Beyond Power Struggles: A Multilevel Perspective on Incongruences at the Interface of Practice,Knowledge,and Identity in Radical Organizational Change

Abstract

Previous approaches to describing challenges inherent in radical organizational change have mainly focused on power struggles. A complementary but less researched view proposes that many problems occur because radical change causes certain incongruences within an organization. In line with the latter perspective, this article suggests that radical change leads to incongruences between “what they do” (practice), “what they know” (knowledge), and “who they are” (identity) as an organization; to achieve the change, these incongruences need to be accommodated by the organization’s individual members. The article takes a multilevel perspective and describes how in radical change organizational goals may interfere with individual characteristics at the intersections of practice, knowledge, and identity. This enables a fine-grained analysis of reasons why radical change efforts may fail, beyond power struggles. The model is concrete enough to help change managers foresee many practical problems, such as member disidentification, routine breakdowns, or knowledge gaps.

Keywords

radical change systemic perspective multilevel perspective incongruence change management

Introduction

Organizational change, especially radical change, poses high demands on managers. Even if the magnitude of failure rates in change initiatives is not as high as 70% as sometimes claimed in the literature (for a review, see Burnes, 2011), there is still consensus that it is one of “the greatest of management challenges” (Todd, 1999, p. 238). But what makes radical change so hard to achieve? Radical change means the “qualitative alteration of an organization’s rules of organizing” (Huy, 2002, p. 31), and the “busting loose from an existing ‘orientation’” (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996, p. 1024). In contrast with continuous change, radical change (also referred to as “episodic” change) is disruptive and revolutionary in nature (Weick & Quinn, 1999), and involves “a transformation of an organization between two points in time” (Barnett & Carroll, 1995, p. 219). By definition, radical change is manifested through the replacement of old goals, structures, and processes with new ones (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004; Todd, 1999; Weick & Quinn, 1999); radical change thus involves a break between an “old” state (i.e., the status quo) and a “new” state (i.e., the status after the change). It is widely acknowledged that this break between an old and a new state in radical change causes inherent tensions that can hardly be avoided.

Lewin (1947) theorized that radical change disturbs the equilibrium of power in a social system; such shifts in power would trigger counterreactions and attempts to preserve the status quo. Since the time of Lewin, research into organizational change has flourished. Many of the subsequent studies have looked into systemic mechanisms of power and resistance to further explain challenges inherent in radical change (Buchanan et al., 2005; Gaertner, 1989; Goltz & Hietapelto, 2003; Oreg, 2006). The present article provides a complementary perspective: Building on ideas from earlier work by Nadler (1993, see also Nadler, 1981) and Nag, Corley, and Gioia (2007), it suggests that many problems in radical organizational change can be traced back to emerging incongruences within an organization. More concretely, it follows Nag et al.’s view that incongruences may arise between an organization’s practices, knowledge, and identity. Nag et al. (2007) have shown that these incongruences may cause power struggles; the present article suggests that, beyond power struggles, incongruences of practice, knowledge, and identity may have many other negative consequences, such as routine breakdowns, knowledge gaps, or the disidentification of individual staff members.

The core argument underlying this article is that many of the problems in radical change arise because emerging incongruences between practice, knowledge, and identity on the organizational level need to be accommodated by the organization’s individual members. For example, a transformation from a low-tech manufacturer to a high-tech producer through increased automatization (organizational practice) may require shifts in individual practices, and cause identity conflicts for the former craftsmen. Or tapping into new markets (organizational identity) may require the sales team to communicate with the new customers in different languages, or via different media than before. This argument implies a multilevel perspective: It is assumed that organizational-level practices and routines are based on individual-level activities and habits (Feldman & Pentland, 2003); similarly, organizational knowledge is continuously cocreated anew by recombining the organizations’ members’ individual knowledge (Kump, Moskaliuk, Cress, & Kimmerle, 2015); finally, organizational identity is built on the identities of the organization’s members (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013).

The aim of this article is to develop a multilevel model of the interrelations between individual and collective practice, knowledge, and identity within organizations. This model allows explaining how an organization’s practice, knowledge, and identity get out of sync in radical change, and what tensions may arise—both, for the organization and its members.

The main contribution of this conceptual study is a systematic analysis of potential incongruences at the interfaces of practice, knowledge, and identity due to radical change, and consequences of these incongruences from an organizational and an individual perspective. The present analysis extends previous work, including Nadler’s (1981, 1993) and Nag et al.’s (2007) research, in three ways: Through adding a multilevel perspective, it (a) shows how organizational interests may interfere with individual characteristics in radical change. Thereby, it (b) enables a fine-grained analysis of reasons why radical change efforts may fail, beyond power struggles. The model is (c) concrete enough to serve change managers as a tool to make predictions of practical problems for a change at hand. Even if it may not be possible to fully avoid these problems, change managers may foresee them and take according measures to cope with the consequences instead of being caught unaware.

This article is organized as follows. First, I will briefly review existing systemic views on challenges in radical change. Then, I will develop a multilevel perspective of the concepts of organizational practice, knowledge, and identity, and their interrelations. In the main body, I will systematically walk through the potential incongruences that may occur at the interfaces, and synthesize findings from previous research to detail possible individual and collective consequences of these incongruences. In the discussion section, I will describe how this alternative incongruence perspective on radical change complements existing theoretical views, before I conclude with concrete suggestions as to how change managers may make use of the presented model.

