Ending Ethnic Civil Wars: By Negotiations or by Military Defeat? Lessons on security from Sri Lanka

Abstract

At the beginning of 21st century (ethnic) civil wars have been proliferate all over the world. Many ethnic conflicts – for example the conflict in Sri Lankan between the Sinhalese majority government and the guerrilla fighters of the Tamil minority – are characterized by constant efforts for conflict resolution interspersed with renewed violence, with cycles of military escalation and de-escalation. Also, they are marked by the helplessness of the international actors, who profess their interest in a resolution and try to mediate between the contending parties. But they are rarely successful – why? I assume that the most important question in war and peacetime is whether security is possible to achieve to prevent the security dilemma escalating. In many Asian and African countries people perceive politics and security in ethnic terms. Thus how a party defines security is of decisive importance concerning whether a conflict can end in peace or will be solved militarily. Within an exclusive security concept, security can only persist if the other is annihilated or oppressed by military means, while inclusive security concepts can achieve security by special arrangements, peace agreements or security guarantees. Third parties, who are engaged in mediating violent conflicts, have to keep in mind that it is the elusive balance of these security schemes which determine successful negotiations and at least a permanent solution. To reach a lasting peace it is not sufficient for external actors to provide security; in the long run, they must transform exclusive into inclusive security concepts.

Keywords

Ethnic conflicts and civil wars successful conflict resolution by negotiations or military defeat mediating violent conflicts security concepts and security dilemma Sri Lanka

1. Introduction: ending civil wars

Civil wars, especially those of ethnic origin, are considered as persistent and hard to pacify (Burgess and Burgess, 1997; Burton, 1990; Fisher et al., 1991, 1997; Licklider, 1995; Moore, 1996; Stedman et al., 2002; Zartman, 1995). The parties involved do not start negotiating unless military action reaches an impasse. Instead, they try to end the war according to Clausewitz: “There will only be peace after the defeat of one party, i.e. that the (military) forces of the enemy are defeated and destroyed” (Von Clausewitz, 1832–1834: 808). Generally, all peace talks sooner or later reach a point of paradox: on the one hand each party wants peace; on the other hand they block or delay talks just when it seems possible to lower the potential of violence through treaties and demilitarization. The idea of defining their own position and security no longer by weapons, but by talks, causes strong feelings of uneasiness, and the demilitarization that inevitably has to follow the talks or the peace treaty is felt as a threat. The conflict parties act against the background of their present security status (e.g. territorial control, military strength, etc.) and their historical security concepts, meaning their experience of former talks and past actions. Thus, how a party defines security is of decisive importance on whether a conflict can end in peace or will be solved militarily. The influence of external mediators is often limited: their intervention is ambivalent; sometimes it even causes further escalation of the conflict instead of progressing the peace process. It is of great importance to know – especially for external mediators – what concepts of security the parties involved have, and how their need for security can be supported in the peace process.

The aim of this study is to investigate the role of security and the security dilemma within ethnic civil conflicts and peace processes. I assume that maintaining security is the decisive factor in determining the success of peace talks. Peace talks can only lead to their goal – lasting peace – if the security dilemma does not lead to any escalation. But it is not the security dilemma per se that furthers the escalation of violence in ethnic conflicts. Instead, I see the behaviour of an ethnic group as a product of its past and present relations and its ethno-cultural perceptions. So, the ethnically shaped concepts of security are the crucial factor. Within an exclusive security concept, security can only persist if the other is annihilated or oppressed by military means; inclusive security concepts can achieve security by special arrangements, peace agreements or security guarantees (e.g. from external actors). Therefore, to reach a lasting peace it is not sufficient for external actors to provide security; in the long run, they must transform exclusive into inclusive security concepts.

An example of a persistent ethnic conflict is the civil war in Sri Lanka, which to date has claimed approximately 300,000 lives and has produced one million displaced persons.¹ Since 1983 the government of the Sinhalese majority and the guerrilla fighters of the Tamil minority have been fighting each other, and various attempts to negotiate have failed. No ceasefire has lasted longer than a few weeks. It was not until 2002 that the first lasting ceasefire agreement was reached under the newly elected prime minister. It was being watched over by an international, unarmed monitoring team and safeguarded by the arrangement of talks by Norway. Peace talks that resulted in quick progress at the beginning were adjourned by the guerrillas in April 2003. In 2005 the island was on the edge of civil war again, as the agreement had repeatedly been broken by both sides. But in spite of frequent acts of violence, the ceasefire remained in effect until January 2008. The government then terminated the agreement and started a new military offensive. Why and how could this happen after the peace process had started so promisingly in 2002? To analyse the dynamics of the renewed escalation of violence and the opportunities for international influence, I will use the concept of the security dilemma. The theoretical assumptions will be discussed briefly in the following section. Sections three and four will attend to the genesis of the civil conflict and the possibilities for a peaceful outcome. The fifth section offers an explanation for the last escalation of violence and its consequences for a lasting peace.

2. Theoretical frame: structural and non-structural conditions of security

The concept of the security dilemma was developed in the frame of the school of realism of international relations and was used primarily to analyse the cold war. The concept was worked out by John Herz in the 1950s and applied to international relations, for example, wars between states. But Herz also argues that the relationships between individuals (or groups) were risky, because one is uncertain about the intention of the other (Herz, 1950, 1951). While classical realism emphasizes human nature when explaining the struggle for power, structural realism states that it is the anarchical system which fosters fear and insecurity (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005). Generally speaking there is no overarching central authority in world politics (status of anarchy) that safeguards security. As a consequence, states have to rely on themselves for (military) self-help. States must also always assume that the other is a threat. Trying to ensure their own security, the parties involved in a conflict cause a chain reaction: if one side arms itself, the other one follows suit. A circle of fear and militarization occurs. With the security dilemma it could be explained how and why states tried to control and neutralize others (Jervis, 1978; Posen, 1993), that is, how arms races were started.

Today, the security dilemma is applied also to intrastate conflicts (Kaufman, 2001; Gross Stein, 2001; Posen, 1993; Snyder and Walter, 1999). Ethnic conflicts are the most prominent intrastate wars. For ethnic groups, security means saving their ethnic existence and, if necessary, defending it. Ethnic concepts of security are to be defined by military strength (Waltz, 1954, 1979) as well as by political, economic and social factors (Buzan, 1983; Weaver and Buzan, 1993). Potentially political marginalization, economic neglect or cultural repression would be perceived as great security threats by ethnic groups. The ‘ethnical security dilemma’ hence not only refers to a military arms race, but also to the intention to gain economic and socio-cultural dominance and to the attempt of the parties involved to influence the discourse within the regional and international environment in their own favour (Posen, 1993; Saideman, 1998).

