Counterbalancing the integration policy for migrants through social work

Introduction

According to various researchers the neoliberal policies of recent decades have shifted in favour of Western societies instead of migrants and asylum seekers (Dominelli, 1999; Entzinger, 2006; Goodman, 2010; Joppke, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2003; Lorenz, 2005, 2006; Strier and Binyamin, 2010). For migrants the balance has shifted decisively towards control, restriction, surveillance and ultimately exclusion (Humphries, 2004; Husband, 2007). Migrants and asylum seekers, in search of a dignified existence in the EU member states, are mostly considered as an oppressed group, belonging to the underclass of society. They are directed to integrate by adapting to the ways of living of the new host society (Joppke, 2007; Joppke and Morawska, 2003). In today’s diminished welfare state they are made responsible for working their way up in their host society. And it is social work that mostly addresses this integration process in communities. Social workers, who have always dealt with the most vulnerable groups in society, find it hard to accept that they are the mere executors of the dominant social policy (Humphries, 2004).

This contribution focuses on the strategic position of social work for migrants. All over Europe, social workers have always had an ambivalent relationship with policy-makers and politicians who translate social policy into legislation (Humphries, 2004). Social workers are dependent on politics, but at the same time they are not without influence on the development and implementation of social policy.

This article chooses to return to the core business of social work. It is argued that social workers first of all should be preoccupied with the problems migrants experience in order to shift the balance in favour of those who are most powerless and vulnerable. Furthermore, it is stated that the success of integration depends on the position occupied by social work. To the extent that social workers are the mere executors of the prevailing social policy, they merely demand assimilation.

The development of a social policy for migrants

In the post-Second World War period, an era dominated by an elite who professed an anonymous equality for all, the masses were only important in light of social economic development. General social improvement was the main principle of the fast growing welfare state promoted in the 1960s by the trade unions. Within this anonymity there was hardly a place for groups that stood up for separate rights or for particular interests of individuals (Hardt and Negri, 2004). It was because of the equality for all, the ‘one size fits all’ model (Dominelli, 2002), that people’s discrete needs did not get fulfilled. As a result, resistance grew within broad sections of society against the all-devouring wave of uniformity in an anonymous society. This was well illustrated by The One-Dimensional Man of Herbert Marcuse in 1964. In various parts of the world young people were sensitive to this development. Moreover, they were surprised to discover that others in New York, Berlin, Prague, Paris, Amsterdam and London were dealing with the same issues. Students forced themselves upon the universities in order to take higher education out of the hands of the elite. They demanded academic freedom and claimed a voice. In their discontentment they saw the problems of the world reflected (Kurlansky, 2004).

It is within this wave of democratization that the social movements of the 1970s were shaped (Kriesi et al., 2003): the democratization of education, action for deteriorating neighbourhoods, addressing the creation of urban ghetto’s, the women’s liberation movement, the second feminist wave, the gay and lesbian movements, the acknowledgement of associations for the disabled and the incentives for a multicultural society. In the 1970s social politics diversified. Proceeding from the revolution of the 1960s, a social policy emerged within which facilities were created that suited the needs of the newly defined problem groups, or even more so, that fitted the specific needs as they were enforced and understood by different groups themselves (De Bie and Van Ewijk, 2008). Hence through the general social recognition of group characteristics, individuals were given a particular identity. Issues of individuals were placed within the particularities of the social group, which in their turn were linked to the social circumstances of this group. Problems of people thus became problems of a local social context. The individual identity was narrowed down to a single dimension, namely that of cultural ethnicity, gender, handicap, sexual orientation, etc. Irrefutably the female identity is typical for all women, but social politics aimed at women makes all women equal and excludes the possibility for one single woman to be different from the dominant standard. In other words, the homogeneity of the movement forces an exclusive and essentialized identity upon everyone (Dominelli, 2007).