Systemic Challenges Inherent in Radical Organizational Change

Since Lewin’s (1947) work radical change has been extensively researched from multiple angles. For example, many scholars have focused on individual reactions to radical change (for reviews, see Choi, 2011; Oreg Vakola, & Armenakis, 2011). Another stream of researchers has developed change implementation strategies to avoid or reduce the problems that may occur: For instance, in their review of the change management literature, Al-Haddad and Kotnour (2015) found a number of popular practitioner-oriented change management methods, including Judson’s (1991), Kanter, Stein, and Jick’s (1992), Kotter’s (1995), Luecke’s (2003), and Hamel’s (2000) approaches. Even if they differ in their details, especially regarding the number of steps, all these implementation strategies can be traced back to Lewin’s (1947) theorizing.

Today, Lewin’s (1947) article is mainly remembered for his proposition that radical change in a social system takes place in a sequence of unfreezing, moving, and refreezing. But Lewin provided much more than a mere “recipe” for change managers: He detailed (and mathematically formalized) the mechanisms at play in a radical change situation. Thereby, Lewin (1947, p. 10) argued that observable problems should be viewed as mere “symptoms” that are “surface” indications of some “deeper-lying” facts. From this Lewinian perspective, both, typical individual responses and typical challenges of change implementation may be seen as symptoms that surface due to certain typical underlying dynamics; that is, systemic challenges inherent in radical change. While a vast amount of research exists in the former two fields (individual responses and change implementation), models of inherent systemic challenges in radical change are sparse. The existing ones fall into two categories, such with a primary focus on shifts in power and such with a focus on incongruence.

Inherent Challenges Due to Shifts in Power

According to Lewin’s (1947) theorizing, social systems are usually in quasistationary states, where different forces mutually balance each other. Changes of the social system necessarily break the equilibrium of forces—which causes countermovements and other reactions by the actors in a social system. In other words, Lewin himself traced back surface symptoms in social change situations to disturbed equilibria of power in social fields. His unfreeze-move-refreeze sequence reflects the idea that such a disturbance of equilibria is necessary to achieve radical change. Consequently, according to this perspective, changes in the power of opposing forces are inherent in radical change.

Some researchers picked up Lewin’s (1947) systemic hypothesis that radical change leads to a shift in power within a social system, and investigated the effects of power struggles on the success of organizational change endeavors (Buchanan et al., 2005; Gaertner, 1989; Goltz & Hietapelto, 2003; Oreg, 2006). For example, Buchanan et al. (2005) suggested that the content of a change, the change substance “can threaten to upset the balance of power between stakeholders, triggering political behavior to shift that balance in favour of particular groups” (p. 202). In fact, modifications in the allocation of decision-making power, especially threats to power, have found to be among the main sources of deterrence to change (e.g., Gaertner, 1989; Goltz & Hietapelto, 2003; Oreg, 2006).

This power perspective is widely accepted in change management theory and practice: All change implementation techniques mentioned above include more or less explicit recommendations as to how to select powerful change agents and establish powerful coalitions (e.g., Kotter, 1995). Buchanan and Badham (2008) have even dedicated a whole practitioner-oriented book to the question of how to “win the turf game” in the course of an organizational change.

Inherent Challenges Due to Incongruences

A complementary but less popular perspective on challenges inherent in radical change is an “incongruence” view. Nadler (1993, see also Nadler, 1981) described organizations as systems that are composed of independent parts, tasks, individuals, organizational arrangements, and informal organization. According to this perspective, each pair has a relative degree of congruence: For example, characteristics of individuals (e.g., skills, interests) have better or worse fit with organizational tasks demands; or tasks may be more or less in line with organizational arrangements, such as standardized processes. The basic assumption underlying Nadler’s (1993) approach to change is that “organizations will be most effective when their major components are congruent with each other” (1993, p. 88, italics in original); problems surface when there is poor fit, or lack of congruence, among the four components. Nadler (1993) analytically derived three basic problems inherent in radical change: (a) a natural resistance of individuals, (b) a decrease of managerial control during and after the time of transition, and (c) political dynamics trying to maintain the “old” state. While Nadler developed according implications for effective change management (change must be motivated, the transition must be managed, and political dynamics must be shaped such that they are supportive to the change endeavor), he did not detail the concrete problems that may arise at the interfaces of the incongruent components.

A second approach that puts incongruences in radical change center stage is Nag et al.’s (2007) case study of a failed change process. Based on their in-depth analysis of a high-technology research and development (R&D) organization that attempted to transform into a market-oriented organization (change of organizational identity), Nag et al. (2007) came to the conclusion that changes in organizational identity are indirectly linked with structural aspects of power and legitimacy. As a side-product, the authors suggested that radical change may lead to severe incongruences between what an organization “is” (identity), what it “does” (practice), and what it “knows” (knowledge). In other words, Nag et al.’s (2007) study linked the idea of incongruences inherent in radical change with according power struggles. The present article suggests that such an focus on incongruences may not only be useful to explain the occurrence of power struggles but that it also bears the potential to explain many other problems in radical change.

Thus, a complementary perspective is offered to dominant views on tensions inherent in radical change in the present article. It takes Nag et al.’s (2007) assumption of incongruences of practice, knowledge, and identity in radical organizational change as a starting point, and develops a multilevel model of interlinkages between the three aspects. This multilevel model enables a systematic analysis of potential organizational and individual consequences of these incongruences.

