Abstract
The paper addresses two basic questions in the globalization literature: (1) is globalization a threat or an opportunity? And (2) how far does market deepening actually encourage genuine substantive democracy in the world? Many scholars have argued that globalization has resulted in increasing inequality and marginalization of the poor, which is not conducive for democracy. Drawing on the case of India, this paper, however, argues that the rolling back of the welfare state and the demise of developmentalism led to the mobilization of the masses against the elitist and exploitative agenda of globalization. As a result, a counter-hegemonic vibrant civil society has emerged, which challenges the hegemony of the elites and channels the empowerment agenda of the subaltern groups. This new politics of the subaltern is grounded on the idea of social justice and citizenship rights, which is redefining the nature of the Indian state and democracy.
Introduction
This paper 1 is developed from the starting point of two basic questions in globalization literature: (1) is globalization a threat or an opportunity? And (2) how far does market deepening actually encourage genuine substantive democracy in the world? A general overview of the literature suggests that globalization is a threat for the poor and an opportunity for the elites (Corbridge and Harriss, 2001; Jha, 2004). The elites have been the beneficiaries of globalization as they have both the economic and social capital to compete in the market place, whereas the lives of ordinary people have been affected by rising poverty and growing inequality. They have increasingly been marginalized and excluded from the centres of power. Scholars have argued that this rising poverty and inequality and the continuous marginalization of the poor is not conducive for the growth of democracy, which is a system of governance based on the idea of equality and liberty. It also inhibits collective action and the fulfillment of common purposes.
Taking into account the socio-economic and political history of the Indian nation-state during the past few years, this paper, however, argues that globalization of the Indian economy has destabilized previously rigid societal structures, produced what Mehta (2003: 16) has called ‘ever-greater politicization of social relationship’ and has proven beneficial for the spread of democracy into the grassroots. ‘Global processes of democratization have exposed the asymmetries in power and knowledge and thus provide a basis for new cultures of resistance among previously marginalized groups such as women, low-caste groups, religious and other minorities’ (Kinnvall, 2002: 12). The interests of the rich that were previously supported by the state have now been constrained by the rising subaltern politics. The poor have resorted to the political space provided to them by the constitutional democracy. By using this space through their increasing participation in the political sphere and demanding their due rights, they have challenged the hegemony of the elites.
The question one then might ask is why did they not use this political space previously, given that it had been ensured by the Constitution long before in the 1950s? It is argued here that the ‘contradictions’ of globalization – that is, rising inequality, increasing exploitation, growing unemployment and, most importantly, the state’s withdrawal from social welfare services – transformed them from what Marx once called a ‘class-in-itself’ to a ‘class-for-itself’. Their suffering gives rise to a unique consciousness about the structural dynamics of capitalist society and organizes them, in Gramscian terminology, as a ‘counter-hegemonic’ (pro-democratic) force in civil society. This new counter-hegemonic force is an outcome of what Polanyi (1975) has called ‘the double movement’ in which political movements respond to the developments in the economy and market. The first movement – expansion of the market and, consequently, the rolling back of the state give way to the second movement of regulating the ill effects of the former. The latter found expression through the increasing participation of the subalterns in electoral politics, various grassroots mobilizations and assertion of citizenship rights which, in turn, has unsettled the existing power equations and changed the nature of democratic politics in India. Before we discuss this, it is important to understand the role of social welfare in democratic societies.
Social Welfare and Democratic Citizenship
Social welfare policies are important for the enhancement of democratic citizenship. The defence of the welfare state is not to be confined to ‘the demands of the electors’ but is intended ‘to pursue social justice and satisfy people’s needs’ (Duncan, 1989: 297). A welfare state guarantees the provisions for elementary education, minimum standards of health care, economic security (food security, protection against unemployment, old age, illness and disability) and a civilized life. As Rueschemeyer (2001: 80) has argued, the ‘democratic welfare policies strengthen democratic citizenship by giving material and organizational support to subordinate groups and by reducing differences in social status and social power’.
