Historical Developments of Political Islam with Reference to Bangladesh

Introduction

Globally, after the catastrophic events of 9/11 and 7/7, ‘political Islam’ ¹ became the focal point or embodiment of the threat of a more politically active version of Islam; many Western, as well as Muslim governments, viewed it as a threat to the more conventional form of the secular, democratic nation state. However, political Islam is a multidimensional force. For example, groups like Al-Qayeda, Jamaatul Mujaheedin, and Lasker e Taeeba conjure images of irrational, religious fanatics with a thirst for vengeance and a penchant for violence. By contrast, there are Islamist and Islamic organizations that reject violence and espouse political liberalization. Around the world, ‘Islamists have won seats in parliament, held portfolios in cabinets and emerged as leading or at least significant opposition in countries as diverse as Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, and Pakistan’ (Esposito, 1997: 4). Even Bangladesh has not been excluded from this scenario. On one hand, while the centralist Islamist parties have been participating in the country’s democratic system, subsequently, waves of terrorist aggression in multiple spheres, like suicide bombings in judicial courts, assaults on non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, and grenade attacks on journalists and foreign diplomats instigated by the extremist Islamists have also continued which demonstrates the multidimensional nature of political Islam in Bangladesh.

The central theme of this paper then is to understand the forces behind the development of political Islam in Bangladesh. For this purpose, I have divided my paper into several sections. First, I aim to understand the development of political Islam in the colonial period in Bangladesh which was part of the Indian sub-continent and used to be known as East Bengal. Second, I will examine political Islam during the post-colonial period in Bangladesh which was at that time known as the East-Pakistan. Third, I discuss the niche of Islam in the political discourse of independent Bangladesh during the period between 1972 and 1990. Finally, I will look into the niche of political Islam from 1990 to 2008. While exploring the history I will use the framework of historical specificity. According to Alam (1993: 89), ‘the notion of historical specificity shows how, for any specific situation, a series of historical conjunctures has led to a distinctive configuration’. Through the exploration of the history of political Islam from the British era up until now, I will try to understand what constructs the forces behind the development of political Islam. Before that, however, it is relevant to provide a general introduction to the country that is Bangladesh.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh is situated in the South-Asian region and emerged as an independent country on 16 December 1971, based on secular-socialist principles (Riaz, 2004: 5). It is one of the world’s poorest nations with the per capita income of US$520. According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Bangladesh government, ‘it has a population of about 140 million where about 88% of the people are Muslim and over 98% of the people speak in Bangla’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). During the colonial period (1757–1947) it was part of Indian sub-continent and in the post-colonial period it was part of Pakistan (1947–1971). Even though it has emerged from a nationalist principle, political Islam at times played an important role during the nation-building process of Bangladesh. In order to understand this process of nation building it is pertinent to visit the history of Islam’s arrival in the Indian sub-continent.

Origin and Sociology of Bengal Muslims

Historically, Islam was introduced to the South-Asian region through the military conquest by Seljuks and Mamluks (Sonn, 2004: 87). Mahmud, a Seljuk Muslim ruler with a Turkish background, established Islam in the region that is now known as Afghanistan and Pakistan. After Mahmud, Mamluks established ‘Islam’s lasting power-base in India – the sultanate of Delhi around 1190’ (Sonn, 2004: 88). During this period Sufis such as Baba Adam Shahid of Rampal and Shah Sultan Rumi visited the Bengali-speaking region of India (Khan, 1985). Sufis historically have converted people from all walks of life and in many different parts of Asia (Khan, 1985); however, Islam continued to remain an insignificant religion in this Hindu-dominated region. The dramatic change in the situation, though, came with the arrival of the Mughal dynasty. Throughout the Mughal regime (1530–1757) Islam was expanded in the Indian subcontinent by the rulers (Sonn, 2004: 97). During that time, mostly Hindus were converted to Islam against the backdrop of serious discrimination that existed within Hindu communities due to the caste system (Alam, 1993; Hossain, 2008; Khan, 1985). The universal ethos of brotherhood – equal status – in Islam attracted Hindus and Khan (1985: 836) asserts, ‘in response to the elitism of the Hindus, many common people and certain sections of the higher castes and classes of Bengal begun to embrace Islam’. Bengal, especially eastern and southeastern parts of Bengal, where most of the Bengali Muslims originated, had been a peasant society (Alam, 1993). People living in this part of the Gangetic delta found themselves standing against a fertile, but unpredictable and unkind nature. Alam (1993: 90) argues that, ‘this desire to come to terms with the adversity of nature distinctly affected and shaped their vision of religion and culture’. Alam (1993: 90) further asserts that, ‘folk beliefs and various non-Islamic principles, especially Hinduism, affected the shape of Bengali Islam and could not be eliminated by the introduction of Islam in those areas’. From these historical accounts, it is clear that Muslims in the Bengali-speaking region have two roots of origin:

