Abstract
Located in northwest Africa, Western Sahara was under Spanish occupation from 1884–1975. Some of the world’s richest fishing waters can be found in Western Sahara. It also holds one of the world’s most extensive phosphates reserves. Since 1975, Morocco has been de facto governing over 80% of the land known as the Moroccan Sahara. Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, has been fighting for the independent Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Despite an UN-mediated ceasefire in 1991 for a referendum for self-determination and the presence of Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to oversee the process, the referendum never took place. In December 2020, President Trump recognized Moroccan claim over Western Sahara in exchange for a normalization deal between Morocco and Israel. While President Biden’s administration now appears to support Trump’s policy tacitly, the Ukraine crisis has provided Algeria with a fresh opportunity. Algeria is Europe’s biggest gas exporter in Africa. Moreover, it is also a strong ally of Russia. As Spain backed Morocco’s proposition to create an autonomous Western Sahara territory under Moroccan control, this change of position will undoubtedly disturb the North-African diplomatic equilibrium, and the implications could be dangerous.
Keywords
Background
18 March 2022 will go down in North African history (Reuters, 2022). On that day, Spain declared a substantial shift in its North Africa policy and backed Morocco’s proposition to create an autonomous Western Sahara territory under Moroccan control. The Moroccan proposal is also endorsed by the United States as their Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman described the idea as ‘serious, credible, and feasible, and a viable strategy to satisfy the aspirations of the people of the territory’ (Middle East Eye, 2022b).
The Spanish government described the event as the start of ‘a new phase in relations between Spain and Morocco based on mutual respect, the completion of agreements, the absence of unilateral actions and the permanent transparency of communication’ (DW, 2022); the Spanish endorsement of the Moroccan proposal has only irked Algeria. Morocco’s regional adversary, Algeria, shelters and supports the Sahrawi Liberation Front Polisario, an acronym in Spanish for their popular front for the liberation of the country. Polisario, an indigenous guerrilla group, is still fighting for Western Sahara independence. Algeria has also provided refuge to more than 176,000 Saharawi people (Hilton, 2021). As a reaction to the Spanish decision, Algeria’s ambassador to Spain was summoned back shortly after Spain announced its support for Morocco over the Western Sahara dispute (Daily Sabah, 2022).
With the never-ending metastasizing war between Russia and Ukraine, the timing of this Spanish move is unique. As it appears, after years of stagnation, the Ukraine crisis might finally bring the Western Sahara conflict to a close. As the world is scrambling for peace in Eastern Europe, this North-African standoff over Western Sahara concerns Europe and the United States in a multiple of ways.
Europe has become overly reliant on Russian gas and it urgently requires Algerian gas to ensure its energy security. On the other hand, caught in surprise by the Spanish announcement, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited both Morocco and Algeria within ten days of the Spanish endorsement. The continuation of the current American policy of hyphenating Morocco and Algeria indicates the sincere American pursuit to avoid another diplomatic imbroglio in North Africa (Lee, 2022b).
Geography and Natural Resources of Western Sahara
Located in the northwest of Africa, Western Sahara is a largely desert tract bordered by the Atlantic Ocean, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. With a surface area of 266,000 square km, Western Sahara is nearly the size of Britain (France 24, 2021a). As per the Special Committee on Decolonisation, it is the last African colony. As a matter of fact, during the latest third and fourth meetings of the 2022 session in June, the concerns over its decolonization were duly discussed (United Nations, 2022). Today, about 500,000 locals live in the area, known as Sahrawis (Heller, 2022). They are indigenous people of mixed descent—Berber and Arab. They primarily speak an Arabic dialect known as Hassaniya (Middle East Eye, 2020).
Some of the world’s richest fishing waters can be found in Western Sahara. Morocco exports about 100,000 tons of fish per year to Spain. However, most Moroccan Sardines or Octopus are captured from the coasts of the disputed Western Sahara territory (Pareja, 2020). While the European Union (EU) has been raising the issue of illegal and illicit fishing on different multilateral platforms, EU fishing vessels continue to operate in the Saharawian waters, depleting its most valuable natural resources (Bagnetto, 2019).
Western Sahara also holds one of the world’s most extensive phosphates reserves, almost 72 percent globally combined with Moroccan reserves (Reuters, 2021b). It is an essential ingredient for modern fertilizer production. Hence, control over Western Sahara represents firm control over world food production. Morocco’s state-owned phosphate company OCP owns the Bou Craa mine in Western Sahara. The mine is considered one of the world’s largest phosphate mines (Pearce, 2011). Plausibly, OCP controls 54 percent of the fertilizer export market in Africa. In addition, the region has the potential for yet-to-be-tapped offshore oil and gas deposits (Atti, 2022b). Morocco also extracts sand, salt, and other agro-products from this region for commercial use (Gilmartin, 2022). Finally, Western Sahara’s lands also provide possibilities for Morocco to use as a strategic site for renewable energy production.