A Multilevel Perspective on Practice, Knowledge, and Identity in Organizations

The following subsections provide brief multilevel characterizations of each of the areas, practice, knowledge, and identity, and an integrative perspective that sketches how the three aspects are linked. This multilevel perspective is schematically displayed in Figure 1. The outer boxes (dark gray) represent the organizational level, the inner boxes (light gray) refer to the individual levels. The flash symbols and letters A, B, and C indicate potential tensions in radical change, which I will return to in the next section.

Figure 1.

The interplay of practice, knowledge, and identity on the organizational (dark gray boxes) and individual level (light gray boxes; dashed lines indicate indirect relationships), and incongruences (A, B, C) that may arise at the interfaces.

Practice

The notion of organizational practice refers to “what an organization does,” and “how it does it”; that is, to the entirety of an organizations’ activities, carried out through its members. Thereby, the description of “what people do” comprises more than the mere accumulation of tasks; it articulates an organizations’ meanings, conditions of legitimacy, strategies of concerted accomplishments, use of materials and technologies, and so forth (Nicolini, 2009, 2011).

A large extent of an organization’s collective practice is determined by organizational routines (R. R. Nelson & Winter, 1982; for a review, see Becker, 2004), repeated patterns of action of multiple participants. While there is the general possibility of behaving differently (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Felin & Foss, 2011), over time routines emerge as generalized collective procedures, transforming input situations into desired output situations (Cohen, Levinthal, & Warglien, 2014). Through experiential learning, routinized individual and organizational behavior gradually leads to favorable outcomes, rising learning curves, and increased efficiency. In this respect, organizational routines do not exist in a vacuum but intersect with other routines and form “routine clusters,” families of “multiple, complementary routines, each contributing a partial result to the accomplishment of a common task” (Kremser & Schreyögg, 2016, p. 698; see also Spee, Jarzabkowski, & Smets, 2016).

Collective practice is rooted in individual actions and interactions. The formation of routines is largely based on the development of individual habits, which denote customary ways of behaving (Ouellette & Wood, 1998), and on reciprocal expectations concerning the other participants’ actions (Cohen et al., 2014). Through bypassing cogitation, habit formation frees individuals to use their finite information-processing capacity for other tasks, which makes action efficient. The execution of routines by its individual participants is largely automatic (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Cohen et al., 2014). Because they are executed mostly without awareness, habits are controllable only to a limited extent (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003).

Knowledge

Organizational knowledge comprises the entirety of what an organization “knows,” in the sense of what it is (potentially) able to do (Kump et al., 2015). Contemporary organizational research regards organizations as structures of distributed cognition (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Hutchins, 1995; Tsoukas, 1996), or transactive memory systems (Hecker, 2012; Hollingshead, 2001; Lewis & Herndon, 2011), in which the complementary knowledge of different individuals is accessed through the social networks of those within organizations. Collective knowledge manifests itself in three forms within organizations: shared knowledge, complementary knowledge, and knowledge embedded in artifacts (Hecker, 2012).

Organizational knowledge is based on the individual knowledge of the organization’s members. It is assumed to be continuously cocreated, renegotiated, and further developed. Thereby, declarative and nondeclarative forms of knowledge can be distinguished (Kump et al., 2015; e.g., based on Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Spender, 1996): Declarative memory refers to the capacity for the recollection of facts (e.g., a bricklayer’s knowledge of different types of bricks) and events (e.g., a sales agent’s memory of previous experiences with a customer). Nondeclarative memory comprises instances of memory that are expressed through performance, such as skills (e.g., a painter’s ability to paint a wall; a mathematician’s ability to calculate insurance rates).

Identity

The term organizational identity refers to an organization’s members’ consensual view on “who they are” as an organization (for an extensive review, see Gioia et al., 2013). It has been defined as those features of an organization that its members regard as most central, distinctive, and enduring (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Thereof, the most essential feature is centrality: Rooted in organizational history, characteristics that are central are manifested as core values, key products, or practices. The second feature of organizational identity, distinctiveness, accounts for the function of identity in distinguishing oneself from others. The third feature, endurance, means that while there are gradual shifts in identity, its core is assumed to remain stable over time.

Organizational identity is based on the individual identities of the organization’s members (Ashforth, Rogers, & Corley, 2011; Gioia et al., 2013) and is assumed to be continuously coconstructed by them. As described by Ashforth et al. (2011, p. 1147), “individual identities interact with others’ individual identities at the intersubjective level and are thereby transformed into something extra-individual.” Vice versa, organizational identity builds the basis for individuals’ organizational identification (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Edwards, 2005; Riketta, 2005). Thereby, the extent of organizational identification depends on an individual’s “readiness to define the self in terms of a particular organizational identity” (Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003, p. 364).

The Interplay of Practice, Knowledge, and Identity

As schematically displayed in Figure 1, individual and organizational practice, knowledge, and identity are assumed to be interrelated. Practice and knowledge are inextricably linked, as knowledge can only manifest in practice (Nicolini, 2011); vice versa, new practice may lead to the creation of new knowledge, which may again improve that practice (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Kump et al., 2015). Similarly, practice and identity are interdependent because people form identities and develop identification based on what they are doing; that is, based on practice (Ashcraft, 2013; Thatcher, Doucet, & Tuncel, 2003). Knowledge and identity are also related, but more indirectly through practice: “[I]dentity influences knowledge use by connecting knowledge to action, and knowledge use influences identity by providing the behavioral frames for its manifestation and maintenance” (Nag et al., 2007, p. 822).