Thus welfare policies, by ensuring social reproduction for the poor and the marginalized, encourage their participation in the political process. This, in turn, leads towards a balance of class power and the establishment of political equality in society. According to Rueschemeyer (2001: 82), social welfare policies encourage and nurture democratic citizenship ‘by reducing inequalities (1) in wealth and income, (2) in status and prestige, and (3) in power and influence’. This reduction of inequality leads to the strengthening of a democratic system because democracy is a political system based on the principle of balance of (class) power. But, with the emergence of neo-liberal individualism, the priority has been shifted on the part of the state, which means the reduced role of the government has redefined the political to someone’s advantage (Duncan, 1989: 298). As Hoffman (2004: 91) argues: It favours the haves over the have-nots, men over women, the conventional over the dissenting, the dominant over the subordinate. It divides individuals and as a result individualism becomes a creed for favouring some individuals over the others. The real position of each individual is masked by market-based abstraction.
Taking into account the role of the various governments across the world, Esping-Andersen (1990) developed taxonomies of the welfare state by looking into the European, American and Southeast Asian types. The European model of welfare state is grounded on the principles of social democracy aimed at redressing the inequalities of early industrialization through a broad range of publicly provided goods and services. The American model is grounded on the principles of neo-liberalism and is characterized by a preference for the private provision of social goods accompanied by low taxation and high levels of voluntary philanthropy. The Southeast Asian model is based on a politically strong state guiding the enterprises towards industrialization and placing high importance on educational development and ‘Confucian’ values (Kohler, 2006: 37–41). In this context, South Asia emerged as a unique kind of welfare state. The South Asian countries, especially the post-colonial Indian state, was influenced by Soviet Socialism and British Fabianism and was grounded on the constitutional notions of rights, entitlements and social justice, where the state is strongly committed to providing an extensive array of public goods and free basic social services (see Panini, 1995: 34). The Fundamental Rights in the Constitution guaranteed equality and liberty to citizens and the Directive Principles of State Policy made the provision of free and compulsory education for children, promotion of the educational and economic interests of the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and other weaker sections and many other welfare functions (Kumar, 2005: 336–363). This commitment of the welfare state towards social policy played a significant role in post-colonial human development and democratic socialism in India.
Globalization and Decline of the Welfare State
The advent of globalization and the spread of neo-liberalism witnessed the ‘demise of the hegemony of the language of socialism in Indian politics’ (Yadav, 1999: 23); and with this the Indian state started withdrawing itself from the major sectors of social services. As Bhambhri (2005: 190) rightly notes, ‘if the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s capitalism was “welfare”, the 1990s capitalist states are rejecting welfarism to their citizens; the capitalist countries are in crisis because of the breakdown of the “Social Contract” between the capitalists and the working classes’. Due to the neo-liberal restructuring and integration of global economies, nation-states have lost autonomy over their welfare policies (Brady, Beckfield and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005: 923). For example, in India public expenditure for social development has decreased consistently in the last decade. In 2001 there was a shortfall of INR6 billion (US$127.6 million) for social services, INR10 billion (US$212.7 million) for rural development and INR6.8 billion (US$144.6 million) for agriculture (Samuel, 2002: 113). Recent data show that ‘the share of public investment [in India], which exceeded 60% of total investment in the earlier plans, has gradually come down to 22% in the Eleventh Five Year Plan’ (Singh, 2010: 199).
The decade of the 1990s witnessed neglect of rural India and weakening of agricultural investment. While the rich countries were spending more in farm subsidies, 2 India was gradually reducing its public sector investment in agriculture and giving way to the private sector enterprises (see Table 1). India’s stunning urban-centric economic growth has bypassed the farm sector, where growth was estimated to have slowed to 2.6% in the year ending March 2008, from 3.8% the year before (The Times of India, 2008). Poor farmers have become victims of rising input costs and falling commodity prices, which has literally driven them to suicide. Data suggest that more than 150,000 peasants have taken their lives since 1997 (30,000 in Vidarbha region alone, making it the epicentre of India’s grimmest agrarian crisis), 3 when traditional practices were transformed under globalization and multinational corporations like Cargill, Monsanto and Syngenta started to take control of seed supply.
Gross capital formation in agriculture and allied sector (at 1993–1994 prices).
Source: (Bhambhri, 2005: 16).
It is not just the farm sector, the state governments have also been reducing budgetary allocations for elementary education, as a result of which 63 million children aged 6 to 14 are out of school today. The landmark Kothari Commission Report (1964–1966) had prescribed 6% of gross domestic product (GDP) for education, but public expenditure on education has been around 3%. Similarly, in the health sector, the budgetary allocation for the public health system decreased from 1.3% in 1990 to as low as 0.9% in 2004 (Human Development Report [HDR], 2007–2008: 249). As Ghosh (2006) has noted, India has the lowest ratio of public to private health expenditure among almost all countries in the world, both developed and developing. 4 As a result, India’s infant mortality rate and maternal mortality rate continues to remain high. Not surprisingly, the infant mortality rate for the poorest 20% is 97 per 1000 live-births, whereas for the richest 20% it is only 38 (HDR, 2007–2008: 255–263). Outbreaks of contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis, malaria and human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) are very high among the poor too.