The weight of the current migrant problem has its roots in these historical facts. Moreover, in exactly that same period, starting from the end of the 1960s, a second migration wave emerged with masses of cheap labourers migrating from the Maghreb countries to Western Europe (Boswell, 2003; Lorenz, 2006). Obviously migration to Europe was not a new phenomenon, but it was only after this large second wave of migration that integration became a significant policy issue. After the oil crisis of 1973–4 an end to immigration was proclaimed in many Western European countries, but at the same time however, it was acknowledged that the migrants already present in these societies would not return to their country of origin. As a result, a new group of interest was born for the profession of social work, namely that of the migrant communities in the large cities. It was generally believed that migrants, with their specific needs, had to be assisted as newcomers in a foreign country. As such, in many European cities local initiatives of categorial development work were initiated, in the first instance centred on housing.

Social work for migrants

In the 1970s, the recognition of diverse groups in society on the basis of their specific characteristics and necessities was considered the ground on which the welfare state needed to be built. The reception and integration of migrants became essential parts of the development of a democratic society with equal opportunities for all. At the same time, however, these changes inherently bore the challenge to migrants to participate in society. Indeed, the maturation of the welfare state relies on the emancipatory, as well as on economic, motives (Lorenz, 2006). Therefore it was considered economically useful to invest in the improvement of the living condition of migrants. Concurrently these migrants were faced with the responsibility to collaborate in the development of an economic welfare state and the well-being of all (De Roo, 2010).

Emancipatory motives, such as the idea that all people are equal and have identical rights, ran parallel to utilitarian motives (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Throughout modern history the dominant powers in society have only been ready to accept the emancipation of the lower classes as long as they could clearly benefit from it. As such, at the end of the 19th century the bourgeoisie had supported the professionalization of social work by means of which aid was not primarily given on humane grounds, but on paternalistic ones. From the perspective of the bourgeoisie the poor jeopardized the modern and democratic society. Therefore it was thought necessary to concentrate on educating working-class children (De Bie and Van Ewijk, 2008). Social work thus became a tool in the construction and preservation of the welfare state.

In order to guarantee the development of general social well-being the intentions of the government have been passed onto professional organizations and social workers. Proceeding from social policy concerns, social workers were given a bridging function and were mobilized for social control. Over the years social work has emulated a diversity of work areas, aimed at increasingly changing target groups that were considered vulnerable: single mothers, the elderly, as well as non-native speakers, migrants and newcomers.

At the end of the 1970s and in the course of the 1980s, migrants became labelled as ethnic minorities. At that time a multicultural approach was mainstream in the migration policy of West European countries, with a clear trend towards an increased recognition and accommodation of diversity through a range of multiculturalist policies and minority rights (Kymlicka, 2012). Migrants were considered one community separate from the majority, consisting of different minority groups that were in need of selective support in respect to employment, housing, education and health care. In view of equal treatment and ‘emancipation’ social workers provided institutional arrangements in a number of areas that ran parallel to existing mainstream ones in the various countries (Entzinger, 2006). On the one hand, within this process the special characteristics of the migrant cultures served to justify a sort of separateness that aimed at emphasizing the cultural identity of the new communities. As such social work offered opportunities to develop ‘the migrant’s way of life’ connected to the homeland (Joppke, 2004; Toonen, 2000). On the other hand, social workers likewise stimulated equal treatment of the migrant population in society by promoting an ideological approach that minimized the cultural differences between people. Insofar as citizens were confronted with differences, social workers urged the need for mutual respect and stimulated citizens to make use of elements of other cultures in order to make daily life symbolically richer. Multiculturalism does not refer to the co-existence of many different cultures, but means that there is only one culture made up like a patchwork with elements from various ‘old’ cultures (Žižek, 1998).

The recognition of otherness (separateness) as well as its denial (multiculturalism) made up the ambiguous attitude from which social workers acted until far into the 1990s (Entzinger, 2006). At the beginning of the 1990s social workers could not prevent guest workers as well as foreigners in general to be seen increasingly as the scapegoats by extreme right movements all over Europe. Initially the multicultural model could still counterbalance the emerging racism in society, as well as the climate of intolerance whereby the guest workers themselves were held responsible for metropolitan problems related to unemployment, ghettoization and insecurity. However, the pressure of the ‘right wing’ has clearly undermined the multicultural model (Kymlicka, 2012). Since the end of the 1990s we have seen a general backlash and retreat from multiculturalism. It is within this spirit that the Dutch historian Paul Scheffer published his controversial article in 2002, ‘The Multicultural Tragedy’ (Scheffer, 2002). According to Scheffer, Western Europe had a large group of North African migrants living on the edge of Western culture. To him it seemed quite obvious that these migrants were not even prepared to change their situation on their own initiative. For him, this indicated that the emancipation of the migrant community did not achieve the results hoped-for.

