Abstract
This article examines the transboundary water challenges among riparian states in and around the Nile river basin. The article argues in agreement with the Collier-Hoeffler conflict model (1998) which claims that Africa’s natural endowments, such as diamonds, gold, copper, bauxite, and oil, are strong predictors of violent conflict in Africa. This article further posits that these natural economic endowments, such as natural resources and geographical locations which include the Nile river basin, are potential triggers of conflict in the horn of Africa.
Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future. (Kofi Annan, speech, March 2001)
Introduction
Background
Access to water in Africa is one of the most critical aspects of human survival. Today, one-third of the African total population lack potable drinking water, and an estimated 313 million people lack proper sanitation (World Water Council, 2006). As result, many riparian countries surrounding the Nile river basin have expressed a direct stake in the water resources hitherto seldom expressed in the past. In this article, I argue that, due to the lack of consensus over the use of the Nile Basin regarding ‘water sharing’ or ‘benefit sharing’, such situations have the potential to escalate into transboundary conflicts involving emerging dominant states – such as the tension between Ethiopia–Egypt. At the same time, this article further contributes to the Collier-Hoeffler (C-H)(1998) conflict model in order to analyze the transboundary challenges and Egypt’s position as the hegemonic power in the horn of Africa contested by Ethiopia. The C-H model’s analysis argues that the dismal economic performance between the 1960s to 2000 stagnated largely due to Africa’s natural resource endowments as well as because of countries located on coastal areas with potential access to sea ports and navigation. The C-H model predicts that Africa’s violent conflict is largely due to its economic endowments. For example, countries with abandoned natural resources suffered the natural resource curse while the coastal regions became avenues for interstate conflict. In order to simplify my argument and analysis, I focus on Ethiopia and Egypt to explicate the extent of how the water crisis is on the brink of conflict in north eastern Africa.
One may question why Ethiopia? My answers are grounded in three main assumptions. The first is based on the failed Anglo-Ethiopia treaty in 1902 which never materialized. The second assumption is based on the exclusion of Ethiopia since 1902 and the subsequent water agreement of 1929 between Britain and Egypt, and the 1959 water agreement between Egypt and Sudan after the latter became independent in 1956. The final assumption is the emergence of Ethiopia as an influential nation in the horn of Africa because of its military power in the sub region. This series of agreements between Egypt and other riparian states show the kind of desperation, albeit stalled, and consensus on a lasting peace agreement on the Nile river basin. The common adage that goes back to the dates of Aristotle and Herodotus says that ‘Egypt is the gift of the Nile’, has since has virtually become a natural resource endowment belonging only to Egypt.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, has pushed forward her demand to develop water resources through its initiation of a hydroelectric power plant along the Nile. However, for several decades Egypt has denied other riparian countries, including Ethiopia, complete access to water resources along the Nile, and for that matter has exercised her hegemonic powers over the development and control of the use of water resources in the Nile river basin for many decades. The Nile river basin has survived centuries, and for many years has served as Egypt’s economic hub, political power, and growth since ancient times. The water resources in the Nile Basin have also served as economic, political, social and cultural achievements of Egypt’s influence in the sub region (Wonddwossen, 2008; see also Flintan and Tamarat, 2002).
The water resources in the past were used as trade routes which, for centuries, enhanced Egypt’s mobile communication and international relations. Many early contacts of Egypt described Egypt as ‘the gift of the Nile’. This hegemonic status – enjoyed since the beginning of earlier civilizations of the ancient kingdoms of Egyptian civilization – compelled the ancient philosopher Herodotus to describe this civilization thus: ‘Egypt is the Nile and the Nile is Egypt’. This again coincides with the period of Egyptian economic boom and its political dominion. What has further entrenched Egypt’s position in the past, and which ultimately contributed to Egypt’s power over other riparian countries in the Nile river basin, is the 1929 water treaty agreement signed between Egypt and Britain (Flintan and Tamarat, 2002). Britain, then in charge of many riparian countries as colonies, negotiated with Egypt on behalf of its colonies, thereby giving Egypt the urge over other riparian countries in the use and access to water resources in the river basin. However, with the attainment of independence by these countries, high population growth, global warming, global economic crisis, natural disasters, political developments, pollution and resource depletion, and droughts among others, have impelled riparian countries to engage Egypt’s control in order to re-negotiate earlier water treaties and to abrogate all attempts by Egypt to control the use and development of water resources over the Nile (Ashton, 2002).