The status of the Bengal Muslims was divided into two sections based on the aforementioned division of the root of origin. Political Islam arose in Bengal in the 17th century under the British regime against this backdrop of the sociological distinction of the Muslim community.

Political Islam in Colonial Bengal

During the oppressive regime of the British Raj, political Islam became a focal point mainly because of two historical events: the Faraizi movement of 1818 and Khilafat movement of 1919.

In 1818, with a demand of establishing the tawhid or oneness of God and abolishing ‘traces of animistic and Hindu beliefs and practices from Muslim society’, Hazi Shariatullah of Faridpur in eastern Bengal initiated the Faraizi movement (Alam, 1993; Khan, 1985). Deriving the movement’s name from faraiz (meaning obligatory duties laid down in the Qur’an), Shariatullah preached a return to a more fundamentalist Islam, shorn of ritualistic appendages (Khan, 1985). Shariatullah’s movement had a profound relation with Saudi Arab’s Wahabi tradition. The national encyclopedia of Bangladesh – Banglapedia – states:

Shairatullah migrated to Makkah in 1799, stayed there for 20 years and studied religious doctrines under Shaikh Tahir Sombal, an authority of Hanafi School. The Faraizi movement spread with extraordinary rapidity in the districts of Dhaka, Faridpur, Bakerganj, Mymensingh, Tippera (Comilla), Chittagong and Noakhali as well as to the province of Assam [now part of India]. The movement, however, gained the greatest momentum in those places where the Muslim peasantry were depressed under the oppressive domination of Hindu zamindars [landlords] and European indigo planters. (Banglapedia, 2009)

Furthermore, Shariatullah’s political campaign advocated for the establishment of a Muslim Caliph and termed British rule as ‘injurious’ (Banglapedia, 2009). In addition, referring to the political thought of the Faraizi movement, Khan (1985: 840) asserts that, ‘Shariatullah rejected shirk (sinful innovation, or bidah), including the support or joining of Hindu rites and ceremonies; pir (spiritual leader) worship, and urs (the death anniversary of pirs which fell under fatiha, or death ritual).’ All of these practices were extremely well-established in Bengal. After the death of Shariatullah in 1840, this movement lost its momentum.

Almost simultaneously, during the 1820s and 1830s, the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya movement, in the Indian sub continent was gaining impetus under the leadership of Shah Sayyid Ahmad. Jones (1989) notes that, ‘Tariqah-i-Muhammadiyah [was preaching for] both a return to past purity and an open struggle, a jihad with non-Muslims’ (Jones, 1989: 22). According to Ahsan (2006):

The Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya movement began in northern India and reached Bengal during the 1820s and ’30s. Sayyid Ahmad’s visit to Calcutta in 1820 was marked by a gathering of about 10 thousand followers who came to meet him. He visited Calcutta once again in the next year on his way to Makka and he propagated his doctrines during his three months of stay there.

Sayyid Mir Nisar Ali alias Titu Mir, a Bangladeshi peasant, according to Riaz (2009), was the leader of this movement in Bengal. According to Khan (2006), Titu Mir met Sayyid Ahmad when he went to a pilgrimage to Makka in 1822 AD. Khan (2006) argues that Ahmad ‘inspired [Titu Mir] to free his fellow countrymen from un-Islamic practices and foreign domination’.