In general, many authors like Geddes (2003), Jacobs and Rea (2005) and Entzinger (2006) have shown that over the last 30 years so-called migrants of the first generation in Western Europe have not been able to develop into a community of equal value. On the contrary, despite all efforts they have remained socially and economically subordinated. Moreover, according to Scheffer (2002) it appears they cannot, or to a lesser extent, withstand the discriminatory pressure of the labour market and the globalized economy. Their lower schooling rates, which particularly involve the second generation, were jointly responsible for the high unemployment figures since the 1980s. However, these migrants were offered various means to develop a specific existence within Western European societies, but the local existing policies were not able to procure the expected results. For critics, the support for equal treatment had rather confirmed migrants’ inequality, despite the ideology of multiculturalism (Brubaker, 2001; Joppke, 2004).

The threatened legitimation of social work in neoliberal society

The multicultural approach and the execution of an emancipation policy vis-à-vis the migrant community did not bring about a community of equal value, nor did they solve the selective problems of migrants. In general, social work has not succeeded in integrating migrants in that one society open for all. With the success of neoliberalism in the 1990s and the expansion of the economic globalization, the influence of the State has been reduced to a strict minimum in favour of the hegemony of the free market. Within this power shift minority groups are no longer economically interesting. In addition, neoliberalism has eroded the European social welfare model (Hardt and Negri, 2004; Lorenz, 2005, 2006). Large groups of well-paid wage earners no longer want to contribute to the general welfare for all. The free-market-thinking individualizes and raises competition in the ‘active welfare state’, aiming for every person to take responsibility and to provide for his/her own welfare in a market-oriented way. The market is not willing to take responsibility for those who are not productive. Only those matter who can cope with the competition and make their way in the market. Consequently women working from home, the unemployed and the majority of migrants do not count. In this context the ‘active welfare state’ has developed conditions that urge people to become market players if they want to count (Dominelli, 2007).

Liberalization of the market generally led to the privatization of the welfare state, which in its turn has rendered social work inaccessible for many more people (Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996). However at the same time those who are not in the position to buy welfare have often appealed to social workers for support. For the time being people in Western Europe have a right to social security, but it is not unconditional: they have to commit themselves to be or to become ‘valuable’ citizens. So, the right to social security implies an essential requirement, which clearly turns welfare into workfare (Dominelli, 1999). Social work now has to justify itself under the neoliberal pressure. Before the liberalization the government, who jointly with the social partners formed the end point of social politics, had legitimized social work as a mediator between political and civic society. Now, due to the reduced impact of the government, social work is deprived of its social standing. Its eloquence takes off proportionately with that of the Government. Now that everything is centred on productivity, only the functional employability of labour is being rewarded.

The first victims of these shifts of power in society are the underclass, of which most migrants and newcomers are part. In general, the social divide between rich and poor, between the prosperous, well-educated people, who are admitted into the liberal global economy and those who stay outside of society is increasing steadily but surely. The poor and many migrants amongst them cannot yet play a part, as they don’t stand a chance in the new political structures. Within the previous class society, even the lower classes, the proletariat, had a productive and political role. The recent lower classes however cannot even appeal to this inferior social standing. This phenomenon occurs now in both poor and wealthy countries (Bauman, 2000). Whereas the democratic society in the 20th century stems from the continuous battle between the weak and the strong, between the oppressor and the oppressed, this battle can no longer be pursued (De Roo, 2010; Hardt and Negri, 2004). Of course, the question remains what effect the current social divide will have on the future democratic society.

Furthermore, it is believed that the endangerment of the democratic political system goes hand in hand with the disappearance of the significance of the nation-state (Joppke, 2007). Over recent decades this has had far-reaching consequences for migrants in Europe. Indeed the existing tendencies to regionalization strongly invoke the ethnic and cultural identity as a result of which migrants get excluded. Today migrants and all other minority groups can no longer call upon democracy to claim a rightful position in society. This is quite opposite to the development of the nation-state and democracy in the 19th century, when democracy was a revolutionary ideal. The then struggle for change and the battle for universal electoral suffrage had to enable workers, women and those without financial means to participate. That is why democratic movements have always been at odds with the political reality or considered a menace to the political establishment. Over the years democratic systems proved very helpful to all kinds of groups and minorities, because the democratic system has always acted in their interest. One could say that the democratic political order was a guarantee for recognition.

