Insurgency in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram Uprisings

Abstract

The Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency pose the greatest security threat to Nigeria since the end of the civil war in 1970. This article places both rebellions in comparative perspective. It argues that, though spatially and ideologically differentiated, both insurgencies are products of the dysfunctional character of the Nigerian state. Owing to poor governance, the state relies essentially on repression and the military option in managing challenges to its legitimacy, leading to the radicalization of violent non-state actors. The article recommends the need for developmental politics and a critical re-examination of the National Question to make the state more relevant to the people.

Keywords

Boko Haram insurgency militancy Niger Delta terrorism

Introduction

Durable peace has remained elusive in Nigeria since the country returned to civil rule in 1999 after 16 years of continued military dictatorship. The great expectation that democratic governance would engender political stability, national cohesion and ethno-religious tolerance has not been realized. Rather than peace and national cohesion, insurgency has remained an abiding feature of state–society relations. Though political instability is neither peculiar to nor new in the country, the radicalization of Niger Delta militants in the south and the Boko Haram insurgents in the north represent disturbing new trends. The growing strategic and operational effectiveness of the violent non-state actors engender enormous human and economic costs for Nigerians and visitors alike (Osumah, 2013a). Despite the repressive response of the state, insurgency and its growing lethality have remained a hard nut to crack. The ineffectiveness of brutal counter-insurgency has prompted a gradual shift from the traditional military calculus to more liberal and flexible alternatives including the use of dialogue and amnesty deals in some cases (Aghedo, 2013).

Though agitations are also rife in other areas of the country, as exemplified by O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) in the south-western region and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the south-east, the Boko Haram enclave in the north and the Niger Delta oil hub in the south-south zone of the federation represent the most violent spaces in the country. Violent agitations have not only been rampant in these areas, but they have also witnessed dramatic shifts in tactics and methodologies including the use of ransom kidnapping, hostage-taking and bombing (Osumah and Aghedo, 2011).

Despite the spatial and ideological variations in the emergence of these insurgencies, there are several areas of convergence and divergence in the motivation, character, dynamics and costs as well as the appropriateness or otherwise of state–society responses to the management of the uprisings. However, while the insurgencies have generated great intellectual attention and attraction, a comparative analysis of these uprisings is rare. Against this backdrop, this article examines the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency from a comparative perspective. Before proceeding to juxtapose these two home-grown insurgencies, the article discusses the background of the Nigerian state, and attempts a historical trip on uprisings in Africa’s most populous nation and second largest economy.

The Nature of the Nigerian State

Though the phenomena of militancy and insurgency got radicalized in Nigeria and became bold in the closing decade of the 20th century, the historical context and character of the state provide a fertile ground for them to mushroom. One distinctive character of the Nigerian state is that it is a colonial imposition. It emerged not as a product of consensus among the constituent units. It was neither created due to irreconcilable differences between the constituent units nor designed as a mediatory instrument for diverse constituent groups. The colonial state was largely created to serve the economic interests of the imperialists, helping to ensure law and order and guarantee an environment that enabled the colonialists to expand their interests. This disposition of the state was underpinned by the philosophy of the dual mandate; namely, ‘non-interference with native culture and institutions and the preparation of the native people for eventual self rule’ (Ebohon, 2012: 25). But the exclusivism which the dual mandate engendered further deepened the south–north divide and entrenched ethno-cultural cleavages in the country.

Another distinctive element of the Nigerian state is its diverse ethnic composition. As a consequence of colonial imposition, the state harbours over 250 ethnic groups and about 400 linguistic groups (Mustapha, 2007). Among the diverse ethno-linguistic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Igbo in the south-east and the Yoruba in the south-west are preponderant. These three groups make up about 68% of the Nigerian over 160 million population (Forest, 2012). The population in the Hausa-Fulani north is dominated by Muslims, while Christians are preponderant in the population of the south. The colonialists made little efforts to integrate these diverse identity groups. Rather than integration, the colonialists encouraged north–south dichotomy through various practices. For example, visitors from the Maritime (south) to the Soudan (north) were seen as ‘strangers’ and restricted to Sabon gari (strangers’ quarters) to prevent the ‘visitors’ from mixing with indigenous northerners (Osaghae, 2002). Also, most parts of the north were shut out from Christian missionaries and Western education (LeVan, 2013).