In addition, the security dilemma offers not only a possible explanation of how conflicts escalate with violence but also why ceasefires or peace talks often turn out to be unstable, and why persistent peace is so hard to reach. Considering cooperation and trust – two important issues in peace talks – from the aspect of security will always remain an uncertain option, since no-one can guarantee that the other side will not cheat or deceive. Cooperation may seem possible but cannot eliminate the roots of the problem. Hence, for example, demilitarization during peace talks is a very delicate matter. Without a third party providing security, demilitarization is very risky. Under exclusive ethnic antagonism, demilitarization can only be accomplished slowly, step by step, or not at all. At the back of the minds of the conflicting parties the idea prevails that building up a new military capacity would remain the best strategy for risk mitigation in spite of all negotiations (Levy, 2001). On the other hand, this leads to a stabilization of fear and mistrust towards the enemy and increases the danger of going back to arms (Hampson, 2001). Accordingly it is only a small step from defence to ‘offence is the best defence’.

The security dilemma is only partly due to human nature or to structural conditions. Considering the escalation of violence, it is not the structural, but the non-structural factors such as the motives of the parties (Glaser, 1997; Kaufman, 1996) and the religious, ethnical and cultural justification and concepts (Cotter, 1999) that are the crucial points.² Security is a construction (Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1992) that is constituted by certain social processes (Onuf, 1989; Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1999). Therefore the anticipated security threat in peace talks is not without presuppositions. How the parties react to a potential threat (basically) depends on their concepts of security. This in turn depends on their specific ‘ethnic past and present’. Specific ways of viewing history exert great influence on the window of opportunity for ceasefire negotiations, and in the long run for a lasting peace. Ethno-specific constructions of security or ‘national’ interest facilitate and justify actions and strategies within the negotiations. If these constructions can be influenced in a positive way – for example, by external actors – an escalation of violence can be prevented. If peace talks are to be successful, two crucial questions are to be clarified: what does security mean to the parties involved in the conflict, and how can it be brought about? Clarification of these points is extremely important for persons who intervene from the outside and try to act as mediators between the parties. Symbolic gestures and mutual recognition and acceptance in peace negotiations can be a first step in providing the necessary conditions for a successful peace process.

The aim of the successful peace process is twofold: it needs to defuse today’s security dilemma and to change the historical ethnical-antagonistic understandings of security. The first aim is difficult to achieve, the second aim is all but impossible. More often than not, mediators or facilitators have already done a good job if they can handle the current situation. Changing deep-seated ethnic concepts is difficult and protracted, but effective conflict management requires a change also in the hostile attitudes of antagonists towards each other (Kaufman, 2006).

3. Sri Lanka: From ethnic antagonism to civil war

3.1. The development of antagonistic ethnic concepts and the erosion of security until the 1980s

Sri Lanka, one of the oldest democracies of the Third World, became independent from British rule in 1948, and adopted the Westminster model of government. In the following decades, the two biggest population groups, the Buddhist Sinhalese majority, who represent 74 per cent of the population, and the Hindu Tamil minority, who represent 18 per cent, developed serious conflicts on the topic of the representation of the Tamil minority in politics, economy and society.³ After independence, numerous laws and constitutional amendments in favour of the Buddhist Sinhalese majority have been passed. The idea of state and nation was remodelled on the basis of an ethnic–religious ideology which marginalizes and excludes the Tamils.⁴ This was felt as a great threat to the existence and security of the Tamils.

Before the 1920s, the colonial ‘grip’, a similar social status and a common school career created a feeling of mutuality between the Sinhalese and the Tamil elites. This caused a security situation that was dominated by a peaceful balance of interests in and through institutions. But even in the 1930s and 1940s it became clear that the ideology of the new independent state would be based on a Sinhalese–Buddhist cultural nation state, and minorities were to play a subordinate role.⁵ The Sinhalese claimed a religious and ethnically biased absolute entitlement to all the country’s resources. Antagonistic concepts of security of the two ethnic groups emerged.

The essential step that aggravated the confrontation and changed the concept of security was a structural change in basic conditions: in 1931, Great Britain introduced the universal suffrage on the basis of a first-past-the-post system. The British did not comply with the Tamil demand for a fixed proportion of seats or special communal right to vote in the North and Eastern Province⁶ – the main settlement areas of the Tamils – which would, according to the Tamils, explicitly protect the Tamil minority.⁷ Now on one hand there were the minorities that felt at a disadvantage in the newly established voting system, and on the other hand there were the appalled Sinhalese elite. In fact, the latter had wished to participate in power (themselves), but they did not like the idea of a universal suffrage for the whole population. This reform endangered the supremacy of the Sinhalese elite that they had enjoyed for centuries. The universal franchise had made a mostly illiterate and rural population a factor to be reckoned with in politics. To protect their power the elite had to win over the Sinhalese population. The elites needed a mechanism to communicate with their voters, since the former belonged to an urbanized, westernized and culturally alienated group, which (partly) did not speak local languages (Sinhala or Tamil). Ethnicity and religion proved to be an ideal bridge to bypass this gap. The Sinhalese elites began to propagate an exclusive nationalism that declared the Tamils to be a threat to the Sinhalese race and to their religion (Houtart, 1974; Rösel, 1997).

Developments since the 1930s have had significant consequences on the feeling of security and threat for the ethnic groups. For both sides this meant a fundamentally changed security situation that seemed no longer attended by the familiar processes (e.g. parliamentary cooperation and personal contacts). But the two groups drew different conclusions from the changes. The Sinhalese started extending their military, economic and societal supremacy vehemently. The Tamils at first continued to cooperate within the frame of the public institutions. They believed in an inclusive model of society and security. The Tamil politicians had trust in the Sinhalese based on the assumption of the multicultural motives of the Sinhalese elite. Readiness to talk and compromise characterized their actions. However, only some restricted concessions were reached, and substantial change was missing.