All of the three aspects are assumed to be in continuous flux: Even if they are routinized, organizational practices are not rigid. While the basic structure of a routine can be relatively stable, its actual manifestation can display considerable variety, thereby leading to gradual changes (e.g., Feldman, 2000; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland, Haerem, & Hillison, 2011). Also, organizational knowledge is fluid as it is continuously exploited and further developed through communication, and integration (Thompson, Levine, & Messick, 1999), such that individual and collective knowledge continuously coevolve (Kump et al., 2015). Similarly, while the perception of identity remains stable within an organization, it still changes in a subtle way over time (Gioia et al., 2013).

At the absence of radical change, incremental changes in one area—practice, knowledge, or identity—may seamlessly be accommodated by adaptations in other areas via micro-processes of learning, habit formation, or adaptation. For example, the introduction of devices for digitally diagnosing errors in cars (practice) may require new knowledge for the mechanics involved and may gradually transform a low-tech occupation into a more high-tech occupation (identity). Slight changes in one area (e.g., an individual learns to handle a new device) may be—more or less easily—accommodated by slight adaptations in other areas (e.g., this new device simplifies a certain practice). That way, through “[n]umerous small accommodations [that] cumulate and amplify” (Weick & Quinn, 1999, p. 366), continuous change takes place. However, radical change is discontinuous; it is likely to cause an abrupt shift in at least one area, such that incongruences may occur between practice, knowledge, and identity (Nag et al., 2007). These incongruences may lead to various tensions and problems both for the organization, and its individual staff members.

Tensions Due to Incongruences of Practice, Knowledge, and Identity

Radical change can start from changes in the organization’s structure (e.g., the coordination and division of work, the formal hierarchy, or communication channels), or its strategy (e.g., major shifts in a firm’s strategic focus, core business, or long-term goals; Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Wischnevsky & Damanpour, 2006). Especially changes in strategy often require concurrent shifts in other organizational dimensions, such as processes, personnel, and culture (e.g., Amis et al., 2004; Weick & Quinn, 1999). But regardless of its starting point, a radical change in one area may involve shifts in many other areas (for potentially affected facets, see Vollman, 1996). Because all intended changes need to be enacted, in order to become effective, radical change always involves changes in practice. This is also reflected in Todd’s (1999) description of challenges in radical change: The “organization is required to move from known and established behaviour patterns to new behaviours, of which [it] has no real experience” (p. 239). Due to the importance of practice, the subsequent multilevel analysis starts with changes in practices and proceeds to incongruences between (A) practice and knowledge, and (B) practice and identity. Then, resulting incongruences between (C) knowledge and identity are analyzed. It is emphasized, however, that incongruences between identity, practice, and knowledge may occur regardless of the actual starting point of a radical change at hand.

Changes in Organizational Practices

As argued in the introduction to this section, any kind of radical change, even if its prime goal is changing an organization’s identity, may ultimately be based on changes in practices. Nevertheless, for some radical change endeavors, changes in practice may be the primary goal. For example, Labatut, Aggeri, and Girard (2012) described effects of a modernization of breeding technologies and routines in livestock farming. Over the course of several decades, traditional livestock breeding practices were replaced by new organizational routines. While previously breeding has been carried out by individual farmers, it now comprises a sophisticated three-staged procedure, involving multiple actors—breeders (farmers), breeding companies, and scientists—and new, complex technologies. A second example of radical changes in practice is A. J. Nelson and Irwin’s (2014) description search routines in libraries: With the advent of the Internet and related advancements in search technologies, librarians’ appropriate tasks related to searching, as well as their search routines have shifted dramatically.

Organizational Perspective on Changes in Practice

If entirely new practices are envisaged (as in Labatut et al.’s, 2012, breeding example; A. J. Nelson & Irwin’s, 2014, librarian case), new routines may have to be created. As outlined by Cohen et al. (2014), at the outset of routine formation, individuals and teams try out new ways of achieving intended outcomes. If the outcomes of the new practices are favorable, reinforcement learning may result in the formation of individual habits and reciprocal expectations of the routine participants (e.g., the farmers and the technicians in the breeding centers, or the students and librarians in a university library). In other cases, existing routines may have to be adapted. Feldman (2000; see also Labatut et al., 2012) described several forms of routine adaptation: repairing (if a routine does not reveal the intended outcomes, or produces unintended and undesirable outcomes); expanding (such that the outcomes produce new possibilities); or striving (such that outcomes ensure the achievement of ideals). Eventually, changes in organizational practice may require organizational unlearning, “the discarding of old routines to make way for new ones, if any” (Tsang & Zahra, 2008, p. 1437).

Such a shift in practices may come with several challenges. If practices are not routinized as a consequence of a change in organizational structures and processes, participants may only have a limited set of valid reciprocal expectations and need to discuss and negotiate single work steps. Moreover, routine breakdowns (Cohen et al., 2014) may occur, for example, due to inappropriate mutual expectations, or misinterpretations within a sequence of actions. If routines break down, cognitive powers must be mobilized to diagnose the reasons for the breakdown, and new individual behaviors must be tried out and aligned to be successful in achieving the task. Due to the embeddedness of routines in routine clusters (Kremser & Schreyögg, 2016; Spee et al., 2016), the modification of one routine may have implications for other related routines within the organization. Hence, changing routines means to increase communication efforts, lower efficiency, and decrease both quality and quantity of the organizational output.

