The Swazi Monarchy and the Poor Performance of the Swazi Anti-Corruption Agency,2006–2009

Introduction

Academic concern about the relationship between corruption and development in developing countries has grown over the years (Brockington, 2008: 107). Combatting or failure to combat corruption is now considered to be an important variable in analyzing a country’s commitment to achieving development (Hope and Chikulo, 2000). The concern about corruption and development in the developing world is motivated by high levels of poverty of the majority of the citizens. As is the case in most of the developing world, African countries are engaged in setting up institutions and structures to combat corruption.

It has been observed that the first decade of the 21st century has witnessed a wave of initiatives to combat corruption and these have emerged at the international, regional and domestic levels (Quarcoo, 2009). In an effort to comply with their international treaty obligations and allay the concerns of their international partners, African nations have promulgated anti-corruption agencies (Quarcoo, 2009). For Southern Africa, it has been observed that ‘the prevailing tendency is to establish dedicated anti-corruption agencies/units’ (Zvekic, 2002). It has been argued that such a reaction is encouraged by the World Bank’s view that controlling corruption was essential for attaining the much-desired economic development (Lawson, 2009). Swaziland is among the Southern African countries that have established an anti-corruption agency supported by a comprehensive legal framework. However, the paradox is that, in spite of the existence of such an agency, the king, together with some ministers, has come out in public to say development efforts were undermined by a high level of corruption.

This paper interrogates the performance of the anti-corruption agency in Swaziland. The paper shows that, since its inception, the agency has been ineffective in combatting corruption. It argues that the failure of the anti-corruption programme in Swaziland is mainly located in the institution of monarchy, especially to the extent that it allows itself to be a sanctuary to corrupt people. The paper argues that Swaziland’s governance system of absolute monarchy undermines the functioning of the anti-corruption agency as those close or associated with the monarchy are beyond the reach of the agency.

Methodology

This paper is anchored on qualitative interviews carried out among ordinary citizens in Swaziland. The interviews were a product of purposive sampling aimed at getting the views of some members of society on the issue of corruption in the country. Consequently the interviews were not meant to be nationally representative but to indicate the thinking of some ordinary Swazi from different parts of the country. Carrying out a nationally representative survey was beyond the financial resources at the disposal of the researcher. These interviews constitute the narratives of individuals who have observed, and at times experienced, corruption in their daily lives. These narratives provide profound insights into perceptions of corruption in the country. As has been the case in other countries, they are indicators of the perceptions of citizens about the functioning of the state (Gupta, 2005). Because the discourse on corruption is a sensitive one, the names used in the paper are all pseudonyms to protect the identity of the informants. However, the names of the places where the interviews were conducted are real.

The nature and focus of the study precluded interviewing members of the royal family and those associated with it because it interrogates the role of the monarchy in the failure of attempts to combat corruption. Much as the monarchy and its associates are stakeholders in the discourse on corruption in the country, interviewing them would have compromised the security of the researcher. As far as employees of the anti-corruption agency are concerned, they were not interviewed because the official explanation of the failure of the agency is already available and their testimony cannot add value to the research.

Desk-top research also contributed to the collection of data for the study. This provided both primary and secondary documents that added value to the construction and conceptualization of ideas informing the discourse on corruption in Swaziland.

Conceptual Considerations

While corruption remains one of the concerns of all nations, it remains one of the most difficult concepts to define. Different scholars and other commentators have come up with different definitions. Richard Tambulasi has argued that corruption is the ‘illegal transfer of public resources from public to private’ (Tambulasi, 2009: 176). In an almost similar construction, Jamieson has argued that it is the ‘misuse of public power for private profit’ (Jamieson, 2001: 380). Georg Cremer has argued that, ‘Corruption is used to describe a wide spectrum of behaviours in an individual’s economic and political environment from illicit to illegitimate behaviour to behaviour that is simply considered undesirable by the person using the word’ (Cremer, 2008: 9). These and many other definitions of corruption highlight the action of individuals to appropriate public resources for individual gain. It needs to be noted that defining corruption remains contextual and dependent on the angle of analysis and inquiry. The concept of corruption is very complex because it has ‘cultural and moral connotations’ (Tambulasi and Kayuni, 2007: 165). To some scholars corruption is a normal part of the political practice of the wider patron–client relationships within which politics are embedded (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This view has been reasserted in a different way by some scholars who have argued that corruption is not a phenomenon but an everyday part of the politics of the governed (Chatterjee, 2004).

