into account the contextual specificities and the diversity of public organisational settings.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-ras-10.1177_0020852320988155 - Supplemental material for Public governance tensions: a managerial artefacts-based view

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-ras-10.1177_0020852320988155 for Public governance tensions: a managerial artefacts-based view by Khouloud Senda Bennani, Anissa Ben Hassine and Bachir Mazouz in International Review of Administrative Sciences

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Khouloud Senda Bennani

Anissa Ben Hassine

Notes

Khouloud Senda Bennani is holder of a PhD in Management Sciences and a master’s degree in Organisational Management, Assistant Professor at the University of Tunis Carthage (UTC), Tunisia, and member of the Laboratoire de recherche interdisciplinaire sur les mutations des economies et des entreprises (LARIME) research laboratory. Her scientific research interests are in environmental policies and the transformation of national systems of governance and state organisations.

Anissa Ben Hassine is Professor of Management at the Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Economiques & Commerciales de Tunis (ESSECT), University of Tunis, Tunisia, and Director of the Laboratoire de recherche interdisciplinaire sur les mutations des économies et des entreprises (LARIME) research laboratory. Her areas of expertise are in human resources management and public management. Her research focuses on career and skills management and citizen participation. She is also a specialist in qualitative data analysis. She is a member of the scientific board of Management International. Her latest work, published in 2017, is a joint publication on the case method.

Bachir Mazouz is Professor at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration Publique (ÉNAP), Université du Québec, Canada. He is editor-in-chief of Management International (HEC Montréal) and founding president of the international symposium ‘Perspectives on the Transformation of Management and Public Organisations’ and of the ‘International Doctoral Research Workshop in Management and Strategy of Public Organisations’ (ADIMAP). His field of research encompasses the transformation of national systems of governance and state organisations, new forms of openness, and public–private partnerships.

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