Abstract
Not long ago, the number of think tanks in Ghana began to increase steadily. These organizations have now carved out a niche as repositories of ideas for government to tap when formulating and implementing good policies for development. Unfortunately, while their role in the policy making process is well accepted, whether they actually have a substantial impact on policy outcomes is as yet undetermined. In this paper, we will examine the impact of think tanks on policy outcomes in Ghana by looking at two major policy areas where policies have been initiated either by these institutions or by government itself.
Introduction
Ideas and institutions have been recognized in the policy literature as integral to the development and outcomes of public policy. Ideas and institutions, however, do not exist in a vacuum. Whether they influence policy making and hence, policy outcomes, depends on how policy actors shape their thinking. In other words, ideas need carriers if they are to exert any influence on policy outcomes. In recent years, think tanks have been key actors in the policy process and projectors or carriers of policy ideas. Although they are not necessarily new in the policy arena, especially in the developed world, there has been exponential growth in such institutions in the developing world (McGann, 2012).
It has been argued that the most effective policies – those that foster healthy, vibrant societies and generate opportunities for people to build better lives – are based on quality research. Those policies are especially effective when grounded in an understanding of local realities. Unfortunately, governments in many developing countries lack the ability to undertake such quality research, thereby immensely impeding policy development. Until recently, the problem was compounded by the authoritarian environment that prevailed in most of these governments, preventing open policy dialogue among different groups. With the emergence of the idea of good governance, this has changed.
Consequently, there is a consensus that the political environment that characterized the policy situations in most developing countries has become a more open one, constituting “room for manoeuvre” by policy makers in the policy making process (Ohemeng et al., 2013). Commenting on the Ghanaian case, for example, Hughes (2005) notes that one of the most significant changes in the Ghanaian polity as a result of democratization “has been a shift away from autocratic and technocratic policy design and enforcement, towards an ethos and practice of consultation and consensus” (Hughes, 2005: 89). This openness has gradually led to the proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are using their new found freedom to engage in policy dialogue and influence policies through qualitative research and, thus, shape national development.
In this paper, we examine the impact of think tanks on policy outcomes in Ghana, as a result of their growth since the 1990s. These institutions merit attention because of their unique role “in bridging the gap between power and knowledge, public and private sectors…” (Johnson, 2000: 465). The questions to be explored in this study are: what is, or has been, the impact of think tanks on policy outcomes in Ghana, and under what conditions are think tanks significant elements in the policy process in Ghana?
It is contended that think tanks have, so far, had a considerable impact on policy outcomes in Ghana. These outcomes reflect the policies they have either initiated themselves or contributed to, in conjunction with government. Thus, while we agree with a number of scholars, who continue to study these institutions, that proving their relevance – especially their significant impact on policy outcomes – is a daunting task (Sherrington, 2000), it is our view that looking at their contributions in a number of areas will help us ascertain their importance in the policy making process, and their impact on policy outcomes. We support this assertion by examining two main areas of think tank involvement: the democratic development and economic development in the Ghanaian policy environment.
The paper proceeds as follows. After this introduction is an analysis of two key concepts: policy outcomes and policy impact. This is necessary, since they are not well defined in the literature on think tanks. The next section attempts to define the concept of think tanks and then look at how think tanks impact policy outcomes as discussed in the literature. Following, is a discussion on the emergence, development and categorization of the various think tanks in Ghana. It is, in short, an attempt to survey the landscape of these institutions. In the next section, we look at the activities and impacts of think tanks from two policy areas: the democratisation process and good goverance and economic management and development.We then identify some problems confronting these institutions in Ghana. The last section concludes the paper with some thoughts on the way forward for these institutions.
Policy Outcomes and Policy Impact: A Conceptual Understanding
The literature on public policy is replete with references to policy outcomes, yet scholars have been unable to agree about how, precisely, those can be identified. In short, despite the concept’s ubiquitous nature, its precise content is unclear to many. Most have equated it to policy influence, while others associate it with policy change. The latter perspective sees the idea in a more positive light, as something leading to the alteration of an existing issue or bringing forth new measures to resolve a given problem. We view this notion of policy outcome, especially as it refers to change, as unacceptable, since policy change can have both negative and positive consequences for society when it comes to development.
It is perplexing that most scholars remain oblivious to the problem of definition, preferring the easier route of addressing issues they believe may lead to policy outcome or change. A large part of the literature thus deals with how institutions and policy actors, for example, may help shape a policy. In all such studies, the preoccupation is with the connection between policy instruments and policy change (Hall, 1993; Howlett, 1991). While there is nothing wrong with studying such connections, we believe that what actually constitutes policy outcome urgently requires clarification. That being the case, we examine the concept here, and attempt to provide a useful working definition for our readers.
Ruhil and Teske (2003), referring to Wilson, explain policy outcome by distinguishing it from outputs. To them, policy “outputs” are what government institutions produce, while “outcomes” denote “the actual effects of government activities on the broader economy and society.” Similarly, Grumm (1975: 441, 448) explains that policy “outputs” refer to the actions that the government performs, while policy “outcomes” refer to the results of those outputs. Burch (1979: 108) is of the view that policy outcomes are about governments telling people what to do through legislation and official regulations and, also, the way that governments spend their budgets to provide the public with goods and services.
These definitions see policy outcomes as a matter of a policy’s societal consequences after the policy has been implemented. Unfortunately, consequences do not tell us much about the nature of the involvement of policy actors in policy adoption, as it relates to getting things onto the policy agenda, leading to the emergence of a policy in a particular area. We therefore need to expand our understanding beyond this narrow frame of reference to include policy development and policy emergence.
To this end, we define policy outcomes as encompassing not only the result, as change or otherwise, but also as the means to get things done; and, in terms of policy, the ability to get one’s ideas included in the final policy. Whether that policy, in the end, has negative or positive consequences, is largely irrelevant. It is consequently essential to surpass the bounds of the policy literature, and venture into the arena of political science. Borrowing from David Easton’s systems theory, we can say that policy outcomes are what come out of the “black box” of policy making after the policy maker has received information through the input mechanism, via support or demand from the general environment (Easton, 1965). To Easton, therefore, “outputs are the formally announced decisions and intended consequences of government action while outcomes are the second order effects of policies and the overall real world effects of policies” (in Nadel, 1975: 3).
In the public policy literature, this second order is considered policy influence. The impact that individuals and institutions may have on the outcome of a particular policy is thus considered to be the same as the level of influence such an individual or institution may have had in shaping the policy, rather than the actual effect of the policy, which is manifested at the policy implementation stage of the policy cycle. The concept of influence is not new. Scholars who have examined the idea of power have identified influence as one of its many facets. They see it as the ability of an actor to get things done the way one wants them done (Ailon, 2006). In this circumstance, ideas and how to promote them are together a fundamental and important means to change the contours of a policy.
Public policy scholars may believe that influence significantly shapes policy, but what do they mean by this? Its status as an essential prerequisite to knowing policy outcomes notwithstanding, is difficult to define (Abelson, 2010; Stone et al., 2001). Rich (2005) defines influence as “success by experts in making their work known among a set of policy makers so that it informs their thinking on or public articulation of policy relevant information” (Rich, 2005: 153). This definition moves beyond the more common one already mentioned, that focuses on implementation. As Rich (2005: 153) argues, “whether this influence on individual policy makers carries over to affect final policy outcome is of interest.” We define policy influence as the ability to initiate or contribute ideas that affect a particular policy outcome or course of action being undertaken by the government. In this case, the approach or degree of influence may differ, according to the nature of the policy.
Similar to the notion of outcomes, that of impact is also taken for granted in the policy literature. This is not surprising because, to many, clearly determining the impact of something, especially of policy, is extremely difficult as there may be too many variables at play in deciding the effect of a policy (Grumm, 1975). Second, and as noted by Weidenbaum (2008), “it typically takes many years for an idea to be transformed into a specific public policy decision” (2008: 91). Consequently, in the process “a variety of individuals and organizations in government, as well as the private sector, are involved in the inevitable modification of the original idea into a specific statute or regulation” (Weidenbaum, 2008: 91). Knowing its impact in a set period thus becomes a daunting exercise. It is therefore not surprising that many, such as policy evaluators, will look at outcomes, and at how many lives were or are being affected by a policy or decision, than at impact. In cases where impact is studied, “attention is directed to examining the extent to which the impact of a policy served the real goals of the policymakers” (Grumm, 1975: 443).
The concept has thus also become very elusive, even to scholars who are interested in measuring the effect of think tanks on the policy process and policy change, as well as on the think tanks themselves. In view of this situation, Stone (1996) has suggested that we conceive of think tanks as having “influence” rather than a direct impact on policy formulation; she argues plausibly that they have changed how policy is “debated and decided,” and that “they help to provide the conceptual language, the ruling paradigms, the empirical examples that become the accepted assumptions for those in charge of making policy” (1996: 110).
From this perspective, the closest one can come to defining impact is to link it to attribution (Carden, 2004). In this case there is the need to attribute the development of a policy or change in government direction on an issue to someone, some institution, or some other thing. The theme of causality is therefore emphasized here. It must be said that it is necessary to focus on impact in any discussion of think tanks because “institutions do not affect outcomes directly, but rather through their impact on the process, by which policies are designed, approved and implemented” (Carden, 2004: 3). In this context, we define impact as the reflection of ideas of individuals and institutions that make their way onto the policy agenda, and that is significantly expressed in the overall outcome of the policy. We think that this definition is more helpful, because actual policy initiative is one of the most obvious indicators of impact.
Defining Think Tanks
In spite of the proliferation of think tanks in both the developed and developing worlds, and the numerous studies on them, scholars have been unable to reach a consensus on their nature (Abelson, 2006; McGann and Johnson, 2005; Stone 2007b). In other words, “the term think tank is notoriously difficult to define” (Denham and Garnett, 1998: 44). The definition dilemma is compounded by the fact that such institutions differ in multiple ways, including funding, size, staff composition, policy orientation, status in society, etc. At the same, while these organizations are generally constituted as NGOs, some are either semi-governmental or quasi-autonomous within governments (Stone, 2007a). Furthermore, some political parties have created similar institutions in the form of party institutes or foundations. Grouping them together to force a precise single definition turns out to be a laborious task.
Stone’s idea of the diverse nature of think tanks is shared by Kimenyi and Datta (2011). The two see them as organizations that generate research products with the aim of informing policy debates. To them, the idea goes beyond NGO think tanks to include government-affiliated research institutes, university research centers, consultancies, informal groups of academics, and individuals who advise governments, consultants, and foreign experts (Kimenyi and Datta, 2011: 1).
The definition with greatest currency, moreover, is largely confined to the Anglo-American context, and ignores publicly funded think tanks because they do not exist in premarket and democratically open societies, such as the United States. Thus, while some of these organizations are non-profit, some are funded by governments, while others are advocacy groups, businesses, or those who derive revenue from consulting work or research related to their projects (Datta and Young, 2011). In short, there are many kinds of institutions that may be considered think tanks, and finding a universally acceptable definition is therefore impossible (Stone, 2007b).
Be that as it may, in this study it is important to at least attempt to define the concept. We will review a few of the definitions in the extant literature, with the hope that we will then be in the position to present our own definition or, at least, accept one that may be close to how we think about these institutions. McGann (2012) says that “think tanks are public policy research, analysis and engagement institutions that generate policy-oriented research, analysis and advice on domestic and international issues that enable policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues.” This definition does not distinguish publicly funded or semi-independent institutions from private, independent ones. The definition thus takes a much larger scale view than others have done and is shared by many. We thus accept McGann’s definition as our working definition for this paper.
How Think Tanks Impact Policy Outcomes
What methods do think tanks use to influence policy outcomes? The influence any institutions have on policy outcomes or policy decision-making processes varies with the expertise, knowledge, and technical proficiency available to the institutions, as well as their level of access to the decision-makers responsible for determining policy outcomes (Lowndes, 1996). For this reason, think tanks adopt a number of methods to achieve their objectives. These methods may differ according to the policy area and the size of the institution (Stone, 2007a).
The most common method is research. It is said that “research can have the purpose of informing late agenda-setting moments, when interest among policy makers is building and ideas are being translated into legislative language… In this form, studies provide general insight on how social, political, or economic problems might be addressed by policy makers” (Rich, 2005: 153). The essence of research is that “for researchers interested in policy impact, ‘do nothing’ is not an option”; hence, the goal of research is to contribute to policy outcomes (Stone et al., 2001).
Peter Wells (2012) has identified four major types of research undertaken by think tanks. These are agenda setting research, position papers, agenda reinforcing reports, and policy development programs. Agenda setting research deals with keynote reports, which are normally authored by senior figures in these institutions, and are launched as high profile national events, with senior politicians invited as speakers. Position papers, on the other hand, seek to inform and influence debates, and are intended to send policy signals and give directions respecting forthcoming policy strategies of the government. Agenda reinforcing research refers to sustaining and reinforcing the profile of either a government or a policy position on a particular issue, while policy development programs may focus on research programs around particular aspects of national development.
Other ways institutions are able to influence policy outcomes are through publicity campaigns and lobbying government to make decisions consistent with their objectives. Such a modus operandi means that the behavior and strategy of institutions are very similar to those of pressure groups (James, 1993). They also lobby governments, either in favor of, or against, policies they deem relevant to their interest or position, especially with ideologically inclined or issue oriented think tanks.
Another important means by which think tanks can influence and change public outcomes is through the “capturing of policy actors or elites in the society” (Schlesinger, 2009). Policy elites not only help shape policy and institutional outcomes, they also demonstrate how the options available to them are constrained by contextual factors. For such institutions to be heard in that quest, they need a stranglehold on such elites, through either their research or their actors’ personal relationships and networks. Policy elite capture is most likely to occur where close, even symbiotic, relationships have developed among bureaucratic actors, elected officials, and regulated interests and through the provision of vivid, compelling encounters and experiences that speak to their current policy discussion (Hart and Vromen, 2008: 138; Singleton, 2000: 7).
Using their discursive leverage in the relevant policy subsystems, particularly (but not exclusively) among key policy makers and stakeholder elites, for example, think tanks may produce frames and narratives capable of pervading the elite rhetoric and policy proposals that circulate in the policy subsystem (Hart and Vromen, 2008: 138). According to Abelson (2010: 26), “the relationships and contacts that develop between think tanks and policymakers can often explain why some think tanks are able to enjoy considerable access to various stages of the policymaking process.” In Ghana, for example, one of the many ways think tanks influence public policy is through engaging various politicians who either serve as institutional members, or contribute to the institution’s publications, or participate in its lunches, launches, seminars, and conferences.
Think tanks also use the media, both electronic and print, simply to acquire and maintain visibility, as well as to achieve their objectives (Abelson, 1992; Rich and Weaver, 2000), because “the news media have direct contact with and influence upon elites” (Cook, 1998: 10). To this end, “many think tanks have recognized this influence and have made securing media visibility a central feature of their missions” (Rich and Weaver, 2000: 100). Cummings (2005: 176) notes that “think tanks are more likely to influence the climate of opinion through the popular media than through their own publications. … The problem is that journalists tend to pick up on sound bites and eye-catching statistics rather than more substantial ideas, and are unlikely to ask think tank researchers to write essays or to take part in television discussions lasting more than a minute or two.” Schlesinger (2009: 5) is of the view that “because think tanks operate within a highly structured market place for ideas, marketing and promotion are central to their quest for influence over government. Consequently, their ability to achieve resonance within the media is of central importance; they are a major resource for journalists.”
The Genesis, Development, and Typologies of Think Tanks in Ghana
If we conceive of think tanks as independent and semi-independent institutions that aim to shape policy outcomes, then they have been in existence in Ghana for longer than contemporary scholars would have us believe. On the other hand, if the definition is restricted to “private independent non-profit organization” that is part of civil society, then think tanks can be said to be fairly new in the policy environment in Ghana. We can trace the genesis of these institutions to the early 1990s, when the political environment, which until the early 1990s was an authoritarian one that failed to create the much needed space for such institutions to thrive, was opened up in 1992 as a result of the movement towards a multiparty democratic environment (Ohemeng and Ayee, 2013). It was within this democratic environment that civil society grew exponentially, with think tanks constituting a major element. Since then, the number of such institutions has risen steadily, with the aim of influencing public policy and bringing changes to the lives of ordinary people (Datta et al., 2010).
It is difficult to say exactly what constitutes a think tank, just as it is hard to determine their exact number in the Ghanaian environment. The reason is that the terrain in which these institutions operate is fuzzy, with some institutions doing work that tends to be the domain of traditional NGOs. According to James McGann (2012), there are currently 36 think tanks in Ghana. These include public and private independent institutions. Our analysis, however, shows that a number of the institutions that McGann includes as think tanks may not be, even with a broadened definition, such as the Ghana Institute of Public Management and Administration. We have identified 43 such organizations in Ghana. These institutions can be categorized into three major distinct groups: public, local private, and private international (see Table 1).
Categories of Think Tanks in Ghana.
Source: Adapted from McGann (2012) compiled by the author.
Publicly Funded Think Tanks
Public or government thinks tanks are directly funded by the central government. They are created by acts of parliament as extensions to institutions of higher learning. Considered integral to sub-vented organizations in the public sector, they are mostly found in the country’s public universities. Their sub-vented status means they receive state funding, including the salaries for all employees. As part of the university system, they are expected to offer courses that relate to university teaching. While such institutions can solicit external funding, whatever they receive goes directly to the main university account system. Hence, they do not have the luxury of using money they receive as they wish and are subjected to various forms of accountability embedded in the public sector (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987).
Publicly funded think tanks were first created immediately after the country gained independence in 1957, and have continued under subsequent governments. These think tanks include the ISSER, based at the University of Ghana; the Centre for Development Studies; the Cocoa Research Institute; and, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (Mbadlanyana et al., 2011). Interesting questions that arise are about the role of these think tanks in policy making, and the influence and impact they have. On closer inspection, they seem to have had little or no impact on the policy process. The reason for that is that in the post-independence period, policy priorities were driven not by empirical research and evidence, but rather by political ideologies and preoccupations with state formation (Ohemeng, 2005; Kpessa, 2011).
Independent Local Private Think Tanks
The second group comprises what may be described as local independent or private think tanks. These organizations’ work is completely restricted to activities in Ghana. While some of them have some relations with similar organizations outside the country, as well as serving as satellite offices of others, their main focus is on development in Ghana. They are also “public policy research and advocacy institutions set up and maintained by an individual or group of individuals without government support directly or indirectly in any shape or form” (Amoah, 2013: 6–7). In spite of this they are closely connected to government and their primary efforts are directed at helping government initiate policies for national development. Consequently, they are different from what may be considered the traditional NGOs that maintain close contact with their constituencies. Nevertheless, some of these think tanks have established a number of community projects that tend to bring them closer to the grassroots of policy making.
The first private think tank was established in 1991. Ten years later, the number had increased to six, and today we can count at least 14 such organizations. In this short period, they have carved, and continue to carve, a good reputation for themselves in the eyes of the populace. As such, their legitimacy is directly attributable to the caliber of the people employed in them, to the visibility their programs have brought them, and, more importantly, to the way their personnel are able to articulate policy positions in both the electronic and print media.
Independent Private Think Tanks with International Dimensions
Apart from the Third World Network and African Security Dialogue Research, the institutions that constitute the third category of think tanks can be said to be more recent, i.e. not more than 10 years old. For this reason they are not well captured in the discussions of think tanks in the country (Ohemeng, 2005). Those in this group are classified as such because their work is not restricted to Ghana. They may work in the West African sub-region or throughout the entire continent. They may also be surrogates of any of the think tanks in the Western developed world. Their presence in Ghana is evidenced by the establishment of a head office there. Another important characteristic of these institutions is that they employ not only Ghanaians, but also people from the rest of the continent, as well as expatriates from the parent organizations.
Think Tanks and Their Impact on Policy Outcomes in Ghana
A discussion of policy outcomes relating to the work of think tanks inevitably will include an examination of both the initiatives that affect the development and passing of a policy, and their influence in terms of actual policy contribution. Knowing the difficulty in actually measuring the correlation between an institute’s research or recommendations and particular policy outcomes, our interest is more in the institution’s ability to influence a policy in terms of their contribution to policy formulation. As Abelson (2006) explains, “having influence is something all think tanks covet, but in reality, most settle for the perception of exercising influence” (2006: 171).
To have direct influence suggests that one actor is capable of convincing another actor to follow a suggested course of action. Considering the nature of democracy and the numerous players involved in trying to influence government policy action, crediting an institution or actor with responsibility for any one particular outcome is unreasonable. Unlike government ministries, all of which exercise power, the policy analysis industry is engaged in policy dialogue. It is through these conversations that think tanks shape process, with influence distributed across various members of the policy community.
As we argued earlier, think tanks in Ghana continue to affect the outcome of government policies in a number of fields, such as the democratic process and governance, economic policies and management, community development, and advocacy. These areas are not watertight compartments and, in some cases, the activities and influence overlap. Their influence has been well noticed because, according to Kpessa (2011), “in some cases, policy think tanks are the main domestic policy entrepreneurs that facilitate the setting up of the policy agenda”; and this is manifested in the three areas discussed next.
The Democratic Process and Good Governance
A large number of think tanks – apart from publicly funded ones and, to some extent, those in the third category – are interested in democratic development and, for that matter, good governance. Concisely, “they all see promoting democracy and good governance as their main mission” (Kamstra and Knippenberg, 2014: 7). It is in this area that think tanks have had the greatest success in affecting the outcome of policy. Reviewing all the policies, actions, and activities of all the think tanks in this field is essential. We will thus look at some recent illustrative examples. The obvious ones that come to mind are the Transition Bill, the Access to Information Bill, and the National Reconciliation Bill. The purpose of the discussion here is not to critique the policy, but to show the role some think tanks have played in pushing these bills forward and, generally, contributing to good governance.
The chaos surrounding the transfer of political power after Ghana’s historic 2001 general elections resulted in a highly polarized, contentious political climate that jeopardized the nation’s new democracy. It was, in fact, the first time in the history of the country that such a change – in which one dominant political party ceded the reins of government to the other and political power was transferred from one democratically-elected president to another – was taking place. There was also no established framework of references by which to guide this transition from an incumbent party to a new one.
The IEA decided to examine this polarization and its origins. Their research highlighted the lack of an established protocol for political transition as one of the main contributing factors, and recommended that political parties collaborate to create one. Through workshops and dialogue with political parties with representation in parliament, the IEA worked to turn the discussion and recommendations into a concrete policy. The result was the Presidential (Transition) Bill, which was passed in March 2012. The law “provides a framework for managing the political transfer of power from an out-going democratically-elected President to an incoming President” (Ofori-Mensah, 2011: 1). Although it is yet to be fully tested, many have hailed the bill as the best move for good governance. It must be said that not only does the legislation regulate political transition, it also has strong potential to enhance good governance in Ghana.
Another revealing example of the role of think tanks in policy process and outcomes is that of the Centre for Democratic Development-Ghana (CDD-Ghana) regarding the development of the National Reconciliation Bill, and the subsequent creation of the National Reconciliation Review (NRC) under the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government. The idea behind the NRC was to find ways to deal with a polarized environment and to help heal the wounds, so to speak, of those who suffered under previous military regimes. While the idea was not produced by a think tank, once the concept had been debated, the CDD-Ghana took it a major step forward through workshops and dialogue. Furthermore, when the idea became a political blame game between the NPP and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the CDD-Ghana assisted crucially in ironing out their differences on how to approach national reconciliation (Kpessa, 2011: 42). This helped to further reduce the tension that had been building in the country, which could have easily plunged it into a political stalemate.
Freedom of information is considered a sine qua non for democratic and economic development, because it leads to better scrutiny of government activities, including financial management, which, in turn, may help reduction corruption – widely held to be the bane of the developing world (Yawson et al., 2010: 326). Under military dictatorship in Ghana, it was difficult to know what the government was doing and to hold it accountable. This continued after the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1992. In fact, in the early years of constitutional rule, with all the freedoms the constitution enshrined, the information gap remained unfilled, and the democratic impediments persisted. Worse, media, the “fourth estate,” was subjected to criminal libel cases for expressing concerns about the government’s lack of transparency, as well as for publishing what were considered half-truths.
A number of think tanks realized that Ghana’s democratic and economic growth depended on information being available to the public, and this could only be achieved if the media was free to publish information about government activities and refrain from resorting to falsehoods; the result of withholding information from them. It was against this background that some of these think tanks, including the IEA, the Ghana Integrity Initiative, the Media Foundation of West Africa, and the CDD-Ghana embarked upon legislative activities that led to the amendment of some of the laws considered inimical to democratic and economic development. These included the Serious Fraud Bill and also the repeal of the Criminal Libel Law. Through their efforts, Ghana’s first Freedom of Information Bill and countless other legislative interventions that expanded government transparency were developed. The Freedom of Information Bill, which was sponsored by IEA, called for all national information, with the exception of information pertaining to national security, to be made available to the public. Although the Bill was still before parliament, in February of 2014 the president promised to implement it as part of one of his four vital pillars of governance, “Transparent and Accountable Governance.”
Economic Management and Development
Economic development and management continues to be a challenge to developing countries, and Ghana is no exception. It is believed that without economic development, in most of these countries, the third wave of democratization will never be more than a mirage (Robinson, 2006). It is, therefore, not surprising that many believe think tanks can make an essential difference in economic development, especially where fiscal policy is concerned. They can do so because of their high quality research and their analytical capacity, and their unique knowledge of local circumstances are strong assets in identifying effective fiscal policy options. Unlike many watchdog organizations and pressure groups, they base their recommendations on solid research.
For this reason, a number of think tanks, including publicly funded ones, have devoted and continue to devote much of their time to economic policy development and management in Ghana. Notable among them are ISSER, IDEG, Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF), CEPA, IMANI, ISODEC, IEA, and the ACET. These institutions undertake studies and present papers that deal with the economy and suggest ways that various difficulties can be addressed. For example, over the years ISSER has contributed to economic policy through its publication, The State of the Ghanaian Economy. Similarly, CEPA publishes papers that continue to inform policies in a number of areas of economic development and management. Likewise, the PEF has gained national prominence as a private sector advocate by participating in key national advisory, policy planning, policy formulation, and monitoring committees. It was the PEF’s efforts that inspired the NPP government to establish the Ministry for Private Sector Development and Presidential Special Initiatives, which is a focal point for coordinating and harmonizing the government’s initiatives and policies designed with the private sector in mind.
An important economic policy area in which think tanks have contributed significantly is that of the development and passing into law of The Petroleum Revenue Management Act. This Act sets out a framework for the management of Ghana’s oil and gas revenues. The IEA, for example, made a number of recommendations that were adopted in the final text of the Act, and it continues to work closely with policy makers to ensure that the country’s fledgling oil industry becomes a positive force for development. Similarly, IMANI made a number of contributions that were also adopted by the government. Both IDEG and ISODEC have budget analysis units, which contribute suggestions to the budgetary process. They continue to make recommendations, which government continues to include in the overall budget.
Conditions Under Which Think Tanks May Operate Effectively in Ghana
For think tanks to act effectively in society, especially in terms of their ability to affect policy outcomes, a socio-political environment conducive to good relationships among these institutions, government, business, and other NGOs, is indispensable. An environment of suspicion creates major problems for these institutions. While the opening up of the political environment has created a favorable environment to some degree, it has, at the same time, continued to generate much political tension through the over-politicization of issues. This tension is the result of the antagonism between the two main political parties, the NDC and the NPP. Consequently, in some cases, think tanks have been caught in a crossfire, where either the parties themselves or their surrogates continue to attack them. In this scenario, such institutions have found themselves embarrassed by having to publish adverse research findings that they deem potentially harmful to one of the political parties. This was instanced by the case of the IEA cited earlier, where the report was withdrawn immediately after the NPP condemned it. Similarly, the CDD was also widely criticized on the release of the Afrobarometer report on the national economy. A number of critics thought the report was intended to make the government of the day unpopular. Such critics view the CDD-Ghana as being in collusion with the opposition NPP.
Despite the perceived bias of some think tanks, an authoritarian environment in which policy development is clouded in secrecy and, more or less, controlled by the state apparatus, is not conducive to operational harmony. In such an environment, dissent is simply not tolerated. Second, in an open political environment, think tanks must be seen by those in power, as well as those seeking to gain it, as friends, not foes. Such institutions can help shape the policy platforms of political parties, as well as be viable assets to government in dealing with local developmental issues. They may also help infuse the political process with legitimacy, as exemplified by the now institutionalized presidential debates in Ghana, and by the development of the coalition for election monitoring led by the CDD-Ghana.
Another issue facing think tanks in their current environment is the proliferation of other NGOs and political organizations that seem to be occupying the traditional think tank terrain (Ohemeng and Ayee, 2013). One effect is the potential weakening of think tanks’ ability to find solutions to some of the nation’s most serious problems, as each wants to be heard, especially in terms of counter arguments and proposals that depend on the perspective of the institutions involved in the policy area. This can create turf wars among such institutions and, coupled with political organizations that continue to challenge the findings of thinks tanks, may affect the role and impact these think tanks have on the policy process.
Third, the ideological proclivity of think tanks is important. In the developed world most are ideologically left or right, with a few in the centre. There is nothing wrong with a think tank identifying itself ideologically – through its ideological position it can propose solutions in which it firmly believes, and can also oppose governments that do not share its position. Unfortunately, in Ghana this is not the case. While major think tanks in the private sector are mostly pro-democracy and, to some extent, pro-market, their ideological stances are not displayed in public. They have, therefore, become all things both to themselves and to the public at large. Consequently, they attempt to please the public, leading to a number of criticisms against them. The only three institutions that have been able to do so are ISODEC, the Third World Network, and the Danquah Institute, which has helped them much in terms of policy input and outcomes.
Fourth, funding continues to be a challenge for think tanks, especially those in the developing world. According to Pollard and Court (2005), “in many countries, think tanks supply the kind of information that policymakers need. However, in most developing countries, think tanks often don’t have the reliable funding and support they need to develop and sustain strong and innovative research programs” (2005: 18). In Ghana, publicly and privately funded think tanks both still contend with this problem. We can, therefore, describe them as beggars with bowls in hand held out to government, as well as to external funders.
Funding is, however, extremely important for institutions that want to influence policy outcomes. According to Burstein (1991: 332–333), “issues are more likely to gain a hearing if their creators have the resources to make their cases credibly, persistently, and in ways seen as potentially useful by those in power … [I]ssues are also more likely to gain a hearing if those in or close to government are accessible and open to new ideas.” Such new ideas can only come through rigorous research. Unfortunately, such research does not come cheap, as researchers have to be well paid, and there are funds needed to carry out the collection and the publication of data. Similarly, and as noted earlier, think tanks are very often heard through workshops and press conferences, and these all involve substantial amounts of money. Thus, a steady flow of funding and tax exemptions, for example, can help these institutions achieve their objectives and discharge their functions well.
It has been noted that if think tanks are to have influence and affect the outcome of policies, they need to be close to the corridors of power, and linked with the policy elite. In Ghana, one method that think tanks have used, and continue to use, is co-opting such elites either onto the boards of these institutions, or to serve as resident scholars, or in some other capacity. While this is acceptable, it has become the bane of them as well. Their closeness to power and the elites associated with them make them appear biased and partisan. For example, Dr Abbey of CEPA is always careful in his analysis of the economic situation in Ghana, irrespective of the party in power, because of his long association with the NDC and its predecessor, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). For this reason, it has become extremely difficult for him to express his candid opinion (except in CEPA’s publications) on policy issues. Whatever he says is read by some through a political lens.
Conclusion
Think tanks have become a global phenomenon. In the developing world, especially, their growth has been astonishing. They are seen as contributing positively to democratic and economic development in the countries where they operate. Unfortunately, studies that look critically at their activities and their impact on policy outcomes are few, leaving a lacuna in the literature. The objective of this study was to fill this gap using Ghana as a case study.
Ghana is important because it is one of the few countries in the developing world that have had these institutions since gaining independence. Unfortunately, the think tanks that evolved were publicly funded, and their contributions to the policy making process and their impacts on policy outcomes were quite limited. This is not surprising in view of the environment in which they found themselves and the bureaucratic model of policy making that characterized their existence, which constrained their activities. Fortunately, a change in the political environment since the early 1990s has resulted in an increase in the number of private, independent think tanks in Ghana, and they are doing important work in the areas of socioeconomic and political development, especially as they deal with democratization. Through either their own policy initiatives or contributions to those of government, they continue to exert much influence in these two areas. They are thus seen as value-added contributors to Ghana’s development.
All of this is not surprising in view of the limited capacity of government to meet the developmental needs of Ghanaian society. It is also not surprising that Ayee (2000) has described these institutions as the “wizards” of the policy making process in Ghana, because of their ability to generate impressive research that has influenced, and continues to influence, public policy in a number of areas of development. They continue to produce applied analysis that has helped improve public policy. They also continue to make complex issues more accessible for the general public, and have helped to stimulate national policy dialogue on highly important issues in the country’s democratic dispensation and economic management and development. More than that, as outsiders to government, they continue to provide independent monitoring of public policy, and propose policy alternatives to those of government. They build public awareness on major issues, and have helped alter the behavior of the policy elites.
Notwithstanding these positive benefits, it was realized that think tanks in Ghana face a number of problems, including the massive politicization of the political and policy environments; the mushrooming of such organizations, which is obviously affecting their credibility and legitimacy; utterances by some of them; and, their limited funding, which has seen most of these institutions (including those publicly funded), seeking financial assistance from the international community. We thus believe that if think tanks are to operate effectively, and truly contribute to national development, these issues need to be addressed.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author will, however, like to thank the organizers of the conference on Think Tanks in Sub-Saharan Africa, at the Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford. A version of the paper was presented at this conference.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