While scholars differ in defining corruption, there is also no agreement on the relationship between corruption and development. One theory posits that corruption is necessary to keep developing countries functioning in their pursuit of development (Heidenheimer et al., 1999). This theory could be traced to Nathaniel Leff, who argued that a negative view of corruption was a prejudice held by individuals (Leff, 1964). Advocates of this theory see corruption as a positive contribution to development because it removes development unfriendly intrusions in the economic process, speeds up bureaucratic processes, provides an incentive to qualified civil servants, and it can act as a source of capital accumulation (Cremer, 2008). This theory has been strongly criticized by scholars such as Gunnar Myrdal (1968). Recent literature has shown that the claim that corruption has a positive effect on development goals fails to address the reality of developing countries (Alam, 1989, 1990; Bardhan, 1997).

An opposite theory posits that corruption undermines development and contributes to continued poverty in developing countries. It is argued that corruption is ‘behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private – regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violets rules against the exercise of certain types of private – regarding influence’ (Nye, 1967: 419). Influenced by this approach, Kofi Annan once pointed out that ‘Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment’ (Annan, 2003: xvi). Jonathan Lucas has emphasized the uneven impact of corruption, arguing that

Corruption hurts us all, but it hurts the poor most. When money is diverted into private pockets, society suffers. People lose confidence in public institutions, foreign investment stays away, and poverty and crime flourish. Development stagnates as people and capital take flight. (Lucas, 2007: 41)

Farai Chiweshe has argued that ‘Corruption redirects scarce national resources, intended for the public good, into the hands of dishonest individuals; it raises the cost of basic goods and services; it discourages foreign and domestic investment, and economic development; and it inhibits political stability’ (Chiweshe, 2007: 71). It has also been observed that corruption is a ‘cancer whose corrosive spread hinders and obstructs development’ (Shah, 2009: 295). Most importantly, ‘It has the power to ruin livelihoods and, under certain circumstances, to take lives’ (Transparency International, 2005: 328).

The theory that posits that corruption makes a positive contribution to development in developing countries cannot be easily dismissed, but it has lost ground. Evidence from most developing countries suggests that corruption has impinged on the process of development. The discussion in this paper views corruption as having a negative impact on development, and as a practice that is not to the benefit of the majority of citizens in developing countries (Wei, 1999). It hurts the poor who do not command political influence as services such as education and health become less available in the free market (Gupta et al., 2000).

Official and Public Perceptions of Corruption in Swaziland

According to official and public wisdom, Swaziland has experienced both petty corruption which includes small bribes to obtain everyday services and grand corruption that includes payments to secure government contracts or major licenses, change regulations or influence the shape of laws. As is the case in other African states, there have been numerous cases of over-billing, bribes, kick backs, ‘ghost’ employees, retainers for relatives, excessive overtime claims, personal use of pension claims and state vehicles, misappropriation of state and donor funds, extravagant travel abroad for suspect state purposes, and the falsification of public documents and records (Grundy, 2000: 46). It is extremely difficult to research corruption in Swaziland. It is a sensitive topic, and researching it can be dangerous to the researcher.

The study of corruption in Swaziland is limited by lack of concrete empirical data on corruption, but this is not unique as it has been observed that ‘the study of corruption beyond the realm of opinion surveys is still in its infancy’ (Fisman and Miguel, 2007: 1021). In Swaziland, most indications and revelations of corruption only come out in the observations of individual citizens and the print media. The first official and public revelation of the extent of corruption was made by the Minister of Finance, Majozi Sithole, when he said, ‘The twin evils of bribery and corruption have become the order of the day in the country . . . the economy is dying gradually because of this practice, and the citizens are placed under a heavy yoke’ (Irinews.com, 2005: xvii). The minister continued to estimate that corruption was costing the Swazi economy approximately R40 million a month.

