The Belt and Road Initiative and the Development of China’s Economic Statecraft: European Attitudes and Responses

Abstract

This article examines how states may be inclined to adapt to the policy goals of powerful economic partner states in acts of ‘anticipatory conformity’ or by adjusting their ‘common’ policy goals. It builds on two classical theoretical bases—the concept of economic statecraft and Hirschmanesque effects—to explore how economic power may be translated into far-reaching effects on other states’ behaviour without a clear goal or objective being proclaimed or even set by the economically powerful state. Our empirical findings suggest that the European Union still has an unparalleled influence on member states, and China’s growing economic presence in Europe alone—especially in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative—is insufficient to influence member states’ politics.

Keywords

Belt and road initiative European politics European studies interregionalism politics of China West European politics

Introduction

Since the launch of the ‘Reform and Opening Up’ policy in 1978, China has undergone a fundamental economic transformation process that has made it one of the most significant players in the international economy. Reflecting this increasing economic strength, China’s current leadership also strives for a more active political role—to move beyond being a rule taker to become a rule-setting actor in international politics. In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, constitutes not only trade, investment and cooperation projects, but also serves as a vehicle for developing China’s economic statecraft and implementing its own conceptions of world order.

In addition to the evolving regional activism of the mid-1990s, and the emphasis on multilateral and bilateral diplomacy—together with the attraction of trading partners and foreign investments to develop a more influential position in world politics since the early 2000s (Goldstein, 2003, pp. 67, 83)—the BRI marks a shift towards a new approach that uses China’s immense and growing economic strength to achieve political objectives. Yet, since deepening cooperation within Eurasia via the so-called five connectivities (policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people connectivity) lies at the heart of the BRI, the responses and responsiveness of both European states and the European Union (EU) play a crucial role in the success of this initiative and China’s political ambitions.

Analysing European reactions to the BRI, a mixed picture emerges. The EU remains reluctant overall to fully engage in the project, preferring an observant rather than an active role. Yet several Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) EU member states are participating in China’s 16+1 transregional cooperation platform, which seeks to deepen ‘minilateral’ (Brummer, 2014) cooperation within the wider BRI framework. There is a rising concern within the EU that the mixed attitudes of its members toward the BRI are the result of China’s growing economic influence on some member countries. The EU has begun to restrict Chinese investments (Ghemawat & Hout, 2016, pp. 94–95), which are regarded as a tool of the country’s political influence (Pardo, 2018; Reilly, 2017). This situation, together with China’s aspiration to become a ‘great power’ that actively pursues its own global interests and promotes and shapes economic globalization (see, e.g., The Washington Post, 2017) gives rise to two key questions. First, to what extent can economic ties between China and EU member states be thought to translate into political influence in the countries that are most engaged in the BRI? Second, what evidence is there of a rising Chinese economic statecraft reflected in political influence based on economic means?

While the former question demands a theoretical answer that considers how economic strength can be translated into foreign policy influence, the latter requires more empirical proof regarding whether there are measurable political impacts in the countries that are most engaged in the BRI. To address these two issues, this article will start by referring to two classics of International Relations scholarship: David A. Baldwin’s concept of economic statecraft (Baldwin, 1985) and Albert Hirschman’s works on the political effects of trade and investment in asymmetric economic constellations (Hirschman, 1945). Although numerous theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted on various aspects of economic statecraft (see, e.g., Blackwill & Harris, 2016), Norris (2016, p. 5) rightly points out that ‘little work has been done to develop a systematic account of Chinese economic statecraft’. The current study contributes to such an account by arguing that the concept of economic statecraft still serves as a worthwhile approach that sheds light on the interconnectedness of ‘power and the purse’ (Blanchard, Mansfield, & Ripsman, 2000) in international relations, but that it must be understood to be limited in the case of the BRI.

The article takes a rather Hirschmanesque turn to investigate whether there can be far-reaching effects on other states’ behaviour—without a clear goal or objective being proclaimed or even set by the state in possession of economic statecraft. Revealing these mechanisms of indirect influence provides a clearer picture of China’s growing power in international politics. These also include rather subtle processes of how states may be inclined to adapt to policy goals of powerful economic partner states in acts of ‘anticipatory conformity’ or by adjusting their ‘common’ policy goals.

In a second step, based on Hirschman’s original assumption, we measure China’s political influence on EU member states. We focus on whether EU member countries’ supportive attitudes toward the BRI—China’s flagship foreign policy project—are related to their level of economic cooperation with China, through trade and investment.

