The Role of Minor Parties in Political Competition: Lessons from Ghana’s 2012 Elections

Abstract

The study of minor parties has largely focused on well-established democracies, even though these political organizations play significant roles in new and emerging democracies. With Ghana as a case study, this investigation provides a theoretical path to understanding the normative role of minor parties in political competition, especially in developing nations with single-member plurality systems. By placing emphasis on the experiences of such parties in Ghana’s 2012 elections in the Fourth Republican dispensation, this article examines the value and importance of minor parties in helping to create and maintain stable democracies. In spite of the recognizable obstacles minor parties face, we argue that they nevertheless contribute to the health of a burgeoning democratic culture.

Keywords

Ghana minor parties democracy elections political parties presidential parliamentary

The so-called third wave of democratization has led to an explosion of political parties in most new and transitioning democracies. The development of these political parties includes minor parties, which are small political organizations with limited structural and outreach capacity to effectively compete and win elections. Because these parties often struggle to win office, scholars focusing on democratization tend to downplay their role in the political process.

This article seeks to amend this view. We argue that minor parties can be viewed as significant benchmarks in the development of new democracies that rely on single-member districts. In these new and developing systems, minor parties can provide political competition during elections, serving as an outlet for minority opinions. Minor parties can also provide accountability to the entire electoral process, as these parties monitor the activities of the other parties in an effort to bring attention to corrupt practices endemic to many developing countries. Finally, these minor political organizations can diversify the political discourse by introducing new policy ideas, some of which make their way into a dominant party’s agenda.

Support for this new approach is given by investigating the case of Ghana, one of Africa’s new yet established democracies. Special attention is paid to the country’s recent 2012 presidential election, which was a tightly contested contest between the two major parties; the outcome was only recently settled by a Supreme Court decision. While the theoretical relevance of minor parties is often understudied, largely because the study of minor parties is focused on well-established democracies, we believe their role in granting legitimacy to electoral competition, especially in new democracies, cannot be understated. Therefore, minor parties represent an essential field of inquiry in the context of fledgling democracies.

The Theoretical Importance of Minor Parties

As noted above, it is our contention that minor parties need to be seen as theoretically important organizations for the acceptance and development of democracies. Studies of long-established democracies with single-member, plurality systems tend to view minor-party campaigns through a more empirical lens, likely due in part to the stability of the systems; scholars do not typically question the role these parties play in strengthening or weakening democracies. However, for those nations that have had only a handful of peaceful elections, theorizing about what minor parties represent is important to understanding how they might influence the maintenance of democratic practices.

First, the presence of a minor party, but typically several minor parties, can be viewed as an acceptance of the framework for the conduct of elections. Most certainly, the transfer of power between two major parties is vital to democratic livelihood in most plurality systems. Still, it is beneficial when those whose views are outside the mainstream political world accept the system and contest elections (they are viewed as a necessary part of having one’s voice heard by government). If the leaders on the political “fringe,” so to speak, are unwilling to accept the processes of democratic governance, it is unlikely that there would be an effort to form new parties that want to play an active role in a representative government (even if the vast majority of these candidates have no legitimate chance to win). Thus, as democracies develop, the persistent efforts of minor parties are a sign of a growing belief that elections are the vehicles of change, rather than non-electoral means.

Second, the voters for these minor parties serve a critical function in legitimizing democracy, too. Those unhappy with how the major parties are governing often turn to minor parties to express displeasure, and doing so through the ballot box, rather than through violence and intimidation, is a strong signal of an established democracy. If many of these votes are considered “protest votes,” then minor parties are serving a function for those unhappy with the choices offered by the current order. They serve as an outlet for political frustration. Thus, while the absence of any choice, or an overabundance of choice, might be problematic for a new democracy, several minor parties competing for office should be viewed as a healthy signal about the vitality of a developing representative government, at least in a majoritarian system (see Meisburger, 2012).

Third, it shows that the vast majority of voters are thinking in terms of voting strategically. To avoid the so-called “wasted vote” syndrome, which is a problem in single-member, plurality systems, voters are going to the polls to choose, in general, between one of two different political options, each with distinct platforms. This means that voters understand the general practice of democracy in this style of government. Granted, some minor-party candidates do win in a few districts, but even then there is likely some strategy; the voters know that the candidate has a chance to win and considers that in making a decision. In most districts, though, the consolidation of voters around two distinct parties, and not shifting rapidly to other parties, can be interpreted as a positive sign of democratic stability.