This revelation was received with mixed feelings depending on the class positions of individuals concerned. For the poor and those hard hit by corruption, this was a revelation and confirmation of the extent to which the country was being impoverished through corrupt activities. For those who belong to the circle of corrupt public and private officials, the minister was exaggerating the cost of corruption to the country. Academics questioned the statement because the minister failed to provide a source for his assertion. Whatever the criticisms levelled against the minister, his statement highlighted the fact that Swaziland’s economy was being undermined by corrupt activities.

Realizing that the issue of corruption was becoming a public concern in a more pronounced manner, in 2006 the Prime Minister publicly stated that corruption remained a challenge to the government and that the government needed the cooperation of the public, business, the media and the international community to effectively combat it. This was a very important shift in the manner in which the government was approaching the issue of corruption. The shift was toward including more social players in the fight against corruption. The Prime Minister was shifting to a multi-sectoral approach in dealing with corruption. This crucial shift in thinking was probably motivated by the involvement of United Nations agencies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. It was a necessary strategy for the mobilization of funds and pacification of donors.

Public statements by King Mswati III have also indicated the occurrence of corruption in Swaziland. He has denounced corruption and the manner in which it has pervaded society, but more particularly the public sector. His public statement indicated that his main concern was the effect of corruption on the economy of the country, especially its ability to undermine attempts at poverty reduction. In one of his speeches in 2006, the king stated that

While we might be able to put a lot of effort in fast-tracking our economy, we must be alert to the fact that corruption is yet another factor that cripples the nation’s development efforts. If left unchecked, corruption will certainly destroy our economy and reverse the gains of the past. (King Mswati III, 2006)

It must be noted that public official statements against corruption in Swaziland in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century had an international context. At this time, Swaziland had committed herself to addressing the problem of corruption by signing regional, continental, and international agreements. These included the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol against Corruption; the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. These commitments put pressure on the Swazi leadership to be seen to be addressing the problem of corruption. Following the arguments of neo-liberal economists, corruption is viewed as a development problem and states that are not seen to be dealing with it may not be popular destinations for foreign capital investment.

In addition to public statements by the Swazi leadership and government officials, the occurrence of corruption in Swaziland is demonstrated through the testimonies of some citizens. Zacharia Dlomo came out with a very interesting assertion:

I am not sure why you people ask me if there is corruption in Swaziland because I think it is there for everybody to see. In fact corruption is part of Swazi culture because our indigenous government system is characterized by corruption and the modern government structure is a prominent niche for corruption. If you want to see the king soonest, you have to bribe someone; you want a job, bribe someone you will get it even if you do not qualify for the job; if you want to win a government tender, bribe someone; and if you want to short-circuit the legal system, a court official will be available for you to bribe. In fact, even the king in Swaziland can be bribed one way or the other, and the only thing you will have to do is to give your act a traditional name. (Interview, Zacharia Dlomo, Manzini, 2009)

Another revealing statement was made by Lungelo Jele:

Corruption is in the vein of the Swazi. It has been prevalent in the country from 1968 when we achieved independence. I say so because I do not know much about what was happening when the country was under British colonial rule. Presently, every level of Swazi society is engaged in corrupt activities of one sort or the other. It starts from the royal family at the top and permeates down to the masses below. I say this not out of spite but because some members of the royal family are affluent through proceeds of corruption. They have become conveyers of high positions of the state as they are bribed to influence the king to appoint individuals into high positions. With the lack of transparency in appointing Ministers, I would not be surprised if most Ministers bribed their way into Cabinet. (Interview, Lungelo Jele, Manzini, 2009)

Sabelo Ndlangamandla also felt that corruption was a source of riches for some in Swaziland.

There is probably no aspect of life that is not informed by corruption in Swaziland. Today the country has millionaires through proceeds from corruption. This is particularly the case with those who have won government tenders. They practically loot the state in broad daylight because who can remove the ‘speck from a brother’s eye’. It is very difficult to deal with this issue because most of the people entrusted with the responsibility of combatting corruption are themselves very corrupt. (Interview, Sabelo Ndlangamandla, Matsapha, 2009)

An opposite view was expressed by Zibuse Yende:

I am not aware of this corruption you are talking about. The main problem with you people is that you have a tendency of calling things done by the king as corruption. How can the king be corrupt because everything that is in this country belongs to him. The Swazi of today are not grateful for having such a wonderful king who goes to different countries begging for money for their upliftment. Once you people get educated you become disrespectful. As far as I know there is no corruption in the royal family or even in the country as a whole. When people thank each other through gifts, why should I call that corruption? (Interivew, Zibuse Yende, Njojane, 2009)

