Abstract
Russia being the largest successor state among the post-Soviet countries, its distinct civilization, unique history, and contribution to various fields has earned interest among scholars. Moreover, it was also perceived that since Russia straddles two continents, Asia and Europe, any development in Russia will either have a direct or an indirect bearing on Europe and Asia. These factors have collectively generated a great amount of scholarly interest in studying post-Soviet Russian democratization. The article focuses on the aspects of the convergence and divergence of these entities in the case of the Russian Federation. In this endeavour, the article chalks out the key components of democratization and their interplay in Russia. An attempt is made to understand the perception of democracy among Russians and whether democratic reforms in post-Soviet Russia led to any change of perception among Russians about democracy. The article also unravels the institutional dynamics in order to ascertain the Russian experience of democratization. The article concludes with some recommendations for future course of actions with regard to democratization.
Introduction: The Background to Study Democratization in Post-Soviet Russia
The fall of Communist regimes across Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union in December 1991 ushered in a new era of democratization in those states. Scholars of international relations and political science were prompt enough to interpret the new phenomenon as the ‘third wave of democratization’ (Huntington, 1991). Although the initial manifestations of the process of the third wave of democratization was witnessed in Southern Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s when successive right wing dictatorships in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Brazil were falling apart, it was only after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the successful Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia that the Communist government was toppled, and also a ‘democratic contagion’ was created across the region. This phenomenon undermined the entrenched Soviet Communist control, which ultimately led to the break-up of USSR itself.
Against this backdrop, democratization in the post-Soviet states became an aspect of intense study for scholars and political scientists alike. Russia being the largest successor state among the post-Soviet countries, its distinct civilization, unique history, and contribution to various fields has earned interest among scholars. Moreover, it was also perceived that since Russia straddles two continents, Asia and Europe, any development in Russia will either have a direct or an indirect bearing on Europe and Asia. These factors have collectively generated a great amount of interest to study post-Soviet Russian democratization.
Democratization refers to the process of transition from a totalitarian to a more democratic political system. The outcome may vary depending on the historical legacy and the existing socio-economic configurations in that particular society. It can either lead to substantial consolidation of democracy or it may witness stasis, glitches, and sometimes even reversals. In the realm of comparative politics, democratization bears a distinct characteristic owing to its diverse conceptual formulations and practical applications. Diverse standpoints exist pertaining to the approaches for exploring the study of democratization in post-Soviet Russia.
Scholars such as Stephen Cohen (1999) lament that transitologists and comparative political analysts have not been able to sufficiently comprehend Russia’s trajectory of economic reforms in the wake of its transition towards a market economy. He also argues at length that many of the scholarships on comparative democratization do not grasp the nuances of understanding the archetypal post-Communist Russia. However, the less stinging critique embarks on a comparative analysis of unearthing the transition of post-Communist Russia with the degeneration of erstwhile authoritarian regimes into a democratic one. In this connection, it is worthwhile to mention certain key parameters of democratic transition. It includes—simultaneous tasks of introducing democratic political institutions and a free market capitalist economic system. The existence of ethnic diversity and conflict, a tradition of weak civil society, the failure of democratic reforms in the past, and the presence of a relatively less conducive international environment have posed challenges before the post-Communist countries’ transition (Bunce, 1995, p. 87). In Russia’s case, it is even more complex due to its huge geographic territory and multi-ethnic character of society which requires the definition of the borders of the states. Among the post-Soviet states, it is also observed that in the countries where there was a broad consensus between the ruling elite and a large segment of the population to radically break away from the Soviet system, they have turned out to be more successful in consolidating democracy (Orenstein, 2001, p. 43). Strong anti-Communist sentiments coupled with different socio-historical conditions created a national consensus in favour of political and economic transformations that did not take shape in Russia (Evans, 2011, p. 40).
These cluster of events became the point of departure for scholars who examined Russia’s transition to democracy following the dissolution of the centralized political system and the command structure of the economy. This is a qualitative difference that Russia exhibits in comparison to the states of Southern Europe. In Southern European countries, the new political regimes were faced to deal with the establishment of new democratic political institutions only (Hatipoglu, 1998, p. 3). These explanations help highlight the rationale for focussing on the uniqueness of the Russian democratic transition. Therefore, the present article seeks to unravel the dynamics of democratization, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation. More importantly, it shall focus on the aspects of the convergence and divergence of these entities in the case of the Russian Federation. In this endeavour, the article chalks out the key components of democratization and their interplay in Russia. An attempt is made to understand the perception of democracy among Russians and whether democratic reforms led to any changes of perception among the Russians about democracy. It also highlights the West’s perception about the end of Cold War and the context in which western agenda of democracy promotion gets momentum and how Russia occupies a pre-eminent place in western geopolitical calculations in the post-Soviet space. The article also foregrounds how Russia sought to challenge the post-Cold War liberal international order by devising its own model of democracy and the actions taken by Russia to lay the ground for a multipolar world order. The article also unravels the institutional dynamics in order to ascertain the Russian experience of democratization.
The issue of democracy promotion became a rallying cry in the 1990s during the administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton. They vigorously pursued the policy of democracy promotion in the wake of humongous power vacuum in Eastern and Central Europe following the collapse of Communist regimes in those countries. They followed the policy of strengthening state infrastructure and increased funding for democracy promotion. The European Union (EU) also joined hands with the US in realizing their common vision for a stable rule based world order. Such a belief emanates from their common understanding and commitment to spread liberal democracy in the world (McFaul, 2004) in order to expand their power normativism well beyond their own borders (Manners, 2002). While both the US and EU agree to the definition of democracy at the conceptual level, however, in terms of implementation of their respective democracy promotion agenda they both pursue different approaches. The EU believes in developmental approach which is a testimony of socio-economic development (Carothers, 2007, pp. 16–18). The US, on the other hand, adopts a more politically motivated and ideologically loaded approach which assumes democracy as a value in itself that should be promoted everywhere by all legitimate means (Carothers, 2007, pp. 8–9). The EU helps target countries in their transition by way of rewards, capacity building and multilateralism. The US pursues aggressive postures such as negative sanctions, coercive measures and unilateral policies including regime change. Democracy promotion finds a prominent place in the foreign and security policies of EU and US. Both perceive democracy promotion as a ‘cultural script’ which is beneficial for international security and development.
Despite the rapid ramping up of democracy promotion activities there were also marked fluctuations, more attention was devoted to those countries/region, which remained under Communist rule or were emerging as independent nations from the debris of Soviet Union. The western developmental aid in this context was understood in overt political terms, which was set to target democratization goals usually under the template of ‘good governance’. Such an attempt was intrinsically related to globalization and of the ‘Washington Consensus’ in which democracy was seen to be contributing to and emanating from market liberalization, free trade and open economics. The rationale behind western democracy promotion was related to the ongoing post-conflict national reconstruction (especially in the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) and humanitarian intervention. During this time, non-state actors also proliferated, especially civil society and human rights groups. There was also a lot of hue and cry about rule of law and issues pertaining to governance. All of these have become veritable tools in the hands of democracy promoters in forging democratization in the target countries. It was in the aftermath of Cold War, democracy NGOs surfaced in size and scope. The programmatic endeavours of all these NGOs and civil society groups spread throughout the globe but their locus continued to be the post-Soviet space. Against this background, Russian transition to democracy was closely watched by the West. It was perceived that a democratic Russia will no longer pose any threat to the west.
