Family policy for all South African families

Abstract

The ‘White Paper of Families in South Africa’ is critically analysed in this article. It is shown that although family diversity is acknowledged in the aforementioned document, certain implications of the document undermine such professed diversity, not all caretakers of children are acknowledged and supported, and financially vulnerable families are not strengthened. Instead, narrow ideals of family life are at times promoted, suggesting middle-class heterosexual values. It is argued here that the realities of family life should be accepted as such and family in different forms should be supported consistently, not subtly pushed to conform to restricted interpretations of what families should be like.

Keywords

Family diversity family policy heteronormative South Africa vulnerable families White Paper

Introduction

The first democratically elected government of South Africa came into office in 1994, and since then the same political party, the African National Congress, occupied that position. This uninterrupted governance by one party is significant for policy development since consistent principles were advocated in various Acts. The Department of Social Development (DSD) released a draft of the ‘White Paper of Families in South Africa’ (referred to as the White Paper in this article) in 2012 which was approved by the parliament in 2013 and officially launched in October 2014. Co-incidentally, 2014 was also 20 years after the 1994 International Year of the Family and hence it was in general a year of reflection on the status of families in the relatively young democratic state of South Africa.

The development of a White Paper, or any other piece of legislation, does not take place in a policy vacuum. Charles (2013: 5) explains the policy development process in the South African context as follows:

a white paper is a type of policy document that often leads to the development of a national law, although this is not always the case. A white paper is preceded by a green paper – a draft policy document prepared by government for public consultation with interested parties and civil society organisations.

In the case of the White Paper on Families, the process was somewhat different in that it was released more than a decade after the Draft National Policy Framework for Families (2001), but hot on the heels of the ‘Green Paper on Families: Promoting family life and strengthening families in South Africa’ (referred to as the Green Paper in this article) that was released in 2011 (DSD, 2011). Apart from the draft policy and the Green Paper, 30 different Acts (e.g. Children’s Act and Divorce Act), 5 national policies, 9 international conventions or agreements and 8 regional (or African) charters are mentioned in the White Paper, all believed to have a direct bearing on the contents or implications thereof. The White Paper itself is 64 pages long and cites various sources and studies to form a picture of South African families. It is thus outside the scope of this article to analyse the entire White Paper or all the mentioned documents in detail, especially since some of these mentioned documents and aspects of the White Paper have already been assessed in the past.

Previous analyses have been critical of the approach taken in the various documents leading to the White Paper. In this regard, Charles (2013) and Goldblatt (2005) highlighted the patriarchal heteronormative nature of policy development related to families in South Africa. Gouws (2012) and Sevenhuijsen et al. (2003) further argue that the South African welfare policy simply assumes that ‘caring work’ will be done by families without recognising that the bulk of it will in fact be done by women (often as mothers, sisters or daughters). Hochfeld (2007) analysed the said Draft National Policy Framework for Families and highlighted the ‘moral regeneration’ discourse that is implied in this document. On a similar note, Charles (2013) suggested that the entire process of developing the White Paper was characterised by selective consultation whereby activist groups were not targeted for comments in the same rigorous manner as certain faith-based organisations (FBOs).

The above observations will be furthered here by arguing that the contents of the White Paper contain moral undertones that are restricted to not only promoting heteronormativity, but also promoting particular notions of middle-class respectability that are being set up as family ideals and hence marginalising ‘the poor’ and certain caretakers, the latter often being women. Furthermore, it will be argued that although the White Paper seemingly developed from research on families, certain of its policy recommendations undermine the professed claims of celebrating family diversity found in cited research and are characterised by prescriptive guidelines. Although the White Paper mentions different theoretical approaches, it will be argued here that a systems approach is favoured in the policy. The aim of this article is thus to reflect on certain implications of the White Paper (DSD, 2012b) based on documentary analysis to understand the substantive content, and comparing it with relevant census results from 2011 as well as insights from research undertaken on families in South Africa during the past two decades. Ultimately, the hope is to contribute to family policy development in heterogeneous societies such as South Africa.