Fourth, this then means that the major parties have incentives to stave off future minor-party threats by listening to their demands and co-opting those that have popular appeal. This is viewed as a hallmark example of the importance of minor parties in developed nations, especially in the United States (Rosenstone et al., 1996; Schraufnagel, 2011). Voters might not have been willing to support a minor party enough for it to win control of government (or even win office), but by siphoning off enough voters, it can cause a major party to react and co-opt some of the minor party’s agenda. In a sense, then, this improves the representation of the public and causes the minor parties to function as agenda setters when there is perceived major-party failure.

Considering these points, it becomes apparent that minor parties are theoretically important for representation, which is necessary for legitimizing democratic practices. While these parties serve similar roles in well-established democratic republics, their value as a signal of democratic health is neglected. But, in terms of new and transitioning democracies, where acceptance of the system is not guaranteed, the signal given by minor parties becomes an important one for scholars to think about.

The next step, then, is to apply this framework to the case of Ghana, a nation with a recent history of democratic elections (since 1992). This nation was also chosen due to the 2012 presidential election, where five minor parties contributed to a closely fought contest between the two dominant parties. Before applying this framework to the so-called Fourth Republic, we describe some of the history of Ghana and then delve into the 2012 election for an up-to-date look at the role of minor parties. As will be seen, minor parties play a theoretically important role in the nation, despite their inability to capture many seats or gain the support of most voters. Still, as the theory above describes, minor parties cannot be evaluated solely on their seats in government, but on the additional support they bring to the political process.

Development of Minor Parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

We must first discuss the gradual evolution of these political parties in Ghana, from the immediate post-independent era through to the Fourth Republic (Kopecky 2011; Morrison, 2004; Morrison and Hong, 2006; Osei, 2012). Even though Ghana’s Fourth Republican democratic dispensation has been celebrated lately, the foundations of the current parties and their political traditions have origins in the post-independent democratic culture. The 2012 election contest among the seven major and minor parties, including the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Progressive People’s Party (PPP), the Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP), the Convention People’s Party (CPP), the People’s National Convention (PNC), the United Front Party (UFP) and Jacob Osei Yeboah (as an independent candidate), served as a demonstration of the co-existence between present and past political traditions.

After independence from the British in 1957, the two political traditions that steered the country through its nationalist era set the background for the development of political organizations and life. Building on earlier attempts at political association through ethnic and literary linkages (Apter, 1966), the CPP sprung from the Nkrumahist tradition (with its leader, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah), which largely promoted state intervention with a tinge of socialism. The competing party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), ascribed to the Busia-Danquah tradition (from its leader Dr. Joseph Boakye Danquah), which espoused a liberal and pro-business agenda.

These two main ideological strands were further sidelined by several military takeovers and political organizations that were structured around the mostly populist agendas of these juntas. Because of this, democratic and civilian rule were interspersed over the four Republics. During each of these Republics, minor parties emerged to contest power with the dominant parties of the day. The success of some of these minor parties was based on how well they tapped into ethnic, nationalist, and elitist sentiments to energize their bases. For instance, Osei (2012) notes that during the first Republic, minor ethnic-based political organizations like the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement (NLM), the Northern-based Northern People’s Party (NORPP), and the Ewe-based Anlo Youth Movement (AYM) joined in an unsuccessful alliance with the United Party (UP)—an offspring of the Busia-Danquah tradition (and one of the progenitors of the current NPP)—against Kwame Nkrumah’s CPP.²

In the Fourth Republic (which is the focus of this paper), some of the minor parties have emerged from the post-independence ideological framework while others exhibit hybridized forms of political ideas that have shaped Ghana’s checkered political history, including the military dictatorships. Since 1992, some of the minor political parties have stayed the course, competing in a majority of the elections; other minor parties have emerged or merged with other existing political organizations.

However, party formation is not as simple as it is in some Western nations. To become political parties in the Fourth Republic, organizations have to meet the legal stipulations of the Political Parties Law (PNDCL, 281) (see Boafo-Arthur, 2003: 221):

The internal organization of the party conforms with democratic principles and its actions and purposes are not contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution;

The party has one member from each region on its national executive committee;

The party has branches in all the regions and is organized in no less than two-thirds of the districts in each region;

There is at least one founding member of the party in each district who is an ordinary resident or registered voter in the district;

The party’s name, emblem, color, motto or any other symbol has no ethnic, gender, regional, religious, or other sectional connotation or gives the appearance that its activities are confined only to that part of the country.