Democracy, Democratization, Transition and Consolidation
In order to arrive at a nuanced understanding of these concepts, let us begin with a few definitions of democracy and democratization and trace their feasibility in the case of Russia. The word, democracy, has been enunciated since the days of Herodotus to delineate that democracy is a form of government in which the power of the state is legally vested, not in any particular class of group, but in the members of the community as a whole (Bryce, 1921, p. 23). As it stands for the rule of the people, democracy does not support monopolization of power in the hands of the political leadership (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 235). Democracy has travelled a long path from the days of Greek city states to the modern days. The evolution of democracy has been captured in the words of Sartori when he says that ‘[m]odern men want another democracy, in the sense that their ideal of democracy is not all the same as that of the Greeks’ (Sartori, 1987, p. 279). Democracy, according to Dahl, is not only the rule of the people; it is a citizen body of members who are deemed to be equals for the purpose of arriving at governmental decision (Dahl, 1989, p. 83).
The process through which a liberal democratic political system is established is known as democratization. Democratization is usually explained in two ways—in a broader and a narrow way. The broader sense is much more fundamental in its essence as it seeks to establish substantive democracy, which not only encapsulates the features of minimalist democracy, but also strives to ensure economic equality and the notion of social justice. The narrow sense is about creating a minimalist democracy which seeks to establish a multi-party electoral system of the western variety that ensures individual rights. Democratization, in such a sense, takes cognisance of the broader structural problems of the democratic system. It not only talks about ensuring equal rights for the citizens, like political rights, as is manifested in minimalist democracy, but also highlights the necessity of economic and social rights, which constitute the bedrock of substantive democracy. It can be seen that most of the available theories of democratization value a western type liberal democratic system along with the collation of socialist ideals of economic and social equality. However, both variants of democratization prefer the multi-party system, rule of law, and free and fair elections (Suthar, 2008, pp. 3–4).
A detailed understanding of the transition and consolidation of democratization is pivotal for grasping its key tenets. Both the process of transition and consolidation ought to be visualized from a comparative perspective. Transition refers to the time period which embarks with the downfall of an erstwhile autocratic regime and terminates with the creation of a relatively stable political system. The transition towards democracy is rather a long-drawn process. In the case of Great Britain, the transition process took almost two centuries. Consolidation, however, differs from transition as it attributes to the achievement of a change in attitudes and ample support for the new established regime, which requires a considerable gestation period. Transition and consolidation are also different from each other in terms of their objectives. The former seeks to establish a new regime, on the other hand, the latter seems to ensure stability and the perpetuation of the established regime (Hatipoglu, 1998, p. 1). However, the existing literature on the subject manifests divergent viewpoints.
The Russian case of democratization is both fascinating and complex, not only from the practical experience but also from the theoretical perspective. Scholars like Schmitter and Karl (1994) argue that the challenges which Russia encountered during its interface with democracy were also observed in other Western democratic states. They underplay the differences of the Russian democratization experience as being inflated and extraneous. Moreover, studies of the democratic transitions of various countries in comparative perspectives should not necessarily hinge on similarities at the altar of distinguished differences. It is these differences that propel the study of democratization and comparative politics (Schmitter & Karl, 1995). David Laitin (2000) concluded that the various concepts and hypotheses obtained from the experience of other countries offer valuable tools and parameters to study the post-Communist experience. With regard to Russia, its varied socio-economic and cultural attributes and several hypotheses gleaned from the experience of other post-Communist transitions have often contributed towards an enriching theorization of democratization.
Democratization in Russia: Key Tools/Components
Seminal works on comparative politics and democratization have pointed out several important components for substantiating the case for a successful transition towards a democratic political system. The most important among these are the presence of vibrant civil society institutions, the issue of stateness, the existence of a viable multi-party system, and, last but not the least, mass media, all of which play important roles in such a process. While each accounts for its own importance in shaping the outcome of democratization, the interplay of these components has a cascading impact on the democratization process as a whole. Therefore, it is important to examine the role of civil society, stateness, political society, and mass media to understand Russia’s democratization experience.
Civil Society
Diamond and Plattner (2001) observed that democracy hinges on the significance of civil society institutions which are compatible with a democratic political culture. Civil society is a cluster of intermediate associations which are independent of the state and family and are largely self-reliant and self-generating. It plays a positive and active role in social, economic, and cultural activities. Civil society can play an important role in the transition of a country towards democracy, as it exerts pressure from below which then interacts with the initiatives on the top to push for institutional change. It is also perceived that the politics of democratization is a subtle collation of processes from above and below (Collier, 1999, p. 20).
During the Soviet period, all realms of social activities were penetrated by the Communist party. Therefore, it did not create a favourable ground for civil society to emerge. Also, the socialist model of economic development dissuaded the rise of an entrepreneurial class, both of which are considered to be important for democratic development (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 376–378). As Fish (1994, p. 33) highlights, the peaceful struggle between and within classes facilitated by an association of myriad interests in terms of their objectives, occupation, sector, and profession is what civil society is all about. The seven decade rule of the Communist Party affected the evolution of social classes and various such arenas of interest aggregation and interest articulation that civil society is donned to perform in a society. Soviet rule also impacted various other sources of identity and interest which generally serves as the basis for civil society to form associations. During Soviet rule, religion was totally under the subservience of the state. The state thwarted religious congregation of groups, and banned free associations of any nature (political, social, economic), greatly contributing towards the elimination of any middle ground between the state and the larger society. Society’s absolute dependence on the state created a vacuum and that space was taken over by the state itself, which prevented the rise of organizations and social groups.
By the time Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985, the political culture in Russia was marked by the absence of civil society. However, the reforms initiated by Gorbachev, especially Perestroika (re-structure), led to the emergence of many organizations whose articulation and mobilizational abilities were largely able to break the shackles of the state’s total control over mediums of communication. Labour groups such as the coal miner’s union played an important role in this regard during the remainder of the Soviet Union’s existence. The emergence of the Democratic Russia Movement is one such example. Democratic Russia played an important role in providing a crucial support base to the Russian president, Yeltsin, during the presidential elections of 1991 (Sakwa, 2008, p. 130).