This practice gave the south a head start over the north in terms of social and political education. The implication of the political ignorance of the north began to show vividly in the meetings the leaders of the regions had in the years before independence in 1960. A number of these meetings, such as the Ibadan Conference of 1950, were disharmonious. Anxieties, fears and apprehensions were expressed about ethnic domination and the feasibility of Lord Lugard’s experiment of ‘political cloning’, and ‘the mistake of 1914’ (Tamuno, 1970). In post-colonial Nigeria, the antagonistic relations among the different ethnic groups have often reflected in secessionist threats by any ethnic group which suffered disadvantage in the federation. Notably, the reference to the south often in opposition to the north does not presuppose that each is monolithic or united. There are minority ethnic groups in the two regions. Owing to the anomalous construction of the state, these sub-nationalities have also been involved in agitation for self-determination through the creation of autonomous states along primordial cleavages and institutionalization of social justice and equity since 1960 (Obi, 2002).

A further distinctive attribute of the Nigerian state is arbitrariness. Like the colonial progenitor, the state essentially relies on the deployment of force in the management of threats to its authority from the various ethnic groups – at grave human and material cost. Efforts by successive governments to forge unity among the diverse nationalities have not yielded considerable results. Political contestation among the ruling elite is intensely built along ethno-regional and religious identities (Jega, 2007). Though federalism was adopted as a political strategy to foster national unity, the protracted military incursion into politics and subsequent authoritarian rule has profoundly eroded the values of the political strategy. The frustration arising from the absence of social justice in the relationships among the political constituent units and lack of equity in the distribution of power and resources make many aggrieved groups seek to exit from the state, including resorting to insurgency.

Another fundamental element of the Nigerian state is the privatization of collective interest by the ruling class. This is underscored by the inability of the state to cater for the genuine needs and aspirations of the vast majority of the populace. Though the country is Africa’s largest oil producer, and the world’s sixth largest oil exporter, the economy malfunctions with an average income of about US$1 a day (Peel, 2005). For decades its massive oil resources have been plundered by various kleptocratic leaders, and corruption is endemic throughout the political and economic systems. The average Nigerian can expect to die before they reach the age of 48 (Forest, 2012; Osumah, 2013a). The rate of unemployment, poverty, and infrastructural decay is very high, driving many, especially the youth, to criminality, violence and insurgent movements as instruments of survival.

Images of Violent State–Society Relations in Nigeria

As earlier noted, one of the enduring conflict management approaches in Nigeria is the coercive strategy which involves the deployment of armed forces to ensure law and order. This recourse to repression has roots in the colonial state. As noted by Falola (1998: 52), ‘the colonial state was coercive… and was built by conquest and subjugation; the state never acquired any enduring legitimacy or trust from the various indigenous groups and nationalities’. As a result, the Nigerian political landscape has witnessed a high degree of violence and insecurity since colonial times. Obnoxious colonial policies especially in the area of taxation had led to The Egba Uprising or ‘Adubi War’ in western Nigeria in 1918. A similar frustration arising from the rumour that women were to be taxed precipitated the Aba Women’s Riot in 1929 in south-eastern Nigeria. Another localized protest in Enugu during the Colliery Strike in 1949 resulted in the fatal shooting of 21 miners (Anifowose, 1982: 47).

In 1953, the Western Region threatened to secede from the federation over the plan to excise Lagos from the region and again in 1993 over the 12 June crisis (Abati, 2001a; Tamuno, 1970). The people of present day Bayelsa and Rivers states were mobilized in February 1966 by Isaac Adaka Boro and his fellow compatriots to unilaterally declare the Niger Delta Republic (Abati, 2001b). Similarly, upset by the silence of the Gowon administration over the massacre of Igbo people in the north, Emeka Ojukwu on 30 May 1967 demanded the secession of the Eastern Region by declaring the Republic of Biafra leading to the 1967–1970 civil war (Onuoha, 2011). In the military establishment, coups and counter-coups were also rampant as witnessed in January and July 1966, 1975, 1976 and 1983 among others. Before the 1983 coup, several northern cities had been engulfed by riots. The most notable of these were the Maitatsine urban revolts which broke out in Kano in1980, Maiduguri in 1982, Kaduna in 1982, Jimeta Yola in 1984 and Gombe in 1985 (Osaghae, 2002).

During the last phase of military rule, especially under the Babangida and Abacha dictatorships (1985–2008), acts of state terror manifested in bomb explosions and political assassinations of pro-democracy and human rights activists across the nation (Osumah and Aghedo, 2011). For example, between 1991 and 2000, there were over 30 violent crises. The Kaduna anti-Sharia riots alone resulted in over 5000 deaths in 2000 (Reno, 2004). As typical of Nigeria’s identity conflicts, the riots precipitated reprisal attacks in Aba and other parts of the eastern states leading to further loss of lives and property (Imobighe, 2003). This period also witnessed the mushrooming and radicalization of ethnic militias across the country (Aghedo, 2011). However, activities of the Niger Delta militants and those of the Boko Haram insurgents remain the greatest security threats to the country in recent years.