It would appear, then, that the law makes it hard for minor parties opposed to the system of elections to operate; it also limits the spread of ethnic and regional parties that could negatively impact developing democracies (see Diamond, 1988 on Nigeria). In other words, the minor parties are legally bound to support the system and, therefore democracy. However, what is considered “legal” does not always limit political organizations. Parties in other nations have claimed to stand for democratic practices yet eliminate them when they rise to power (Eritrea’s People’s Front for Democracy and Justice since its rise to power in 1993). Other parties claim to accept the process of elections, only to turn violent when the results do not conform to their expectations (e.g. recent cases in elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe). In reality, the minor parties themselves have to accept the parameters of the system, regardless of the nation’s attempts to instill these values in the legal codes.

With this in mind, the next step is to highlight the key minor parties in the 2012 election. First is the PNC, which is the only minor party that has competed in all six elections of the Fourth Republic. As shown in Table 1, the PNC has had a poor showing in all elections with an average of 1.8 seats won between 1992 and 2012. In the 2012 presidential elections, its candidate, Hassan Ayariga, garnered 0.22% of the votes cast. The PNC is a successor to the People’s National Party (PNP), which was a Third-Republic party fronted by Dr. Hilla Limann, who led the country for 27 months after winning 62% of the votes in the 1979 presidential election. The PNC itself was formed in 1992, when the ban on democratic politics was lifted. The leader and founder, Dr. Limann, sought to continue his agenda of socio-economic transformation based on its avowed Nkrumahist tradition, which was largely socialist. Before Limann’s death in 1998, Edward Mahama, a medical doctor, took over the party and led it through four elections (1996–2008). He later gave way to Hassan Ayariga’s leadership during the 2012 elections. Even though the PNC is yet to be successful at capturing power or becoming a major party in the Fourth Republic, it has been part of political coalitions and has helped to shape the course of democratic development in the country.

Table 1.

Seats Won by Political Parties in Parliamentary Elections, 1996–2012.

	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
NPP	Boycotted	61	100	128	108	123
NDC	189	133	92	94	114	147
PNC	Boycotted	1	3	4	2	1
CPP	Not in existence	Not in existence	1	3	1	0
PPP	Not in existence	Not in existence	Not in existence	Not in existence	Not in existence	0
GCPP	Not in existence	Not in existence	Not in existence	Not in existence	0	0
UFP	Not in existence	Not in existence	Not in existence	Not in existence	Not in existence	0
Independent	2	5	4	1	4	4
Total		200	200	230	229	275

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana (2013).

The second minor party is the CPP. It is a reincarnation of its predecessor, which was led by Ghana’s foremost leader, Kwame Nkrumah. Formed in 1949 with the vision of Nkrumah, the party’s mass appeal and populist approaches won the support of the people against its main opponent, the UGCC. After the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, and throughout the subsequent shifts between military rule and civilian government, the CPP remained fragmented and characterized by an identity crisis nestled in the egos of various party stalwarts.

The Fourth Republican variant of the CPP emerged as an attempt to coalesce the splintered Nkrumahist factions during the 1996 elections. This was caused by the poor results of the Nkrumahist parties—the National Independence Party (NIP), the People’s Heritage Party (PHP), the National Convention Party (NCP) and the PNC—in the 1992 elections. After this, the NIP and the PHP merged to form the People’s Convention Party (PCP), which later joined the NCP to reunite the various Nkrumahist parties (except for the PNC).¹ Though these mergers were intended to increase electoral performance, the CPP has continuously struggled in both presidential and parliamentary elections to date. The 2012 elections were no different. Led by Abu Sakara as the presidential candidate and, critically, Samia Nkrumah (daughter of Kwame Nkrumah) as the party chairperson, the CPP could only capture 0.18% of the votes for presidential election. The party received no seats in Parliament, either.

The last set of political parties—the GCPP, the PPP, and the UFP—are all driven by the ambitions of their leaders and hence could be termed as personality political parties. The GCPP originated in 1996 and has taken party in the 2000 and 2012 elections. The party was developed around the personality and charisma of veteran politician Dan Lartey. A Nkrumahist, Lartey broke away to form his own party to propagate the idea of “domestication of the economy”—a policy directive he helped design during the term of the sixth president of Ghana, General Acheampong. After the death of Dan Lartey in 2009, his son, Henry Lartey, took over the party in the 2012 elections, receiving 0.35% of the presidential vote.