Egypt has been in control of the Nile rivers for a long time and has emerged as the major country that has complete access to the Nile. Shortages of water and water resources in Ethiopia – and of course Sudan – have prompted those countries to take a second look at Egypt’s access to the Nile, most especially Ethiopia’s attempt to confront Egypt regarding the Nile river. Berman and Paul concluded that the tension between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile is likely to escalate to war in the future. Due to Ethiopia’s rapidly growing population, in consequence, Ethiopia’s water demand has almost doubled in the last decade (Berman and Paul, 1999).
Nile River Basin and Declining Water Resources
The Nile river basin comprises 10 countries, namely Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. These countries are known as the 10 riparian countries due to their proximity to the Nile river basin (Wonddwossen, 2008; see Figure 1). It is the longest river in the world constituting about 6,700 km or 4,100 miles long and drains almost all of the 10 aforementioned countries. The flow of the Nile as a naturally endowed commodity has benefited the north eastern countries’ economic activities through agriculture and tourism. About 90% of Egypt’s land is desert and, therefore, many populations have concentrated along the Nile river basin due to the economic opportunities available along the Nile river basin coupled with irrigation activity for landscape farming and animal rearing (Alcamo et al., 1996). The complete dependence on water resources over the centuries has caused the Nile river basin to deplete, especially of essential material resources, causing high rates of unemployment, diseases and hunger in the countries depending on the water resources. Goulden and Conway (2009) argue that the resource depletion in the Nile river basin is due to three spatial factors, namely global green house effect, regional (through land use) and river basin (land management). This assertion is also consistent with Oxfam studies in the Askum region and the drought that has engulfed the entire country. In a brief quote Oxfam indicated the situation in Ethiopia: Climate variability in Ethiopia is not new – but now, in addition to the usual struggles, Ethiopians living in poverty are additionally suffering the effects of climate change – both more variable climate and more extreme weather events. People who are already poor and marginalized are struggling with the added burden of climate variability. For now, this means that the little that they have goes to dealing with the current unpredictable weather because their livelihoods are so dependent on it. When selling off assets becomes a mean to cope, there is little left to plan for the future. Thus communities are faced with simultaneously increasing climate variability, and with it increasing risk and vulnerability. (Oxfam, 2010: 4)
The Nile river basin and riparian states
Global warming due to climatic conditions and the green house emission effect, according to Goulden and Conway (2009), is one of the contributing factors for the recent water resource decline in the Nile river basin (Kim and Kaluarachchi, 2009). They argued that high temperature coupled with underground water reduction in the Blue Rivers in Egypt and Sudan is undergoing a drastic impact due to global warming. As a result, development along the Nile river has led to water resource pollutions by many riparian countries (Kim and Kaluarachchi, 2009). For example, the Ethiopian and Eritrean wars in the late 1990s polluted a substantial part of the river basin with military accoutrements and missile deposits. This pollution activity is further exacerbated by the huge population growth concentrated in the river basin. This population growth, according to the World Water Council (2006), has doubled in the last two decades, and continues to rise amidst migrations to the Nile river basin (World Water Council Report, 2006).
The impact of population pressures and the resource decline in the river basin is also consistent with Ashton’s (2002) argument that the southern and northern portions get less rainfall than their equatorial neighboring countries (World Water Council Report, 2006). For example, the Nile has two confluent tributaries connecting the White Nile and the Blue Nile; the Blue Nile, which is considered the most fertile for crop production, flows from Lake Tanna in Ethiopia through to Sudan from the south east (Wonddwossen, 2008). The Blue and White river basins also coincide with the division of upstream and downstream riparian countries and their source of water. While the upstream mainly benefit from water rainfall, downstream locations such as the Blue river basins enjoy the physical flow of water. Braune and Youngxin (2010) argue that the demand for allocation of water resources has witnessed several treaties and pointed out that ‘in the past 60 years there have been over 200 international treaties on water and only 37 cases reported on violence between countries’ (Braune and Youngxin, 2010: 14; see also Darwish, 1994). The magnitude of the problem resulted in a lack of adequate resolutions in resource allocation of water resources.
