Religion as ‘Prime Institution’ of International Society

Religion in International Relations

Religion was largely absent in the theories of IR until the very late 20th century. This absence of religion had three main reasons (cf. Fox, 2001; Petito & Hatzopoulos, 2003; Snyder, 2011): First, the widely held belief in modernization went hand-in-hand with the conviction that secularism would prevail, thus rendering religion as a social category irrelevant to academia. Second, IR is a traditionally state-centrist field of study with the international system that evolved from the Westphalian Peace at its core, symbolizing a clear break with religion as a source of identity, legitimation or power. Third, in its endeavor to become an established and respected scientific discipline, an effort the so-called great debates circled, religion would have added (yet another) discrediting dimension. However, by nature, IR is also a dynamic (and self-reflective) field of study and thus susceptible to change and innovation—from within the area but also in reaction to evolving international politics. Three developments are crucial in facilitating or even fostering the inclusion of religion in IR: the most recent ‘great debate’ within the discipline, the events surrounding 9/11; and the debate around (post-)secularism and the public sphere.

The first point refers to the discipline’s opening up to a broader spectrum of epistemological approaches, ⁴ while the second indicates a political happening that sparked public and academic interest and awareness of religion in society and politics. This ties in with the final development, namely the debate around (post-)secularism, pursued among others by Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor. The former, for example, examines how religion features in both private and public spheres (cf. Habermas, 2008), specifically considering how ‘religious consciousness’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 4) is changing and how both secular and religious citizens need to engage in ‘complementary learning processes’ (Habermas, 2006), particularly in liberal states. In a similar vein as Habermas, rather than positioning secularism and religiosity as diametric opposites, Taylor presents secularism as seeking three goods, which he classifies by borrowing the three terms from the French Revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity (cf. Taylor, 2008, p. 34). Taylor posits that secularism, at least in democracies, should entail ‘religious liberty’; equality between believers and non-believers; leading to all members of society having a voice or the possibility of (political) participation (cf. Taylor, 2008, p. 35). ⁵

In line with these developments, with the dawn of the 21st century, academics increasingly accepted that religiosity would not subside but rather would continue to take on new forms. In the past two decades, the debate on including religion in theories of IR can be said to have peaked, with some scholars arguing that a religious turn did indeed take place (cf. Kratochvíl, 2009; Kubálková, 2009; Thomas, 2016). Apart from Huntington’s (1997) Clash of Civilizations, promising attempts by Kubálková (2000, 2013), Laustsen and Wæver (2000), Dark (2000), Philpott (2000), Hasenclever and Rittberger (2000), Thomas (2001, 2005), Petito and Hatzopoulos (2003), Fox and Sandler (2004), Haynes (2009, 2011), Snyder (2011), Troy (2014) or Sandal and Fox (2013) in particular contributed to this endeavor. Fox and Sandler (2004, p. 29) summed up the main challenge of religion in IR theory in the following, ‘For an approach that sees the Westphalian international system as the creation of man, the divine is in trouble’. Based on their ontology, realist, liberal, but also constructivist approaches have difficulties conceptualizing religion—be it based on their state-centrism or in the latter case, based on the belief that reality is constructed by humans, not a divinity (cf. Fox & Sandler, 2004, pp. 29–30).

One proposal was to grasp religion as an institution or socially constructed edifice (Kubálková, 2000, p. 682). In her work on International Political Theology, Kubálková defines religion as ‘(…) a system of rules (mainly instruction-rules) and related practices, which act to (…) explain the meaning of existence including identity, ideas about self, and one’s position in the world, (…) thus motivating and guiding the behaviour of those who accept the validity of these rules on faith and who internalize them fully’ (Kubálková, 2000, p. 695). This definition is discussed later in the article. To sum up, IR theory—at least the main approaches rooted in the strictly secular Anglo-Saxon and European traditions—face the challenge of including that which they sought to exclude for so long, believing that state and religion—or science and religion for that matter—should be separated. This brief summary by no means implies that religion is not being included in IR research, particularly in empirical work (cf. Johnston & Sampson, 1995; Mavelli & Wilson, 2017; Shah et al., 2012). It does, however, underline that religion has not found a prominent or clearly defined place in IR theories.

