Abstract
God and the Problem of Evil explores Classical and contemporary approaches to explain how evil can be ‘permitted’ in a world created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent deity. The logical part of the problem of evil was outlined by Epicurus (341–270 BCE) as follows: ‘Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil, in the world?’ (p. 4). An atheist may follow this by asking—‘if God exists, then evil should not exist,’ but ‘evil exists,’ therefore it holds that ‘God does not exist’ (p. 4). Herein lies the initial dilemma for theists, to overcome a seeming logical contradiction in their beliefs.
Chad Meister, who has written extensively on the problem of evil, and James K Dew, begin by asking the more fundamental question ‘what is evil?’ Evil is characterized in two ways: moral evil and natural evil. While God’s ‘gift’ of free will may be held to account for moral evils, we still might wonder about natural evils (earthquakes, etc.). For instance, in the evidential problem of evil against the existence of God (cf. William Rowe), the case of the gratuitous suffering of a fawn burned by a forest fire caused by lightning is perplexing. What greater good could possibly come from such an event? The above frameworks, i.e., moral evil, natural evil, the logical problem, and the evidential problem, shape the content of the book.
The book has two parts. Part one gives ‘Five Perspectives on the Problem of Evil,’ while the second part provides ‘Responses’ from each of the authors to the other four authors’ arguments. The second part provides insights into the strengths and limitations of each perspective, forcing the reader to think again. The chronology of the chapters is well thought through; the book begins with the Classical view, then proceeds to contemporary approaches which include: a logical defence, two theodicies, and finally, ‘epistemic humility.’
The first paper, ‘A Classic View’ by Phillip Cary, draws on the thought of Plotinus, Augustine, and Aquinas. For Cary, and indeed for many of the other contributors, the problem of evil has to be ultimately understood eschatologically. Between ‘a “now”, when evils are in a very narrow sense justified, and a “not-yet”, when evils are overcome […]’ (p. 132). He explains how malum (evil/ bad) relates to corruptio in the Augustinian tradition. God cannot cause corruption as ‘corruption is not a form of being but is always a failure to be something’ (p. 15). This is the idea that evil is a privation of the Good. Because created beings come into being, they can cease to be, so vulnerability to corruption, and nonbeing may be concomitant with being contingent beings (p. 20). The first sin is seen by Augustine as the corruption of the will, as the fallen angels chose evil by choosing themselves, not God (p. 25). Cary provides a succinct, yet comprehensive, overview of the Classical account, which grounds, informs, and contextualizes the modern debates.
William Lane Craig, in ‘The Molinist View,’ utilizes Luis de Molina’s theory of providence in order to bulwark other approaches to the problem of evil. Molina’s position is that ‘logically prior to his decree to create the world, God possesses not only knowledge of everything that free creatures could do (natural knowledge) but also of everything that they would do in any appropriately specified set of circumstances (middle knowledge)’ (p. 37). God also knows what is the full range of possible worlds. According to Lane Craig, ‘a God endowed with middle knowledge can have morally sufficient reasons for permitting events that far transcend the foresight of any temporally bound person not so endowed’ (emphasis added, p. 45). Wykstra in his response is not convinced regarding Molinism, and outlines some problems with possible worlds: for instance, could God have knowledge of creatures in worlds such as Never-Never land; of Peter Pan and Wendy’s possible choices, etc. (p. 179)?
William Hasker, in ‘An Open Theist View,’ explains that ‘Open Theism’ takes a ‘robust realism concerning the character and activities of God attested [to] in the Bible’ (p. 59), but not a ‘wooden literalism’ given figurative elements of Biblical literature (p. 59). Open Theists reject the idea of God as ‘Pure Act,’ but they hold that God is ‘absolutely perfect in power, wisdom, and love’ (p. 60). God is unchangeable in his nature, but undergoes changes of state, including God’s affective states; he rejoices, and is sorrowful. God has dynamic omniscience. Open Theists hold that much of the future is known, but not all, so when God creates creatures with free choice, he cannot be sure of the overall outcomes (moral evil, p. 60). For Open Theists, natural evil arises due to the world emerging through evolutionary processes, and the world has a lot of autonomy in its functioning (p. 69). Open Theism would require a move away from the interpretation of the attributes of God as traditionally understood.
Thomas Jay Oord in ‘An Essential Kenosis View’ boldly offers a ‘solution’ to the problem of evil. It is a five-part solution, but here he concentrates on the Sovereignty dimension. He contends that for God to prevent evil occurring to an innocent victim (e.g. murder) he would have to deny himself. But God cannot do this, ‘for his nature is self-giving, others-empowering love, and this love is necessarily uncontrolling’ (p. 84). This self-giving is related to ‘essential-kenosis.’ In response, some contributors highlight that Oord gives us a completely feeble/Deist god. As Cary states, does Oord let God off the hook? If he can’t rescue someone, how then can God redeem the world (p. 133)?
Finally Stephen Wykstra, in ‘A Skeptical Theist view,’ perhaps better understood as ‘epistemic humility’ (p. 119), holds that if the God of theism exists, we humans should not expect to see or grasp much of God’s purposes, including the divine actions of allowing or even causing events that bring much horrific suffering (pp. 99–100). Wykstra points out that although William Rowe argues in his evidential argument against the existence of a good God, that in most cases while we can see no (C-No) greater good for an all-powerful, all good God to allow such events to occur, it is not the case that there be no (B-No) greater good. Even if Rowe comes to the conclusion that there probably B-No greater good, appealing to the principle of credulity, it still does not mean that there B-No greater good (p. 107). As Wykstra notes, ‘If […] God does exist, what our minds see and grasp and purpose in evaluating events in our universe will be vastly less than what this being’s mind sees and grasps and purposes’ (p. 109). On the other hand, it does not necessarily mean that Rowe is wrong, although he overstretches the logic of his argument, while Wykstra might be accused of leading us too far back into mystery.
Meister and Dew provide a valuable collection of articles on the problem of evil. Some of the perspectives found above would require shifts from a traditional Christian understanding of the Divine, especially given Open Theism’s altering of omniscience, while essential-kenosis may well mean a move towards Deism. For the theist, the eschatological expectant hope provides an ontological framework wherein the problem of evil can ultimately be resolved. For the atheist, the problem would appear to vanish as a brute fact of the world of chance in which we find ourselves. This edited volume, with its responses section, will be very useful for students of theology and philosophy of religion, and indeed a wider readership interested in questions surrounding the problem of evil.