Jones (1989) states that on his return home, ‘Titu Mir expounded a fundamentalist doctrine that condemned elements of popular Islam as errors, called upon his followers to practice equality among their coreligionists, and to adopt a unique form of dress as an outward sign of their religious commitment’ (Jones, 1989: 23). Based on Khan (2006), Ahsan (2006) Jones (1989) and Riaz (2009), it is plausible to argue in favor of following characteristics of this movement:

However, the ramification of such movements is three dimensional. First, it shows that Islam became a political force to provide a voice to the oppressed and from the historical evidence it is plausible to argue that the Faraizi movement also became popular among oppressed Muslim peasants. These peasants were oppressed by the Hindu landlords as well as by British rulers. Muslims around the time of the Faraizi movement in Bengal were ‘in all aspects . . . a race ruined under British rule’ (Ahmed, 2001: 19). Ahmed (2001) argues, referring to this movement, that

their rise was more directly linked to the social and political transformation produced by the dominant presence of colonial Europe . . . going back to the ideals of the pure faith was seen as the only road back to political glory [of Mughal and previous Muslim regimes]. (Ahmed, 2001: 15)

Second, it also demonstrates the demand for the absolute conformity of a form of Islam that was Arab oriented. Third, and most importantly, this movement provided a ‘conflict in identity – both Bengali and Muslim – which in Bengali political culture has often been formulated as two opposite poles’ (Alam, 1993: 91).

After these movements, the set-up of the Deoband Madrassah near New Delhi in India in 1857 is a landmark in the history in the development of political Islam in Bangladesh as well as in south Asia. Faruki (1987: 54) asserts that, ‘this Madrassah was designed to produce Ulema, theologians and a clerical leadership who will re-assert the traditional understanding of Islam in practice’. Karim (2004: 298) argues that, ’the Deoband school strictly enforced Islamic jurispru- dence based on medieval scholarship of Hanafi scholars and any departure from that path was considered heresy’. The influence of the Deoband Madrassah in the discourse of political Islam will be discussed in the appropriate section.

Ulemas attached with the Deoband Madrassahs played a significant role in upholding the ethos of pan-Islamism during the time of the abolishment of the Caliphate in the Ottoman Empire. Muslims in India, including Muslims from Bengal, launched the Khilafat movement in 1919 (Sayyid, 1997: 61). During this time prominent pan-Islamic leaders caused a great deal of tension in Calcutta and elsewhere in Bengal (Shah, 2001: 101). Regular meetings were organized by these leaders and the main theme of the meetings was to ‘refer to the troubles in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and other Muslim countries, and suggested that the object of the British government was to drive out Islam from Indian sub-continent’ (Shah, 2001: 102). In addition to holding these meetings, Shah (2001) notes, ‘many Bengali Muslims from rural districts had travelled to Turkey to fight for the Turks during that period, where a training camp was set in Afghanistan, and religious leaders were preaching against British regime throughout the Bengal in Friday prayers’ (Shah, 2001: 100). However, after the fall of Caliphate, many of those involved in the movement abandoned the quest for global Muslim unity (Sayyid, 1997: 61).

Similar to the Faraizi and Tariqah-i-Muhammadiyah movement, the Khilafat movement showcases that once again the Islamic ethos of universal brotherhood (Ummah) was a tool that united Bengali Muslims, and helped them rise against an oppressive regime. On the one hand, the only major difference between both of these movements is that the Faraizi movement advocated a pure form of Islam, whereas the Khilafat movement was truly a pan-Islamic movement. On the other hand, through the set-up of Deoband Madrassah and its institutional framework, political Islam received the momentum it so deserved. However, while these pan-Islamic movements generated a lot of tension within the British administration, it is interesting to note that they also rekindled a strong sense of Bengali nationalism in Bengal.

Islam and Bengali Nationalism in East Pakistan

Bengali nationalism culminated through the formation of the Muslim league in 1906 in Dhaka (Alam, 1993; Khan, 1985). Muslim league leaders voted in favor to the partition for Bengal. The ramification of this decision was that Muslims of East Bengal (now Bangladesh) became a separate entity from their Hindu counterparts (who were a majority) in west Bengal (now part of India). During this period, ‘new institutions of higher learning were established which led eventually to a significant expansion of opportunities for Bengali Muslims in the areas of public administration, education, and business’ (Khan, 1985: 841). However, the decision of partitioning Bengal was revoked in 1911, which Muslim league leaders read as a Hindu–British conspiracy. As an aftermath, several communal riots broke out between Hindus and Muslims which eventually forced the British rulers to come up with a two-state solution – India or Hindustan for the Hindu majority and Pakistan, also known as the homeland, for Muslims in 1947.