The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated the implementation of economic reforms, which had to be done along with the political ones. The economic reforms included the privatization process by which state assets were to be privatized, which led to the emergence of a small group of economic actors came to be known as ‘oligarchs’. The tiny oligarchs occupied key positions of power and reaped the benefits of reforms at the expense of the Russian people. Yeltsin’s problematic shock therapy measures and the resultant impoverishment that it caused virtually eliminated the possibility of a vibrant middle class which was emerging in the Gorbachev period. The oligarchs who constituted the Russian economic elite emerged after the privatization process was launched organically linked to the Russian state. They were able to ensure that the reform would not proceed beyond a ‘partial reform equilibrium’ largely hindering the rise of a modern middle class essential for the emergence of civil society. In the wake of such negative fall-out of economic reforms in the 1990s, most of the ordinary Russians withdrew themselves from active political life and became highly sceptical about the intent of the ruling elite (Gill & Markwick, 2000, p. 249). Gill and Markwick (2000, p. 251) continued with their analyses by highlighting that it was the feebleness of civil society organizations in the Soviet period as well as in the post-Soviet period that led to the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elite, which hindered the emergence of a stable and robust democracy in Russia. The evolution of civil society movement in Russia and its various related organizational attributes are inextricably linked to the economic and political transformation of the country in between 1990–2009. That the transition was not a well thought out and clearly articulated process has a negative impact on the overall development of civil society organizations with regard to their political and social roles (Belokurova, 2010, p. 458).
Stateness
During his state of the nation address in the parliament on 17 February 1997, the Russian president Boris Yeltsin, lamented the fact that the course of political and economic change in Russia has been problematic because of the failure to develop state autonomy and capacity (Robinson, 2008, p. 1). Stateness is an important component for successful democratic consolidation. State-building, nation-building, and democratization are often concomitant and interdependent processes within a context of multiple transitions. It was even more daunting in the case of ethnically heterogeneous character of the Russian state with a huge geographic territory. In the observations of Rustow (1970), an ethnically homogenous state is enabling for the consolidation of democracy, but it was just the opposite in the case of Russia. In such a situation, a well-capacitated state was necessary for democratization to succeed. In their celebrated work, Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 17) dwelled on the question of stateness by elucidating it ‘as a congruence between territorial definition and the right of citizenship in the state’, based on a state’s monopoly ‘on the use of force within a sovereign territory’.
Embarking on a new democratic and capitalist order by replacing the old Soviet system was indeed a humongous task before Russia. Democratic reforms necessitate the introduction of competitive elections both at the national as well as the local level. It also entails the drafting of a new constitution, establishing a new judicial system, and legal codes. It is also important to form various political organizations like political parties and pressure groups. Similarly, economic reforms also entail the creation of adequate institutions to reinforce market relations. However, in the case of Russia, the ruling elite inspired by neo-liberal models of economic reform, at the cost of building appropriate institutions in place, first relied alone on stabilization, privatization, and liberalization. They were confident that once the market reform agenda gets momentum it will spontaneously set the tempo for necessary legal and state institutions. This did not work in Russia due to its weak legal and institutional configuration, unlike in other post-Soviet states, like in Poland and Hungary where the states already had better legal and financial systems in place. While pre-occupied with the task of dual transition, the centre was encountering pressures from constituent republics to decentralize power, which in retrospect challenged the centre’s authority and capacity to continue with its reform agenda of social transformation.
Amid such a legal–constitutional crisis of governing central and local units, the centre–periphery tussle, and the growing ethnic tension, autonomous republics such as Chechnya and Tatarstan came at odds with the Russian state. The break out of the First Chechen War (1994–1996) posed a serious challenge to Russia’s national unity in the wake of its transition. Although Yeltsin signed a Federation Treaty in March 1992, which accorded major powers to ethnic–republics, including right to secession, the picture was completely reversed by the end of December 1993, when Yeltsin emerged victorious following the conflict with parliament. The enactment of the new democratic constitution in 1993 confiscated the right to secession from the republics and centralized rule was imposed on their sovereignty. During Putin’s rule, the Russian state became even more centralized much to the contrary of whatever little devolution of power there was in Yeltsin’s time. Stoner Weiss (1997) argues that the weakness behind the capacity of central state during the transition phase was due to the absence of national institutions that could play an integrative role in tying the centre and the periphery. The most notable among them was the absence of a well-structured party system, which binds politicians from the central level with the local level within a national organization. This got further aggravated by the weak Constitutional Court, which was unable to adjudicate disputes between the centre and the local units as its rulings were often not heeded. The Russian Parliament also proved to be ineffective in improving the centre–periphery relations. In the words of Ross (2005, p. 347), ‘the major challenge to the Russian state today is not confederalism or the threat of ethnic disintegration, but rather defederalization and the creation of a centralized and authoritarian state under Putin’.
Political Society
Political parties are an integral component in representative political systems as they connect civil and political society in order to advance the interests of individuals, various social strata, and multiple groups with an objective to consciously develop these constituencies. Political parties acts as bridges between the state and society, advocating the claims of one and enforcing the rules of the other (Sakwa, 1995, p. 169). Furthermore, political parties perform as recruitment agencies of political leadership, provide representation and accountability, act as a structuring factor of electoral choice, promote political competition, and also pave the way for political opposition. In the democratization process, parties are considered to be essential components in the effective functioning of democracy. Against this backdrop, we have to see whether the party system played a positive or a negative role in Russia’s democratization process.
The Soviet period was unequivocally characterized by the rule of a single party, and the society was largely rendered uniform as the lack of socio-political cleavages did not get transformed into well-defined interests to pave the way for the party system. It was only when Gorbachev initiated a political liberalization campaign that various reform movements were initiated, prominent among those was the Democratic Russia Movement (DRM). Competitive elections pave the way for the development of the party system. That is one of the reasons why elections following the break-up of the old system are important in laying the ground for a successful democratic transition (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 57). However, in the wake of the first presidential election in 1991, the Democratic Russia Movement, despite the fact that it was at the helm of Yeltsin’s campaign organization, was betrayed by the president who signed an agreement which went against it (Urban, 1992). The movement was weakened due to Yeltsin’s bid to increase his own power at the cost of building institutions (Urban, 1992, p. 193). Another institutional change that impeded the emergence of a viable party system necessary for a successful democratic transition was the imposition of the presidential system on the existing government. It further got aggravated by the fact that neither Yeltsin nor the members of the Parliament owed their allegiance to any political party, which led to the marginalization of parties in the politics of Russia. The lack of institutionalization of the party system did not create any intermediary institutions which could connect politicians to the legislative and executive organs of the state.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union dealt a major blow to the inchoate party system and it virtually ruptured its connection with the society. Though an opposition political force was in place, they proved to be unable in providing an action programme once the system they were opposing ceased to exist. In particular, the pro-reform, anti-Soviet, democratic camp appeared to be incongruent after the break-up. Many studies have found that the first ever competitive national election after the collapse of an erstwhile totalitarian regime heralds a victory for the entities striving for democratization in the wake of the re-configuration of the political space around a well-structured party system; this has not taken shape in the case of Russia (Dallin, 1994, pp. 248–250). The disintegration of the Soviet Union left the party system as a whole to be re-configured and reconstituted by the emerging ruling elite of the Russian Federation from above, which in turn made it difficult for it to establish a link with society and its ability to interact with the political system at large has dwindled. Since parties were formed by the ruling elite from above rather than emerging from below by linking society and the ruling class, parties became veritable mechanisms for the ruling elite to push for their own vested interests instead of the party as a medium of interest aggregation of diverse social interests. However, post-1996 presidential elections marked the end of polarized politics which used to be the hallmark of the Yeltsin years. Russia witnessed a modicum of positive development with regards to its electoral politics as a kind of multi-party system started emerging following the 1999 parliamentary vote (McFaul, 2000, p. 9).