In the meantime, the Sinhalese had changed their mind: since independence they had pursued a policy of exclusive security. The base ethnic myth to this exclusive concept was as follows: the Sinhalese refer to a myth, according to which Sri Lanka was chosen by Buddha, in order to secure and to protect the existence of Buddhism. The unity of the country is the pre-condition for the survival of Buddhism and the Sinhalese race. At this time, 2500 years ago, Sri Lanka was a golden land with a prosperous economy, a good Buddhist king and a happy population. But this ‘golden age’ was lost because of foreign invaders. So the history of Sri Lanka turned into a never-ending struggle of the Sinhalese people against western powers, foreign values and Tamil invasions from South India. This myth was the basis for the proof of the pre-eminence of the Sinhalese population group. Even the use of violence against different religious groups and dissidents was justified by the task of securing the unity of the island in order to protect the reign of Buddhism.⁸ Moreover, in the eyes of the Sinhalese, the so called Estate-Tamils (plantation workers from southern India brought to Sri Lanka in the 18th century by the British) and the millions of Tamils living in southern India melded together into a unity with the indigenous Sri Lankan Tamils of the North and Eastern Province. In the imagination of the Sinhalese this mass outnumbered the Sinhalese, and was a threat to their social and cultural position (Rösel, 1996, 2004).⁹

According to these ethnic concepts the Sinhalese preferred an exclusive model of power and security that focused on hegemony and the repression of the Tamils. Since the 1970s the state has continuously strengthened its security forces.¹⁰ At the same time, leading politicians have built up groups of private thugs and a paramilitary security apparatus. Recurrent riots in 1952, 1956–58, 1977, 1982 and the pogroms against the Tamils made clear that the Sinhalese really were prepared to push through their security and supremacy with the help of military force. Hundreds of Tamils fell victim to the ‘disturbances’ of a Sinhalese mob that was at least tolerated, if not supported, by the Sinhalese government. In 1983, civil war broke out (Obeyesekere, 1984; Tambiah, 1986, 1996).

Discrimination, riots and pogroms finally changed the concept of security on the Tamil side, too. The Tamil politicians now asked for a federal state structure and particular minority rights to save their interests. In the mid-1970s the Tamils ended their institutional and non-violent principle of politics: Tamil student organizations founded militant guerrilla groups out of which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the strongest organization. To ensure the security of the Tamil population, the LTTE demanded the establishment of a separate Tamil State in the North and Eastern Province of the island, which is considered as the Tamil homeland. Under the leadership of Vellupallai Prabhakaran, the Tigers turned into a hostile countervailing power to the Sinhalese state, as they turned out to be extremely brutal, flexible and cohesive.¹¹ This development led to a counter-reaction on the Sinhalese side. However, the Sinhalese security forces did not only take violent action against the LTTE, but also against the Tamil civilian population. Thus the Tamils were forced into thinking that the guerrilla LTTE was the only organization granting them safety from Sinhalese despotism.

What promised security for the Sinhalese after independence – namely ethnic predominance – meant increasing insecurity for the Tamils. This denoted a crucial change in their concept of security. The Tamils now thought that only a separate state would grant the survival of their people, their culture and language, and that their interests could only be pushed through by force. The security of the Tamil population would now be based on the coherence and military potential of the LTTE guerrillas. The manifold interests of the Tamil elite politicians were replaced by the Tigers’ claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people.¹² The rebels formed the informal counterbalance to the previously all-powerful Sinhalese state. The demand for the north-east region as the homeland of the Tamils developed into a counter-nationalism that was antagonistic to the concept of the Sinhalese.¹³

On the Sinhalese side the conflict was also based on specific concepts of security: the Sinhalese identity and ideology was based on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. The Sinhalese saw the Tamil minority as a threat to their security (Ahmed, 1996; Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998). This perception of the Tamils led the Sinhalese to the conclusion that any collective identity and regional autonomy, let alone an independent Tamil state, had to be refused. According to the Sinhalese perception, Sri Lanka was a Sinhalese-Buddhist society and was to remain so if it was to preserve its heritage, and violence seemed a legitimate means to an end (Bartholomeusz, 2002). Fear about the security of their people and religion provoked the Sinhalese and justified excluding the Tamils from Sri Lankan society. The multicultural Ceylonese tradition and Theravada Buddhism were transferred into a Sinhalese, anti-Tamil nationalism, that started to be of political relevance in the 1940s (Gombrich, 1988; Gombrich and Obeyesekere, 1988). The outbreak of civil war in 1983 contributed further to a growing propensity for violence (Wimmer and Schetter, 2002). This Sinhalese view left almost no space for federalism (the aim of the minorities), because the unity of the country was seen as a pre-condition for the survival of the Sinhalese race and the Buddhist religion. Federation in this sense is just another word for secession.

3.2. Explaining the decline of peace talks from the 1980s onwards

Since the 1980s, different external actors have tried to arbitrate between the conflict parties, but nothing has changed. Quite the contrary: the conflict has deepened and the violence has escalated. Neither power mediation (1983–86) and military intervention from India 1987–89 (Bullion, 1995) nor diplomacy (1994–95; Norway, EU, USA) brought an end to the civil war. From time to time the Sri Lankan armed forces got the upper hand; sometimes the LTTE won some battle. The longer the civil war lasted, the more the antagonistic concepts hardened in both groups. Any attempts to mediate and to resolve the conflict failed.¹⁴ Both parties thought to win the war militarily; negotiations were only of secondary importance. Concepts of security were solely defined by military strength. It was not until 2002 that Ranil Wickremasinghe, the Premier holding office at that time, from the United National Party (UNP), managed to establish a dialogue with the LTTE and to sign a ceasefire treaty. During these negotiations attitudes partly changed: the Sinhalese government offered the Tamils a federal structure of the country. The LTTE agreed to waive their claim for a sole right of representation of the Tamils and their claim for a separate state. The peace process was supported by a Norwegian mediation and an international monitoring team, the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and the Co-Chairs acted as consultants during the peace talks.¹⁵ Mutual trust was enhanced by ceasing all military offensives and reacting indulgently to local skirmishes. Although the Tamil guerrillas ceased to carry out conventional attacks against the Sri Lankan army, they would not demobilize since, in their opinion, the ceasefire was based on the balance of military power.

