Devolution: Discontinuity and dissonance

Introduction

This is an analysis of the impact of the Philippines’ Local Government Code of 1991 on Philippine social policy and social welfare. The Local Government Code of 1991 is one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the Philippines within the last two decades. A key consequence of the adoption of the Code was the devolution of certain social welfare programs and services. Some of the effects of the devolution are just being seen and its full impact is still unfolding. It is argued here that the devolution ushered in important changes in social policy which need to be critically examined.

This article is based on a study conducted with Philippine Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officers (MSWDOs) as the primary participants. MSWDOs were among the thousands of national government personnel transferred to local governments as part of the devolution process under the Local Government Code of 1991. Devolution, as implemented in the Philippines, involved the handing down of certain administrative and fiscal authority and responsibility from the national government to provincial, city and municipal governments. Most notable among these, insofar as social policy is concerned, was the transfer to city and municipal governments of responsibility for primary health care and social welfare services and the construction and maintenance of school buildings used for primary education. What used to be the functions of the national Department of Health, the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the Department of Education were placed in the hands of city and municipal governments. As a consequence of the devolution, city and municipal authorities now have discretion over the amount of resources to put into primary health care, social welfare services and basic education facilities. In a way, devolution came in the form of the decentralization of power and authority from central government to local governments, thus the two terms will be used interchangeably here, especially in reference to similar changes in other countries.

Devolution across the globe and in the Philippines

This analysis of the impact of the devolution in the Philippines is informed by the debate over the merits of such an approach in fostering social welfare and development. Devolution is offered by proponents as a mechanism for increasing local decision-making and control of resources. But there are those who argue that strategies and approaches that have been taken in implementing devolution on the whole result in the reduction of support for public needs as localities are given a more active role (Carson and Wadham, 2001). Some point out that devolution forms part of an approach in social policy and administration characterized by increased market orientation and managerialism with the main objective of increasing efficiency, constituting the hallmarks of neoliberal philosophy (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002). Among the many questions pointed out by Schneider and Netting (1999) in relation to devolution efforts are: With the grant of more freedom to local governments, will policy differences among them widen? What will determine priorities in resource allocation? Can local governments be trusted to protect the rights of vulnerable populations?

There has been a devolution trend across the globe motivated in part by calls for democratization and, to a notable extent, by the supposed economic benefits of the decentralization of authority and resources (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). Such countries as Brazil, Mexico, India, China, the USA, and some European countries to name but a few, have seen such initiatives in various forms (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). In the UK, devolution was heralded as having the potential to usher in the development of ‘radically different social policies’ (Mooney et al., 2006: 483). Of course, the extent to which power and resources are distributed or centralized is and has always been a contentious issue in the United States of America (USA). Some experiments in devolution, like that of Pakistan, seem to suggest that it creates ‘genuine change’ in terms of opportunities for citizens to have their concerns heard (Asian Development Bank et al., 2004: 2). In the UK, the dominance of the Labour Party in the early 2000s maintained normative reference points for policy innovations (Woods, 2004). But the experience of Canada shows how devolution can provide space for the influence of neoliberal ideology (McBride and McNutt, 2007). Based on studies on the link between devolution and regional economic growth in Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and the USA, it seems that devolution does not necessarily result in greater economic efficiency and there appears to be a correlation between worldwide devolution initiatives and growing income inequalities across regions (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2004). As Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2004: 2097) point out, the global trend in devolution has been the ‘renunciation of the traditional equalization role of national government in favour of . . . economic and public competition . . . leading to greater development of initially rich and powerful regions to the detriment of poorer areas’.

In the case of the Philippines, there were apprehensions that devolution posed problems for a strong, rights-based conception of social welfare. At the start of implementation of devolution, there were doubts over the ability of local government units to absorb the devolved functions and fears for the further deterioration of the health delivery system (Borlagdan et al., 1993). It was argued by the Congressional Commission on Health (1993) that the devolution of such concerns as the administration of health care was inconsistent with a strong rights-based perspective. Indeed, it has been found that the devolution has had a negative impact on primary health care and health care in general as the mandate and burden of financing shifted from the national government to local governments and, consequently, to the population (Bautista, 2001; Del Prado et al., 1999; Magno, 2001). Others have pointed out problems in the devolution of social welfare services in terms of getting funding support and the interference in the work of professional social welfare staff from local chief executives (Asia Development Consultants, 1997; De Leon, 1998). Poblador (2000) thus questioned the wisdom of the devolution in how it undermined a strong centralized system of governance deemed useful for a unified strategic response to the challenges of globalization. Silva (2005: 399) argues that devolution ‘plays a direct and interactive part in preserving and/or promoting regional disparities in the country’. What does it mean for the country to commit to the achievement of such standards as the Millennium Development Goals when it leaves discretion and responsibility for primary health care, social services and basic education to local governments?