Another Nkrumahist breakaway party is the PPP, which emerged from the CPP. Following the latter party’s disappointing 1.3% in the 2008 presidential elections, and stimulated by raucous reactions within the CPP, its candidate, Papa Kwesi Ndoum, formed the PPP in 2012. According to Ndoum (who had earlier held different cabinet positions in the Kufour administration), the PPP represents a broad-based alternative to the two major political parties (the NDC and NPP) and it is also perceived as a movement for change (The New Ghanaian, 2013). In spite of the pomp and expectations that came with the founding of the PPP, Ndoum and the party secured only 0.59% of the 2012 presidential vote, a slightly weaker outcome than Nduom’s 1.34% result as the CPP candidate for president in 2008.

The last minor party contesting the 2012 elections was the UFP, a Kumasi-based political party formed in 2010. The founder and presidential candidate, Akwasi Addai—a renowned business executive—established this political party as an option for disillusioned supporters of the NPP and the NDC, particularly Ghanaians who are disappointed in the NDC administration (The Chronicle, 2013). In spite of its vision of freedom and empowerment, and reaching out to the country’s youth, a voting block that the UFP banked on to reap its electoral fortunes, the party gained a disappointing 0.08% and no parliamentary seats in the 2012 general elections.

These minor parties largely emerged to serve as alternatives to the two dominant parties, the NPP and NDC. However, as shown by Table 2, these political parties lacked the political gravitas to serve as strong electoral competition against the NPP and the NDC. The insignificant number of votes accrued by these political parties reveals certain inherent challenges that exist within Ghana’s maturing democratic system.

Table 2.

Results of 2012 Presidential Elections.

NPP	NDC	PNC	CPP	PPP	GCPP	UFP	Independent
47.74%	50.70%	0.22%	0.18%	0.59%	0.35%	0.08%	0.14%

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana (2013).

Still, this brief overview of the minor parties provides evidence to support the theory presented in the previous section. On the surface, there is clear evidence that a few political parties have developed to compete in, and accepted the process of, elections, even though the odds of electoral victory are slim at the presidential and district levels. Though most voters are voting strategically, thus avoiding minor-party candidates, the parties do receive votes and a handful of seats; the parties are channeling discontent with the major political parties through, and not against, elections. Finally, the presence of these parties can serve, at a minimum, to keep the major parties concerned about losing potential voters in some parts of the country. This explains why minor-party leaders have, at times, been given positions in the government by majority parties. Examples range from the vice-presidential position offered to the NCP’s Kow Arkaah by the NDC during the 1992 elections, to the different cabinet appointments held by Papa Kwesi Ndoum (then leader of the CPP) in the NPP administration after the 2000 elections.

The next step is to focus on these parties in Ghanaian elections, with extra attention given to the recent 2012 elections and their aftermath. Through this, we provide more evidence for our normative view that minor parties can play a valuable role in the process of democratization.

The “Also Rans” in Ghana’s Democratic Progress

As noted earlier in the article, the role of minor parties in most political systems is often an understated part of political competition and behavior. Nugent (2001) aptly captures the peripheral role of minor parties in Ghana’s democratic development when he referred to these political organizations during the 2001 general elections as “also rans.” While Nugent perceives the proliferation of minor parties as part of Africa’s democratization process, he attributes the underwhelming roles and results of these parties to the limited organization, mostly revolving around the personalities of their leaders (2001: 420).

In spite of the dominance of the NDC and the NPP throughout the Fourth Republic, minor parties have had roles such as playing kingmakers during closely fought elections. For example, the presence of minor parties and an independent candidate contributed to the 2008 run-off election between NDC’s John Atta-Mills and NPP’s Nana Akuffo-Addo after a 47.92% to 49.13% result in the first round. This ended with the NDC edging out the NPP with a 50.23% to 49.77% victory in the run-off elections, in which the former solicited the support of minor parties to defeat the later (then the incumbent). This aligns with the point made earlier about the major parties aligning themselves with smaller parties, which can offer credibility and popularity to a major party’s message.

This part of the paper reviews some of the challenges that have short-changed these minor parties, which mostly set out with the object of serving as alternates to the existing major parties.

