Institutionalizing the African Reach: Reviewing China’s and India’s Multilateral Drives

Abstract

China and India have for quite some time been participants in African politics and have employed persuasive strategies to make their presence felt in that continent. The main objective of their current participation and presence in Africa is to exploit energy resources and establish greater political connections there. The Chinese strategy is to be generous with loans and financial aid; the Indian strategy has been to employ populist and democratic measures, highlighting its historical and cultural connections with Africa. Pursuing stronger bilateral relations with African countries has been the principal medium of their continental reach. But bilateral bonding has been taking a backseat recently in their approach vis-à-vis multilateral relations, for which institutional and organisational bonding is being used as the prime medium. South Africa is a conspicuous illustration of this approach. Both China and India share strong bilateral ties with South Africa, which is the frontier state for their outreach to Africa. Their engagements with that country through multilateral forums like the AU, BRICS, BASIC and IBSA exhibit how multilateralism is becoming for them a leading approach relative to bilateralism. Their objective, besides enriching and influencing their bilateral understanding with that country, is to achieve their global ambitions and objectives in tandem with the African continent on a whole. This paper examines the instrumental approach that the two countries employ towards Africa where multilateralism is becoming a prime channel of contact over bilateralism. To what extent this approach has advanced their strategic interests in Africa commercially and politically also needs analysis.

Keywords

China India Africa South Africa multilateralism AU IBSA BRICS BASIC

The premise

Contemporary politics is about forming adaptable diplomatic connections and establishing multilayered engagements. Resource, identity and politico-economic primacies have become bases of contemporary diplomacy for many countries, with geographic distance becoming almost irrelevant. The policies of contemporary diplomacy towards Africa, a resource centre for many countries outside the continent, are a clear example of this phenomenon. The changing course of geopolitics and globalisation has made it crucial for both the developed and the developing world to harness Africa’s resource wealth (Kragelund, 2012: 448). China and India, currently the two leading Asian economies, are courting Africa determinedly, through a set of bilateral, institutional and organisational means. Comparatively, China as a P-5 (permanent five) member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and as a stronger global economy has an edge over India.

This paper examines the instrumental nature of comparative Chinese and Indian foreign policies within the charter of the two countries’ pledge to multilateral outreach in Africa. This multilateral reach connotes a polygonal approach that harnesses bilateral, institutional and organisational chain of contacts together. The objective of this paper is not to dichotomise multilateral modes of contact from bilateral ones. Rather, it seeks to show how multilateralism enhances bilateralism that includes institutional and procedural contacts. Unlike the existing literature on the topic, which is mostly confined to assessing China’s and India’s comparative bilateral engagement with Africa, this paper appraises their multilateral mode of contacts. This is not to imply that a multilateral mode of reaching out to Africa is entirely distinctive from their existing bilateral mode of contacts. The strength of the two countries’ presence in Africa has always been their bilateral interactions with African countries. But the new mode of their multilateral contacts with the region through the African Union (AU) and multilateral forums such as Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS), Brazil–South Africa–India–China (BASIC) and India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) reinforces this presence. This multilateral bonding provides the two countries with various inter-continental benefits, strategic reach, opportunities for power positioning, posturing as well as distinctions that a merely bilateral approach does not necessarily provide.

The diplomatic nuances that the two countries employ in Africa through bilateral, institutional and organisational bonding locate them in a situation of balancing each other’s rising presence and growing strategic influence. Their bilateral interactions help them engage with the African countries at individual levels; and their multilateral contacts help them strengthen relations bilaterally, and further, establish ties institutionally and organisationally through settings such as the AU, IBSA, BRICS and BASIC. Rather than merely inspecting the conformist bilateral Chinese and Indian engagement in Africa (such as aid in terms of finance, governance), it is necessary to critically inspect the geopolitical and geostrategic motives in the multilateral engagement that both Asian powers have forged with Africa. This paper argues that there is a pervasive but subtle struggle for presence and partnership emerging between the two countries in Africa. This may not be a directly competitive one; nonetheless their drive to institutionalise the African reach is allied to their power-building networks and cross-continental alliance politics. South Africa is a conspicuous example in this respect. Both China and India are driving to entice South Africa into their penumbra through a multilateral chain of contacts to establish their respective greater presence in the African continent. This paper takes four multilateral settings – the AU, BRICS, BASIC and IBSA – to highlight this unravelling outreach and competition.

Methodological context

This paper pursues a comparative instrumental approach. It portrays a comparative record of China’s and India’s engagement with Africa and how they design innovative multilateral means and modes to engage with that continent, each trying to balance the gains of the other state by adjusting its own policies and mode of engagement. As Caporaso rightly suggests, multilateralism is one instrumental medium used by states through which they ‘actively adjust their strategies to take into account the preferences of others’ (Caporaso, 1992: 603). Through a review of literature, this part of the paper locates the vitality of multilateral settings such as the AU, BRICS, BASIC and IBSA in China’s and India’s reaching out to Africa and outlines how these multilateral mechanisms are linked closely with their geopolitical and geostrategic objectives.