However, in April 2003 the LTTE ended direct talks after the international mediators tried to force the demilitarization of the LTTE without offering additional guarantees for their security. The LTTE regarded the international community as a security net for the government, having the intention of forcing them to accept inadequate proposals (Sunday Leader, 8 June 2003). The background was that the USA forbade the LTTE representatives to take part in a donor conference in Washington and additionally coerced the guerrillas to lay down arms. However, it was impossible for the LTTE to demilitarize: the Tamil security concept was built on the cognition that each attempt to reconcile with the Sinhalese on a peaceful base failed and concessions were only granted after the use of violence. Hence, military balance was the foundation of their security concept. From the LTTE’ s point of view, neither the Sri Lankan government nor the external actors tried to maintain this balance, but instead only increased pressure on the LTTE. The guerrillas answered this lack of security by returning to their genuine security concepts of building up power: within their sphere of influence in the North and East they defeated the political opposition and reinforced their administrative structures such as police stations and courts. International actors mistook this as a ‘bargaining chip’ by the LTTE to wrest further concessions from the Sinhalese and exerted pressure instead of equalizing it.

Developments since 2003 illustrate the thin line between self-defence and defence-offences: at the beginning of November 2003, a second setback hit the peace negotiations. The President of Sri Lanka at that time, Ms Chandrika Kumaratunga from the opposition of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), dismissed parts of the cabinet, suspended the parliament and took over the peace talks that had been chaired by the premier up to that point.¹⁶ Officially she justified this procedure with the ‘danger to national unity and security’ for the Sinhalese (Mukarji, 2005). In April 2004, the president’s coalition United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) defeated the UNP, led by Premier Wickremasinghe in early parliament elections.¹⁷ The victory jeopardized the prospects for peace talks as the UPFA’s most important coalition partner, the People’s Liberation Front (in Sinhalese: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP) a Sinhala-chauvinistic party,¹⁸ refused to make concessions to the Tamils; on the contrary, they recommended a military strategy.

Furthermore, after the elections there was no identifiable political line. The president started manoeuvring between divergent positions, which led to deep insecurity on proceeding further for the LTTE. At one time Kumaratunga demanded to negotiate an interim government for the North and Eastern Province and also a final peace agreement simultaneously; at another time she only wanted to decide on the interim government. Later she denied that the LTTE was the sole representation for the Tamil people; again a few days later she declared that the rebels were the only negotiation party for the Tamils. No direct talks between Kumaratunga and the LTTE took place. Moreover, Kumaratunga did not attempt to cooperate with the Tamil parliamentarians of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), who had won 22 seats in the elections, a two-thirds majority in the North and Eastern Province, and who had turned out to be the third strongest party in parliament. Kumaratunga ignored them when forming the government.¹⁹ This confirmed the LTTE’s security perception. They strengthened their position in the North-East, claimed again to be the sole representative for the Tamils, recruited new child soldiers and started a military build-up.

Another problem was that of the paramilitary groups operating in the North-East. They posed an imminent and lasting threat to the LTTE’s security. President Kumaratunga and the military cooperated with them, especially with commander Karuna, an ex-LTTE cadre, who had defected from the LTTE in March 2004.²⁰ The LTTE repeatedly demanded that the government disarm these groups and to stop any cooperation between them. The government refused to do so, stating that it was not their responsibility to ensure security for the LTTE. From April 2006 the LTTE started to eliminate Tamil opponents, members of the security forces and alleged spies, to an even greater extent than before. Furthermore, the guerrillas started building civilian ‘defence forces’ in each town and prepared themselves for war (Asian Tribune, 11 and 13 January 2006).

The tsunami that hit western Asia in December 2004 delayed further escalation of the conflict. Instead of negotiations over a peace contract, discussions about the ‘Post Tsunami Operation Management Structure’ (P-TOMS), commonly called the Joint Mechanism (JM), determined the talks between the government and the rebels (Sunday Times, 13 March 2005; 8 and 29 May 2005; 5 June 2005).²¹ The LTTE demanded free disposal of, or at least a strong influence on, the distribution of the relief funds for the North and Eastern Province. Due to the lack of security guarantees and without direct peace negotiations, the LTTE aimed at consolidating its security position by using the post-tsunami situation. The government showed itself to be indecisive – partly because of the president’s self-interest in maintaining her power – and would not decide on a distribution key for the funds until the international community put it under pressure. For the Tamils this implied the government’s unwillingness to come up with a new security construction regarding a devolution of power with the Tamils. After protests by Buddhist monks, the validity of the distribution key was limited to a year and strong restrictions were put on its usage. The Supreme Court declared fundamental parts of the P-TOMS treaty unconstitutional, as it queried the unity of the country. Moreover, it was leaked that at the same time the president had ordered new military equipment.

Ethnic antagonistic concepts have got the upper hand again since 2004.²² Furthermore, the LTTE felt internationally isolated, inter alia because they had received an admonishment from international actors for recruiting child soldiers. Notwithstanding that this reprimand was ethically correct and adequate, it had a counterproductive effect on the peace process. The guerrillas regarded this as unfair because the arbitrariness of the Sri Lankan military was only casually mentioned. This intensified the LTTE perception that it could only rely on its own military strength, while the government was being treated more favourably.

4. The beginning of the end: political development from 2005 to 2007

4.1. Escalating violence and the end of direct peace talks

In November 2005, the Sinhalese representatives at the negotiation table changed again, when president Kumaratunga’s party member Mahinda Rajapakse took over presidency in the presidential elections.²³ After Rajapakse’s electoral victory, the military primacy, that up to then had only been informally in effect, came to the fore again. Rajapakse had formed an election alliance with the ethno-nationalist JVP and a radical-religious party, the Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party, JHU) and was supported by the nationalists in the south of the country and the Buddhist clergy.²⁴ These groups categorically refused any negotiations with the LTTE or even the implementation of a federal system. For the LTTE this meant that there was no basis for negotiation any more. The Tamil MPs were sceptical towards the new president, too: “Mr. Rajapakse has categorically ruled out a weakening of the unitary nature of the state and rejected the notions of homeland and self-determination – the cardinal principles, from a Tamil perspective, on which a permanent solution must be reached” (Tamil Net, 4 November 2005). The minority politics of the new president were primarily aimed at the ethnically mixed settlement areas in the East.²⁵ The development of the North ranked low on his agenda. After his election, Rajapakse officially called for new peace talks, but at the same time he did not dissociate himself from the idea of a Sinhalese-dominated ‘unity state’.