Religion and the English School

As mentioned above, religion has and continues to feature in English School literature, though mostly not explicitly. A greater emphasis is instead placed on culture, identity, norms or the question of civilization (see e.g. Buzan, 2010, 2014; Dunne & Reus-Smit, 2017; Linsenmaier, 2018; Reus-Smit, 1999, 2018; Williams, 2011), which all serve as points of departure for the debate on religion. The English School is in a similar predicament as other IR theories, as Jackson observes, pointing out that ‘Westphalia removed religion from international politics…’ (2000, p. 166). He repeatedly underlines that the international society is a society of states, nevertheless, he concedes that (t)he important role of religion in our subject is not always recognized by contemporary international relations scholars (Jackson, 2000, p. 156). While mainly state-centric and often considered to be a via media between realism and idealism, ⁶ there are significant aspects that allow the English School to stand apart from other IR theories: For one, it not only looks at the Westphalian system but rather is characterized by the fact that it considers various types of past and present international systems and societies. As Little points out, ‘It is an oversimplification to suggest, therefore, that the English school is synonymous with the study of international society. Certainly, the English school has acknowledged the importance of rationalist ideas but this is not to the exclusion of realist and revolutionist ideas’ (Little, 2000, p. 398). He goes a step further and argues that there is an ‘ontological pluralism observed in the distinctions drawn between the anarchic international system, the rule-governed international society and the transnational world society’ (Little, 2000, p. 402), indicating that the English School has evolved substantially from its realist beginnings. ⁷

Second, while the main actors considered are state actors, the theoretical framework, as indicated above, is flexible enough to consider other forms or types of actors. What is more, there is the matter of institutions—both primary and secondary, which goes beyond what other theories take into account. Finally, to tie these points together, the English School boasts both an ontological as well as epistemological pluralism. This central issue is criticized by some and lauded by others. ⁸

In the following section, English School literature is reviewed to establish points of departure to include religion to better understand how international society has been evolving in recent times. While it is difficult to review what does not exist, the criterion for the texts reviewed was that they might have been expected to mention religion. For example, a work that includes chapters on ‘The Byzantine Oikoumene’ or ‘The Islamic System’ (Watson, 1992) or a book with the title ‘International Systems in World History’ (Buzan & Little, 2000) might be expected to have sections which expressly discuss religion—the former does not while the latter does. Admittedly, this is a vague criterion, and the selected material does not claim to provide a complete review of religion in all of English School literature. Rather, it seeks to provide a solid understanding of what role religion has assumed to then build upon this knowledge in the next section.

Early English School Work

‘Christian Pacifism’ (Wight, 1936), ‘Christianity and History’ (Butterfield, 1949), ‘Christianity, Diplomacy and War’ (Butterfield, 1953) are works by some of the most prominent founding scholars of the English School. Drawing on their own faith, looking at religion as a foundation of values, or a means of interpreting history, religion features prominently in these works. Butterfield understands religion—at least Christianity—‘as a religion of the spirit, other-worldly if you like, preaching charity and humility, trusting Providence and submitting to it, and setting its heart and its treasure in heaven’ (Butterfield, 1949, p. 169). According to his work on ‘Christianity, Diplomacy and War’, ‘The international order is destroyed because we cannot achieve genuine consent over the effective field of interrelated powers’ (Butterfield, 1953, p. 87). He places great emphasis on the idea of order, regarding the international system as similar to a social order which ‘by inhibition as well as prohibition, […] operates to restrain a predominant power’ (Butterfield, 1984, p. 201). Religion, in particular his own faith, thus features prominently in Butterfield’s works—both as a means of understanding human history—or destiny—as well as providing a moral compass. ⁹ A point of departure discussed later in this article how religion either emphasizes or helps overcome the destruction of the international order Butterfield identifies.

