Abstract
While working on the Manhattan Project in remote New Mexico, Oppenheimer and his colleagues, of course, must have known the catastrophe, a nuclear detonation, can be produced, but perhaps did not realize the reaching political consequences which their innovation will create in future. Stephen J. Cimbala maintains that nuclear disarmament is a relevant, serious but not an unresolvable issue, by centring his arguments around and against ‘conventional wisdom’, which says that nuclear arms control is politically impossible, unnecessary, strategically misguided and a fool’s errand.
Stephen J. Cimbala is a distinguished professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine and former consultant on arms control to various US government agencies. He has written extensively on nuclear issues and Cold War since the beginning of his academic career. Apart from the fact that the current book War Games has a fascinating title, the most intriguing aspect is that Cimbala’s prediction, that is, end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, will see the onset of third of the three nuclear ages he mentions in his book Arms for Uncertainty in 2013 and show signs of becoming a reality, after the Crimean Crisis of 2014–2015.
In the fourteen chapters, the major discussion covers the spectrum of modernization of nuclear weapons, and the parallel offensive in cyberspace that will undoubtedly accompany an offensive against computer-dependent adversaries like the USA and Russia. How these new technologies affect theoretical deployment and use of nuclear weapons and the non-proliferation discussion are some of the major contributions of this work.
Book Reviews
The author begins with the argument that in the twenty-first century, nuclear weapons are embedded in polities and institutions that are ‘wired’ through networks and information for decision-making. The complex relation between communication and nuclear weapons in information age is discussed in detail. Considering the fact that cyberattacks are inexpensive, difficult to identify, but cannot approximate the physical destruction of nuclear weapons, we have to understand the uniqueness of cyber deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Cimbala’s analyses show that USA–Russia nuclear arms reduction is possible, with the modernization of nuclear weapons in both the countries. He argues that modernization need not imply a larger force; a small force with enhanced performance might serve equally well as the basis for stable deterrence, through various convincing examples. Stable deterrence on all the three sides of the Washington– Beijing–Moscow triangle is well addressed, by suggesting that active engagement of China as an equal participant in strategic nuclear arms reduction talks, regardless of its inexperience and other asymmetries with Russia and USA, is necessary. The author warns that isolation of China can cause a mistaken nuclear pre-emption, due to misperceptions in a crisis situation.
In the next chapters, he examines how the nuclear crisis management differs in an information age from the pre-digital age. His main argument is that in a digital world, where the creation of ‘information embolism’ in a state’s network is possible, when an attack is launched, it would not be easy to identify, respond and assign accountability for that. While the end of Cold War reduced risk of nuclear conflict between USA and Russia, now the danger is posed by nuclear risks arising from outside Europe, from Asia (India–Pakistan rivalry and revisionist policies of North Korea) and Middle East (Iran’s Nuclear ambitions and the response from other countries in the region). The USA and Russia would be equally concerned about nuclear first use or exchange outside Europe, and nuclear proliferation in these areas are undoubtedly a serious concern.
While postulating his strong belief in the idea of minimum nuclear deterrence before the reader, he also describes the counter arguments in detail. This allows the reader to make balanced and comprehensive assessment of the issue. The ‘desirability’ and ‘feasibility’ of realizing the dream of nuclear abolition are described in the following sections. He argues that this may be attained perhaps only in case of a catastrophic nuclear accident or first use occurring in the future. He calls for nuclear arms reduction and abolition, because he believes that the future conflicts between nuclear states would be based on political issues, such as identity, nationalism and religion, which are difficult to resolve through negotiation and compensation.
The book does not ignores the significance of conventional weapons and warfare leading to a nuclear conflict. The NATO’s ramp up of its budgets and deployments in the wake of crisis in eastern Ukraine and the similar situations are discussed and compared in detail. The missile defines systems in USA and Russia, geographical peculiarities of these two states and other nuclear states with different territorial features are compared and analysed to create an understanding about stable deterrence possibilities between various states and a region as a whole.
Cimbala concludes by mentioning the major nuclear challenges in the second nuclear age for international relations theorists, policymakers and military planners.
Nuclear abolition is a possible dream but difficult to achieve when everybody else says—you go first. It does not mean arms reduction is not worthy of time and effort. Cimbala quips that fewer the nuclear weapons, the better for a peaceful world. With the twenty-first century, technological advancements, cyberterrorism, occasional cross-talk with states like North Korea, and the nuclear ambitions of states like Iran, the concern and frustration of the established nuclear powers has increased. Peace must be negotiated, nurtured and backed. The multiple components of the discourse on nuclear disarmament put forth by Cimbala in a wellorganized and interesting manner is most thought provoking. His account of the dangers which human society is facing in the second nuclear age is insightful, systematic and comprehensive.