Furthermore, he insisted on a revision of the ceasefire agreement and aimed at limiting the influence of the Norwegian mediators (BBC News, 28 November 2005; Sunday Observer, 27 November 2005). This was as little security building for the Tamils as were the political steps he took after that. To the position of secretary of state he appointed his Chief Coordinator Mangala Samaraweera, a hardliner with sympathies for the JVP. While Kumaratunga had been in office, this position had been held by a Tamil (Asian Tribune, 18 December 2005). He proceeded similarly in choosing the premier: instead of the moderate Anura Bandaranaike he appointed a fierce Sinhala Buddhist, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake.²⁶ As defence adviser, Rajapakse chose a senior member of the JHU. In contrast, the new Peace Commissioner John Guneratne was a political lightweight. Under these circumstances, Rajapakse’s negotiation-friendly rhetoric had little meaning for the guerrillas.²⁷ Hardliner Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, who had led several operations against the LTTE, became the new army commander. At his first press conference he declared that he intended to take a tough stance towards the LTTE. He openly admitted to boosting the security forces (Asian Tribune, 5 and 30 January 2006).²⁸ Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekara was appointed General Director for 25,000 homeguards (armed civilians) who were to support the army. Like Fonseka, Weerasekara had a reputation for being an aggressive hardliner towards the guerrillas. However, the LTTE did nothing to disprove the negative perception of themselves from the Sinhalese side. On the contrary, they increased attacks against opponents, security forces and civilians. In his address on Hero’s Day in November 2005, Prabhakaran issued an ultimatum to the government.²⁹ He threatened to return to war if the government did not submit acceptable proposals for negotiation by the end of the year (die Tageszeitung, 29 November 2005). He judged that all previous talks had been deception.

Since early in 2006, the security situation deteriorated although none of the parties revoked the ceasefire agreement. The escalation was particularly intense in the security-sensitive areas in the North and Eastern Province and in the capital Colombo. Since then, numerous acts of violence on both sides formed the focus of the reciprocal perception of security: starting in mid-January 2006, violence increased at an exponential rate in Trincomalee and Batticaloa (Eastern Province). The Tamils regarded the security forces as responsible for the violence and complained that the government did little to stop the radical and nationalistic forces. At the beginning of January 2006, five students were executed in Trincomalee by shots to the head, carried out by the Special Task Force.³⁰ JVP representatives initiated anti-Tamil demonstrations in Trincomalee (Asian Tribune, 5 January and 1 February 2006; Tamil Week, 15 January 2006; Virakesari, 14 January 2006). The street from Habarana to Trincomalee, that had only been patrolled sporadically after the ceasefire treaty was signed in 2002, was being patrolled by approximately 7000 soldiers starting in June 2006. In Batticaloa the Tamil Catholic Member of Parliament, Joseph Pararajasingham (TNA), was shot by an unidentified gunman at a Christian Mass. The Tamils blamed the Sri Lankan intelligence service and the paramilitary militia for the assassination. Defectors reported that not only the security forces but also ministers of the national parliament had cooperated with the paramilitary.³¹

The security situation was also aggravated in Jaffna, in the north. An LTTE attack on the security forces in the east was followed by a wave of arrests of alleged LTTE activists by the police. As in the time civil war, civilians were arrested and abused by masked members of the security forces. Some of the people abducted are still missing today (Virakesari, 9 January 2006). On the Jaffna peninsula the army stationed a 25,000-strong occupation force. Since then permanent roadblocks, check-points, patrols and provocative cordon-and-search operations have become normal practice. The police have also taken action, using weapons and batons against peaceful protests of students and drivers of three-wheelers. In the capital Colombo, circumstances were now nearly as bad as they had been during the war. On 30 December 2005, heavily armed soldiers from the army, air force and navy were joined by 1500 policemen. They started the operation ‘Stranger’s Night II’ and combed through the Tamil-dominated districts. More than 900 persons, among them 105 women, were arrested, questioned and ill-treated.³² Because the emergency rule came into effect again in mid-July 2005, the forces now had the legal backing for their actions. The search operations were the first big official operation since the ceasefire had been signed. Now, however, for the first time the security forces were involved openly in the acts of violence.

On the other hand the LTTE launched several heavy attacks in the North-East and in Colombo.³³ Symbolically important, 15 marines were killed when a Sri Lankan sea force patrol ship was blown up off the Trincomalee shore on 7 January 2006, and nine more marines were killed on January 12. This reminded the Sinhalese of an LTTE attack in April 1995, when LTTE forces entered into the naval port of Trincomalee and blew up two ships. The attack marked the beginning of the third Eelam War.³⁴ With both sides heavily attacking each other, cooperation became unthinkable.

4.2. De-escalation through new peace talks and parliamentary committees?

At the end of January 2006, the situation briefly eased. Under the auspices of the Norwegians, both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE agreed to meet in Geneva from 22–23 February. Both parties agreed upon preventing a further escalation of violence. Moreover, a new round of talks was arranged for the end of April. The LTTE consented on the condition that the paramilitaries were disarmed. But in the end a direct meeting failed as the guerrillas and the government could not agree on how the LTTE delegates would get to Oslo. The Tigers demanded a plane from the government, which they were not granted. As a result the LTTE postponed the talks until 8–9 June 2006. Finally it accused the government of cooperation with the paramilitary and called off the negotiations a few hours before they were due to start. At the end of October the government and the guerrillas entered into negotiations again, but achieved no results (Ratnayake, 2006a).

As far as the LTTE was concerned, the government did nothing to meet its security demands. In their perception they saw only the consequences of the hostile conduct of the Rajapakse government. Rajapakse’s coalition partners continued their anti-LTTE campaign: the JHU targeted whole towns with poster papers saying: […] ‘Yes Mr. Burns, there is only one way to deal with terrorism’ (Asian Tribune, 30 January 2006).³⁵ The JVP and JHU appealed to the USA to intervene, because […] ‘the murderous tiger terrorism is the main challenge of the Sri Lankan people. The whole nation must be lined up against this terrorist threat […] the best course of action would be to destroy the terror headquarters (in Sri Lanka) which in turn would pave the way for America’s security’ (Ratnayake, 2006b). The Sinhalese on their part accused the guerrillas of endangering peace, as they had withdrawn from the peace talks and committed several assassination attempts, for example on Fonseka, the new army commander (Asian Tribune, 27 April 2006; BBC News, 26 April 2006), on General Kulatunga³⁶ and on Gotabaya Rajapakse, the president’s brother and Defence Secretary (Frontline, 12 January 2007: 47-50). Moreover, Sinhalese civilians were among the victims of LTTE violence again,³⁷ and as a result the government tightened the security measures again.³⁸ There were even rumours that the LTTE was in possession of a ‘toxic special weapon’ (Asian Tribune, 12 July 2006). The chances for direct negotiations diminished further with the (natural) death of Anton Balasingham, chief ideologist of the LTTE who had led negotiations for the LTTE, in mid-December 2007.³⁹