From official statements and perceptions of some ordinary citizens, it is clear that Swaziland is faced with the problem of corruption and very little success has been achieved in curbing it. Public complaints about corruption have, in part, been heightened by increasing poverty. It is estimated that in 2000 about 66% of the Swazi lived below the poverty line (defined as R71.00 per month; Swaziland Government, 2000). Presently, evidence indicates that the situation has become worse as it is estimated that 70% of Swazi are living below the poverty line (Swazi Observer, 7 July. 2009). It is also estimated that about 10% of the Swazi population consumes above 50% of the national income. Clearly Swaziland is a country of huge inequalities and, according to official public statements, corruption has contributed significantly to these inequalities through undermining economic development efforts. The occurrence of corruption in Swaziland is not unique as ‘There is corruption in most countries, but it is nearly always worse – and more economically distorting – in non-democracies’ (Ferguson, 2008: 27).

The Swaziland Anti-Corruption Programme

Corruption is many-faceted and can be deep-rooted within African countries, and it is always necessary to create institutions of combatting it (Deegan, 2009). In spite of the fact that corruption has a long history in Swaziland, the first piece of legislation aimed at combatting corruption was the Prevention of Corruption Act ( Swaziland Government, 1986). This legislation also failed to make a difference as there were no individuals prosecuted for corruption and there was no indication that corruption was decreasing. This act had a very narrow interpretation of the location of corruption in Swaziland as it targeted only public officers and attempted to criminalize bribery in the private sector. The act adopted ‘the presumption of corruption on the sole basis of unexplained lifestyle or assets’ (Goredema, 2002: 32). This act was not supported by any institutional body to make it operate. It subsisted for about six years, and in that period no person was investigated or prosecuted under the act.

Out of the ashes of the 1986 act was born the Prevention of Corruption Order (PCO) of 1993 (Swaziland Government, 1993). The order appears to have been born out of concerns about increasing levels of corruption in the public sector. There were strong feelings that corruption was eroding the economic gains made in the early decades of political independence. The official explanation of the failure was that it was not well capacitated to carry out its functions because it had no sound administrative structure and financial base. It has also been pointed out that ‘There was also the problem of interference from various authorities . . .’ (Transparency International, 2006/7: 14). The Prevention of Corruption Order remained ineffective as the institution of monarchy was used by corrupt officials and members of the royal family to undermine the authority of the legislation. According to some commentators this was because corrupt government officials remained the ones to enforce the order. Maxwell Dlamini said:

Our first attempt at combatting corruption was a good initiative but there was no way it could have succeeded. The same is true of the order that was made law in 1993 which was also just a piece of legislation with no strategy of implementation. Most importantly, it was imposed on a very corrupt structure which at the same time carried the responsibility of enforcement. At the end of the day the order was simply a ‘paper tiger’ with no resolve for implementation. (Interview, Maxwell Dlamini, Matsapha, 2009)

The third element of the Swaziland anti-corruption programme was the creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 1998 (Swaziland Government, 1988). This was the first attempt at institutionalizing efforts against corruption. Legally, the commission was founded on the Prevention of Corruption Order of 1993 and for the first time the country had an agency responsible for combatting corruption. Its chief mandate was to conduct investigation work, corruption prevention, and public education programmes. Its creation was against the backdrop of a public outcry about the escalation of corruption in the country. For instance, there was an outcry about an amount of R50 million meant for capacity building for job creation that disappeared and the responsible officials could not account for it. There was also an outcry of corruption around the Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) fund whereby most of the money was not used for the intended purpose but found its way into the pockets of high-ranking civil servants and school principals. Like its predecessor, the commission failed to function as intended. It has been argued that it failed because of the absence of a substantive commissioner and poorly trained officials (Shabangu, 2007). However, a more thorough investigation points to much deeper limitations. It appears that the commission was formed as a paper institution without any capacity. From the very beginning it was faced with serious operational problems such as shortage of qualified staff, equipment, office accommodation and transport. It also faced a legal constraint in that its relationship with the Directorate of Public Prosecution was cumbersome and hindering.