Mass Media
The media plays an important role in the democratization process. Lisa Muller (2014) in her seminal work has highlighted the importance of mass media in the consolidation of democracy. According to her, mass media performs two essential functions in a democracy. First, mass media is entitled to disseminate relevant information to the citizens and thereby act as a public watchdog, which she points out is the vertical function of mass media. Second, mass media provides a public platform that embodies the diversity of society, which she calls the horizontal function. In many of the studies, it was found that countries with higher performance of media tend to ensure higher participation of the people in the political process and minimal corruption is noticed. Countries with high media performance are conducive for vibrant civil society and elected representatives are more inclined towards fulfilling citizens’ preference. In this way mass media performs an important role in the strengthening of democracy. In view of this, let us examine the role of mass media in the democratization process of Russia.
The mass media could not play its role in the Russian transition towards democracy due to variety of reasons. During Soviet time, the media was not free to disseminate relevant information to Russian citizens as it was state controlled. When Gorbachev introduced political liberalization, the autonomous role of the media began to surface. However, the media remained divided along political views in the remaining years of the Soviet Union. After the onset of the economic reforms by Yeltsin, the media instead of being a free medium of communication and information became instruments in the hands of the ruling elite. The privatization drive afflicted the media badly. As a result, newspapers were dependent on governments for financial support, which made them favour one side at the cost of the other. In the process, the objectivity of mass media was greatly eroded. The oligarchs would own most of the TV channels and newspapers to further their personal agenda and vested interests. The structures set up by the political leadership to put censorship on the media’s autonomy also restricted the media’s contribution in paving the way for a stable democracy (Hatipoglu, 1998, p. 3). The emergence of the independent media was thwarted further after the colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which propelled the Putin administration to further control the dissemination of information to avoid a similar kind of revolution in Russia.
The Perception of Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia
The Russian understanding of democracy emerged much before the collapse of the USSR. Having lived under Communist rule for almost seven decades, democracy for Russians came to be embodied with a sense of collectivism as opposed to the western understanding of democracy which is individualistic in nature. Hence, democracy for Russians has found compatibility with norms such as collective goods, collective welfare, and economic equality. The notions of egalitarianism and social justice matter more for Russians than a competitive multi-party electoral system, a formal constitution, or the safeguarding of individual civil–political rights. This perception about democracy among Russians has sustained throughout the existence of the Soviet Union (Sil & Chen, 2004, pp. 354–355).
The disintegration of the USSR further complicated the situation for Russia. Uncertainties have persisted regarding the future of its political system. The reason is not hard to comprehend. Both the Soviet style of communism and the command economy became futile. Therefore, it can be argued that the interplay of social variables in the Russian case is different from that of the Western world. The possible reason behind the ambivalent understanding of democracy among the Russians could be the sketchy start of the Russian Federation as an independent nation under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. The Yeltsin administration adopted an ‘Atlanticist’ approach through the introduction of ‘shock therapy’ and a neo-liberal market economy to resurrect Russian economy. Besides, the adoption of the Western liberal democratic model to create a pluralistic society, the urge to acquire membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have been inconsequential and have often met with unnerving outcomes. All these factors have accentuated people’s scepticism about democracy (Trenin, 2007). During this transitional phase, the Russian leadership showed an unflinching allegiance to the West, especially to the United States. However, soon it became quite evident that the much hyped ‘Atlanticist’ policies yielded no positive consequences for the country, as these reforms left the Russian market and territory open to unwarranted western intervention and meddling. These negative feelings coupled with economic instability, massive corruption in various state institutions, glaring inequalities in income, rapid unemployment, deteriorating health care and education, criminalization and clientelism of the body politic, and the financial crisis of 1998 generated a negative or apprehensive attitude among the Russian population towards democracy (Karpowicz, 2006, p. 3). A feeling of insecurity on all fronts in everyday lives made a large section of the Russian society strive for order and security, rather than democracy (Sil & Chen 2004, p. 356). It can be said that since the Russian people’s initial support for democratic reforms was meant to be in economic terms rather than political ones (Hatipoglu, 1998, p. 3), when faced with the unsavoury outcomes of Yeltsin’s economic reforms they equated liberal democracy with poverty and unemployment. The Russian peoples’ perception of democracy and capitalism underwent a massive transformation during the transition phase.
Democracy in Russia, to a considerable extent, is conterminously perceived as the loss of Russia’s superpower status in the international domain, which it enjoyed during the Cold War era. More importantly, democracy also enables western countries to intervene in the internal affairs of Russia and its neighbouring countries. All these developments have led to a kind of situation, where Russians do not believe democracy to be the perfect model for their country (Surkov, 2009). Russia’s tryst with democracy is also synonymous with the crisis of its state institutions and its declining international leverage, contrary to what it used to have during the Soviet times. It is quite evident that most of the Russians prefer a strong state over democracy for a number of reasons: the dominant role that the State has always played in their country’s history, the inconsequential fall-out of democratic reforms, and the mismanagement of events by introducing reforms in the 1980s and in 1990s which led to the dissolution of the USSR (McFaul, 2001). The Putin administration has also been able to convince the society that, ‘Russia has a different kind of democracy’, than the standards and procedures set by the West. The uniqueness of the Russian democracy accounts for its long tradition of social relations, complicated history, multi-ethnic state, and its vast geographic territory (Levada Analytical Center, 2011). It has also been argued that Russia is a ‘Sovereign Democracy’ or a ‘Controlled Democracy’ by stressing on the incommensurability of the Russian democracy with Western requirements (Okara, 2007).
The Invocation of Sovereign Democracy: Russian Challenge to Liberal International Order
With the ascent of Putin, the politico-ideological orientation of the Russian state began to change. The invocation of ‘Sovereign Democracy’ which was coined by Vladislav Surkov in 2006 has to be understood in the context of Russian strategy to rechristen its status as a global superpower in the 21st century, which is reminiscent of the Soviet era (Fisher, 2014, p. 3) and to retain its sovereign right to pursue an independent policy both internationally as well as domestically. Surkov was the First Deputy of the Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration. He opines the term Sovereign Democracy implies that Russia is a democratic country which must never be questioned, otherwise Kremlin will view such an action as unsolicited intervention into Russia’s domestic affairs. It subsequently became the ideological doctrine of the Putin administration. Its implementation was justified as Russia’s intellectual, moral, and ideological opposition to the Western democracy promotion agenda. Sovereign Democracy provides an ideological firewall to Kremlin against the hegemonic post-Cold War liberal international order. It essentially excludes Russian understanding of democracy from the western debate and hence gives an opportunity to the ruling elite to proclaim it as Russia’s unique democratic experience which should become an universal political discourse alongside the western one (Pavlova, 2013).
