Social attitudes towards welfare policies in Russia and other European countries

Abstract

Based on the 2008 data from ESS, the article analyses the attitudes of Russians towards state social policy, and compares their opinions with those of populations in selected European countries. The research identifies the factors affecting social attitudes toward welfare policies. Results suggest that Russians believe that the majority of social support functions must be provided by the state stems from the severity of these problems in the country.

Keywords

Russia social attitudes social policy social risk values welfare state

Introduction

Social attitudes towards state welfare policies have been researched in detail in economically developed Western countries where, in addition to polls being carried out in specific countries, comparative studies have also examined the differences in the public outlook on welfare from country to country. However, in Russia very little research has considered social attitudes towards welfare policies and there have been virtually no studies up to this point examining how these differ from attitudes to welfare in other countries. At the same time, two decades after Russia began liberalization, it is important to understand what the attitudes of Russian people are towards state welfare policies and how social attitudes towards the welfare state might differ from attitudes in other countries. Comparing social attitudes towards state welfare policies in Russia with those in other countries allows us to identify countries that are similar to Russia in the way that people view state welfare policies. Traditionally, it is believed that Russian people tend to view the state as a parent that ought to take care of their needs. This belief has become so widespread among politicians, the media and even scientists, that for many years, it has been used by politicians to justify inefficient social support for the population and low social expenditure. Comparing Russia with other countries should help us get a more objective perspective on this issue and check whether the social demands made on the state by Russians are unjustifiably high. Moreover, an analysis of the factors that affect these demands could be useful for developing effective social policies since the success and efficacy of the government’s social policies will depend to a large extent on how closely the decisions taken by the country’s leadership correspond to the attitudes and expectations of the population (Salmina, 2010a).

The research context

Social attitudes towards specific state welfare policies have been studied in detail in European countries. In particular, it has been demonstrated that healthcare and pensions are viewed as basic social functions of the state in the majority of European countries (Bean and Papadakis, 1998; Cook and Barrett, 1992; Taylor-Gooby, 1985, inter alia). In this article we studied what expectations and requirements Russians have regarding the state social welfare system. In addition we compared the attitudes towards specific state welfare policies in Russia with those reported in other European countries.

When comparisons are made between different countries, researchers frequently use Esping-Andersen’s classification of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984; Korpi, 1983). At the same time, a large number of studies comparing national attitudes to state welfare attempt to identify correlations between the predominant social attitudes towards state welfare in each country and the type of welfare state that country has. All such studies are based on the hypothesis that predominantly negative attitudes towards state welfare policies are characteristics of liberal or neo-liberal countries while predominantly positive attitudes are characteristic of countries conforming to the social-democratic model.

Even though some studies have confirmed this hypothesis (Andress and Heien, 2001; Kangas, 1994; Svallfors, 1997: 283), the majority of more recent studies have shown that Esping-Andersen’s classification of welfare states does not necessarily reflect the differences between social attitudes to welfare policies in the countries studied (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Gelissen, 2002: 48–50; Ragin, 1994). It is also important to realize that, in terms of its social policy, Russia cannot be unambiguously classified in Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology. Therefore in this study it was decided not to rely on Esping-Andersen’s models of welfare but rather to attempt to build a classification of welfare states based on how closely a country’s social policies are correlated with social attitudes towards the existing national welfare policies. It should be noted that the construction of a new welfare state classification was not the purpose of this research, but plays only a supporting role.

A separate issue challenging researchers and policy-makers concerns the identification of factors which determine social attitudes towards state welfare policies (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Heien and Hofäcker, 1999, inter alia). While social attitudes towards welfare policies in Russia have been little studied, even less research has been carried out into the factors that shape these attitudes. Thus one of the goals of this research was to identify and analyse the factors affecting social attitudes towards welfare policies. The basis for this analysis is the explanatory model, which suggests that attitudes are influenced by two sets of factors: self-interest and culture, including values and beliefs (Cousins, 2005).

Method

This was a quantitative study based on analysis of secondary data.

Data

The empirical data used come from the European Social Survey (ESS) for 2008, which conducted polls in 28 countries, including Russia. The ESS sample was run through several filters. In particular all the respondents younger than 17 years of age and all the respondents who were not citizens of the country where the survey was carried out were deleted from the sample as well as those who did not answer the relevant questions in the survey. All the responses in the ESS sample were weighted based on the design of the sample and the population of each country.