The non-functioning of the commission was compounded in 2003 when the High Court of Swaziland ruled that the Prevention of Corruption Order of 1993 on which the commission was founded was improperly promulgated and therefore had neither force nor effect in law. The ruling brought the commission to a standstill as its existence and operation was brought into question. For about three years after the ruling all employees of the commission were paid for performing no duties at all. This was a serious drain to the ailing economy of the country. The government resolved to get out of this unpleasant situation by promulgating the Prevention of Corruption Act of 2006 (Swaziland Government, 2006).

Subsequent to the promulgation of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the United Nations Development Corporation (UNDP) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) pumped money into promoting the agenda for combatting corruption in Swaziland. The main focus was on crafting a national strategy for combatting corruption and capacitating the commission in terms of staff development and training. The involvement of the United Nations agencies made the crafting of the national strategy transparent and consultative. Private sector and civil society workshops were conducted to allow these groupings to contribute to the formation of the strategy. These workshops also involved officials from the public sector who communicated the government view on combatting corruption. This consultative process was very useful as it produced constructive contributions from all the sectors. The main product of this consultation was the formulation of the Swaziland National Anti-Corruption Strategy (SNACS) in August 2006, and for the first time Swaziland had a mechanism to facilitate the operation of the anti-corruption commission.

With the aforementioned institutional framework and mechanism for combatting corruption, there was optimism that the country was on its way to seriously combatting corruption. Different segments of the Swazi population were caught in this optimism as there was hope that, with a revamped commission equipped with better trained personnel and a national strategy for combatting corruption, the country had empowered itself to bring to an end one of the major pillars of poverty and destitution. Sabelo Dladla said:

The country has been drained by corrupt activities perpetrated by individuals since independence. For decades nothing was done to curb the scourge. The economy of the country continued to be undermined, and poverty levels escalated. The formation of the anti-corruption commission gives us hope that corruption will be brought to an end or significantly reduced. I am very optimistic that with effective combat of corruption many Swazis will be liberated from the clutches of poverty and deprivation. Having said that, we need to be aware that Swaziland is a very strange country where leaders are not ashamed to undermine even the smartest decisions. (Interview, Sabelo Dladla, Mafutseni, 2009)

Amid the optimism, pessimist voices have been heard. Zwelakhe Mhlongo stated:

There is no doubt that the formation of the anti-corruption commission is a positive development. However, I cannot see it achieving its objective of effectively curbing corruption in a holistic manner. The Swazi leadership is very corrupt itself and it will compromise the success of the commission. Maybe the commission will be able to ‘fry’ the small fish, but the big fish will continue to swim in the deep waters of corruption. So far we have made too much of the issue of political will, without thinking what it really means in Swaziland. (Interview, Zwelakhe Mhlongo, Malindza, 2009)

While Swaziland has followed the trend of forming anti-corruption agencies, it is important to realize that:

The issue of implementation of any anti-corruption policy and legislation is rather complex. It covers such issues, for example, the operationalization of the political will through political support and political determination to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate any person or institution suspected of being involved in corrupt practice or act . . . (Zvekic, 2002: 23)

Roots of the Failure of the Swaziland Anti-Corruption Programme

There is a growing body of literature that examines the factors behind the success or failure of anti-corruption programmes in Africa (Doig et al., 2005; Fombad, 1999; Meagher, 2005). Chartey Quarcoo has concluded that ‘nations that emphasize the prosecutorial functions of their anti-corruption bodies risk undercutting their sustainability’ (Quarcoo, 2009: 33). Quarcoo used the South African and Nigerian anti-corruption agencies to show that anti-corruption agencies that combine the power to prosecute in their functioning are less successful because prosecution becomes politicized. This is a sound argument, but does not explain the failure of those agencies that do not have the power to prosecute, and therefore this argument is theoretically sound in understanding the Swaziland situation. In the Swaziland case, failure of the anti-corruption agency is rooted beyond the internal dynamics of the agency.