The term Sovereign Democracy was proclaimed as a democratic ideology, in which both the notions of sovereignty and democracy are culturally embedded within Russian civilizational legacy. The term is poised to build a political community, the identity of which can be traced back to the Soviet notion of modernity (Morozov, 2008, p. 153). The Russian government viewed Colour Revolutions with great deal of scepticism. It considers Colour Revolution as Western attempt to encircle Russia geo-politically by overthrowing pro-Russian regimes and installing pro-western governments. However, the United States and EU are wary about growing Russian assertiveness which they believe is a reversal of democratic reforms and continue to accuse Russia of thwarting genuine democratic aspirations of people in the post-Soviet space by adopting undemocratic means (Fisher, 2014, p. 3). This has had limited impact on Russia as it continues to re-define its geopolitical identity in terms of realist Eurasianism which is antithetical to European conceptualization of ‘soft power’ (Belokurova, 2010, p. 457).
Although, the concept of Sovereign Democracy is grounded in the democratization literature, however, many of its conceptual underpinnings are of typical Russian origin. Therefore, it is imperative to comprehend the terminology beyond the confines of conventional democratization literature, especially in the Russian context in order to grasp its distinctive character. It constitutes and continues to be the cardinal policy doctrine of successive Russian regimes towards Western democracy promotion. It defines the uniqueness of Russian democracy, even though, many of its facets are considered to be undemocratic and unapologetic from the Western perspective. Nonetheless, the term was coined to preserve and advance Russian interests and priorities rather than anything else. When the doctrine became official, it was meant to give a politico-intellectual cover to Russian actions in the wake of growing international criticisms. The Russian articulations stem from the fact that to question Sovereign Democracy and the meanings it entails is to question the very foundation of Russian cultural and social history. Russian history, culture, and every bit of its civilizational component is intertwined with the meaning and nature of Sovereign Democracy (Fisher, 2014, p. 4).
The promulgation of sovereign democracy invariably brought Russia in sharp conflict with the Western liberal universalist discourse which believes that the notion of sovereignty is redundant and perhaps even reactionary in a ‘post-modern world’ (Morozov, 2008, p. 153). It is because the end of Cold War was characterized to be the triumph of political and economic liberalism. The West believed that the ideological victory first against fascism in the Second World War and then against communism in the 1990s would put liberalism in a high pedestal which would symbolize the western unity and collective hegemony in a post-Cold War scenario (Diesen & Lukin, 2020, p. 107). Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis lends ideological credence to that worldview, which proclaims that with the demise of communism the world is left with liberalism which attempts to unite the world in perpetuity (Diesen & Lukin, 2020, p. 105). After the disintegration of Soviet Union, Western democracy promotion agenda gained momentum. The introduction of liberal democracy, market economy and human rights was considered to be western civilizing mission in the countries coming out of the debris of the Soviet Union including Russia which occupies a prominent place in the Western universalist discourse. This ideology of democratism propelled the West to formulate a kind of foreign policy which would enable it to incorporate these newly independent countries into the ambit of Western political, economic and security alliance systems. The Western political ideologists were optimistic about this approach which would help disseminate universal values in the post-Cold war era even if the target countries do not match the required democratic standards. It was believed that once the leaders of target countries surrender to the supremacy of western political and economic systems they will be impelled to achieve certain standards with western nudging (Diesen & Lukin, 2020, pp. 41–42). This perception about the universality of western liberal model of democracy has been viewed with scepticism by many scholars. Voskressenski (2017) is of the opinion that the Anglo-Saxon domination of our understanding of democratization which creates an ethno-centric continental bias limits our ability to comprehend the nuances of political processes in non-western societies. He essentially highlights the developmental trajectories of non-western societies including Russia, China, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea and Turkey to emphasize about the multiplicity of democratization models which in essence broadens our understanding about the process of democratization as a whole beyond the confines of western scholarly contribution.
In order to understand Putin’s project in today’s Russia, it is important to take into account that his vision for Russia and sovereign democracy as one of its significant attributes are firmly embedded in the canopy of Soviet past as the golden era of Russian statehood (Morozov, 2008, p. 159). The collapse of the Soviet Union has been described by Putin as a ‘geopolitical catastrophe’ which led to many of the problems faced by Russia in a post-Soviet world. During his state of the nation address in 2005, Putin portrays Russia of the 1990s in a poignant manner, such as, ‘epidemic of disintegration’, the dismantling of ‘old ideals’, the pre-eminence of ‘oligarchic groups’, ‘economic downturn’, ‘mass poverty’, ‘the paralysis of social security system’ are some of the catchy phrases of his speech (Putin, 2005). Sergei Lavrov (2006, p. 12) the foreign minister anchored the same feeling like Putin by arguing that Russia lost its ideological and imperial statehood when it moved out of Cold War. The Putin administration in successive periods believes that Soviet Union sacrificed itself for the sake of security and peace in wider Europe. Richard Sakwa (2017) advances similar perspective to highlight the failure of the post-Cold War liberal international order. He gives credit to the transformative outlook of last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, for helping to end the Cold War with his new political thinking (NPT). This approach to politics, which was based on consensus, would make the end of Cold War a common victory for all. However, in reality, what happened was just the opposite. The NATO and the EU, the ‘Historical West’, claimed victory and sought to lay the ground for an expanded liberal international order with dominant Western values and norms. This was in sharp contrast to Russian aspirations of being a founding and equal member of a transformed ‘Greater West’ eventually leading to ‘Greater Europe’. Gorbachev’s ‘common European home’ and former French President Charles de Gaulle’s Europe ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’ were in line with this vision of Greater Europe.
In the post-Cold War world order, Russia found itself in a position of strategic impasse which would dilute its unique identity and great power status. Although, the Atlantic powers invited their former adversary to be a part of the stable rule-based system, the Russian scepticism arose from the fact that the West wanted an enlarged/extended order with the existing institutions and structures reminiscent of the Cold War era. Russia, on the other hand, wanted to be a part of a transformed Europe as a core constitutive member. Sakwa (2017) argues, by denying ‘the logic of transcendence’ of Russia, the European enlargement process essentially gave birth to what it intended to avoid. This is where Sakwa joins the dots to analyse the Russian attempt to assert an independent position through actions (e.g., the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, etc.). Sakwa argues that Russia’s assertive behaviour in Ukraine is due to the failure of the post-Cold War international system, provoking Russian resistance to Euro-Atlantic liberal hegemony. He points out that it is the inherent difference in the conception of Greater Europe and Historical West which sort of stymied any meaningful dialogue between Russia and the West. The Historical West is defined by NATO and EU’s monological outlook of security and prosperity with United States at the centre of European security apparatus and market economy as a precondition for every state which comes under its ambit. The Greater Europe, on the other hand, is pluralistic in nature, with multiplicity of political systems, the EU representing one among many European models. Since Historical West was only willing to enlarge and not change, it generated disillusionment, frustration, resentment and ultimately resistance on part of Russia. Sakwa is right when he says, ‘Europe could not be “whole and free” if Russia was effectively excluded’. Isolated and excluded from the United States led liberal international order, and with talks on Greater Europe agenda in abeyance, Russia sought to create a Greater Eurasian order (Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation [SCO]) to resist the imposition of Western liberal ideas on its sphere of influence (Diesen & Lukin, 2020, p. 48).
