Fighting the Cancer of Corruption and “Hostage-Taking” in the District Assemblies in Ghana

Introduction

Decentralization policies aimed at improving local government administration have been at the heart of public policymaking and implementation processes in Ghana since independence in 1957 (Ayee, 1994). Even long before the advent of colonialism, indigenous political authorities in what is now Ghana, found ways of decentralizing power to lower political structures in furtherance of an efficient local government system. However, unlike previous policies, the current one, which began in the early 1980s, seeks to facilitate popular participation in democratic decision-making and implementation processes at the local government levels so as to ensure empowerment and local development.

Decentralization: a definition

The concept of “decentralization” is an omnibus term covering a multiplicity of concepts (Burki et al., 1999; Decentralization Thematic Team, u.d.; Mawhood, 1983: 1; Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983: 18; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1997, 1998). As UNDP points out:

…Decentralization, or decentralizing governance, refers to the restructuring or reorganization of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels… Decentralization could also be expected to contribute to key elements of good governance, such as increasing people’s opportunities for participation in economic, social and political decisions; assisting in developing people’s capacities; and enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and accountability (UNDP, 1998: 6).

It should be noted that the concept, and for that matter practice, of decentralization takes various forms, for example: (1) devolution which is an administrative type of decentralization in which central government relinquishes certain functions or sets up new units of government which are outside its direct control; (2) delegation which involves the transfer of central government’s decision-making and administrative authority and/or responsibility for certain designated functions to institutions, which although not directly controlled by central government, are accountable to it; (3) deconcentration which covers the redistribution of management, policy, and financial responsibilities to different levels of government; (4) privatization which could include permitting privately-owned enterprises to perform functions hitherto performed by central governments; and (5) fiscal decentralization which carries the idea that decentralized institutions can only succeed if they have adequate levels of revenue and/or control over same. In fact, central to the concept of decentralization is the difference between a hierarchy based on authority, i.e. two actors in an unequal power relationship; and an interface, i.e. a lateral relationship between two actors of approximately equal power. The different types of decentralization emphasize different characteristics, policy choices, and conditions for success.

Why decentralize?

Much debate has gone on in the literature about democratic decentralization as a vehicle for facilitating local government in countries in the Global South. The perception that decentralization could serve as a means of strengthening local government is as old as the idea of governance itself (Anderson, 1996: 2; Blair, 1998: 1). In more recent times, the issue of decentralization has come to dominate discussions on development in many countries in the Global South and within the international community and development-oriented institutions (Adamolekun and Rowland, 1979; Conyers, 1981, 1983; Nyendu, 2000, 2006). As Furniss (1974) points out, hardly a day passed without any references being made to decentralization as a vehicle that is expected to facilitate development in one form or another in countries in the Global South.

Conyers (1983: 99) and Nyendu (2006) both note that at the heart of the decentralization debate, especially from the 1980s, is the expectation that it could facilitate popular participation in development decision-making and implementation processes at the local government level. Hye (1985: 2) notes that the emerging popularity of the decentralization of governmental authority from central to regional, district, and local agencies came from two other converging forces, i.e. the desire for participatory management of local development projects and the need for local development planning and implementation processes to be determined by the local people in whose interests the projects are being carried out in the first place. These new shifts in development thinking, therefore, called for political changes in the various countries that intended to implement decentralization policies.

The popularity of democratic decentralization in the Global South also grew out of the perception that centralized planning and bureaucratic centralization, which were adopted as development strategies in the immediate post-colonial era in the developing regions of the world, had failed to achieve the desired goals. The perceived failure of this development strategy resulted in the search for an alternative paradigm for facilitating development, hence the most recent debate on decentralization (Ayres, 1999: 71; Faguet, 1997: 2).

Blair (1998: 2) points out that the recent trends in global efforts at integration have given a new dimension to globalization with an emphasis on democracy as its central component. This linkage between globalization and democracy, as he further notes, has given birth to the concept of “democratic” decentralization, which places much emphasis on periodic elections. Thus the processes of globalization and the neo-liberal free market policies and democratization ideas that drive it, have greatly influenced this new dimension of decentralization. In a sense, democratic decentralization is seen as central to globalization and the neo-liberal agenda, both of which seek to liberalize the political space by decentralizing power from central to local governments in countries in the Global South. This, it is expected, will help promote a suitable environment for the implementation of neo-liberal free market policies. However, the initial goal of democratic decentralization in these countries is to facilitate democratization at the national level. Thus, as Blair clearly points out: “…the national context is critical for the success of DLG (Democratic Local Government)” (Blair, 1998: 4).