Down to the second half of 2009, the Swaziland anti-corruption agency was still not off the starting blocks if judged in terms of cases investigated and people prosecuted. After three years, the restructured commission remained a failure and showed no signs of moving forward except for two cases, one involving a managing director (MD) of a semi-governmental body, and another of two employees of a government department who failed to declare personal assets (Weekend Observer, 19–20 September, 2009). The failure of the commission was highlighted by a Ministry of Justice Portfolio Committee in Senate which observed that ‘there appeared that very little had been achieved by the commission since being revamped’ (Times of Swaziland, 21 April, 2009). So serious is the issue of the failure of the commission that some whistleblowers have decided to report cases of corruption direct to the Prime Minister (Times of Swaziland, 1 June, 2009). Officially the failure has been blamed on the inability of the leadership of the commission to get the agency into action. However, a more nuanced analysis shows that the paralysis in which the commission is caught is much deeper than a simple critique of the leadership of the commission. It has to do with governance problems that have faced the Swaziland anti-corruption programme since its inception in 1986.

It is the institution of absolute monarchy that has contributed largely in undermining the effectiveness of the agency. Swaziland is governed through a dual system whose origin can be traced to British colonial rule, but consolidated after independence in 1968. It includes what the Swazi call the ‘traditional system’ which includes the king, the queen-mother, members of the royal family, regional chiefs, and all those who support the monarchy. After independence, the king who led the ‘traditionalists’ assumed absolute power and built extensive patron–client relations that grew to dominate the country’s system of governance. These are the relations which Richard Sandbrook in his analysis of governance systems in African countries has called ‘neo-patrimonialism’ (Sandbrook, 1985). Monarchical absolutism under this system was consolidated through a governance system called Tinkhundla (Simelane, 2006).

There is also what the Swazi call a ‘modern system’ built on the Westminster model headed by a Prime Minister (Libby, 1987). He has a cabinet together with all relevant structures that make for a modern state. There is a parliamentary system that is supposed to play an oversight role and is put together using the traditional system of Tinkhundla. The country’s ‘modern system’ is a window to the outside world. It makes the country relate to regional, continental and international bodies, organizations and institutions. Yet this centre of power is subordinated to the traditional system through royal absolutism (Baloro, 1994). The king has the power to overturn any decisions made by anybody in the country, thus making all policies to be ‘a monarchical prerogative which renders the rest of the [structures] ineffective and therefore window dressers’ (Transparency International, 2006/7: 20).

The constitution of the country has entrenched monarchical absolutism above the law as chapter II, article 11 (a) states that ‘The King and iNgwenyama shall be immune from suit or legal process in any cause in respect of all things done or omitted to be done by him’ (Swaziland Government, 2005). What is crucial about this provision is that, in the Swaziland situation, such immunity does not end with the person of the king but virtually protects all individuals within the patron–client relations constructed by the king, regional chiefs and members of the royal family, and this would include more than half of the Swazi population. This means that, if you are the king’s appointee or have influence in royal circles, you only need to mention the king’s name and the anti-corruption agency can not investigate you for any form of corruption. This is the case because ‘It is common knowledge that the use of the king’s name in whatever transaction assures compliance’ (Transparency International, 2006/7: 13). Because the king is above the law his name has been used to escape investigation and possible prosecution for serious acts of corruption. Indeed:

It is rare to have punitive legal action taken against individuals in senior public office who are suspected or even found to have contravened the country’s moral and legal norms confirms the public perception that traditional authorities [monarchy] condone and even worse still, approve corruption. (Transparency International, 2006/7: 13)

The Swazi have been quick to learn to use the monarchy, especially the name of the king, to conduct corrupt activities. They have developed the concept of Labadzala (elders, but it is known in Swaziland that this means the king and queen-mother or members of the traditional inner-council) to avoid investigation or prosecution. The concept of Labadzala uses the king’s name to commit transgressions. If you commit a corrupt act and explain it in terms of how it was blessed or permitted by labadzala you place yourself above any law against corruption in the country because the decisions of the king are above questioning and are not subject to judicial review (Transparency International, 2006/7: 12). The use of the concept was well put by Takhona Shongwe:

Institutions that are meant to fight corruption in Swaziland cannot act beyond certain limits. Today there is widespread use of the concept of Labadzala. It is not new but it has gained wide usage. It is a cultural exploitation of the fact that the word of the king is beyond question. It is based on the knowledge that if you are told that the king was made aware of a certain action, no one has the right to confirm it with the king because that would be tantamount to questioning his authority. High ranking people have taken away other people’s properties using the concept of Labadzala. They have accessed state resources of staggering amounts using this concept. It is a very dangerous concept that has been used by influential people to loot the state. What is saddening is that nothing has been to these people. (Interview, Takhona Shongwe, Sichushe, 2009)