Family policy development in South Africa

State policies often suggest a link between the individual and the state, with the state having certain presupposed responsibilities towards the individual. In the case of family policy, the relationship between the individual and the state is more complicated to delineate because families act as mediators when taking on caring roles towards individuals. If an individual is too sick, too young, too disabled, too frail, too poor or too unstable to care for themselves, the individual’s family usually provides care. In fact, in constituting family policies, it is often assumed (or at least hoped) that aspects of care towards individuals will be undertaken by family members. If this does not take place, it is habitually asked where the individual’s family is, implying responsibility from them. The specific family members that have to take up this care may not be specified, as Tessa Hochfeld (2007) argues: ‘in general public discourse the notion of family is taken as self-evident and remains uninterrogated’ (p. 79). Although ‘responsible’ family members may thus not be identified in an explicit manner, specific family members are targeted for care responsibilities, for example parents in the case of the young, adult children in the case of the old and immediate partners/spouses if such relationships exist. Grandparents, siblings, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, cousins and other extended family members may also be held accountable for taking care of individuals (see Mokomane, 2013). The expectations from family members as caregivers of children are manifested in the childcare policy, if the current monetary values of the child grants in South Africa are scrutinised. A primary caregiver who passes a means test (based on earnings less than a stipulated amount) can claim a Child Support Grant (CSG) of R330 (US$±28) per month (amounts applicable for 2015; there is usually an annual increase), but a person fostering a child can claim a Foster Care Grant of R860 (US$±72) which is more than double the value of the CSG. It may be argued that the Foster Care Grant grew from child protection conceptualisations in Western thinking, while the CSG is intended as a poverty alleviation strategy. In practice, though, foster parents are compensated more and a possible reading of this practice is that there are greater expectations of family members than caretakers who are not necessarily related to the child.

If family members do not take adequate responsibility for individual members, other institutions may become more directly involved. The state and its representatives are often seen as the next responsible body, after the family, for taking care of individuals. However, the involvement of the state should not be taken for granted. In an analysis of African countries, unlike welfare states from the North, Seekings (2002) shows a general picture of minimal assistance from the state and a reliance on extended families to take care of individuals. Kangas’ (2012) analysis of social security in African countries shows a more complex picture in relation to work accident insurance, sickness benefits, pensions and family allowances, but Mokomane (2013: 253) cautions that such social securities are often restricted to salaried workers. In addition, developing social security programmes for large and heterogeneous societies, such as South Africa, is far more difficult than in more homogeneous societies (Kangas, 2012: 77). In the new democratic dispensation of South Africa since 1994, Seekings (2002: 27) argues that ‘the historical division of responsibility between family and state is breaking down, as the former cannot cope with new demands and pressures’, which include the HIV/ AIDS pandemic. While Mokomane (2013) makes a similar point of added pressures on families in sub-Saharan countries, it should be added that in South Africa large numbers of families were unable to cope satisfactorily with family care demands under the apartheid regime for decades (Allen, 1992: 185–224). Not being able to cope with the ‘demands and pressures’ of individuals has become a feature of South African families (it is thus not a new phenomenon as may be suggested by Seekings) since the former apartheid state imposed other demands and pressures on (particularly black) families.

Families and the state may be the most recognisable caretakers of individuals, but various role players are in fact involved in caretaking. Hochfeld (2007: 79–80) records how the South African government became involved in the welfare of families since 1937 when the Department of Social Welfare was introduced, but it was in fact to assist existing church and community-based initiatives that were supporting families. The Nationalist Party government (the ruling party in South Africa from 1948 to 1994) created a multitude of policies and laws and supported various institutions in relation to care of individuals. However, all such initiatives aimed at families had different sets of regulations for families from different racial categories and were therefore discriminatory, with families categorised as ‘white’ benefitting far more than other families.

Mindful of this legacy, the current DSD (2012a) describes the importance of the White Paper by claiming that

significant progress towards strengthening families and supporting community interventions which foster social cohesion [was made]. A notable milestone was the completion and gazetting of the Green Paper on Families. Inputs received from the consultation process will culminate in a White Paper which will provide a formal policy framework for providing integrated services to families. This initiative will help to ensure that families play a central role in achieving the Department’s goal of restoring family values and responsibilities as a key element of building cohesive communities. (Emphasis added)

These mentioned ‘family values and responsibilities’ and ‘building cohesive communities’ already suggest a macro-level focus based on a structural functionalist or systems approach. This approach is further developed in the White Paper by citing Saunders (DSD, 2012b: 37), who categorises strategic priorities on the micro, meso and macro levels. According to this explanation, the macro level is informed by a systems approach where stability is sought and the status quo maintained. The term social cohesion has become pivotal in many policy documents and is defined and mentioned another four times in the White Paper. This supports the notion of stability which may not be problematic at face value, but if it undermines diversity, as is argued in the following, it becomes a contested approach.