The impact of industrialization and mechanization has played a significant role as a result of expansion projects along the Nile river basin. In 2004 the Ethiopian minister for trade accused Egypt of using undiplomatic strategies to control Ethiopia’s development projects on the Nile. He said, ‘Egypt has been pressuring international financial institutions to desist from assisting Ethiopia in carrying out development projects in the Nile Basin’ (McGrath and Baraj, 2004).
Farming along the Nile is one of the major sources of livelihood for communities living along the concentrated Nile river basins, but the ensuing drought, famine, population growth and land degradation have impacted the water resources in the Nile river basin. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its 2010 report also argued that land degradation and deforestation in the river basin, due to excessive burning for land cultivation in many parts of the Nile river, has virtually eroded the oasis making it extremely tough for cultivation and water conservation (EPA, 2010).
Before the 1950s there was less resentment over the Nile water resources by riparian countries; however, with changing circumstances such as declining water resources, hunger, and diseases, riparian countries have decided to renegotiate amongst themselves in order to access the Nile. Kenya together with Ethiopia is pioneering this process, as seen in the cessionary address to parliament by the member of parliament for Kenya Paul Muite in 2004, who remarked ‘Kenyans are today importing agricultural produce from Egypt as a result of their use of the Nile water’. In a similar statement, Moses Wetangula, the assistant minister for foreign affairs, remarked ‘Kenya will not accept any restriction on use of lake Victoria or the river Nile’ and stated ‘it, however, does not wish to be a lone ranger in deciding how to use the waters, and has consequently sought the involvement of involved countries’ (EPA, 2010; McGrath and Baraj, 2004).
Methodology
Conflict Theory and the Collier-Hoeffler Model
Kofi Annan reiterated that Unsustainable practices are woven deeply into the fabric of modern life. Land degradation threatens food security. Forest destruction threatens biodiversity. Water pollution threatens public health, and fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflicts and wars in the future. (Kofi Annan, speech delivered to Association of American Geographers, 2001)
This statement is buttressed by Amery when he alluded to the Egyptian member of parliament’s assertion that Egypt’s ‘national security should not only be viewed in military terms, but also in terms of wars over waters’ (El Deen, 1998, cited in Amery, 2002: 4). The horn of Africa has been bedeviled by conflicts, both interstate and civil wars for several years now. These conflicts are mainly concentrated in northeast and central Africa. While many of these conflicts have been disputes over land occupation in mainly oil-rich areas of the Congo, others have been over the issue of diverting water resources. This article examines the water scarcity in the north east with an attempt to focus on Egypt and Ethiopia through the Collier-Hoefer (1998) model of theory of civil wars in order to construct the model on water scarcity with an attempt to reconcile the tensions over water resources and its effects on the people of north east Africa.
There have been several applications and interpretations of the earlier conflict theorists propounded by earlier scholars such as Karl Marx, Lenin, and Weber. The Collier-Hoeffer model (also known as the C-H model; 1998) is one such recent interpretation. Their analyses on conflict are based on the framework of many variables such as tribes, identities, economics, religion and social status in Africa; they subjected data to a regression analysis and concluded that, economic factors rather than ethnic, or religious, identities are the main causes of conflicts in Africa. In complementing this model with the earlier conflict theory propounded by Karl Marx, Marx recognized the significance of the social interactions within a given society. These interactions, according to Marx, are characterized by conflicts. Hence the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of the capitalist system forms a synthesis of the forces of the interaction within the system (Marx, 1909).