Individual Perspective on Changes in Practice

Newly envisaged organizational practices may require adjustments in staff members’ individual practices, as illustrated both with the breeding and the library example. Individuals may have to show new behaviors or redefine their individual goals and responsibilities to enact the new practices. Thereby, the amount of change in the work unit and individuals’ jobs has been found to be negatively correlated with individual commitment to change: If the new tasks seem favorable, individual commitment to change was higher and emotions related to change more positive (e.g., excitement and challenge), as opposed to situations in which the new tasks were not desirable (Bartunek, Rousseau, Rudolph, & DePalma, 2006; Fedor, Caldwell, & Herold, 2006). The extent to which changes in tasks are perceived as personally harmful is also a key determinant of resistance to change: Oreg et al.’s (2011) found that if negative personal consequences are anticipated, this likely causes negative attitudes toward change. Among the typical situations that entail negative outcomes are downsizing, greater workload, increased job complexity, perceived loss of job control, or job insecurity.

Practice and Knowledge

If practices change within an organization, an incongruence may occur between the currently applied knowledge and the knowledge required to accomplish the new practices. Consider again Labatut et al.’s (2012, p. 54) example from above, where “the nature and daily practices of the participants in breeding routines changed radically, as did the tools and performance criteria that they used.” Most strikingly, the previous expertise of farmers was no longer useful: The new artificial insemination technology involved procedures that now had to be carried out by skilled technicians and geneticists. Moreover, breeding now should rely on a division of labor, and a distribution of knowledge and skills among the participants (farmers, technicians, and scientists) in the breeding routine. A second example that illustrates the relationship of changes in practice with a firm’s existing knowledge is Nag et al.’s (2007) case study where TekMar, a high-technology R&D organization, attempted to establish more market-oriented practices. TekMar’s traditional strength was basic R&D excellence in telecommunications technology, but the goal to build formal business development and market analysis procedures required marketing and business development knowledge, which was not yet available within the organization. These examples illustrate a first incongruence that may occur in radical change:

Incongruence A. Practices and knowledge may become incongruent

Organizational Perspective on Practice–Knowledge Incongruence

As Todd (1999, p. 241) put it, a “change programme will not succeed if the organization does not contain the correct competencies required for successful operation.” In many cases, at least some of the newly required knowledge may exist as latent potential within an organization that has not been used so far (see Hargadon & Fanelli, 2002, for a detailed analysis of the interplay of latent and empirical knowledge). Sometimes, it may be possible to accommodate the required shift in practices using the collective knowledge available within the organization. However, in many other cases, discrepancies may arise between an organization’s current (empirical and latent) knowledge and the knowledge required to successfully enact the newly envisaged practices. In such situations, paradoxes may surface. For example, A. J. Nelson and Irwin (2014) described a paradox of expertise that occurred for librarians at the advent of Internet-based search technologies: Existing mastery of a function (i.e., search without technology) limited librarians’ ability to recognize a technology with the potential to mimic, alter, or improve that function. Similarly, Smith and Lewis (2011) described learning paradoxes: The organization may be facing new situations where the old recipes for success are not only ineffective but also even counterproductive.

Successfully managing radical change, therefore, involves closing the knowledge gap by abolishing these discrepancies between required and available organizational knowledge (Nadler, 1993). If this happens through training existing staff, it seems pivotal to make training plans that dovetail with new job descriptions, reward systems, reporting relationships, and so forth; otherwise, in the absence of consistency, organizational performance may decrease, and the change may even be aborted (Nadler, 1993). Nevertheless, short courses may not fully compensate for practical experience; the organization “must be realistic of the likelihood of success” of training the existing staff members to the required level of expertise in the new tasks (Todd, 1999, p. 241). In other words, there are limits to the extent to which individuals and teams can be trained to the job, particularly when the new demands are combined with the daily demands of business performance. Expert staff members may have to be hired to bring in the newly required knowledge (as in TekMar’s case; Nag et al., 2007).

Individual Perspective on Practice–Knowledge Incongruence

For individual staff members who need to carry out new tasks, an incongruence may occur between the envisaged new practices and their current knowledge; they may have to acquire new knowledge and skills. Individuals may experience—subjectively paradoxical—situations where their existing recipes for success are not effective anymore (A. J. Nelson & Irwin, 2014; Smith & Lewis, 2011). They may have to modify or discard practices and change their existing knowledge, that is, to unlearn (Hislop, Bosley, Coombs, & Holland, 2014). Unlearning may affect both, cognition (e.g., changes in values and goals), and behavior (e.g., actual changes in the habits and coordinated interactions of individuals). In other words, individual participants may have to change their habits and use some of their (limited) cognitive capacity to reflect and to intentionally change their behavior.

Learning and adaptation demands in the context of radical change have been found to cause uncertainty and fear of failure (Fedor et al., 2006), which again are thought to drive negative attitudes toward change. It seems that the higher the demand for adaptation is, the less an individual staff member may be willing to contribute to the radical change. Especially when emotions (e.g., fear, anger) are engaged by a novel task but the established capabilities and habits are insufficient to accomplish that task, challenges may arise (Cohen, 2007). Negative experiences when trying new tasks may lower the staff members’ perceived readiness for change; that is, their belief in the organization’s capability to manage the change (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993; Choi & Ruona, 2010; Eby, Adams, Russell, & Gaby, 2000), and the staff members may become cynical about the change.