The impetus for the devolution in the Philippines

Efforts for the devolution came on the heels of the people power revolution that toppled the Marcos dictatorship (Brillantes, 1998b). The Marcos dictatorship had consolidated power in the hands of a few and this was seen by many as a key source of problems in how it facilitated the abuse of authority. The Marcos regime thus nurtured distrust for a strong, central government among its opponents, many of whom chose to work outside government if not outside the fold of the law. Working mostly within non-government organizations, they took pride in their independence from government. Consequently, they carried over their philosophy in their work in the post-Marcos years under the mushrooming of non-government organizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It can thus be said that the move towards devolution came as part of efforts to purge the Philippine state of Marcos’s legacies which included a strong, highly centralized national government.

The devolution was framed by proponents as a vehicle for democratization, local empowerment and national advancement (Brillantes, 1998a; Iglesias, 1986; Padilla, 1998; Tapales, 1992). No less than the law’s author, former Senator Aquilino Pimentel (1993), hailed it as ‘the key to national development’. The argument was that national development could only be achieved with the strengthening of local government units. As articulated in the law’s declaration of policy, the local governments were to ‘enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities’ (Section 2.a). A system of decentralization providing local government units more power and authority was put in place toward this end.

Apart from engendering self-reliant communities, the devolution came with the promise of providing space for innovation and responsiveness on the part of local government units to meet the needs of their local constituencies. With more power and authority granted to local government units, there was conceivably more space for the development and innovation of programs and services that were more attuned to local needs and conditions. The delegation of such power and authority was also thought to make local governments more directly accountable to their constituents. As conceived by proponents, the devolution would lead to the development of thousands of local government units which would then go on to creatively and autonomously respond to the challenges of local conditions and, in the process, collectively contribute towards national development.

The devolution

In line with the purpose of strengthening local government units, the Code provided local governments with a significantly broader range of powers and functions, including the provision of basic services such as those classified under social welfare, health and agriculture support services. In fulfilment of the law’s mandate, the national Department of Social Welfare and Development went on to devolve a broad range of social welfare services. This included programs covering ‘child and youth welfare, family and community welfare, women’s welfare, welfare of the elderly and disabled persons; community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars, street children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition services; and family planning services’ (Section 17, Article B.2.iv). Only disaster management, handled by interdepartmental bodies at various levels, and special projects have been retained at the national level.

In the area of health, local governments were mandated to provide health services including ‘the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control services’ (Section 17, Article B.2.iii). Responsibility for primary health care is now delegated to local government units instead of being the mandate of the national Department of Health. Local government units now have the discretion over the amount of resources to put into primary health care and whether or not to give priority and attention to primary health care at all. As with local social welfare and health services, important components of the agricultural support provided by the national Department of Agriculture were also devolved. Like the other two, local government officials now have discretion over the level of support they give to this concern.

On the whole, the devolution represented an unprecedented divestment of power and authority from the national government in favor of local government units. This came with the belief that local government units would be in the best position to develop and manage basic social welfare, health and agricultural support services.

Methodology

The informants of the study were what are commonly known as Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officers (MSWD Officers) serving as unit heads of Municipal Social Welfare and Development Offices (MSWD Offices) who are directly under the supervision and control of municipal mayors under the developed setup. There are currently around 1500 MSWD Officers in the country, roughly corresponding to the number of municipalities, the majority of whom are licensed social workers and members of the Association of Provincial, City and Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officers Association.

A number of methods were used in the study. A survey on the conditions and issues in local social welfare and development work was conducted with a sample of 120 MSWD Officers randomly selected using the Association’s directory of members as a sampling frame. Philippine municipalities are classified into six income classes according to their average annual income during the last three calendar years, with First Class municipalities representing those with the highest incomes (PhP50m or more) and Sixth Class municipalities having the lowest (below PhP10m). Sampling for the study was confined to the three lowest classes. This sampling process serves the purpose of limiting the sample to a relatively homogenous group of municipalities, at least in income terms, which provides some revealing insights as shown in the discussion of findings. Of 120 invitations sent out, 37 valid returns were received. From the survey which included a built-in snowball sampling process to identify those who have had problems under the devolved set-up, 10 key informants were identified for interviews. Two of these had reported that they experienced no problem in relation to the organizational changes that came after devolution, two reported having experienced problems and six of them were among those who had been removed from office under questionable circumstances. A focus group discussion was held during one of their Association’s annual national conventions to validate the initial findings. An invitation for participation in the focus group discussion was sent in advance through the president of the Association. Then, during the conference itself, posters were placed in conspicuous locations in the conference venue. The focus group discussion for this study was one of a number of small sessions held as part of the conference. A total of 11 participants volunteered for the focus group.

There are two main limitations in the present study that need to be acknowledged. The first limitation is that this study is mainly confined to devolution in the Philippines and therefore generalizations cannot be extended beyond the national scope. A second limitation of the study is that it is solely informed by accounts of MSWD Officers as against having corroborating accounts from their immediate superiors, the mayors. The latter were deliberately excluded as participants in the study because to have done otherwise would have compromised the identity and anonymity of the main informants of the study.