Unfortunately, though, the partition of India was not the happy ending most Bengali Muslims had hoped or dreamt of. Following the separation, Muslims of East Bengal once again experienced neo-colonialism under their Pakistani rulers. It was in this period that Bengali nationalism became more dominant over the Muslim identity due to the oppression from the Pakistani government. A nationalist movement hit the streets of Bangladesh under the leadership of the Awami Muslim League, which later dropped ‘Muslim’ from its name ‘in a process of secularization’. This change in name also indicates the dominant nationalist philosophy in East Pakistan. Alam (1993: 93) claims that ‘Islam as an ideology never played a significant role in the political process of the region as long as it remained within the united Pakistan’. However, this is not entirely true. Gulam Azam, head of East Pakistan Jamaat e Islami, was imprisoned in 1952 for his role in the language movement (Rahim, 2001: 239). He again suffered imprisonment in 1955 for speaking out against political repression by the Pakistani government (Rahim, 2001: 239). Even Mawlana Mawdudi, a graduate of Deoband Madrassah and chief of Pakistan Jamaat e Islami who arrived in Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh, in February 1956 to attend an all-party Islamic constitutional conference, ‘pledged his support for the recognition of Bengali as an official language and admitted that East Pakistan had suffered discrimination under the Pakistani government’ (Rahim, 2001: 240). Thus political Islam embraced the ethos of nationalism during the time of the language movement.

Surprisingly, at the time of the war in 1971, Jamaat’s political stance had shifted sharply. This party helped the Pakistani Army to capture and kill Bangladeshi freedom fighters as it believed that it was their duty to preserve the unity of a Muslim nation (Alam, 1993; Rahim, 2001). Rahim (2001) notes that:

days after the Pakistani army launched its bloody reprisal against the Bengali nationalists in the early hours of 26 March 1971, Ghulam Azam met with general Tikka Khan, who was in charge of the military operation in the province of East Pakistan and pledged his party’s full support in safeguarding the unity of Pakistan. (Rahim, 2001: 245)

Rahim (2001) argues that:

To directly bolster the regime’s military operations, the Jamat created several impromptu counter insurgency armed groups, notably, the al Badr, the al-Shams and the Razakars, who were trained and equipped with weapons by the Pakistan army to fight against the Bengali nationals. (Rahim, 2001: 245)

During that war, ‘some 3 million civilians were killed by the erstwhile Pakistani occupying forces, while about 200,000 women were raped, and tens of thousands of homes were torched and plundered’ (The Daily Star, 2009).

Political Islam in Independent Bangladesh from 1972–1990

After a nine-month bloody battle war with Pakistan, Bangladesh became a separate country on 16 December 1971. Even though Bangladesh is a Muslim country, secularism was recorded as one of the four state principles in its constitution in 1972 under the regime of the first president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Ahmed and Nazneen, 1990; Hossain, 2006; Riaz, 2004, 2008). Alam (1993) argues that secularism was conceptually based on the critique of the colonial and post-colonial exploitation to which East Bengal had been subjugated. However, after the killing of Sheikha Mujib, the army took over the ruling system and it is during the two subsequent army regimes (1975–90) that numbers of measure were taken to introduce and promote Islamic values in the state of Bangladesh. In summary, those measures included: replacing secularism with ‘absolute faith and trust in the Allah Almighty’ and ‘Bismillahirahmanir rahim’ in the constitution, the hanging of posters in government offices with quotations from the Qur’an, the displaying of Qur’anic verses and the Prophet’s advice in public places, the flying of Eid-Mubarak festoons beside the national flags on Eid festivals, issuance of messages by the head of state or government on religious occasions such as I’d-i-Miladunnabi, Shab-i-Barat, and Muharram, and offerings of munajat (prayer) on special occasions, practice of azan (call to prayer) five times a day, establishment of a new division of religious affairs, under a fully-fledged minister, establishment of the Islamic foundation with an extensive network of research facilities, set-up of an Islamic university with an Islamic research centre attached to it, establishment of a Zakat fund headed by the president and the proposal of education policy intended to introduce Arabic and Islamiat in the schools, beginning with class one, a huge amount of fund was released for the construction of mosques and madrassas, and the establishment of the Bangladesh Madrassah education board (Ahmed and Nazneen, 1990; Hossain, 2006; Riaz, 2004, 2008). These measures were indicative of the regimes’ interest and finally in June 1988 ‘Islam was declared as the state religion’ (Hossain, 2006; Riaz, 2005). However, Bangladesh’s legal and judicial system is based on secular British law.