Militancy is used broadly in this article to denote a combative and aggressive activism or engagement regardless of the use of physical violence or pacificist methods in a struggle for identified causes (Ikelegbe, 2006: 92). Most times, militancy is precipitated by a governance crisis arising from grievances over a lack of popular participation, marginalization, exclusion, alienation and exploitation of a vast majority of the populace in terms of resource allocation cum distribution or development promotion (Ebiena, 2010). However, Collier (2000) noted that militancy is driven more by greed than grievance especially in natural resource contexts where rebels are motivated by self-regarding agendas rather than the quest for justice. But in contrast to the greed/grievance dichotomy, it has been argued that in most conflicts the phenomena of greed and grievance often reinforce each other rather than being mutually exclusive (Aghedo, 2013; Korf, 2005).

Following Schmid and Jongman (1988: 28), terrorism is defined in this article as

‘an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets’.

Post (2007) identifies four ingredients of terrorism namely: (i) the presence or threat of violence; (ii) a political or social motive; (iii) a broadening of audience beyond the immediate victims; and (iv) coordinated and often well-executed attacks. Both militancy and terrorism are sources of security threats. And it is possible for an otherwise militant struggle to metamorphose into a terrorist action as the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency exemplify. The strategic operations of both groups are similar in several respects. Despite the variations in terms of impact and frequency, both groups adopt insurgent tactics such as kidnapping, bombing, attacks on security formations and jail breaks.

Comparison of Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram Insurgency

This section is concerned with comparing the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency. For analytical convenience and following Clapham (1998), the comparative mapping is categorized into different sections.

Motivation

The Niger Delta militancy was driven by the demands for remediation of environment and distributive equity. The Niger Delta contains the crude oil which since 1970 generated over US$400 billion in revenue for Nigeria and more billions in profits for oil companies (Aghedo and Osumah, 2009). Yet its host oil communities are mired in poverty and pollution. This paradox stirred militancy in the region which initially adopted legal instruments, party formation, and dialogue in the 1970s and armed rebellion in the early 2000s with hostage-taking and attacks on oil facilities. Though some of the militants in the Niger Delta still hang on, there has been considerable decline in their combative activities since the declaration of amnesty for repentant fighters in 2009. On the other hand, the Boko Haram insurgents evolved in the early 2000s with sporadic attacks on police stations, though a serialized offensive began to make local and international headlines from June 2009. In its narratives of grievance, the radical Islamic sect opposes Western education. Indeed, the Hausa translation of the phrase ‘Boko Haram’ means Western education is evil’ (Aghedo and Osumah, 2012; Ishaya, 2011).

The foot soldiers of both groups have essentially been the unemployed, poor and uneducated. However, unlike the Niger Delta militants which comprised essentially the Ijaw people, members of Boko Haram were initially drawn from the Kanuri nationality; this has now been broadened to include recruits from other nationalities in the north and some illegal aliens from other African countries such as the Republics of Benin, Chad, Niger, Sudan, Somali and Mauritania (LeVan, 2013; Soria, 2012). Also, unlike the Niger Delta militant groups, Boko Haram is believed to have links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for logistical support. In addition, some security personnel have purportedly enlisted into Boko Haram sect for fear of attack or primordial sentiments (Osumah, 2013a).

Operational Base

The operational base and activities of Boko Haram have been in major cities in the north, especially the north-east geo-political zone. The northern cities include Maiduguri, Yobe, Damaturu, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Bauchi and Abuja, the federal capital territory. On the other hand, the operational base and activities of the Niger Delta militants were mainly restricted to the Niger Delta region, particularly the swamps and creeks of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states. One fundamental similar feature of the operational bases in the two cases is the level of unemployment, poverty, and economic destitution in both regions (see Table 1), though higher in north-east geo-political zone of Nigeria where Boko Haram began before spreading to other parts of the north.

Table 1.

Indicative poverty trends by region in Nigeria.

Levels	1980	1985	1992	1996	2004	2010
National	28.1	46.3	42.7	65.6	54.4	69
Sector
Urban	17.2	37.8	37.5	58.2	43.2	61.8
Rural	28.3	51.4	66.0	69.3	63.3	73.2
Geopolitical zone
South-south	13.2	45.7	40.8	58.2	35.1	63.8
South-east	12.9	30.4	41.0	53.5	26.7	67
South-west	13.4	38.6	43.1	60.9	43.0	59.1
North-central	32.2	50.8	46.0	64.7	67.0	67.5
North-east	35.6	54.9	54.0	70.1	72.2	76.3
North-west	37.7	52.1	36.5	77.2	71.2	77.7

Source: British Council (2012: 10).