The Genesis of the Conflict
In 1884, during the scramble for Africa in Berlin, Spain colonized the region, and subsequently, by 1934, it was named Spanish Sahara (The Indian Express, 2020). In 1969, Harakat Tahrir, a pro-independence organization, was formed against Spanish occupation (Hodges, 1983). While Harakat Tahrir was crushed the following year, a Western Sahara independence movement known as the Polisario Front was born out of it in 1973. On 27 February 1976, the Polisario Front declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and has been fighting for its independence since then, first with the Spanish and now with the Moroccans (War Resisters’ International, 2019).
As the pressure from the UN to decolonize Western Sahara was increasing and the country was also suffering from domestic political instability, Spain reluctantly decided to withdraw its troops in 1975. However, under its fascist leader General Francisco Franco, Spain backed off from the promised referendum and, instead, made a secret deal with Morocco and Mauritania, known as the Madrid Pact. As per the accord, Morocco and Mauritania got the joint right to administer the region, leaving nothing for the local people (Rafael, 2022).
Thereafter, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) took over the case and annulled both Moroccan and Mauritanian sovereignty over the Western Sahara territory. Angered by this decision, Moroccan King Hassan II staged a Green March of 350,000 unarmed civilians and 25,000 armies to claim vast swaths of Western Sahara after the ICJ ruled against Morocco’s unilateral claim to Spanish Sahara (Rickett, 2014). Polisario continued fighting Morocco and Mauritania until August 1979, when Mauritania signed a peace treaty with Polisario and gave up its claim (Johny, 2020).
However, Morocco refused to relinquish any control and reinforced its authority by occupying the majority of the territory (Omondi, 2022). And until this day, Morocco continues to control, and de facto govern, over 80 percent of the land known as Moroccan Sahara. The Polisario Front holds the remaining 20 percent of the land, known as the SADR. Since then, the war between Morocco and Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, has persisted.
After occupying the land, the Moroccan army took the US military’s help to push the Polisario out of the eastern part of Western Sahara. Morocco then followed it up with the help of US weapons companies Northrop and Westinghouse, and they built the world’s second-largest wall to protect the mineral resources of Morocco-occupied Sahara from the Polisario Front (Democracy Now, 2020), while in the eastern side of the wall, which is controlled by Polisario, lies an inhabitable desert. Furthermore, like the Berlin wall, this 1,700-mile-long wall also helped Morocco to divide the Sahrawis living in Morocco-occupied land from those Sahrawis who fled to Algeria (Press TV, 2021).
The Peace Process
In 1991, the UN brokered a ceasefire on the promise of an independence referendum (France 24, 2022). In the same year, the United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established based on UNSC resolution 690 (Peoples Dispatch, 2022). The prime objective of MINURSO was to hold a referendum on ‘self-determination’ for the Sahrawis, the indigenous people of Western Sahara.
In 2000 and 2003, two Baker peace initiatives were proposed by James Baker, the former US secretary of state, then acting as the UN secretary-personal general’s envoy (Popoviciu, 2020). The proposal called for a UN-sponsored referendum allowing people to choose between a merger with Morocco, autonomy or independence. However, they were both shelved due to confusion over voting rights. The impasse continues to linger as Morocco is not ready to accept the self-determination of Sahrawis, and Polisario rejected autonomy.
Under the leadership of former German President Horst Kohler, the then UN envoy for Western Sahara, two sessions of ‘roundtable’ discussions took place among Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania (DW, 2019b). This was the first time Algeria joined any UN talk over Western Sahara (Arieff, 2021). While the deadlock remained, the positive development raised hope toward a negotiated peace. However, the abrupt resignation of Kohler over health issues in May 2019 put a stop to this discussion. And there was no discussion on the subject over the next two years. The latest discussion took place in 2021 under the leadership of the newly appointed UN envoy on Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura. During the meeting, the UN took note of the absence of a comprehensive settlement and decided to extend MINURSO’s mandate (Al Jazeera, 2021).
Moroccan Design for Western Sahara
Morocco has a history of using all the approaches, including economic, political and military resources, when it comes to achieving consolidated control over Western Sahara. In 1984, when it joined the Organisation of African Union (OAU), SADR got the recognition of a sovereign state. Later, it also became one of the founders of the African Union (AU; Saleh, 2022). However, immediately after SADR was admitted to OAU, Morocco withdrew from the OAU as a ploy to maintain diplomatic pressure on the continental body (Fabricus, 2016). Most recently, in 2018, Morocco severed ties with Iran for the second time in a decade. This time it was because Iran supplied arms to the Polisario through Hezbollah, a US-designated terrorist organization (DW, 2018).