Marx again reiterated the fact that these social and human interactions are dialectical in the sense that, when a dominant nation seeks to control dependent nations or peripheral countries, what yields in consequence is the tension to rebel against the oppressor by dependent states in order to agitate for an equitable and fair share of national resources. This point is consistent with the C-H model when the authors argued with empirical data on the causes of conflicts in Africa, and concluded that economic factors are the significant predictor of conflict in many parts of the African continent. Therefore, according to the C-H model, economic reasons contribute, to a large extent, to the greater portion of conflicts in Africa (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; see also Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). While these economic reasons are varied and numerous due to the resources available in a given region and the allocation of resources, whether naturally endowed or man-made, any form of competition to control these resources or allocation of resources will naturally generate two outcomes: tension and potential conflict, and/or cooperation. In this case, Egypt’s sole access to the Nile for centuries has invariably gratified itself as the sole control of the Nile water resources.
As a result of the 1929 mandate that gave Egypt absolute control of water resources of the Nile, she has worked to sabotage many riparian countries through other diplomatic and international treaties. Ethiopia has vowed to engage Egypt over the control of water resources in the Nile valley basin. This is exemplified in many water agreements initiated by Ethiopia and the other riparian countries to abrogate all previous agreement hitherto entered by Egypt. Consequently, Stars (1991) argues that the looming tension between Egypt and the riparian countries initiated by Ethiopia is a recipe for conflict in north eastern Africa. For instance, these tensions are exemplified in Egypt’s response to Kenya’s assistant foreign affairs minister’s statement when Mohammed Abu Zeid, Egypt’s minister for water resources, remarked that Kenya’s statements were a ‘a declaration of war’ against Egypt and subsequently threatened Kenya with an economic and political embargo (British Broadbasting Corporation [BBC], 2003; see also Nkrumah, 2004).
This looming tension among riparian countries is further worsened by Kenya’s continuing threat of engagement. In 2002 a senior Kenyan minister, Raila Odinga, called for the review and renegotiation of the 1929 treaty which gave Egypt the right to veto construction projects on the Nile river basin, and said ‘it was signed on behalf of governments which were not in existence at that time’ (McGrath and Baraj, 2004). This article’s argument is further rooted in the idea that there are emerging players such as Kenya and Ethiopia in the horn of Africa as major hydro-political powers to engage Egypt’s hydro-hegemonic status. Prior to the Nile Basin initiative in February 1999, Wondwossen (2008) argues that there were several similar water treaties such as the 1993 Technical Committee to promote development cooperation among riparian countries. Also, in 1995, the Nile Basin Action Plan was launched, and in 1997 the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), through collaborations with the World Bank, attempted to foster cooperation among riparian countries to promote dialogue (BBC, 2003; see also Cascão, 2008).
This initiative, including earlier treaties already mentioned, shows the magnitude of the problem in the Nile Basin, and of course the consensus necessary to equitably allocate water resources and thereby encourage development projects along the Nile. In 2010, for instance, Ethiopia announced that it was initiating a hydro-electric development project in order to improve its country’s electric and energy needs. This announcement a few days later saw resentment by Egypt and Egypt made an attempt to veto any such policy along the Nile. While Ethiopia is poised to make this project a reality, Egypt has begun galvanizing international support in order to prevent Ethiopia from undertaking such a project. Cascão (2008) argued that the asymmetrical flow of water resources in the Nile river basin and the access to physical flow of the Blue Nile by Egypt and Sudan downstream has extremely heightened hydro-political tension over the Nile.
These tensions have attracted United Nations interventions – as well as from other international organizations – on matters concerning the distribution and allocation of water resources in the Nile river basin and in which compensation is offered to other riparian countries with unequal access to the distribution of water resources, especially those upstream who only benefit from rainfall (Cascão, 2008). Thus, in 1999, nine riparian countries met in Dar Es Salem, Tanzania, as the Council of Minister of Water Affairs of Nile River Basin Countries and agreed to cooperate in solidarity for equitable allocation of water resources in the Nile Basin as well as for economic integration through sustainable development (Cascão, 2008). This economic solidarity through cooperation is declared in the Nile Basin Initiative as the shared vision by riparian countries to promote cooperation and economic well being, while at the same time ‘to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources’ (The Nile Basin Initiative [NBI], 2010). This Nile Basin Initiative is the first attempt by riparian countries to push demand for equal access to the Nile, whilst at the same time promoting economic cooperation. Egypt’s defiance of the NBI and its lack of participation in the NBI’s initial attempt to convene such a cooperation agreement is a crucial aspect of the NBI’s objective to consolidate through cooperation in the negotiation for equitable distribution. The subsequent institutional mechanism for policy guidelines for riparian countries to agree to follow is set forth by the NBI in order to stimulate cooperation rather than intimidation in the allocation of water resources. The following objectives were set up by the NBI in February 1999:
To develop the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure:
prosperity, security, and peace for all its peoples;
efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources;
cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries, seeking win–win gains;
to target poverty eradication and promote economic integration;
to ensure that the program results in a move from planning to action (NBI, 2010).