According to John Galbraith, for the first time in recent political history of the Western countries a democratic majority opts for inequality in order to maintain the former attainments of the welfare state and chooses against various minorities who cannot make use of its advantages. In recent history, the steady growth towards more democracy needed to generate more equality for all, but now that the majority forms part of the democratic society, there is no room left for new minorities (Galbraith, 2007; Munters, 1998).

Social work for flawed consumers

In his book on the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman confirms the proposition of Hannah Arendt (2005) that Jews in the first half of the 20th century benefited from a citizenship, which supported liberalism (Bauman, 1989). This was supposed to counterweigh the anti-Semitic movement lumping Jews and nobility together as if they were forming a financial alliance against the upcoming bourgeoisie. The rupture with an age-old dependence on political rulers created the need for a new social basis, necessary to acquire political autonomy. Liberalism, in that respect, promised self-construction and self-maintenance of the free individual. Oddly enough Jews were considered as the opposites of the autonomous, independent or self-made bourgeoisie. They became the enemy of social consciousness and political freedom. They became defined as opposite to other groups within the society for whom there was a space. The Jewish community on the other hand found itself in a social vacuum, disoriented and out of place.

According to Bauman (1989), today’s ‘new poor’ find themselves in this same vacuum. This socio-economic category does not merely consist of those who fall by the wayside because of material or financial reasons, but also of those who are poorly educated or without any degree or professional credentials. It equally encompasses those people without social involvement and the ones who do not understand the current state of affairs. Bauman calls them aliens in what used to be familiar surroundings as they cannot relate to dominant trends and are ignorantly excluded from an indispensable protective social environment. They have missed the train before they have known it come past them. Take for example the impressive role of information technology and computers. All those who do not use the World Wide Web are threatened to become estranged.

All these shortcomings are – to a greater or lesser extent – embedded in the large group of migrants and foreigners. Lorenz (2006) points out that the encounter with migrants and refugees is not the cause of the decrease of social solidarity within European societies, but that it does activate the existing uncertainties in everyday contexts. Migrants and refugees have become the personification of the inner demons of the consumer society as they confront us with the excesses of consumption. They are weak and needy, though not necessarily materially or physically. To Bauman (1989), these ‘new poor’ cannot contribute to the so-called ‘normal life’ because of the psychological or mental conditions they live in. Within the consumer society the poor are considered a disturbing element in the social construction, a blot or defect and thus inadequate. They are but flawed consumers and prospectless as they are not able to unite themselves as the labourers did in the 20th century (Marotta, 2000). They are also permanently unemployed because they cannot organize themselves, as did the workers in the 20th century. At least the impoverished working classes at the end of the 19th century were able to unite around the conviction that their employers exploited them. They were even indispensable for the entire process of mass production. Today neither the former, nor the latter is true. The new lower classes are no longer exploited as such; they are useless and totally redundant. They are of no value in the macro-economic system. Nobody notices them, they do not unite and so they are not able to join forces. They do not unite because there is no reason to do so, heterogeneous as they are as a group. Moreover, they are confronted with the impossibility of being politically valid. Their flaw is that they do not belong anywhere. All newcomers, Bauman concludes, without possessions, pushing their luck in economically prosperous countries, are to be considered as flawed consumers.

