Post-Gaddafi Libya and the African Union: Challenges and the Road to Sustainable Peace

Introduction

The overthrow of despotic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt by revolutionary demonstrations dubbed the Arab Spring in 2011 stimulated Libyans as well to demonstrate against the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s rule. The demonstrations, which started in Benghazi, led to the uprising that deteriorated into a civil war. The Libyan crisis attracted the intervention of the West and the United States under the banner of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1973 which legalised a ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya against Gaddafi’s force. To the chagrin of the majority of the African Union (AU) members, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) aided the National Transitional Council (NTC) in the overthrow and murder of Gaddafi under the guise of protecting civilians. Instead of attaining the anticipated lasting peace, Libya was drawn into a contested civil war. The conflict led to: refugee crisis, the spread of combative Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), radical Islamist and terrorist groups both within Libya and beyond, and an arsenal of weapons that are used to destabilise the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and beyond. The NTC as the recognised formal government of Libya totally failed to manage a successful transition because all its post-Gaddafi elections did not yield sustainable peace and elected officials were susceptible to militia threats, abductions and assassinations (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: x). Undoubtedly, the AU and African states were denied the chance to take a leading role in implementing their proposed road map of resolving the Libyan conflict and some of its members instead cooperated with the UN and the Arab League. This article thus examines the involvement of the AU and its member states using the lens of the African-centred solutions in peace and security’s three pillars namely, ownership, commitment and shared values. The article further asserts that the AU’s road map for Libya, which advocated a negotiated settlement between the contending parties, had and seemingly has bright chances of ending the civil war in Libya due to its engagement thrust which respects pillars of ownership, commitment and shared values in the outcome of the peace talks. It is therefore my conviction that the AU and states should be given the chance to hatch strategies and tactics of amicably ending the Libyan civil war. The UN, United States and allies as international actors should be indirectly involved due to their active role and quest to curb global terrorism. This means that, they should be encouraged to admit that as external actors, they have limited ability to directly influence events in that country and should therefore give the AU and its member states a chance. Even the AU and its member states must take part in ending the Libyan civil war, cognisant of the fact that the ultimate and foremost determinant of Libya’s future is its government and people. Overall, regime change in Libya failed because, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, no other regime replaced the previous one but ‘failed states’ emerged. Consequently, security became ‘largely non-existent, and no strong single armed force emerged to constitute itself as a ‘state’ with the monopoly of legitimate violence’ (Glazebrook, 2014). Instead it opened another operating ground for the spreading ISIS group where in February 2015 it executed 21 Egyptian Christian citizens (CNN Staff, 2015).

Indeed, the AU’s road map for Libya, which advocated a negotiated settlement between Gaddafi and the rebels, would have brought a promising solution to the Libyan crisis unlike the NATO-led intervention which engulfed the country into a deeply contested civil war. A sense of ownership, commitment and shared values could have been realised on the part of the Libyan people regarding their country’s future. Since Libya is war-torn the AU and its member states should be accorded the platform to develop plans to halt the Libyan crisis amicably by engaging the rival parties.

The collapse of governance in Libya

Libya experienced a sudden collapse of its security sector and this was coupled with the fact that it had no defined governance institutions. The Gaddafi regime depended on the security sector for its survival thus the collapse of the security architecture marked its end. The defeat of the regime meant the end of a repressive system and its structures which had in the past monopolised violence against diverse ethnic groups in the country. In contrast, the governments which emerged in Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Spring were stable because they had governance institutions that remained intact and functional, including the security sector systems. As a result, the structures in Tunisia and Egypt were able to embark on a gradual political stabilisation process under representative government and constitutional rule and their security sectors continued to benefit from their country’s resources unlike in Libya.

Distinct from Tunisia and Egypt, where the security forces survived the revolutions and continued to function after the collapse of Ben Ali and Mubarak, Libya’s security sector (armed forces, police and revolutionary committees) crumbled and the essential establishments of the state malfunctioned. The Libyan opposition declared its victory on 23 October 2011. The proclamation of independence marked the end of the Gaddafi state strategy whose main components (the legislative people’s conferences and executive people’s committees) were shaped since 1977 (Hanspeter, 2014). The demise of the Gaddafi regime and its state domination of the strategy of violence paved way for competition between the fundamental countrywide forces controlled by the NTC and the non-state-revolutionary brigades (which bore the brunt of the military operations against Gaddafi’s forces) from March 2011 to August 2012 (Hanspeter, 2014). Libyans had a limited sense of national identity and had no familiarity with democracy. The collapse of Gaddafi opened many fissures of disunity and these could not be stopped by a transitional government that took over leadership without a monopoly on the use of violence. To build a functional state, Libya needs to prevail over the four decade old Gaddafi-led authoritarian legacy which prevented the development of authentic national institutions.

Added to this, developments in Libya took a different course as compared to those of her neighbouring states because Gaddafi’s forces attempted to crush the uprising with severe violence. Disgruntled and stunned by the reactions of the special units and mercenary forces, the Libyan population supported the rebels (Wolfram, 2011: 1). The state and security apparatus rapidly disintegrated culminating in a civil war. Almost the whole army defected and the rebel forces became strong defending the north east and north western part of the country as liberated areas. Accordingly, when Gaddafi was captured and killed, Libya had no security sector institutions. In fact, insecurity increased in the country. This was revealed by the Libya Herald which quoted one Tripoli resident who noted that, ‘We do not feel the taste of happiness, security and stability, nor did we have any benefit from the government. People are now feeling insecure and live in fear because of killings that are being witnessed all over Libya’ (Scott, 2013).

Furthermore, the institutions of the security sector were exceptionally weak or non-existent organizationally. The Ministry of Interior was feeble to begin with and weakened further after the war and the Ministry of Defense was dis-established by Gaddafi a couple of decades ago. The prewar military staff was also exceedingly weak. Fearing possible coup threats, Gaddafi frequently shook up the ranks, transferred ‘officers around arbitrarily, and doled out posts by patronage requirements rather than merit’ (Chivvis and Martini, 2014). A limited number of new officers were added following the 1993 coup attempt and this badly bloated the upper ranks. Military personnel were not allowed to rise above Gaddafi’s own rank of colonel. Subsequently, the military had no capacity for decision making, strategic scrutiny or planning – elements which are needed for successful security sector reform. Defeated in battle and neglected under Gaddafi, Libya had a weak force. On the whole, Libya had a poorly structured and weak military, air force and navy and the NATO strikes crippled the Libyan security systems.

Furthermore, the government’s ruling Justice and Construction party controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood movement faced tough resistance from the opposition. Afraid of an Egyptian-style situation, the president of congress, Nuri Abu Sahmain, summoned the militias allied to the Brotherhood to the capital (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Worse still, armed militia groups representing diverse interests at some point besieged the Libyan Foreign Ministry and the Justice Ministry pushing through the Political Isolation Law which forbade the Gaddafi-era officials from taking part in the new government. This deepened divisions between those in power and the excluded groups. In the absence of the rule of law, the militia groups established clandestine detention centres which were not accountable to anybody.

The revolutionary brigades made up of the renegades from the armed forces and beleaguered volunteers positioned themselves unexpectedly after February 2011 (Hanspeter, 2014). They established themselves on the basis of local allegiance, regional origin and/or their ideological beliefs. When the war spread to western Libya, the brigades were compelled to retreat into unfamiliar areas. When victory was proclaimed against Gaddafi the brigades or militias did not return to their homes. Instead the militias took charge of vital infrastructure and facilities largely in Tripolitania, including airports, road crossings and central government buildings (Scott, 2013). In addition, the militias rejected a non-Islamic state thus posing a great threat to the call for demobilisation and integration into the national security forces. More so, the demarcation between these brigades’ activities and those of terrorists was vague and the precise scope of their relationship with the al-Qaida network was indistinct. The post-Gaddafi political administration up to the present was unable to overcome the different interests of the diverse armed and unarmed actors and this made it difficult to establish a countrywide compromise policy. More so, the historical dissections in Libya deepened since the overthrow of Gaddafi and prevented the creation of a consensus among the Libyans on how the country should be governed.

Following Gaddafi’s fall, not many strategists envisaged that Libya, with its troubled history, would materialise as a successful state. The three historical Libyan provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan have different ethnic structures and existed as a nation state between Tunisia and Egypt as a result of a number of factors. These factors embody the rigid and repressive institutions, the Gaddafi state ideology and state subjugation of: regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. Indeed, the end of the Gaddafi regime provided a platform for the advancement of the once autocratically-suppressed cultural divergences leading to the fragmentation of the country (Wolfram, 2011).

In reality, it was the split between east and west which played a pivotal role in the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. Since 2012, a federal system of government manifested itself as provinces including Cyrenaica demanded more autonomy and a bigger share in the state’s resources. The proclamation of self-government of Cyrenaica in June 2013 by tribal representatives and the establishment of the Cyrenaican defence forces presented the central administration in Tripoli with a serious problem. Secondly, an ethnic problem emerged where the Berbers in western Libya in the Jabal Nafusa and the Tabu ethnic group from southern Libya demanded more rights. The Berbers (the majority of whom are Ibadis and not Sunnis like the majority of Libyans) called for the recognition of their language as an official language and demanded constitutional protection. They threatened war since 2013 if their demands were not met. Moreover, radical Islamist groups and the conservative Islamic ones rejected the rigidity of the Islamic society project and the demand of Islamists to introduce the Islamic penal law. Therefore, the nation building process that was initiated when Libya gained independence in December 1951 was not completed. Subsequently, the antagonistic forces in Libya were kept in check for over 60 years by the Sanusi monarchy and the Gaddafi administration, but as soon as an opportunity presented itself different ethnic groups publicised their demands leading to a political crisis.

Over the years, the previous regimes including the one that was led by Gaddafi did not groom leaders nor create favourable conditions for leadership mentoring. For 42 years, public and private sector management jobs were parcelled out to Gaddafi family members and friends. Linked to this, the Minister for Youth, Fatih Turbel, said, ‘the Internal Security establishment was large and effective. Its main responsibility was to identify potential stars and then to stop them. Leadership in any sector: business, community, sports, arts, was systematically stamped out’ (Mercy Corps and The Governance Network™ (TGN), 2011: 10). Like the public and private sectors, the civil society had no chance during the four decades of oppression to spawn leaders. Subsequently, there was no profound leadership in the public sector. For example, in the police there is no evidence that can be used to explain how appointments and promotions in government were carried out. It appears that individuals were appointed on the basis of their loyalty to the regime.

More significantly, the youths played a prominent role in the overthrow of Gaddafi and became increasingly vocal about the future of their country and often differed with the views of NTC leadership. After the revolution, the youths felt that it was their chance to forestall the enhancement of individuals who committed crimes under the Gaddafi regime. The youths argued that the old system wants to replace itself. They discredited the NTC’s implicit view that the vast resources under their control empowered them to accomplish the wishes and aspirations of the Libyan citizens. The youths instead viewed this tactic as similar to approaches that were used by Gaddafi who ignored their underlying interests. On the other hand, the older generation hold the conviction that without their support the revolution could have been doomed to failure (Mercy Corps and The Governance Network™ (TGN), 2011: 11). The generational divisions curtailed unity among the Libyan people towards nation rebuilding and peace building.

One of the major challenges widely popularised was that Gaddafi’s influence is deeply entrenched in the minds of Libyans. In this light one interviewee said, ‘It is easy to get rid of a Gaddafi in the bunker in Tripoli but it will take quite an effort to get him out of the heads of Libyans’ (Mercy Corps and The Governance Network™ (TGN), 2011: 11). The influence was evident in the: ‘divide and conquer amongst the various sections of Libyan society, corruption, invasive intelligence, brutalization of those in disagreement, disrespect, loyalty over competence, irrationality, authoritarianism, buying allegiance and contrition’ (Mercy Corps and The Governance Network™ (TGN), 2011: 11). By and large, there was a belief that all problems will be history when Gaddafi is removed from power, but this was not the case and a lot of frustrations crept in when promises were not fulfilled.

The Gaddafi regime was corrupt and lacked transparency in the day to day running of the country. After the revolution, corruption was viewed as a universal problem. In response, all of the interim leaders believed that the solution to this problem was easy and said: ‘We will hire honest people’. Practically nothing significant happened to stem the tide of corruption thus Libya needs urgent assistance in this regard.

In addition, during the Gaddafi era citizens did not have greater participation in planning their country’s future. The advent of independence from the dictatorial system witnessed a call for greater participation in the planning of the country’s future by Libyan citizens. There was fear among the youths and civil society that NTC leaders were not consulting, thus displaying signs of old regime tactics. To augment their position they cited the drafting of the transitional constitution by a committee of academics set up by NTC leaders without including a wider population in the process as testimony of lack of citizen participation. They added that, during an open forum meeting tabled to discuss the constitution, participants were not allowed to voice their opinions where they either disagreed or sought clarification, but instead they were castigated as ‘stooges of the former Gaddafi Revolutionary Committee’ (Mercy Corps and The Governance Network™ (TGN), 2011: 12). This is true especially given the absence of inclusivity, dialogue or debate for the NTC driven constitution making process which was just presented to the Libyan citizens. Furthermore, the Libyans were not in agreement on the aspect of external assistance given the fact that some Libyans had been killed or injured as a result of external help. There was distrust in some of the external driven projects and funding especially from those who were opposed to the regime change agenda.

The African Union’s approach to the Libyan crisis

The African Union (AU) was criticised for not doing enough to curtail the escalation of the conflict in Libya. This is true given the fact that when the anti-Gaddafi demonstrations broke out in February 2011, the AU only made a solidarity expression that it was in support of ‘legitimate aspirations for democracy’, condemned violence and the violation of international humanitarian law by the Libyan state machinery that harmed civilians (Institute for Security Studies, 2011: 3). There was nothing concrete and politically powerful that emanated from the AU (Eriksson and Zetterlund, 2013: 38). Added to this, there was ambiguity regarding the AU’s position which emanated from the fact that it was not comprehensible whether it was still recognising the serving regime or fully supported the Libyan citizens’ democratic aspirations soon after condemning the abuse of human rights and the infringement of the international humanitarian law. Furthermore, it is documented that the AU was among other groupings that condemned Gaddafi’s suppression of protesters and initially called for international action against his government but went on to disagree on the manner in which the external intervention was executed. As a result, the AU together with the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) among other regional groupings extensively contributed to the establishment of a ‘no-fly zone’ to create a safe haven for civilians against Gaddafi’s forces under Resolution 1973 (Zifcak, 2012: 4–6) which was later on abused by NATO leading to regime change and Gaddafi’s death.

Added to the above, all the three African countries in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were among the 10 countries that supported and authorised the use of force in Libya namely, South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States (Adams, 2012: 7; Pommier, 2011: 1064). This shows beyond doubt that the AU and its member states contributed to the ratification of Resolution 1973 but later disagreed with implementation of the resolution with very little or no influence in reversing or halting it. In essence, the AU and some of its member states, particularly South Africa, supported the Arab League and the international community disregarding mediation in favour of military intervention.

In reality, Resolution 1973 did not approve regime change but the intervening forces only stretched it to its limits whereby they pursued and fulfilled their own hidden agenda of regime change (Payandeh, 2012: 387; Thakur, 2012: 4). In this regard, Khalifa Isaac (2012: 122) attempts to downplay the regime change agenda by NATO arguing that those who raise this criticism ignore the fact that the Libyan people demanded regime change, as revealed by the NTC’s refusal to accept the AU’s road map for Libya. The AU’s road map advocated a negotiated settlement between Gaddafi and the rebels (Adams, 2012: 9). However, whilst Khalifa Isaac’s argument has some credibility on the basis that similar uprisings had successfully toppled long-serving dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt, it fails to grasp the fact that in these two countries, foreign hands were indiscernible, let alone military intervention to effect regime change. More so, the swift recognition of the NTC out of the country before it had legitimacy in Libya alone signals foreign influence behind the NTC’s actions and the killing of the Libyan leader and his close associates. This was not the case in Tunisia and Egypt. What disturbs one’s mind is that Syria’s Bashar al-Asad had been fighting anti-regime protesters since 2011 but with no brisk international community response and forceful intervention as they did in oil-rich Libya, pointing to ulterior motives in the intervention veiled under the pretext of the need to protect civilians (Khalifa Isaac, 2012: 122).

Furthermore, Seamus Mine cited by Ramesh Thakur (2012: 3) was convinced that the Arab Spring in Libya was hijacked by western powers and he noted that, ‘If stopping the killing had been the real aim, NATO states would have backed a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, rather than repeatedly vetoing both’. In the same vein, O’Connell (2011: 15–16) asserts that the use of military force in Libya was not a last resort strategy because other alternative peaceful measures which include sanctions and negotiations among others were not given the chance before engaging force. Moreover, international law demands that military interveners should ensure that their actions do more good than harm instead of only being a last resort. In the Libyan case, tens of thousands of civilians were killed during the intervention and this further raises the question of whether the intervention was truly motivated by the need to protect civilians. In this regard, Kuperman (2013) notes that NATO’s intervention was humanitarian-inspired but it overthrew the Gaddafi regime and, instead of protecting civilians, it endangered the security of the Libyans. This is convincing because NATO’s intervention lengthened the duration of the conflict, increased the toll on human lives, worsened human rights abuses and humanitarian suffering, created room for Islamic radicalism and weapons proliferation in Libya and outside into neighbouring states. Amid these disturbances bedevilling Libya, the AU and its member states only opposed NATO actions in the country in word and not in deed.

It appears that the AU’s passive response to the Arab Spring in Libya, over which it was sidelined by the Arab League and NATO, was due to its lack of capacity and capability for engaging in democratic reforms. According to Eriksson and Zetterlund (2013: 39–40) one critical factor is the aspect of the AU’s organisational power relations whereby Libya, besides Egypt and Algeria, was the financial backbone of the AU, contributing 15 percent of the AU’s general budget until the time of the uprisings. This points to the fact that supporting the opposition in Libya was seen as costly to the organisation since it held a strong sway in it. It further explains why the AU delayed recognising the rebels because it wanted to be certain about the victorious side. The AU only recognised the NTC on 20 September 2011 after its capture of Tripoli (Thakur, 2012: 4). Moreover, the principle of sovereignty which dominates the AU also incapacitated it to act without violating this essentially upheld standard, hence several countries that faced political deterioration escalated unchecked. The AU’s political instruments oriented to handle unconstitutional changes of government do not include changes led by the people as was the case in the Arab Spring. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) spells out the unconstitutional changes of government. The AU lacked ‘hard power’ and as a result it was sidelined by NATO and the Arab League over Libya. If the AU had military stamina and the financial capability to sustain its deployment otherwise it could have played a vital and active role (Eriksson and Zetterlund, 2013: 39–40). According to Williams (2011: 5) there is questionable commitment on the part of many AU member states to the idea of humanitarian intervention and hitherto no military action against a member state has been executed, even in cases where crimes against humanity were committed – including in Libya where the UNSC even suspected that such crimes occurred. Three reasons explain the AU’s unwillingness to act, namely the host state’s strength, the sanctity of the principles of non-interference and anti-imperialism within post-colonial African states and the lack of practical military capacity for humanitarian intervention. As a result, the AU can even struggle to quickly gather the necessary military capabilities, only with exceptions against the smallest and weakest AU member states. This was reinforced beyond doubt by the AU’s unwillingness to endorse the UNSC intervention to protect civilians in Libya in 2011.

It is my assertion that the AU’s road map for Libya, that was denied by the NTC, had the chance and capability of leaving the Libyan crisis better positioned in line with the three pillars of the African-centred solutions namely, ownership, commitment and shared values. This is convincing because on 10 April 2011 following the commencement of NATO airstrikes, AU delegates made up of the presidents of South Africa, Uganda, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali and Mauritania claimed to have managed to secure Gaddafi’s support for a ‘road map’ aimed at ending the conflict. The road map was preoccupied by the need for an immediate ceasefire and negotiations on political reforms (Adams, 2012: 9). Additionally, Gaddafi, through his son Saif al-Islam, is alleged to have demonstrated his willingness in mid-June 2011 to enter into a power sharing deal with the NTC but the USA and western powers showed unwillingness to urge the NTC to do so. The aim of the peace deal was to stop the further bombing and destruction of Libya, but the refusal further exposed the regime change agenda of the US and her western allies (Chigozie et al., 2013).

Furthermore, Adams (2012: 9) notes that the AU membership’s open support for Gaddafi, revealed by some of the AU delegates (South African, Ugandan and Mauritius presidents) that called for peace talks between him and the NTC, compelled the latter to reject the call demanding the removal of Gaddafi and his family as a precursor to the peace talks. The NTC failed to respect the AU’s call for peace because the AU delegation publicly referred to Gaddafi as ‘Brother Leader’ and that most mercenaries recruited by Gaddafi were supposedly from some AU member states. The AU’s desire for a negotiated settlement in Libya also became increasingly awkward as the conflict degenerated into a total civil war amid the AU’s unclear position regarding the opposition forces. It is apparent that the AU’s position on Libya was in direct contrast to the internationally held consensus (Eriksson and Zetterlund, 2013: 42).

The regime change strategy was not strictly designed to attain the protection of civilians; if this was the goal it could have been achieved through ceasefire and political dialogue (Payandeh, 2012: 389). Regime change was viewed as the only prerequisite to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian-populated areas in Libya since dialogue and other peaceful strategies to settle the conflict were not given a chance. This stance among the other factors emboldened the opposition forces to ignore the AU’s calls for a negotiated settlement. The AU’s belated recognition of and support for the opposition and vigorous call for resort to nonviolence, which it had not done in Tunisia and Egypt, was high likely designed to keep Gaddafi in power. This was the case in many African countries including Zimbabwe and Kenya where the continental grouping did not act decisively on dictators, allowing them to cling on to power through negotiated settlements leading to Governments of National Unity (GNU) which did not resolve conflicts but only transformed them in the short term. By and large, the GNUs in Africa have become a convenient route for dictators to thwart the people’s democratic will while prolonging their stay in power (Moghalu, n. d.: 35; Muguti et al., 2012: 149–158). Besides the weaknesses identified in the GNUs, it might seem plausible to say that the negotiated settlement initiative of the AU, though not the best, was supposed to be welcome. It could have produced better results as compared to the collapsed state that Libya culminated in and by this she resembles Iraq and Afghanistan due to the NATO-led intervention (Glazebrook, 2014). More importantly, this was the only possible way that African centred solutions in peace and security’s pillars of ownership, commitment and shared values amongst the Libyans were to find their real place. If one judges with the level of instability which emerged and affected Libya, one would be correct to conclude that the engagement strategy must have been used to de-escalate or end the conflict.

Why intervention is important in Libya

Regrettably, developments in post-Gaddafi Libya have seen the country decline into a failed state. Alluding to the same conclusion, one senior Libyan official in August 2014 noted that, ‘factors at the moment are conducive to a failed state’ (White, 2014). More so, chaos is difficult to contain in Libya as militant extremists and terrorists spread violence even beyond the country’s borders, which are practically non-existent (White, 2014). The situation was aggravated by the Libyan Supreme Court’s decision in early November 2014 which opposed the newly elected and relatively secular government. In fact, post-Gaddafi Libya never evolved beyond militia dominance after the militias’ refusal to disarm, leading to the explosion of violence in various cities and towns. Only Tripoli had shaky stability until mid-2014, dependent on the unstable balance of power between two powerful militia groups, namely: the Islamist militia (now ‘Libya Dawn’) from Misrata and the Secular Nationalist Militia from the Zintan mountain region south of Tripoli employed by Libya’s parliament, which at the time had a modest Islamist majority. The balance of power collapsed following the elections in June 2014 when the Libya Dawn secured victory over the Zintanis. The Libya Dawn seized Tripoli and forced the elected and internationally recognised House of Representatives (HOR) to flee eastwards to Tobruk (White, 2014). In this regard, Libya’s lack of experience in holding elections, even perfunctory ones, appears to have doomed its path towards a democratic solution (Foundation for the Future, 2011: 5).

In addition, the September 2012 terrorist attack on the US embassy in Benghazi confirmed the fears of many that the rise of anti-western factions, including Islamists, winning elections was the result of the USA and the West’s introduction of democratic reforms in countries in the MENA (Archick and Mix, 2013: 20). In fact, formerly suppressed Islamist organisations won elections both locally and nationally after regime change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Eriksson and Zetterlund, 2013: 13). Moreover, in April 2013 half of the French embassy was destroyed by a vehicle bomb in Tripoli pointing to high insecurity perpetrated by the radical Islamist groups which had no room to operate under Gaddafi (Kuperman, 2013). These attacks, among other terrorist and jihadist activities, further heightened security concerns in Libya since the country harbours Al Qaeda-affiliated groups. By overthrowing Gaddafi, the US and its allies failed to create a stable, secure and prosperous MENA region safeguarding their interests namely: ‘…countering terrorism, weapons proliferation, and transnational crime; curtailing Islamist extremism; ensuring a reliable flow of energy exports and commercial transit; and ensuring Israel’s security and advancing peace negotiations with the Palestinians’ (Archick and Mix, 2013: 24). In addition, ethnic and racial violence that did not occur in Gaddafi’s Libya became dominant, including reprisal killings and the expulsion of over 30,000 Tarwega residents (mostly blacks) by the victorious rebels on the basis that some were Gaddafi’s ‘mercenaries’ (Kuperman, 2013). Indeed, conflict continued in post-Gaddafi Libya with violence taking multiple forms which include but are not limited to: ‘…tribal disputes over territory and trading routes, to conflicts with alleged regime holdouts, to score settling, federalist manoeuvring, and jihadist efforts to generally destabilize the country’ (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 20–21). Lives were lost and many people were wounded in these various forms of violence, further jeopardising the lives of many. These insecurities were not heard of prior to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime or could have been prevented had Libya pursued the African Union (AU) road map for Libya.

In addition, various sectarian militia groups armed and empowered by the USA, France and the UK against Gaddafi refused to disarm and began terrorising their perceived and real opponents in the name of completing the revolution. Violent campaigns were waged against immigrants and black skinned Libyans, and in 2013 they were directed against the Sufi minority whose shrines were obliterated. Furthermore, they besieged several government ministries, demanded the removal of experienced government officials on the grounds that they worked and supported the former regime. This also led to the massacre of 47 protesters in Tripoli in 2013 and the subsequent kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan by the Libyan Shield, which then actively took part in a bitter war to unseat the newly elected government leading to the loss of thousands of lives. To this end, Dan Glazebrook (2014) concluded that NATO created conditions of a permanent civil war and not a new regime.

The combined rebellion, civil war and the NATO bombing campaign to defend civilians led to several thousands of deaths, many thousands injured, hundreds of thousands displaced persons, and enormous damage to infrastructure. Post-Gaddafi Libya lacked security and this threatened the rebuilding of a functioning socio-political, economic and administrative institution in the country. The primary cause of insecurity emanated from the failure to disarm and demobilise militia groups following the fall of Gaddafi.

The humanitarian crisis deepened due to violence and chaos in post-Gaddafi Libya. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) around two million people were affected by the recent conflict where more than 1000 died, 107,028 were internally displaced and over 150,000 fled abroad to seek sanctuary. Frequent power cuts and essential needs shortages affected those who remained in the country.

Oil production and export in Libya was negatively affected by relentless fighting and the competing centres of power after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. Oil production had recovered to almost pre-war levels soon after the civil war but the resurgence of violence and insecurity disrupted its production, scared off investors and foreign workers – all of whom are significant for economic stabilisation in a post conflict environment. In fact, the violent militias and gangs took over control of many oil production facilities forcing oil production – the nerve centre of the Libyan economy – to treacherously low levels. For example, the El-Sharara field worth 300,000 BPD was closed by the ‘Zintan forces who blocked the pipeline to its northern export terminal of Zawiya against the Libyan Dawn who wanted to take control of the fields. The situation was also aggravated by a security guard industrial action over unpaid wages which led to the closure of the Tobruk’s Hariga export terminal forcing exports down to only just 500,000 BPD’ (White, 2014). Moreover, groups from Cyrenaica, a province in the east, seized control of oil facilities there and threatened to establish an independent state within a state (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 38–40). In August 2013 militias in the east and west took control of the oil eastern port terminals including Es Sider, Ras Lanuf, Brega and Hariga. Overall, these actions brought oil production in post-war Libya down to 160,000 barrels per day at a cost of US$130m per day in lost revenue for the government (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 57).

Libya became the store for weapons that are used for terrorism and destabilisation activities, fuelling conflicts in over 14 countries in the Sahel region and beyond. The affected countries include: Somalia, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Niger, and all the countries affected by the US-driven regime change, notably Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, which descended into chaos. Despite Egyptian countermeasures to stop the Sinai-based Beit al-Maqdis, which swore loyalty to the Islamic State (IS), from getting weapons from Libya, it continues to receive them and constantly perpetrates violence unabated (White, 2014). Moreover, NATO’s intervention in Libya in support of the rebels has encouraged formerly peaceful protesters in Syria to resort to violence since mid-2011. They hoped to attract a similar intervention but instead the Syrian conflict escalated leading to increasing deaths (Kuperman, 2013). The residual violence in Tunisia is also purportedly stemming from the cross-border infiltration of weapons from Libya’s al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar al-Sharia (ASL). Jihadists in Mali are also using Libya as their replenishing base and safe haven and are also causing insecurity on the border of Niger (White, 2014). According to Kuperman (2013) Mali is the hardest hit due to regime change in Libya as instability became elusive, the human rights situation became grim and the displacement of civilians became massive. This was caused by rebellion in northern Mali, allegedly launched by former Gaddafi soldiers of the ethnic Malian-Tuareg origin who influenced the Malian army to overthrow their president. The rebellion was hijacked by local Islamist forces and al-Qaeda who jointly declared northern Mali an independent country after imposing sharia law. In addition, weak states in the region like Chad, Niger and Sudan were disturbed, including the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt, with far-reaching consequences on the region’s security and alliances (Lacher, 2012b: 47). The grave situation was permitted by the already porous Libyan borders which made infiltrations into the country easier.

Furthermore, post-Gaddafi Libya grappled with the previous regime’s patronage politics legacy, exacerbating regional rifts between the privileged and the underprivileged. In reality, Gaddafi’s former power and authority was not diffused to local centres of power which competed for superiority locally and nationally. The competition led to contestation over resources and political power instead of the drafting of a new constitution or control of state institutions (Darwisheh, 2014: 16). The death of Gaddafi, the NTC’s common enemy, led to the emergence of internal divisions along regional lines – Tripoli versus Benghazi and its composition, which included those formerly suppressed by Gaddafi and recent defectors, made it difficult for the two groups to work together (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 36–37 ). Rivalries based on tribal or local interests developed and the NTC failed to close the gap between the NTC and the revolutionaries. The NTC even lacked legitimacy in the domestic arena and faced resistance when it attempted to bring under its control the brigades, weapons and prisons controlled by cities and tribes. Consequently, popular resentment erupted against the NTC and other established local councils on the basis that they were ineffective, not transparent and accountable because they failed to solve urgent problems. Repeated clashes erupted in Tripoli as the NTC failed to establish control over the militia groups. The clashes were triggered by one militia group which attempted to arrest or disarm another and the labelling of others as being former Gaddafi loyalists (Lacher, 2012a: 13–14). The major various armed groups in Libya include but are not limited to: the Zintan Military Council, Misrata Brigades, Souk al Jouma and Sadun al-Suwayli Brigades, February 17 Brigade, Libyan Shield 1, Ansar al-Sharia (Benghazi), Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade, Ansar al-Sharia (Derna) and Libya Revolutionaries operations room (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 30–34). These groups pursued their political, ideological and criminal agendas using the power they wielded from their possession of weapons, control of territory and resources. Undoubtedly, what Libya experienced in the post-Gaddafi era could have been avoided if the AU road map (although not the best) had been vigorously pursued and implemented.

In spite of its current challenges, Libya still has many advantages when contrasted with other post-conflict nations and these augment the prospects that the country could be stabilised. If the country’s oil resources are properly managed the government can finance much of its post-conflict needs, especially if credit institutions give the country a breathing space for repayment of its external debt. This is achievable given its relatively small population and the country’s closeness to the European markets. More so, a lot of Libyans are by and large pro-European and American in their outlook, not withstanding that others distrust foreign influence.

The African Union Opportunities in Libya

The African Union (AU) should recollect that the former South African president Thabo Mbeki said Zimbabwe’s lasting solution to the protracted political crisis was supposed to come from Zimbabweans. This is similarly echoed by Richard Joseph (2013: 2) who noted that, ‘external forces cannot rebuild nations in the absence of domestic forces able to cohere to pursue such an objective’. The continental grouping should ponder whether military responses translate into African solutions, taking into consideration South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho in 1998 and 2014, Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia to fight Al Shabab, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda’s military intervention in the DR Congo. This should be done cognisant of the controversies which emerged from these operations, in particular on the extent to which they were designed to protect civilians other than state-centric and individualistic interests. It is imperative for the continental organ to approach the Libyan challenges with the debates generated by the interventions which were carried out in the above mentioned countries among others.

It is my conviction that the African-centred solutions in peace and security can work in Libya if a number of challenges, some within the AU itself, highlighted above are addressed. Firstly, the Constitutive Act (which spells out several guiding principles regarding how the AU should respond to violations by its member states of their obligations on human rights, democratic principles and governance, the sanctity of human life and unconstitutional changes of government), considered the most important for dealing with unconstitutional changes of government, needs to be revised to include policies on how to respond to the new phenomenon of popularly driven changes of government. Moreover, the AU’s motives when intervening in popularly driven changes of government should be uniform beyond doubt in its defence of democracy and respect for human rights (Eriksson and Zetterlund, 2013: 44). More so, it is this article’s conviction that the AU should not separate popularly driven changes of government from other unconstitutional changes of government, although this has a number of challenges. The AU should be knowledgeable of the situation existing in a country whether it is threatening the propagation of democracy and the systems and structures for encouraging it, including the rule of law, popular participation, social order and electoral processes so that it could be capacitated to act accordingly.

For the AU to play a meaningful role in Libya and other countries it needs to operate beyond pronouncing denunciation statements without concrete backing for the affected country. The AU whilst seized with the questions of how, when and who to target when intervening in popularly driven changes of government still needs to do so, delineating the regulations and mandates required to be functional together with an all-inclusive definition of an unconstitutional alteration of government. It is critical to empower the AU to apply the nonviolent measures like targeted sanctions against the incumbent regime in support of popular demands for the regime to reform (Eriksson and Zetterlund, 2013: 45–46). Arguably, this could have been initiated in Libya with some good effect. However, given the AU’s reluctance to recognise the opposition forces advocating democracy, other challenges followed in the form of the sanctity of state sovereignty which mainly derives from the legitimacy problems of many AU member states. Member states thus become reluctant to pressure each other to accept opposition demands for democracy. Humanely and practically the AU should be encouraged to place its citizens’ rights before those of their governments. The AU has the instruments to penalise both those who usurp power through coups or those democratically appointed leaders that illegally cling to power. These can be subjected to the wrath of sanctions and isolation.

In post-Gaddafi Libya the AU still has a role to play despite its failure to do so when the conflict started. The AU’s envisioned Peace and Security Architecture can be engaged to halt the political crises in Libya. However, the AU has an uphill task given that it courted some risk for itself by refusing to recognise the Libyan rebels tipped to establish a new regime that may show little respect on the African heritage and identity compared to its Arab one (Thakur, 2012: 4). The AU and its member states should work towards ensuring that the Libyans take the leading role in creating the road to sustainable peace in the country. Such an approach is plausible because it ensures that the citizens of that country assume ownership of the process, commitment and responsibility for the outcome – tenets which the AU upholds. The AU, like the international community, should be motivated to accept and live by the political choices made by the warring factions and their followers in Libya in a drive towards sustainable peace, democracy and development to the country. Moreover, it is critical to establish a representative government which considers the different ethnic groups and includes all relevant societal actors and groups in the process to democratise the country, or for that matter to stabilise it.

Road to sustainable peace in Libya

To attain a lasting solution to the Libyan crisis multi-stakeholder solutions are vital. These are composed of the African Union (AU) peace talks aimed at achieving compromises and power-sharing accommodation, reconstruction and national reconciliation based on the politics of concessions and continuing regional and international support.

First and foremost, multi-stakeholders should help in the rebuilding of Libya’s economy and security situation so that all the other reforms and challenges may be fully addressed. This is critical given Libya’s wealth resources of petroleum, which are the engine to stabilise her domestic situation and overcome the intensifying internal rifts and disorder. In fact, Libya’s new leaders should be encouraged to find better ways to manage the country’s oil resources and its economy. It is critical to adequately diversify the country’s economy because its oil sector cannot create enough jobs for the many unemployed and underemployed youths (Barah, 2012). Added to this, Tripoli should promote entrepreneurship, address widespread corruption and cultivate the spirit of hard work among the young who have a strong sense of entitlement and a weak work culture. Tripoli can use the experiences of other oil-rich countries that had civil wars, such as Nigeria that dealt with patronage challenges and reasserted itself. Libyan policymakers should be encouraged to depart from the country’s previous idle development model to more competently administered oil proceeds.

The UN should provide assistance to Libya’s overwhelmed judicial system. The assistance should address, as a matter of urgency, required training for judicial police (who provide security at detention facilities) and skilled manpower to help Libya stop the crime of mass arbitrary imprisonment. This will assist Libya to handle cases of the thousands of people who were detained for long periods in Libyan prisons with or without charge. Furthermore, Libyans should be empowered to execute transitional justice, including national reconciliation processes following institutional reforms of the security sector as opposed to retributive justice. Above all security must be provided to members of the judiciary against possible reprisals including death.

The UN should also halt the continued unlawful forced displacement of Libyans. The UN should press for accountability from leaders of conflicting parties and militia leaders by imposing sanctions against those responsible for crimes against humanity. This is important given the fact that Human Rights Watch documented dozens of assassinations of judges, prosecutors, activists and members of security forces by undisclosed assailants with complete impunity (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In addition, Human Rights Watch documented kidnappings, torture and forced displacement which reached alarming levels. As an interim strategy to this challenge, the AU and/or member states and the Arab League should urge the militias to end their collective punishment of the displaced Tawerghans and allow them to return to their homes.

In light of the several centres of power that emerged in Libya, security-sector reform should be carried out for the country to move towards sustainable peace. It is crucial to integrate and unify the command and control of the military to avert further weapons propagation in the country and beyond. The national army should be integrated through professional training in other countries which have agreed, such as Bulgaria, Turkey, Italy, France, the USA and the United Kingdom (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 82). This will help Libya to have a competent security system. This also points to the magnitude to which disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all the armed groups are critical in the country. Accordingly, if properly and professionally done, the new Libyan national army should be composed of both rebel and former Gaddafi forces.

It is also vital to help Libya to secure her borders and take control of her territory as well as resolve other security-related challenges, including the resuscitating of government institutions and restoration of their legitimacy. Strengthening Libya’s border security will assist in curbing the movement of rebels and prevent arms smuggling by Jihadists who are undermining Libya’s security and that of the region at large.

The European Union and NATO having taken the lead in military operations should also be encouraged to help the Arab League, AU and its member states ready to assist the transition in Libya with material and financial resources in post-conflict reconstruction, management of civil–military relations, restoration of the rule of law and other policy areas that are crucial in post-Gaddafi Libya.

Conclusion

The overthrow of Gaddafi by a NATO-led military intervention, veiled under the pretext of protecting civilians, led to a civil war which ignited negative socio-economic and political consequences for the Libyan people and beyond. In reality, Libya degenerated into a failed state. The seemingly successful overthrow of Gaddafi by the US and allies backfired to a regrettable extent if judged by the instability that emerged from the conflict. The intervention by the US and allies lengthened the duration of the conflict, aggravated the toll on human life losses, worsened human rights abuses and humanitarian suffering, provided a breeding ground for Islamic radicalism and weapons propagation in Libya and beyond. This was largely the case because the AU road map for Libya, whose end state was power-sharing between the Gaddafi regime and the opposition, was overshadowed by the NATO-led regime change mission. The AU and states had a plausible strategy given the fact that their strategy was designed to lobby the warring factions to compromise and accept power-sharing, national reconstruction and reconciliation based on the politics of concessions. This could have enhanced the interest and scope of the AU’s three pillars of the African-centred solutions, namely ownership, commitment and shared values amongst the Libyans. More so, Libya’s repressive history and intricate governance milieu presents a number of transitional challenges to the present and future leadership of the country, its citizens, the Arab League, AU and the international community. Overall, for sustainable peace and democracy to return to Libya, the USA and allies should humbly admit that, as external actors, they have limited ability to influence events in Libya directly. The final and main determinants of Libya’s future are Libyans. Therefore the drive to lasting peace in the country should embody institutional reforms in the security sector to ensure public order and prevention of the propagation of weapons by radical groups in Libya and its neighbours.