The DSD (2011: 5) further identified ‘government departments, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), FBOs, community-based organisations (CBOs) and the business sector’ as all having an interest in family and individual wellbeing. The term ‘civil society’ is also used by the DSD but the way it is understood is not spelled out, although traditional healers, professional people, volunteers, news media and social researchers are all mentioned in this regard (DSD, 2011, 2012b: 54).

Having provided some idea of the complex policy milieu in which the White Paper was developed and released, understanding the actual state of families in South Africa is crucial. In the next section salient realities are highlighted and linked to the White Paper (comparing it with the Green Paper where relevant).

Salient family characteristics and the White Paper

Based on various studies and census data, three distinct features of South African families two decades after the advent of democracy can be identified: (1) there are unacceptable levels of domestic violence among families of all socio-economic classes in South Africa that are ignored (or even condoned) by extended families, neighbours, local communities and institutions such as the police force; (2) a variety of family structures and patterns of care are thriving; and (3) many families are living under such extreme conditions of poverty that their physical wellbeing is at risk (Abrahams et al., 2009, 2010; Bray et al., 2010; Ferreira and Lindgren, 2008; Gummerson and Schneider, 2013; Makiwane and Berry, 2013; Makoae et al., 2009; Posel and Rudwick, 2013; Rabe, 2008, 2014; Ratele, 2008; Rogan, 2013; Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), 2013; Surender et al., 2010). These three identified features of families in South Africa will now be teased out in more detail.

The first of these realities, domestic violence, is often linked to a ‘family in crisis discourse’ as was also mentioned in the Green Paper’s executive summary (DSD, 2011: 5) but later contradicted, or at least qualified. The alarming levels of interpersonal violence, in both the private and public sectors, reported in the media (almost on a daily basis) as well as research (Abrahams et al., 2009, 2010; Ratele, 2008), have become synonymous with South Africa. In trying to make sense of these acts of violence, there is a general sense of moral panic in the public discourse. The family as an institution is directly linked with this moral panic, and it is believed that families are in crisis. While acknowledging the horror of interpersonal violence in South Africa, I want to highlight, as the Green Paper later does, that the remarkable resilience and adaptability of the family are downplayed in the public discourse. If we look at the structural organisation of de facto family households on its own, we notice that in the absence of biological parents, other family members have taken up the responsibility of raising children for decades. In other cases, families may also be better off when dissolved, for example divorcing an abusive partner. Maintaining the status quo by being married (associated with a systems approach to family life) is thus not always ideal. Acknowledging various forms of conflict and dealing with it are thus of importance as it cannot be wished away by ‘promoting stable marital unions’. In this regard the White Paper is an improvement on the Green Paper in that it recognises resilience and adaptability of families in South Africa. Since a range of other legislature has been developed to deal with domestic violence (such as the Domestic Violence Act), it is not a main concern of the White Paper and will not be focused on further here.

The second reality, diversity, can be described as a trademark of family life in South Africa, and two prominent features are discernible. One of the prominent manifestations of diversity is that South Africa is the first country in the world to concurrently give legal recognition to both homosexual unions (the Civil Union Act of 2006) and polygyny (the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, No. 120 of 1998). These two pieces of legislation are significant since the former confirms homosexual unions and the latter acknowledges entrenched marriage practices.

In the White Paper, explicit acknowledgement of family diversity is stipulated:

There are different types of families in South Africa which are products of various cultures and social contexts. Therefore, the need exists to recognise the diverse nature of South Africa’s families in all initiatives that address their plight. This principle will guide Government and all stakeholders in their engagement with the family. (DSD, 2012b: 9)

In the same vein the following is stated:

Put in place measures to eradicate discriminations related to, among others, age, gender, birth, sexual orientation, race, ethnic or social origin, marital status, disability, beliefs, culture, language, physical and mental conditions, family composition, financial conditions, and blood relations. (DSD, 2012b: 39)

Such statements by the government in the White Paper are welcomed, and these are further underscored when looking at how families are defined in the Green Paper (DSD, 2011: 73):

a group of persons united by the ties of marriage, blood, adoption or cohabitation, characterised by a common residence (household) or not, interacting and communicating with one another in their respective family roles, maintaining a common culture and governed by family rules.