Flawed consumers may want to be as successful as the dominant groups, but they can only dream of obtaining a different identity because of the social and economic conditions they live in. Of course, they want to be better off, they look forward to being quality consumers, but they have no opportunities. Their life leads to nowhere. They are the underdogs that cannot comply with the demands of the consumption culture; however, in a sense they are simultaneously aware of the pressure put on them to be equal to the others (Munters, 1998). On 12 April 2006 a 17-year-old Polish Roma gipsy killed a young Flemish boy in the Central Railway Station of Brussels. Apparently the Polish offender was only after the victim’s iPod. Many commentators could not understand how a person could ever be capable of committing a murder just for an MP3-player. According to Žižek, what activated the offender was not the wish as such to own an IPod, but the desire to strike the owner of the IPod in his privileged social position, a position that unjustly gives him the privilege of being the owner of such objects (Žižek, 1998). This example strikingly illustrates the structural difference between quality consumers and flawed consumers. In this article I want to argue that if social work denies this structural difference, by joining in with oppression via measures that punish and exclude, the underclass of migrants do not stand a chance. After all, social work, being the advocate of social politics, has the responsibility to acknowledge all groups within the democratic society. From the practice of its existence, it is the duty of social work to fuel the discussion on the extent to which equality and justice should take root within that anonymous underclass.

Choosing position: Three principles

Abdelmalek Sayad, from his Algerian background, has developed a unique vision on the migration problems in Western Europe. Bourdieu and Wacquant (2000) detect three crucial principles of Sayad that he has applied as a central frame of reference in his scientific approach to migration.

The first – seemingly insignificant – principle is that each immigrant first was an emigrant in his country of origin. This means a complex process of emigration by definition precedes the problems linked to immigration, a fact so often neglected in migration research. The consequence of this simple chronology is that all migration studies ought to part from the country of origin, whereas most scientific research immediately and exclusively focuses on concerns and ruptures brought about in the host country. However, reducing the significance of migration to immigration problems is by definition a denial of reality.

In general the ‘reduced migrant issue’ is being interpreted as a temporary ailment, as a deficiency of the new society in which migrants have difficulties with unemployment, housing, education and health care (Sayad, 1999b). Moreover, in confrontation with all these problems they cannot fall back on a viable hinterland or the social economy of their community of provenance. They are chiefly left to themselves; they must resort to individual strategies of self-provision (Wacquant, 2010).

Within the practice of social work in the native community, it is self-evident that all problems clients may have (psycho-social, financial and material) are approached from the angle of social research, as often an entire life history precedes these problems. Strangely enough the latter does not count for migrants. Their problems are considered those in the here and now. It is equally invariably assumed that those are the exclusive problems that cause migrants to be slighted as a ‘minority group’, or in other words, that burden the new society.

However, according to Sayad (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2000), the newcomers – preceding all problems in their host society – have already been dealing for a long time with dynamics and tensions between the unbearable living conditions that incite them to emigrate and the secure environment they leave behind for that reason. This significant previous history ought to be examined and mapped when studying migration, because it always lives on disguised in the new society, even in the course of different generations. In this respect it could be stated that the distinction between ‘labour migration’ and ‘settle migration’ is irrelevant, as the former is always part of the latter (Sayad, 1999a). When a person leaves his family to find work abroad, the cohesion in the native group is disturbed. The relatives involved ought to carry on in face of an empty space within the family. It is precisely this unbearable situation that leads to family migration. Wacquant (2010) goes even further stating that the empty space in the homeland is not being compensated for in the host country. To Wacquant, on top of it all, migrants here are confined to urban ghettos as a result of which their stigmatizing gets territorialized. The ghetto is a dissolution of ‘place’, with the loss of a humanized and familiar setting with which marginalized urban populations identify and in which they feel ‘at home’ in relative security (Wacquant, 2010).

The fact that migration and immigration are inextricably linked subsequently leads Sayad to posit that migration in a material and symbolic way is the result of a historical relation of international domination (Sayad, 1999b). Migration is thus a ‘state to state’ issue, another fact that is not being acknowledged by the immigration states. The ‘receiving’ societies govern migration as an internal affair through a set of laws, administrative or bureaucratic rules and regulations (Sayad, 1999b). When concluding bilateral agreements, the economical (and post-colonial) preponderance is detrimental in such a way that the dominant states unilaterally call the stakes.

According to Sayad the impact of this dominance is reflected in the relation between the individual immigrant and his opposite in the new society: the Algerian worker versus the French employer in Lyon, the Surinamese child versus his teacher in Rotterdam, the Jamaican mother versus her social worker in London, the Ethiopian aged citizen versus his landlord in Naples (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2000). Simultaneously, the relation of the migrant with his country of origin is invisibly imbued with the asymmetric and conflicting relation between the two countries. The migrant worker deals with feelings of being a traitor. S/he has moved into the ‘camp of the other side’ and within this the bargain has disturbed the social equilibrium in his/her home country. It is self-evident that the migrant is inclined to compensate this by manifesting his/her own ‘true’ identity in the host country.