India’s job market has also shrunk and, as a result, unemployment has risen significantly in the post-reform period. As Ghosh (2011: 169) notes: Even though economic reforms and market recession have caused more harm, particularly to the organized sector workers through job losses, the rise of casual and informal sector jobs and services has intensified processes like ‘informalization’, ‘casualization’, and ‘feminization’ of the workforce in many industries.
The National Sample Survey Organization confirms that ‘the growth rate of employment has declined from 2.7% per annum during 1983–94 to 1.07 per cent during 1993–2000 when the growth of output, that is gross domestic product, accelerated from 5.2 per cent to 6.7 per cent’ (cited in Bhambhri, 2005: 67). According to Jha (2004: 134–148), while the number of job seekers is rising by 2.5% per year, the growth of employment in this sector fell to 0.46% in 1998, to 0.04% in 1999, to −0.15% in 2000 and −0.38% in 2001. In all, 672,000 educated entrants into the job market have tried to find jobs every year, but only 17,000 have succeeded.
The neo-liberal policy regime in India has created uneven patterns of economic growth and accelerated inequality. According to Deaton and Dreze (2002: 3740), this rise in inequalities is a new development in the Indian economy: until 1993–1994, the all India Gini coefficients of per capita expenditure in rural and urban areas were fairly stable but has shown significant increase since then. In the recent Gini Index, India is ranked as 66 with a value of 36.8 (Photius.com, 2010). Data suggest that, while the top 10% of India’s population enjoys 31.1% of the country’s income, the lowest 10% suffers with merely 3.6%. Despite the much-hyped economic growth, more than a quarter of India’s population live below the national poverty line.
Disparity between the states has also increased in India (see Table 2). Growth has been concentrated in a few states like Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamilnadu, whereas poverty has been concentrated in states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh (UP), Orissa and Madhya Pradesh (MP) and also in Assam and West Bengal. Kurian (2000: 539) has referred to the former as the ‘forward group’ and the latter as the ‘backward group’. The forward states, with better infrastructure facilities, have attracted large-scale foreign investments, whereas the poorer states have remained deprived of the benefits of economic reform (see Table 3). During 1991–2001 almost 68% of the proposed investment went to the eight richest states in India. Only three states – namely, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh – cornered half of the investment (Singh, 2010: 200). Although Orissa and Jharkhand have attracted investment in recent years because of their heavy stock of mineral resources, other poorer states like UP, Rajasthan and Bihar have not been able to do so. If we consider the entire post-reform period (1991–2009) the pattern of investment has remained highly skewed in favour of the richer states. About 31% of the total investment in the post-reform period has gone to Gujarat, Maharashtra and Orissa. However, the share of the poorest six states excluding Orissa is a meager 20% (Singh, 2010: 201–202).
Various dimensions of inequality between states in India.
Notes: HDI: Human Development Index; MMR: Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live-births); IMR: Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live-births). Compiled by the author from: Gupta (2009: 687–721) and Saxena (2001).
State-wise investment proposed through industrial entrepreneurs memorandum during reform period (1991–2001).
Note: * refers to the undivided state.
Source: Singh (2010: 201).
This shows that India’s engagement with globalization through neo-liberal economic policies has tended to exacerbate the social and economic marginalization of the poor. With increasing privatization of the state apparatus, the ordinary people in civil society are left to be responsible for their own social reproduction (Chandhoke, 2003: 2962; Alam, 2005: 127). ‘Concerns related to equity, social justice, gender and ecology have now become subordinated to the logic of market’ (Panini, 1995: 33). These developments carried serious implications for the disadvantaged groups, who found themselves no longer in a position to ensure their social reproduction. Where formerly they had been enabled to do so by the welfare state, they are now thrown upon the not-so-tender mercies of the market and a rather uncivil society (Chandhoke, 2003: 2962). The rich became richer by the logic of accumulation and market forces, and the poor became poorer by the logic of exploitation and exclusion.