Moreover, Rajapakse appointed an All Parties Representatives Committee (APRC) in June 2006 to work out a devolution proposal for the North and Eastern Province. In the president’s advisory committee – created to support the conference – there was only one Tamil member. Later three Tamils and one Muslim were included (Asian Tribune, 28 July and 15 September 2006). Observers pointed out that strident anti-federalists like H. L. de Silva and Gomin Dayasiri formed the core of the expert panel formed to advise the APRC, and that the APRC had little chance of making any progress towards peace. On the Tamil side the question was raised of why there had to be more discussions. There had been many devolution proposals in the history of the conflict, but a there had also been a lack of will for implementation.⁴⁰ The Tamils suspected that Rajapakse had created the committees to suggest to the international public that he was willing to make peace, instead of really intending to make peace.⁴¹ The Tamil TNA did not participate in the APRC, the JVP quit in December 2006, and in February 2007 the main opposition of the UNP decided to leave future deliberations. Finally the Committee on Constitutional Reforms was abruptly halted and adjourned indefinitely. President Rajapakse then gave an ultimatum to produce a consensus in devolving power, to be delivered by the end January. The closing report of the committee presented in February 2008, after 18 months and 63 meetings, was dismissed by the government, because it made the point – contrary to expectations – that the minorities were discriminated against. Instead, the government presented its own vague proposals, providing less power for the minorities. This nourished the Tamil suspicions that negotiating with the Sinhalese would lead to nothing but broken promises, and that only military self-help can guarantee security.

Since the end of July 2006, the situation in Sri Lanka could be called a ‘de facto situation of war’. On the pretext of saving Sinhalese settlers, the Sri Lankan government used a LTTE blockade of a water tank in the hinterland of Trincomalee as an opportunity to carry out air raids against guerrilla positions. These operations were clearly in breach of the ceasefire agreement, even if the LTTE action was a deliberate provocation to the Sinhalese government. Informal attempts from the LTTE to re-establish the ceasefire were rejected by the government – a reaction standing in sharp contrast to the president’s numerous appeals for a return to negotiations (Asian Tribune, 27 and 31 July; 1, 14 and 30 August 2006; BBC News, 2 August 2006; Kumara, 2006). Apparently the Sri Lankan army succeeded in ousting the LTTE from strategically and politically important bases in the East and the North during 2007. Among others, the army seized control of the coast of the Vaharai region, which was the line of supply for the LTTE to Batticaloa and Amparai. In September 2006 the army succeeded in repelling the LTTE from Sampur (Trincomalee) (Frontline, 27 January-9 February 2007). The Eastern Province, which was substantially controlled by the LTTE until autumn 2006, was brought under government control except for a few LTTE pockets. In November 2007, the Head of the LTTE Political Division, S. P. Tamilselvan, was killed in a Sri Lankan Air Force bombardment around Thurivaiaru (Kilinochchi).⁴² With the death of Tamilselvan it became apparent that the LTTE was no longer safe, even if hiding in the Wanni.⁴³ The loss of Tamilselvan was also a setback to any hope of peace talks in the near future, because his successor, P. Nadesan, was not known for his negotiation skills. In Colombo, for a second time that year, Tamils in residential areas were rounded up. About 1000–1500 Sri Lankan Tamils were arrested, incarcerated, and held incommunicado. On the grounds that the security forces and police have a legitimate necessity to provide for security in the city, collective punishment was imposed on the Tamils as whole ethnic group (Asian Tribune, 1 December 2007). In return the guerrillas tried to repel the Sri Lankan army, carried out several suicide bombings and attacks on military institutions.⁴⁴

On both sides the security dilemma escalated. Like Kumaratunga, President Rajapakse denied that the LTTE was the sole representation for the Tamil people. Furthermore, the government felt that security for the Sinhalese people could only persist if the LTTE was annihilated. The guerrillas in turn felt that security had been resumed by military means because the international community was propping up the Sri Lankan state through economic aid, military aid and subtle diplomatic efforts but did not condemn the military path of the Rajapakse regime.⁴⁵

5. The abrogation of the ceasefire and the fourth Eelam War 2008–2009

5.1. The defeat of the LTTE and the decline of the Sri Lankan democracy

In 2008, the civil war ‘officially’ started again: the government revoked the ceasefire agreement in January 2008 (Asian Tribune, 2 and 4 January 2008). The escalation of violence since then has turned the conflict into a cycle of violence, and has been following the combatants’ principle to see the war as interplay between action and reaction. Two soldiers were killed and three injured in a Claymore mine explosion in Kebithigolawa on 3 January. Nation Building Minister D. M. Dasanayaka succumbed to his injuries after his Ministerial convoy came under a LTTE Claymore attack 6 km away from the Katunayake International Airport (Asian Tribune, 3 and 8 January 2008). A total of 23 civilians, including school children, were killed and 67 wounded in a Claymore blast that targeted a bus in Helagama deep in the south-east of Sri Lanka on 16 January. Two days later a group of LTTE terrorists carried out an attack on civilians in Kalawalgala at night, killing nine.⁴⁶ On 2 February, a bomb exploded at the Dambulla bus stand; 20 civilians were killed and 50 more were wounded. On the next day a bomb blast inside the Colombo Fort Railway Station killed nine people and wounded around 100; on the 4th a total of 13 civilians were killed and 16 others injured when a bomb detonated near a bus at Ethawatunuwewa. In April, Sri Lanka’s Minister of Highways & Road Development, Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, was killed in a bomb blast in Weliweraya (Gampaha District, Western Province).

On the opposite side, the security forces were out for an all-over war in the North-East. The Commander of the Sri Lanka Army said in his New Year address that the Northern Province of Sri Lanka would be taken from the LTTE during this year. The latest budgets demonstrated that the regime had no compunctions about undermining economic stability in its quest for a military solution to the ethnic problem. The defence allocation for 2009 was a record of nearly 200 billion rupees ($US 1.8 billion) or 17 per cent of the government’s total expenditure. New taxes on imported products such as wheat, milk powder, maize, animal feed, paper and furniture, leather items and on telephones increased the cost of living. Inflation hit between 20 and 30 percent in 2007, 2008 and 2009. Clearly, Rajapakse prioritized the war and the needs of the war above all else. New negotiations became unimaginable as both sides keep attacking each other. Security could only be achieved now by destroying the ethnic other.

