Abstract

Few passages in the Bible appear more self-serving for a preacher than this one. Not only is Paul defending his ministry against ecclesial detractors, he is defending his “right” to be fairly compensated for his labors. One preacher might be inclined to preach this passage before the session or personnel committee considers whether to give him or her a raise. This, of course, is not a great idea. Another preacher might choose to mimic Paul’s (false?) modesty, eschewing material compensation for their labors in ministry. Either approach creates irreconcilable problems for the preacher and lands far afield from the daily concerns of congregants and parishioners. There are more fruitful paths for this difficult text.
Paul’s argument unfolds in three overlapping moves. Move 1 (vv. 8–12a) provides a theological justification for his argument in the verses immediately preceding this pericope. From the opening of ch. 9 to our present text, Paul is defending his right to remuneration through appeals to common practice and common sense: workers deserve to be paid for their work. Move 2 (vv. 12b–14) provides further warrant for his compensation, while noting that Paul has not claimed his right for fear of obstructing the Corinthians’ view of the gospel. Move 3 (vv. 15–18) reiterates Paul’s selflessness in proclaiming the gospel freely. This is a mark of his apostolic commission, which he receives from God and not to earn praise or money from his hearers.
Despite its cogency on a cursory read, closer scrutiny of this pericope positions the interpreter over a logical abyss. Paul engages in fallacious reasoning at key points in his argument. This forces interpreters to engage in all kinds of exegetical gymnastics to make sense of Paul’s tortuous logic—especially with regard to the Greek text, the complexities of which are muted in English translations. These two fallacies are faulty syllogism and equivocation.
Paul cites the law of Moses to substantiate his claim—nay, his right—to material compensation for his spiritual labors. This citation is analogical. Paul is like an ox who deserves to eat while he is bearing the burden of labor. In terms of logic, the form of Paul’s argument looks like this:
No ox should be muzzled while laboring (Deut 25:4). Paul is laboring. Therefore, Paul should not be muzzled.
Logicians categorize such a formal syllogistic fallacy as The Four Term Fallacy, wherein the argument is invalid based on ambiguity in one of the terms used in the premise. Here the ambiguity lies in the condition of the one who is laboring. Sure, both Paul and oxen labor in their respective contexts. Sure, God cares for the ox treading out the grain, just as God cares for Paul who is ministering in Corinth. Paul’s argument is invalid, however, due to a qualitative difference between the conditions of his labor from that of the ox.
The digestive system of ruminants such as oxen requires them to eat on a regular basis to maintain their energy for the hard work of threshing grain. If it is muzzled, its capacity to work will be severely diminished. But Paul does not face such digestive concerns. And the work of proclaiming the gospel is altogether different from the work of threshing. Lastly, Paul has alternative means to provide for his material needs that oxen do not, which he mentions elsewhere (1 Cor 4:12; 2 Cor 11:9; Phil 4:15). All this means that Paul’s “right” to pay is incommensurate to the ox’s “right” to feed.
A second logical tension emerges in the equivocation of rights and rewards. In v. 12 Paul asserts his “rightful claim” (exousia—also, “authority” or “power”) to receive material compensation for his spiritual work among the Corinthians. In vv. 17–18 Paul’s terminology shifts from rights to rewards. The Greek word the NRSV translators render as “reward” is misthos. The English connotations of a reward can be misleading, as the Greek word denotes a recompense. From its earliest use, misthos signifies wages owed for work performed. 1
We should not be surprised when Paul subverts our worldly understandings of authority and rewards. The church in Corinth was just as complex as most of our contemporary ecclesial contexts. The tensions between the care of souls and the care of bodies, between the spiritual and economic spheres, were no less problematic for the Corinthian Christians than they are in our congregations. Preachers do well not to ignore or dismiss the text’s logical tensions but to embrace them, as they are part of the paradoxical and countercultural logic of the epistle at large. Paul’s alternative logic pervades 1 Corinthians. Wisdom is folly and folly is wisdom, weakness is strength and strength is weakness, honor is shameful and shame is honorific. Embracing these tensions opens up the text for proclamation today.