Practice and Identity

When an organization changes its practices, identity conflicts may occur. One example that explicitly describes the effects of shifts in organizational practices on organizational identity is Tripsas’ (2009) longitudinal case study of Linco, a company in the digital photo industry. Linco was founded in the mid-1990s, at the time when “digital film” was on the rise. The firm established an identity as The Digital Photography Company. In the subsequent years, technological advancements (architectural innovation in flash memory) created an opportunity that did not fit with the firm’s old identity—and thus was not recognized by the firm’s members. Only through the appointment of a new CEO, changes in practices could slowly be initiated. Thereby, the firm was facing many obstacles because the required shift in identity was hard to accomplish. A second example is Nag et al.’s (2007) TekMar case, where a team of world-class researchers needed to become more business oriented (identity). Therefore, they had to change many of their collective practices and routines, such as the formal operating procedures for launching and evaluating projects. Among other measures, they installed structured market analysis procedures and reporting processes. The existing staff members saw the imposed procedures as being in conflict with their previous practices; this tension caused severe resistance. These examples illustrate a second incongruence that may surface in radical change:

Incongruence B. Practice and identity may become incongruent

Organizational Perspective on Practice–Identity Incongruence

A strong link exists between an organization’s practices and its identity: Organizational identity requires practice; it is continually “renewed and reaffirmed through everyday interactions and continuity of practices” (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 166). Thus, an existing identity may encourage or hinder certain practices. As shown in Tripsas’ (2009) example, identity may serve as a filter for recognizing business opportunities; such technology innovations that do not fit with a firm’s current identity may be overlooked by decision makers. Identity tends to be reflected in routines, procedures, and beliefs of the organization. Due to this strong link between identity and action, identity is likely to be self-reinforcing (Tripsas, 2009), thereby hindering radical change.

A planned change of an organization’s identity, such as the aim to move from an R&D-driven organization to a market-driven organization, as it was the case at TekMar (Nag et al., 2007), may require changes in organizational practices that do not fit with the current organizational identity. Such a situation that has been termed a “current identity-new practice incompatibility” (Nag et al., 2007, p. 836, italics in original) and was shown to be a strong deterrent to change: The dramatic change in work practices at TekMar undermined members’ sense of their TekMar identity, and resulted in intense attempts to preserve the former status quo.

If changes in practice succeed, as in Labatut et al.’s (2012) breeding case study, this may have an impact on the distribution of roles of the involved participants. In Labatut’ et al.’s (2012) case, a new form of professional identity of breeders and a new type of power in the community of farmers arose in the region where the changes were implemented. In other words, changes in practice may gradually lead to the formation of new collective identities.

Individual Perspective on Practice–Identity Incongruence

Because shifts in organizational practice require shifts in individual practice, individual practices may become incongruent with individual identities in the course of a radical change. Such identity conflicts due to changes in practices were observed in many of the examples described so far: In Labatut et al.’s (2012) breeding case, the roles of farmers in their communities were changing dramatically; in A. J. Nelson and Irwin’s (2014) case, the role of librarians was changing from Masters of Search’ via “Masters of Interpretation” via “Teachers of Search” to “Connectors of People and Information”; and in Nag et al.’s (2007) case, the identities of scientists were threatened to change—which caused deterrence and, eventually, led to the “heroic failure” of the change.

Previous research has provided some insights under which circumstances changes in practices may cause individual identity conflicts. People tend to define themselves in terms of their profession, such as lawyer, secretary, or plumber (Ashcraft, 2013; A. J. Nelson & Irwin, 2014; Thatcher et al., 2003). Hence, what people “do in their jobs” constitutes an important aspect of their individual sense of identity. When they have a strong need for occupational self-verification (e.g., “I used to be a farmer and I want to do things, farmers do!”) and their occupations are changing in an undesired way, the exit of professionals is likely (Schilling, Werr, Gand, & Sardas, 2012). Vice versa, if occupational identities are strong, mere changes in organizational identity may not be perceived as being too problematic, if professions remain unaffected.

Knowledge and Identity

In a radical change, not only the practices may become incongruent with the organization’s identity but discrepancies may also occur between the organization’s identity and its knowledge. For example, Labatut et al.’s (2012) breeding case study showed that newly required knowledge (e.g., about breeding technologies) may create new roles within a community. As Nag et al.’s (2007) TekMar case analysis has shown, such a shift in required knowledge may be experienced as problematic: When the firm attempted to establish more market-oriented practices, staff members (world-class scientists) felt that these new practices would undermine their knowledge, and thus did not fit with their current identity (“That’s not who we are!”). Moreover, TekMar’s members saw the putative change in organizational identity as damaging to the firm’s reputation and ability to attract the best scientists. This, they feared, would impair TekMar’s ability to continue the kind of work for which they were famous. Hence, the staff members tried to prevent the change. Albeit less explicitly, also A. J. Nelson and Irwin’s (2014) study on the changing identity of librarians with the advent of Internet-based search provides indications that incongruences of knowledge and identity are strongly related in radical change: Only via changes in their expertise did the identity of librarians slowly shift from “Masters of Search” to “Connectors of People and Information.” These examples illustrate a third possible incongruence in radical change:

Incongruence C. Knowledge and identity may become incongruent

Organizational Perspective on Knowledge Identity Incongruence

As Nag et al. (2007) outlined, the link between an organization’s knowledge and identity is indirect. Their analysis implicitly reveals two mechanisms: (a) Only knowledge that is in line with an organization’s identity may be used within an organization (even if other knowledge may exist as latent potential). Hence, identity determines which knowledge is considered valuable. (b) Vice versa, only knowledge that is applied in an organization’s practices can become part of an organization’s identity. Thus, organizational identity is determined by an organization’s empirical (not latent) knowledge—that knowledge that is actually used within an organization. These two mechanisms are part of the self-reinforcing dynamic of organizational identity as illustrated by Tripsas’ (2009) study in the digital photo industry: Embedded in organizational practices and knowledge bases, identity serves as an information filter for the firm’s strategic choices, and over time consolidates practices and applied knowledge. Moreover, by defining legitimate action on the part of the organization, identity guides the development of capabilities and the acquisition of knowledge (Tripsas, 2009, based on Kogut & Zander, 1996).

Based on findings from her case study in the digital photo industry, Tripsas (2009) concludes that identity-challenging changes are much more difficult to handle than competency-destroying changes with only minor effects on an organization’s identity. For example, in Tripsas’ Linco case, incremental technological advances (minor change in organizational knowledge) that were applied to entirely new markets (radical change in organizational identity) destabilized Linco’s digital photography identity and caused deterrence to change within the organization.

Besides internal tensions, changes in identity may also have an effect on the market: If an organization decides to change its identity, conflicts may occur between changed identity claims and the firm’s reputation (Harvey, Morris, & Müller Santos, 2017; Tripsas, 2009), threatening the firm’s position on the market. Such changes may also be seen as a threat by the organization’s members themselves: For instance, in Nag et al.’s (2007) case study, staff members feared that TekMar’s move from research to ventures would damage the firm’s reputation.

Individual Perspective on Knowledge Identity Incongruence

Incongruences between knowledge and identity may take two shapes, (a) an incongruence of individual knowledge and individual identity and (b) an incongruence of organizational and individual identity. With regard to (a), consider Labatut et al.’s (2012) example of changing breeding routines that illustrates how individual knowledge and identity are related: The previous knowledge of farmers was no longer useful for the new routines. While the farmers did not actually lose their knowledge, it became latent, as the new breeding technologies required different knowledge. The new artificial insemination technology involved procedures that now had to be carried out by skilled technicians and geneticists. This example shows that changes in the perception of what is expert knowledge may affect one’s own identity as an expert. Depending on both, the individuals’ latent knowledge, and their expert status in the old firm, radical change may either be conceived as an improvement or as deleterious. Those individuals who lose their expert status are likely to try to maintain practices that preserve the (old) status quo, thereby hindering change, as shown by Nag et al. (2007).

With regard to (b), one relevant factor for individual identification with a collective is self-enhancement; that is, people identify with the organization to provide the basis for thinking of themselves in a positive light (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000). Hence, individuals may identify with an organization to the extent that it matches subjectively relevant features (Haslam et al., 2003). A “favorable” identity is positively related to job satisfaction, which again predicts turnover rates (Van Dick et al., 2004), and is crucial in helping to ensure that staff members work toward the interests of the organization (Edwards, 2005).

In general, individuals prefer self-continuity rather than abrupt changes in their identities (Eilam & Shamir, 2005). When a firm’s identity changes, identity conflicts may occur for individual members, as the firms’ new identity does not match their individual identities anymore. If, moreover, the identity changes in a way that is not favorable to an individual, that person may start to disidentify with the organization (Ashforth et al., 2008; Gioia et al., 2013). Identity changes can cause negative emotions and lead individuals to dismiss change initiatives, even when their personal interests are not threatened (Huy, 2011). Moreover, identification is at the core of why people join organizations and why they voluntarily leave (Ashforth et al., 2008). Hence, if a radical change causes changes in organizational identity that do not fit with individual identities, they may decide to quit.

Discussion and Implications

This article developed a multilevel model of incongruences between practice, knowledge, and identity inherent in radical change, and derived potential tensions for the organization as a whole, and it individual staff members. In summary, it aimed at making three contributions: (a) a multilevel perspective that opposes organizational interests with individual characteristics in radical change, (b) a fine-grained analysis of problems that may ultimately lead to a failure of radical change efforts, beyond mere resistance due to (anticipated) losses in power, and (c) a model that is concrete enough for change managers to anticipate problems in radical change. In the following sections, I will elaborate on how this study may complement existing change management research, and sketch potential ways of how to use the model in practice.

Implications for Research

One of the main assumptions underlying the present conceptual study is that radical change may come with certain inherent tensions during the transition that may not be fully avoided nor easily resolved, no matter what approach is chosen. Starting from Lewin’s (1947) seminal work, many attempts have previously been made to describe such inherent tensions; most of these attempts, however, have focused on power struggles. A few other researchers have developed models that do not focus on power struggles in the first place, but that build on the idea of incongruence to explain challenges in radical change (e.g., Nadler, 1981, 1993; Nag et al., 2007). The present study extends these previous models that are centered on the idea of incongruence, by providing a multilevel perspective that enables a detailed analysis of tensions at the interfaces of organizational and individual practice, knowledge, and identity.