The National Bureau of Statistics in 2010 reported specifically that Yobe State, the headquarters of the Boko Haram sect, habours 33.2% of unemployed people which is the highest in the country (Nwachukwu, 2011). Meanwhile, it can be argued that both cases feed on widespread inequality, unemployment and poverty in their regions of emergence.

Modus Operandi, Strategies and Targets

The Niger Delta and Boko Haram militants in their modus operandi share some similarities and distinctions. They both adopt a franchise system whereby they claim responsibility through press releases with a central email facility after launching attacks (Agbo, 2011). They both launch attacks with sophisticated weapons and explosives. Instructively, Boko Haram appears to be more coordinated in launching attacks and its targets are different from those of the Niger Delta militants. Though both groups adopt various violent methods to achieve their objectives, targets of their attacks vary. While Boko Haram target both soft and hard spots such as churches, market places, banks, public places of relaxation, traditional institutions and strategic government offices such as the security posts and border posts, the Niger Delta militants essentially attack hard spots such as oil installations, oil companies and security formations. In particular, Boko Haram allegedly executed the bombing of the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja on 26 August 2011. The target according to the sect was a protest against to the role of America in helping the Nigerian government to suppress the terrorism (Fabiyi, 2011).

Furthermore, unlike the Niger Delta militants who used boats to navigate the maze of creeks and rivulets in their operations, the Boko Haram terrorists use vehicles and motorcycles in launching attacks. With motorcycles, popularly known as Achaba in the north, the Boko Haram insurgents are able to meander through the crowded cities after launching attacks (Suleiman, 2011). This contrast can be adduced essentially to the difference in operational terrain or geographies of violence. In addition, Boko Haram’s adoption of suicide bombing makes it distinct from the Niger Delta militants whose operational strategies were more of guerrilla warfare.

Inventiveness

There is a remarkable difference in the dynamism and inventiveness of the champions of both groups. Unlike the actors of the Niger Delta militancy, the Boko Haram insurgents have been allegedly involved in the establishment of factories at various locations including Kano and Kogi states for the production of bombs and other explosive devices to aid their strategic operations. In addition, unlike the champions of the Niger Delta militancy, there is an indication that some women and other vulnerable individuals such as the Almajiri (Koranic pupils) are used by Boko Haram insurgents. Some women have been reportedly involved as arms couriers. For example, two women with AK 47 rifles, a pistol and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) concealed under their veils were arrested recently by an anti-terror youth group known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) at the Bulabulin entrance to the Monday Market in Maiduguri (The Nation, 2013). Notably, some women were involved in the Niger Delta struggle. However, they were only involved in street protests, occupation of oil flow stations and demands for improved socio-economic conditions. Fundamentally, there was no clear trace of attempts to radicalize women and other vulnerable individuals in the structure of the militants for the purpose of perpetrating violence.

Militarization and Radicalization

There is a commonality in state authorities’ interpretation of and response to the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency. The Nigerian state largely interprets and responds to militants’ violent activities as a grave threat to national security as shown by the deployment of a huge military presence. The heavy military presence in both areas was largely associated with repression, intimidation, abuse, mass arrest, detention, beatings, torture, killings, and destruction. In response to the Niger Delta militancy, the Nigerian state deployed a repressive counter-terrorism strategy. The administrations of Olusegun Obasanjo and Umaru Musa Yar’Adua respectively ordered military action against militants in the region. Like the Niger Delta case, President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration has proscribed Boko Haram; declared emergency rule in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states; ordered heavy military operations in the hotbed of Boko Haram; and approved the deportation of illegal immigrants to some African countries.

Also, the militias and military had several confrontations leading to mass killings at Ogoniland in the 1990s, Umuechen in 1990, Odi in 1999, Okorenkoko, Opia, Ikiyan, Egbema, Etche, Ogbia, Opia, Ekiye, Odioama, Tombia, Bukuma, Ogbakiri, Buguma, and Oru Sangana in the 2000s. Similarly, the Boko Haram militias and military have had several confrontations. In July 2011, the JTF created a military cordon in parts of the north and went on a house-to-house search, arresting and shooting suspected Boko Haram members. Also, in October 2012 the JTF executed 30 suspected Boko Haram members and killed another 40 suspected terrorists in November 2012. In February 2013, the JTF bombarded a remote encampment in the north-east with a helicopter, killing 17 suspected members of the sect (LeVan, 2013).

In aggregate, the repressive military responses of the Nigerian state which resulted in the extra-judicial murder of members in both cases have been argued as a key factor fuelling the radicalization of the conflict. The execution of some prominent leaders in both cases culminated in more vicious attacks by the non-state actors (Agbonifo and Aghedo, 2012). The execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni environmental activists in November 1995 was based on trumped-up charges by the Sani Abacha regime. The execution led to the mushrooming of more militant groups in the area (Tonwe, Ojo and Aghedo, 2012). Similarly, the 2009 arrest and killing of Boko Haram leader Mohammad Yusuf and his father-in-law resulted in more vicious attacks by the sect including the use of suicide bombings (Osumah, 2013a).