Methodology for building the indicators of social attitudes towards welfare policies and factors affecting them

A State Responsibility for Social Support Index (SRSSI) was built to assess social attitudes towards state welfare policies. The index measures views on how responsible the state should be for key social support functions. The index is constructed by calculating the extent to which respondents agree with a series of statements reflecting support for state responsibility for implementing a number of social functions, namely: ‘ensuring a job for everyone who wants one’; ‘ensuring adequate health care for the sick’; ‘ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the old’; ‘ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed’; ‘ensuring sufficient child care services for working parents’; ‘providing paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members’. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with each statement on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means the respondent does not think the state is supposed to have anything to do with the issue in question while 10 means the respondent believes the state must be completely responsible for it. To test whether a multiple index could be built on the basis of these variables a factor analysis was carried out: as a result it was possible to combine all the variables into a single index that explains 69 percent of the total dispersion. A similar factor analysis was carried out for the other indices that were constructed for this research.

Several auxiliary indices were also used in this study. To identify socially vulnerable groups in the population a Social Risk Index (SRI) was constructed. This index essentially reflects the subjective assessment by the respondent of the social risks they are exposed to. The index was built by adding up the respondents’ answers to questions about their fears that their socio-economic status may deteriorate in the near future: ‘How likely is it that during the next 12 months you will be unemployed and looking for work for at least four consecutive weeks?’, ‘How likely is it that during the next 12 months you will have to spend less time in paid work than you would like, because you have to take care of family members or relatives?’, ‘During the next 12 months how likely is it that there will be some periods when you don’t have enough money to cover your household necessities?’, ‘During the next 12 months how likely is it that you will not receive the health care you really need if you become ill?’ The index has a scale from 1, which means very high probability that the respondent’s situation will deteriorate, to 4, almost zero probability of deterioration in the near future.

To measure the public assessment of how successful the state is in performing its social functions another index was constructed, namely, a Vulnerable Social Groups Index (VSGI). The index is a sum of several variables: ‘What do you think overall about the standard of living of pensioners?’, ‘What do you think overall about the standard of living of people who are unemployed?’, ‘What do you think overall about the provision of affordable child care services for working parents?’, ‘What do you think overall about the opportunities for young people to find their first full-time job in [country]?’ Respondents were asked to assess how well different population groups in the country were doing on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means a specific group is doing very badly while 10 means they are doing very well.

The study also looked into the link between social attitudes towards welfare policies and various values. The Schwartz methodology was used for identifying values. This methodology has been empirically verified in a number of studies (Schwartz, 1992, 2004a, 2004b). A 21-question form is used to identify 10 groups of values, which were used in this study: Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, Security, Power and Achievement.

Procedures

The study results were obtained from the analysis of ESS data for 2008. For data analysis the study used such methods as regression analysis, Kruskal-Wallis test, correlation analysis and factor analysis. Classic linear regression with dummy variables was used to analyse the factors affecting social attitudes toward welfare policies. When building regression models, steps were taken to ensure that regression remainders were normally distributed, were homoskedastic and exhibited no multicollinearity.

Findings

The structure of social attitudes towards welfare policies in Russia

Analysis of the ESS sample has shown that on the whole, Russians believe the state should be responsible for social support. The vast majority of people in Russia believe that the state must perform such social functions as ensuring a reasonable standard of living for old people (88%¹), ensuring adequate healthcare for people who are sick (86%); providing paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members (72%); ensuring sufficient child care services for working parents (71%); and ensuring a job for everyone who wants one (65%).

However, it should be noted that, while most Russians believe that the state must be responsible for these functions, there is some variance in the degree to which different people think that all these functions should be the sole responsibility of the state. The public perception in Russia, as in most European countries (Bean and Papadakis, 1998; Cook and Barrett, 1992; Jowell, 1998) is that the state should focus on financing pension schemes and healthcare services. ESS data show that over 80 percent of Russians believe that the state must perform these functions. Furthermore, people in most European countries also believe that providing healthcare and ensuring an adequate standard of living for elderly people are key functions of the state (Bean and Papadakis, 1998; Cook and Barrett, 1992; Jowell, 1998).