In the White Paper (DSD, 2012b), a family is defined as

A societal group that is related by blood (kinship), adoption, foster care or the ties of marriage (civil, customary or religious), civil union or cohabitation, and go beyond a particular physical residence. (p. 3)

From the above definition of ‘family’ it appears as if there is a positive acceptance of family diversity that was repeatedly highlighted in both the Green and the White Papers, but this acknowledgement of diversity is undermined by wanting to promote ‘stable marital unions’ (see later). However, the different definitions by the two documents imply slightly different approaches to families. The first definition from the Green Paper alludes to certain responsibilities and rights to be expected from family members towards one another by referring to concepts such as ‘interaction’, ‘family roles’ and ‘family rules’. The definition in the White Paper simply describes possible relations between family members. By using a definition which only specifies the relationships and possible locality of family members, this inclusive definition does not venture into a description of expectations and responsibilities from family members.

Although there are some similar issues addressed in both, the Green Paper has a more historical view of families, while the White Paper tends to focus on the present-day picture of families. This is clearly demonstrated in the discussions on migrant families where the White Paper (DSD, 2012b: 21–22) focuses on the 1990s and onwards, while the Green Paper (DSD, 2011) mentions the interconnection between black families and the migratory system (especially its historical roots) repeatedly. Perhaps this shows a commitment from government to focus more on the current challenges instead of dwelling on the past, but it does obscure an understanding of important entrenched living practices that have survived the apartheid years (at its peak between 1948 and 1994 when so-called separate development for different ‘ethnic groups’ was enforced to the detriment of the majority of people classified as ‘black’, ‘Coloured’ or Indian) and is still influencing family household arrangements today.

Regardless of the differences, these statements appear promising by being so inclusive, but under the recommendations of the White Paper it is stated that the aim of government should be to ‘[i]mprove the availability and accessibility of “family-type” housing in cities to facilitate the decent co-residence of spouses as well as parents and their young children’ (DSD, 2012b: 39). This clearly favours housing for nuclear type families and there is thus no recognition of other types of housing that can accommodate other types of families such as multi-generational family households or older people living independently (which is called for in the South African Older Persons Act No. 13 (DSD, 2006: 8) that wants to promote older people living in communities for as long as possible). This incongruity resonates with statements by the Lund Committee for Child and Family Support that highlighted the mismatch between the realities of South African (especially black) families and the direction social grants (such as the CSG) are taking (Lund, 2011).

This ‘family type’ of housing may have been a reaction to single-sex hostels that were built during the apartheid years and contributed to the residential division of many couples. In this regard the Zambian Copperbelt housing policy gives an important historical lesson. During the expansion of the Zambian Copper mines, houses suitable for nuclear families were built on the mine premises. Nuclear families were regarded as ‘stabilised’ or ‘modern’ by the colonial rulers, and hence active strategies were employed to promote such families in various ways (Ferguson, 1999). These strategies did not take into account that in Zambia the dominant family form was extended in nature and that matrilineal descent dictated family practices. Vaughan (1998) describes the ensuing reality as follows:

Colonial experts looked on in dismay as their neat lines of nuclear family housing took on the more familiar appearance of an African village settlement with new huts erected next to brick houses and the ‘colonial village’ fragmented into what was essentially a set of lineage settlements. (p. 173)

The clear lesson to be learnt from the ‘Zambian housing experiment’ is that realities and ideology should be separated and policy should address realities, not promote ideology.

Another noticeable trend that gives rise to diversity, apart from diverse legal recognition for different couple relationships, is the absence of biological fathers in family households and the weak link between fertility and nuptiality. This weak link (Garenne, 2004; Mhongo and Budlender, 2013; Palamuleni et al., 2007) and absent biological fathers (Morrell, 2006; Padi et al., 2014; Swartz and Bhana, 2009) have been analysed in some detail (also repeatedly in the White Paper), but the presence of adult men, other than biological fathers, in family households is not highlighted. From the 2011 census it was observed that 63.7 per cent of children under the age of 18 years do not live with their biological fathers compared to 28 per cent who do not live with their biological mothers. Yet in the same census it was reported that 79 per cent of women live with a husband or male partner in the same household (StatsSA, 2013: 7, 9). It is thus clear that large numbers of children live with their biological mothers as well as an adult man who is not their biological father but a partner of their biological mother. I want to argue that instead of focusing only on absent biological fathers (DSD, 2012b: 9), more attention should be given to stepfathers (or social fatherhood) and their roles should be acknowledged and strengthened.