A major implication of the army regime was the return of Jamat e Islami Bangladesh (JIB) in the political discourse of Bangladesh, as well as with other Islamist parties. Soon after independence, it was not possible for this party to play an active role in Bangladeshi politics as the principle of secularism restricted any communal politics in the country. However, since secularism was removed from the constitution by the military regime, it was no longer a hindrance for political Islam to re-emerge.

A close reading of the history of Bangladesh reveals that the introduction of Islam in the public life of Bangladesh and the emergence of JIB is inter-connected. To create an aura of political legitimacy for their rule, and to win the approval of Middle Eastern countries, these army regimes often collaborated with the JIB, since the leaders of the JIB have healthy connections in the Middle East (Rahim, 2001: 248) The military regime was overwhelmingly dependent on foreign aid, the bulk of which came from Middle Eastern, oil-rich Islamic fundamentalist countries (Alam, 1993). The influence of Middle Eastern countries on Bangladesh during the 1970s and onwards opens up the scope to understand the change of power shift in the global political economy in the 1970s.

Right after independence, Bangladesh’s economy was in peril and the country was desperate to get aid from the West and other Middle Eastern countries. During the cold war regime, due to Bangladesh’s socialist stance, oil-rich Middle Eastern Muslim countries were the main hope for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This justifies the reason behind Bangladesh’s membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1974. During that period, the Yom Kippur War broke out between Arab countries and Israel. The United States (US) and many Western countries helped Israel actively in that war. In response to that, Arab countries imposed an embargo on supplying oil to the US and Holland for supporting Israel. The embargo was lifted after six months in March 1974, but a shockwave went through the Western economy. According to US government statistics, world crude oil prices had tripled from the 1973 average to about $12 per barrel (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2002). Khanna (2008) argues that, ‘it is during this time oil became the Arab’s geo-political lever, making the gulf monarchies the world’s nouveau riche’ (Khanna, 2008: 237). Arab countries, realizing their own importance, have undertaken efforts to shape the world in their own images and, ‘with the help of their new found wealth, have been financing missionary programs in various Muslim countries’ (Ahmed and Nazneen, 1990: 806). Also, Bangladeshi society has been deeply influenced by this phenomenon (Ahmed and Nazneen, 1990). The proliferation of Islamic institutions and organizations, mainly of a charitable and missionary character, and the construction of new mosques and madrassas along with the repair, extension, and beautification of old ones are but overt manifestations of the phenomenon (Ahmed and Nazneen, 1990).

Apart from the oil price hike, in the 1980s another international issue influenced the growth of political Islam in Bangladesh. It was the war in neighboring Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the US was actively supporting the Taliban mujahedeen who branded that war as a ‘holy war’ which justified the participation of foreign nationals (Riaz, 2008: 81). The seeds of militant Islam were thus entrenched into Bangladesh for the first time in 1984 when volunteer corps were organized by some radical group of Islamists to join the jihad (holy war; Riaz, 2008: 82). Riaz (2008) notes that:

Approximately 3,000 people were motivated to travel in several different branches to fight in Afghanistan and alongside with other volunteer Mujahedeen from all over the globe. Over the next four years, at least 24 of these Bangladeshi volunteers died and 10 became disabled. In 1988, a delegation of 10 self-proclaimed Ulama (Islamic scholars) from Bangladesh visited Afghanistan. The returnees from the Afghan war maintained a close contact with the Taliban and became jubilant when the Mujahedeen captured Kabul in 1992. (Riaz, 2008: 82)