Also, in the wake of the emergency rule by President Jonathan, the Boko Haram insurgents who were dislodged by the security force have regrouped and sacked Bama and Gwoza towns along the Sambisa Game Reserve camps in Borno State. The fresh attacks in Bama and Gwoza towns in the post-emergency rule era by the insurgents have resulted in a mass exodus of residents from the two towns to Maiduguri and neighbouring Cameroon and Niger Republic. Before the imposition of emergency rule on Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states the insurgents had invaded Bama killing 40 policemen, 13 prison warders, three soldiers and several civilians (Marama, 2013).

Rapprochements

Apart from the counter-terrorist strategy used in managing the two home-grown insurgencies, the Nigerian state also undertook some rapprochements. In the case of the Niger Delta militancy, the rapprochements included the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961, the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) in 1979, Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 1999 and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs in 2008, as well as the implementation of 13% derivation in 2000, preferential patronages by Petroleum Trust Development Funds (PTDF), skewed employment/scholarships and projects in favour of Niger Delta indigenes and communities by oil companies and specialized aids directed by foreign donor agencies to the region (Osumah and Aghedo, 2013). Other peace gestures demonstrated by the federal government included the setting up of the General Ogomudia Security Committee on Oil Producing Areas, the Chief James Onanefe Ibori Committee on the Niger Delta in 2004, the Niger Delta Youth Standing Committee in 2004, the Major General Mohammed Presidential Committee on Peace and Reconciliation, the Niger Delta Peace and Security Strategy (PASS), and the Ledum Mitee-chaired Technical Committee on the Niger Delta in 2008 (Oronto, 2006) as well as the amnesty deal for repentant militants in 2009.

In addition to the federal government’s rapprochements, some states like Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta demonstrated some peaceful gestures. The Rivers State government adopted the ‘3 Es’ approach; namely engagement, education and empowerment. In Bayelsa State, the government sought re-orientation, skill acquisition and employment for fighters (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye and Okhonmina, 2007). The responses to the Niger Delta militancy are transposed on the situation in the north. Like Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states in the Niger Delta, some of the hotbed states in the north are also strategizing on how to address the Boko Haram insurgency. However, the measures undertaken by the Niger Delta states appear to be more extensive than those in the north. For example, the aforementioned states in the Niger Delta variously launched disarmament programmes or had peace accords with militias or sought re-orientation, skill acquisition and employment, while in the north only Borno State has promised dialogue with Boko Haram fighters.

Meanwhile, the peace efforts in response to the situation in both cases have not been utterly different. Like the Niger Delta militancy, the federal government has empanelled various committees to probe the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and make recommendations. Just like in the Niger Delta where ex-militias were granted amnesty, the federal government is contemplating an amnesty ideal for repentant Boko Haram insurgents. Instructively, a faction of Boko Haram has objected to the proposed amnesty offer. In the same way, after a few years of relative peace in the post-amnesty period in the Niger Delta, there has been growing discontent and disenchantment within the rank and file of ex-militia leaders and their foot soldiers due to the corrupt implementation of the amnesty programme (Aghedo, 2013).

Splinter Groups/Fractionalization

The Boko Haram insurgents and Niger Delta militants share elements of fractionalization and non-homogeneity in terms of drive, organizational control or leadership style. Ibaba and Ikelegbe (2009) categorized the active Niger Delta militias loosely into three groups (see Table 2), but Francis, Deirdre, and Rossiasco (2011) classified the resistance groups into five categories as shown in Table 3.

Table 2.

Classification of Niger Delta militants.

Private militias	Ethnic militias	Pan-ethnic militias
Niger Delta People Volunteer Force	The Meinbutus	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
Adaka Marines	Arugbo Freedom Fighters	The Coalition For Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA)
Martyrs Brigade	Iduwini Volunteer Force	The Niger Delta People Salvation Front
Niger Delta Volunteers	Egbesu Boys of Africa
Niger Delta Militant Force Squad
Niger Delta Coastal Guerillas (NDCGS)

Source: Ibaba and Ikelegbe (2009).

Table 3.

Types of resistance and armed groups in the Niger Delta.