The insights that we expect from exploring these questions are promising in two respects. First, they will advance our knowledge of how economic statecraft can work in practice. Second, they will reveal the extent to which China has developed an effective strategy to advance its economic statecraft via the BRI. In addition to Hirschman’s theory, our analysis also explores another plausible explanation—that states defined their interest in actively supporting the BRI, that is, by acts of ‘anticipatory conformity’. In recent years, some European governments have maintained that the primary reason behind their eagerness to deepen their relationship with China is connected to a perceived overdependency on the EU. In this regard, their main motivation is to diversify their economic relations. We therefore also investigate this factor as a possible reason behind some EU member countries’ support of the BRI.

In exploring these aspects below, our analysis will point out that despite broad agreement that China exercises strong influence within the EU, the data analysed provide only weak support for this argument. Although China has a growing economic presence in the EU, it is still struggling to translate this presence into the kind of indirect influence that would be expected by a Hirschmanesque reading. Against the backdrop of our analysis and in the case of current EU–China relations, further efforts are needed to systematically explore the extent to which Chinese statecraft can influence participating countries within and outside the EU.

Economic Statecraft and ‘Anticipatory Conformity’

In his 1985 book Economic Statecraft, David A. Baldwin describes how powerful states can use economic means in diverse ways to pursue their foreign policy goals. Other than dealing with economic diplomacy, leverage, sanctions or even coercion, the concept of economic statecraft focuses on describing the multitude of economic tools and techniques that can be used ‘to pursue a number of noneconomic ends’ (Baldwin, 1985, p. 40). Most of the economic means that Baldwin describes are well-known instruments in international political economy and security studies, which can be subcategorized into either negative sanctions (such as tariff increases, embargos, boycotts, blacklisting, license denial, freezing assets) or positive sanctions (such as subsidies for exports or imports, favourable tariff discriminations, financial aid, investments) (on the latter, see also Baldwin, 1971). And, of course, the mere threat or promise to implement these sanctions might be sufficient to exert political influence by economic means (Baldwin, 1985, pp. 41–42).

The chances to successfully use economic statecraft in international politics, however, are distributed highly unequally. Most states simply do not have sufficient economic weight to exert a considerable economic influence over other states. This makes economic statecraft primarily a policy instrument—though not solely (Kahler & Kastner, 2006)—available to superpowers, great powers or even regional powers (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 34–37) with a strong relative economic position vis-à-vis other states.

Baldwin argues that ‘the scope of an influence attempt based on an economic technique may be any dimension of the target’s behavior’ (emphasis in original, Baldwin, 1985, p. 32). This necessarily includes the identification of certain goals or objectives—that is, a change in a specific behaviour of the target—to be achieved by imposing the above-mentioned sanctions (Mastanduno, 1999, pp. 292–293). State A, for example, may boycott goods that state B produces and that are an important part of B’s economy in order to ‘convince’ the government to implement a policy change. In many cases, however, it is difficult to identify goals or objectives with certainty, because governments frequently camouflage their reasons for action, especially where economic statecraft is used to mainly enforce self-interests. State A’s boycott of state B’s good might be portrayed as a measure to demand the implementation of international law or human rights norms, for example, even though it is principally motivated by economic rivalry. There are numerous historical examples of this tendency to mask self-interests and deliver less egoistic and more commonly accepted justifications.

Apart from the general difficulty of determining the “true” reasons for exercising economic statecraft, there is another possibility that is largely neglected by Baldwin’s concept of economic statecraft and studies that have mainly considered either positive or negative sanctions as tools of economic statecraft (see, e.g., Blanchard & Ripsman, 2008; Drezner, 1999; Rowe, 1999). This is that states (try to) change the behaviour of others via economic statecraft without defining a narrow ‘[s]cope of the influence attempt, i.e., some dimension(s) of the target(s’) behavior (including beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, emotions, and/or propensities to act)’ (Baldwin, 1985, p. 32). In other words, states may use economic statecraft to impose far-reaching effects on other states’ behaviour without proclaiming (or even setting) a clear goal or objective. Policymakers might be inclined to follow an economically powerful state in an act of ‘anticipatory conformity’ or to adjust their ‘common’ policy goals because they expect some kind of benefit in return.