Due to the fights between the army and the guerrilla, 55,000–125,000 persons have been forced to flee their homes up to September 2008 (Asian Tribune, 17 April and 3 August 2008; Sunday Times, 10 August and 7 and 21 September 2008). A United Nations human rights expert said that ‘torture is prone to become routine in the context of counter-terrorism operations’.⁴⁷ Some 50,000 civilians were trapped in the war zone (Symonds, 2009a). At the end of 2008 the LTTE had lost all its strongholds in the East and the western half of the Wanni. The fall of Kilinochchi – one of the guerrillas’ last remaining major centres – followed in January 2009, and the Tigers’ top leadership was killed in May. After the defeat of the LTTE, the government set up military-run ‘welfare villages’ surrounded by barbed wire and heavily armed soldiers, in which around 280,000 Tamil refugees were interned. About 95,000 people are still being held in these detention camps.

Democracy and the rule of law have undergone a profound degeneration. Since President Rajapakse took office, the government has imposed a complete ban on any independent reporting from the North-East. Journalists have been killed or assaulted; others have been arbitrarily detained without trial. Private television stations were ransacked and torched by pro-government thugs.⁴⁸ The government exploited the war for suppressing political opposition and even forbade people’s demonstrations against deteriorating living standards. Workers Unions that supported the demonstrations were defamed as ‘traitors’, ‘anti-government elements’ and ‘LTTE-allies’ (Sunil, 2008). In the Eastern and in the Northern Province, the Rajapakse government imposed a military occupation presided over by a provincial administration headed by ex-LTTE-cadres and a former Inspector General of the Police. To date (May 2010) all criticism of the government’s agenda and its record is branded as ‘pro-terrorist’ and creating chaos. Furthermore, Rajapakse declared that the extensive network of army camps in the North-East established during the war will be made permanent.

How did the international community support the peace process after the direct talks collapsed? Since 2006, the Sri Lankan government has tried to isolate the LTTE internationally: a visit of the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Samaraweera in Washington at the beginning of 2006 and certain remarks of the US Foreign Ministry nurtured suspicions that the two governments planned to cooperate more closely in the future. Also, the USA condemned the LTTE actions without mentioning the human rights violations of the Sinhalese security forces. Public remarks from the US Under-Secretary of State and the American Ambassador in Colombo indicated that the Bush administration planned on supporting the Sinhalese side financially as well as logistically. Moreover, the US Government proscribed the activities of the LTTE’s best fundraising support network TRO (Tamil Rehabilitation Organization) and froze its assets. In October 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigation launched a report (‘Taming the Tigers – From here in the US’) (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008) putting the LTTE on the same level as Al Qaeda, the Hezbollah and HAMAS (Asian Tribune, 30 January 2006; Sunday Observer, 29 January 2006).

The EU prompted both parties to terminate hostilities and to enter negotiations again. In addition, the EU decided to classify the LTTE as a terrorist organization and to add it to its list of banned terrorist groups.⁴⁹ The ban made it difficult for the LTTE cadres to travel abroad and to ‘collect’ money from the Diaspora. Hereupon the LTTE asked the EU observers to withdraw from the North- and Eastern Province, leaving behind the war zone without an international monitoring team. The Sri Lankan government at least had to put up with the reproach of cooperating with the paramilitary groups. But it was not until the end of 2008 that the EU finally put some pressure on the government, threatening to withdraw its GSP+ (General Preference System Scheme) trade facility on the grounds that the government was violating human rights. But it was too late to exert influence on the Rajapakse government.

India, the great regional power, refrained from taking sides, although the LTTE had tried to use its connections to the government of Tamil Nadu by seeking influence via the Indian national government. Despite protests in southern India about the fate of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, New Delhi refused to pressure the Sri Lankan government to declare a ceasefire. Unlike Rajapakse, who demands a ‘unitary state’, India emphasized that the solution would have to be an undivided Sri Lanka, but had to comprise a fair devolution for the minorities (Frontline, 14–27 January 2006). On the one hand, the Indian government has had to defend the right of the Tamils in Sri Lanka to satisfy its Tamil Nadu allies. On the other hand it has rejected a separate state of Eelam, fearing that it would encourage separatist movements in India.⁵⁰

International influence seemed to be limited as Rajapakse, until April 2009, rejected all international appeals for even a short no-fire period to assist civilians trapped in the war. The President has distanced himself from the West and formed alliances with some Middle East, African and Eastern Powers. In 2007, he established diplomatic relations with the Government of Eritrea, visited Iran’s President and got military assistance and credits from the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, Pakistan and China (Asian Tribune, 27 December 2007). China has provided the most part of military and financial aid without asking any questions. Beijing has a $US 1 billion deal with Colombo to construct a major port facility in southern Sri Lanka (Hambantota), including a container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery, an airport and other facilities. In March of 2009, China even blocked an informal briefing at the UN Security Council on the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka, arguing that it was an internal matter for Sri Lanka and not a threat to international security (Symonds, 2009c).

In summary, it is fair to say that all international actors had reiterated their support for a negotiated settlement, given the escalating violence since 2005. They reproved Sri Lanka for its withdrawal from the ceasefire agreement, too. Particularly the Co-Chairs had emphasized their belief that there could be no military solution to the conflict. But soon after the war succeeded in conquering the LTTE there was no suggestion of a return to the 2002 ceasefire and internationally sponsored negotiations with the LTTE. Furthermore, pressure was not put on both conflict parties equally. While restricting the guerrillas’ activities, the government was backed by financial and logistical assistance. The international community aimed at a ‘political settlement’, regardless of whether it will be achieved by military means or by negotiation.