Even with these connections to major parties, minor parties face numerous struggles in developing into strong stand-alone organizations. A lack of party structure and access to resources are the two major challenges for minor parties in political competition, especially in the developing world. Structure and resources in the form of a party platform, money, candidate recruitment, and mobilization of volunteers are essential to the success of a political party (Conway and Feigert, 1968), yet these are often lacking for parties other than the NDC and the NPP. The minor parties during the 2012 general elections typified the view that most independent political institutions during the resurgence of democracy in Africa lack the requisite support and resources needed to engineer victories during electoral competitions. This has especially been the case in Ghana, where most party organizations have lacked strength since independence (Ninsin and Drah, 1993).

The PPP, which contested in 2012, fits this mold. It was formed as an organization about nine months before the elections, and it hurriedly introduced its platform to the electorate. Of course, the platform mattered less than the one feature of the party that was very familiar to voters—its flag bearer, Kwesi Ndoum, who had run as the CPP presidential candidate in the previous election. With less than a year to build a grassroots organization and gather resources to finance its electoral endeavors, the structure and organization of the PPP mainly rested on the shoulders of its ambitious leader.

While an electoral failure in 2012, the PPP is a clear example of the normative value of minor parties that is so often overlooked by scholars. It was imperative for Ndoum to bring together the party as quickly as possible, so as not to lose out on this opportunity to promote his viewpoints and, in turn, his new party. It did not matter that the organization and resources were not in place for a legitimate presidential challenge; what mattered most was his and his party’s presence on the ballot. In addition, even with a low percentage of the presidential vote and winning no legislative seats, the PPP accepted the results of the closely contested 2012 election, which had to be determined in court. On 29 August 2013, Ndoum made this clear to his supporters on Facebook by issuing the following statement:

The Supreme Court of the land has spoken. They have affirmed John D. Mahama as our President. We must all abide by the decision. Let’s get to work and deal with poverty, unemployment, indiscipline, disease, etc., etc. Politics must not be above everything. God Bless Our Homeland Ghana. We Must Make Our Country Great and Strong. (Ndoum, 2013)

Of course, the CPP has not relented in its quest for political power, either. Soon after the 2012 election, party chair Samia Nkrumah came out in support of internal party reforms to enforce a clearer policy agenda and strength the organization, especially in light of the party’s success in the Kumbungu by-election. Nkrumah went so far as to claim a potential victory for the party in 2016 (GhanaWeb, 2013b). While such an outcome is highly unlikely, it does provide evidence that the political party has become well accepted among those non-mainstream political activists. Rather than taking to the streets and resorting to violence, the minor parties and their leadership are resorting to building up the parties and focusing on improving Ghana.

The PNC followed suit, too. Even though some members in the party questioned the outcome of the election, Emmanuel Wilson, the party’s national organizer, accepted the results. Furthermore, and much like the CPP, he is pushing for reforms within the party to improve their chances of winning seats in the next election (GNA, 2013). The established trend among these parties, then, is to strategize about how to translate their platforms into public support, ultimately leading to larger seat shares in Parliament.

However, organizational issues are still likely to persist. With the CPP and PPP in mind, some scholars have noted that this reliance on ambitious leaders is used to compensate for the general lack of financial resources dedicated to political and electoral activities in the Fourth Republic (Morrison, 2004; Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1999). During elections, the dominant parties (NPP and NDC) either tap into their traditional sources to strategically focus on the presidency or employ state resources (especially for incumbents, if they happen to be in the governing party). Clearly, this leaves the minor parties largely to their own fate, which consists of resources mostly limited to the wealth of the party leader and a hurriedly constructed support base that may be ethnic or regional.

These discrepancies in party funding are not likely to disappear in the near future. A survey report on political party financing in Ghana by the Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana, 2005: 19) found that 53% of the sample supported state funding of political parties in Ghana while 43% were against state funding. Even more revealing in this survey are the formulas for disbursement of state funds to political parties. If state funds existed for political parties, more than three-quarters of the respondents wanted funds to be disbursed based on the “number of functional regional offices” and the “percentage of total votes won in the last election” (CDD-Ghana, 2005: 22). Such results are certainly not in favor of minor parties, who may neither have the structural organization nor the impressive percentage of votes to attract sufficient funds.

