Abstract
That tolerance contributes to good character is not a foregone conclusion, according to Bowlin’s assessment of literature around the concept. In fact, much of his argument is a response to tolerance’s detractors, among philosophers and in popular discourse. Some of the opposition to tolerance, he argues, is rooted in a denial of the unavoidable realities of pluralism and impatience with the difference and disagreement that are inevitable and intractable social experiences. Some critics, however, resist the celebration of tolerance because they view it as an unstable and therefore dangerous practice. They argue that it is nearly impossible to maintain a state of tolerance without eventually losing the balance between objection and restraint. In some cases that balance will be resolved in the direction of coercion, but opponents of tolerance argue that it is just as likely and equally problematic that tolerance eventually leads to an erosion of the convictions that prompt objection in the first place. In other words, the longer I tolerate something, the more likely I grow indifferent to it, or actively accept it as a new norm. Thus, critics of tolerance argue that we should regard tolerance as morally corrosive, for it trains us to dilute our commitment to our norms.
Bowlin argues, however, that the apparent instability in tolerance is simply its challenge, to find and maintain the balance between objection and restraint. The difficulty of maintaining this balance is what makes the life of virtue challenging, but to hold the temptation to resolution as unavoidable is to confuse the virtue with its imperfect exercise. And even if what passes as tolerance is often the imperfect attempt to practice it, Bowlin reminds us that the ideal still serves us. Tolerance gives voice to our collective commitment to a peaceful society, respect for the rights of others, and the common good, while also laying bare the realities of difference in which we reside. In this way, the ideal of the virtue motivates our practice and reminds us why we need it.
Critics also complain that tolerance cannot be a virtue because virtues are practices that orient us toward the good, and liberal society has no common conception of the good to which to point us. A fundamental feature of liberalism is that it defines stability in a pluralistic society by avoiding the adoption of any one worldview, choosing instead an ideological cease-fire with no appeal to unifying interpretations of the good. But without a shared sense of the good, there is no compelling explanation for why we should consider tolerance an inherently valuable character trait. At best, tolerance serves as a compromise condition that keeps competing perspectives from declaring war on one another. Understood this way, tolerance is not the practice of virtue but of utilitarian self-restraint, which collapses when its usefulness becomes unconvincing. In the meantime, the practice of pragmatic self-restraint encourages resentment among people who feel compelled to curb their convictions.
But Bowlin pushes back on the assumption that lies beneath this insistence that tolerance is incompatible with virtue-language, namely that tolerance is a product of modern liberalism. His extended use of Thomas’s moral theology is part of a broader insistence that tolerance enjoys deeper historical roots than the advent of modernity. Specifically, he argues that tolerance does not depend on liberalism’s agnosticism on the good. Instead, tolerance as virtue presupposes and contributes to a society’s shared vision of the common good. He also argues that tolerance as virtue is a practice with inherent, and not just instrumental value, in contrast to the depiction of tolerance as a simple ideological cease-fire.
Bowlin’s book superbly marshals the power of the Thomistic virtue tradition to make a compelling argument for locating tolerance among the virtues. He makes clear how ends, intentions, and circumstances significantly shape the definition and practice of character, and he illustrates how each of these ingredients contributes to the contours of this particular virtue. His critical assessment of the philosophical literature on tolerance (as well as popular uses of the term) is also quite useful. Finally, I appreciated his exploration of the relationship between tolerance and its less-studied theological cousin, forbearance.
At the same time, both the conceptual seriousness and the theological connection also mark shortcomings to the book. Bowlin’s treatment is solely dependent on a Thomistic conception of virtue. While he notes the contributions of other philosophical and theological lineages to our idea of tolerance, he seldom departs from Thomas to take advantage of them, and insisting on this vocabulary shapes how he describes and resolves certain problems. In particular it forces his hand when he discusses the relationship between political tolerance and Christian forbearance. Weighed down by classical ideas of ends and objects, he exaggerates the conceptual distinction between tolerance in political community (which is rooted in justice and duty) and forbearance in ecclesial community (which is rooted in Spirit-infused charity). Some emancipation from Thomas’s hierarchy of natural and theological virtues may have permitted him to understand the relationship between tolerance and forbearance differently.
Bowlin further distinguishes political tolerance and theological forbearance by insisting that forbearance requires an active expectation of the resolution of difference (rooted in the theological hope for reconciliation), while tolerance commends restraint in the face of disagreement that we admit may never be resolved. Here, too, Bowlin exaggerates the necessary difference between the two virtues. Could a theology of forbearance be motivated by Christian hope in reconciliation while not expecting the resolution of real differences any time soon? I think so, but if the hope for resolution of difference does not distinguish forbearance from tolerance, then perhaps the two virtues are again closer cousins than his Thomistic framework allows. As Bowlin seems to be willing to imagine toward the end of his book, forbearance and tolerance could be conceived as norms that are featured in different communities (ecclesial versus political) and are animated by distinct moral motivations (human flourishing versus Christian faithfulness), and yet still operate quite similarly as habitual practices that maintain community in the face of difference. To accent their similarities invites us to imagine how a commitment to Christian forbearance might inform the cultivation of political tolerance, and vice versa.
Given the culture of divisiveness in which we now live, Bowlin’s careful explication of tolerance as virtue is an important contribution to theological, philosophical, and popular discourse. Many readers, even with substantial theological literacy, may struggle with the philosophical nature of this text. While well written, the argument is highly conceptual and not a casual read. But if you want to think seriously and with nuance about an important political and social ideal—tolerance, its proper functioning, its limitations, and its correlatives with Christian ethics—then this book is worth the investment of energy. Church and society routinely misunderstand (and reject) tolerance as abdication of conviction, antithetical to justice, or conceptually dependent on a liberal mindset that many find problematic. As a response, Bowlin’s apology for tolerance is powerful and necessary.