In May 2009 the army finally conquered the last LTTE conclave and killed the entirety of the guerrilla leaders.⁵¹ After the victory the refugee camps were fully over-occupied (ca. 290,000 in welfare centres, 11,000 in rehabilitation camps, 800 in secret camps). Sanitary equipment, medical supplies, food and water were hardly to be found. The areas, surrounded by barbed wire and secured with machine guns, were fiercely watched by the army. Camouflaged security forces and Tamil paramilitaries prevented contact between members of aid organizations and internees. Only those classified as harmless were permitted to leave the camp (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Supplies outside of the camps were also poor: the areas along the road A 9 were destroyed, roads were closed and the military patrolled everywhere. The president had already announced in May 2009 that all refugees would be re-settled within 180 days and that a political solution would be brought forward, but in February of 2010, 180,000 Tamils in camps and 6000 more in rehabilitation camps were still waiting for their release. The government first withdrew the emergency laws in August 2011. The anti-terror laws remained in power and the government used them as a basis for new rulings, according to which alleged LTTE members could be imprisoned without charges or a hearing and the high-security zones would remain under military control (Frontline, 10–23 September 2011). Many refugees (400,000) returned to the North up to the end of 2011; however, at least 16,000 remained in refugee camps and about 1000 remain in rehabilitation camps. In spite of international aid almost everything was lacking in the North: accommodation, food, medical care and infrastructure. The security situation was desolate: violence in the form of attacks, abductions, torture, rape and murder by the security forces, paramilitary and criminals were ubiquitous (Amnesty International, 2012; US Department of State, 2011). The Tamil population was subject to a narrow security regime and was forced to register with the police and to announce and assemblies of more than four persons. Demonstrations and the activities of political activists and human rights campaigners were repressed. The army additionally installed a spy network comprising local Tamils that informed them of everything (International Crisis Group, 2012a).

Nothing occurred in the sense of ethnic reconciliation and power distribution. The president instated the Lesson Learnt Commission (LLRC) to investigate human rights violations only after international pressure (Commission of Inquiry on Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation, 2011); their results remain limited and were criticized as inadequate by the UN as well as by human rights organizations. Despite international protest, the government did not shed light on war crimes and the cases of disappearances and torture over the decades, and persons who were suspected of committing human rights violations continued to occupy high government offices. In an interview President Rajapakse admitted that he had never intended to keep to the ceasefire agreement. 2012 showed clear signs of Sinhalization in the north: villages and streets were renamed in Sinhalese; Sinhalese signs, war memorials and Buddha figures were erected; Sinhalese fishers and businesses were privileged in the allocation of licences, Tamil district civil servants were replaced by Sinhalese and Sinhalese settled on the southern provincial border.⁵²

Little was done internationally to contain the violence. While in 2002 the United Nations initially supported peace negotiations, they undermined the position of the LTTE after 2004 and strengthened the president’s war course. The European Union, Japan and Norway criticized the withdrawal of the ceasefire agreement and demanded new negotiations; however, they simultaneously bent to the wishes of the USA, according to which the guerrillas should be cut off from their resources and isolated. Only in 2009, after the devastating situation of civilians could no longer be denied, did the US Defense Minister demand that the UN be granted access to refugee camps. In the UN China, Russia and India blocked a resolution to investigate war crimes. Sri Lanka failed in the attempt to prevent the implementation of a UN expert committee, although its final report, which concluded that on both sides war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed, was not followed up with any action. The UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution that requested that the Sri Lankan government take up the LLRC’s suggestion and seek reconciliation with the Tamils. Whether they accepted this request, and how, was left to the government itself (Asia Times, 24 March 2012).

5.2. Conclusions on security in civil wars and peace processes

The following conclusions can be drawn in view of the escalation of violence. Up to the beginning of 2003, the security patterns of both sides were geared to negotiations. International support and mutual arrangements in the ceasefire agreement guaranteed a stable security situation. But the old, antagonistic concepts of security could not be overcome. Following the acquisition of the conduct of negotiations in 2004 by president Kumaratunga, the security situation was continually aggravated. This was not because of the concrete details of the ceasefire agreement, but due to the perceived security situation for both parties. Both parties felt the motives of the other side to be threatening, and both sides tried to protect themselves by military means. At some point, negotiations were considered only as being the second best option.

As president Rajapakse and his coalition partners took over the peace talks, a new sense of uneasiness developed among the LTTE. The LTTE regarded Rajapakse’s offers of talks as a rhetorical gesture, and the demands of the radical allies JHU and JVP were considered as a deliberate blockade of the negotiations and did not pledge security. By intensive arming, attacks and assassinations the LTTE tried to re-establish the balance of power. This provoked the Sinhalese side to arm themselves further as well. Moreover, they blamed the LTTE for the collapse of the peace talks. Since 2007, the tensions escalated into a full-scale war. The Sinhalese were still not ready to share power with minorities. Instead of negotiations, the solution of the government was to ‘oust Tamil terrorism’. Although the government has won the war, it maintained all the police state measures built up over the last 40 years. It seems as if security for the Sinhalese still means controlling and suppressing the country’s Tamil minority.

International mediators have observed developments without much engagement. In respect of peace by negotiation, the demobilization of the LTTE, as requested internationally, has been of no avail. The unstable balance of the ceasefire was based on the parties’ military balance of power. The LTTE would never hand over its weapons as long as federal structures were not implemented. Too often, concessions made by the government were taken back at short notice or blocked by radical forces and the opposition. Ethically, it was right to condemn a guerrilla group for recruiting child soldiers and eliminating political opponents, but these arguments may have had a negative effect on negotiations. Much more successful was the Norwegian and EU strategy at the beginning of the negotiations in 2002. At that point, there was a variety of institutionalized cooperation. Factual imbalance of power, mistrust and fear between government and guerrilla movement can be counterbalanced, for example by institutional guarantees. The success of the negotiations until 2003 demonstrates that the security dilemma does not have to escalate, and differing concepts about the definition of balance of power are – to a certain extent – negotiable.

Security is volatile and bought dearly. Elite power struggles, Sinhala chauvinism and anti-democratic methods to silence any kind of opposition have led to the near dictatorial rule of President Rajapakse and his family today. Any concessions to the Tamil minority in the form of power-sharing provisions will alienate Rajapakse’s Sinhala extremist coalition partners – so it is not very likely that a new constitution or amendments can be implemented. The international actors should care about the recent emergence of authoritarianism in Colombo as much as the human rights violations in the North-East. Correspondingly, it would be the duty of the international community to put pressure on the Sri Lankan government. Ethnic bias has deepened during the last 4 years. Ultimately, peace in Sri Lanka can be prepared and supported by external mediators, but it has to be accomplished by the people of Sri Lanka.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biography

Mirjam Weiberg-Salzmann is Senior Research Fellow, Cluster of Excellence on “Religion and Politics” at The Westfälische-Wilhelms University Münster. She was Lecturer, Department of Sociology and Demography and Assistant Professor, Department of Political and Administrative Science at the University of Rostock from 2004–2008 and Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany from 2002–2005. Her current research interests include conflict and violence in multi-ethnic states, religious fundamentalism and state- and nation-building with area focus South Asia. Dr Weiberg-Salzmann studied at The Georg-August University Göttingen and The University of Rostock, Germany, where she obtained her state examination and PhD respectively.

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