The second most important social function of the state, in the opinion of most Russians, is family support, and in particular, financing paid leave for people who have to take care of sick family members (72%) and ensuring sufficient child care services for working parents (71%). This reflects the actual situation in Russia. Thus, various studies have shown that families with children in Russia are characterized by the highest social risks and the most extreme poverty (Burdyak and Popova, 2007; Ovcharova and Popova, 2005).

A fairly large proportion of Russians believe that the state must provide jobs for everyone who wants to work (65%). The evidence seems to suggest that this belief stems primarily from the not so distant Soviet era when the state was the sole employer: thus prior to 1989 about 90 percent of the population were employed by the state while today state employees account for only about 30 percent of the working population (Shkaratan, 2006). A smaller proportion of the population, compared to those who believe the state must provide jobs for everyone, are those who think that the state must pay decent unemployment benefits to those out of work (49%).

In addition, the ESS data show a statistically significant link between welfare attitudes in Russia and the way people assess the actual situation regarding welfare in the country: generally those people who believe that the social protection of socially vulnerable groups of the population is inadequate tend to believe that the state should provide more social support. For example, the majority of Russians who believe that Russian pensioners have inadequate living standards believe that the state must ensure adequate standards of living for the elderly (94%). Thus among Russians, the perception of state responsibility for implementing social policies is shaped to a large extent by the kind of unsolved social problems the country is facing at the moment.

Social attitudes to welfare policies in Russia and other countries

Any reforms of Russia’s social welfare system must take into account the experience of other countries. However, it would be wrong to use the solutions from those other countries without changing them to take into account the historical and cultural differences in attitudes towards welfare policies between Russia and those other model countries. The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to make one-to-one comparisons between the countries included in the sample to determine whether social attitudes towards welfare policies in Russia are different from those in other countries. The State Responsibility for Social Support Index (SRSSI) was examined as well as the variables that comprise it. For comparative analysis of social attitudes towards the welfare policies all the countries were ranked by their mean (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Means for SRSSI in different countries (0 means the state must not take on social support functions, 10 means the state must provide maximum social support) and public social expenditure as % of GDP (2007).³

To identify countries with similar welfare attitudes (rather than simply show which countries have no statistically significant difference from Russia in this respect), one-on-one comparisons were carried out between the countries included in the sample, using the Kruskal-Wallis test for the SRSSI. For each country, other countries were found whose populations exhibit no statistically significant differences in their attitudes towards state welfare. For instance, there is no statistically significant difference in the SRSSI between Russia and such countries as Bulgaria, Israel and Spain. Similar analysis for specific welfare policies demonstrated that there is no statistically significant difference between Russia, Israel and Spain, and most of the time between Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary.

As a result the following groups of countries were identified:

1) The countries in Southern and Eastern Europe (Russia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Greece, Spain, Israel²) and

2) Some Central and Western European countries (France, Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Slovakia, Czech Republic).

Thus it was established that, in terms of social attitudes towards the welfare state, Russia is markedly different from the more economically developed post-communist countries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia and is in the same group as Southern (Spain, Greece) and Eastern European countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, Ukraine) as well as Israel. However, it seems surprising that public attitudes in Russia are similar to those in Southern and Eastern Europe, even though social policies and the situation of various groups of the population are different in Russia from those in some of these other countries. But the resulting categories make sense if we take into account the history of the countries in question as well as their current socio-economic situation. Spain, Greece and Israel, which are classified as developed countries by the International Monetary Fund, ended up in the same group as Russia. However, all these countries should be regarded as less developed than Western European countries because, for instance, countries such as Greece and Spain have only been parliamentary democracies for a relatively short period and Israel is a relatively new state. Unlike them, the Western European nations have been parliamentary democracies with market economies for considerable periods of time. Predominantly positive attitudes towards welfare policies in Spain can also be explained by the fact that Spain lags behind other European countries in terms of economic development while the social welfare policies pursued by its governments are closest to the Mediterranean model (Larsen, 2008: 31).

In terms of GDP and consumption the most developed post-communist countries are the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, the first two of which ended up in the same group as Western and Central Europe while Hungary exhibits traits more characteristic of Southern and Eastern Europe. It should be noted that these countries were among the hardest hit in Eastern Europe during the economic crisis of 2008–2009.