Martin Wight, who joined the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics thanks to Butterfield, was also a ‘devout Anglican’ (Thomas, 2001, p. 906). Thomas explains that Wight’s faith led him to more closely examine ‘the role of religious doctrines on ideas about war and peace, the impact of religious doctrine on national churches and national consciousness, the evolution of diplomatic practices in the states-systems of different civilizations, and the role of a common culture in different state-systems in history’ (Thomas, 2001, p. 925). A Christian pacifist himself, Wight was highly skeptical of the principle of just wars and critical—or even disillusioned—by the role of religion and in particular, the Christian church played in international politics. ‘The League of Nations is the common-sense solution of international anarchy, and it is the organization of the just-war doctrine; future historians will record the irony that one of the chief reasons for its failure to establish peace and justice was the Roman Catholic Church’s refusal to give it support’ (Wight, 1936, p. 19). He did, however, believe that religion could contribute positively to shaping international society. According to Wight, Hall (2015, p. 135) notes, ‘Christianity provided a unique—and uniquely good—foundation for an international society in the past, and might do again in the future.’ Hall (2006, 2015) and particularly Thomas (2001) extensively examine Wight’s take on religion—the latter in his article ‘Faith, history and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English school of International Relations’, it is not further elaborated on here. Unlike Butterfield and Wight, however, Carr was highly skeptical of religion. In ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis’, Carr briefly mentions religion and dismisses it, though arguably it would have fitted well into his discussion of realism and utopianism (1946; cf. Wilson, 2012).

Second-Generation English School Work

Hedley Bull, arguably one of the most prominent thinkers of this school, did not include religion in his works either, even going so far as stating, ‘I have often felt uneasy about the extent to which Wight’s view of IR derives from his religious beliefs during the second Martin Wight Lecture’ (Bull, 1976, p. 115). In contrast to the Christian pacifist, Bull thus had a very different approach to understanding and engaging with international politics. In ‘The Anarchical Society’ (Bull, 1977), Bull seeks to understand the ‘nature’ of order and presents alternatives to the current order. Throughout his book, Bull mentions neither Christianity nor religion in general. However, he looks at the role of ideologies in the chapter on ‘Alternatives to the Contemporary States System’. ¹⁰ One alternative he discusses here is that of a state’s system ‘marked by ideological homogeneity, as distinct from the ideological heterogeneity that prevails in the states system at present’ (Bull, 1977, p. 243). Examples of past and contemporary ideologies he lists are those of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation or of Communism and Anti-Communism, though he is critical of how such a homogeneity might be attained and how such an order would look in the long term. While advocates of political ideologies believe a homogenous state system would lead to a more peaceful order, Bull also points out that these are at the same time those who are calling for war (cf. Bull, 1977, pp. 243–244). As with Butterfield and Wight before him, Bull also grapples with the question of what they term division, disunity or heterogeneity, respectively, and which at its core raises the question of what society must be able to agree upon for it to endure or even exist.

To sum up Bull’s work in the context of religion, his considerations on alternative state systems serve as a point of departure discussed in part two of this article.

Though religion also does not feature prominently in Adam Watson’s works, he does mention it in several contexts. In his work on ‘Diplomacy’ (Watson, 1982), Watson pursues ideas very close to those by Bull presented above when he also underlines the lack of homogeneity of the current states system of the 1980s. He observes that not all states—but also includes ‘active political entity’ (Watson, 1982, p. 37)—pursue the same peaceful goals. ‘They may have revolutionary governments, or at least governments who consider it their duty to change the way in which other states are governed (e.g., to spread communism, or democracy, or a religion like Islam)’ (Watson, 1982, p. 37). In ‘The Evolution of International Society’ (Watson, 1992) Watson considers various types of society in which a ‘divine’ element appears, usually as a means of legitimizing rule or spreading civilization. He does not, however, address religion as such, thereby dismissing the possibility of elevating it to an explanatory factor. Yet Watson provides valuable points of departure for including religion in the analysis of past international systems and society, such as the Byzantine or Islamic systems mentioned above. Just as importantly, however, is his work on diplomacy. The role of religion in establishing institutions such as diplomacy is further discussed in the second section.

Contemporary English School Work

The end of the Cold War triggered several English School publications, which may have been expected to include religion as they look at international society after the collapse of the USSR. Halliday raised the question of the role of religion in his works, for example in ‘Rethinking International Relations’ (1994) or in ‘Islam and the Myth of confrontation’ (1995). In the former, religion only appears marginally, while in the latter, Halliday warns of essentializing Islam (cf. Halliday, 1995, p. 208) and is rather interested in shedding light on different understandings of Islam both from within as well as from outside the Middle East, thus seeking to dispel what he terms the myth ‘(…) of an “Islamic threat”’ (Halliday, 1995, p. 107). This book provides a helpful point of departure, as it provides ample historical insight into the role of one particular religion, thereby considering religion more than most ensuing English School works.