Many links can be established between the present model and previous research into systemic problems focusing on power. For example, due to changes in practice and according changes in required knowledge, former experienced and valuable staff members may become less useful for the newly envisaged firm. In a similar vein, as Nag et al. (2007) have shown, changes in organizational practice may affect “not only [ . . . ] who controls knowledge, but also how it is controlled and used in the current change situation” (Nag et al., 2007, p. 840). Such shifts in status may cause potential deterrence and provoke attempts to block the change. In this context, most approaches that theorize on success factors for change management, including Nadler’s (1993) model, suggest that power groups should be part of the radical change. If, however, changes in practice or knowledge strongly affect these power groups, it may be hard to motivate them to actively support the change.

Moreover, the presented multilevel model of incongruences complements research into individual reactions to change as synthesized by Oreg et al. (2011) and Choi (2011): It provides many contextual variables for diverse individual responses that may occur, regardless of the personalities and dispositions of individual staff members. For example, Choi (2011) summarized that commitment to change decreases as the extent and turbulence of the change increases. It further decreases if the change impact is unfavorable, and the change has a low fit with the organization’s vision. The present analysis provides possible explanations for these observations: If the change affects organizational practices, this may require changes in individual habits (Cohen et al., 2014). Changing habits is a slow process: Mindless action must be turned into mindful action, which costs cognitive resources. This means, individuals not changing their habits in the course of a radical change may not always exhibit (passive) resistance; sticking to the old habits may as well indicate a high degree of automation in an individual’s practice. Similarly, an individual not performing the newly envisaged practices does not necessarily indicate resistance; it may as well be that the individual is just not capable to change, due to lacking skills. In summary, the theoretical perspective put forward in this article may serve as an overarching framework to provide explanations for many of the individual-level phenomena that occur in response to a radical change.

The article provides several avenues for future research. First, it started from the assumption that many of the problems in radical change may occur because emerging incongruences between practice, knowledge, and identity on the organizational need to be accommodated by the organization’s individual members. It seems that even if the change is envisaged to be radical on the organizational level, the underlying required changes in individual practice, knowledge, and identity shifting can only be achieved in an evolutionary way—at least without replacing existing staff members by new ones. However, the question as to whether individuals can change radically at all, or if they can only gradually shift their practices, knowledge, and identities in an evolutionary manner needs further research.

One limitation of the present study is that the analysis started from radical changes in organizational practice. It is assumed that, in theory, radical change may be triggered by changes in any of the three dimensions (practice, knowledge, or identity), and that similar incongruences may occur. Also, the change cases from the studies used as examples throughout this article had different starting points: In Nag et al.’s (2007) case, the firm explicitly aimed at changing their identity, Labatut et al.’s (2012) study described changes in practice, and A. J. Nelson and Irwin (2014) elaborated on changes that were triggered by technological advances; that is, by changes in knowledge. Nevertheless, future research may look into the question as to whether different challenges stand out, depending on the starting point of a radical change. Moreover, while the present analysis has focused on radical change as a source of discrepancy between practice, knowledge, and identity, future work may study potential alternative causes for such incongruences to occur.

Implications for Practice

The model presented in this article may provide additional guidance for change management and implementation. While many of the existing frameworks (as summarized by Al-Haddad & Kotnour, 2015) focus on motivation and leadership, the analysis in this article points to the necessity of taking into account and dealing with the discrepancies between practice, knowledge, and identity that are likely to surface. It may help answer questions such as: Which tensions are likely to occur in this radical change? What may be the effects of this change for the organization as a whole, or for a certain employee? What do we need to keep in focus in order to successfully lead through that concrete radical change?

To use the model, in a first step, change managers may analyze what the main area of the envisaged change is on the organizational level. For example, does it mainly entail a change in organizational practices? Is it mainly a change in organizational identity? Then, they may start asking themselves, what effects the envisaged change may have on the other aspects. For example, will the change require new organizational knowledge? Will it lead to a new organizational identity? In a third step, implications of each of these changes may be anticipated for individual change recipients. For example, who will have to change their practices? Who may have to learn new skills? How strongly will the individual staff members’ identities be affected by the change? To anticipate negative reactions to change, change managers should ask themselves for whom the envisaged changes may be seen as drawbacks. In this context, for example, Illia (2009) suggested a method to diagnose the extent of members’ concerns with regard to the changes. In case radical changes on the organizational level cannot be achieved with the existing members, the organization may have to change (some of) its members. All these considerations may then be integrated into a change management strategy that is in line with existing best practices for change management (Al-Haddad & Kotnour, 2015). Overall, change managers should be aware of both, the problems for individuals to radically change their knowledge and identity and their motivation to do so—not just for power reasons, but also due to lacking skills or rigid identities. Particular attention should be paid to reestablishing the congruence between practice, knowledge, and identity.

In conclusion, the present model suggests that tensions in times of transition cannot be fully avoided, no matter what change management strategy is chosen. Nevertheless, the better such problems can be foreseen, the more effective approaches can be developed to cope with them. A thorough analysis of incongruences between practice, knowledge, and identity in the course of a radical change may build the basis for change management that targets smoother realignment, and helps anticipate at least some of the obstacles during the difficult and risky transition phase.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research has partly been funded by the Austrian Funding Agency (FFG).

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