S/N	Group typology	Group description
1.	Advocacy groups	Nearly all major ethnicities in the Niger Delta have created advocacy groups to formally promote their collective interests. Typically they agitate for substantive ethnic and communal demands using non-violent methods. They have played important mediating roles in negotiating community interest with government and corporate entities. Examples: The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) issued the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights; the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) became the driving force behind the famous Ijaw manifesto known as the ‘Kaiama Declaration’.
2.	Cults and confraternities	University-based ‘confraternities’ date from 1952, with the founding of the Pyrates by Wole Soyinka. Similar to fraternities in the United States of America (USA), they often have business offshoots or ‘street cults’ that typically operate in and around major cities. These and other ‘cults’ or gangs are the main players in petty crimes and local kidnapping for ransom. Usually they are not politically motivated but frequently serve as mercenaries or allies of other armed groups and may join political militias during elections. Many also engage in bunkering, drug trafficking, piracy, and robbery, gang wars between cult groups flare up with some regularity. Examples of confraternities include the Pyrates (inactive), the National Association of Sea Dogs, Black Axe, and Vikings. Cults include the Deegbam and the Deywell, Outlaws, and Greenlanders, all of which are still in operation.
3.	Vigilantes	Community-based ‘vigilante’ groups are a longstanding institution in many parts of the Niger Delta. They assure communal defence and protection from criminals or predatory enemies. Sometimes they engage in oil-related border disputes with neighbours. Since the 1990s these local groups have assumed increasing importance in the absence of adequate official policing at the community level. Rogue vigilantes have also become a law unto themselves and practice extra-judicial killings, seizure of personal property, and other serious human rights violations. Examples include the Bakassi Boys (Aba), the Bush Boys (Okrika) and the Isongofaro (Nembe Ogbolomabiri).
4.	Militias	Armed militias are typically self-motivated and self-sustaining. Modern Ijaw militias have been inspired by Adaka Boro’s 1966 revolutionary bank of 150 freedom fighters. Today’s militia men move freely between locations and groups, and this fluid structure makes them highly adaptable. Most militias sustain themselves with oil bunkering, well-paid security contracts for politicians or oil companies, political enforcement, armed services, piracy, or trafficking in drugs and weapons. Examples include Adaka Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), echoed by Dokubo Asari’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Ateke Tom’s Niger Delta Vigilante Movement (NDVM, also called the ‘Icelanders’) and John Togo’s Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF). Some militias were allied under the MEND brand (see below).
5.	Umbrella militias: MEND	Formed in late 2005 by Tom Polo (Delta), Farah Dagogo (Rivers), and General Boyloaf (Bayelsa), all key field commanders in their states, MEND prior to the amnesty spoke for a loose coalition of field-based militias. Its leadership has been elusive, known publically through an internet persona named ‘Jomo Gbomo’ who is associated with Bayelsan Henry Okah. Okah was previously a major arms supplier and supporter of MEND, and was imprisoned in South Africa on charges including masterminding bombings in Abuja and Warri in 2010.

Source: Francis, Deirdre, and Rossiasco (2011: 55).

Also, some Niger Delta militant gangs such as MEND gained notoriety between 2007 and 2009 because of the infiltration of their ranks by criminal gangs (LeVan, 2013). Similarly, the Governor of Bauchi State observed that a faction of Boko Haram insurgents is rooted in distorted Islam while the other is driven by criminal profit. Furthermore, two of Mohammed Yusuf’s prodigies, Aminu Tashen-Ilimi and Mola Umar, left the main group and established a base in Kanama in Kano State near the border with Niger Republic. This group has also executed attacks against police patrols in the area. The leader of the Izala Sect (Jama’atul Izalatul Bidi’a wa Iquamatus-Sunnah), Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi, had in the past maintained good relations with Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf (Imobighe, 2012). But currently the two factions have been considered rivals. In August 2009 the police in Kano State released members of the Izala Sect after blaming Boko Haram for the attack on police personnel in Wudil. At the time, the Deputy Chairman of Izala Sect, Ulama Imam Abubakar Ikara, stated that his group was not in any way linked to Boko Haram (Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011).

It is widely believed that there are two splinter groups from Boko Haram; namely, Ansaru and Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (JAMBS), which roughly translates as ‘Vanguards for the Aids of Muslims in Black Africa’. The Ansaru specializes in the targeting of Westerners and the group claimed responsibility for the kidnap of a French family on the border between Nigeria and Cameroon in 2012. JAMBS, which emerged in January 2012, was said to have been created owing to disenchantment with the leadership style of Boko Haram’s commander and spiritual leader, Abubakar Mohammad Shekau, especially the tendency of killing fellow Muslims. The sect, JAMBS, an affiliate of AQIM, is led by Abu Usamatal Ansary. The group is said to be motivated by an anti-Nigerian government and anti-Western agenda (Osumah, 2013b). JAMBS is believed to be more dangerous than Boko Haram. According to the President of the Northern Civil Society Coalition, Shehu Sani:

What makes this group very dangerous is their mobility. You cannot say this is where they are located. They operate a mobile command and no part of Nigeria is immune to their acts… It is difficult to estimate their actual number because they are not in a particular position, but I can tell you that they have high capacity to inflict lethal damage and to also carry out operations without being caught. (Quoted in Osumah, 2013b: 7)

Costs

The attacks by both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram violent non-state actors have engendered huge carnage and economic costs. In both cases there is no statistical exactitude on the costs that may have been engendered. For example, in the Niger Delta, since 2006 approximately more than a thousand people were reportedly killed and over 300 kidnapped (Azubike, 2009; Oladesu, 2009). Between 11 January 2006 and 20 May 2006 MEND alone was alleged to have killed 24 soldiers and policemen, kidnapped 13 oil workers and caused severe damage to critical oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta. On the other hand, a recent report entitled ‘START’ which was conducted by the University of Maryland for the American government on global terrorism revealed that Boko Haram emerged in 2012 as the second deadliest terror group in the world by killing a total of 1132 people in 364 attacks. Only the Afghanistan’s Taliban which killed 1842 people in 525 attacks was ahead of Boko Haram in the period under review. These Boko Haram-related deaths surpassed those of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Maoists in India and Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (LeVan, 2013; The Guardian, 2013).

Aside from human deaths, the violence engendered by the twin home-grown insurgencies has resulted in huge economic costs for the nation, corporate bodies and individual business owners. The unhealthy security situation provoked by the insurgencies paralyzed and shut down businesses in many cities in the two regions. For example, Boko Haram ruined many local investments and caused a group of investors from Germany, who wanted to build a cement factory in Maiduguri, to shelve the plan and moved to another African country (Ishaya, 2011). Over 25 foreign airlines, which use the Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt and Kano international airport facilities are planning a boycott of some of the airports owing to Boko Haram-related insecurity (Abioye, 2011).

In the Niger Delta, since 2006 when the spate of militancy escalated, the economic costs have been tremendous. Between 2006 and 2008 Nigeria lost at least a quarter of its oil production due to frequent attacks on oil installations resulting from the activities of oil bunkering cartel and kidnapping for ransom in the region (Azubike, 2009: 12). In specific terms, the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta estimated that the nation lost about N8.84 trillion or US$61.6 billion to oil theft and sabotage during the period (Ajearo, 2009). Some of the 2008 losses are captured in Table 4.

Table 4.

Quantity of oil loss in barrels per day and amount in US$ for 2008 in Nigeria.

S/N	Month	Estimated quantity of barrels of oil loss per day	Total barrels of oil loss for the month	OPEC basket price for bonny light crude oil for the month in US$	Total amount loss for the month in US$
1	January	700,000	21,700,000	88.35	1,917,195,000
2.	February	700,000	20,300,000	90.64	1,839,992,000
3.	March	700,000	21,700,000	99.03	2,148,951,000
4.	April	700,000	21,700,000	105.16	2,208,360,000
5.	May	700,000	21,700,000	119.16	2,590,763,000
6.	June	700,000	21,700,000	128.33	2,694,930,000
7.	July	700,000	21,700,000	131.22	2,847,474,000
8.	August	700,000	21,700,000	112.41	1,633,793,000
9.	September	700,000	21,700,000	96.85	2,439,297,000
10.	Grand Total				$20,720,842,000

Source: Newswatch (2009: 19).

Notes: OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

In addition, the activities of the Niger Delta militants coupled with the decline in international oil price were attributed to the inability of Nigeria to meet the financial projections in the 2009 budget (Ajearo, 2009). Also, the cut in the nation’s oil production capacity and shortages owing to the heightened spate of militancy contributed to the 2006 rise in global oil prices (The Nation, 2006). Equally, the activities of the Niger Delta militants significantly contributed to an increase in security expenditure by the federal and state governments as well as the oil companies. In the 2008 fiscal year, for instance, about N400 billion was voted by the federal government for providing security in the region. Also, the security manager of Addax Petroleum Nigeria, and the chairman of the Oil Producers’ Trade Section (OPTS), claimed that the companies jointly spent about US$3.7 billion on security in 2007 (Ajearo, 2009).

Furthermore, the horrendous violence and criminality of the militias in the Niger Delta and north-eastern Nigeria generated an image crisis for the nation locally and internationally. Amid the insecurity engendered by the two home-grown insurgencies, the US embassy and the United Kingdom (UK) Travel Advisory variously warned their nationals on the risk involved in travelling to Nigeria. For instance, the US State Department in a statement noted that:

travel to Nigeria carries a considerable risk … the lack of law and order in Nigeria poses considerable risks to travelers. Violent crimes committed by ordinary criminals… can occur throughout the country. (Quoted by Osumah and Ekpenyong, 2006: 11)

Similarly, the violence occasioned by the Boko Haram insurgency prompted the US and UK authorities to warn their nationals against travel to some states in the north, particularly Bauchi, Borno, Yobe and Plateau (Adepegba and Adesomoju, 2011; Ogunseye, 2012). Such travel warnings which are often relayed on international media outlets portray Nigeria as unsafe thereby undermining the country’s efforts to rebrand its image internationally (Ojo and Aghedo, 2013).