Factors affecting social attitudes towards welfare policies

In this section the factors behind social attitudes towards state welfare policies in Russia are discussed. A number of regression models were built to find the combination of factors that have the greatest impact on the State Responsibility for Social Support Index (SRSSI) which reflects demand for state responsibility for key social support functions. SRSSI was used as a dependent variable in multiple linear regression with dummy variable. The final regression model (see Table 1) includes the following factors: self-assessment of income sufficiency, education, a Social Risk Index (SRI), a Vulnerable Social Groups Index (VSGI), the values of security (Schwartz, 1992).

Table 1.

Ordered logit regression coefficients SRSSI by countries^a.

Explanatory variables	Western and Central Europe	Southern and Eastern Europe	All countries	Russia
We live on this income without problems	−0.63***	−0.69***	−0.70***	−0.75**
We live on this income without problems	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.32)
This income is in principle sufficient for us	−0.43***	−0.47***	−0.45***	−0.26
This income is in principle sufficient for us	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.21)
We are having difficulties living on this income	−0.02	−0.34***	−0.19***	−0.02
We are having difficulties living on this income	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.21)
The number of years of education	−0.01***	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.03)
Very low probability of economic hardship in the future^b	−0.16	−0.49***	−0.63***	−0.66*
Very low probability of economic hardship in the future^b	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.33)
Fairly low probability of economic hardship in the future	−0.09	−0.91***	−0.74***	−1.38***
Fairly low probability of economic hardship in the future	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.24)
Fairly high probability of economic hardship in the future	−0.02	−0.62***	−0.47***	−0.86***
Fairly high probability of economic hardship in the future	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.24)
Socially vulnerable groups are doing well^c	−0.36***	−0.80***	−0.77***	−1.03**
Socially vulnerable groups are doing well^c	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.42)
Socially vulnerable groups are doing passably well	−0.64***	−0.61***	−0.90***	−0.58***
Socially vulnerable groups are doing passably well	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.13)
Values of security	0.56***	0.79***	0.74***	0.96***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.13)
Pseudo R²	0.07***	0.11***	0.17***	0.17***
Number of obs.	17,855	21,616	52,739	2131

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.

Ordered logit regressions. Included as controls are respondents who believe they are barely surviving on their income, have a low level of education, believe their situation is very likely to deteriorate in the future, assess the situation of socially vulnerable groups in the country as very bad, and put a lot of value on security.

Public Assessment of the Probability of Economic Hardships in the Future (SRI).

Assessment of the Situation with Socially Vulnerable Groups of Population (VSGI).

Security was included in the regression model, as it more strongly correlates with SRSSI (see Table 2) than other values. Moreover, citizens in Russia and Southern and Eastern Europe have the highest scores on Schwartz’s value type of ‘Security’ (67% and 68%, respectively; see Figure 2).

Table 2.

Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between SRSSI and values (Schwartz).

Values	Russia	Western and Central Europe	Southern and Eastern Europe
Power	−0.05*	0.03**	−0.02**
Achievement	−0.00	−0.01	0.01
Hedonism	0.09**	−0.07**	0.06**
Stimulation	0.11**	0.01	0.08**
Self-Direction	−0.05*	−0.03**	−0.03**
Universalism	−0.24**	−0.16**	−0.19**
Benevolence	−0.19**	−0.13**	−0.16**
Tradition	−0.23**	−0.11**	−0.16**
Conformity	−0.19**	−0.07**	−0.17**
Security	–0.30**	–0.20**	–0.23**

Note: **p < .01; *p < .05.

Figure 2.

Value priorities in Russia, Western and Central Europe and Southern and Eastern Europe (ESS, 2008).

The results of regression analysis not only confirm the conclusions outlined in the previous sections and arrived at using other methods, but also help us to understand the characteristic features of social attitudes in Russia. Thus it was established that the structure and nature of the factors affecting the public perception of social responsibility of the state for providing welfare for citizens in Russia and Southern and Eastern Europe are exactly the same. Key factors in all these countries are the perception of income and the estimate of the probability of economic hardship in the future, as well as the assessment of the situation of socially vulnerable groups in the population. The more affluent and socially secure respondents place less importance on state social support. The values of security (Schwartz, 1992) also have a significant impact on social attitudes towards welfare policies in Russia.