Findings and discussion

The devolution granted local government units a substantial amount of power and authority and this resulted in the financial and political strengthening of a number of local governments. The Code provided sufficient space and opportunity for local government units to transform themselves in the areas of tax administration, budget management and local financing (Ilago, 1997). The local governments of economically advanced cities and towns suddenly found themselves getting a more sizable portion of the fees and taxes paid by businesses in their areas. Some towns and the provincial governments of certain regions gained a windfall from having a more direct hand in the administration of quarrying and other environmental resource extraction operations in their localities. Unfortunately, many were not as fortunate as others in obtaining income from local enterprises. Some argue that these local government units simply have not yet learned how to more actively and creatively exercise their taxation powers and to tap local sources of funds (Cuaresma, 1997). The law mandates the provision of supplementary funds for these local government units but such supplementation from the national government has never been generous and forthcoming.

Understandably, the devolution provided more political power to local government officials. This power, however, is not well distributed. Many local chief executives, mayors as they are called, hold a substantial amount of power at the local level, even in relation to the local legislative body. One respondent, referring to the existence of local legislative bodies, remarked that ‘that is just a structure’ (Lourdes, 50), indicating that mayors hold sway even over local legislators who, as a collective, supposedly comprise a co-equal, independent branch of local government. It can thus be said that the devolution did to a certain extent provide the resources and political space for local government units. But as to which direction this has taken is, of course, another issue. For local social welfare services, there are indications that the promises of the devolution are not being fulfilled.

Conclusion

The implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 and the devolution of local social welfare services in the Philippines came with the promise of promoting local autonomy, empowerment and development through the provision of space for innovation and responsiveness on the part of local government units. The measures that have been taken towards this end have given all local government units a notable amount of political space and some local governments the financial resources to determine and fund their priorities in local social welfare as with devolved health care and agricultural support functions. This study found that the goal of allowing innovation and responsiveness in local social welfare provision has not really been achieved. Moreover, a much more fundamental issue was uncovered in how the devolution has reconfigured Philippine social policy. The Philippines’s experience in devolution provides credence to the concerns raised by Schneider and Netting (1999) about how such moves can result in the widening of policy differences across localities and how this can compromise the protection of the rights of vulnerable populations.

What has not been clearly pointed out in most accounts of the devolution in the Philippines is how it represents a significant ideological shift in Philippine social policy. To many, the devolution may have appeared innocuous and may have even been deemed desirable. Couched in elegant language borrowed from what has become the veritable bible of new public management, the devolution accompanied by the DSWD’s repositioning was not met with notable resistance from social workers and development workers within and outside government, many of whom were enthralled by the promise of local empowerment, development and democratization, as a bigger role was given to local governments, non-government organizations and civil society, in general. But in welcoming devolution, social workers welcomed the advance of a policy regime underpinned by conservative ideology as a national social welfare system was dismantled in the name of local empowerment and development. In place of a national system is a patchwork of non-mandated, unregulated local initiatives after the new local government code divested provincial governors and the national DSWD with oversight powers over municipal governments. While ostensibly not deliberate, it hid from view the far-reaching implications of what is regarded by some as a legitimate development policy. It was, perhaps, for this reason that Spies-Butcher (2002: 173) warned us of how the discourse on social capital and the uncritical valuing of the local can be used as an ideological ‘Trojan Horse’.

What practitioners need to realize is that the devolution does not only represent a change in their location in the institutional space comprising the national bureaucracy. Even if it does not appear to do so, devolution represents a fundamental change in the character of Philippine social policy and, as a consequence, of their work. The Philippines’s experience in the devolution of local social welfare can be likened to the shattering of Filipino citizenship into a thousand pieces in the way differences in policies and provisions between municipalities have widened and how the protection of vulnerable populations is now left to the discretion of local executives. What does it mean to be a Filipino? What does it mean when the national government commits the country to the promotion of social justice, the protection of human rights and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals? Given our experience with the devolution, the answer now seems to depend on which locality one resides in.

This study, of course, mainly applies to the Philippines. But, as noted earlier, globalization has seen a thrust across the globe towards the devolution of authority and resources from nation-states to regions and localities (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). This raises the question of what effects devolution initiatives have had on social welfare services and social policy in other countries. Thailand’s decentralization process, started at around the same time as that in the Philippines, has also seen to a transfer of functions for primary health care and basic education to local government authorities (Amornvivat, 2004). Indonesia undertook what has been described as a ‘massive and drastic decentralization’ in 2001 which involved the transfer of functions and two million civil servants to local governments, supported in part by limited intergovernmental fund transfers from the central to local governments (Brodjonegoro, 2004: 1). The experience of Pakistan in devolution has, according to the review undertaken by the Asian Development Bank, the United Kingdom Department for International Development and the World Bank (2004), engendered more reliable and responsive service from the medical and teaching staff of devolved health and education services. But while most of the accounts speak of the merits of decentralization in enhancing responsiveness and improving service delivery, no critical discussion is being offered about how the processes of devolution have shaped the landscape of social policy and social welfare programs and services across these countries and what it means to be a citizen of these countries. The findings in this study suggest that there is a need to critically examine the ideological and practical implications of devolution initiatives in countries where these have occurred. At the very least, they point out that there is wisdom in Rodríguez-Pose and Gill’s (2003) prescription for caution in the promotion of devolutionary efforts.