In contrast to my argument and accepting absent fatherhood as a fact, the White Paper suggests that detrimental effects of certain family problems (such as neglect of children and domestic violence) will be lessened by promoting marriage:

Encourage the establishment and sustenance of stable marital unions on the basis the established body of research evidence showing that families founded upon stable marital unions provide significant economic and psychosocial benefits for men, women and children. (DSD, 2012b: 39)

Although stable marital unions have been linked with children and adults enjoying many benefits, other variables in such relationships, such as more than one adult breadwinner and sharing of childrearing tasks, are contributing to such benefits. Promoting ‘stable marital unions’ in itself is thus not always an appropriate approach, especially since it is not practical in all cases or people choose to live in other family household structures. Practical support and strengthening of various family forms should rather be consistently articulated in policy documents on families to avoid confusion between economic, practical and ideological arguments on families.

The divergence between the research cited, statements in support of family diversity in the White Paper and certain recommendations in the White Paper are even starker when focusing on poverty.

Currently, people who receive less than a specified income (a means test based on income or lack thereof) are eligible to receive state sponsored grants as individuals in South Africa. These targeted individuals include older persons (60 years and older) who are entitled to a State Old Age Pension, people with disabilities who are entitled to a Disability Grant and children who may qualify for a CSG, Foster Care Grant or Care Dependency Grant. Not all people who qualify for these grants apply for them (often due to administrative difficulties), but a higher uptake has been discernible over time (Makiwane et al., 2006). These mentioned grants are targeted at selected individuals, but in practice are shared by family members (see also Lund, 2011).

The importance of these grants should be understood within the context of unemployment in South Africa. Using existing data sets released by StatsSA, Makiwane and Berry (2013) analyse the official unemployment rate over a 10-year period according to race and gender. In 2002 the official unemployment rate for women was 33.9 per cent and for men 26.1 per cent, and in 2012 the unemployment rate for women was 27.5 per cent and for men 22.8 per cent. Furthermore, women in paid employment earn on average 71 per cent of the income of men. If the intersection between gender and race is considered, it transpires that black women on average earn 85 per cent of the amount black men earn, 71 per cent of white women’s earnings and 46 per cent of the amount white men earn. Women, and in particular black women, are thus economically worse off as a category of income earners in the formal employment sector.

Added to the above, there are no grants available for able-bodied people between 18 and 60 years (unemployment insurance can only be claimed for 1 year if a person was registered as an employee whose employer paid over the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) contributions), and yet these grants are sometimes described as ‘hand-outs’ (Surender et al., 2010). There is a public discourse suggesting that a ‘culture of dependency’ is developing among ‘the poor’ (see, for example, Kelly, 2013, quoting comments from online news sites). Conditional grants are sometimes suggested as an alternative to the ‘hand-outs’. When employing conditional grants, families have to do something in return to continue receiving a grant, such as ensuring that children attend school and receive their scheduled immunisations. The well-known Latin American examples are cited in this regard (also mentioned in the Green Paper on Families (DSD, 2011: 16) such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil, Oportunidades in Mexico and Chile Solidario in Chile. Lund et al. (2008) explain that the assumption of conditional grants is

that it is a cash constraint that is keeping the recipient from, for example, going to health services or school; that health services and schools exist; that cash is the appropriate incentive to encourage attendance; and that improved health status and school attendance will impact on school achievement, and thereby improve life chances. (p. 4)

Lund et al. (2008) further weigh the reported benefits of conditional grants and conclude that not much will be gained in South Africa if similar practices are employed. For example, South African children do receive immunisations since there is free medical care for children. Furthermore, according to the census data from 2011, more than 95 percent of children aged 7–14 attend school (StatsSA, 2012: 47), so very little will be gained in terms of school attendance. Yet a new policy was introduced in 2010 compelling the caregivers of the grant recipients to provide proof of school attendance bi-annually (Lund, 2011: 5–6). Lund (2011) argues that this precondition adds to the administrative burden of all parties involved, especially schools situated in poor communities with few resources at their disposal. The notion of ‘co-responsibility’, where the state has to provide adequate services for children, is of importance here (Hanlon, in Lund, 2011: 11). Lund (2011) argues that the state should rather spend money on building a well-functioning educational sector (that all South Africans will want to use) instead of checking whether children are attending schools where low-quality education is offered.

To help combat poverty, a Basic Income Grant (BIG) for everybody in South Africa was suggested in the 1990s (Seekings, 2002), but it was rejected due to the projected unattainable cost. Similarly, Lund et al. (2008: 9) describe an initiative to give all children access to a CSG that would signify ‘solidarity’ under the ‘new non-racial regime’ and to avoid the costly means testing. This initiative was abandoned in favour of a simple means test based on the income of the primary caregiver and/or partner. However, the means test may be regarded as ineffective use of government resources due to the administrative burden in determining who qualifies for the grant, and costly to recipients of the CSG who have to produce documentation and pay transport costs in order to reach relevant government departments. It is further argued that extending a BIG would eradicate the stigma attached to being dependent on the money and remove opportunities for corruption and bribery (see also Ntshongwana et al., 2010).