In Fawn and Larkins 1996 edited volume ‘International Society after the Cold War—Anarchy and Order Reconsidered’ Wæver is the only one to explicitly use the term religion when considering Bosnia-Herzegovina and the future developments in the region (Wæver, 1996, p. 239). Linklater’s ‘The Transformation of Political Community’ (1998) for example looks at the changes underway since the end of the Cold War. Once again, though, neither religion nor faith is mentioned in any general sense or as a point of discussion, however, he does observe and include two important considerations: Linklater identifies what is at the heart of the Stoic-Christian tradition, namely ensuring that ‘no individual or group interest is systematically excluded from moral consideration’ (Linklater, 1998, p. 57) as ‘the purpose of cosmopolitanism’ (Linklater, 1998). ‘The state-building project which aimed to secure national frontiers and to create highly protected and integrated national economies undermined earlier conceptions of Christian or European international society and precluded attempts to widen the moral and political boundaries of community’ (Linklater, 1998, p. 214). These two considerations indicate how the modern states system evolved away from religiously based values, guided more by securing boundaries, which now Cosmopolitanism again seeks to overcome. In a post-secular world, it is worth reconsidering how these values are being upheld and by whom.

This widened spectrum of analysis is further pursued and deepened by Buzan and Little in ‘International Systems in World History—Remaking the Study of International Relations’ (2000). Not only an essential work for (the redefining of) the English School, but equally for the discipline of IR as a whole, the volume clearly demonstrates how the English School has an approach to IR, which is by no means limited to the Westphalian states system. What is more, like some of the predecessors, they also do not limit their understanding of actors to state units. Buzan and Little examine how societies over tens of thousands of years came to be and continue to evolve. They consider kinship but also religions’ role, stating that ‘the main identity core of these civilizations [ancient and classical] was almost always a common religion. […] religions were a feature of international systems from the very beginning of civilization’ (Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 236). They identify a major achievement of what they term universal religions to be the ability to not only overcome deeply ingrained traditions, but also to transcend cultural or linguistic barriers, and that they have been able to span hundreds—even thousands—of years. They also consider how universal religions enable interaction to take place between societies, ‘religion can have a profound effect on regular transactions within and between societies because it becomes possible to draw on a culturally defined supernatural dimension to reinforce the import of a message communicated through more conventional channels’ (Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 203). Though they call them universal, they do not consider any of them to have constituted a world society. They also concede that ‘classifying any religion is problematic’ (Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 204), with Hinduism being a prominent example. Religion, therefore, does receive some attention, but it is kinship, among others, which they see as a factor that continues to have a shaping impact (Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 376). The fact that religion could have, but was not, explored in more depth in this volume and the one by Linklater (1998) was criticized for example by Thomas (2001) and Bethke Elshtain (1999) respectively.

In his 1999 chapter on ‘Religion and international society’, his 2001 article on Wight, and his 2005 publication ‘The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations’ Thomas considers the English School and the question of religion. He underlines that ‘(t)he kind of observations they [Wight and Butterfield] asked about culture, religion, and identity have now become some of the most important ones in the study of international relations’ (Thomas, 2005, p. 17). He points to the English School’s ‘complacency’ (Thomas, 2005, p. 152) despite the fact that ‘(t)he global expansion of international society, the incorporation of non-Western cultures and societies into a global international society, and global resurgence of religion have brought into prominence the role of religion and culture in international cooperation’ (Thomas, 2005, p. 155). Ultimately, Thomas proposes devising a ‘social theory of religion’ which would go beyond what either the English School or other IR theories have on offer, namely attempting to grasp religion with the concepts available to them (Thomas, 2005, p. 72). While Thomas demonstrates the prevalence of religion in international politics and the need to grasp it analytically and theoretically, Sandal and Fox examine various theories of IR and how they might include religion in their framework of analysis in their book on ‘Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities’. They argue that of all IR theories, the English School lends itself particularly well to including religion, based on its focus on ‘human rights, moral roots and implications of international interactions, intervention, international order, and justice’ (Sandal & Fox, 2013, pp. 118–119). They focus on the different worldviews religions offer and what this means for interaction in an international political context. What is more, they present how religion lends legitimacy in such a context, be it at the domestic or international level.