Thus among the NBI’s core functions, among others, is the promotion of water resource management, water resource development and capacity building enhanced through cooperation. These initiatives have proven worthwhile in preventing escalation of a major conflict in the region, although there are still tensions among riparian countries along the Nile. Egypt still exercises hydro-hegemonic powers in the region because of her absolute control of the Nile Basin, but Egypt has participated and is willing to cooperate with other riparian countries in bringing lasting solutions to the increasing demand of water resources in the Nile river basin. When it comes down to water resource allocation and distribution, it has always been sidelined and not considered a significant issue in the solution to the Nile problem.
Africa’s interstate conflicts in the past have been on a number of issues such as ethnic and tribal as well as land disputes and acquisitions. The discovery of oil, however, has proven to be a blessing in disguise in many of the oil regions in Africa. In the Congo, for instance, there have been several conflicts with rebels over the control of oil regions in Brazzaville. This area has not been spared violence and mayhem for several decades now. In Nigeria, for example, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has created havoc and tensions culminating in violence and attacks on oil expatriates. These oil regions in Africa today are bedeviled with conflicts and violent attacks in order to control oil resources. And the less said about the diamond and gold areas of sub Saharan Africa the better. Similarly, and consistent with the paradigm this article takes, is the assertion that water conflicts, like many of the natural endowed assets bestowed on the African continent, are a bane for the continent’s development. In the cases of the Nile, although there is not any imminent conflict, scholars are predicting that the lack of concrete and up-to-date resolution on the water policy regarding the distribution of water resources on the Nile is a recipe for conflict in the region.
Relations of Power
As already mentioned, and by extension of Herodotus’ comments on Egypt as ‘the gift of the Nile’, this view has been extrapolated by Egypt in order to exercise hydro-political power in the Nile river basin for several decades. This status Egypt has enjoyed for some time now without allowing any riparian countries along the Nile to negotiate any form of control on water resources and development projects such as hydro-electric power by neighboring countries. The asymmetrical flow of water resources in the Nile has also afforded Egypt a position of dominance compared to other riparian countries who are situated upstream on the Nile. The Nile’s downstream is currently housed by Egypt and Sudan, a consequence of Sudan’s attempt to renegotiate Egypt’s unilateral control on the Nile (NBI, 2010).
In 1959 a water agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan gave Egypt 55bcm and 18bcm to Sudan. Again this uneven allocation of resources points to asymmetrical power relations of riparian countries’ ability to negotiate with Egypt to access water resources (NBI, 2010). Cascão (2008) provides a theoretical understanding on this hydro-power hegemony of Egypt in controlling water resources, and indicated that the hegemonic power of Egypt is due to many factors in the horn of Africa, but argues that this hegemonic status is about to end as counter hydro hegemonic powers are beginning to emerge in order to contest Egypt’s long-standing hegemony in the region. I agree with Cascão, and in fact her analysis is in line with my argument that the position Egypt finds herself in is about to change due to, first, the declining rate of water resources in the Nile. This is because, in the past when life was booming, riparian countries made no mention of inequity of water resource; however, with the emergence of a global water crisis due to global warming, these riparian countries are beginning to contest power relations and access to the Nile.