Institutional Framework for Understanding Democratization in Russia
One of the tested frameworks of examining the success, failure, or how much of something was problematic with regards to the process of democratization is to analyse the role of institutions and inter-institutional dynamics. Institutional legacy plays an important role in elucidating how the traditions of institutions are bequeathed upon and how institutions shape democratization in a particular country? Institutions vary from each other so do their legacies and different institutions exhibit different roles in shaping the outcome of democratization. The outcome of such a process depends on the level of resources and status of those institutions that precede and succeed democratization (Bratton & VandeWalle, 1997, p. 242).
Within the purview of the institutional design and its role in case of the Russian Federation, I will be dealing with the executive, legislature, and judiciary to see how these institutions impact democratization in Russia.
Executive
The role of the executive has always been pre-eminent in Russia ever since the Tsarist time. During the Tsarist period, power was heavily centralized around a rigid hierarchy. The tsar was the ultimate decision making authority and he was also the formal head of the Russian Orthodox Church which further strengthened his position in the society. Although in the tsarist period a few representative bodies were present, they were virtually enfeebled (Willerton, 2005, pp. 20–21). The Soviet Period (1917–1991) was synonymous with the tradition of a dominant chief-executive who was at the helm of a huge state bureaucracy. The Soviet system was marked by its hierarchical and centralized structure with a massive bureaucratic paraphernalia directly under the command of the ruling CPSU. The executive power was aimed at consolidating and preserving its power within the state apparatus. However, the rising stagnation within the Soviet state bureaucracy and its growing inability to deliver goods and services propelled the reforms of the executive and the centralized party bureaucracy.
Gorbachev’s reform movement changed the locus of power away from the party to the new legislative body and to the President of the Soviet Union. His objective was to democratize the political system through a political consensus with a new legislature and the President himself with the intention of establishing the rule of law guiding such a process. It was Gorbachev who initiated the process of transition by creating institutions independent of the Communist Party. For Gorbachev, it was necessary to push through his reform agenda which would rejuvenate the crippling Soviet system. By the time Boris Yeltsin came to power, Russian society was longing for the democratic movement to further expedite reform, which did not find much echo as Gorbachev and more than him the party was reluctant for further reform. The party believed that further reform would seriously undermine the hegemonic control of the party which it enjoyed over Soviet society for decades. It can be said that Gorbachev did want to get rid of the strong executive authority by decentralizing the political system which would have enabled various bodies to function from central to the local level of governance.
It often intrigues one to think why Yeltsin, who was more supportive of reform in the wake of Soviet disintegration, lay the foundation for a presidential constitution which would ultimately give the executive authority more leverage? Another problem that arises while deliberating on the institutional design in Russia is the preponderance of executive authority over the legislature, and how often the executive exerts pressure on the legislature to push through for further executive powers. Here we need to analyse the decrees, constitution making procedure, and Yeltsin’s opposition to fresh elections in Russia to understand such phenomena and their impact on democratization. However, a strong presidential system, which is deemed to be the primary source of delegative democracy in Russia and other post-Communist countries, can be traced back to their historical legacy incarnated in the elite configurations emerging from the debris of the Soviet Union (Easter, 1997). According to Michael McFaul (2000, p. 206), the politics of ‘imposition’ as opposed to ‘negotiation’ has made the task of institution building and democracy problematic in Russia.
The Presidential Decrees
It was the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies that granted Yeltsin the power to rule by decree which would have the authority of law in the entire territory of the Russian republic. The 1993 constitution gave the president the power to issue decrees. 1 For Yeltsin this was necessary to take the country out of the ‘extraordinary situation’ following the tussle with Gorbachev and also to speed up the process of democratic reforms. However, following that precedence decrees have had a great impact on Russian politics. During the nine years of the Presidency Yeltsin issued more than two thousand decrees which ranged from institutional changes to policy priorities. Even during Putin’s first terms of presidency (2000–2004) he issued more than five hundred decrees. The president’s right to issue decrees is not favourable for democratic transition as it aims to strengthen the role of the president and empowers the executive to make legislation without the consent of the parliament.
The Constitution
In a country which is at the rudimentary stage of democratic transition, the making and adoption of a new constitution is of great importance. The constitution explicates the institutional dynamics and thereby the role of different institutions in governing the state. It is interesting to see in the Russian case that neither the parliament nor the president have exhibited any quest to dwell upon the question of the importance of a constitution. Furthermore, there was also a schism between the president and parliament regarding the method in which the new constitution would be adopted. While Yeltsin was in favour of a constitution first and a referendum later, the Congress wanted to opt for either a referendum or an election through which a new Congress would be constituted, which would then take up the task of drafting a new constitution. However, both failed to come to any tangible consensus regarding the question of how a constituent assembly would be established. The stalemate between them hindered the process of constitution making and its subsequent adoption. The parliament also lacked the conviction to oppose the president, and Yeltsin by then had already established himself as a popular leader and he had mass support behind him to thwart any obstacle that came in the way of implementing his ambitious economic reforms.
In the case of Russia, the constitution was adopted through a national referendum on 12 December 1993, when opposition political forces were muzzled. The deadlock between the Congress and the President ended in a bloodshed, in which the president emerged victorious. Therefore, the first democratic constitution of Russia was the winner’s constitution, and not the one drafted through political consensus (Sheinis, 2004, p. 56). As a consequence, the 1993 constitution gives unbridled powers to the president without devising any mechanism of checks and balance and separation of power as deterrence against executive overreach. The constitution virtually disrobes the legislature of any sway over policymaking and minimizes its legitimacy as an institution of interest articulation for the Russian people. The 1993 constitution makes the president the sole custodian of domestic and foreign policy and also authorizes the president to represent the country both domestically and internationally. As per the constitution, the president can also impose emergency in his capacity as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president can ask for a referendum and annul the decision of other bodies if he thinks their actions contravene the provision of constitution or of the federal law (Willerton, 2005, p. 23). In the case of Russia, it was also observed that the adoption of the new constitution was bereft of any participatory, transparent, and accountable procedure; rather, it was one which was manoeuvred and personality-driven. The constitution was drafted by a president-appointed tiny political clique, not through any constitutional convention or constituent assembly.
