Power to the People! How far has the Power Gone to the People? A Qualitative Assessment of Decentralization Practice in Ghana

Abstract

Decentralization is a concept well professed by political elites in Ghana yet there has been inadequate political will to transfer actual power, authority and resources to the district assemblies. Ghana’s current decentralization was introduced in 1988 with a mesmeric mantra of ‘power to the people’, and the concept is now over two and half decades old. This paper examines the extent to which local government reform through decentralization has brought about any meaningful changed relationship between central and local governments in Ghana. This work adopts a retrospective analysis of policy documents and a critical stage review of the relevant literature on the theoretical suppositions and practical experience of decentralization practice. The appointment of assembly heads in Ghana makes the relationship a principal-agent typology. Decentralization is at best a theoretical ramification but its actual practice has been just minimal. The study provides a ‘walk-the-talk’ model that requires political will to address the key challenges of decentralization in Ghana.

Keywords

Decentralization local government challenges power to the people political will Ghana

Introduction

In the context of developing countries, centralization was a tool for marshalling resources and a deliberate attempt to disempower local units so as to prevent any secession or challenge to the state. This point has forcefully been brought home by Mahwood (1993): that, in the post-colonial period, many newly independent governments in Africa and Asia saw local jurisdictions as colonial institutions or as strongholds of ethnic or religious minorities that could become sources of political opposition. As a result of centralization, service delivery suffered because few central government ministries rewarded civil servants for dealing with citizens as customers, and government bureaucracies grew more unresponsive to the needs of their constituents; central planning and management brought economic stagnation and increasing poverty (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). A growing discontent with the inability of the central government bureaucracies to deliver effectively almost any types of service to local areas fuelled the decentralization movements in Africa (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983; Smoke, 1994).

Against that background, for more than half a century governments around the world have sought to use decentralization to democratize their political systems, enhance popular participation in public affairs and give local administrative units more responsibility for providing public services. ‘There is not a single country in Africa in which some form of local government is not in operation’, (Oyugi, 2000: 16) and the stated objective of virtually all of these reforms is to strengthen democratic governance and service provision.

The first local government system in Ghana predated its independence, and was introduced in the then Gold Coast in 1878, during the colonial era, by the British. The introduction of decentralization during this era conferred a legal basis for traditional authorities to perform limited local government roles including judicial and legislative activities and resources management. Between 1957 and 1988 there have been several attempts by successive governments to devolve administration. The current practice of decentralization was systematically introduced in 1988 by the regime of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and the process was underpinned by PNDC Law 207. In an attempt to strengthen the decentralization process as well as local government, the Fourth Republic, with the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, has devoted chapter twenty to such a purpose. The main rationale for decentralization was to promote participatory democracy and to bring governance closer to the people as well as to improve service delivery (to be responsive to local needs and preferences). The point has been argued that the basis for decentralization ‘stems largely from the idea that decentralization will promote better governance as local officials are supposedly more aware of, and more responsive to, local needs’; that is, it is more likely to encourage and promote not only democracy, but also provide locals with the chance to have control (Duncan, 2007: 713, cited in Antwi-Boasiako, 2010).

It could, however, be observed that very little real decentralization has been achieved after almost 26 years of its implementation in Ghana. Therefore, the overall expectation that decentralization would lead to effective, responsive and accountable district assemblies, which in turn would foster poverty reduction and the empowerment of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in society, have remained unfulfilled. This point has been dealt with extensively in the literature: although decentralization is primarily a strategy for transferring authority and responsibility from the central government to sub-national (regional and district) levels of government (Antwi-Boasiako, 2010; Ostrom, 1989; Stone, 1997), many African leaders adopt the concept in theory but fail to delegate powers to the districts and regions.

The main purpose of this paper is to adopt a retrospective policy analysis and a critical stage review of the relevant literature to examine how local governance through decentralization has brought about appreciable change in the relationship between central and district administration systems in Ghana in the Fourth Republican era. The approach takes into consideration the history, content, structure and process as well as the functional dimension of decentralization in the Ghanaian context (Riggs, 1962; Walt and Gilson, 1994). The study is organized into five main sections. Section one provides an introduction to the study and states the problem; the second section provides a literature review on the concept of decentralization and the various forms. The third section of the study discusses the methodology that was employed in carrying out the study; the fourth section provides an in-depth discussion of the various policies on decentralization by bringing out the key constraints to effective local government system in Ghana. The final section provides a comprehensive framework to enable an effective local government system; the study discusses a ‘walk-the-talk’ model that requires political will to address the key challenges of decentralization in Ghana.

Theoretical framework and literature review

‘Strong man’ versus ‘social forces’ theory

It is incontrovertible that those groups containing a ‘great man’ in terms of leadership have higher product rates of producing suggestions and agreements. To the extent that a lack of tension shown is an indication of smooth functioning, groups with great men appear to show a less inhibited response to the task situation with less anxiety and withdrawal from active participation, which may point to greater satisfaction with the group (Borgatta et al., 1954). The authors explain that it may be said that great men tend to make ‘great groups’ in the sense that both major factors of group performance – productivity and satisfaction of the members – are simultaneously increased (Borgatta et al., 1954).

The social forces theorists also posit that whilst great men to an extent contribute to prevailing circumstances, the presence or absence of the needed cultural elements in the socio-political environment do also matter a lot. Ogburn (1926) argues that ‘will power’ alone is no more competent to produce a certain form of social organization. Using a metapor, he explains that as a flying machine depends upon contributory mechanical elements; so do social organizations depend upon contributory social elements. Men influence the times because all cultural change must occur through the medium of human beings. The outstanding individual inspires the times; one man is more influential than another and there is such a thing as leadership, even though the leader is the medium through which social forces play. It should be noted here, however, that the extent of the influence of great men depends not only on their talent but also on the favourableness of social conditions ( ibid).

Ogburn further provides that greatness must be conceived in terms of inherited qualities and environmental traits. The distribution of inherited qualities appears to be such that the inherited abilities of greatness should be plentiful and constant, facts that minimize the importance of the great man. On the social forces side, there are two important factors that affect great achievement: existing cultural materials and social valuations. These two factors vary greatly over time and by place, and hence may be called the causes of great achievement. They are of the nature of social forces. Great men are thus the product of their times. They, in turn, influence their times, that is, their achievements influence the times. The great man is thus a medium of social change. The phenomenon of the great man varies, ‘But certain extended observations indicate that the production of great men and their influence are strongly conditioned and determined by the particular existing stage of the historical development’ (Ogburn, 1926: 231).

However, in spite of the social environment – prevailing circumstances, history, public opinions, civil society groups – a final decision usually rests with the leader, who needs to express their will and forge the subsequent links when undertaking an action. This is discussed below.

The concept of ‘political will’

Political will has been quoted as a major factor that affects the developmental efforts and governance processes of many political systems, especially the developing democracies. For example, a recent needs assessment survey of more than 250 practitioners from around the world, undertaken by the CIVICUS Participatory Governance Programme, identified lack of political will as a foremost impediment in promoting participatory governance; (CIVICUS, 2007: 4). It outranked other variables such as: inadequate knowledge and skills, limited citizen capacity, a disabling political/policy environment and a lack of access to public information.

Brinkerhoff conceptualizes political will as, ‘the commitment of political leaders and bureaucrats to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives and to sustain the costs of those actions over time’ (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 242). He provides three key reasons to explain that political will is a multifarious and intricate concept. Firstly, it involves intent and motivation, which appear inherently intangible phenomena. These canons render ‘political will’ difficult to assess objectively and may be prone to manipulation and misrepresentation. Secondly, political will may exist at both individual and collective levels. At the individual level, the idea of political will is viewed as a personal characteristic, which may depend on a person’s values, philosophies, priorities and desires. Aggregating beyond the individual introduces more complexity. A final point is that, though political will may be expressed in spoken or written words (speeches, manifestos, legal documents), it is only manifested through action (Brinkerhoff, 2010). He further explains that whether there is political will or not relates to two key elements: whether government is ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’. Malena (2009) discusses how political will is influenced by what she calls political ‘can’, which she explains as the capacity to act; and political ‘must’, which refers to public pressure and citizen engagement. She provides a three-point framework that involves political want, political can, and political must. In order for power-holders to become committed to an action, they need to want to undertake a given action, feel confident that they can undertake that action, and feel that they must undertake the action.

From the above, one could suggest that, until action is taken, we cannot holistically access political will at the initial stages; merely promising or pronouncing without forging subsequent links could be described as a lack of political will, provided the capacity exists.

Decentralization and forms

‘There is not a single country in Africa in which some form of local government is not in operation’, and the stated objective of virtually all of these reforms is to strengthen democratic governance and service provision (Oyugi 2000: 16). Decentralization has been used extensively in the literature, and scholars have various perspectives regarding it; the concept of decentralization and its interpretations have become a battleground for a variety of disciplines and theories (Antwi-Boasiako, 2010: 168). Most countries have widely accepted the concept in theory, mostly in their statute books, but it is not really felt (Antwi-Boasiako, 2010; Ayee, 2008; Fesler, 1965: 536). The concept of decentralization has been defined to mean the transfer of planning, decision making or administrative authority from central government to its field organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments or non-governmental organizations (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983).

Decentralization in the Ghanaian context has been defined as the ‘transfer of significant authority, responsibility for services and fiscal and human resources to local government units for the development of their areas and reduction of poverty and also involving legal and administrative measures to transfer authority, resources, accountability and rules from central government to local entities’ (Ayee, 2008).

Rondinelli and Cheema further indicate that different forms of decentralization can be distinguished by the extent to which the authority to plan, decide and manage is transferred from central government to other organizations, and the amount of autonomy that decentralized bodies or units have been assigned. Consequently, four major forms of decentralization have been argued for in the literature, namely devolution, deconcentration, delegation and privatization (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983).

Decentralization is conceptualized as delegation when decision making and management of authority for particular functions are delegated to organizations that are not under the direct control of central government ministries. Delegation of authority is usually from central government to semi-autonomous or parastatal organizations including public corporations, regional planning and area development authorities (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983).

Privatization involves the process of opening up economic production and distribution processes to involve businesses or non-governmental actors. In other words, privatization is the relocation of economic planning, production, distribution or other economic functions from government to voluntary, private or non-governmental institutions. Through this process, the government shares the authority and power to engage in economic production and decisions with private actors or non-governmental actors.

Devolution is conceptualized as the transfer of authority and resources from the central government to democratically elected sub-national bodies. With this form of decentralization, the recipient body is given ‘real power’ and resources to plan, decide and manage the area of jurisdiction. This is also referred to as ‘political decentralization’ as a result of the real powers involved to plan, tax and make byelaws for the individuals within the area of control. The process usually culminates in the setting up and empowerment of a local government that is largely answerable to the local community and to a lesser or zero degree to the central government. Devolution of powers and authority to local governments is not born out of the magnanimity of the central government, but such powers come as a result of a well-established legal and regulatory framework that directs how such powers are transferred from national government to legally recognized and geographically identifiable units of local government with their own elections.

A final form of decentralization is deconcentration, which involves the redistribution of administrative functions within central government agencies. This is also referred to as administrative decentralization because it involves the shifting of the administrative workload from a central government ministry, department or agency headquarters to its own field staff outside the national capital without the corresponding authority and discretion to make real decisions (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). Scholars such as Fesler do argue that merely shifting workload from the centre to the periphery may not be real decentralization. Fesler intimated strongly that, ‘to move workload out of the capital may be efficient and convenient for the public and may even promote a feeling that government is close to the people’ (Fesler, 1968: 373). Amongst other reasons, workload is deconcentrated to ensure administrative convenience. A major difference between devolution and deconcentration is that the former entails the real imposition of a legal framework that regulates and directs the transfer of authority, resources and responsibilities between the centre and the sub-national bodies. For instance, in Ghana there have been various legal frameworks that have sought to direct the central–local government relationship. These include, but are not limited to, PNDL 207, chapter twenty of the 1992 Republican Constitution, the District Assembly Common Fund Act, Act 455, the Local Government Act, Act 462 and the Local Government Service Act 656. Theoretically, devolution gives real powers and autonomy to local governments to select their leaders, plan, manage, tax and engage in activities so defined by the legal framework. These are described below.

The legal framework of decentralization in Ghana

The legal framework that establishes Ghana’s current decentralization could be attributed to the 1992 Republican Constitution. Under this arrangement, Article 242 requires the District Assembly (DA) to be non-partisan in nature; and it is the highest political authority in the district, comprising one person elected from each electoral area; the member of parliament (MP) from constituencies that fall within the jurisdiction of the DA; the district chief executive (DCE) appointed by the president with executive powers and with the prior approval of not less than a two-thirds majority of the members of the assembly present voting at the meeting; and the other members being not more than 30% of all the members of the DA appointed by the president in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups.

Subsequent legislation by act of parliament such as the Local Government Act 462, 1993; District Assembly Common Fund Act 455, 1993; The National Development Planning Systems Act; legal instruments establishing the DAs; and the Local Government Service Act 656, 2003 have all sought to enhance and strengthen Ghana’s decentralization. For instance, Section 2 of Article 240 of the 1992 Constitution stipulates that ‘Parliament shall enact appropriate laws to ensure that functions, powers, responsibilities and resources are at all times transferred from central government to local government units in a coordinated manner’. The consequent establishment of a service by Local Government Service Act 656, 2003 was to ensure a better local government whose main objective was ‘to secure effective administration and management of local government in the country’. It was charged with the following responsibilities: the commencement of functioning decentralized departments at the DAs, transfer of functions to the relevant decentralized departments, transfer of staff from the Civil Service to the Local Government Service, and establish a performance-based management system for both human resource and service delivery.

The DAs have been tasked to perform 86 functions in an attempt to empower them to provide deconcentrated and devolved local public services and also the overall development of the district… shall ensure the preparation and submission… for approval of the plan and budget for the district (Local Government Act, 1993). The DAs act on the advice of District Tender Boards; DAs are the sole taxing authority in the districts; they also make byelaws.

In spite of all these prescriptions (what ought to be), decentralization has not been able to entrust to local governments enough autonomy or real power to initiate and execute their plans and policies. The context and history of Ghana’s decentralization, and most of the laws that are still in the system, have hindered the transfer of real power and resources to the local governments, thereby strengthening central government’s position vis-à-vis the DAs.

A trajectory of decentralization practice in Ghana: Pre-colonial systems

The pre-colonial Fante Confederation

Tenkorang (1974) referred to ‘the emergence of the Fante Confederacy of States’ as occurring between 1701–1711, with the Fante conquest of Asebu and Fetu to the west and Etsi to the north; while Daaku dated its establishment to 1715, when its ‘nucleus’ was created by the alliance of Fante with Fetu and Assin, to the north (Daaku, 1970, cited in Tordoff, 1962). The pre-colonial decentralized structures of the ‘Fantes’ has been described as a loose clustering of more independent states or kingdoms with the centre being relatively weak. Boahen (1965, 1974) designated Fante in the seventeenth century as forming a confederacy (or federation), whose component ‘states’ were essentially ‘independent’. In other words, the Fante Confederacy was as a federation of city-states that were semi-autonomous in nature. Likewise, Bosman later noted that although the Brafo was ‘the first man among the Fantes and had ‘the greatest authority’; in practice he did not enjoy this status. Bosman maintains that ‘though all the states still recognised Mankessim as their sacred city, and in theory its ‘Brafo’ as their king, in practice they all behaved not only as separate and independent but also as rival states’ (Bosman, 1967).

Attempts at a historical explanation of Fante’s decentralized structure have generally presented it as a deviation from a supposed norm of Akan political organization. This point is explained by Arhin (1966), in that the pattern of ‘diffuse authority’ that characterized the Fante was a product of recent historical change, due to the impact of European trade and colonial rule. This had weakened the central authority of the rulers, whereas it was maintained in the Akan states of the interior, such as Asante (Arhin, 1966). The early historians, including Boahen and Daaku, presented seventeenth-century Fante not merely as a decentralized, but as a dysfunctional polity, stressing its ‘weakness’ and ‘disunity’ (Boahen, 1965; Daaku, 1970).

The pre-colonial Asante state

The pre-colonial political arrangement of the Ashantis depicts a more centralized administration. The literature argues variously that, in the period of conquest, it would have been administratively convenient to make the outlying chiefs (Abrempon) responsible for the government of such conquered territories as abutted onto their own states or that lay within easy reach of their capital towns. It has, however, been realized that Osei Tutu and his successors did not adopt this policy, which suggests that they were afraid to entrust further power to the chiefs (Amanhene), ostensibly to avoid any dangerous, separatist tendencies (Busia, 1951) ). They chose, rather, to magnify the position of the Kumasi chiefs, thereby balancing the power of one class of chief against that of another. The policy of recruiting the class of provincial governors from among the Kumasi Nsafohene ensured that Kumasi retained its pre-eminence, if only because its fighting potential was so much greater; it was very important that, at all times, the King of Ashanti should be able to put a larger army into the field than any of his subordinates.

During the reign of Opoku Ware, an addition of new provinces to the empire so increased the power of the Kumasi chiefs that, towards the end of his reign, it was they rather than the outlying Abrempon who threatened the stability of the nation. The king, it seems, tried to curtail drastically their power in the provinces. Around the period 1748, the Nsafohene rebelled against the Asantehene, who had to flee his palace by night and take refuge with the Juabenhene, only to return later. He reoccupied his capital, pardoned the rebel leaders, and allowed them to return to Kumasi, but only after they had accepted new limitations on their power. This struggle for power within the Kumasi Division is recalled today in the Ashanti proverb: ‘Kumasi abrono ye aduoson nson, tumi agyinagyina ne nyina so’. It is literally explained as ‘Kumasi has seventy-seven quarters; each of them has enjoyed power in a particular time’ (Dupuis, cited in Tordoff, 1962: 414).

The strong central authority of Asante was itself the product of a historical process. According to a common reading, its structure had originally been more decentralized, and effective central power established only from the mid-eighteenth century onwards; indeed, the original Asante state, as constituted at the beginning of the eighteenth century, has sometimes been characterized as a ‘confederacy’ (Wilks, 1967).

The context of Ghana’s decentralization

The context and history of Ghana’s decentralization has been argued by Antwi-Boasiako (2010: 171) that, following over a decade of military dictatorship under Chairman Rawlings (1981–1991), the 1992 Republican Constitution provided a transition from a military rule to multi-party democracy at the national level, which also authorized the 1988 local government reforms. Decentralization was within the overall context of a liberal democratic constitution, yet essential democratic elements remained compromised, especially through the retention of presidential appointments instead of local elections in the districts. The objective of decentralization was specifically laid out in the 1992 Republican Constitution (chapter twenty), which is entirely devoted to the concept of decentralization and local government administration in Ghana. Here, the ‘Constitution’ states emphatically in Article 240 that local government and its administration shall be decentralized, and that the functions, powers, responsibilities and resources should be transferred from the central government (Flagstaff House) to the local governments (metropolitan, municipal and DAs). The autonomy and independent role of local governments, with discretionary powers at the grassroots, was subject to a provision in Article 240(2b), which stipulates and directs that measures should be taken to enhance the capacity of local government authorities to plan, initiate, co-ordinate, manage and execute policies in respect of matters affecting local people. An important aspect of Ghana’s reform was decentralization, the process of devolving political and administrative authority and rationalizing the relationship between central government and local authorities. The overall goal was to redress the over-centralization of power at the national level, improve the rural–urban imbalance and enhance local participation in national decision making (Ahwoi, 1992; 2011).

Methodology

Ghana’s current decentralization system has been in place since 1988; over two and half decades at the time of writing. This study reflects upon decentralization practice in Ghana by assessing the key challenges inherent in the system. In order to critically assess it, the study is situated within the qualitative paradigm of social research, which is deemed appropriate for exploratory and explanatory studies (Babbie, 2004). The study relies on secondary data and existing relevant literature on decentralization practice. Various legal frameworks in Ghana underpinning decentralization and local governance, including the 1992 Republican Constitution, the Local Government Act, Act 462, the District Assembly Common Fund, Act 455, the Local Government Service Act, Act 656 and the National Development Planning Act, Act 480 are analysed to achieve the study objective. The study, therefore, adopts a retrospective policy analysis by critically assessing the various policies as well as legal frameworks that regulate decentralization and local government systems in Ghana. A critical stage review method was used to analyse written reports, journal articles and other relevant literature on decentralization practice.

Challenges of decentralization: The appearance of ‘decentralized centralization’ in Ghana

Though decentralization is primarily a strategy for transferring authority and responsibility from central government to sub-national (regional and district) levels of government (Ostrom, 1989; Stone, 1997), many African leaders adopt the concept in theory but fail to devolve powers to the districts and regions. Decentralization is a term of rich conceptual and empirical meaning, which can designate static fact and dynamic process, and it can refer to pure ideal-type and moderate incremental change when the rational theory of decentralization is understood in all compartments (Fesler, 1965; cited in Antwi-Boasiako, 2010). The key constraints that are identified in Ghana’s decentralization are discussed below.

Excessive subservience of local governments to the centre

An account of Ghana’s political history indicates that decentralization is a concept adopted by regimes to reflect the leaders’ political ideologies, but the actual implementation of the concept by these statesmen does not conform to the theoretical underpinning of the concept. In other words, the various ways with which decentralization is practiced to a greater extent deviates from what the literature provides. A conspicuous trend in Ghana is that, whether civilian or military, the centre or president has always appointed favourites as chief executives in the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) with little input from the local electorates (Antwi-Boasiako, 2010). With the Fourth Republican Dispensation, the 1992 Constitution sets the stage for a subservient local government or DA system in Ghana. Articles 242 and 243 are the provisions that seek to make the central government masters of the DAs. The provisions tend to make the DAs tools or instruments of central government; as such the DAs are not primarily responsible to the local people but to the centre. Article 242(d) empowers the president to appoint at least 30% of the members of the districts; this has variously been abused by several assemblies to fill the president’s or government’s cohorts. What is more problematic is Article 243(1) (2a–c), which places the DA into the direct ambit and control of the president. The provisions allow the president to appoint the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executive (MMDCEs) of the various assemblies. Article 243(2a) allows this MMDCE to preside over the Executive Committee of the DAs whilst Article 243(2b) allows him to undertake the day-to-day activities of assemblies. Placing this appointed MMDCE in a tight corner is Article 243(2c), which enjoins him/her to be the chief representative of the central government in the district. This constitutional provision is quite problematic because the concept of representation is very complex. Being a representative is quite vague: is he to be given instructions to be executed in the districts? Or is he a trustee? A simple agency model argues that the representative ought to do the bidding of the appointing body. However, the local people also expect the assembly to be accountable and responsible to them; in this case the chairman or chief executive officer (CEO) as well as about 30% of the members of the assembly owe their allegiance firstly to the president or central government. The outcome of the appointment of 30% of MMDA members by the president hardly reflects a broader consultation but in most cases reveals an apogee of partisan appointment that neutralizes the relative autonomy of the MMDAs when it comes to voting (see Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2014).

The present situation, therefore, leads to such appointees being caught between two sides: the local people whom they are to serve and the appointing agent. This tends to make the local units very weak in terms of autonomy and taking their own initiatives. According to Wolman (1990), small democratic (local) governments were the fundamental hope of the people, as most of them distrusted the activities of the central government. Bobo and Gilliam (1990) argue that local involvement in the political process through elections ensures self-empowerment as locals gain more political power. Such empowerment translates to locals not only trusting their elected officials but also have a higher sense of political efficacy about local citizens’ issues (Bobo and Gilliam (1990: 382–384). Ghana is on record as making some progress in implementing decentralization. Therefore, allowing locals to elect their own leaders or public officials makes government more accountable to the local populations (Duncan, 2007) and more responsive to local concerns.

Unfavourable provisions in the legal framework

The statute books of Ghana contain a lot of centralizing factors (most of them of colonial and early post-colonial heritage) that have hindered effective and autonomous local government, and have sought to make the DAs more subservient to the centre.

Per the Local Government Act, Act 462, the non-elected members of the assembly are not responsible to or accountable to local people, and the grassroots have no direct control over these individuals. This point has been brought home by section (9) of the Local Government Act. Section 9(1) argues that, subject to the constitution, the mandate of an elected member of a DA may be revoked by the electorate by a process initiated by about 25% of the registered voters in the electoral area. However, such a process cannot be initiated against the appointed members of the assembly. Therefore, who is accountable or responsible to who? Could this not affect the capacity and autonomy of the local governments in Ghana?

Section 10(6a) of Act 462 appears to directly place the activities of the District Assemblies (DAs) into the control and direction of the president or central government. The provision maintains that, the Metropolitans, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), in the execution of their legitimate functions, are subject to the general guidance and direction of the president on various matters. If the president, or Minister of Local Government and Rural Development does not agree with a policy or an initiative of the MMDA, such a matter is referred to the Regional Coordinating Council, where the regional minister is also a president’s appointee. Section 34 of Act 462 places actions of the MMDAs into the control of the Minister for Local Government and Rural Development (LGRD). Section (34) and (100) provide that a district can only charge fees for any service or facility provided by the assembly or the issuance of a licence, ‘subject to the guidelines in respect of the charging of fees prescribed by the minister by legislative instrument’. Even though section 62 of the Act empowers the MMDAs to make byelaws on sanitation, drainage, control of construction and buildings and other petty issues, section 80 of that same Act argues that these byelaws are valid only subject to the discretion of the Minister for LGRD. This point is forcefully brought home by section 80(1) that, ‘by-laws made by a District Assembly shall be submitted to the Minister for approval or rejection’. Section 88 also enjoins the DAs not to raise drafts or loans for greater than twenty million cedis (old cedis) or currently two thousand Ghana Cedis without permission from the minister of LGRD. What is more problematic about the subservience of the MMDAs vis-à-vis the central government is the provision of Section 43 of Act 462, which gives the president the sole power of dissolving any DA he considers to be defaulting.

Inadequate autonomy to initiate the district development planning process

A linchpin of decentralization and local government is the enhancement of self-determination of local communities through the formulation and adoption of responsive services. However, the National Development Planning (System) Act, Act 480 appears to render the local governments second place in decentralized planning. The formation of the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) to harmonize development plans is good, but at times appears to obstruct the autonomy of MMDAs. The Act provides that the decentralized national development planning system shall be regulated by legislative instruments and guidelines issued by the NDPC. This provision to a greater extent refutes the provision of the 1992 Constitution by Article 254 that, ‘parliament shall take steps necessary for further decentralization of the administrative functions and projects of the Central Government but shall not exercise any control over the DAs that is incompatible with their decentralized status or otherwise contrary to law’.

What seems more compromising of genuine decentralization is that Act 480 appears to give the NDPC an ‘ultimate power’ of district development planning and plans. Section (11)(a) of the Act provides that NDPC shall determine the format and content of deve1opment plans for the districts, ministries and sector agencies. This provision appears to render the MMDAs to the general control and direction of the president or central government because the head of the NDPC is appointed by the president. In the run up to the 2012 general elections the Presidential Candidate of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) suggested that his vice-candidate would head the NDPC if he won the election; this type of statement has been heard on various political platforms. Whether headed by a vice-candidate or any individual duly appointed by the president, the NDPC is obliged by section (11)(f) to issue approved development policies as directed by the president to guide MMDAs and other public sector agencies as well the private sector. It appears that what the MMDAs do at the local level is ‘just fill in the blank spaces’, which could still be disapproved by the NDPC. Again, the Commission in consultation with the Minister for LGRD could recommend to the president to designate an area as a ‘special area’ and that area shall not be under the administrative control of the respective MMDA. The NDPS Act, Act 480 of 1994 greatly obstructs the concept of administrative responsibility because the general framework for development planning is determined by the president, based on the NDPC issues guidelines to MMDAs to make appropriate development plans by ‘filling in the blanks’; again, any final District Development Plan (DDP) is either approved or disapproved by the NDPC even if such a plan was adopted overwhelmingly through a public hearing of all community members. Section (21) provides that a ‘approved district development plan’ refers to a plan approved for a district, a municipality or metropolitan area by ‘the Commission’ and not the people or community members. What is the essence of the public hearing? Is it a mere formality?

Where is the originality of the MMDAs in planning development and where is their autonomy?

Financial constraints of local governments: Troubles with DACF

Though local governments in Ghana have been bestowed with 86 functions to perform under Act 462, these responsibilities are not commensurate with the requisite financial resources. The main sources of revenue to DAs are rates, fees and levies, the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) under Act 455, grants-in aid under Article 252 of the Constitution, and 55% of the Stool Land revenue. The capacities of most of the assemblies have become thwarted as a result of their small sources of revenue. Most of the DAs solely or largely depend on the DACF. The DACF is a statutory provision by the DACF Act, Act 455, which directs the government to allocate 5% (subsequently increased to 7.5%) of national revenues to local governments, which is to be shared by formula. Unduly depending on the central government for such a source of finance, the DACF has been used by the central government variously to hold the DAs to ransom. The moneys are at times delayed, while the administrator of the fund in most cases deducts part of the moneys at source. Assemblies that are not in the ‘good books’ of the government could have their DACF unduly delayed (Tettey, 2006). Instead of minimizing central government control over the local governments, DACF has been used as a tool to increase the control of the centre over the DAs’ functions. Note that ‘you cannot bite the hand that feeds you’ (author’s emphasis). The decisions of the DACF have been usurped by the central government so that the DAs remain as talking shops without finance to implement their decisions. For instance, deductions are made at source without the knowledge of the DAs; continued central control has reduced the potency of the DACF as an effective instrument of decentralization and democratization; the introduction of the DACF under Act 455 as an incentive to augment revenue base of District Assemblies appears to have made most of the Assemblies renege on their local resource (internally generated funds) mobilization efforts; the DACF is also suffering from irregularities in the disbursement of funds, a lack of transparency and a lack of discretion afforded to district authorities over the allocation of funds. For instance, although the Constitution stipulated that 5% of national revenue must be assigned to local governments, only 3–4% was transferred between 1994 and 2000. In most cases, the DACF, which is the major source of revenues to local governments, get delayed for two to three quarters. For instance, the late and non-payment of the DACF and other non-statutory funds for the period 2012–2014 posed major challenge to the MMDAs in their attempt to carry out their functions bestowed by Article 245 and the Local Government Act, Act 462. Granted without admitting that the state does not have enough funds; is it the moneys (5–7.5%) allotted to MMDAs that should be sacrificed? Fiscal decentralization has not been promoted; this is because composite budgeting has not been effectively implemented because of the unwillingness of the Ministry of Finance. In addition, centralized laws on fiscal policies of Ghana such as the Financial Administration Decree (FAD), 1979; and Financial Administration Regulation (FAR) Financial Memorandum of Local and Urban Councils, 1961, and even the Local Government Act do not promote a segregation of the DA budget from that of the central government. Because these appear to favour the central government, they still exist in the legal framework underpinning decentralization in Ghana.

Human resource challenges

Local governments in Ghana have been entrusted with 86 functions by the 1992 Constitution and Local Government Act, Act 462 with most of them being quite technical in nature. This ideally requires adequate technical personnel to effectively carry out these activities at the local level. However, DAs are confronted with inadequate technical and competent personnel, especially in the rural areas. In most of the DAs, it is commonplace to find one official doubling as the budget officer, planning officer and even coordinating director. Whilst this puts stress on performance and service delivery, what is more problematic is the conflict of interest and lack of checks and balances, which could lead to unbridled usurpation of powers and abuses. While devolution of authority imposes increasing demands for services at the local level and requires well-trained local functionaries, the economic conditions of Ghana and administrative and structural reforms suggest less government spending on human resources and fewer government agents. Lack of autonomy to recruit and dismiss personnel without the interference of the ministry of local government is not only frustrating but an impediment to effective decentralized local governance. Rondinelli (1981) argues that leadership, responsibility and service are sine qua non for decentralization to advance the course of economic and social development.

The central bureaucracy (ministries, departments and agencies)

The bureaucracy is also to be blamed for adjusting too slowly to, or resisting, the decentralization process; some scholars have argued that decentralization is viewed as an instrument for legitimizing the government’s power. There is, therefore, an unwillingness of the leadership of decentralized departments and agencies to cede power to the local government leadership, refusing full integration (Ahwoi, 1992; Ayee, 1997; Crook, 1994; Mohan, 1996).

Summarizing the challenges

The myth surrounding Ghana’s decentralization (subservient position of the DAs) has been summarized by Olowu: ‘…the laws have been structured in such a way to ensure that these decentralized institutions operate more as appendages of the national government rather than agents of local economic development. A number of statutory enactments have been made to effectively nullify the broad constitutional mandate. They include the appointment (not election) of the executive heads of the DA, the continuing control of senior staff by the national government, leading to mass sackings of local government staff when the national government changes hands from the ruling party to the opposition’ (Olowu, 2011).

It could be inferred from the above that Ghana has adopted the concept of decentralization at best in theory with ‘periphery’ incremental improvement; however, effort at giving real power to the people has been an illusion, the centre has deliberately repositioned itself to weaken the DAs.

African governments have appeared, in the past, not to have put any serious premium on local governments as agencies for development because of their very structures, functions and roles, that were inherited at independence and have remained unchanged for a very long time (Ahwoi, 2011).

The context of such a position and the subsequent draconian laws in those times were because, ‘many post-colonial African governments depended on a base of weak legitimacy and would not, therefore, risk conferring any substantial measure of autonomy on local government institutions in order to perpetuate their stay’ (Tordoff, 1980).

In an attempt to ensure a very formidable position for local units in terms of a central–local government nexus, there must be the creation of a capable local government; the public administration of Ghana must be strengthened to carry out the complex tasks that it ought to perform; by that, they would reposition themselves as being able to carry their destiny in their own hands. Kauzya (2011) proposed a capable, intelligent and effective framework to ensure a strong public administration in the local governments. He observed that ‘capability’ includes not only functioning institutions, systems and qualifies personnel, but also intelligence and effectiveness (where intelligence refers to the ability to leverage partnerships from the private sector and civil society, and effectiveness refers to achieving the objectives of decentralization as well as community development goals).

Recommendations for effective decentralization: A comprehensive framework

From the discussion above, one could that various governments come and go, but they comfortably inherit the structures without bringing about any real transformations. The argument is that, when in opposition, they do promise better alternatives; but when given political power the implementation of those ideas appears illusory. The framework above is therefore referred to as walk-the-talk model. The model posits that enhancing the effectiveness of MMDAs in Ghana requires a strong political will from a president who is willing to genuinely shed most of his appointment powers. A president who is able to transform intentions to actions would make the enforcement of genuine decentralization a reality. This is because, it appears that every presidential aspirant had good plans for local governments but, upon assuming power, these become marginalized and only ideal; whilst, in reality, they keep the status quo with little or no incremental transformations at the periphery. The walk-the-talk model argues that a strong political will is required to ensure financial breakthrough, personnel breakthrough and the required autonomy of District Assemblies to take relevant decisions that really emanate from the people and not the principal-agent type currently faced.

The framework suggests that enhancing Ghana’s decentralization process requires touching the core challenges that tend to perpetuate the subservient nature of local governments. We argue that moneys due District Assemblies as prescribed by the District Assembly Common Fund Act, Act 455, should be released on time and the challenges shrouded with it should practically be resolved. This will enable the District Assembleis carry out their activities and plans without obstructions.

More importantly, the political heads of the local governments should be elected by the local population in order to be held accountable. Although this has been debated in the literature (see Ahwoi, 2010), electing the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) will help resolve most of the challenges that confront local governments today and will help make the elected leaders relatively independent of the centre and responsive to the local communities. The MMDCE will not have to walk on the tightrope of double-edged accountability being faced today; a major dilemma they face today is the extent to which their loyalty and accountability goes to the president or local people. The current appointment criterion of MMDCEs and 30% assembly members tends to reduce competition and people’s interest in voting in local elections (see Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2014). Again, in order to tackle the human resources challenges, there should be regular training of MMDA staff with the view of equipping them with the relevant skills needed for their job descriptions, rather than simply mass-training efforts.

Another important requirement is to take a comprehensive view of the legal framework and the various sections and clauses, which have existed since the colonial era, that tend to transfer most of the moneys ideally meant for local governments. The clauses that tend to make the local governments take second place when it comes to local planning and decision making need to be amended, repealed or abrogated.

Figure 1.

Walk-the-talk framework.

The key challenges of decentralization are well acknowledged by the government and key stakeholders; in recent times there has been a popular survey by the Constitutional Review Commission, where most of these resurfaced. Acknowledging the problem is one step and taking real actions is another, lest the question of inadequate political will comes into the equation (Brinkerhoff, 2010; Malena, 2009). Tettey (2006) argues for a subsidiarity between local and central governments, but not a principal-agent type. Though the pre-colonial history of the Fante Confederacy provides some lessons, such comparative analysis will not be plausible here because the Constitution would in clear terms delimit the nature of the subsidiarity, unlike the Confederacy, which was loosely designed. The Ashanti history of centralization also provides a lesson that over-empowering the core or centre could still lead to unwanted ramifications. The social forces theory suggests that the culture, the environment and prevailing conditions should provide a congenial environment for take-off. These conditions are available, and the recent survey indicated that a great majority of stakeholders prefer the election of local government chief executives. There have been various agreements by the state and stakeholders; what remains is a final phase of ‘political will’, which is real action. For instance, the delay in the 2014 local government elections for assembly members is quite worrisome; where is the political will to promote decentralization? The non-release of the Assembly Common Fund for over two to three quarters mostly hampers the process and tends to question the ‘political will’ of the centre.

The discussion above will still be ‘a talking shop’ unless there is a president who has the political will to make decentralization work. This is so, because Ghana practices executive presidency where much powers have beeen vested in the President to appoint almost all heads of key state institutions; also, the hybrid system of government makes him dominate the legislature, especially, if he has majority of his party’s representatives in Parliament which has been the case in the Fourth Republic. In other words, everything behoves a strong political will to effectively devolve power to the local assemblies; Asibuo (1991) argued that decentralization is about distribution of power in society and hence nobody would like to implement a programme that would curtail their power or prestige. This has been a major obstacle to effective decentralization which, to the third world was supposed to, ‘suggest the hope of cracking open the blockages of inert central bureaucracy, curing managerial constipation, giving more direct access for the people to the government and the government to the people, stimulating the whole nation to participate in national development plans’ (Mahwood, 1983). However, making the process effective requires a collaborative effort from all stakeholders and actors. We do expect the local governments to enhance their capacities and increase internal revenue mobilization; and for think tanks, media and civil society organizations to push forward an agenda for real decentralization.

Conclusions

It can be concluded from this study that though decentralization sought to transfer power to the people, there are various provisions in the legal framework that do not encourage the genuine transfer of power and autonomy to local governments in Ghana. As a result of central control and bottlenecks, the effectiveness of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in discharging their functions as the highest political authority in the districts is undermined, and their responsibilities appear to be restricted to local issues alone. From the conclusions above, the idea that decentralization would lead to self-determination and enhanced service delivery of local governments has not been realized to an appreciable level. The conclusion supports an argument by Oyugi that, ‘the legal-political design of local government in Africa tends to weaken the cultivation of a democratic culture at the local level as well as weaken the ability of local authorities to take initiative in the field of service provision’ (Oyugi, 2000: 10). In the specific context of Ghana, for over two and half decades ‘the power’ has not really reached the people but it is still the central government that in many ways controls the affairs of local governments. Various regimes have not really lived up to the expectation; they have not ‘walked -the-talk’ of providing local governments with the requisite platform to reassert themselves from the grips of the centre.

Footnotes

Author biography

Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah is a Doctoral Candidate at the University of Ghana Business School reading Public Administration and Policy Management. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science with first class honours (CGPA of 3.75) and a Master of Philosophy in Public Administration (CGPA of 3.88) from the University of Ghana. He has experience in teaching and research having being in these capacities, first, at the Political Science Department and later the Public Administration Department of the University of Ghana Business School. Emmanuel has passion for teaching and research and has played active roles in various research projects including localizing MDGs in Ghana; post-mortem of the 2010 Local Government Elections in Ghana, just to mention a few. His areas of research and publication include decentralization and local governance, privatization and urban services delivery, ethics and governance, institutionalism and environmental management.

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