It could be stated that the large-scale riots of the last decade by young migrants in various cities find their explanation here. Many in Western Europe have considered integration as unsuccessful. This however does not mean that the second and third generations of migrants from the Maghreb countries are being further removed from the European societies in the same way as their parents or grandparents. All these youngsters grow up in a Western culture, which differs completely from the daily experiences in Morocco, Algeria and Turkey. Now they are as familiar with the Western society as are the native majorities.

In their variety these youngsters are decreasingly homogenous and increasingly resemble the native majority. Paradoxically, the pressure on the migrants as a group is rising. Their marginal social position (unemployed, low education rate, poor housing, etc.), which has remained unchanged over years and generations, is the very spot from where they commence the resistance to enforced integration. In a certain way this type of resistance might be constitutive for the emancipation process that all subordinated cultures need to go through vis-à-vis the dominant West. When they offer resistance, they do so because of the familiarity with the all-embracing power position of the well-known Western culture. They fight a battle, if necessary by being deliberately obstructive, in order to obtain eventually a fulfilling place in that world in which they grow up. They succeed in denying the evidence that they are French, British, Belgian, Dutch, etc. That in particular young ‘migrants’, educated in Europe, identify for example with an Arab-Islamic culture in protesting against Western culture is the exact opposite of what is expected in terms of integration, but it is probably an important step within the process of education and emancipation. Like all youngsters they ‘fight’ for an acceptable place in society. They use the roots of their ancestors, in this case Islam, to successfully manifest themselves. As a consequence our attention as social workers should shift from the so-called ‘integration problem’ to the ‘civil or social problem of an integrated society’.

In the third principle that determines migration, Sayad states that migration demands collective hypocrisy and social untrustworthiness (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2000). By this he means that emigration and immigration can only exist because their positive interest is always being mystified. The objective reality of the host countries and the migrants themselves is being characterized by a ‘magical’ denial (Verneinung). Both seek justification in the consideration that migration is merely temporary and transitory, that it is economically beneficial for all parties and that migration occurs in a neutrally political sphere and without consequence for the civil society in the country of origin (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2000).

To Sayad emigration cannot solely be considered as the export of labour potential because the social relations in the country of origin are always being disrupted by it. Furthermore, the perception in the host country is always that migrants are transients because of the alleged temporary nature of their labour. That is why over generations they have been called guest workers, migrants. Also, inevitably a distance is created with their initial social environment. They lose their position and honour in their native country, but do not obtain a similar new status in the host country. Migrants need to ‘deny’ this dubious situation (Verneinung). They have to deny their feelings of guilt, deny being what they are. This is particularly apparent in the relation with their children. Those children, says Sayad (1979), are ‘sociologic bastards’, the embodiment of the impossibility ever to return home. Children incorporate their parents’ longings in the ambivalent relation between the country of residence and the country of origin. This disturbed relationship with the children possibly occurs within what we recognize as the process of the radicalization with migrant youth of the second and third generation. As French, Belgian or Dutch youngsters they justify their actions by calling upon their ‘otherness’, the culture and country of their ancestors (Wacquant, 2010).

A paradigm shift in the integration process

Many researchers claim that in the last decade the conditions in the EU for the integration of migrants have proliferated and gradually have become more restrictive (Brubaker, 2001; Carrera, 2006; Carrera and Atger, 2011: 55; Dell’Olio, 2004; Goodman, 2010; Husband, 2007; Joppke, 2007; Kostakopoulou, 2010).