A second major implication of this military doctrine is that it allowed the growth of government-funded and privately-funded (Quomi) Madrassahs. Over a period of 32 years (1972–2004), government Madrassahs have grown about 732% whereas student enrollment had jumped by 653% (Karim, 2004; Riaz, 2008: 37). However, due to a more modern, government-approved curriculum (which enables students to study math, English and science apart from theology), students from these Madrassahas are competitive in finding places in the public universities. By contrast, Quomi (people’s) Madrassah follows a curriculum from the Deoband Madrassah (Karim, 2004). Karim (2004) argues that, ‘following the legacy of the Deoband Madrassah, the Quomi madrassahs in Bangladesh only teach the Quran, hadith, sunnah, and an orthodox interpretation of the sharia to its students’ (2004: 298). With this type of curriculum set-up, students of these madrassahs are not fit to graduate in to the job market. According to an estimated report, around two million students are enrolled in about 15,000 Quomi Madrassahs which are funded by individuals from various countries such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Kingdom (Karim, 2004).

To sum up, it is plausible to argue that the military regime from 1975 to the 1990s re-opened the closed doors of political Islam in Bangladesh and helped it to expand in multiple ways. With the power of globalization, Bangladesh felt the strongest presence of political Islam with its discursive force since 1990 onwards; and this will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Political Islam in Contemporary Bangladesh

In the face of a popular upsurge, the army government resigned in 1990 and Bangladesh elected a liberal democratic government in its place. However, democracy in Bangladesh is yet to work in its full form. Barkdull (2005) identifies seven major problems related to Bangladeshi democracy, which are: (1) division between the parties; (2) thwarting bipartisanship; (3) a lack of internal democracy within the parties; (4) weakness of political institutions; (5) the unequal status of women; (6) economic inequality; and (7) corruption.

To improve such a poor democratic system, many forces of modernization like the European Union countries, the US and the United Nations (UN) agencies alongside with NGOs (international and local) begun to expand their base throughout the country. The sole aim was to develop many of the underdeveloped sectors in Bangladesh; that is, women’s empowerment, poverty alleviation, and good governance. Through foreign trade assistance, foreign aid and foreign investments, these agencies and development partners changed the landscape of aid ² in Bangladesh. Whereas previously many Middle Eastern countries used to be major allies of Bangladesh in terms of disbursing foreign aid during the army regime, following the formation of a democratic government in 1990s, many Western countries have started taking their place.

Against this backdrop, the growth of political Islam in Bangladesh can be considered phenomenal, as according to one research, ‘the number of Islamist parties in Bangladesh stood up to 100 until 2006’ (Riaz, 2008: 29). Interestingly, out of those hundreds, only seven parties which adhere to Islamic terms and symbols in their titles participate in the election process. They are: JIB, Jaker Party, Khelafot Andolon, Muslim League, Jomiote Ulamaye Islam Bangladesh, Islamic front Bangladesh and Islami Oikko jot (IOJ). However, among these seven parties, in the 2001 election, the JIB and the IOJ won seats in parliament (JIB 17 and IOJ two out of 300 seats). During that time, the JIB became an influential coalition partner of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which won 193 seats, to help it form the central government. Thereafter, members of parliament (MPs) from the JIB held two ministerial posts during the BNP-led government until 2006. However, in the 2008 election, the JIB was the only Islamist party to win any seat in the parliament. The JIB won two seats, wherein the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), widely known as the ‘secularist party’, formed the present government under the premiership of a Muslim lady, Sheikh Hasina who is also the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (the former president), with a sheer majority, by winning a whopping 230 seats.

However, the decline in the election win for the Islamist parties does mean a demise for political Islam in Bangladesh, nor does it indicate the appropriate level of influence or presence of political Islam in the country. With the change in geo-political dynamics, fostered by the forces of globalization, Bangladesh is witnessing hitherto new dimensions of political Islam.