On the whole, the influence of the aforementioned factors on welfare attitudes in Russia and in Western and Central Europe is roughly the same, even though there are a number of significant differences between how these factors work in Russia as opposed to Central and Western Europe. First of all, such differences include the influence on social welfare attitudes of the respondents’ concern that their socio-economic situation may deteriorate. The coefficient for probability of economic hardship in the future (SRI) is negative in Russia and in Southern and Eastern Europe and indicates that the more apprehensive people are of a possible deterioration in their socio-economic situation, the more requirement they will have for social support from the state.

At the same time, the coefficient is statistically insignificant in Western and Central Europe. Thus the hypothesis was confirmed in Russia and in Southern and Eastern Europe, but it did not hold true in Central and Western Europe. In Russia and Southern and Eastern Europe this factor (personal expectations of future needs) has the most profound impact on social welfare attitudes; in fact, its impact is even greater than the impact of self-assessed sufficiency of income. People living in Central and Western Europe are different from Russians in this respect: their lack of fear that their socio-economic situation may significantly deteriorate if something bad happens in their life could be a result of well-developed insurance systems. For example, when someone becomes unemployed in Western Europe, insurance payments usually enable them to survive this difficult period in their lives without too much hardship. The probability of economic hardship is not a general expectation and therefore is not a factor in attitudes supporting increased state welfare provision. Of the values we have considered so far, the one that best illustrates the difference between the two groups of countries is security. This significantly affects attitudes to welfare policies in Russia and Southern and Eastern Europe more than in Western and Central Europe. In Russia and similar countries security has an impact, which, in quantitative terms, is comparable to the impact of the estimated probability of economic hardships in the future (SRI). Partially, the greater impact of this factor has to do with the fact that traditionally in Russia, and in Southern and Eastern Europe, people have tended to place greater value on security (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Magun and Rudnev, 2008). This means that the need for security, which is a vital demand in Russia, is not adequately met.

Concluding discussion

This study has shown that Russians generally tend to have a high demand for state welfare and believe that the state should be responsible for providing social support and protection for the population.

Unlike the developed countries in Western and Central Europe, Russians believe that the state must play a bigger role in social support and the protection of the population. However, in Russia people do not assign as large a role in social support to the state as do people in other countries with a similar level of socio-economic development and social support. This essentially means that Russians do not really expect the state to be as paternalistic and all-pervasive as is traditionally believed.

The fact that Russians believe that the majority of social support functions must be provided by the state stems from the severity of these problems in the country, because, as this study has shown, demands for welfare policies are more pronounced in countries that are facing more social problems. In this article, macro-level factors were not included and the study focused on the influence of individual characteristics and attitudes to state welfare. Meanwhile, previous studies have shown that the social demands placed on the state are higher in countries with a lower share of public social spending and with higher levels of inequality and unemployment (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Larsen, 2008).

In countries with lower incomes, factors related to living standards and lack of safety nets play a deciding role in shaping social welfare attitudes. This can be seen in Russia as well as in a number of countries in Southern and Eastern Europe. In particular, this correlation explains the fact that in Russia, the value of security has a great impact on social attitudes towards state welfare policies (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Magun and Rudnev, 2008).

Also, it can be hypothesized that, in this case, social welfare attitudes and the demand for state social support are dictated not so much by traditional Russian values, as by the population’s basic need for survival. It is this lack of confidence in the state’s ability to perform its social support functions which determines the specific characteristics of social welfare attitudes in Russia where the most salient demand is that the state must at least create institutional conditions in which people can successfully solve their own problems (Salmina, 2010b).

We can also note a pronounced imbalance between social welfare attitudes in Russia and the degree of success in solving social problems in the country. This can result in increased social tension, especially considering that, when decisions are made about how to spend huge amounts of money on social support, the Russian government still does not take into consideration the ideas of the public about the kind of social policy the state should pursue, what priorities should be addressed first and which groups in the population are most in need of support. Taking social attitudes towards state welfare policies into account would require large-scale reforms, ranging from significant healthcare reforms to a reform of the social (financial) support system. The latter would need to be reoriented from targeted support to benefits being provided to categories of the population. An increase in the share of social spending on welfare is a necessary step in resolving these problems, but more spending will produce little effect unless the social welfare system is also made more efficient. The latter point could form the basis for more research in the social welfare field.

Footnotes

Funding

The article was supported by the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

Notes

Author biography

Alla Salmina is a Research Fellow at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia.

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