These ‘contradictions’ of globalization transformed the subaltern identity from a ‘class-in-itself’ to a ‘class-for-itself’ and provided greater capability for self-organization. As Shah (2002: 21) argues: members of the same class not only have common interests vis-à-vis other classes, but also share a common consciousness regarding their position in society and the common interests they share facilitates their collective action against the ruling classes and the state.
This, in turn, geared up the communities as politically significant rather than being mere ritual status groups. It led to the rise of various new social movements where the marginalized were mobilized against the elitist project of globalization; this ultimately gave rise to a new politics, expressed through class coalition and subaltern mobilization. This new politics is based on what Taylor (1994) would call ‘the politics of recognition’ because it interrogates the notion of a monolithic nation-state and puts forward a critique against the process of homogenization in society; and it is not only about dignity but also about entitlements, substantive rights and freedom (Mohapatra, 2002: 170).
Grassroots Mobilization and Political Participation
The question then is what is the nature of this ‘new’ politics and how does it try to redress the growing inequality and alienation of the marginalized? Following Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 57), who argue that ‘those who have only to gain from democracy will be its most reliable promoters and defenders, those who have the most to lose will resist it and will be most tempted to roll it back when the occasion presents itself’, I argue that this ‘new’ politics is essentially democratic in nature, because democratization provides the opportunity to redress inequalities of class and power and helps establish a new egalitarian social order. This new politics has manifested itself primarily in two ways: first, through associational politics and mass mobilization; and second, through increasing participation of the marginalized groups in electoral politics. 5
The struggles of the poor around issues of identity and exclusion have become increasingly important. In the process of opposing neo-liberal economic policies and as a part of charting out alternative discourses of development, grassroots social movements are expanding the arena of politics beyond the sphere of political parties. They have played a significant role by articulating the basic issues of development such as education, health, livelihood, displacement, and so on in the framework of rights. According to some estimates, there are 50,000 to 100,000 different movement groups active in the country (Sheth, 1995: 31). Examples of some such movements are the anti-corruption movement of Mazdoor Kishan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS [Association for the Empowerment of Workers and Peasants]) which resulted in the enactment of Right to Information Act; Chipko movement; the Save Narmada Movement, the struggle for food and employment that led to the passing of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, Jungle Jamin Jan Andolan which extended property rights to the tribal population and various others.
These grassroots social movements that articulate the interests of the poor ultimately address the class character of the state due to their opposition to the neo-liberal economic policies that have been disproportionately beneficial to wealthy elites. Although their political action has been manifested mainly through Gandhian Satyagraha, it can be seen that the Naxalites have readily used violent armed struggles. The preoccupation of Naxalites with violence and armed struggle is due to: (1) the cynicism and ruthlessness with which the non-violent struggles of people were treated by the power bloc; and (2) the complete abdication by the entire mainstream democratic Left of the space of mass struggle and its confinement to the parliamentary arena; and (3) the exclusion of the revolutionary Left from the field of acceptable, ‘legitimate’ political struggle and the simultaneous co-optation of the democratic Left by the repressive neo-liberal state (Menon and Nigam, 2007: 123; Giri, 2009: 463–464). The state has defined Naxalites as undemocratic and totalitarian who threaten the security and law and order of society; the Naxalites, however, see their movement as a political response to the socio-economic marginalization of rural people, ‘arising from poverty, deprivation, loss of livelihood, lack of employment opportunities and abject poverty, given a neo-liberal state abdicating all welfare functions’ (Giri, 2009: 463–464).
Apart from being active in the non-state sphere of politics, the poor have also entered into the formal sphere of politics through their rising participation in electoral democracy. They appear to believe that the rising economic gap, increasing poverty and their exclusion from the centres of power can be addressed only by their active representation in the political arena. The subaltern’s desire for social justice thus translated the submissive language of mass alienation into assertive political mobilization. This has led to the rise of a ‘shared solidarity of the oppressed’, expressed through various political parties that have emerged to represent their interests.
Caste mobilization has appealed to the ‘politics of self-respect’. In many states of India, the previously discriminated castes – that is, the Dalits – have acquired political power. In North India the lower caste and tribal political groups are becoming successful, namely the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand Mukti Morchha in Jharkhand. This political awareness among the lower castes of North India occurred very late; however, in South India there has been a long history of political mobilization (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam [DMK] and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam [AIADMK] in Tamilnadu) among the lower castes against their exclusion from the political and public sphere (Varshney, 2000: 5–7; Bardhan, 2005: 93). Thus access to political power became the swiftest route towards social mobility and redressing of inequality and discrimination.