Some contemporary scholars, already mentioned above, revisit the question of faith and how it impacted for example early English School scholars’ work (cf. Hall, 2006, 2015; Jones, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Thomas, 2001). While other authors have focused on one religion in particular: ‘Islam in the International Order’ (Piscatori, 1984); ‘Islam and Europe’ (Roberson, 1998) or ‘Islam, the Middle East and the Pan-Islamic Movement’ (Hashmi, 2009). Reus-Smit’s 2018 publication on culture was listed in the introduction and is included here because he repeatedly includes religion in the discussion and many of his points, arguably, can be transferred to including religion in the English School framework. The debate between what he terms ‘culturalists’ believing in cultural unity as the foundation of the international order and ‘pluralists’ who posit that diversity among states is inevitable and international society is merely functional is a case in point.

The overview provided here reflects the highly heterogenous attitudes and approaches to including religion in English School thought, which reflect the ‘triangulation’ between the three traditions. Following up on Dunne (1998, p. xv) who stated that the English School’s ‘recognition that all theory is a normative theory, that forms of human association are changing, and that order without justice is ultimately unstable, are themes which contemporary critical international society theorists have taken up’, this article suggests that religion is an issue which potentially is linked to all points mentioned. While some (earlier) English School scholars may have decidedly excluded religion from their considerations, based on their more realist views or a more pluralist approach to the international system, the more the research turned towards international, transnational and world society, the more open scholars have been to including religion, culture or other foundations of society. ¹¹ With Linklater, Buzan and Little for example, the spectrum of analysis was widened in order to better understand how institutions were evolving and identities and interactions were being shaped. As Little observed, ‘The English school (…) is not only concerned about analysing the history of International Relations, it is also concerned about the moral implications of current and future developments in the international arena’ (Little, 2000, p. 414).

Rather than looking at only Christian foundations, but expanding the view as Buzan and Little do, the next step is to follow-up on previous English School ideas and concepts and consider religion as a—if not the—‘prime institution’ of international society, linking system with international and world society.

Religion as ‘Prime Institution’

For the sake of clarity and before proceeding, the term ‘religion’ in this context requires clarification. In the introduction religion was presented as institutionalized faith. Neither the field of sociology nor that of political science offers the one definition of religion. Kubálková’s (constructivist) definition, mentioned above, in full reads,

(…) a system of rules (mainly instruction-rules) and related practices, which act to (…) explain the meaning of existence including identity, ideas about self, and one’s position in the world, (…) thus motivating and guiding the behaviour of those who accept the validity of these rules on faith and who internalise them fully (2000, p. 695).

This definition is quite similar to the one provided by Durkheim in his work on ‘The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life’, ‘(a) religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them’ (Durkheim, 1915, p. 62). Finally, a third understanding of religion shall be presented here and followed-up on later. Gandhi referred to religion in the singular, positing that ‘(t)his religion transcends Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc. It does not supersede them. It harmonizes them and gives them reality’ (Gandhi, 1958, p. 59). To illustrate his understanding, he describes it as a tree, ‘(r)eligion is one tree with many branches. As branches, you may say, religions are many, but as tree, religion is only one’ (Gandhi, 1958, p. 63). In the context of religion and the English School, the tree here can be taken to represent the prime institution, which is discussed again in the context of the quilt model. What is more, this understanding of religion in the singular rather than the plural is adhered to in the article. The former two definitions point to the shared practices and beliefs which are institutionalized or, in other words, constitutive of the religion and thus a community, while the latter sees it as constitutive of humanity or world society. All three definitions allow religion to be grasped as both a pre- as well as a post-state institution, that is, it can exist independently of a state and is thus a pre-state formation; sometimes constituting the foundation of a (nation) state; it can exist beyond the state, but it can also take the place of a state once it has failed. This understanding of religion shall be employed as the basis of the following deliberations. ¹²

In English School thought primary institutions ‘are constitutive of both states and international society, in that they define not only the basic character of states but also their patterns of legitimate behaviour in relation to each other, as well as the criteria for membership of international society’ (Buzan, 2014a, p. 17). Buzan identifies and labels ‘sovereignty, territoriality, the balance of power, war, diplomacy, international law and great power management’ (Buzan, 2014a, p. 16) as the ‘classical “Westphalian” set’ (Buzan, 2014a), as they are understood to have constituted the society of nation states which was established by the Westphalian Peace. Such institutions are presented as being constitutive of states and the international society and the debate as to how they evolved was touched upon briefly above. If religion is understood as constituting communities or even political units and of providing the foundation of respective values or a moral compass of these communities or humanity as a whole (cf. Butterfield, 1953; Gandhi, 1958), removing religion from the equation of how primary institutions and thus international society/(-ies) evolved and continue to evolve, becomes nigh impossible—especially if one bears in mind that even today over 80 countries either have a state religion or officially support one or more religions.