Given this context, it is alarming that the White Paper carelessly categorises poverty and unemployment as ‘social ills’:

Moral degeneration is often seen as preceding or concomitant with the decline in quality of life, and in South Africa it is widely-reported in the media as is evident and reflected in social ills such as a general lack of discipline, violence, poverty, unemployment, a high crime rate, school vandalism and corruption. (DSD, 2012b: 29; emphasis added)

It is thus implied that to be poor is to have low moral standards and this can be lumped together or even equated with vandalism and corruption. This line of reasoning can be linked with the ‘deserving poor’ discourse (criticised by, for example, Adesina, 2011) where only certain poor people are targeted as worthy of support. In a similar vein, it is argued that before considering having children, financial issues should be considered:

Financial readiness means that the prospective families are financially capable to dealing [to deal, sic] with the costs associated with a new born child; structural readiness means that the prospective parents have a home within which to raise the child close to clinics or hospitals, care giving facilities and educational facilities. (DSD, 2012b: 40)

In the above quote, a specific ideology of the middle-class family is promoted. Since we know that certain people are far from the mentioned infrastructure and they stay poor throughout their lives, we can only conclude that poor people are informed that they should not have children. It seems that ‘the poor’ are punished for being poor. The disconnection between the realities (or research cited) and certain (not all) recommendations in the White Paper is a source of great concern. Goldblatt (2005) illustrates this concern vividly from a gendered perspective:

Women mediate social assistance and deliver it on behalf of the state. They claim it, collect it and are then expected to turn it into food, shelter, clothing, education, health and other aspects of a child’s maintenance through their own labours. In order to help their children, they have to be poor – they must pass a means test. Thus, unemployed, impoverished women (and some girls) are expected, without any means to feed themselves (or meet any of their other needs), to provide child care services for the society, in exchange for nothing. (p. 242)

In Goldblatt’s words we see the absence of a ‘stable married union’ with ‘a stable income’ as how the majority of families live, as clearly indicated in research and census results. The White Paper thus subtly promotes a nuclear family, or rather a heteronormative middle-class family, despite its own citations of diverse families and acknowledgements of poverty. The heteronormative middle-class family should be recognised and its potential strengths celebrated. This family structure may be practical and desired by some individuals, but it should not be seen as an ideal or superior family form at the expense of other family structures. Some individuals may not be able to enter or stay in such a family, while others may not wish to do so for a variety of reasons.

Conclusion

The White Paper is intended to give direction to a family policy in South Africa. Aspects of the document are encouraging, such as the stated commitment to family diversity and an awareness that any family policy has to be in sync with various other national policies run by different government departments. Further positive aspects include that it is a social policy that not only focuses on economic aspects and that not only poor families are targeted in the White Paper. The South African government should be commended for these actions.

The general realistic overview of families in South Africa is, however, undermined by promoting notions of the nuclear family under the heading ‘Promotion of healthy family life’. This promotion of financially well-off heteronormative families does not speak to gay relationships, people living in poverty or people who may not want to be married (for whatever reason) and so forth. Instead, the diversity that has been acknowledged in the White Paper should be used as a springboard when wanting to promote healthy family life. Resilience among poor families should be highlighted instead of only taking a negative stance of poverty per se. Instead of focusing on elusive biological fathers, acknowledgement and support of all people who actually take care of children should be provided. Instead of trying to convert all families into nuclear families, all family arrangements should be recognised and celebrated as they are and seen as a healthy family or support them to become a healthy family.

Similarly, conflicts such as violence and divorce are recognised in the document, but instead of facing conflict and acknowledging that certain family unions will cope better when dissolved, an idealistic notion of ‘stable marital unions’ is stated. For example, helping women to leave abusive relationships or supporting couples to dissolve conflict-ridden relationships in an amicable manner is far more ‘healthy’ than telling people to have ‘stable marital unions’.

In short, the ideal of the nuclear middle-class heteronormative family should be abandoned and all family structures be regarded as potentially ideal if the individuals within such families are treated with respect and care by other family members, and if given the support the South African government envisages in this policy but does not always provide.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Author biography

Marlize Rabe is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of South Africa. Her research interests are on gender within the family context with a special focus on the fathering role.

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