This combination of a lack of party organization and resources is often cited as a main, if not the key, problem for minor parties in Ghana. For instance, Nugent (2001: 422) attributes the poor performance of the GCPP in the 2000 presidential elections to the lack of party organization. In fact, throughout the 2000 election season, the GCPP’s campaign consisted of “a single billboard erected near the exit of the Accra-Tema motorway.” Like other efforts by minor parties, this is hardly enough to reap significant electoral rewards during competitive elections.

On top of these barriers to minor-party success, others have alluded to the misuse of incumbency to the detriment of minor parties and independents (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Lindberg, 2003). Incumbent parties will always enjoy considerable financial advantages over both major and minor parties in opposition, which inevitably leads to an uneven playing field during elections. Referring to the political bickering between the NDC and NPP over financing during the 2004 elections, Ninsin (2006: 18) argues, “the party that wins executive power uses its control of state resources to stuff its election chest with slush funds obtained through graft and patronage.” Amidst charges of unfairness during the 1992 and 1996 elections, “the NDC’s use of state resources was considerably overwhelming, with each district office provided with brand new vehicles and Rawlings himself using the Ghana Air Force helicopter” (Aryee, 1998: 39). During such contests for resources, minor parties remain heavily disadvantaged with their low membership and the lack of clout necessary to attract money from other brokers. Finally, Morrison (2004) asserts that, like many independent African parties, some of these parties are weak because they were co-opted or displaced by personalist leaders. Most of these minor parties are developed around personalities with their own political agenda and with the urge to translate their popularity or wealth into political power.

Sometimes, aware of the uphill task of capturing political power during elections, the leaders of the minor parties acquiesce to the demands from a major party to partake in a political union, even if this means an “unholy alliance.” The political antagonism that ensued between the NDC’s Jerry Rawlings and the NCP’s Kow Nkensen Arkaah (aka, the “Stubborn Cat”) after the NDC-NCP-EGLE alliance during the 1992 elections (Ghanaweb, 2013a) underscores how the objectives of a minor party with an ambitious leader can be co-opted or captured for the political gain of a major party. This is, however, a typical practice in nations with strong two-party systems with single-member, plurality districts. For example, in the United States, studies have found that the Democratic Party was able to stave off minor-party threats in the early to mid-1900s by co-opting their key policy positions. This practice, then, is in line with well-established democracies.

It is also a common practice for elected minor party and independent legislators to work with a major party once in office. The recent developments after the 2012 election provide examples of this. The one elected PNC member, along with three independents, made the choice to work with the NDC majority in Parliament (Essel, 2013). Instead of rabble-rousing, these “outsiders” have agreed to play by the rules of Parliament and sit with one of the major parties. Working with the NDC, even when just one member is involved, gives the PNC an advantage at the table over those parties without representation. While funding is limited, and incumbent major-party politicians get the vast majority of the rewards, the behavior of the PNC fits in line with an incumbent politician seeking to make do, represent the district, and channel this into future successes for himself and the party.

Another challenge for minor parties in Ghana is the struggle to gain national and international visibility. Clearly, poor financing deepens weaknesses in organization and national visibility, which eventually obscures the deeds of the party (see Morrison, 2004)—a necessity for the expansion of support for the party. In emerging or incremental democracies like Ghana, external support and factors have, and continue to play, both monetary and motivational roles in the transition towards democratic consolidation (Handley, 2013). Though the democratic wave had picked up in post-Cold War Africa in the early 1990s, Rawlings and his Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (which later became the NDC) were nudged into the Fourth Republic democratic dispensation by international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Expectedly, Ghana’s democratic arrangements have been heavily supported and financed by external aid institutions and foundations (see Hearn, 2000). Boafo-Arthur (1999: 64) considered the $1.2 billion pledge to Ghana from the Paris Club in the aftermath of the 1992 elections as “an absolute vote of confidence” as the country embraced democratization.

So, as the newly formed NDC (with its incumbent advantage) received external encouragement and the NPP (from a liberal democratic tradition) was energized by post-Cold War manifestations and the dominance of Western liberalism, minor parties like the PNC, PHP, and NIP (as reincarnations of the Nkrumah doctrine of social democracy) struggled to establish national and international linkages. In addition, Article 23 of the Political Parties Act 2000 stipulates that political parties cannot receive contributions from non-citizens, making it more restrictive for these minor parties to reach out. Still, the PNC persevered, a testament to its continued efforts to promote its ideological values. Continuously contesting elections, yet making few electoral gains, shows a deep-seated commitment to the democratic process.