The district assemblies

In an address at a Workshop on Decentralization in 1988 Kwamena Ahwoi, a former Secretary ¹ for Local Government and Rural Development in the government of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) ² and arguably one of the chief architects of the decentralization policy, pointed out the goals of the decentralization policy when he stated that it:

…seeks to create a kind of democracy that will bring about local participation of the majority of people in decisions concerning their well-being. In more specific terms, decentralization seeks to give to the people the responsibilities for managing their own affairs themselves with particular reference to planning, implementation and evaluation of programmes. And in another dimension, it seeks to strike a balance in the exercise of actual power between the state and local communities (Kumado, 1994: 203).

Ahwoi again reiterated the goals of the decentralization policy when he pointed out that:

… In its totality, our decentralization programme has two broad dimensions: - political decentralization of state power to enhance participatory democracy through local level political institutions: - decentralization of administrative, development planning, implementation and budgeting decision-making (Massing, 1994: 138).

Ahwoi (1994: 18) also points out elsewhere that the decentralization policy sought to transfer power, decision-making, the means, and competence to the grassroots level and that these goals would be realized through the district assemblies ³ which would provide the mainstay of the policy. Furthermore, Ahwoi (1994) again points out that: “The decentralization policy has necessitated a change in the national planning process from the centralized ‘top-town’ system to a decentralized ‘bottom-up’ planning system.” This view was underscored by Ahwoi himself when, back in 1992, he stated that: “I consider democracy, development and decentralization as inseparable triplets in Ghana: they can be linked to Siamese triplets sharing one stomach. Whatever they eat individually will go into the same stomach” (Ahwoi, 1992). This relationship between the district assemblies, democracy, and development is important because it is seen as a means of enabling local people to make decisions affecting their own development (Anaman, 2000: xi). Further, and as Anaman (2000) again points out, the development of the rural communities will also ensure a rise in their productivity, income-levels, and the purchasing power of people living in these communities. In broad terms, therefore, it is clear that the concept of the district assemblies seeks to ensure local participation in the design and implementation of development programs that meet the basic needs of local communities.

Since 1988, the metropolitan/municipal/district assemblies (MMDAs) ³ have come to serve as the basis for local government in Ghana (Ghana, 1988, 1992, 1993). As stipulated in the 1992 Constitution: “…a District Assembly shall be the highest political authority in the district, and shall have deliberative, legislative and executive powers” (Ghana, 1992, Article 241: 3). In furtherance of the exercise of these powers, the MMDAs have been assigned as many as 86 functions including: (i) responsibility for the general development of the districts; (ii) facilitating the formulation of programs and strategies for the effective mobilization of all available resources within their areas of jurisdiction; and (iii) responsibility for the initiation of programs that would ensure the development of basic infrastructure in the districts (Ghana, 1993).

The Constitution provides for two main types of membership in the MMDAs, namely the Elected Members, who must constitute two-thirds of the total membership and represent designated Electoral Areas ⁴ (i.e. Electoral Districts) and Government Appointees. ⁵ Unlike the former who enter the MMDAs through competitive elections based on universal adult suffrage, the latter, who must constitute not more than 30% of the membership of a given MMDA must be: “…appointed by the President in consultation with traditional authorities and other interest groups in the districts” (Ghana, 1992: Article 242(d); 1993). The other members of the MMDAs are: (1) the metropolitan/municipal/district Chief Executives (MMDCEs), ⁶ who are the political and administrative heads of the MMDAs and the representatives of the President at local government level; and (2) Members of Parliament (MPs) whose constituencies ⁷ are located within specific MMDA areas. MMDCEs must be nominated by the President and then appointed by same with the prior approval of not less than two-thirds of the members of the respective MMDAs present and voting at a meeting called for the purpose (Ghana, 1992: Article 243(1)). MPs, on the other hand, serve as ex officio members of their respective MMDAs by virtue of their positions in the national legislature.

In spite of the laudable objectives of the decentralization policy pointed out earlier, continuing allegations of corruption have dogged the functioning of the MMDAs for a while now. In fact, the perception that corruption is endemic in society is a global phenomenon and not limited to the developing regions of the world. As Shabbir and Anwar (2007: 7) rightly point out, corruption: “is not a new phenomenon; it is as old as mankind itself. The corruption made itself visible when the institution of the government was established.” And as Glynn et al. (1997: 7) also note: “… no region, and hardly any country, has been immune from corruption.” Globally, corruption has become a major issue of concern due to its negative effects on economic development, human rights, and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2004). According to the World Bank, more than US$1 billion per annum is estimated to be paid in bribes globally. In the developing countries, corruption is carried out on a large scale and has become an integral part of everyday life (Hors, u.d.). Hors further points out that:

Society has learned to live with it, even considering it, fatalistically, as an integral part of their culture. Not only are public or official decisions – for instance, on the award of government contracts or the amount of tax due – bought and sold, but very often access to a public service or the exercise of a right, such as obtaining civil documents, also has to be paid for (Hors, u.d.: 1).

There are basically two sectorial types of corruption: public sector and private sector. Whereas the former occurs when people abuse public office for “private gain” (World Bank 1997: 8) and very often share the private gain with other accomplices, the latter may involve businesses corrupting public officials through bribery, undue influence, and money laundering, among others, but it can also occur between the private sector for personal gains (Seldadyo and de Haan, 2006). In fact, corruption in the public sector is higher than in the private sector in the developing world. Weylandt (2013: 3) points out that the commonest forms of corruption in the public sector are bribery and embezzlement. This is where public servants extort bribes in exchange for services that they are supposed to make freely available to the public, or, in some other instances, where these public servants give preferential treatment to the public in return for bribes. As Weylandt (2013) further notes, it is those who have control over spending who are often involved in the practice of embezzling funds in the public sector.

According to Transparency International (2012), most African countries are full of “serious corruption.” Corruption has, in fact, become a major concern at both central and local government levels throughout Africa. In a national survey carried out in 2011 by Ghana Integrity Initiative (Local Chapter of Transparency International), 1936 out of 2096 respondents, constituting 92.4%, indicated that corruption was a serious problem in Ghana, while 74 respondents, constituting only 3.5%, do not regard it as a serious national problem (Ghana Integrity Initiative, 2011: 5). In the same survey, 1524 respondents, representing 72.7% of the total number of respondents, pointed at politicians as the most common perpetrators of corruption in Ghana (Ghana Integrity Initiative, 2011: 15). The findings of this survey, and the numerous reports by the media and views expressed during interviews with the general public collectively, demonstrate the perceived degree of corruption in public places in Ghana.

Besides this survey and the findings from interviews that I have been conducting in Ghana since 2003, both religious and other prominent citizens have also come out to openly complain about the increasing trends in allegations of corruption in the public sector in Ghana. As reported on Ghanaweb.com (2014b), the Diocesan Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Tamale in Northern Ghana, Jacob Ayeebo, was reported to have loudly complained at the Eighth Diocesan Synod of the Anglican Church at Tamale that corruption has become a core issue in Ghana, which is hindering national economic growth and resulting in institutional mismanagement (Ghanaweb.com, 2014b). Additionally, there are such prominent public officials as Brigadier-General Joseph Nunoo-Mensah, the Head of Human Security Department of the National Security Secretariat of the government in power, openly lamenting the pervasive state of corruption in Ghana when he pointed out that:

What is happening in Ghana and in the last few days, tells me that there is complete rot in our society, and we need to do something about it. It is more like an epidemic that is running through the system (Ghanaweb.com, 2014c).

Dr Gyesika Agambilla, a former Deputy Minister of Ports, Harbours, and Railways in the previous government, lamented the growing “culture of corruption” in Ghana (Ghanaweb.com, 2014d). Emile Short, the previous Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), ⁸ commented that corruption in Ghana has assumed “frightening proportions” (Ghanaweb.com, 2014e). Finally, the Chief Justice of Ghana, Georgina Theodora Wood, strongly summarized the general concerns when she indicated that: “The situation has reached tipping point” (Peacefmonline.com, 2014a). This article will, therefore, be confined to public sector corruption since the MMDAs are public sector institutions in Ghana.

The often heated discussions over the alleged rise in corruption in Ghana in general and also in the functioning of the MMDAs as pointed out in the epigraph, have raised certain pertinent questions that will be dealt with in this article. First, are the numerous allegations of massive corruption in the functioning of the MMDAs a mere perception or a reality? Second, if the latter is the case, to what extent has it impacted the smooth and efficient functioning of the assemblies? Finally, are there any effective remedial measures that could be put in place so as to enhance the effective functioning of the MMDAs, in order to enable them to achieve the objectives of the decentralization policy?

In order to deal with the above questions, I intend to do the following in this article. First, I will examine the general perception that the MMDAs have become increasingly corrupt, thereby hindering the efficient performance of their mandate. Second, I will argue that corruption in the MMDAs has partly resulted in what could appropriately be described as “hostage-taking”. Third, I will also argue that the problem of corruption and embezzlement in the MMDAs are self-inflicted since the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1992. Finally, I will suggest ways of dealing with the problems of increasing corruption and the accompanying hostage-taking in the MMDAs, so as to refocus the assemblies on their primary objectives. I wish to point out that my understanding of the issues to be discussed in this article are largely based on interviews that I have been conducting in Ghana over time, my review of the relevant literature, my experience as a former government appointee in the assembly in my home district in Ghana, and my continuing academic interest in democratic decentralization globally, Africa in general, and Ghana in particular.

Increasing corruption and “hostage-taking”

It has become public knowledge that the MMDAs in Ghana are bedeviled with numerous problems which have affected performance levels in the assemblies. In fact, one of the main problems confronting the assemblies is the continual allegations of corruption, which are sweeping through the MMDAs nationwide. These allegations include the bribing of members of MMDAs to influence their votes in the approval of nominees for MMDCE positions in what could be described as hostage-taking, and the regime of bribery, among many others, that the MMDCEs have established in the award of contracts in the districts.

One such instance of an alleged bribing of assembly members to approve a nominee occurred in connection with the approval on October 10, 2003 of the new district chief executive (DCE) for the South Tongu district assembly in the Volta Region (Nyendu 2006: 229–231). It was, in fact, alleged that in the days prior to the meeting of the assembly, both the nominee and others allegedly acting on her behalf, had given various sums of money to members of the assembly to influence their votes. ⁹ It was further alleged that, in some instances, the assembly members had to bargain for the amount of money that had to be paid to them in exchange for their votes. As some former and current members of some MMDAs told me in separate interviews, the increasing desire of assembly members to literally extort money from some nominees for the positions of MMDCEs in exchange for their votes, in a scheme that could best be described as hostage-taking, is due to the widely-held belief throughout the country that most MMDCEs use their offices to amass wealth through various corrupt means. ⁹ The idea is that most members of the MMDAs believe most MMDCEs are involved in various acts of corruption while in office, and that the only way to get part of this alleged ill-gotten wealth is when the MMDCE-nominees appear before them for their approval, giving rise to a situation of hostage-taking. ⁹

During the 2013 exercise for the selection and vetting of candidates for the position of MMDCEs, the issue of corruption again reared its ugly head across the country. There were numerous allegations that members of the regional committees which were constituted by the ruling party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), to vet the prospective candidates for the MMDCE positions, were being given “tons” of money by aspirants to enable them to be nominated for the positions. In the Nkwanta North Constituency of the Volta Region, for instance, violence broke out over the choice of nominee for the DCE position leading to the burning of six state-owned vehicles, among other losses. The MP, John Oti Bless, alleged that the outgoing DCE, Paul Levin Gyato, was renominated because he had allegedly paid massive bribes for the position (Ghanaweb.com, 2013a). In fact, what gave some degree of credibility to the alleged bribery in Nkwanta North, as alleged by the MP, was that the nominee was not even among the three shortlisted candidates for the position. According to the MP, the DCE-nominee allegedly bribed powerbrokers of the ruling party with fat cows and inordinate amounts of cash to secure the nomination, thereby lending credence to the widespread rumors all over the country that the position of MMDCEs is for the highest bidder. Further, it was also pointed out by one Karim Dagara, a member of the Communication Team of the NDC, on a Stuttgart-based Radio (Sankofa FM) program about the violence in the same Nkwanta North Constituency, that aspirants to the DCE position in the constituency paid between GHC 20,000 and 30,000 ¹⁰ to be considered for nomination (Ghanaweb.com, 2013b).

There have also been numerous allegations that MMDCEs take bribes from contractors before awarding them contracts in their respective districts. This is allegedly when they personally award contracts in their districts, making fortunes in the process, and thereby side-stepping the executive committees of the MMDAs, which are the statutory bodies that are expected to award these contracts.

Some former MMDCEs who I have interviewed over the years had denied the “bribe-for-contract” allegations, maintaining that if they ever side-stepped laid down procedures in the award of contracts then these might have been because of the need for urgency in the execution of particular projects. ¹¹ Moreover, some of them pointed out that, even if any contractors were to give them sums of money after having been awarded contracts, they did so simply out of gratitude for having been given jobs to execute. In spite of these denials, pieces of evidence from several districts in Ghana have come to confirm the alarming tendency of allegations of corruption in the award of contracts by MMDCEs.

In his address at the final meeting of the Sefwi-Wiawso district assembly in the western region in 1995, the outgoing Presiding Member, Herod Cobbina, called on the government to do a forensic audit of the assembly before the end of the tenure of the current membership, pointing out that projects amounting to huge sums of money had been awarded on contracts in the district: “without the knowledge and approval of the assembly” (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2002). The implication here is that the award of those contracts was done by the DCE without reference to laid down procedures. In fact, my own experience as a government appointee for about eight years in the district assembly in my home district confirms the bribe-for-contract allegations.

In a publication (Daily Guide, 2009) entitled Mills’ Man Cited In GHC 280m Deal, it was reported that the Dormaa municipal assembly in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana had accused its municipal chief executive (MCE), Vincent Oppong Asamoah, of having allegedly awarded contracts worth more than GHC 280 million through the back door, i.e. without reference to the executive committee or receiving the prior approval of the Assembly (Daily Guide, October 23, 2009). At a separate function at the opening of a workshop in October 2005 on Democracy and Good Governance, the Brong Ahafo regional minister, Ignatius Baffour-Awuah, was emphatic about the degree of corruption in the MMDAs when he stated that MMDCEs often arranged with district engineers to inflate the estimated costs of projects in their respective districts (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2005). As he further points out: “When the contract is approved and the contractor is to collect the money, the percentage added will be deducted” (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2005). The importance of this example lies in the fact that Baffour-Awuah was a former MCE of Sunyani in the same region and must have been absolutely sure of his facts, more so when his main audience was a combination of DCEs and heads of department, including the district engineers, who are at the center of the award of contracts in the districts.

It is interesting to point out that a new dimension of malfeasance in the award of contracts that has engulfed the MMDAs in recent times, is an alleged collusion of MMDCEs and their respective MPs in the formation of individual phony construction companies with their front men/women to which they award overwhelming numbers of contracts in their respective districts. In a series of interviews that I conducted in some districts in Ghana, it was abundantly clear that this practice has become a national problem. ¹² In interviews in three regions (Eastern, Greater Accra, and Volta Regions), a combination of MMDCEs and MPs allegedly awarded their phony companies about 85% of contracts during the period between 2008 and 2013. ¹² In two particular districts in one region, the DCEs and their MPs together awarded their alleged phony companies a total of 24 out of 27 contracts between 2008 and 2013. ¹²

Apart from the instances described above, there are other forms of alleged cases of massive corruption associated with the functioning of the MMDAs. The annual reports of the Auditor-General ¹³ on the financial administration of the MMDAs in Ghana are full of instances of financial malpractice and corruption, such as the payments of huge sums of monies to companies for works not completed, misuse of imprest accounts, payments without records, lack of cash control mechanisms, poor procurement and purchasing practices, embezzlements, violations of financial regulations, and misappropriation and misapplication of earmarked funds for development, among many others. For instance, according to the Auditor-General’s report on the disbursement of the District Assemblies’ Common Fund (DACF) ¹⁴ and other statutory funds in the 2011 financial year, it was shown that 170 out of 216 MMDAs nationwide misappropriated a colossal GHC 44 million (Ghanaweb.com, 2013c; Peacefmonline.com, 2014b). In the Greater Accra region for instance, Accra metropolitan assembly, Ledzekuku/Krowor municipal assembly, Adentan municipal assembly, Ga East municipal assembly, and Dangme West district assembly were detected to have disbursed a total of GHC 587,139 with no proper documents covering the disbursements. In the Ashanti Region, the Kumasi metropolitan assembly, Adansi North municipal assembly, Asante Akim North municipal assembly, and Bosomtwe district assembly, together with seven others, disbursed from the DACF a total of GHC 1,371,446.26 without relevant documentation on their respective expenditures (Ghanaweb.com, 2013c). In fact, the financial situation with regard to the disbursement of the DACF and other statutory funds in the remaining eight administrative regions in Ghana reflects the same sordid situation of massive corruption. The situation of corruption in the MMDAs has become so serious, forcing the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament to lament that: “…the assemblies continue to violate rules, procedures and legal requirements in the administration of funds” (Ghanaweb.com, 2014f).

The issue of massive corruption in the MMDAs does not surprise any observer of the political scene in Ghana. This is because since the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1992, MMDCEs have allegedly been unofficially put in charge of raising funds for party work at district levels. According to information provided by some former and current members of some MMDAs, together with that provided by some contractors and ordinary citizens, one could not get any contracts in the districts without having to pay various sums of money “under the table” (euphemism for bribery) to either the local ruling party chairman or the MMDCE as contributions to the running of the governing party. ¹² In fact, it is public knowledge in Ghana that MMDCEs have always been instructed by their national party leaderships to take 10% of contract sums from contractors for party work in their districts. ¹⁵

It is in this role of a fundraiser for their respective political parties that the MMDCEs are also expected to provide for the welfare of the “foot soldiers” ¹⁶ of their political parties since their refusal or inability to do so could lead to their removal from office. For instance, it was reported that one of the reasons why Kwesi Biney, the former DCE of Ahanta West in the western region resigned from his position was because of: “…the complaints and agitation from the party foot soldiers in the area to the extent that the DCE did not care about their welfare by not providing jobs for them” (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2006). As the paper further notes: “Insiders believe this might have led to the regional executives of the party playing a role in the forced resignation of the DCE” (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2006). Thus it is in the process of performing this role of catering for the welfare of party activists that the MMDCEs get further mired in corruption since they have to adopt any means, including the collection of bribes from contractors, to raise such funds. In a sense, therefore, efforts by a governing party to clandestinely raise funds toward financing its activities indirectly encourages MMDCEs to deepen their own degrees of involvement in corruption for personal gain, with sore consequences for their respective districts in particular and the country at large.

As Olken and Pande (2012: 16) rightly point out, corruption sometimes results in efficiency impacts on the provision of goods and services by government in various ways. First, it leads to an increase in the cost of goods and services. In fact, projects that are initially cost effective have their costs increased by having to absorb the costs of corruption, thereby leading to the projects being abandoned. Second, corruption could sometimes create additional efficiency costs as a result of distortions. This second situation occurs because corrupt officials, fearing they may be detected when they steal cash directly, prefer going through a variety of more convoluted procedures to obtain their rents. It must be pointed out that, in certain instances, some of these convoluted procedures and processes may induce inefficiencies which could be even larger than the cost of the corruption itself.

It is clear from the ongoing discussion that corruption in the MMDAs in Ghana has become pervasive. It must be noted that this corruption is largely promoted by the fact that Ghana is a patrimonial society where informal relations, family connections, favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism are very pronounced in both private and public life. Thus it could be said that the patrimonial character of the state provides a conducive breeding environment for corruption. In a sense, therefore, corruption largely occurs in societies with limited self-discipline. And it is within this context that one sees signs of petty and massive corruption in all sectors of society, especially in the public sector, with those higher up in the public sector being the greatest beneficiaries. In fact, it could be said that all these manifestations of corruption are largely due to a weak governance system that has resulted in bad government policies, the weakening of enforcement mechanisms like the police, the judiciary, and other law-enforcement state agencies, and an absence of accountability, probity, and transparency.

Findings and conclusion

In this article I have argued that corruption has become an endemic and destructive feature in MMDAs in Ghana. I have cited examples of rabid corruption from some MMDAs to emphasize the point that this problem has become entrenched in MMDAs nationwide. On the basis of the discussion, I wish to suggest certain measures that could be put in place so that these developments, which have become a drag on the efficient functioning of the MMDAs, are reduced to their barest minimum in order to ensure that MMDAs perform to achieve the objectives of the decentralization policy.

First, the problem of corruption could be dealt with by ensuring that the guidelines for the award of contracts are effectively enforced. That is, it must be made mandatory that all contracts in the districts are awarded only by the district tender boards and that under no circumstance should MMDCEs sidestep this statutory requirement. Moreover, the processes involved in the award of contracts could be further strengthened through the enactment of legislation that would ensure that all contracts are put out to open tender. The results should then be openly declared at the sittings of the MMDAs to ensure transparency in local governance, thereby leaving less scope for corruption and making it easy to detect and punish dishonest behavior on the part of officials. This means that the possibility that the MMDCEs could inflate contract sums, which has sometimes been at the center of complaints and controversies, will be greatly minimized if not entirely eradicated.

Second, there must be put in place a system that ensures the systemic collection, analysis, regular availability of information, and a constant review of guidelines and structures in the system, so as to ensure the verification of compliance with policy objectives and also eliminate or plug loopholes that officials exploit for personal gain. The central idea here is that by allowing information about governmental actions to become public, citizens are better placed to monitor government officials and agencies to ensure accountability. This scheme, if put in place, would encourage local participation in the political process and also ensure that the central government will be able to easily monitor and supervise how funds released by it are disbursed by the local authorities.

Third, the practice of central governments/governing political parties requesting MMDCEs to raise funds for party work must be abolished. This currently arises because the MMDCEs have no independent means of raising funds other than by exploiting their official positions, by colluding with the contractors to exploit loopholes in the system in order to enrich themselves. This situation has therefore created a “self-inflicted wound” with the government at the center.

Fourth, it has been suggested that the corruption of MMDCEs is largely due to the fact that they do not have any fixed tenure and therefore could be dismissed at any time either by the President or their respective MMDAs. They therefore tend to become corrupt to ensure their financial survival should they lose their position. In order to assure the MMDCEs of a security of tenure, laws must be put in place to ensure that those who are dismissed before the end of their tenure receive some pension, unless the reasons for their dismissal is too serious to warrant any pension.

Fifth, in certain instances corruption could be dealt with, to a very high degree, by effectively tying incentives to performance either through direct awards of cash or through promotion schemes, among others. However, as has been common practice in Ghana, even in these situations corruption has persisted giving credence to the view of the Founder of the International Christian Gospel Church, Mensah Otabil, that:

A whole nation’s destiny is mortgaged on the greed of one person (emphasis mine) who decides a contract of no significant value be awarded because it will line his pocket with something for himself so 20 million perish and one man has something (Ghanaweb.com, 2014g).

Sixth, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, which is the supervisory ministry of the MMDAs, must be well-resourced to enable it to exercise an effective monitoring of the activities of the MMDAs and also to ensure that any officials found to have misused, misapplied, or failed to exercise adequate discretion and proper accounting are prosecuted in the law courts. In fact, commonsense teaches us that an increase in monitoring would logically lead to a reduction in corruption. However, in practice, this has not been the case since people who are given the responsibility of monitoring and enforcing punishments may themselves be corruptible. Hence increasing monitoring could simply result in the transfer of corruption from low-level officials to auditors. It must be pointed out that auditors may not necessarily find enough evidence to call for punishment more so when these auditors themselves could connive with the corrupt officials to exact their share of the loot (as is widely known in Ghana). In spite of this, however, governments have continuously failed to heed public calls for the prosecution of several MMDCEs and other officials of the MMDAs who were accused in the past of shady dealings while in office. The failure to prosecute them is largely due to the fact that some MMDCEs had patrons higher up in the government and/or party hierarchy to protect them. In fact, it is only through the adoption of policies that demand stringent accountability and fearlessly promote the prosecution of corrupt officials across the board, that corruption in the MMDAs could be reduced to the barest minimum, if not entirely eliminated. The need for the prosecution of offending officers is shared by a ranking member of the PAC of parliament, Alhaji Ibrahim Dey Abubakari, when he points out that: “We’ve realized that preaching alone does not solve the problem and it is our resolve to push for punishment against recalcitrant officers of the assemblies” (Ghanaweb.com, 2014f).

In summary, the issues of rabid corruption and hostage-taking have become serious problems that are undermining the efficient functioning of the MMDAs in Ghana. The solution to the situation, as already noted, largely lies in the hands of a determined political leadership, and the vigilance and participation of an active civil society in the functioning of the MMDA system in Ghana. In fact, evidence adduced in the discussion has vindicated not only the citation in the epigraph but also appropriately captures the sorry state of financial administration in the functioning of the district assemblies in Ghana.