Integration obligations in certain member states impose the heaviest burden of proof on the foreigner to demonstrate his/her assimilation into a homogenous framing of a pure societal self, which is considered to ideally exist at the foundations of the nation. (Joppke and Morawska, 2003)

The Civil Integration Programs formed the first step in the integration obligations process and were introduced in several countries. In some of them (Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands) migrants and newcomers became required to participate in language courses and to acquire basic knowledge of the history of the host country, its institutions, socio-economic characteristics, culture and fundamental norms and values. In various countries migrants now have to pass a test in order to enter the country through mechanisms of family reunification, to obtain permanent residence and to acquire citizenship. This reflects a major shift. Carrera and Atger (2011) argue that when language and civic knowledge constitute mandatory conditions for residence or access to basic fundamental rights (or both), integration courses, tests and programs should be deemed mechanisms of exclusion rather than of integration. In the past, integration policy was based on the development of a process of participation and a liberal policy of non-discrimination. There was a distinction between migration and integration. Whereas before the guest society was responsible for the latter, it is now the migrants who are held accountable for their own integration process. Civic integration has been singled out as an alternative or an altogether new strategy of integration. Civic integration policies express the idea that successful incorporation into a host society rests not only on employment (economic integration) and civic engagement (political integration), but also on individual commitments to characteristics typifying national citizenship, specifically country knowledge, language proficiency and liberal and social values (Goodman, 2010).

Even so, most scholars endorse the general interest of these mandatory language and country-knowledge requirements (Carrera and Atger, 2011; Green, 2007; Joppke, 2007; Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Kostakopoulou, 2010; Odmalm, 2007). Knowledge of the local language is considered essential in order to achieve a place in the labour market. However, what the above authors critically indicate is that by this swing to control and sanctions, migrants to a large extent will not integrate (Kostakopoulou, 2010). They are not able to be part of the new society as equal citizens, unless – and that is the overall condition imposed to them through the civic integration policy – they fully adjust to the new society, discard their past and the place they have come from and be ‘re-socialized’ and re-educated. They must, according to Sayad, get rid of everything that precedes the moment of immigration (Sayad, 1999a).

It could be stated that the notion of integration does not seem to involve a process of social inclusion of migrants, but has rather become a mechanism of control by which the state may better manage who enters or who is excluded from its territory. For Carrera (2006) the current ‘integration policy’ veils the actual convention setting of assimilation, incorporation, or acculturation philosophy. It tries to prevent social problems by excluding those people who are defined as problematic because ‘they belong to another world’. The receiving society obliges newcomers to forget that they have come from elsewhere along with their whole existence. According to Sayad (1999b) Western policy-makers are blind to the fact that foreigners come to Europe to earn money for their family members left behind. For the Frenchman Sayad, connected to his Algerian homeland, it goes without saying that in a strange continent migrants live in solidarity with their relatives.

Migrants come from elsewhere. They have brought along their own world that in many respects differs from the new society. That in itself should not be a problem for social workers, as it makes up one of the basic constitutions from which social work results. Namely, it is precisely because some people fail to participate fully and freely in society, that professional social work was created.

Social work and evidence-based practice

In the last decade the engagement of social work has become problematic, at least in meeting the needs of refugees and asylum seekers (Husband, 2007). It critically exposes the fraught intersection of the core values of social work with the political priorities of the state. Husband terms this the ‘politics of dissuasion’ that has been a pragmatic and calculated political response to popular xenophobia and racisms. It has taken place within an increasingly contested and politicized national context. It has also challenged the universalist humanism of the social work profession. According to Beth Humphries (2004), the problem of the reactionary relationship between social work and social policy, is that the government ignores the ideological base of its decisions. In order to legitimate its politics the government makes its increasing control stem from evidence-based practice in all aspects of employment, health, education and housing. In his book Perspectives on European Social Work (2006), Lorenz situates social work within the political context of the nation-state. In this work he is very conscientious in tracing the distinctive characteristics of the construction of national identities as emergent homogenizing ideologies central to the legitimation of the state’s exercise of power over individuals. Humphries in his turn believes that social work is in danger because of the significant lack in critical thought on the incoherence between evidence, policy and practice. The practice of social work is reduced too easily to regularization practices and the mitigation of risks:

The evidence-based practice movement is leading social work research away from initiating policy developments towards one of evaluating, monitoring and legitimating them, with an emphasis on exploring the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of policy. (Humphries, 2004: 94)