The body politic always abides in the tension between the spiritual and the material. Pastors and parishioners inhabit a space of friction between what we believe to be our “rights” and our corporate calling to care for our fellow human and non-human animals. How you choose to preach into this text’s tensions will depend on your congregational ethos. Begin by considering the socioeconomic disparity among your congregants. Depending on whether the congregation is relatively homogenous in terms of class or whether there is great income disparity, you will want to adjust your sermon to account for this. Preachers should also think about the relative wealth of congregants in comparison to the community at large.
Consider next the context of Paul’s questionable proof-text from the Pentateuch. In all fairness, the redactor of Deuteronomy 25 doesn’t offer much context to aid Paul’s hermeneutical labors. This verse Paul cites from Deut 25:4 is sandwiched between a passage about the proper protocol for flogging a fellow Israelite (vv. 1–3) and the rules for levirate matrimonial responsibilities (vv. 7–10). When we regard these pericopes thematically, the reference to oxen, muzzles, and threshing is a total non sequitur. If, however, we consider these pericopes with regard to forces of power and privilege, vs. 4 seems much more relevant.
The laws around flogging the guilty stand out from the laws of Israel’s ancient Near Eastern neighbors by its admonition to protect the human dignity of the guilty party. Deuteronomy 25:3 reads, “Forty lashes may be given but not more; if more lashes than these are given, your neighbor will be degraded in your sight.” Deuteronomy 25:5–10 stipulates provision for the rights of the deceased. Even if a side benefit of levirate marriage is the economic protection it offers widows, the focus of these verses is less about care for widows than patrilineal continuation following a husband’s demise—”so that his name may not be blotted out of Israel” (v. 6). These verses establish a communitarian ethic, where honor and care for the vulnerable are of paramount importance.
In each of these three pericopes, the law delimits the rights of those with power to preserve the rights of the powerless (the one without power following a guilty verdict; the other without power following death). Deuteronomy 25 is not about protecting the rights of those who already have power. It is about restricting the power of the powerful in order to provide care for the those whose dignity and honor are in jeopardy. This resonates thematically with Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 9. Dale Martin explains,
Paul has been willing to do what the strong have heretofore resisted: he has not made use of his right but has “endured” everything…. Paul calls not the weak but the strong to do this. The term exousia refers to a social prerogative and is directly related to freedom, high status, and power. Low-status persons, the weak, by definition have no exousia to surrender. Telling the weak to give up exousia is like telling a slave to give us his or her eleutheria, “freedom.”
2
In our contemporary contexts, saturated as they are by capitalist ideologies, the care and dignity of our neighbors tend to be subordinated to market values. In America especially, the nuance is not between rights and rewards but between power and powerlessness. Just because Louisville police officers had the authority to execute a “no-knock” warrant, this did not give them the right to shoot Breonna Taylor seven times and leave her to bleed out in her own hallway without medical attention. Just because some Americans have the right to refrain from wearing a mask amid a global pandemic that has produced hundreds of thousands of deaths, this right cannot trump our responsibility to care for the most vulnerable members of our society. Just because certain state governments have the authority to purge voter rosters, this does not give them the right to restrict access to the polls for who those who wield less power in our political system.
Preaching this passage requires less attention to quantitative remuneration for spiritual labor than to qualitative concern for the material health of the whole community. It calls not only preachers to temper their authority out of concern for those with less power, it calls all Christ-followers with power to yield that power when it jeopardizes the health and dignity of the powerless. It calls us to think less about what the powerful are owed by others than what they/we owe others with less economic, political, and racial privilege.
Footnotes
1
Cf. Aristotle, Economics 1344b: “If they are made to work, and are chastised, but stinted of their food, such treatment is oppressive, and saps their strength. The remaining alternative, therefore, is to give them work, and a sufficiency of food. Unless we pay men, we cannot control them; and food is a slave’s pay [misthos].”
2
Dale B. Martin, Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 120–1.