Based on the fluid understanding of religion as an institution beyond but also constitutive of some states, religion can shape (classical) primary institutions by providing the moral foundations and guiding principles of interaction beyond the own community. War, international law or diplomacy are examples of such classical primary institutions that have evolved from, inter alia, religious foundations. Looking at past or present forms of international society it becomes clear that no international society was ever constituted of purely nation states or religious states. In other words, primary institutions are a constant process of states contesting, accepting, or introducing values and legitimate behaviour and religion can be found as a prime institution or additional layer to the formation of these international societies. Diplomacy, as just one example, has religious origins (cf. Black, 2010; Watson, 1982), was formally institutionalized as an international treaty among states in the shape of the Vienna Convention in 1961, and has continued to take on new forms such as faith-based diplomacy (cf. Thomas, 2005). More recent primary institutions that have evolved are nationalism, human rights, democracy or environmental stewardship (cf. Buzan, 2014a). For each of these, religion can be taken as a point of departure for analysis, considering for example a debate triggered by the concept of universal human rights or states agreeing on an Islamic Declaration of Human rights; or the question of the environment and human’s responsibility towards it.

Not only did religion contribute to shaping (some of) these institutions, it is the only type of institution capable of doing so. One might argue that the market—or trade—is an equally enduring institution, but it lacks the moral foundations religion can provide and while it might offer structure and guiding principles of behaviour, it is never a source of identity or constitutive of a community or society. The concept of a ‘prime’ institution shall therefore serve to better grasp how ‘a system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things’ (Durkheim, 1915, p. 62) not only constitutes a community—a religion—but at the same time contributes to shaping the primary institutions and therefore international society itself. The term prime in this context indicates that this type of institution exists before and independently of states and the international society.

Finally, an aspect that has not surfaced in English School literature regarding the common or divisive nature of religion and to what extent a common ‘culture’ is crucial for an international society to endure, is that of religiosity itself serving as a common identity. Religion is deliberately referred to here in the singular for two reasons: on one hand, it is discussed as a concept, at the same time, it is understood similarly to Gandhi’s understanding presented above. It can also be treated in the singular if one assumes that the trait of being religious can lead to an augmented understanding and thus cooperation among states. Empirically speaking, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) indicates how religion can lead to the formation of what the English School terms a secondary institution. The OIC, whose members are states either with Islam as official state religion or have designated Islam with a privileged status, could equally be considered as another international society, or what Buzan would term a sub-global or transnational society. This of course is an example of just one common religion. Inter-religious dialogue, especially when conducted or promoted by states, indicates that a form of institution has evolved which is based on the shared identity of being religious or at least valuing religion, regardless of the religion in question. While the beliefs, practices and ideas of position in the world may differ (possibly even compete), being religious in this case is the foundation for different means of identifying and agreeing upon common values and what is accepted as legitimate behaviour within international society and beyond. Inter-religious dialogue is not only pursued by states with an official state religion (Iran and the Holy See), it is also pursued by states that officially separate church and state (Germany or South Korea). Inter-religious dialogue can therefore be understood as an additional primary institution. Here, again, religion can be grasped as a prime institution, providing a common identity and added means of strengthening the international society.

To sum up, a prime institution, in this context, is understood as a layer (or, in Gandhi’s terms, the tree’s stem) that can provide the constitutive foundation for individual states or political units as well as for international societies as a whole. A prime institution can exist independently of this international society and political units can have this prime institution as its foundation without being a part of the international society (for example failed states or new forms of states that are not internationally recognized). In this particular case, religion can contribute to shaping new primary (and even secondary) institutions, what might be termed the ‘thread’ that holds together international society. Religion can also lead to the creation of new types of society, capable of bridging state and transnational realms. Ontologically speaking, therefore, this concept unites what was referred to above as a ‘pluralism of ontologies’ because the assumption is that all three elements, that is, system, international society and world society do not exist independently of one another, as the model below illustrates.