International Links/Foreign Connections

A major distinction between Boko Haram insurgents and the Niger Delta militants relates to linkages with foreign terror groups. Boko Haram is believed to have operational links with some international terrorist organizations including AQIM, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and other rebel groups in Algeria and Mali (Osumah, 2013a). It adopts the signature tactics of AQIM such as the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in attacks against high-profile public targets. Both AQIM and Boko Haram leaders have issued statements complimenting each other and pledging mutual support. In addition, there is the question of the role currently being played within Boko Haram by the Chadian-born Mamman Nur, formerly third highest-ranking figure in Boko Haram’s leadership behind Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Mohammad Shekau. In the aftermath of the government crackdown in 2009, Nur allegedly went to Somalia where he and his followers trained in Al-Shabaab camps and forged links with transnational jihadist networks. Though speculated, Boko Haram links to Al-Qaeda core has not been proven. Unlike Al-Shabaab, which fully aligned with Al-Qaeda’s ideology and strategy in 2008, Boko Haram has ‘refrained from officially aligning itself with Al-Qaeda-core’ despite its shift from sporadic violence to a more coordinated and spectacular strategy (Soria, 2012: 8).

Indeed, Boko Haram spokesmen have boasted of their ties with militants in Somalia, links that have been confirmed by African Union forces in that country (Pham, 2012). Such links have provided Boko Haram access to training, weapons, and financial support. It is perhaps only during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) that a rebel group secured this kind of international recognition. In the course of the civil war, France, Haiti and Ivory Coast granted formal recognition to the independent Republic of Biafra and provided military support to the rebels, while the UK backed the Nigerian federal government (Forest, 2012).

Notably, both militant groups have sought involvement of international observers in dialogue with the Nigerian government. For example, Boko Haram opted to dialogue with the Nigerian government in Saudi Arabia (Aghedo and Osumah, 2012). Similarly, in the post-amnesty resurgence of violence in the Niger Delta, renegade John Togo, Keiti Sese and Tamunotonye Kuna demanded the convocation of a post-amnesty conference between them and the Nigerian government with the international community, particularly the US and the UN as external observers (Ajaero and Azubike, 2010).

Conclusion

The Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency pose the gravest threats to Nigeria’s political equilibrium since the end of the civil war in 1970. Both insurgencies share a lot in common. First, substantially, at the roots of both insurgencies are governance crisis, elite political corruption and banditry. The inability of the Nigerian state to effectively manage the question of exclusion and marginalization combined with political rascality prompts radical insurgents to articulate counter-hegemonic themes and possibilities. Second, the counter-terrorism strategy with coercive military deployment and brutal repression conflated with some rapprochements in response to the two home-grown insurgencies is based on the Nigerian authorities’ interpretation of insurgent activities as a threat to national security. As shown earlier, Nigeria has placed an inordinate premium on state rather than human security since colonial times.

Understandably, these insurgencies are an atavistic political force resisting the politics of hegemonic construction, which portends grave threats to the political viability of Nigeria. In particular, the Boko Haram insurgency is far more daring and destructive than the Niger Delta militancy. However, despite the apprehension of possible collapse, history can turn Nigeria into a safe haven if some lessons can be learned. If the descent into anarchy or civil war that these insurgencies pose is to be averted, a political process of reconstruction must be initiated. Political reconstruction and sustainable democratic consolidation undoubtedly, regardless of their appeals, are also painful processes of learning and development.

If democratization is to assume its full essence, governance must not be characterized by political rascality, corruption, insensitivity, neglect, marginalization, exclusionist tendencies and intolerance of opposition. To engender a political reconstruction, there is need for national dialogue or conference. The conference must be democratic in procedure and content and must guarantee opportunities for both expression and self-fulfilment in order to correct the so-called ‘mistake of 1914’ and redefine the formal context and space within which politics may be practised. This will infuse the Nigerian project with reserves of legitimization and minimize violent uprising against the state.

Footnotes

Author biographies

Iro Aghedo is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Benin, Nigeria. He was educated at the universities of Ibadan and Benin in Nigeria, and at the College of North-West London and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

Oarhe Osumah is a lecturer in the Department of Public Administration, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria. He earned a doctorate degree in Public Administration from the University of Benin. He has published widely in both national and foreign journals.

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