Albert Hirschman described the effects of such influence in his seminal book National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945) as deriving ‘from the fact that that the trade conducted between country A, on the one hand, and countries B, C, D, etc., on the other hand, is worth something [emphasis in original] to B, C, D, etc., and that they would therefore consent to grant A certain advantages—military, political, economic—in order to retain the possibility of trading with A’ (Hirschman, 1945[1980], p. 17). Of course, trade is not the only expression of economic interdependence in a highly globalized market economy in which the barriers to large-scale foreign direct investments (FDI) have continuously been lowered and most shares of stock corporations are not just held by national investors. Yet, due to highly fragmented international production chains and an increasing domestic dependency on both foreign products and access to foreign sales markets, trade relations still form a crucial element of inter-state economic relations.

In addition to the ‘classical’ tools of economic statecraft that Baldwin emphasizes, which have often been limited to positive and negative sanctions (Chan & Drury, 2000; see also Mastanduno, 2012, pp. 204–205), Hirschmanesque effects indirectly affect other states’ policymaking in that they develop as a side effect of economic relationships in asymmetric economic constellations. The policy change deriving from such effects is unconditional: it does not include an explicit quid pro quo (see also Kahler & Kastner, 2006, pp. 524–525). This does not mean that direct or conditional ways of exerting influence would become unimportant, such as sanctions or even the threat of cutting economic ties. On the contrary, ‘the power to interrupt commercial of financial relations with any country, considered as an attribute of national sovereignty, is the root cause of the influence or power position which a country acquires in other countries, just as it is the root cause of the “dependence on trade”’ (Hirschman, 1945[1980], p. 16). The possibility of being excluded from much-needed or at least advantageous economic relations is a precondition for Hirschmanesque effects to take place. Otherwise there would be no incentive to uphold or intensify economic relations, and there would be a policy adaption of some kind to ensure these relations.

The crucial difference between such direct and indirect influence mechanisms—‘classical’ economic statecraft and Hirschmanesque effects—is essentially this: while the ‘classical’ exercise of economic statecraft is directed at a specific, limited dimension of actors’ behaviour, Hirschmanesque effects make states adapt their policy goals themselves (largely without being asked to do so, rather voluntarily) in order to match those of the economically powerful state more generally.

The mechanisms that lead to this ‘anticipatory conformity’ or the adjustment of ‘common’ policy goals are arguably much more subtle than attempts to directly influence state actions via (the threat of) positive or negative sanctions. They also differ from what Joseph Nye called ‘soft power’ in that they do not build on the appeal or attraction of culture, political values, or the acceptance of foreign policies as legitimate (see Nye, 1990, 2004). Yet, we claim that these may be particularly powerful effects of economic statecraft in two respects. First, economic statecraft does not need to be backed by sanctions in concrete cases, but it has a steady and durable effect on defining states’ preferences. Second, the active and passive elements are somewhat interchanged: states are not necessarily being coerced to take particular actions but may anticipate political expectations and act accordingly.

In this context, ‘anticipatory conformity’ phenomena are closely related to conceptions such as ‘power over opinion’ (Carr, 1962; Russell, 1938), ‘ideological power’ (Galtung, 1981) or ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002) in that they do not limit the idea of power to the force or ability to push others to do (or refrain from doing) something. Rather, we argue that the notion of economic statecraft includes ‘the ability to define what passes for “normal”’ (Manners, 2002, p. 253) or ‘preferable’ beyond the borders of a state’s own political domain, that is, the ability to redefine others’ preferences.

Based on these theoretical assumptions, economic statecraft could be an important dimension of China’s political influence in the framework of the BRI, especially in countries that have developed close economic links by implementing partnership programs and engaging in enhanced trade and investment cooperation. We start from Hirschman’s original assumption to argue that the BRI and the 16+1 cooperation platform can be understood as a Chinese attempt ‘to make the most out of its strategic position with respect to its own trade will try precisely to create conditions which make the interruption of trade of much graver concern to its trading partners than to itself’ (Hirschman, 1945[1980], p. 16). Such a strategy of indirect and largely unconditional cooperation could not only represent a quite subtle way of shaping European attitudes towards Chinese policies, but may also serve as a door opener, in that it could foster a more benign position towards China’s political preferences and acceptance of China not only as a ‘regional hegemon’ (Goldstein, 2003, p. 60), but also as a global player in international politics. The Hirschmanesque effects could therefore be much broader than the quantitative gains to be expected from trade and investment; these economic ties could also facilitate a qualitative change in European attitudes and responses towards China’s political position in the world (see also Holslag, 2017).