The ‘Quilt Model’ ¹³

Similar to what has become known as Watson’s pendulum/sphere model, the ‘quilt model’ also aims at better illustrating what is meant by a prime institution and spheres or layers of international society. ¹⁴ The top layer of a quilt is usually made up of individual segments of fabric that are unique in some way and conformable in many other ways. They are stitched together with thread to create a blanket and often have patterns. The middle layer, the filling, provides the overall quilt with sustenance. A quilt also has a bottom layer or what might be termed a foundation, which is connected to the top with further thread which often enforces the patterns visible at the top.

Each segment of fabric in the top layer represents a state within the international society of states. The thread that binds these states together and creates patterns can be grasped as the primary institutions. Several segments, that is, states, may resemble each other more than others or be positioned in a certain constellation and can represent regional or sub-global societies. As is the case in a quilt, patterns can arise when these individual shreds of cloth (states) resemble one another either in shape or colour. This resemblance reflects the similarity of states based for example upon their shared political systems, their history as empires or as colonized states, their acceptance of human rights, their ideologies, or—most importantly in this context—their religions. They are all sewn together by thread which represents the primary institutions they have agreed upon and practice, as for example, their membership in the United Nations indicates. ¹⁵ How states became members of international society and agreed to adopt and contribute to upholding it can vary, usually depending on common historical experiences (e.g., colonialism) and political developments (e.g., democratization). The stitches are especially tight among those states that are strongly integrated in the international society as a whole and this might be due to their strong identification with the primary institutions (e.g., democracies that proactively pursue the protection of human rights).

The middle layer represents what Buzan would term transnational societies (cf. Buzan, 2004, pp. 126–127), that is, there might be threads (institutions) running along this layer in addition to the top layer of international society that connects states beyond their borders. This middle layer additionally strengthens the integration of (states) in international society (top layer) due to an increased identification with other members based on share values and beliefs. Examples of such transnational, international society-enforcing ‘threads’ or foundations for identification can be found in the realms of inter alia culture, environment protection, business, ideology and religion (cf. McLarren & Stahl, 2021; Tedeschi et al., 2020). In other words, if states not only share the common denominator of seeking to overcome anarchy and maintaining peace by forming an international society, but share a common history or political system, this will strengthen their acceptance of the international society and thus the society itself. If, in addition, these states are shaped or at least influenced by a common transnational identity, such as believing in universal human rights or fighting for climate change, this conviction (thickness of the thread) will augment how firmly established they are in the top layer. This transnational layer can also lead to societies being formed within international society, as a proposed union of democratic states or the Islamic Organization of Cooperation illustrate.

In this model, the bottom—foundational—layer stands for religion as prime institution. Unlike a well-crafted quilt, the foundational layer in this case is not evenly connected to the top layer and its size may not match that of the top layer. There are different types of segments: Some of the segments will be sewn on very tightly to the bottom layer, while other states are not connected to the bottom layer at all. In other words, some states have religion as a foundation and this basis can but does not have to greatly influence how they are positioned in the international society—it can both strengthen as well as weaken their belonging (e.g. Iran, Israel, Greece, UK). Another type of states, though not necessarily based on religion, may have a religious past or engage with religion (India being a case in point). There are also states who actively seek to minimize the influence of religion in the international society and would seek to sever ties to the prime institution completely (e.g., China, Cuba, North Korea). Finally, there are those segments (perhaps better conceived of as shreds in some cases) strongly attached to the bottom layer, but not included in the top layer, either because they have come loose (e.g., the Islamic State) or they hope to be added (e.g. as was the case with South Sudan before being internationally recognized).

This quilt model not only offers a status quo image of international society, the proximity of the layers and the shape and constellation of the segments and thread can vary over the course of history. During the Cold War, for example, the segments in the top layer would have been arranged very differently compared to now and large parts of the bottom layer would have been completely disconnected from the top. The US proclaiming its solidarity with the Afghan people under Reagan (Reagan, 1982) based on the common identity of being religious, which needed to be defended against the anti-religious Soviet regime is one empirical example of this bottom layer surfacing in manifold ways. The bottom layer, that is, religion as prime institution, would continue to exist even if the top layer were to dissolve. The top layer could also continue to exist without the bottom layer, however, the ties between the states would have to be strong enough to endure the loss of the foundation. Based on this image, religion arguably lends the international system a certain dynamic as it can strengthen individual segments, provide new institutions and sources of identity. ¹⁶