Yeltsin’s Opposition to Fresh Elections
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, anxieties were prevalent regarding Russia’s economic reforms and its political future. Then it was decided that the elections were to be held in October, 1991, through which regional executives were to be elected. However, Yeltsin pleaded with the parliament to postpone the election for a year. He did not deem it important to conduct elections amidst harsh winter and topsy-turvy political situation owing to the weak capacity of the central government. Although many have argued that it was Yeltsin’s fear of a Communist victory in those elections at the cost of the democratic forces that might have propelled him to postpone elections. The Communists and radical democrats were vociferously advocating for immediate elections. The first election in which different political parties compete for power is considered to be a breakthrough in the transition to democracy (Schraeder, 2002, p. 229), and the primary indicator of democratic progress (Marsden, 2005, p. 135)
It is in this way Yeltsin delayed the evolution of the normal political reform process, which according to many scholars should have been done immediately after the Soviet collapse. Democratic Russia which had Yeltsin’s support conducted a poll in which they would win majority of the seats in the Russian parliament, if elections were conducted prior to the launching of the economic reforms. However, by postponing elections for various reasons, Yeltsin missed an opportunity to create a consensus for his economic and political reforms. The elections could have helped in bringing new actors into the unfolding political scenario and also make the way for the creation of a federation of shared sovereignty rather than a system imposed by an authority which was elected under the Soviet electoral law (Suthar, 2008, p. 53). Richard Sakwa (1995, p. 103) has explained that elections at that point in time would have re-enforced Yeltsin’s dependency on Democratic Russia and the ‘democratic movement’ as a whole, as a consequence, the furthering of democratic revolution would cast an onslaught on the nomenklatura class, which Yeltsin was averse to doing. Invariably, he came to bank upon this class only. In doing so, democratic movement as a whole received a setback. However, by overlooking the importance and sustainability of democratic governance in the two most cardinal procedures, the elections and constitution making, the ruling Russian elite greatly impeded the democratization process. The issuance of decrees further added to that hindrance.
The Judiciary
The role of the judiciary is no less important than other institutions in the transition process, and for the survival of democracy itself. The judiciary plays a critical role in guaranteeing civil and political rights, which are obtained during the transition and subsequently get incorporated into the newly drafted constitution. The judiciary is the ultimate custodian of ensuring the rule of law and promoting accountability and transparency in various organs of the state. Furthermore, the judiciary acts as a balancer in an executive dominated political system by counteracting the president who wants to enjoy more power. The judiciary also adjudicates disputes between the executive and the legislature. The strength and autonomy of the judiciary depends on its powers inherited at the time of transition (Bratton & VandeWalle, 1997, p. 248).
Not until the 1980s was the role and the importance of judicial supervision over the commensurability of executive and legislative action in accordance with the provisions of the constitution recognized in the erstwhile USSR. It was only when Gorbachev assumed office that the notion of rule of law as the basis of state came to the fore. Accordingly, the Constitutional Supervision Committee was formed following the enactment of the Constitutional Control in the USSR Act on 25 December 1989. After functioning a little more than a year, the committee was disbanded by Yelstin at the end of 1991. In December 1990, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic’s (RSFSR) constitution was amended to form a Constitutional Court. Accordingly, in July 1991 the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR Act was adopted. On October 1991, the Fifth Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic elected thirteen members of the court and the Constitutional Court started functioning de-facto. However, before its suspension of work through a presidential decree by Yeltsin on 7 October 1993 citing constitutional crisis, the Constitutional Court did play an important role in delivering a few significant decisions, most notably, it forbade the practice of extrajudicial eviction by rendering certain decrees of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet unconstitutional which had been adopted ultra-vires. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR Act itself was abrogated through another presidential decree and in July 1994 the new Constitutional Court Act was adopted. It could start acting only in February 1995 owing to the refusal of the Federation Council of Russia to appoint president nominated judges many a times. Former President Dmitry Medvedev proposed to the legislature on 8 May 2009, by signing an amendment, which says that the names of the chairperson and the deputies of the Constitutional Court would be proposed by the President to the Parliament as opposed to the practice of them being elected by the judges. The question of judicial autonomy is a highly contested one in Russia, which can further be illustrated by the statement of a Constitutional Court judge, Vladimir Yaroslavtsev, in an interview to a Spanish newspaper on 31 August 2009, in which he said, ‘that the presidential executive office and security services had undermined judicial independence in Russia’. Judicial autonomy in upholding rule of law is important for democratization to succeed.
Legislature
The role of parliament is important in strengthening the base of a fledgling democracy by enacting laws and legislations, which are necessary to take democracy down to the grass root level. It has been observed that most of the former totalitarian regimes opted for a parliamentary form of government rather than a presidential one. Although there is reasonable debate among scholars with regards to the merits and demerits of both the systems as to which one is more suitable for a country which is at the initial stages of its transition, many scholars have also proposed a semi-presidential form of government for new democracies, which entails some elements of both parliamentary and presidential systems. In the case of Russia, scholars have extensively debated about the perfect model of government for Russia, which would facilitate smooth transition. There are some who have opined that for a transition as complex as in the case of Russia, political stability through a presidential system can only provide for a successful transition. For them, the parliamentary system degenerating into party competition and fragmentation and inter and intra-party squabble may derail the transition process. Those who have argued against the presidential system and for a parliamentary system, hold that the presidential system can turn into an authoritarian system as it revolves around the personality of the president. Whereby, the parliamentary system is characterized by the fusion of the executive and the legislature, which is more appropriate for a new democracy to work in tandem through co-optation and consensus. Various studies have shown that countries undergoing the democratization process with strong parliaments tend to move faster in their transition than presidential systems. Fish (2005, p. 209) has shown in a cross country study of the post-Soviet states that the countries with strong parliaments have performed better than those with weak parliaments.
In the case of the Russian Federation, the institutional interplay between the executive and the legislature assumed a vital role in dominating much of the discourse on democratization. Russia’s first democratically elected president, Boris Yeltsin, was avowedly reform-oriented and wanted to transform Russia from a Communist into a democratic one. However, it soon landed him in a stand-off with the Russian parliament, which opposed his ambitious economic reforms. The stand-off between the president and the Congress of People’s Deputies reached a deadlock in September, 1993, when Yeltsin decided to dissolve the legislature on the basis of an April 1993 referendum. The Russian parliament declared the move illegitimate as the president was not constitutionally authorised to do so. This culminated in a violent bloodshed as the Russian army stormed the parliament building to remove the deputies who were holed up inside. It led to the killing of hundreds and another more hundred were wounded. The adoption of the new constitution in December 1993 accorded more power to the president (Suthar, 2008, p. 57). At the same time the voters elected a new parliament, the State Duma, by replacing the Supreme Soviet, which was won by Nationalists and Communists, only to further aggravate the executive–legislature relations.