Cascão (2008) points to ‘apparent consent’ to illustrate the apparently lackadaisical attitudes of consent by riparian countries. This apparent consent, Cascão argues, was latent consent by riparian countries along the Nile on many agreements that were signed as far back in 1902. Ethiopia is a case in point. In many of these water treaties, Cascão points to about 60 water agreements since the first one in 1902 which either ignored Ethiopia or which Ethiopia decided to apparently consent to by keeping mute on the issue. But what is significant is a looming civil war among riparian countries. There have been scuffles between Sudan and Burundi, also Ethiopia and Eritrea and Rwanda and Somalia in the past several decades without totally engaging Egypt’s hydro-hegemonic power in the region, given the emerging hydro political configuration that is beginning to unravel (NBI, 2010). In order to understand the relations of power and dominance with regards to the situation in the Nile river basin it is prudent to again invoke Cascão’s analysis of power and dominance as they have significantly hinged on Ethiopia’s counter hegemonic strategy in the Nile river basin for some time now. Cascão begins by citing Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as ‘political power that flows from intellectual and moral leadership, authority, or consensus as distinguished from armed force’ (Gramsci, 1971, cited in Cascão, 2008: 18). She continues to argue ‘power is relational and the outcome of hegemonic power relations is determined by the interaction of diverse actors’ (Cascão, 2008: 18); diverse actors for me seem meaningful and significant here in terms of the power relations. It can be recalled that there are 10 riparian countries, each diverse with varied needs and demands in regard to the fair allocation of water resources of the Nile. This diversity is yet galvanized for a common interest as seen in the Nile Basin initiative put forth by the nine riparian countries.
Once again the significant portion that Egypt occupies comes under a counter hegemonic truce by riparian countries to renegotiate earlier treaties concerning the Nile river allocation of resources, which is consistent with Cascão’s (2008) assertion that ‘power relations are not static or immutable’ (p. 18) and points to a dialectical thesis of challenging the status, thereby bringing in a new status quo with alternatives. This dialectic is one earlier propounded by Marx and Lenin in their conflict theories regarding the suppression of groups and their simultaneous revolt of the existing status quo. In the case of the river basin, these riparian countries see themselves as having asymmetrical power relations with Egypt, and because of Egypt’s consistent dominance in both economic and hegemonic political relations in the sub region, there is an attempt to contest existing status quo as seen in the earlier water treaties and allocation of resources in the Nile Basin.
Based on the accusations and counter accusations on the allocation of water resources along the Nile, Ethiopia, like Egypt, has both galvanized for support in terms of international diplomacy and legitimacy over the use of resources in the Nile. While Egypt continues to maintain its legitimacy based of the earlier water agreements and proclamations that exclusively gave Egypt dominance with the right to veto any development projects, Ethiopia has taken its stands to engage Egypt on talks to renegotiate Ethiopia’s position with regards to the Nile resources. When it comes to international funding on the Nile river basin, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has withheld funds for development along the Nile because of the looming tension between the riparian countries but has promised not to get itself tangled in the crisis (World Water Council Report, 2009).
‘Water Sharing’ or ‘Benefit Sharing’
The debate as to whether ‘water sharing’ or ‘benefit sharing’ is possible has dominated much scholarly discourse on the Nile issue. According to Wonddwossen (2008: 40), benefit sharing is ‘the distribution of benefits through cooperation’ and he argues furthermore that ‘benefit sharing gives riparian states the chance to share the benefits derived from the use of water rather than the physical distribution of water itself’ (Wondwossen, 2008: 40; World Water Council Report, 2009). Wonddwossen’s analysis regarding benefit sharing through cooperation sounds a laudable alternative to riparian countries’ capacity to cooperate in order to tap water resources, but this argument is idealistic given the power relations along the Nile, and the asymmetrical flow of water resources in the upstream and downstream countries could be difficult to ascertain (see Figure 2). I offer the following reason to buttress my argument.