Walter Lorenz (2006) has extensively highlighted the legitimizing role of academic discourses for contemporary social work practice. Strier (2007) equally points to the dissent on the meaning of research along with the rising comprehension that social work research is a politically contested area in which certain knowledge is constructed as ‘legitimate’ whereas other ways of knowing are excluded. Social work researchers should be aware of the subtle forms of oppression involved in dominant research traditions and values. In the use of scientific research the government finds it very easy to find a partner for the credibility of their proposed anti-oppressive-based practice. From this perspective only those practices and interventions whose effectiveness has been proven through research may be deployed to combat social problems. Within this paradigm the social worker is being reduced to the executor of procedural guidelines derived from scientific knowledge. It is assumed that these guidelines are applicable in any situation, that they always offer the right solution and that the influence of the social context of the intervention can be kept under control. The practice of social work is standardized. It runs through a rigorous methodological framework with a scientific substructure. This scientific research relies on quantitative measurable effects, which needs to result in solid, context-free guidelines and predictable outcomes. And that is what leads to the pre-eminent objective of social politics: it makes social problems manageable.

Humphries (2004) points out that many social workers are in favour of this social policy, as they believe that conducting ‘anti-oppressive practice’ allows them to continuously feel as if they are acting in humanitarian and helpful ways (Sakamoto, 2007). Nowadays a wide range of values is available related to human rights, which is part of every plan of social policy. Free choice, citizenship, individual development, community participation, responsibility, social inclusion, etc., all belong to the basic values of civic integration policy for newcomers. They have to guarantee an ‘anti-oppressive and anti-racist practice’ towards migrants. These values entirely coincide with those that inspire social work as well (Humphries, 2004). It is believed that, on the basis of the above-mentioned values, civic integration programs are a right means to offer migrants and newcomers valuable opportunities. This belief is fortified by the conviction that what one does is anti-oppressive. Unfortunately, precisely that anti-oppressive practice is repressive: all newcomers are ‘obliged’. The obligation consists in accepting the ‘given chances’ in the way it has been offered to them. When they ‘fail’, they are punished and excluded. According to Humphries social workers are required to guard the functioning of that policy system.

Social workers should not let themselves be led by the vague definition of emancipation, security, empowerment, autonomy, social inclusion and social cohesion. Social interventions are realized in the practice of social work. That means they are the result of the interaction between social workers and their target group. Although the success or failure depends on this interaction, its outcome is not predictable in the sense that it can be captured in a given disciplined plan. By contrast, within the evidence-based practice the available research evidence has to be integrated with the professional expertise of practitioners and the experiences, expectations and needs of clients. In the case of migrants and newcomers it is of the utmost importance that they receive a voice through the social workers to whom they are directed. Interprofessional exchange and reflection or the exchange of practical experiences of practitioners form the next step. ‘Social services organisations that internalized the culture of reflection’, say Strier and Binyamin (2010: 1917), ‘relinquished the search for uniform, de-contextualised solutions.’ Evidence-based practice would mean that the extensive professional experience of practitioners is being mapped through research. Assembling very particular events and confronting them with one another renders scientific knowledge into a relevant investigation of practice. It must counteract that which emerges from social politics as a false appearance of anti-oppression and anti-racism.

Conclusion

In today’s EU, social work for migrants has to deal with a significant wave of anti-migration in the general public opinion (Žižek, 2011). In such an atmosphere social politics that associate with social work, self-evidently have a repressive character. This article wants to promote more counterweights and action out from the professional field of social work for migrants. The article argues in favour of shifting the balance towards migrants and newcomers. Social work is not merely the implementation of social policies; it primarily exists so that individuals and groups with fewer opportunities might be better able to participate in society.

Within the globalized world, the position of social work has become considerably weakened. The weight of the national government, which legitimizes social work, has declined in favour of the neoliberal free market economy. Migrants and newcomers are allowed here insofar as they are economically useful. Sayad has taught us that the universalist view of the Western countries did not cease with the end of colonization. Within the general migration process the part of emigration is always being eliminated, which to this day makes it acceptable that newcomers are obliged to integrate and thus to adapt.

Finally, this article argues that social work in itself has become the victim of a misleading anti-oppressive and anti-racist practice. The overwhelming humanitarian values wrongly suggest that evidence-based practice benefits the migrants and newcomers.

This article aims to advocate the expansion of the scientific research field with the expertise of field workers and the experiences of clients. Exchange of results and methodological reflections can strengthen the impact of professional social work for migrants to a considerable extent.