Much of the institutional design in post-Soviet Russia was characterized by the tumultuous relationship between the executive and the legislature, which has influenced the democratization process as a whole. Following the negative fallout of ‘shock therapy’ measures, Russian society was deeply divided among the reformist and anti-reformist camps which continued to define the nature of the Russian state during the Yeltsin years. The division of society among reformist and anti-reformist camps can be seen in the power struggle between the executive and the legislature, in which the executive was pro-reform and the Russian parliament was anti-reform. Growing dismay over Yeltsin’s reform movement further strengthened the opposition space in the parliament, which can be seen in the 1995 election of the State Duma. The 1995 election marked the emergence of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) as the single largest party in the country at the helm of leading the opposition of a legislative majority. Despite having a poor public approval rating at the initial level, Yeltsin managed to win the re-election. It can be summed up that hostility between the executive and the legislature was the hallmark of Russian politics during the transition phase. The executive–legislature hostility could be traced back to the sketchy institutional design of the Russian state. The equivocal separation of power of the First Russian Republic, which was later replaced by a constitutional structure that gave the president more power over other institutions, was based on allaying tension between institutions by establishing the dominance of one organ over the other, which in the Russian case was the presidency.
Conclusion
Democratization in Russia was a complex process as it was faced with triple transitions as opposed to many scholarly claims, which highlight dual transition. It transitioned from an empire to a republic, from a totalitarian form of government to a democratic one, and from a command economy to a market one. In the early and mid-1990s, scholars who specialized on post-Soviet countries had portended that post-Communist states were sought to navigate through a complex tightrope of economic and social changes as well as sweeping political transformation in order to successfully consolidate democracy. However, in the case of Russia, the corrupted manner in which the privatization process was carried out undermined the institutionalization of democracy (Evans, 2011, p. 40).
Moreover, in Russia, candidates and voters were divided in the initial years of competitive elections between those who stood in favour of restoring the old Soviet order and those who wanted to get rid of it. This observation merits attention for two reasons. First, for the period of time this division dominated Russia’s electoral politics is unique in itself. It was seen in many post-Soviet countries that such a division no longer existed after the first round of national elections following the break-up of the old system. Second, it is also fascinating to see how this balance of division among the electorate in Russia remained considerably stable, whereas in many successful transitions to democracy, it has been observed that electoral preferences have witnessed considerable variations. This stable polarization for such a protracted period was due to the absence of accord between different centres of power regarding the new rules of the game. However, following the 1999 parliamentary vote, this period of polarization largely subsided with the emergence of centrist coalitions in the political scene of Russia.
The liberalization and privatization programme in Russia was carried out in a very problematic manner by not putting appropriate institutions in place, which could facilitate market reforms. Liberalization requires structural reforms which necessitate at least some form of the state to introduce market by undertaking measures, such as relaxing prices and trade and slashing government spending on subsidies, and so on. The neo-liberal reformers in Russia had rather a simplistic view of the economic reform. They thought that introducing market alone would become a substitute for subsequent reform of the state institutions, rather than introducing market in accordance with simultaneously creating appropriate state institutions to support that market economy. As a consequence, national policy was virtually held hostage by parochial interests of organized groups, such as the super-rich class of oligarchy. The economic miscalculations of the reformers led to the emergence of a powerful group of oligarchs, who quickly occupied key positions in the government. This oligarchical class took over the reform movement, exploited Russia’s enormous resources, halted further reform endeavours, and prevented political reforms through errors of omission and commission. The privatization in Russia amounted to a confiscation of public wealth by the oligarchs.
Apart from the failure of creating adequate institutions to support a market-based economy, Yeltsin and his team of reformers also floundered to create a supportive political constituency for further reforms. The middle class in Russia, which gained currency during the last years of the Gorbachev period, could have become the building block of Yeltsin’s reform movement but virtually got wiped out due to impoverishment caused by hyperinflation. The fact that privatization was adopted prior to de-monopolization led to large, socially indifferent enterprises extracting monopoly rents from an already destitute population (Rousso, 2000, p. 111). By the end of the 1990’s, economic condition adversely impacted the lives of citizens, which could be seen in the steep rise of unemployment, welfare was virtually rendered minimal, expectance of life dropped by a decade, and there was a slump in the accessibility of consumer goods. It should be noted that the regime’s success or survival was largely contingent upon the performance of the economy. The democratic consolidation in Russia does not hinge only on its political transformation alone, but to a large extent on the economic outcome of the reform. The harsh realities of the economic reform such as inflation, irregular or often delayed payment of pension and wages, and the near total collapse of the social security system, pervasive crime, and endemic corruption within various organs of the state have led to the erosion of the Russians’ belief in the democratic institutions. It was the failure/inability of the ruling elite in Russia for not being able to create social capital through a national consensus from below for reform, rather than imposing it from above. As a result, people got alienated from the government.
It was at this critical juncture that Putin became the president of Russia in 2000. Russia witnessed more centralization of power in favour of the president as order and stability became the mantras for Russians to survive in the post-Yeltsin years. Even now, if given a choice, most Russians will prefer order over democracy. The chaotic experience of the reform era continues to shape the Russian people’s perception of democracy.
During first few years after assuming power Putin initiated some of the major market reforms to resuscitate Russia’s crumbling economic situation which includes a flat 13 percent income tax and a lowered cooperative tax. Due to the spike in the energy prices, the size of the economy witnessed a growth of 83 percent and the purchasing power of Russians doubled. The surplus revenue generated through oil and gas was used in expediting state spending on social sector and military modernization. He also appointed ministers with liberal approach in terms of market reforms. In the foreign policy front, he came closer to the West, especially United States after 9/11 when both shared the menace of terrorism and the importance of global war on terror. All these developments, however, have come at the cost of political institutions, autonomous organizations and free media, which has eroded democracy significantly. Scholars begin to describe Russia under Putin with acronyms such as ‘electoral dictatorship’, ‘competitive dictatorship’, ‘unconsolidated dictatorship’, and so on. Putin and his associates describe Russia as a ‘managed democracy’, ‘sovereign democracy’, and so on.
The article makes the following recommendations in relation to democratization in Russia:
In the current context of volatile international order following Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin’s hyperbolic rhetoric and fierce ideological skirmishes with the West in regard to the nature of liberal international order which Russia seeks to challenge, it is extremely unlikely that domestic political process will take any meaningful shape. The absence of war, status quo in the existing global order, stability in the region are some of the important prerequisites of democratization. Two years after winning presidential election in 2018, the Russian parliament ratified constitutional amendments upon Putin’s proposal which would further embolden the president and the executive authority by allowing him to stay in power till 2036. This is an ominous development in so far as democratization is concerned. The major obstacle which Russia continues to face in its transition to democracy since the dissolution of the USSR has been the executive preponderance and the subservience of other institutions. The tenure of Putin is no exception to this. Building of institutions is an essential parameter of democratization.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