In light of these new developments, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), an extremist group, came into the forefront through a press conference held on 30 April 1992 when they demanded that Bangladesh should be transformed into an Islamic state (South Asia Terrorism Portal [SATP], 2009). Following that press conference, over the course of time, HuJI-B is accused of a series of terrorist activities which include an attack on the British High Commissioner in Bangladesh in May 2004 by throwing grenade on him, a failed attempt on the life of renowned secular poet Shamsur Rahman at his residence in Dhaka on 18 January 1999, another grenade attack on 21 August 2004 on an Awami league rally in Dhaka which killed 23 people, and a failed attempt to assassinate Sheikh Hasina (Lintner, 2002; SATP, 2009). Huji-B was formed in 1992, reportedly with funds from al-Qayeda leader Osama Bin Laden. Linter (2003) argues that the existence of firm links between this group and al-Qayeda was proven when Fazlul Rahman, a leader of the HuJI-B, signed the official declaration of ‘holy war’ against the US on February 1998 where other signatories included Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of the Jihad Group in Egypt), Rifa’i Ahmad Taha (aka Abu-Yasir, Egyptian Islamic Group), and Sheikh Mir Hamzah (secretary of the Jamiat Ulema Pakistan). Interestingly, according to the South Asian Terrorism Portal, ‘at one point of time, the groups issued a slogan, Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan (‘We will all become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan’).

Later, following few high-profile raids on their training camps in remote coastal areas by law-enforcement agencies, this group went into hiding and re-emerged under the new name of Jamaatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB) on 17 August 2005 when they detonated 300 small bombs across the country (Hossain, 2006; Riaz, 2008: 83). They left a leaflet in every bombing spot which threatened judges, government officials, politicians, and other ‘enemies of Islam’, including the US and the UK and demanded to establish Sharia law in Bangladesh (US State Department/US Embassy Dhaka, 2006). If this was not enough, the JMB also carried out the country’s first Taliban-style suicide bomb attack on 3 October 2005 and thereafter two more on 18 October 2005 and 14 November 2005 killing at least four judges (The Daily Star, 2005). Furthermore, reports suggest that this Islamist party operates across the border. For example, Bangladesh’s neighbor India accuses HuJI-B for the attack on the American Center in Kolkata (Calcutta) in January 2002, and a series of bomb blasts in the state of Assam in mid-1999 (Lintner, 2002). Riaz (2008) argues that veterans from the Afghan war in the 1990s are actively involved with this organization, whereas according to Lintner (2002), members of this group are trained by the militants of Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, the HuJI-B, turned JMB, was banned in Bangladesh and several of its activists were hanged by the government. However, it still is covertly operating in Bangladesh and recently issued a threat letter to the UN agencies in April 2009 where it demands that ‘the local offices of UNICEF, the World Food Program and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to close down in coastal town in Barisal’ (Arabiya, 2009).

These extremist organizations are financed by foreign Muslim NGOs. Riaz (2008) in his study finds that at least 34 major such ‘Islamic’ NGOs are active in fostering extremist activity in Bangladesh with an annual funding support of US$40 million that is being injected from Europe, America and Gulf states through personal channels (Riaz, 2008: 85). In addition, these organizations use Quomi madrassahs and orphanages as their base to recruit students and develop weaponries. For example, a recent raid by the law-enforcing agencies on a British-run orphanage in a remote island of Bhola in March 2009, discovered

small arms – about nine or 10 in total – plus equipment to make small arms, about 3,000 rounds of ammunition, two walkie-talkies, two remote-control devices and four sets of army uniforms and Islamic book in line with extremists like Osama bin Laden and al-Qayeda. (Page et al., 2009)

Further investigation reveals that the charity, named Green Crescent, is involved in projects in Pakistan as well (Page et al., 2009).

The second dimension of political Islam in independent Bangladesh is the return of the call of pan-Islamism after 1919’s Khilafat movement through the emergence of the Hizbut Tahrir. Emerged in 1953, the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) is a global Islamic political organization. According to the organization’s website, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir works at all levels of society to restore to Muslims a means of living an Islamic life under the shade of the Khilafah State’ (Caliphate). The party is active throughout the Middle East, central Asia, south-east Asia, Africa, the Indian subcontinent, Europe, Australasia and the Americas. In Bangladesh, it launched its chapter as Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB) on 17 November 2001 (Riaz, 2001: 31). A study of its website indicates that this group is distinct from the extremists as well as from the centrists. For example, a discourse analysis conducted by Hasan (2011) of two publications of the HTB titled With an aim of establishing Caliphate Government, safeguarding the national interest and establishing the rights of the masses: the Islamic Manifesto of Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh and Hizbut Tahrir reveals that it campaigns explicitly against the democratic system of Bangladesh as it argues that, ‘this system is devised by non-Muslim capitalist West which increases the disparity between the rich and the poor and is equal to polytheism’ (Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh, 2004: 39). However, having said that it doesn’t resort to extreme measures to propagate its ideology. After the formation of the Awami League government in the 2008 election, ‘it introduces a law targeting Hizbut Tahrir which will enable police to lodge criminal cases against the activists of Hizbut Tahrir as the government claims this organization preaches against the philosophy of the state system’ (Daily Prohtom Alo, 2009: 1). According to intelligence reports received from Bangladesh through a personal email, it is revealed that ‘HTB is black listed by the law-enforcing agencies and now under strong monitoring and surveillance’ (Yousuf, 2009). A significant phenomenon about HTB is that it is ‘becoming popular among teachers and students of secular universities in the country’.