The up- and downstream of the Nile river basin
Most significantly, the lack of political will to cooperate by riparian countries is the main reason benefit sharing could be difficult to achieve. Several water agreements have been launched since the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian water agreement that gave Egypt the exclusive power to monitor development activities along the Nile. The lack of political will is clearly demonstrated by Ethiopia’s ‘apparent consent’ to many water treaties that have been passed. The most recent treaty, the Nile Basin Cooperative Frame Work Agreement, launched in 1997–2007, shows the nature of participation by riparian countries to cooperate in order to achieved common goals and the allocation of water resources. This lack of political will is also consistent with Wonddwossen’s argument that the lack of political leadership has exacerbated the situation to the extent that, at present, there is no international treaty or agreement that binds riparian countries together, although the many cooperative agreements between upstream and downstream riparian countries have sidelined issues bordering benefit sharing in their agenda (World Water Council Report, 2009).
In addition, a problem in benefit sharing cooperative agreements is the fact that many riparian countries come from different political and socio-cultural backgrounds and are therefore prone to a series of political and civil upheavals that will endanger any attempt by riparian countries to cooperate for mutual benefit sharing. The most significant one is the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict that has rocked the region for several years, and also the Somalia civil conflicts, and the Rwanda–Burundi and many others in Sudan have worked to prevent many cooperative agreements to realize its potential. Although mutual benefit is essential, its implementation to a full potential is unattainable. This argument is also supported by Cascão when she argued that cooperative agreement can be a ‘battle ground for opposing tendencies’ (p. 24). There is also the issue of Egypt’s power and international diplomacy over the region. It is indeed important to acknowledge the role of Egypt’s diplomatic relations in the past that ushered in its dominance over the Nile. The strategic position of Egypt on the Suez Canal has been a strategic location for British involvement in Egypt and for British access to India through the canal. This important location of Egypt was advanced by British interest in India (Cascão, 2008). Cooperative agreement regarding ‘benefit sharing’ by both upstream and downstream riparian states has always been at a deadlock. The recent NBI has been used as a platform by Ethiopia to get the 1959 water agreement between Egypt and Sudan annulled, since Ethiopia was excluded, and for that matter the other seven riparian countries in order to enact a comprehensive water policy that will promote the advancement of cooperative water sharing without hostilities.
Additionally, a significant factor that hampers any cooperative agreement on benefit sharing is Egypt’s diplomatic influence in the region. If all riparian countries agree to benefit share, these cooperative agreements may be lopsided and, for that matter, benefit Egypt more than the other riparian because of Egypt’s diplomacy with Britain and the United States, and international organizations including the Arab league. This point is argued in Wonddwossen when he said: Egypt has been pressuring international institutions to desist from assisting Ethiopia in carrying out development projects in the Nile Basin … it has used its influence to persuade the Arab world not to provide Ethiopia with any loans or grants for Nile water development. (2008: 38)
My final alternative is that several water sharing agreements have been adopted by riparian countries at least since 1959 between Sudan and Egypt in terms of allocation of water resources. This allocation which earmarked 18bcm to Sudan and 55BCM to Egypt is seen by Sudan as an unfair deal and they have since pushed forward for renegotiation on the allocation of water resources that has given Egypt an unfair proportional distribution of resources and for development projects on the Nile. This last alternative could be dangerous because physical allocation of water resources are to be shared among riparian countries through demarcation, and land demarcation and allocation of resources have been one of the dangerous ingredients in a recipe for conflicts currently ongoing on the continent; to physically allocate resources is nothing but to add more insult to injury. With emerging hydro-political powers in the region, Ethiopia and Egypt could dominate other countries and for that matter wage physical wars in order to control water resources.
On the basis of these discussions, it can be said that because of the nature of tension in north eastern Africa, most especially the Nile, riparian countries are on the brink of conflict over the control and use of Nile water resources. As already pointed out, Collier-Hoeffler’s (1998) predictions of conflicts in Africa did not cite the potential danger which the Nile poses; but what is significant about the model is their empirical evidence and the correlations of resource endowments and countries situated on coastal regions as becoming sources of conflicts and underdevelopment in Africa. And since water is a vital part of the economic resources of Africa, this article concludes that the water resources just as any other economic resource have the potential for tension and conflict, especially over the Nile river basin by riparian states.
Footnotes
Majeed A Rahman is the Executive Secretary of Combat Human Trafficking, and a PhD candidate in Political Economy and Public Policy, Department of Africology, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA.