Abstract
This study examines the political implications of women’s participation in social movements in Thailand. Based on interviews at protest sites and focus group discussions with movement participants as well as interviews with leaders and key informants, the study suggests that political socialization within what is commonly called the color-coded movements has resulted in women acquiring political knowledge and learning about political engagement while being increasingly accepted as competent political actors. Consequently, women have utilized the Red and Yellow Shirt movements to increase their engagement in politics in three different ways. First, women form groups to enhance their political roles and opportunities within the movements. Second, women are expanding their political roles beyond those offered by the color-coded movements by becoming informal representatives, bridging their communities with formal political agents and institutions. Finally, women are increasingly entering into formal politics through the support of their movements.
Introduction
Many analysts (Chaisukkosol, 2011; Laungaramsri, 2011; Satitniramai et al., 2013) have noted the significant change in political consciousness and participation among various groups of people in Thailand in the last decade. However, scholars such as Laungaramsri (2011) and Songsamphan (2011) have emphasized that the participation of women in these movements has not been adequately analyzed, and have argued that we need to broaden our understanding of politics and social movements to include a wider view of women’s perspectives.
Thai social movements during this period have largely been divided into two color-coded groups – yellow and red. The so-called “Yellow Shirts” refers to persons who joined the social movement in protest against the governments led by Thaksin Shinawatra. They are called yellow shirt because those who joined the movement that started in 2006 with the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) used to wear yellow shirts as a form of expression of their loyalty to the king, who was born on a Monday, a day for which yellow is considered auspicious. Even though not every person in this loosely defined social movement feels associated with the PAD or uses the yellow color as their symbolism, the term “Yellow Shirts” is roughly understood by the public as being against Thaksin, corruption, and cronyism. In this study, the term Yellow Shirts is used to mean all of those who are in the above-mentioned protest and reform movement.
The so-called “Red Shirts” refers to the social movement formed after Thaksin was toppled by a military coup in September 2006. It is made up of those who opposed the coup, together with Thaksin’s supporters, officially forming an alliance called the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) or the “Red Shirt movement.” Red Shirt supporters are seen as being strongest in the northeast and northern parts of the country, although followers also come from all over the country. In recent years, even though Thaksin himself has been in self-imposed exile to avoid imprisonment, political parties related to him maintained their political power and as a result Thaksin’s younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, became the first woman prime minister of Thailand after the 2011 national election. During Yingluck’s time in office, which lasted until the coup d’état in 2014, these two main political groups mobilized their followers and took turns trying to gain public attention and occupying the streets to advance their political agendas and expand their influence.
In considering women’s participation in these “color-coded” movements, Laungaramsri (2011) and Songsamphan (2011) have argued that the movements dramatically increased the visible participation of women in demonstrations and political debates at all levels, from the village to the national level. In the past, established women’s organizations have provided the main form of political engagement for women as a group. Although not exclusively, women’s organizations in Thailand tended to involve women from urban areas who were relatively well educated and were often middle class and above. As Pinkaew Laungaramsri argues, women’s organizations in Thailand appear to lack an understanding of the changes that have taken place in rural areas in recent years and may not actually know much about the needs of women in this context, despite the fact that a large number of rural women have now become politically active (Laungaramsri 2011). Chalidaporn Songsamphan (2011) makes a similar assessment, noting that although the Thai feminist movement has succeeded at some level in promoting gender equality, Thai feminists will need to broaden their understanding of the diversity of women’s interests in order to strengthen women’s empowerment in politics.
In the following section, a short overview of the context of gender politics in Thailand will be discussed. This will be followed by a short discussion of the research methodology used in the study. The findings of the study will then be presented in three parts. The first will focus on the motivation of women in participating in the color-coded movements. This will be followed by an analysis of the political socialization process that has enhanced women’s confidence and agency. We will then examine the expansion of women’s political participation gained from their involvement in the color-coded movements, in which we found three different forms of participation: first, forming groups within the movement; second, creating a new type of informal political representation; and finally, paving the way to engage in electoral politics. The study will conclude with an examination of the impact of this expansion and realignment of the public sphere to be more inclusive of women’s participation in political life. It should be noted that although some contrasts will be drawn, this study will not involve an explicit comparison of women’s experiences in the Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt social movements, but rather will explore the ways in which the two movements have resulted in the opening up of new forms of political participation for women in Thailand – ones that had been largely closed to them in previous years.
Gender Politics in Thailand
A number of scholars, including Fraser (1992), Landes (2003), and Pilcher and Whelehan (2004), encourage a reconceptualization of the public–private divide to expand our understanding of women’s roles and engagement in the political sphere as well as in the broader public sphere. West and Blumberg (1990: 4) note that culture, religious doctrines, and legal codes have had an impact on defining “who is political.” This restricted participation in the public sphere therefore affects women’s access to, and participation in, the formal political system. For this reason, women have often been seen as “apolitical” in both mainstream electoral and movement politics.