Based on this, we will investigate two hypotheses in order to measure the degree of influence China may have on countries participating in both the BRI and the EU.

H1: EU member states’ willingness to support China’s foreign policy is related to their level of economic dependence on China.

In recent years, some European countries have argued that their major motivation to deepen their relationship with China is to diversify their economic relationships. In 2008 and 2009, many European countries were hit hard by the financial crisis, especially those that were highly dependent on the European market. Diversifying their economic relations seems to be a rational strategy for these countries, and China, the emerging economic superpower, seems to be a natural choice, based on their own national interest (Éltető & Szunomár, 2016). This argument assumes that those European countries were most likely to act in ‘anticipatory conformity’ in order to attract more investment and implement new trade opportunities. This argument provides an alternative to H1: it questions the relevance of Hirschman’s theory in the EU. We therefore examine a second hypotheses that relates to the participating countries’ dependency on the EU market.

H2: EU µeµber states∏ willingness to suππort China∏s foreign πolicy is related to their level of econoµic deπendence on the EU.

In the next section we define the variables and the statistical method used to analyse our hypotheses.

Measuring Influence and Economic Dependency: Variables and Method

Both hypotheses aim to understand states’ motivation to engage in ‘anticipatory conformity’ by predicting a positive relationship between accommodation of China’s foreign policy goals by BRI-participating countries and their economic dependence either on China or—based on our second hypotheses—on the EU. Our sample comprises all 28 EU member states. We consider Hirschman’s precondition of an asymmetric economic relationship to be fulfilled for all countries in the sample, since all EU member countries have much smaller economies than China. We created our dataset with the latest available data (Appendix A).

Finding a variable to measure the accommodation of China’s foreign policy is highly challenging, since foreign political decisions are flexible and complex, based on constantly changing influences from interest groups. However, the BRI provides an appropriate setting in which to investigate European countries’ attitudes toward China’s foreign political ambitions and willingness to accommodate Chinese interests, since it has forced most European governments to deal with China and form an opinion of it.

The study analyses a symbolic event related to the BRI—the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, held on 14–15 May 2017 in Beijing. The forum attracted 29 foreign heads of state and government as well as representatives from more than 130 countries and 70 international organizations. The list of attendees was published by The Diplomat (2017). We assume that the seniority of the individual representing each EU member state at this forum indicates the state’s willingness to support the BRI. Figure 1 illustrates the seniority of EU members’ representatives, which implies the following level of support for the BRI:

heads of state or government (the most supportive of the BRI): 6 countries

ministers (less supportive of the BRI; recognize advantages but have concerns): 4 countries

other envoys (limited support for or interest in the BRI): 1 country

no participation (no interest in or opposition to the BRI): 17 countries

The variation in supportive attitudes among EU member states provides an ordinal scale with which to measure individual states’ attitudes toward the BRI, where the differences between the levels are unknown. We code the following categories: 0 = no participation; 1 = other envoys; 2 = ministers; and 3 = heads of state or government.

Regarding the explanatory factors of the economic dependency of EU member countries, we operationalize variables in two classical ways: China’s weight in the given state’s trade and in the foreign direct investment (FDI) it receives. The first variable represents the individual EU country’s exports as a percentage of its total exports. The second variable is conceptualized based on China’s share of each EU member country’s total imports. The data used to calculate both variables are from 2017 (Eurostat, 2018a). We assume exports will show a more positive relationship in accommodating China’s foreign policy than imports. Measuring Chinese FDI is more problematic, since there are considerable differences between relevant data from different sources. In order to measure Chinese FDI in Europe, we use data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2020). However, OECD does not provide data for five non-member EU countries, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Romania. The variable is therefore based on China’s share in each country’s total FDI.

To analyse the second hypotheses (economic dependency on the EU as a major factor in the depth of a country’s relationship with China), our investigation introduces three further variables based on Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2018b). The fourth and fifth variables denote the share of EU trade in each member country’s total exports and imports in 2017. The sixth variable is calculated as the share of EU investment in each member country’s total FDI stock in 2016.

To test our hypotheses, we use the Kendall rank correlation coefficient to measure the strength and direction of the association between EU member states’ accommodation of China’s foreign policy objectives and the variables of economic dependency on China and the EU. Kendall’s tau-b (τb) correlation coefficient is a nonparametric measure of the strength and direction of association that exists between two variables measured on at least an ordinal scale. It is often used to measure associations between states’ policy positions in the political science literature (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975; Signorino & Ritter, 1999). Kendall rank correlation is used due to the ordinal measure of the seniority of the delegates at the Belt and Road Forum. The heads of state or government in six cases were coded with 3, the level of ministers was coded with 2, other envoys’ level in one case was coded with 1, and finally, no participation in 17 cases was coded with 0. Kendall’s τb makes adjustments for ties, as values of τb range from −1 (100% negative association, or perfect inversion) to +1 (100% positive association, or perfect agreement), while a value of 0 indicates no association.

Figure 1.

Source: The Diplomat (2017).

H1 assumes that EU member states’ accommodation of China’s foreign policy objectives and level of economic dependency on China will have a positive association; H1: τKen, b < 0. H2 also assumes a positive association between economic dependency on the EU and support for China’s foreign policy objectives; H2: τKen, b < 0. We used JASP 0.9.0.1 for our calculations.

Findings

H1 predicts a positive association between accommodation of Chinese foreign policy objectives, represented by the seniority of participants at the Belt and Road Forum, and the three variables for economic dependency on China. Table 1 presents the Kendall’s τb correlation results for H1. In the case of individual EU member countries’ exports to China as a percentage of each country’s total exports, we found a very low accommodation between the rankings—τKen = 0.081—which does not support H1.

Table 1.

Kendall’s Tau-b (τb) Correlation Matrix for H1

		Representatives Code	China Share in Total Exports (2017)	China Share in Total Imports (2017)	China Share in Total FDI (2017)
Representatives code	Kendall’s τb	—
Representatives code	p-Value	—
China share in total exports (2017)	Kendall’s τb	0.081	—
China share in total exports (2017)	p-Value	0.300	—
China share in total imports (2017)	Kendall’s τb	0.409**	0.304*	—
China share in total imports (2017)	p-Value	0.004	0.013	—
China share in total FDI (2017)	Kendall’s τb	0.296*	0.313*	0.040	—
China share in total FDI (2017)	p-Value	0.040	0.019	0.396	—

Source: Eurostat (2018b) and OECD (2020).

Notes: All tests one-tailed, for positive correlation.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, one-tailed. ** and *** refers to the legend in the table.

Table 2.

Kendall’s Tau-b (τb) Correlation Matrix for H2

		Representatives Code	EU Share in Total Exports (2017)	EU Share in Total Imports (2017)	EU Share in Total FDI (2016)
Representatives code	Kendall’s τb	—
Representatives code	p-Value	—
EU share in total exports (2017)	Kendall’s τb	0.007	—
EU share in total exports (2017)	p-Value	0.482	—
EU share in total imports (2017)	Kendall’s τb	−0.151	0.476***	—
EU share in total imports (2017)	p-Value	0.836	< 0.001	—
EU share in total FDI (2016)	Kendall’s τb	0.249	0.311*	0.207	—
EU share in total FDI (2016)	p-Value	0.053	0.011	0.066	—

Source: Eurostat (2018a) and Eurostat (2018b).

Notes: All tests one-tailed, for positive correlation.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, one-tailed. ** and *** refers to the legend in the table.

By contrast, for imports as a percentage of each country’s total trade, Kendall’s correlation coefficient is equal to 0.409 and is therefore significant (p < 0.01). Based on Kendall’s coefficient, the relationship between the variables can be described as moderate. The Chinese share in total FDI provides similar proof of H1 with a moderate association, where τKen = 0.296 and is significant (p < 0.05).

H2 predicts a positive association between accommodation of Chinese foreign policy, represented by the rank of delegates sent to the Belt and Road Forum, and the three variables denoting economic dependency on the EU, which is defined as a motivating factor to deepen economic cooperation with China. Table 2 presents the Kendall’s τb correlation results for H2. We find only a low and insignificant association between the rankings of the variables of economic dependency on the EU and accommodation of Chinese foreign policy in all three cases. None of the results supports H2, and we found an unexpected negative correlation for the EU’s share of imports.

In sum, these findings partially support the first hypotheses and reject the second. Positive and significant associations were found between variables related to the Chinese share in the total imports and FDI of the EU member countries, and the seniority of the delegates at the Belt and Road Forum. However, economic dependency from the EU does not play a demonstrable role in the support for the BRI.

Conclusion

There is a broad agreement that China’s growing economic statecraft has started to transform into political influence, providing the country with considerable influence over international relations. The BRI is a vehicle of this ambition, which involves the long-term goal of changing the international system. This article focused on two questions. The first was how China can ensure other countries’ conformity with its foreign policy goals. Based on the literature, our article points out that an effective way can be to foster ‘anticipatory conformity’. The most adequate mechanism to lead to such adaption processes, we argued by referring to the concept of economic statecraft, is to achieve indirect influence through deeper economic cooperation. Second, to delve deeper into the mechanisms of such indirect influence, we discussed the possibility of Hirschmanesque effects and examined empirically how Chinese economic statecraft can be translated into political influence as a primary way to encourage ‘anticipatory conformity’ within the BRI and its policies. The article also examined another plausible explanation for member states’ interest in supporting the BRI—a desire to decrease their dependency on the EU and diversify their economic partners.

The results of our statistical analysis partially support Hirschman’s original idea of indirect influence through economic ties. Countries that have been more willing to accommodate the BRI generally have deeper economic relationships with China. This shows that China’s rising economic statecraft can be translated into political influence, at least with regard to the BRI. The examination also shows that the accommodation of Chinese foreign policy tends to be related first to import dependence on China, and second to Chinese FDI. In the first case, despite the generally accepted mercantilist argument (Heaton, 1937; Landreth & Colander, 2002), we found that the share of imports from China plays a greater role than exports to China in terms of foreign policy accommodation. This result is consistent with other recent findings (Kastner, 2014; Strüver, 2016), which reflects that the mercantilist view of trade is fundamentally outdated in the framework of a globalized economy. Exports have by now become inseparable from imports, since the majority of exports from one country to another often involve a complex cooperation of domestic and foreign suppliers via value chains. Since China has a trade surplus with most European countries, the dependence on imports in fact plays a greater role in their economic relations. Therefore, the result reflects that the EU member countries’ dependence on Chinese imports plays a decisive role in accommodating China’s foreign policy goals, and at the same time fits into Hirschman’s (1945) ‘supply effect’ explanation. In the second case, our results relate to the role of FDI as a possible tool to influence the behaviour of the EU member states, which is important because the issue is at the centre of European attention. The investment monitoring mechanisms put in place by several EU member states in recent years are aimed precisely at overseeing China’s increasing power. From this point of view, the study points out that investment has a real impact on states’ foreign policy preferences, therefore Chinese investment is worth monitoring. However, it would be necessary to explore this simplified assessment in light of the different types of investment.

The article’s second hypotheses, which explores the role of (over)dependency on the EU as a major motivation for some EU member states’ to diversify their trade relationships and to deepen their relationship with China, has also not been supported. The degree of dependency on the EU’s economic relations has no direct relationship with countries’ support for Chinese foreign policy, even though it is an often-used argument in some countries and the fact that it could be understood as a rational strategy, due to China’s growing role in the global economy.

This analysis has three main limitations. First, the small sample size increases the risk of error in testing the hypotheses. The second limitation is the study’s static character: it analyses one event, the Belt and Road Forum, but countries’ attitudes are flexible and change over time. Moreover, participation in this forum fails to strongly indicate EU member countries’ complex views of the BRI as a whole. Third, EU member states’ foreign policies are shaped by a number of influences not studied here, such as domestic interest groups. Future research should use more complex and dynamic methods to measure degrees of accommodation of Chinese foreign policy interests. In sum, our article suggests that China’s economic statecraft in Europe is growing, and it will no doubt have an impact on the behaviour of EU member states. Our findings suggest that ‘anticipatory conformity’ is a good theoretical base for analysing this process. However, due to the complicated nature of the situation, a more complex understanding is needed in order to avoid the oversimplification of Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, the empirical data underline that, despite the increasing Chinese economic statecraft, China’s economic influence is still limited. Hirschman’s theory entails a clear assumption about the degree of asymmetry in a relationship. In the case of China and EU member states, this threshold is undoubtedly met, as individual EU members’ economic capacities are much smaller than China’s. Yet the EU as a whole still has an unparalleled influence on all member states, and China’s growing economic presence in Europe is not sufficient to influence their politics. In this respect, the EU continues to provide significant protection for European countries against Chinese statecraft.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared the following potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Appendix A

ORCID iD

Andreas Grimmel

Note

1. Only data from 2015 were available for Portugal in trade statistics.

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