Alam (2005) has also shown that in comparison to the 1970s, the 1990s witnessed the electoral upsurge of the disadvantaged groups. Though the voting percentage has not changed significantly between 1971 and 1996, the internal composition of the voting public has changed dramatically. In 1971 there were more upper caste, urban and college-educated voters, whereas in 1996 there were more non-literate people, rural based people, Muslims, SCs, STs, and other backward classes (OBCs). The caste composition of voting pattern reflects that: … beginning with the OBCs versus the upper castes, in 1996, there were 59 percent OBC votes against 56 percent upper caste votes. Compared with the average polling of 58 percent, there is 1 percent more in OBC votes and nearly 2 percent less of upper caste votes. The difference becomes more pronounced when we look at the scheduled castes, whose votes are 2 percent above the average, that is about 60 percent of them voted, in comparison to the upper caste votes of 56 percent. In 1971, the difference was not so conspicuous. Both the OBCs and upper castes were 1.5 percent below the average, but the scheduled castes were only half a percent above the average. (Alam 2005: 29)
Similarly, there is a more pronounced shift in voting figures between the non-literate and the educated. To quote from Alam (2005: 29): In 1996, the non-literate vote is half percent more than the voting average, and surprisingly the educated vote is 5 percent lesser than the average. On election day, 60.5 percent of the non-literate and only 55 percent of the educated choose to vote. In 1971, the educated voted 6 percent above the average of 55 percent, and non-literate voted 3.5 percent below the average.
It is also observed that the Adivasis (tribals) and Muslims are participating increasingly in the election process.
In 1996, the aggregate vote of the various Adivasi communities was slightly less than one percent (57 percent) below the national average of 58 percent. In 1971, it was below the average by 6.5 % on an average polling of 55 percent, the tribal vote was 48.5 percent …. In the case of Muslims, it was exactly 1 percent below the average in 1996; where as in 1971, it was 7 percent below the average. (Alam, 2005: 31)
Although, the urban people have more access to the media networks and seem to be more politically sensitized, it is observed that their voting percentage is lower than the rural people.
The vote of those residing in rural areas is one percent higher than the average in 1996; whereas in 1971, it was lower than the average by 1 percent. This is not significant shift in the case of some of the other pairs we considered. But it acquires significance in relations to the votes in urban areas. In 1996, the vote of the urban residents was lower than the average by about 3.5 percent, but in 1971, it had been higher by 4 percent. (Alam, 2005: 32)
There is also an upsurge in the political empowerment of women with close to a million women being a part of the Panchayats and local bodies and acting as architects of social change. 6 Yadav (2000: 120) has defined this greater participation and intense politicization of the marginalized groups as the ‘second democratic upsurge’ and Jaffrelot (2003: 494) has called it India’s ‘silent revolution’. The social foundations of political power today – as distinct from the class character of the state – comprise more vulnerable sections of the population than in 1971 (Mehta, 2003: 135–136; Alam, 2005: 27).
Reinstitutionalization and Democratic Politics
Politics during the time of Indira Gandhi had gone through a massive process of deinstitutionalization which ultimately led to the imposition of emergency rule for the first time in India. Party politics was undermined; politics of populism and personal benefit made their way into politics. The civil service and bureaucracy became politicized and corrupt. Political parties, which represent political institutionalization in a society, were themselves undermining political order. They had become electoral networks to capture state power, rather than vibrant people’s organizations to ensure accountable, just and democratic governance (The Times of India, 2006). This fragmented politics and corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy led to institutional failures in India.
The 1990s, however, witnessed the revival of various legal and political institutions to strengthen democratic politics in India. This increasing institutionalization along with high mobilization and participation has strengthened the democratic culture and made India governable. Some of these institutions are briefly discussed below.
The Election Commission
The Election Commission has been very active since the time of T.N. Sessan through J.M. Lingdo to the present, and has kept a close watch on the behaviour of the politicians and electoral process. It tries to make sure that elections are free and fair and ensure a sense of accountability and responsibility on the part of the representatives of the people. It now has the right to declare an election as fraudulent and a politician as corrupt and thereby prevent them from gaining power. It has also set up a particular limit to expenditure during the election campaign, a breach of which may lead to legal action.