This is quite beneficial to the maturing democracy in Ghana, though struggles continue for minor parties. This becomes very evident in the lack of organizational ability and resource wherewithal for minor parties to compete and contribute to the democratic process. As rightly capsulized by Nugent (2001) in relation to the 2000 elections, the “also rans” or smaller parties have rather bleak futures founded on the lack of vision for some parties, and the acrimonious fragmentation of other parties. In addition, internal challenges affect the process. For example, the Institute of Economic Affairs, which puts on the key presidential debate, changed its rules for 2016. Before, any party with a representative in Parliament could participate; now, minor parties are excluded unless they receive 5% of the national vote (which none did in 2012) (Gadugah, 2013). These political challenges are further exacerbated by the lack of resources or an efficient framework to financially empower these minor powers, thereby creating an uneven field for political competition. Despite these structural deficiencies, a lack of resources, and limited media attention, the parties continue to vie for political office. Normatively speaking, this is valuable for the development and maintenance of competitive democracy in Ghana.

Concluding Remarks

This article sets out to argue that minor parties play a key role in the legitimization of developing democracies. Given that studies of minor parties in single-member, plurality district systems tend to focus on well-established democracies, the literature has paid little attention to the theoretical value of such parties in creating and perpetuating working, representative systems of government. By focusing on the case of Ghana, a nation that has had stable democratic elections since the early 1990s, with a growing number of minor parties heading into its most recent election in 2012, we find evidence that supports our argument. The willingness of those citizens outside mainstream politics to create minor parties and contest elections, the voters who support these parties, even when they have little hope for victory, and the major parties that react to the attention these parties receive, are all positive signs that mirror the activities of major and minor parties in countries with a similar system of elections with strong, entrenched traditions of democracy.

Though this is only one case, it has helped to create theoretical insights that can shape a broader research agenda on the role and value of minor parties in developing democracies. Future studies should expand on this study, then, with more rigorous empirical and qualitative work. While many avenues of research are open, we suggest a few ideas, based on the evidence presented in this article.

One potential study would involve learning about when minor parties can be a boon to democracy and when they can hinder it, specifically within the confines of single-member plurality systems. Though we clearly express that minor parties can be a signal of good democratic health, it is quite possible that, under certain conditions, the opposite is true. As noted throughout, Ghana has two firmly entrenched major parties; for a nation without such luxury, the number of minor parties might be more of a hindrance to good democratic practice. Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) note that centralization of economic power in majoritarian systems tends to decrease the number of parties gaining national representation; this could benefit a nation where ethnic and regional divides are strong by uniting them in larger party organizations. Granted, it is not clear how such issues would be resolved in developing democracies and how these would interact with other variables, but this is why future research is necessary.

A second potential study would involve systematically interviewing and/or surveying the leaders of minor parties in transitioning democracies to better understand their motivations for contesting office. As we assert, the ability to contest elections over several years and typically lose is a beneficial sign to democratic health in Ghana. Even so, it is likely that the leadership of these parties is behaving this way because of particular reasons that we cannot specifically address in this research. Many citizens, and minor-party politicians, likely participate because of the expressive benefits of being part of a cause, or perhaps the solidary benefits of being friends with like-minded people in a political organization (see Salisbury, 1969). Losing might become a trademark of the party, but the party itself serves to unite these disparate elements in a way that other organizations cannot. This, in and of itself, would be an interesting finding, implying that these minor parties can build social and political capital among those who may otherwise be left out.

Overall, then, this article serves as a starting point for greater investigations into the nature, value, and democratic significance of minor parties in transitioning and developing democratic nations. Instead of marginalizing their presence as idiosyncratic and unimportant, minor parties should be studied and chronicled as important components of a system of free elections when single-member, plurality districts are used. Their influence on major-party politicians, voters, and the course of public policy should not be downplayed, especially since minor parties have been harbingers of change in established democracies throughout the world.

Footnotes

Notes

Author biographies

Richard Aidoo is Assistant Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and Geography at Coastal Carolina University. His research focuses on the politics and economics of sub-Saharan African countries, particularly, relations between African and Asian countries. His contributions appear in different academic journals, books, and in the media.

Adam Chamberlain is Assistant Professor of Politics at Coastal Carolina University. His research interests focus on political parties, especially minor parties, and public opinion in the United States.

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