A very interesting case of attempted corruption using the name of the king involved a senior prince who attempted to defraud a national bank of R300, 000. What is interesting about this case is that, even though the MD of the bank reported the matter to the board, nothing came out of it. Narrating the story the MD said:

I was visited by one of the senior princes who wanted me to write him a cheque of R300, 000 for a personal business. I told him of the things he had to do to fulfill bank requirements for a personal loan. He told me it was not necessary for him to do that because he has had meetings with Labadzala at Ludzidzini [one of the traditional headquarters] and they have assented to his request. I was in a very difficult situation because I could be party to his fraudulent actions. I then decided to use tradition to counteract his move. I told him I will write him the cheque but first I will send a cow to the king to thank his decision because the money was a big sum. After hearing this he told me not to send the cow to the king until I hear from him because he wants to be there. I knew there and then that he was pulling out. I later heard from one of my managers that he was complaining as he went out the main door that his father’s bank was in the hands of dogs. I did not hear from him again. (Interview, Jonathan Masuku, Mbabane, 2009).

It will continue being difficult for the anti-corruption agency to perform effectively if, ‘traditional authorities [monarchy] are routes that can be taken alternate to normal, accepted, transparent, and legal route and has also provided avenue for corrupt and illegal acts’ (Transparency International, 2006/7: 13). The recent case of the chief executive officer (CEO) of a government transport department is very revealing. When an audit firm, KPMG, made a forensic audit of the department it revealed that the CEO appears to have misappropriated large sums of money. Coincidentally, the CEO is also a member of the royal family. A criminal process was instituted, but now it appears all the charges have disappeared and the CEO is enjoying his retirement in one of his homes in Johannesburg, South Africa. There is strong reason to believe that the monarchy took care of its own but in the process undermined the functioning of the anti-corruption agency.

The argument that the monarchy undermines the functioning of the anti-corruption agency does not mean that the king comes out publicly to overrule the decisions of the agency, but he enjoys that absolute authority he can secretly (because it is not public) use to reverse decisions of legally constituted bodies, including courts. However, the most serious way in which the monarchy contributes to the failure of the anti-corruption agency is the extent to which it allows itself to be used by corrupt people as a shield against investigation and prosecution for corrupt activities. It is not uncommon in Swaziland for people who are being investigated for criminal offences to send a gift of cattle to the king and afterwards the investigation dies a natural death. The monarchy has become a sanctuary for the protection of corrupt members of the royal family, chiefs, and middle-class people and in the process becomes a driver for corruption. For instance, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has revealed serious wrongs in the management of the country’s resources, the culprits were not dealt with, ‘because those cited are said to be either influential people or too close to royalty’ (Hlophe, 2007: 21). Ntombi Maseko highlighted this problem when she said:

It is extremely difficult to fight corruption in Swaziland because there are many people who, through association or closeness to the king, have become above the law. This is because all actions associated with the king cannot be investigated. The majority of members of the royal family commit acts of corruption, but if they mention certain directives from the king no one will question the king to prove the authenticity of statements by these people. In Swaziland you can only be investigated for corrupt actions if you are poor and are not connected to the king or the royal family. (Interview, Ntombi Maseko, Maphopheni, 2009)

The actions of King Mswati III have fed into the perception that the monarchy condones corruption and undermines the functioning of the anti-corruption agencies. His audacity to appoint people who committed acts of corruption into important organs of the state has strengthened the argument that the monarchy undermines the anti-corruption agency. A case in point is that of a businessman who defrauded the government of about R10 million. He won a government tender to supply a rig, he was paid the amount of R10 million but never delivered the rig. The Swaziland government responded by blacklisting all his companies. To the surprise of the nation, in 2003 King Mswati III appointed this corrupt businessman into the Senate. The disappointment of members of the public was summarized by Mbongeni Zondo:

The king’s action of appointing this man into the senate is very disappointing. He did it because he knows nobody can question him. However, the king must realize that he is compromising the work of all the organs that are meant to combat corruption in the country. Nobody is going to take them seriously when the head of state acts contrary to their chief objectives. This action also indicates that if you are closer to the king you cannot be punished for being engaged in corrupt activities. Instead, it appears that the high institution of the state can reward you for your corrupt actions. It is unfortunate that the office of the king is used as a hide-out for corrupt people. All attempts to fight corruption will continue to yield negative results if our actions and the constitution allow some people to be above the law. (Interview, Mbongeni Zondo, Njojane, 2009)

Swaziland has a well constructed framework for combatting corruption that includes a sound legal framework founded on the very comprehensive Prevention of Corruption Act of 2006, and the Anti-Corruption Strategy of the same year. The main undoing of the legal framework is that influential Swazi can easily escape it because they can receive the grace of the king who can willy-nilly stop investigations against them. The king does not need legal loopholes to influence the functioning of the anti-corruption agency, but uses the absolute powers vested in him by the constitution and custom to be unreachable through the arm of the law.

What also makes the functioning of the anti-corruption agency difficult is that it is not independent. While the line ministry may be responsible for the process of recruitment, the final approval for the appointment of senior officers in the agency rests with the king. Also, the anti-corruption agency is financially dependent on the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, which is itself under the sway and influence of the monarchy. In 2006 regional experts strongly recommend that the agency should be made financially independent, but that has not been realized (UNODC, 2007). This financial dependence compromises the agency significantly, but the ability of the monarchy to protect some Swazi against investigation and prosecution is even more crippling.

When the anti-corruption strategy was launched in 2006, different commentators were pessimistic that the strategy was going to be a success because the leadership of the country had demonstrated its political will to fight corruption. Willy McCourt has demonstrated that the concept of political will is complex (McCourt, 2003), and it is important to note that there is a difference between expressions of political will and actual implementation. In spite of the fact that the king expressed a will to combat corruption, the institution of monarchy continues to protect corrupt members of the royal family, and senior public officers. Nothing has been done to dismantle what Lary Sisay called a ‘kleptocratic group that perpetuates corruption and corrupt practices. . . ’ (Sisay, 2007: 40). Because of its complicated and multilayered system of patrimonialism (Crouch, 1986), the monarchy is inextricably woven in a complicated web of corruption that has undermined the functioning of the country’s anti-corruption agency.

Conclusion

According to official statements and comments by some Swazi citizens, corruption is one of the factors that has contributed to increasing poverty in Swaziland. After the establishment of the anti-corruption programme it was hoped that corruption would be reduced and thereafter resources would effectively be redirected toward serving the economic needs of the majority of the citizens.

This paper has shown that the official view and that of some citizens is that corruption is widespread in Swaziland. Again, the official view is that corruption has had a negative impact on the economic development of the country. This is a realization that, while corruption can, to a certain extent, be viewed as a moral issue, it is fundamentally a development issue. Consequently, there is awareness of the need to integrate anti-corruption agendas into synergies of national economic development and quality living for all citizens. It was this awareness that has given rise to more bold attempts to fight corruption, including putting more resources into the Swaziland Anti-Corruption Commission.

In spite of these efforts, the paper has shown that, as of 2009, the Swaziland Anti-Corruption Commission has failed to have a significant impact in fighting corruption. By the second half of 2009 the commission had not prosecuted even a single case of corruption in spite of ample anecdotal evidence indicating that corruption is on the increase. The anti-corruption agency is visibly failing to fight corruption at all levels of Swazi society in spite of being empowered with a sound legal framework.

The paper has shown that the failure of the anti-corruption programme in Swaziland is largely a product of the tendency for the king to protect corrupt senior officials and the constitution places him above the law. In the final analysis, the anti-corruption agency can deal with corruption at lower levels of society but is incapable dealing with influential people. It is very difficult to envisage a successful anti-corruption programme in Swaziland if the monarchy continues to be above the law and uses this privilege to reward certain groups in society.

This study of the failure of the anti-corruption agency in Swaziland, particularly the theory that royal absolutism with its extended patron–client relations undermines the functioning of the agency, is very informative and has wide applicability. It shows that combatting corruption is to a large extent a democratic issue. It shows that successful combatting of corruption is a governance issue. It confirms the view that it is difficult for developing countries to effectively combat corruption if their governance system is not democratic.