The Supreme Court and the PIL System
The Constitution of India has placed the socio-economic rights of the people under the directive principles of state policy, which in principle are not justiciable. In this regard, the Public Interests Litigation (PIL) has proved to be an important tool in increasing the marginalized sections’ access to the right to development, to a dignified life and to social justice. The concept of PIL was articulated in the late 1970s (post-emergency period) by the Supreme Court of India in an effort to reestablish its institutional credibility. The Supreme Court brought some changes in the conventional litigation and relaxed various rules of procedure to facilitate easier access to the courts. Individuals or organizations were permitted to approach the courts ‘in the public interest’ on behalf of those unable to do so themselves. The PIL movement developed in two distinct phases. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s the Supreme Court focused on the protection of human rights traditionally regarded as civil and political rights. But since the mid-1980s, it has expanded its scope and encouraged petitions on social and economic rights such as the rights to food, education, health, environment, and so on.
The Panchayati Raj System
The Panchayati Raj is a system of self-governance where the rural people elect their local level political representatives to the village councils. Though the institution of Panchayati Raj was initiated by Nehru on 2 October 1959, the process became dormant after a few years. It became the mechanism of power for the upper caste male members for the realization of their vested interest. The 73rd Amendment of the Constitution revived the institutions of local governance, diversified the power structure and transformed the political hierarchy in rural communities. It has incorporated a plurality of voices into village institutions and extended power to the ordinary people. With this, the Indian government has transferred budgetary resources and decision-making authority to the village level, which has increased autonomy of the local institutions of governance. The hitherto excluded groups like women, SCs and STs are now enabled and empowered to decide their own development. The Panchayati Raj Extension to the Scheduled Areas Act of 1996 has identified Gram Sabha as the nucleus of all activities, with wide-ranging powers in the Fifth Schedule areas, 7 and this has provided self-rule to the bulk of the tribal population. The constitutional status of the Panchayati Raj institutions has further been supported by the active participation of the marginalized and the holding of regular elections. It has thus established itself as a strong people’s movement for decentralized governance at the grassroots (Mathew, 1994: 37–41).
The Regionalization of Political Parties
Compared to the dominance of the Congress in the early years, today political institutionalization is ensured by different regional parties claiming to represent different interest groups based on different identities like caste, religion, ethnicity, region, language and so on. The pluralization of political centre and the creation of regional political parties has not only given representation to the interests of the hitherto excluded groups but also strengthened the democratic political culture in Indian society. The Congress, which was reluctant to accommodate the diverse interest groups and share power, has been taken over by this regionalization and diversification of political parties. Thus the decline of Congress which was previously, as Kothari (2001) argues, a cause of political disorder, has by now had the consequence of politicizing community and identity, enabling a wider sharing of power, and establishing political stability in Indian society.
The Media
The rigid censorship during the emergency period provided little scope for the Indian media to maintain its freedom and criticize the government and its policies. It was state controlled and manipulated for political gains. However, with the opening of the Indian economy, both print 8 and electronic media witnessed an unprecedented growth and broke the hegemony of the government-controlled media. In addition, the Prasar Bharati Act of 1990 also provided greater autonomy to Doordarshan and All India Radio. As a result, India has gone from having just one television channel in 1992 to 626 channels by January 2011 (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 2011: 73). Such proliferation of transnational satellite broadcasting has not just lessened political abuse of the media but has presented alternative perspectives to the public. It has also represented the issues of the poor and demanded accountability of the government. 9 The media thus has established itself as one of the viable institutions of civil society that works as the watchdog of democracy.
Towards a Conclusion
It is evident from this discussion that globalization of economy and the flow of transnational capital across the globe marked the rolling back of the welfare-oriented state and the demise of developmentalism. This, in turn, led to the mobilization of the masses against the exploitative policies of globalization. The developments in the last two decades reveal that a political self-awareness and sense of solidarity has been growing among the marginalized sections of Indian society, who have been fighting to reclaim their rights, dignity and lost political space. As a result, a counter-hegemonic vibrant civil society has emerged, which challenges the hegemony of the elites and channels the empowerment agenda of the subaltern groups. This counter-hegemonic civil society stands as an obstacle to the capitalist state that previously gained legitimacy, acquired consensus and established hegemony through the ideologies of developmentalism, welfarism and depoliticization of the citizenry. People now have the autonomy to devise new ways and means in which they can choose how they should be governed. This new politics is based on the subalterns’ empowerment agenda for social justice and citizenship rights, which is redefining the nature of the Indian state and democracy. To conclude, as Sheth (1995: 32) argues, social transformation for the poor is not an apolitical activity, but a live political agenda for changing the terms of discourse on democracy in India.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.