Furthermore, Morocco has always been cautious regarding its various treaties with the European Union and Spain, making no marginal concessions with regard to Western Sahara. This deft diplomatic handling of the issue helped Morocco keep the conflict under wraps. Moroccan diplomats’ success, as Shelly Tobby puts it nicely in his book, lay in keeping France and the United States out of the game and convincing the Soviet Union to remain disinterested (Shelley, 2004). Evidently, the diplomatic imbroglio over Western Sahara has hardly made it to the international news apart from a few stray reports. As a result, Morocco was able to pursue its interests in the region without interference.
Morocco has also been using other diplomatic tools to keep Western Sahara under its firm grip. Over the last few years, Morocco has authorized 23 friendly African and Arab countries, including Jordon, Bahrain and the UAE, to open consulates to Morocco in Morocco-occupied Western Sahara territories in the cities of al-Dakhla and Laayoune (Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco in Japan, 2021). Without any doubt, the primary goal of these consulates is to assert Moroccan authority through symbolic political messages rather than to provide consular services.
In 2017, 33 years after withdrawing its membership, Morocco rejoined the AU with the explicit goal of cultivating regional support for its claim to Western Sahara as well as exploring economic opportunities for different Moroccan firms (Kazeem, 2017). Since then, King Mohammed VI has launched several diplomatic, investment and trade initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa to amplify its voice in the AU to suspend SADR.
Meanwhile, Moroccan policies of settlement and assimilation in Western Sahara have jeopardized Saharawis and their identity. Morocco has invested billions of dollars in Western Sahara’s infrastructure development. Most of the infrastructure in the capital Laayoune and the coastal city Dakhala are built with Moroccan Dirham. Morocco has been constructing a state-of-the-art port at Dakhala (The North Africa Post, 2021). Besides, the kingdom has provided considerable incentives to encourage Moroccans to settle there. Over time, the number of Moroccans living in Western Sahara has largely surpassed the number of its indigenous inhabitants (The Economist, 2022). It’s no surprise that Morocco wants everyone in Western Sahara, including the many Moroccan people who have settled there, to be able to vote, as this would tip the referendum in Morocco’s favour. Algeria and the Polisario Front oppose it and want only native Sahrawis to be eligible to vote.
African Position on West Sahara
To date, the most significant endorsement for Western Sahara came from its recognition by AU as a member. As a matter of fact, SADR was initially recognized by about 84 UN member countries. Although 34 countries across the world have changed their position and derecognized it, such withdrawals are actually in violation of international law. Any government party to the Montevideo Convention of 1933 cannot revoke the recognition as the convention clearly prohibits it, stating ‘the recognition is unconditional and irrevocable’. Currently, the UN classifies Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. However, even the UN is not an appropriate legal authority to recognize states under international law.
At one point in time, about 34 African countries recognized SADR. However, many of them withdrew or froze their recognition. Today, South Africa and Algeria remain the only two staunch supporters of autonomy for Western Sahara. In 2019, when the UN Security Council presented a resolution on extending the observer mission in Western Sahara, South Africa abstained from voting. It vehemently opposed the resolution, citing it as unbalanced and ignoring African concerns. However, even South Africa appears to be softening its opposition against Morocco. This was evident in 2020 when South African President Ramaphosa, speaking during the closure of the 14th African Union Extraordinary Session, reaffirmed Decision 693 of the African Summit, which provides the UN with exclusivity in finding a solution concerning the Western Sahara conflict (Alaoui, 2020).
Today, SADR is a party to numerous multilateral treaties at the continental level, such as the following:
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1992) African Economic Community establishment treaty (1992) OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002) African Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact (2005) Convention of the African Energy Commission (2006) African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2009) African Continental Free Trade Area (2018)
However, by recognizing SADR as its member and simultaneously allowing Morocco the membership of the AU, the continental body might engender some dangerous consequences at the regional level.
Saharawis, People Without a Country
Since Morocco occupied the land of Western Sahara, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and many other reputable investigative groups have reported massive arrests, torture of dissidents, random disappearances, killings and violent suppression against the pro-independence Sahrawi people living in the occupied territory (Bamne, n.d.). According to the Freedom House survey of 210 countries, Western Sahara ranks at the bottom, particularly regarding political rights (Freedom House, 2020). As per Stephen Zunes, an international studies professor at the University of San Francisco, the human rights condition in Morocco-occupied Western Sahara is worse than in Iraq under Saddam and Indonesia under Suharto (Kasprak, 2016).
Traditionally, Sahrawi women have had more rights compared to women of many other countries in that region. While they have been highly proactive in the nonviolent resistance movement in the occupied territories, they are frequently subject to harassment and torture by the Moroccan army. In addition, there are accusations of the propaganda war against Morocco. In February 2020, there were massive protests in the Saharawi capital Dakhala against Moroccan occupation and the disappearance and possible murder of Lehbib Aghrichi (Equipe Media, 2022a). The security forces brutally cracked down on the demonstration (Equipe Media, 2022b).
The president of the Sahrawi Association for the Defence of Human Rights, activist Sultana Khaya, was nominated for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought 2021 (The Left, 2021). Since 2005, Sultana Khaya has been suffering from physical attacks, death threats, torture and sexual assaults perpetrated by the Moroccan authorities. On 22 August 2021, Moroccan security agents broke into her house and sexually assaulted her and her sister Laura Khaya, and they physically harassed other members of her family. She is under de facto house arrest since November 2020. In September, when she was nominated for her work on women’s rights and promoting the right to self-determination for the Sahrawi people, Morocco engaged in intense diplomacy, resulting in her disqualification from the final round. And on 15 November 2021, Moroccan security forces again broke into the house, raped her and sexually abused her sisters and 80-year-old mother (Amnesty International, 2021). Others like journalist El Bachir Khadda or Mohamed Lamin Haddi were both were sentenced for reporting the month-long Gdeim Izik protest camp in October 2010, killing about 11 Sahrawis and injuring hundreds (RSF, 2021).
When Morocco occupied Western Sahara, half of the Sahrawis fled the country and entered Algeria. As per UNHCR data, about 173,000 refugees live in Tindouf province, located at the border between Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara. Though the total number of refugees is doubtful, as there has been no census to date and WFP recognizes only 90,000 refugees. Nevertheless, their shelters consisting of tents, mud shacks and brick buildings are not better than those remaining in Morocco-controlled territory (Ghosh, 2022). There are accusations of slavery, torture and repression of the freedom of expression and dissent opinions as well as detention and deprivation of the freedom of movement by the Polisario. There are also accusations of drug and human trafficking inside these camps.
These camps rely entirely on international aid. The World Food Programme (WFP) distributes the monthly ration while water tankers bring the water (Vescovi, 2017). Some electricity pylons, installed by Algeria, provide electricity in the camps. In 2021, France donated $478,000 to support the education of Sahrawi refugee children in Algeria (WFP, 2021). And in March 2022, Spain donated US$2.7 million to provide for their food and other medical needs (WFP, 2022).
The region is highly susceptible to international drug routes. Moreover, the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active there. As per some Moroccan reports, local imams in the Polisario-controlled territory on Algerian soil have been recruiting young people for AQIM (Kasraoui, 2022). There is also the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara (EI-GS), led by Adnane Abou Walid al-Sahraoui, a former active member of the Polisario Front. Unless there is some political solution, the youth living in the camps are particularly vulnerable to the calls of drug and extremist networks (Middle East Online, 2021a). The recent UN envoy Staffan de Mistura’s visits raise some hope for finding a solution to the conflict in Western Sahara.
The Spillover Effect of Western Sahara on Morocco-Algeria Bilateral Relations
The dispute between Morocco and Algeria dates back to their independence years when in 1962, they fought a brief war over their border, dubbed as a sand war (Dworkin, 2022). After the independence, while Morocco carried on with its monarchy system, Algeria not only pursued socialism but also began supporting revolutionary movements around the world, making the conservative Moroccan monarchy uneasy (The Economist, 2021). The continued tensions between Morocco and Algeria have long hampered security and economic cooperation in North Africa. In 1994, Algeria accused Morocco of backing Islamist groups to create unrest in the country, which killed two tourists in Hotel Marrakesh, and decided to close the border, which remains closed to this day (France 24, 2021b). The relations have remained strained since then. Moreover, military tensions continued to erupt at regular intervals over purported invasions by one side or the other.
On 10 December 2020, President Trump announced that the Kingdom of Morocco and Israel have decided to establish full diplomatic relations (CNBC, 2020). The normalization agreement between these two nations rekindled tensions between them; as part of the accord, the United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Saharan territory, making it the first international major power to accept Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara (Gilmartin, 2020). He also pledged to open a US consulate to Morocco in Dakhla, but he was dislodged from his position before the deal was materialized (Middle East Eye, 2022a).
Late in 2020, a new round of conflict broke out. In November 2020, the Polisario announced its withdrawal from the truce and began small-scale attacks on Moroccan military positions (DW, 2020). This was due to the alleged incursion of Moroccan troops into a demilitarized ‘buffer zone’ to clear Polisario demonstrators who were interfering with the Moroccan construction of a road connecting to Mauritania. Meanwhile, Algeria blamed Morocco for the increasing military clashes and the normalization of relations with Israel around the same time.
In April 2021, Morocco was accused of using drones to assassinate Addah al-Bendir, a leading Western Sahara independence fighter (The Economic Times, 2021). This was done in violation of the 1991 ceasefire agreement. Surprisingly, Morocco had no official denial of the operation that killed the Polisario leader except for the deployment of drones. And, as per the Moroccan news site Le Desk, Bendir was killed using a French-Israeli unarmed Harfang drone (The Defence Post, 2021).
In August 2021, Algeria experienced the worst wildfire in its history, killing at least 90 people (Arab News, 2021). Algeria accused Morocco, specifically a Paris-based Kabyle independence organization Rashad group and MAK, of fanning the fires and lynching a man by wrongly charged with arson (The Times of Israel, 2021). Morocco is also suspected of utilizing Israeli software Pegasus to monitor around 6,000 Algerian politicians, army men, intelligence chiefs, senior government officials, diplomats and political activists (Zerrouky, 2021). Earlier in July, Morocco’s UN envoy, Omar Hilale, said that the people of Algeria’s Berber region of Kabyle should have the right to define their status (Morocco Latest News, 2021). Several experts compared Morocco’s statement at the UN in support of the Kabyle as a war cry. Periodic hostile actions and this statement led Algeria to severe its diplomatic ties with Morocco and cut off gas shipments to Spain that had previously passed through Morocco (TRT World, 2021). This was followed by the Algerian accusation of killing three truck drivers in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara (DW, 2011).
Now, both countries are important in the fight against terrorism in the broader Sahel region (Bhattacharya, 2021a). As both countries are allies of Western nations, this Algerian stance will complicate the diplomacy in the region (The Times of Israel, 2021). Furthermore, in the absence of international pressure, both Morocco and Algeria will keep their diplomatic distance as neither has any interest in waging war. Consequently, this might lead to another round of cold war in the North African desert.
Diplomatic Imbroglio Between Spain and Morocco
In April 2021, Spain and Morocco faced a bitter diplomatic spat when Spain allowed the 73-year-old Western Sahara independence leader Brahim Ghali to be treated for coronavirus in the Spanish city of Logrono (DW, 2021). Although Spain argued about the humanitarian aspect behind the treatment (Pinedo, 2021), Morocco was clearly offended and recalled their ambassador to Spain (Africa News, 2022a), only to send them back this month after the visit of the Spanish PM (Al Jazeera, 2022b).
In May 2021, Morocco retaliated against the Spanish decision to host Ghali by deliberately easing border controls with the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, allowing at least 6,000 migrants to enter Morocco in less than 36 hours (BBC, 2021). The way Moroccan border authority let illegal immigrants, including children, cross the border is one drastic instance of weaponizing its border and alarmed the human rights groups against Spain (Al Jazeera, 2022a). This has prompted Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles to accuse Morocco of blackmailing Spain using minors (Reuters, 2021a).
Ukraine Crisis and Scramble for Alternative Gas Supply
Reinforcing the geopolitical balance in North Africa had taken on fresh urgency in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. At the moment when the whole of Europe is scrambling to replace Russian sources of energy, this Spanish rapprochement with Morocco might exacerbate the energy insecurity for Spain, France and the rest of Europe.
As EU countries are desperately exploring alternative energy sources to reduce their dependency on Russia, Algeria emerged as the best possible option, at least in the short term. Algeria’s status as an underdeveloped oil and gas producer right on Europe’s doorstep has triggered a flood of international interest. It is evident that in the past few months, in addition to hosting Italian Prime Minister (PM) Mario Draghi and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Algeria also received the foreign ministers of France, Italy, Portugal, Russia and the United States (Farrand, 2022).
The scramble for alternative gas suppliers in Europe augured well for Algeria and provided additional bargaining power. Currently, the EU sources 11 percent of its gas supply from Algeria. Moreover, Algeria is also Spain’s second-biggest supplier of natural gas and covers about one-quarter of Spanish needs. It has been delivering natural gas to Spain and Portugal via Morocco for the past 25 years using the Maghreb-European pipeline, also known as MEG (Africa News, 2022b). However, in October this year, the contract between Algerian company Sonatrach and the Moroccan National Office for Energy and Potable Water (ONEE) expired. Algeria refused to renew the contract over its skirmishes with Morocco (Middle East Monitor, 2022b).
Algeria has two other undersea pipelines, Transmed and Medgaz, and none of them passes through Morocco (Middle East Online, 2021b). While Algerian Energy Minister Mohamed Arkab promised to meet Spain’s demand by using the smaller undersea Medgaz-pipeline, the decision has generated fear of gas shortages and skyrocketing energy prices in Spain and other European countries (The Arab Weekly, 2021). The suspicion escalated by Italy’s agreement to import additional volumes from Algeria, amounting to around 12 percent of its total demand. On 11 April Italian PM Draghi met the Algerian President to sign the deal (Mcgregor, 2018). It is feared that in order to supply extra gas to Italy, Algeria might reduce the supply or increase the price to Spain (Bloomberg, 2022). Moreover, Medgaz pipeline has already hit its maximum capacity, and it is highly susceptible to breakdowns as it is located mainly offshore (The North Africa Post, 2022).
Early in April, Algeria warned of halting its gas export to Spain after Spanish energy minister Teresa Ribera announced that Madrid would allow reverse gas flows to Morocco via the MEG (Arab News, 2022). Despite Moroccan claims of legal validity of the action, Algeria is clearly in an advantageous situation and would want to leverage it. However, stopping the gas supply to Spain would only mean redirecting it to Italy, the other large buyer of Algerian gas. In any case, this Spanish volte-face would further complicate the energy security of Spain and broader Europe (Hedgecoe, 2022).
The Russia Factor: Algerian Ally
Algeria’s diplomatic closeness with Russia and its anti-West positioning concerning the Ukraine crisis further complicates the situation. As a matter of fact, Algeria is not only the most significant natural gas exporter in Africa; it is also a close ally of Moscow since its independence from France in 1962 (Lee, 2022a). The Soviet Union provided much-needed financial, military and political support to the Algerian war of independence (Mhaka, 2022). Both countries have maintained strong economic cooperation since the 1960s, and even today, Russia has substantial clout over Sonatrach, the national oil company of Algeria (Wehrey & Weiss, 2021).
Russia is also Algeria’s biggest weapon supplier, which includes Sukhoi and MiG jets, helicopters, tanks and submarines (Mcgregor, 2018). At this moment, any disruption of the gas supply from Algeria might cause energy insecurity in Europe, weakening its opposition to Russia. While Sonatrach has stated that it will expand its supply to Europe, its intention and production capacity are doubtful (Hamdi, 2022). Furthermore, given Algeria’s long-standing ties to Russia, it seems unlikely that Algeria will take any move that would be detrimental to Russian interests (Middle East Monitor, 2022). Additionally, Russia has hosted the Polisario Front twice in recent years, in 2017 and 2021, conveying a strong message of solidarity to Algeria (Alaoui, 2021).
The Position of the USA: Democracy when Convenient
The Morocco–US relation goes back to 1777, when Morocco was one of the first countries to recognize US sovereignty. Morocco has been treated as the most prominent non-NATO ally for the United States since the end of the Cold War, and this has resulted in several military deals. As a matter of fact, the relationship has been mutual. Before the 2016 election of the United States, Moroccan state-owned phosphate company OCP operating from Western Sahara donated several million to the Clinton Foundation (Mosk, et al., 2015). Earlier, Moroccan King Mohammed VI pledged USD500,000 to the Clinton Foundation to help build Bill Clinton’s presidential library (Vogel, 2015).
In the case of Western Sahara, the United States played a crucial role in pressuring Spain to leave Western Sahara. Since 1977, it has maintained a neutral stance (Slimi, 2009). Despite President George W. Bush’s open support for the Moroccan proposition of 2007, he never formalized it. Not only did President Trump formally recognized Moroccan rights over the disputed territory but the United States also became the world’s first major country to do so in the process.
Interestingly, President Biden’s administration now appears to tacitly support Trump’s policy shift on Western Sahara, avoiding the reversal of Trump’s quid-pro-quo agreement with Morocco (Sauers, 2021). This was evident in the State Department’s decision in May 2021 to officially recognize the Abraham Accords, establish a temporary Consulate in Dakhla, develop a new commercial port there and release new maps representing Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty (Zunes, 2022). Moreover, reports linking Polisario to Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and other terrorist groups mainly originate from Moroccan intelligence. Hence, they should be accepted with caution. And finally, the American position on Western Sahara clearly highlights American hypocrisy. In a similar situation, where Russia annexed Crimea and, more recently, is trying to annex Ukraine, the United States is not only vehemently opposing it but also getting ready to be at war, if required.
China at Crossroads
The current diplomatic imbroglio in North Africa has put China at a crossroads as it has a substantial investment in both countries. Using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China wants to develop Europe–Africa connectivity across the Western Mediterranean; for that, both countries are crucial.
Originally joining the BRI in 2017, Morocco upgraded its investment and financing agreements on 5 January 2022. However, China’s participation in the Moroccan infrastructure development sky jumped much earlier, particularly since Moroccan King Mohammed VI’s visit to China in 2016. That was the time when both countries signed several strategic partnership agreements (Xinhuanet, 2016). China has substantially invested in Morocco’s emerging West Africa-to-Western Europe commercial transportation corridor. The corridor will use Morocco’s al-Boraq high-speed rail line and the newly expanded Port of Tanger Med (East Asia Forum, 2021). The expansion work that was funded by China Merchants Group has transformed the Tanger Med port into the largest port in the Mediterranean (China Merchants Group, 2017).
French-led European manufacturing predominates in Morocco. However, as France lacks a strategic ally in the region, China showed interest in integrating into the French-led value chain. French manufacturers Renault and Groupe PSA are the two major players in the Moroccan vehicle manufacturing industry. To integrate into the French-led value chain, Chinese company Nanjing Xiezhong Group is constructing a US$15 million facility to supply air conditioners, while CITIC Dicastal established a US$400 million plant to supply equipment to Groupe PSA (East Asia Forum, 2020). In 2017, China’s electrical vehicle manufacturer BYD Auto signed an agreement to build a 2,500-person plant. Once completed, it will be just after Renault and PSA (Silk Road Briefing, 2022).
Although currently off-track, China is also building Mohammed VI Tangier Tech City. Once completed, this US$10 billion project funded by Chinese Communications Construction Company, Haite Group, has the potential to transform the Moroccan economy (The Arab Weekly, 2017). Another Chinese company, Hubei Forbon Technology, has come into an agreement with Moroccan State-owned phosphate company OCP to develop new generations of fertilizer solutions and smart agriculture (Kasraoui, 2021).
Similar to Morocco, China has a substantial investment in Algeria, and China plans to develop an infrastructure corridor that will connect sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean, passing through Algeria. In 2018, Algeria joined BRI, and the two countries are currently negotiating a 5-year plan for cooperation. In July 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a visit to Algeria, putting into motion the construction of El Hamdania port. Signed in 2016 with China State Construction Engineering Corporation and China Harbor Engineering Company, the commercial deep-water seaport would cost US$3.3 billion and compete with Morocco’s Tanger Med deep-water port, also built with Chinese financing (RWR Advisory Group, 2021). As per some reports, China will have control of the port for 25 years in exchange for financing (Foster, 2022). Further, the port will be connected to Algerian railway lines and the East–West highway; another Chinese-backed infrastructure, including CITIC Corporation and China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC; China.Org., 2006). As China recently appointed senior diplomat Xue Bing as its new special envoy for the Horn of Africa (Al Arabiya News, 2021), he may be given additional charge of bridging the Algeria–Morocco divide. Alternatively, a new special envoy can also be explicitly appointed to the region as the need to protect its assets become paramount.
Indian Neutrality over Western Sahara
India has had a bitter-sweet relationship with Morocco. In 1969, during the first Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) summit in Rabat, Morocco, persuaded by Pakistan, vehemently opposed India’s participation in the Summit. However, things have changed over the years, and the India-Morocco relationship has bolstered several notches (Bhattacharya, 2021b).
Similarly, India always maintained a cordial relationship with Algeria. As a matter of fact, Algeria established its embassy in India even before its independence in 1962 (Financial Express, 2021). India upgraded its strategic relationship with Algeria when in September 2021, the Indian Minister of State (MoS) for External Affairs V Muraleedharan visited Algeria and met the PM of Algeria Aimene Benabderrahmane.
During the Cold War, despite its non-aligned position, India was closely linked to the Soviet Union. In 1985, when the then PM of India Rajiv Gandhi, visited Algeria on his way to the United States to meet President Chadli Bendjedid, a great friend of the Soviet Union, Rajiv Gandhi was convinced about the need to recognize Polisario (Naqvi, 2021a). Mohammad Abdelaziz, the Polisario leader, was a friend of Cuban revolutionist Fidel Castro and had Soviet backing. Upon meeting with Bendjedid, the Indian PM agreed to recognize the sovereignty of Western Sahara. The decision got diluted only 24 hours later when in Washington, the PM was persuaded that the decision to recognize the Polisario should be at least delayed if it could not be called off at this stage (Naqvi, 2021b).
Immediately after the Indian recognition, Morocco decided to sever ties with India (Bobb, 1985). Despite their financial shortcomings, Elated Polisario opened a full-fledged embassy in New Delhi. However, within a month, the whole picture changed when they found out that apart from allowing them to establish an embassy in the national capital, there was no real intention to engage. While the embassy was shut down the following year due to inactivity, the limbo persisted till 2000, when the Indian government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided to derecognize SADR. This derecognition shocked everyone and was vehemently protested by CPI (M), who termed it a diplomatic volte-face (CPI(M), 2000).
Since then, there has been no discussion on the subject in the Indian diplomatic circle. During that time, neither the PM nor the external affairs minister clearly stated the reasons for their decision. It was assumed that given the Kashmir issue at home and the possibility of Pakistan exploiting the situation, the Indian government wanted to avoid mentioning words such as ‘self-determination’ and ‘referendum’ or ‘plebiscite’ (Dasgupta, 2000). Moreover, the influence of the United States has also worked, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Today, the Indian company Paradeep Phosphates Limited is the biggest importer of Western Saharan phosphate. It is the only one of the three companies that continue to buy phosphate rock from the disputed land. As a matter of fact, Paradeep is a subsidiary of OCP itself (Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2022).
Ripple Effects of Ukraine Crisis on Western Sahara Issue
In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, Italy and other EU nations started to view Algeria as a powerhouse in the energy sector that could assist them in fast weaning themselves off Russian gas. Given the ever-increasing disagreement between the West and Russia, the European countries will likely become increasingly reliant on Algerian oil and gas. Therefore, EU members must carefully weigh the risks of taking any action that might antagonize Algiers. Such circumstances put the EU in a challenging predicament. Officially, it has so far maintained its neutrality. However, given the rapprochement of one of its member countries, Spain, with Morocco, the 27-member bloc must decide on its position between Morocco and Algeria.
Now, as the end of the Russia-Ukraine war is not in sight even after eight months, the pressure to find an alternative gas sources will only grow in the aftermath of the conflict. To escape from this quicksand in which the EU currently finds itself, one likely move of the EU could be to distance itself from the Spanish position and wait for the tensions to cool down. EU may also express its solidarity with Spain and reprimand Algeria for breaking its diplomatic connection with Spain. However, this move risks further infuriating Algiers, and the EU might tread this approach with extreme caution. Ultimately, given the refugee flows and associated security risks that Morocco is suspected of triggering, the possibility of the EU tilting toward Algeria appears to be nil.
As a matter of fact, when Spanish PM Pedro Sanchez and Moroccan King Mohammad VI shook hands in Rabat on 7 April 2022, speculations were rife over what both sides stood to gain or lose from this rapprochement. During that trip, Spain affirmed its acceptance of the Moroccan proposal of 2007 for an autonomous Western Sahara region under Moroccan sovereignty (Minder, 2022). The Spanish PM also described the plan as the most serious, realistic and credible way to resolve the dispute (TRT World, 2022). As per an article in the daily El Periódico de España, Spanish endorsement for Moroccan rights over Western Sahara is a barter for Morocco’s promise to drop its claims on Ceuta, Melilla enclaves and the Canary Islands (Lmrabet, 2022). However, it is also possible that Spanish action was prompted by US pressure or at least played an important part in recognizing Western Sahara as a Moroccan territory (Atti, 2022a).
Be as it may, this Spanish volte-face in North Africa, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, would further complicate the stability of the region. This issue of the gas blockade would continue to be the elephant in the room in any discussion regarding the future of Western Sahara. Despite allegations that it is a Russian ‘proxy’ state, Algeria has refrained from overtly backing Russia. Under these current geopolitical realities, the EU would probably try to mend its relations with Algeria while putting the Western Sahara problem aside for the future. However, given how high the stakes are for the EU, time is on Algeria’s side. Algeria, long considered the most distant and enigmatic country in North Africa, is suddenly the centre of attention. And the Algiers government under President Abdelmadjid Tebboune will not miss this opportunity to further its objectives over the Western Sahara issue.
Way Forward
It has been more than 45 years that there has been a simmering war over Western Sahara. Even today, the country finds itself in a unique position of being the last colony of Africa. UN rejected the Madrid Accord as the subject of transfer of sovereignty over the territory is carefully ignored, and no signatories have been bestowed with the administering power. Similarly, the ICJ does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Hence, as per international law, Spain remains the administering authority and it needs to end the decolonization by initiating a free referendum in order to respect the principle of self-determination by the locals (Guell, 2015).
Currently, 46 nations recognize SADR as an independent nation. MINURSO has been in operation since 1991, yet Sahrawi self-determination remains elusive and the monitoring of ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario remains underwhelming. It took two years to find a replacement since the departure of the last UN envoy to the region.
Currently, even though a solution based on the strict application of the self-determination right appears the most appropriate, it is unlikely to happen. Given that the proposal will be detrimental to Moroccan and European interests, France would possibly veto it in the UNSC. The absence of political institutions would make self-governance difficult for the locals, and they may plunge into a civil war similar to other newly created nations such as South Sudan. Besides, the internal stability of Algeria is highly questionable. In this situation, the only way to avoid the risk of instability is to maintain the status quo and thus refuse the Sahrawis their fundamental right to vote.
As many scholars, including Noam Chomsky, consider that a series of nonviolent protests in Western Sahara sparked the Arab Spring, it is essential that international communities, particularly the UN, recognize the agency and aspirations of the region’s indigenous people (DW, 2012). It is regrettable UN has failed the people of Western Sahara in providing the groundwork for self-determination and decolonization (DW, 2019a). Instead, a peace process proposed by Morocco is more likely now.
If that happens, this would give Morocco undue veto power over how the Sahrawi people exercise their internationally recognized rights. Unless the people of Sahrawis get to decide their future, whether it’s complete independence or autonomy as proposed by Morocco, this long-fought battle will amount to nothing. The final outcome of the Western Sahara conflict is extremely crucial to a few hundred thousand indigenous Sahrawis and their kin residing in southern Morocco, northern Mauritania and western Algeria. The dispute over Western Sahara is one of the world’s most underlooked conflicts. Finally, as the European and American interests seem to have intertwined in the conflict, this North African standoff is again back in the news. In any case, there are new churns in the sands of North Africa. As tensions rise, this might drive the long-stalled Western Sahara peace talks forward and determine the destiny of Africa’s last remaining colony.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