The next part of the paper outlines further the geopolitical and geostrategic purposes that are attached with Africa. Placing the ‘energy first’ approach as the main context of their strategic reach, the paper locates the essentiality of trade to China’s and India’s maritime diplomacy. This appraisal is based on a comparative assessment of the two countries’ trade figures, strategic reach, geopolitical interests and notably, assessment of the recent approach to the region. The article stresses the ‘polygonal’ approach that the two countries employ towards Africa, which involves multilateral, bilateral as well as organisational modes of engagements. The multilateral mode of contacts is just one of those principal mediums to actualise and augment the two countries’ bilateral as well as organisational engagements with the region. This argument is further elaborated in the subsequent two parts of the paper to display how bonding with the AU has institutionalised the two countries’ multilateral tryst with Africa and has been beneficial for bilateral contacts as well. Giving the example of South Africa, the paper shows how cross-continental initiatives such as BRICS, BASIC and IBSA help them to connect with Africa at all levels: bilaterally, institutionally as well as organisationally. Even though both countries contrive similar methods to reach out to Africa, there is a delicate struggle for presence and partnership in their outreach. This can be identified, through a comparative analysis, in terms of India’s tryst with IBSA, with which China is not associated.

To note directly, a multilaterally persuasive approach is being pursued by both China and India to reach out to Africa. Its crux is to establish a systematic and continuous organisational bonding with the African continent and African countries. Bilateral measures still remain important, but alongside, the two countries are pursuing a craft of multilateral mechanisms. The Chinese approach has been more generous in funding projects and establishing strong economic linkages through an ‘aid and donor’ approach; whereas the Indian approach is based more on a ‘populist’, ‘third world’, ‘developing world’ factor. Both countries employ this soft-power strategy through bilateral and multilateral means.

The recent advent of BRICS, BASIC and the institutionalisation of the AU prompt a new thesis of research and investigation in China–Africa and India–Africa relations. This new thesis needs to be understood from the perspective of the emerging powers approach as well. Emerging powers are often perceived as potential major powers as they portend to rise and influence global politics. Both China and India belong in this category. Recent literature on major powers’ approaches towards the African continent suggests that both China and India have emerged as the two most influential powers in Africa in the recent past. Some argue that the crux of this growing presence is the robust trade and economic contacts that both have employed (Broadman, 2008; Chen, 2012; Meeking, 2013). Others see the merits of the soft-power approach that the two countries have pursued in Africa and view them as influential actors of contemporary ‘donors and partners’ strategy (Meeking, 2013; Naidu and Heyley, 2008; Vickers, 2013). The reach of these two Asian powers has been so pervasive in Africa in recent times that experts and scholars have been prompted to perceive a possible ‘Asian’ approach, distinct from the erstwhile colonial or Western approach towards Africa (argued in Iwata, 2012).

Unlike the traditional Western ‘donors or partners’ approach that most countries have employed towards Africa, both China’s and India’s approaches towards the continent have evolved from a combination of history and contemporary dynamics. They combine the established ‘Afro-Asian’ multilateral bonding along with the contemporary multilateral realities of economics, politics and diplomatic nuances and strategies. These involve a set of principles that combine a populist measure or approach, traditional ‘donors and partners’ contact and, most notably, a reliable international conglomerate that is multilateral and multipolar in nature, which is important both to Africa and to China and India. This multiple mode of reaching out to Africa helps the two countries enlarge their own presence in the continent while checking the other’s influence. A comparative analysis of India’s and China’s contemporary approach to Africa would bear out this assertion.

The rationale of multilateral politics

In today’s context, key notions and beliefs through which China and India as emerging economies characterise their polygonal bonding with Africa are: the rubrics of ‘Southern world’, ‘emerging or developing world’ and ‘populist societies’ of a multipolar world order. The manifestation of these notions and beliefs is closely linked with the course of globalisation and multilateral politics, resource politics and identity politics between North–South and South–South formations. China’s and India’s multilateral bonding in Africa also forms part of their power politics of competition and cooperation.

Rising powers phenomenon

At present, other than the politics of energy and economics, the West is less concerned about Africa politically. Earlier, Western presence in Africa was more focused on checking communist expansion in the continent (Shinn, 2012; also see Metrowich, 2005).¹ Since in its view the ‘threat of Communism’ has evaporated in Africa, the West currently prefers to engage with the continent by means of trade, aid, assistance and economic contact (Shinn, 2012). However, rising powers such as China, India and Brazil see the African continent not only as an opportunity but also as an effective international partner for global partnership and for advancing their foreign policy objectives. This is important at a time when the North–South divide still exists in international politics. South–South bonding today represents a political manifestation of the developing world relying on itself rather than the traditional mode of depending on the West (Sidiropoulos, 2012: 1–2).

In South–South solidarity, bilateralism becomes secondary and cross-continental bonding takes the lead, placing multilateralism and multilateral interests in the forefront. BRICS, BASIC and IBSA are representative of this portent. IBSA was originally constituted on the basis of South–South solidarity. BRICS is mainly a superset of developing countries or emerging economies. BASIC explains the necessity of collaboration in global governance issues such as climate politics, which similarly symbolises South–South bonding. Likewise, the representation of AU as standing for Africa as a continent is reflected emphatically in China–AU, India–AU and Latin America–Africa summits. This South–South spirit explains three policy directions. First, it is more about pan-continental frameworks, and explains the economic, diplomatic, cultural and political nuances attached to it. Second, the South–South spirit has become revitalised in the growing interests and political magnitude of the developing world, where these emerging countries are not necessarily reliant on the developed world (Sidiropoulos, 2012: 2). Third, this bonding explains the increasing extent of multipolarism and multipolar world order, where nation-states seek to maximise their bilateral and multilateral foreign policy aims and objectives through coordinated positions and contacts. This generates a conditional ‘global South foreign policy’, which is noticed in the African states’ relationship with the rest of the world (Persaud, 2003: 55). South Africa’s connection with rising powers such as China and India and its quest of a future UNSC permanent membership for itself explains this fact forcefully. Africa also sees powers such as China and India as superpowers in the making.

‘Development’ as a model and the course of multilateralism

The discourse of development is different today from the conventional orientation the West used to attach to it (Sidiropoulos, 2012: 2). The Chinese economic model and trade and economic reach have shaped a new developmental model that many other countries would like to emulate. The relationship between China and the rest of the developing world is becoming increasingly pragmatic, secularised and commercialised (Dittmer, 2010: 9). The African response to this Chinese developmental discourse, while usually welcoming it, is multidimensional (Wasserman, 2012: 336-354).² Similarly, the Indian model of democracy has been the lead story of the ‘democracy promotion’ campaign in the world, a calculated soft-power reach, which many countries in the developing world would like to adhere to (Dogra, 2011: 2; Saran, 2012). IBSA has been one of these enterprises. IBSA’s push for a people-to-people connection between India and South Africa includes Brazil too. At the same time, India’s promotion of democratic ideals remains somewhat weak, lacking in vigour to match the aid, financial and commercial attraction that the China–Africa engagement currently enjoys.

‘Energy first’ diplomacy: trade to maritime; the competing presence

The strategic location of Africa and its resources are attractive to various countries to posit it as a leading factor in their foreign policy. Energy in Africa, a report by the World Bank, notes that despite the continent’s abundant energy resources, nearly 25 African countries face an energy crisis (Masondo, 2013). Access to raw materials remains at the forefront of China’s and India’s reach in Africa, but the most effective device for the two countries in the continent is to have a longer-term impact in creating human development conditionality and forging ahead institutional capabilities there (Gupta and Wang, 2011). Manufacturing, services, infrastructure and telecommunications also provide massive opportunities.

China’s trade recipe

The volume of trade and economic contacts between Africa and the two Asian countries is growingly rapidly. In 2000, China–Africa trade was around $10.6 billion; in 2011 it jumped to $160 billion (Smith, 2012; Wang, 2012), growing at about 33.6% annually (Wang, 2012) (Chart 1). China overtook the United States as Africa’s biggest trading partner five years ago. It is estimated optimistically that China–Africa trade will rise to $325 billion by 2015. The China–Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF) has been a linchpin mechanism behind this growth. Trade and economic contacts have expanded to various areas such as tourism, finance, infrastructure and investment. It is also reported that by 2012, $20 billion have been accumulated as Chinese direct investment in Africa; some 75% is going to sectors such as agriculture, transportation and infrastructure, finance, manufacturing (Ma, 2013). Almost 2000 Chinese enterprises have reached Africa and have flooded their business in almost 50 African countries. Beijing has been generous in granting a huge amount of loans and aid in the last few years to Africa.

Chart 1.

Bilateral trade 2000–2011.

India’s trade performance

There has been a steady growth in India’s trade contacts with Africa in the last few years as well, growing by almost 20 times in the last one decade. India has set the target to push the trade figure to $500 billion by 2020 (Mungai, 2015). By 2011–2012, the bilateral trade figure was around $67 billion, registering almost 28% growth from 2010–2011 (The Hindu Business Line 2013).

Ambitiously, India aims to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) involving a limited number of goods with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (The Hindu Business Line, 2013). The current Indian trade engagement with Africa is mainly in commodities and low-end manufactures. Statistics indicate that China accounted for 16.9% of Africa’s global trade and India for 5.2%. Most of the African countries continue to enjoy a favourable trade balance with India (Banerjee, 2013).

India is concerned about the massive Chinese presence in Africa and seems to be facing an uneven competition with Beijing. Experts are of the view that India’s search for oil and energy in Africa has to be a ‘political game’: simply relying on economic maximisation may not serve the purpose, since China has already consolidated its embrace of Africa in energy diplomacy. New Delhi is increasingly concerned about the ‘cash diplomacy’ that Beijing has promoted to woo and impress the African community for oil and energy diplomacy. There are a number of factors such as money, premium payments while signing the deals, freedom of Chinese overseas oil exploration companies, the Chinese government’s backing to those companies, and the value of the Chinese currency (RMB) which is stronger in the world market and puts China ahead of India in exploring energy in Africa and absorbing the African market (Katakey and Duce, 2010). China pursues a business model that rotates around mostly infrastructure building, loans in exchange for accessing natural resources, exploring new areas and markets and trade opportunities. Indian diplomacy in Africa so far has focused on areas such as diamond and coal. India wants to promote its claim, stake and interests in areas such as information technology, pharmaceuticals and automobiles (Kermeliotis, 2011).

Prevailing maritime politics

Connecting to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean has been one of the prime political factors in China’s and India’s reach towards Africa (Map 1). The Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will remain the vital and critical route for China’s and India’s oil and energy diplomacy in the times to come. It is estimated that around 70–80% of their oil imports will probably originate through the Persian Gulf. Major chokepoints in the Indian Ocean such as the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, the Mozambique Channel, Bab-el-Mandeb in the Gulf of Aden, Lombok and Sunda Straits constitute vital energy routes for China, India and the rest of the world (Van Rooyen, 2011: 8). Traditionally, neither China nor India has given strategic priority to these chokepoints (Potgieter, 2012: 2).

Map 1.

China, India and Africa: the Indian Ocean connection.

China does see the vitality of the Indian Ocean in regional and global politics and contextualises its strategic relevance in its Africa outreach, in terms of using sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean for its trade and economic transit with Africa. Many have argued that Beijing has pursued a ‘string of pearls’ strategy around the Indian Ocean to protect its energy routes and concentrates heavily on its trade and energy routes with Africa. In contrast, India continues to maintain its strong posture in Africa, keeping the Indian navy active on the East African coast, which is known for continued maritime insecurity (Potgieter, 2012: 18–19). India’s maritime posture in the Indian Ocean has been more “south-westward to the African littoral” in recent years (Scott, 2009: 117). In 2006–2007 India set up a maritime monitoring station in northern Madagascar. Its objectives are not only to combat piracy and terrorist activities in the sea, but also to keep a close eye on the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. The Indian navy has been quite pro-active on the African east coast recently. India has signed an agreement with Mozambique for regular maritime patrolling, and has provided ‘seaward protection’ for the AU at Mozambique (Pubby, 2007). Conducting robust naval diplomacy along the African littoral has been a key feature of India’s continued focus on Africa and Indian Ocean trade routes (Scott, 2009).

Furthermore, India has carried out maritime exercises with Africa and has also taken the AU into confidence in this regard. India’s involvement with South Africa in IBSA has facilitated raising maritime security issues vis-à-vis the African continent. IBSA has conducted maritime exercises with India under IBSAMAR (India–Brazil–South Africa Maritime) exercise. India has also been active with regard to the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), which involves some of the key African states, including South Africa. The prime target of IOR-ARC (now renamed as Indian Ocean Regional Association, IORA) is to have a peaceful and stable maritime zone in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). To address the security and defence issues, India has taken an initiative to create the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which includes a few African countries.

Tying up with AU: a sprint to institutionalise the bonding?

Though AU is a well-known ‘continental body’ (Murithi, 2012: 666),³ lack of consensus flowing from divergent national interests has affected its continental and global standing in recent times.⁴ In reaching out to the AU, both China and India advocate greater unity and solidarity among the people of Africa. India has so far preferred to engage with only a few African countries bilaterally, while advocating greater institutional linkages between itself and Africa through the AU.

The Chinese institutional reach

China is politically better placed in Africa today than India. It has strong diplomatic relations and embassies and political offices across the continent. India is deficient in this aspect despite being culturally and historically closer to Africa (Shinn, 2011).⁵ China takes the African continent more seriously also because of the Taiwan factor: not all the African countries adhere to the ‘One China’ policy. China notes that the AU is the ‘most important representative inter-governmental body in Africa’ (People’s Daily, 2012) and can be instrumental in facilitating a pan-African Chinese presence. The new AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia has been funded by China as a ‘gift to the AU’ (BBC News: Africa, 2012).⁶

FOCAC: shaping the Sino-African bonding

By 2000, China had realised the importance of Africa; and Africa also mostly realised that China was emerging as an effective power in global politics and that it was vital to institutionalise the Sino-African engagement. The Forum of China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000 to take this engagement further (Yu, 2010: 135). FOCAC has pushed the ‘Sino-African strategic partnership’ in the last one decade and has emerged as one of the most effective channels of communication between the two sides. China views FOCAC as a ‘premier mechanism for collective dialogue and practical cooperation between China and Africa’ (Yang, 2012).

The FOCAC mechanism has helped Beijing design and formulate an effective Africa policy. A review of the statements made during FOCAC meetings suggests that China now has a more decisive and robust policy towards Africa than earlier. FOCAC has facilitated regular summits between China and African leaders, promoting innovation. FOCAC celebrated the year 2006 as the fiftieth anniversary of establishing Sino-African relations, and forged the bilateral relationship in a range of comprehensive areas. Forty-eight African leaders attended the FOCAC meeting in Beijing, and reiterated their faith in a progressive Sino-African relationship. At this meeting China unveiled its grand African policy, going beyond its conformist ideological mode of narrating its Africa policy (Yu, 2010: 136). A four-point agenda was outlined, which has made the Sino-African relationship comprehensive. Trade, economic and political understanding and other areas such as cultural engagement between two sides have improved through FOCAC. As evidence of the cultural bonding between China and Africa, by the year 2012, a total of 29 Confucius Institutes were established in 20 countries in Africa (Yang, 2012). China has also been granting scholarships to African students and training African professionals.

India’s outreach to AU

India’s approach to Africa is based more on soft-power linkages, against the background of its cultural and historical experience of having been subjected to colonialism, an experience which Africa also shares. On eve of the third India-Africa Forum summit on October 29, 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi have viewed emphatically: “Our histories have intersected since ages. Once united by geography, we are now linked by the Indian Ocean. The currents of the mighty ocean have nurtured the ties of kinship, commerce, and culture through centries” (Text of PM’s Speech, October 29, 2015). Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated also during the first Africa–India Forum Summit (AIFS): ‘Africa is our Mother Continent. The dynamics of geology may have led our lands to drift apart, but history, culture and the processes of post-colonial development have brought us together once again’ (Press Release, 2008). India’s approach to Africa has been based more or less on the ‘developing world’ formulations, where India has always denounced the ‘donor-recipient’ approach, and followed a ‘developmental cooperation’ framework (Saran, 2012: 1–2). This ‘developmental cooperative’ structure is based on three broad foundations: idea of partnership, consultation where donorship comes secondary, and mutually beneficial interdependency (Saran, 2012: 2).

India’s approach to the AU has been subtler than that of Beijing. India does value AU as a pan-African continental body, and has tried to build South–South solidarity with it, including becoming a member of the AU Partner Group (AUPG). The India–AU relationship formally started moving to the next level with the 2008 IAFS, in which 14 African leaders and the AU Commission participated.⁷ This summit adopted the Delhi Declaration and Africa–India Framework for Cooperation, which have institutionalised the current India–Africa relationship (Dogra, 2011). The second AIFS was more organised, and pushed ahead the bilateral relationship. This summit, held in May 2011 in Addis Ababa, was punctuated by the Addis Ababa Declaration and the Framework for Enhanced Cooperation. During this summit, India announced a grant of US$5 billion to Africa. The Addis Ababa declaration discussed not only cooperation between India and Africa but also a number of multilateral issues and concerns that both sides share. Besides, the Addis Ababa declaration addressed various governance issues such as climate change, poverty and the millennium development goals (MDGs). This declaration also narrated the possible scope of cooperation between India and Africa in G-20, UN, climate change platforms such as the UNFCCC (United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change) (Press Information Bureau of India (hereafter PIB) 2011).

The AIFS is seen as a principal mechanism by both sides to promote South–South bonding. The level of their interaction has become manifold, with initiatives that include AIFS and the Pan-African e-Network project.⁸ In March 2010, the first Africa–India Plan of Action (2010–2013) was propelled. It created conditions for India to be generous towards Africa, offering concessional lines of credit to African LDCs, fellowships and scholarships to African students, better institutional cooperation, vocational training centres in Africa, etc. That India’s stratagem in Africa has gone beyond conformist bilateralism is also indicated by the fact that India invited the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) for interactions in November 2010, elucidating the fact of ‘multi-tiered functional engagement’ between India and the broader African communities (PIB, 2011). This is a model of unsullied ‘multilateral engagements’ (PIB, 2011),⁹ somewhat similar to what China has pursued with Africa.

The AIFS seems to be comprehensive today, replicating the versatile interests India and Africa hold for each other. India has been forthcoming in multilateral forums to support and advocate the African motives and agenda, such as the Technical Assistance Programme of the UN and Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP). India attaches considerable importance to the Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and its own observer membership with SADC (South African Development Community), COMESA and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). India has also launched ‘Team 9 Initiative’, which is aimed at forging better economic trust with French-speaking African countries.

Courting South Africa: the politics of BRICS, BASIC and IBSA

While multilateral networks and forging closer bonding with Africa have been a prime medium for both China and India at a wider level, networking with Africa has also been country specific. South Africa exemplifies this. South Africa is strategically important for China and India both for African politics and for broader global and cross-continental politics. Scepticism persists over South Africa’s potential regional and global prominence;¹⁰ yet the Chinese and Indian linking with South Africa in various bilateral and multilateral forums has made this African nation a vital one in global politics today. South Africa is connected to India in IBSA, and with both China and India in BRICS. South Africa fits into the global discourse of ‘developing world’ and ‘emerging economies’ more than any other country in Africa. Not to oversee, the historical Afro-Asian movement is a facilitator in this regard too.

For China, the association with South Africa in various multilateral forums is of utmost strategic importance. Bilaterally too, China has constantly upgraded its relationship with South Africa at several levels – political, diplomatic, economic and cultural. But the most astounding circumstance in the Sino-South African relationship was the Sanya (China) BRIC summit in 2011, where Beijing lobbied hard to induct South Africa as a member of BRIC, to emerge as BRICS (Donnelly and Benjamin, 2013; Smith, 2013). China has also managed to persuade South Africa that there is scope for maximising BRICS-IBSA cooperation, and perhaps a possible future merger of these two groups. President Jacob Zuma of South Africa encouraged this view by stating, ‘We believe that the IBSA will get a better balance and become even stronger with South Africa now as a member of BRICS, more especially since the mandates of BRICS and IBSA complement each other’ (Shao, 2010).

BRICS is a vital cross-continental grouping for both China and India. This forum is important for the advocacy of their international positions on a range of issues that are linked to their developing-world dialogue and reform of global governance. BRICS helps China establish a connection across the African continent through South Africa; both BRICS and IBSA also facilitate India’s Africa outreach simultaneously via South Africa. BASIC is another important forum that helps both China and India stay connected with Africa on the climate change dialogue through South Africa. Though BASIC is just a climate-change dialogue forum, it helps both countries gather confidence through network building with South Africa, and makes climate change a global governance issue closely related to the interests of the developing world. It helps them internationalise the issue within the spectrum of the North–South divide, where the African world constitutes an important module of Southern sentiments. In all these three groupings, South Africa remains the bonding factor for China and India in the African continent (Vickers, 2013: 684).

The vitality of BRICS and IBSA narrates the politics that both China and India share with South Africa. The nature, spirit and objectives of the two forums are complementary in many respects. BRICS currently constitutes a superset of the South–South spirit as well as developing countries that IBSA as a forum initially represented. IBSA fundamentally depicts South–South solidarity bringing together the culture, democracy and people’s spirit of the participating countries. It also brings together three large multicultural democracies of three continents – Asia, South America and Africa – and three aspiring powers that have asked for reform of global political institutions in their favour, aiming for permanent seats for themselves in the UNSC. In this portrayal, the sentiments of South Africa as well as those of the African continent continue to constitute the main spirit of IBSA’s South–South bonding (Panda, 2013a).

BRICS, however, broadly conveys five correlated ideas in current world politics, where South Africa as well as Africa matter. They are: first, BRICS poses a style of politics where emerging economies’ or developing powers’ interests matter; second, it gives the call that the developing world should gather adequate representation at all levels – politically, economically and structurally; third, it is a grouping based more on the North–South divide and aims to bring reforms to the global financial institutions in favour of the developing world; fourth, it works towards bringing about structural changes in world politics, within the spectrum of a multipolar world order, where the main aims and objectives should be to reform the Bretton Woods institutions; and fifth, to improve global governance and bring transparency in the global decision-making process (Panda. 2013b). In all these ideas, South Africa represents the African sentiments, thus making itself as well as Africa relevant for China and India.

Representing the developing world’s interests is a fundamental theme of IBSA, BRICS and BASIC. Trade measures in global financial bodies, climate politics, developmental issues and protecting the interests of emerging economies have been the overriding themes of IBSA and BRICS. BASIC also shares these sentiments. These governance issues induce China to take BRICS, BASIC and the developments concerning IBSA seriously in its foreign policy formulation. Given China’s rising influence and economic supremacy, BRICS is vital to China’s global presence. This also applies to India, given New Delhi’s advocacy of reforming global politics in favour of the developing world. But what puts IBSA in a stream separate from BRICS is its ‘democratic’ ethos, a datum in which China always falls short. New Delhi’s purpose in pushing forward the spirit of IBSA is to establish a chain of understanding that is democratic in nature. At the same time, Beijing’s exclusion from IBSA raises the importance of South Africa for both China and India.

With the 2014 and 2015 leadership summit in Brazil and in Russia respectively, BRICS has become an established cross-continental forum now and has institutionalised most of its meetings. The rapid institutionalisation process of BRICS seems to be overpowering IBSA’s prominence that India, Brazil and South Africa had over the years tried to develop (Panda, 2013a; Sidiropoulos, 2013). Beijing has played a stronger role in institutionalising BRICS. It is not only a leading economy within BRICS but also a leading proponent of many ideas. South Africa entered BRICS at the Sanya Leadership Summit in 2011 with strong Chinese backing, and that has helped Beijing to harvest the confidence of the African leaderships. Using South Africa’s entry into BRICS as an opportunity, Beijing has of late started to exert pressure on that country for a possible merger between BRICS and IBSA to diminish the relevance of the latter, the ulterior aim being to reduce India’s importance in cross-continental politics.¹¹ IBSA’s progress and dynamism have regularly been noted in China,¹² with the near-term goal of weakening its influence, and in consequence, India’s reach in South Africa and Brazil (Panda, 2013a). The vitality of BRICS, as a ‘cross-continental’ grouping and a grouping of ‘emerging economies’ is central to China’s trade politics and global profile. Popularly known as a ‘trading nation’ (Zweig, 2010: 37), China pursues intense trade (Chart 2) and diplomatic contacts with both South Africa and Brazil, to facilitate its energy and commercial needs, and takes BRICS seriously to promote the Yuan as an international currency. China’s trade contacts with South Africa and Brazil are evidently much ahead of India’s relations with these two countries (Chart 3).

Chart 2.

China’s trade figures with individual BRICS countries (2000–2012).

Chart 3.

China’s trade figures with IBSA members.

BRICS and IBSA politics is not merely about associating with Africa or South Africa; it is about the growing Chinese and Indian influence in continental politics. For instance, the 2013 Durban BRICS summit focused a lot on Africa, and how there is scope for BRICS–Africa cooperation. Africa’s vitality for BRICS countries was clearly visible in the theme of the summit, which was titled BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation. BRICS members also held a retreat with African leaders after the summit under the theme Unlocking Africa’s Potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure, which suggests that most BRICS powers realise the need to establish better cooperation with Africa in order to exploit Africa’s resource potential (eThekwini Declaration 2013). Two things were given utmost importance by the summit: to improve infrastructure in Africa and carry out developmental projects through partnerships, and to help improve human and societal conditions in the continent. In the summit, Africa was discussed exclusively, and much emphasis was given to tying up with Africa. BRICS–Africa trade was estimated to touch $500 billion by 2015, with China–Africa trade being roughly 60% of the total figure (Smith, 2013). But while the weight of Africa for BRICS powers is obvious, one wonders why BRICS did not discuss Africa earlier, given that BRICS is about the developing world. This indicates that BRICS does want to have a greater stake and involvement in Africa through South Africa rather than leaving it to India-dominated IBSA.

A few factors need to be highlighted in this context. First, both China and India realise the importance of Africa and its continental representation that both BRICS and IBSA must have. The importance of BRICS has increased after the inclusion of South Africa, and it has helped China’s cross-continental planning. Reaching important continental powers has been a calibrated approach in recent Chinese foreign policy. Both South Africa and Brazil figure highly in this regard. Both are attached to India under IBSA and that may restrict their partnership with China. To compensate at the cross-continental level, China has employed a mixture of political, ideological, economic and strategic stretch towards Africa (Yu, 2010: 130) and Latin America (Jiang, 2007: 7; Wu, 2009). The Chinese aim is also to restrict the American influence in Africa and Latin America.¹³ India has been taking serious note of this trend, but discreetly.

Second, the politics of representation is a prodigious issue that divides India–China perspectives with regard to Africa. China, being a P-5 country, understands the complexity of reforming the UNSC and exploits the situation by advocating for greater continental representation, possibly from Africa. The Chinese advocacy is rhetorical, but Beijing benefits from the exercise in terms of public relations and goodwill in Africa.

Third, the economic consequence of China–Africa relations is attached with the BRICS grouping too. Greater openness and impressive growth patterns of the Chinese economy are noticed among the African countries (Asongu and Aminkeng, 2013; De Grauwe et al., 2012). The rise of China is a big discussion point in Africa today and how the Chinese economy must flow and reach out to the African continent is keenly being pursued at official and non-official courses of both Africa and China. The idea of BRICS Development Bank is being promoted energetically by China today and it has successfully managed to have the headquarters of this institution in Shanghai. South Africa’s support was a key factor in this regard. South Africa will be immensely benefited through this bank, which is noticed from the growing China–Africa trade and economic ties both within and outside BRICS. Former president Hu Jintao noted in the 18th Party Congress report that ‘China will actively participate in multilateral affairs’ and would give special importance to bodies such as BRICS and G-20 and some other organisations (Cheng, 2012) where African countries would have a bigger role to play. Interactions with Chinese experts and scholars indicate that China backs the idea that developing countries, mainly from IBSA, BRICS and BASIC forums, must align together and forge a credible union at the global level to promote and defend the ideas and demands in favour of the Southern world. African countries see greater opportunities for them at this level.

Fourth, IBSA is an important project of India’s cross-continental policy; and being known as a ‘people’s project’, tends to promote Asian–African–Latin American solidarity, in which China has little interest (Panda, 2013a). IBSA deals with governance issues that China has aimed to achieve over the years with developing countries’ alliance. A prominent example is climate politics. BASIC, which was established in December 2009 at the UNFCCC summit during COP15 (Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties) in Copenhagen, has been exclusively voicing the concerns of the developing world vis-à-vis the climate change issue. The politics around COP15 indicated sufficiently that the developed countries would not initiate steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions if developing countries failed to do so, targeting mainly China and India (POYRY Report, 2011: 30). BASIC broadly agrees that the climate change negotiations should be carried out under the framework of UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Roadmap; but its member states also realise that they need to come to some concrete understanding to counter the Western pressure (Wei, 2009: 76). For this reason, China needs to be in touch with South Africa, and has started raising the climate change issue in BRICS for a coordinated position on behalf of the developing countries. South Africa has represented the African Group in UNFCCC and represents a consensus of Africa on climate change (Otto, 2012: 92). Tying up with South Africa in BRICS and BASIC helps China, and also India to some extent, to talk about the climate change issue more cogently.

The major global antagonism between China and India currently is regarding India’s quest for permanent membership in the UNSC. China would have taken a bold position in supporting India’s case a decade ago under the developing-country formula, when both China and India were rising and the USA was leading a unipolar world. Today, in a complex and versatile multistructured and multipolar world order, the tide has turned against China and India to have any realistic cooperation in this matter openly. Like China, India carries the tag of being the leader of developing countries at many multilateral forums, and IBSA is a reflection of that.

India sees IBSA not only as being conducive to its democratic practice but also as a platform for addressing the needs and objectives of the developing societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America, where three countries represent these continental societies eloquently. This was clearly evidenced in the statement of former prime minister Manmohan Singh: ‘IBSA has a personality of its own. It is three separate continents, three democracies. BRIC is a conception devised by Goldman Sachs. We are trying to put life into it’ (Bagchi, 2010). Broadly, India’s dialogue with regard to IBSA is an extension of its South-South politics (Speech, 15 April 2010). In addition, IBSA fits into India’s soft-power bearing, which is aimed at building a network that is more egalitarian. Greater political consultation and coordination, multisectoral trilateral cooperation and execution of developmental projects in third countries are some of the priorities of the IBSA framework (PIB, 18 October 2011). That helps India to reach South Africa more at the societal and grassroots level, taking forward the people-to-people connections. Both IBSA and BRICS embrace similar concerns on issues such as food security, social inconclusiveness and energy issues, but India distinguishes IBSA’s uniqueness as being largely a ‘people’s project’ among democratic societies.

Taking serious note of this, China has tried time and again to downgrade IBSA (Sharma, 2011). Organisations such as BRICS, BASIC and IBSA were seen as symbolic concepts in the broader Chinese strategic community until recently, but now Beijing attaches much importance to them. Taking South Africa into confidence, BRICS is seen as a new focus in China’s ‘multilateral dialogue’ course, where it aims to carve out a wider global role for itself in an ever-expanding multipolar world order. South Africa takes serious note of these China–India politics in BRICS and IBSA. For itself, South Africa sees the vitality and stability in China–India relations as the key to its own economic growth and global rise (Stuurman, 2013).¹⁴

Explaining the China–India outreach to Africa: a comparative analysis

Bonding with Africa through the AU or through bilateral, cross-continental and organisational networks is certainly a fresh stratagem for China and India. These networks and involvements explain the broader global and cross-continental plans and ambitions both Asian powers hold with regard to Africa and its constituent powers. Overall, China’s and India’s networking engagement is a mixture of ideology, policy, politics and economic support that involves serious economic initiatives spurred by liberalisation. Both place their Africa policy in the context of their rising demand for energy resources and growing global political, diplomatic and economic ambitions.

Africa sees India positively, but values the Chinese presence even more. As discussed earlier, African leaders see the Chinese model much more favourably than the American model which is currently dominant in global politics and in the global financial institutions (Manji and Marks, 2007; Power and Mohan, 2010: 463). In this context, though Chinese officials and authorities try to highlight an ideological connection between China and Africa by giving the historical context of the Bandung Conference and South–South spirit, ideology has become secondary, and ‘business’, ‘resource politics’ and ‘resource diplomacy’ occupy the primary place in current China–Africa relations (Alden, 2007; King, 2007; Power and Mohan, 2010; Taylor, 2006; Tull, 2006: 476). India still continues to follow the traditional bilateral mode of reaching out to Africa, though New Delhi has started exploring new modes and mediums for this, mostly through institutional linkages and multilateral reach.

Overall, China contextualises Africa purposefully as a chance in international affairs to advocate its global image and stratagem (Shinn and Eisenman 2008: 2). Beijing’s strategy towards Africa is to show a growing solidarity towards South–South people’s movement, while advocating transparency in the global decision-making process. Chinese official statements have given adequate importance to the African continent in recent times and have prioritised the China–Africa bonding in Beijing’s evolving foreign policy (People’s Daily, 2012). China has been quite positive and forthcoming in advocating a greater role for African countries in international affairs. It has openly backed the African countries for ‘greater representation’ in the UN, and pushed for African representation in global bodies such as G-20 and BRICS. China has conditionally supported South Africa, as a representative African country, to be considered for the UNSC permanent membership. China has equally backed the African cause in the WTO Doha Round of Negotiations and helped African members to attain the MDGs (Yang, 2012). This strategy of supporting Africa’s process of internationalisation has been carefully drafted in Beijing.

The Chinese institutional reach in Africa explains four aspects: first, the elucidation of a vital strategic relationship as a mode of pushing the relationship ahead; second, forging a common ‘people-oriented’ outlook to world affairs and international systems; third, cooperation building and establishing developing-world alliances; fourth, global identity building through South–South solidarity (Contessi, 2009: 413). The main dialogue and ethos Beijing implements in the context of African bonding are to overcome the existing inequalities of globalisation and reforming global political and financial institutions in favour of the developing world.

India in its turn sees Africa as a key continent in achieving the politics of the developing world that it advocates globally. Besides, India locates its dialogue with Africa as a reliable partner for a range of socio-economic and global governance issues. The Non-Aligned Movement has been a common bond between India and Africa. India’s connections with South Africa in the IBSA do suggest that India wants to carry forward the ‘people’s projects’ that both India and Africa have tried to advocate for long. Maritime security and politics in the IOR is one issue that brings India and Africa together. The recent maritime power posture in the Indian Ocean between China and India suggests that Africa will be an important factor in the future IOR politics. India needs to maintain the solidarity that it has always tried to forge with Africa, in order to match the growing Chinese prominence in that continent. India’s involvement with Africa and the countries in the region has always been ‘historical’ and ‘culture centric’, explaining a soft-power image. But contemporary Indian diplomacy needs to rely more on power factor and economic prominence to meet growing African expectations from India.

Four comparative policy imperatives can be seen in the context of Africa’s current bonding with China and India. First, the ‘ideological’ prevalence that both countries seemed to be employing in the past has become secondary. Though South–South solidarity still remains the prime mode of reaching out to Africa, the spirit of its employment is highly subjective and covers a range of political, economic, diplomatic and strategic interests in Africa and in the region. Both China and India employ these strategies shrewdly and diligently. China promotes Afro-Asian solidarity to take forward its ever-evolving relationship; India justifies the merits and ethos of Afro-Asian solidarity as the people’s struggle to build a stable India–Africa relationship in the name of democracy promotion.

Second, Africa will continue to be a vital factor in China–India maritime politics in the Indian Ocean. Even though China is geographically disadvantaged in this matter relative to India, there is no doubt that China will continue to take Indian Ocean maritime zones seriously, as this is the key to China’s oil diplomacy in Africa. China has taken serious note of the IBSMAR naval exercise, and this is likely to reinforce its attempts to scuttle the remaining prominence of IBSA.

Third, the politics of BRICS and IBSA will gather momentum. Africa will continue to be the prime focus in BRICS. One may also witness the AU forging cooperation with BRICS. A possibility in the longer run, with China’s determined striving and with a little help from South Africa, is that BRICS and IBSA could either merge or establish a formal institutional linkage to discuss further governance issues.

Fourth, China and India will continue to prioritise their foreign policy strategies towards Africa, both to gain an advantage in terms of exploring energy resources and forging commercial dealings and to form multilateral dealings with that continent. New trends and new patterns of engagement will be noticed in South–South politics, which may also shape and impact the emerging world order.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This paper was presented at the workshop titled ‘The Rush of China and India to Africa- State Versus Market Driven Development Cooperation Strategies?’ at Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, The Netherlands from 17-18 May 2013, sponsered by the Working Group on Europe and Asia of European Association of Development and Training Institutes (EADI), Bonn, Germany.

Notes

Author biography

Jagannath P. Panda is Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.

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