However, the JIB is now under serious pressure, since the BAL government has vowed to bring war criminals, a number of whom are involved with JIB politics, to face a war crimes trial. In this regard the Bangladeshi government is closely working with the UN (The Daily Star, 2009). In response to that the JIB has lodged a country-wide political campaign. The JIB through its website states, ‘We can firmly assert, in the circumstances, that no Jamaat leader was involved in any criminal activity of the nature of plunder, rape, murder or arson during the liberation war’. It will certainly be interesting to follow the developments in this regard in the future.

To conclude this section I argue that Bangladesh is experiencing many diverse forces of political Islam which are related to the complex web of geo-political factors and globalization. Given this, which is the best possible theoretical framework to explain the extraordinary growth of political Islam in Bangladesh? In this regard, I aim to employ Esposito’s theory wherein he claims that, ‘Islam has re-emerged as an alternative ideology to the perceived failures of more secular forms of nationalism and capitalism and socialism’ (Esposito, 1997). I argue that Esposito’s theory is apparent in the context of Bangladesh. For example, it is among the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world. Unabated corruption widens the gap between rich and poor here. Islamists are exploiting this internal vulnerable position to woo their support within the masses’ (Hossain, 2006). A good example is the website of the HTB where it has a publication titled how to solve economic crisis in Bangladesh which might justify the claim of Esposito. Another way to explain this diverse force in Bangladesh is to apply the theory coined by Pasha (2002) where he emphasizes that, ‘in the context of globalization, [political Islam] is an open rebellion against the latest phase of modernity’ (2002: 125). Attacks on foreign diplomats, threat to the UN agencies as well as rejecting the concept of democracy based on the ground that it is driven by the Western capitalist force which fosters modernization provides some ground for Pasha’s claim.

However, both theories become insignificant when I compare the re-emergence of the secular Awami League in the recent election. Therefore, to conclude this section it is fair to argue that the theories coined by Esposito and Pasha are applicable to explain many of the activities of a small, thought important, section of Muslims in Bangladesh.

Conclusion

In the preceding sections, an attempt has been made to discover the forces that foster or hinder the development of political Islam in Bangladesh. Through the usage of the notion of historical specificity, I find three forces that determine the growth of political Islam in Bangladesh. They are: (1) oppression and socio-economic disparity; (2) institutional set-up to propagate pure and orthodox Islam; and (3) geo-political factors and pan-Islamism. For example, first, during the colonial period, political Islam arose through the Faraizi movement and the Khilafat movement against the backdrop of the oppression of the elites and the colonial forces. Similarly, in independent Bangladesh, against the backdrop of corruption and economic disparity, groups such as the JMB or the HTB managed to propagate its ideology amongst vulnerable sections of the society. Second, graduates of the Deoband Madrassah played an active role in the Khilafat movement in Bengal, whereas students of Qoumi Madrassahs are the lifeline of political Islam in contemporary Bangladesh which justifies the claim that institutional set-up is an important factor in the development of political Islam in Bangladesh. Third, it is visible that geo-political factors and pan-Islamism are both significant in the growth of political Islam in Bangladesh since the colonial period, which I have shown by establishing the connection between all these events:

Similarly, through the method of historical specificity, I understand that nationalism and, in effect, the principle of secularism are the major factors that hinder the development of political Islam in Bangladesh. The implication became visible after the partition between in 1947 over the language movement, but become clear in 1971 during the time of the liberation war and which has now culminated in the potential trial against the JIB in charge of war crime and crackdown on the HTB by law-enforcing agencies.