In the context of Asia, there is generally a wide gap between the public and private spheres. Kazuki Iwanaga (2008) finds that the public and private divide is the main obstacle shared by women in many countries in Asia, including but not limited to Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and China. Women face resistance during the election process to their engagement in the political sphere, no matter what their educational background, activities, and roles in the labor market or their religions. Women are portrayed as inexperienced in public affairs and are relegated to the domestic sphere. In his cross-country study, Iwanaga argues that women are stereotyped as being emotional and too naive to fit into the “dirty world” of politics. He identifies such arguments as the assertion that women hold a “higher moral ground” as further legitimizing women’s lack of access to politics (2008: 13).
Women in Thai society might appear to have a better status, in term of decision-making and political participation, than other women in many Asian countries (Iwanaga, 2008). Thai women were granted the right to vote by the People’s Party (or in Thai “Khana Ratsadon”) together with men since the first national election after the democratic reform of 1932, which transformed Thailand from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. This would appear to suggest that Thai women may have more rights or be more engaged in politics than would be true of women in many other countries.
However, Puthipong Pong-anekkul (2013) questions whether this can count as women’s advancement in politics, since elections in the early “democratic” period were manipulated by the state and voters did not actually have free choice in the elections (candidates were assigned by the Bangkok-based government). To Pong-anekkul, the legal fact of a woman having the right to vote at that time had no particular significance in women’s lives and had no impact on Thai women’s advancement. In 2011, the percentage of women representatives in Thailand’s parliament was still only 15.2% (the highest percentage to date), compared with 0.42% when Thailand first had a woman representative in 1949.
Thai politics has been male dominated throughout its 80 years of democracy. This constraint within the political establishment resulted in women organizing within civil society and taking collective action. Feminist women’s groups have adopted various strategies to carve out a place in the political arena and attempt to increase the number of women both in the public sphere and in decision-making positions in public office (Doneys, 2002; Iwanaga, 2008; Tantiwiramanond and Pandey, 2008; Taotawin, 2011). They actively advocated within a circle of limited numbers of educated and middle/upper-class women, yet without a mass base (Yapparat, 2006).
This paper examines the recent surge in the color-coded social movements and how it has shaped women’s political participation in new arenas in which they can play active roles as they negotiate and claim a greater political presence within the color-coded movements and in the political public sphere in general. It is argued that studying women’s participation in the color-coded movements will allow a broader understanding of women’s political participation. It provides us with an opportunity to study women’s political participation not through an analysis of women’s organizations or an examination of formal political institutions, but through gender-mixed social movements established with the goal of political change.
In this paper, we focus in particular on a diverse group of women interviewed for this study who became involved in the two social movements for the first time, and then took on different political roles. These are all women who had not been politically active other than by voting before the crisis started in 2006, and who became involved in politics because of an increasing sense of duty. We selected this subject of the study because we aimed to explore a process of change that allowed the breaking free from the stereotypical pattern of political engagement by women, who as a group had been perceived as being less engaged or interested in the political process than were men in many developing democracies (Soule and Nairne, 2006).
Research methods
The qualitative methods involved in this research were adapted to cover participants involved in a moving, intermittent, and contested field. The aim was to understand how social movements, and being active within them, expand women’s political engagement and understanding of politics. Field research for this study was conducted between April 2013 and May 2014, a period of democracy interspersed with mobilization from both Red and Yellow Shirts. Methods of primary data collection included In-Depth Interviews (IDIs), Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).
There were 18 women leaders and activists of the color-coded social movements who were IDI respondents of the study. They were actively involved in the color-coded movements from 2006 through 2014. This group of women – which includes housewives, farmers, former teachers, and many others from both urban and rural backgrounds – was not actively involved in politics before the emergence of the color-coded movements, although some were known to community people for being active members in the community as businesswomen and small entrepreneurs or as factory workers who were also members of labor unions. They are a diverse group, standing in contrast to assumptions that presume low-income rural women to be on the Red Shirt side and urban middle-class women to be on the Yellow Shirt side. The interviewees’ names and contact details were provided by members of social networks, cable TV, movement leadership, and others who have been active in the protest movement.
Additionally, through the snowball method, 16 male leaders in both movements and 12 key informants (women and men) who did not identify with any movement were also interviewed. Focus group discussions with women and men who are the rank and file of the movements were conducted at various protest sites in both Bangkok and the so-called Red Shirt Villages in three provinces: Udonthani Province in the northeastern part of the country, Singburi Province in central Thailand, and in Narathiwat Province in the deep south, with a total of 108 participants (73 women, 35 men) including both FGDs and IDIs. Udonthani province is known as a “capital city” of the Red Shirts, Singburi is a province where the majority of the population tends to sympathize with the Yellow Shirts, and Narathiwat province is where an armed conflict that began during Thaksin’s administration in 2004 is still continuing and where the PAD and the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) members (key parts of the Yellow Shirt movement) are particularly strong. All interviews were conducted by the first author in the Thai language.
Women’s motivations in engaging in the color-coded movements
In interviews, movement participants as well as the top leadership of the Red and Yellow Shirt movements agreed that women made up a majority of those who came to demonstrations, and in some cases up to 60%. Observations based on visits for data collection during peaceful mobilizations also suggested that women formed a majority at protest sites. During interviews, different reasons were given to explain why women have been able to take on these new roles and transcend the “public-private divide,” entering increasingly into public life and more specifically into political activities in ways that were not generally attempted by women, or allowed, in earlier years.
One important reason for the increase in women’s engagement in movement politics has been patriotism, particularly on the Yellow Shirt side of the color-coded movements. The discourse regarding “Save the Nation” or “Koochart” was promoted by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), led by Mr. Sondhi Limthongkul, an important media mogul in Thailand, since 2006. PAD used a variety of campaigns to strengthen the discourse such as through such means as ringtones for mobile phones, songs, Chinese opera, headbands, plastic fans, scarves, and other approaches. Khamnoon Sithisaman (2006, as cited in Somjai, 2008) noted that the PAD advocacy TV channel was called “TV Koochart.” This campaign succeeded in labeling Thaksin as a “traitor” (Somjai, 2008) and a potential threat to the monarchy. As New Mandala (2013) reported: [The discourse of] “Saving the nation/monarchy” or “Koochart” in Thai has worked well to both provide the focal point for uniting the various groups and eliciting support from the masses. However, such a monarchy-centered strategy is most effective when the “threats” are apparent and significant. The pre-coup and 2013 rounds of protests were able to turn out hundreds of thousands of supporters because there was a strong perception that Thaksin and his “clans” could be in power for the foreseeable future (perhaps forever). On the contrary, the 2008 and 2011 mobilizations of the PAD garnered much less support from the public due partly to the weakened position of the Thaksin-aligned forces [at that time].
PAD succeeded in popularizing the color yellow as it symbolizes the color of the day King Bhumibhol was born. According to Kritaya Archvanitkul, the nationalistic ideology is expressed in a form of Thainess, wherein Thainess is closely linked with both the monarchy and Buddhism (Archvanitkul, 2008: 7).
The logic of patriotic discourse as it relates to the protection of the monarchy had a powerful influence in mobilizing women in particular to movement politics, and more specifically to the Yellow Shirts. From interviews and encounters with women participants at various anti-Thaksin protest sites, a majority of female respondents reported that their main motivation is to protect the monarchy from the perceived threat that the Thaksin leadership represents. Thongchai Winichakul (2012) notes that the reverence toward the idea of absolute monarchy has retained its influence in Thai society throughout the modern period. The gratitude of Thai people toward the royal family is deep – as one female respondent, echoing large numbers of respondents inclined toward the Yellow Shirts, reflected regarding her political engagement: My family’s status has been good because we are living in this country. We are indebted to the country. This is an opportunity to show my gratitude. (Female participant of Anti-Thaksin movement organized by Thai Patriotic Front and allies, interview on May 20, 2013)
Suriyasai Takasila, who has been associated with the Yellow Shirt movement since its establishment and was a prominent leader and spokesperson of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and an adviser to “Kor Por Tor” or “People and Student Network for the Reform of Thailand” (PSRT), states: Large numbers of women [in the Yellow Shirts and its allies] engaged in protests to protect the monarchical institution. For male participants they have more of a variety of motivations such as getting rid of corruption and protecting human rights. This might be because women have a particularly strong emotional connection with the monarchy. (Interview on March 31, 2014)
Although it appears that no major survey to date has examined the apparent difference of political motivations between women and men in detail, both male and female respondents in this study seem to agree that women’s political involvement, more often than men’s, has been based on patriotism and the protection of the monarchy. They explain their engagement in the anti-Thaksin movement on the fact that women respondents thought that protests against Thaksin were meant to protect the king. One respondent who is sympathetic to the Yellow Shirts put it this way: The conflict is between the two parties. The first party is tied to the king. The second party is associated with Thaksin. Thaksin is undermining the [royal] institution. He represents evil capitalism. In contrast, the king emphasizes and supports the sufficiency economy. My goal in participating in the protest is to ensure peace and security for the country. (Female member of the Dharma Army of the Santi Asoke, interview on September 5, 2013)
The moral justification for protecting the monarchy has had the effect of bringing women into movement politics by creating a legitimate and convincing discourse to bring women out from the private domestic sphere to become political activists. Husbands and wives on the Yellow Shirt side thus have said that they now see politics as a form of patriotic duty, and they will support and encourage each other to participate in demonstrations. The justification for joint participation has ramifications for partner relations in ways that facilitate women’s participation. For instance, a number of women report that they felt encouraged by their husbands to share household work when there were calls to mobilize. Similarly, many male respondents reported that this same process – of men taking on household responsibilities so that women could engage in political activities – was taking place in their families. Thus, due to a sense of urgency to protect the monarchy, the traditional patriarchal hold on politics has been reduced and made women’s participation an essential part of mass mobilization.
A different explanation for women’s political engagement was given by Red Shirt women and men during interviews for this study. On the Red Shirt side, women’s participation is seen as an important means to ensure well-being or life security for the majority of the people. The articulated aim on the Red Shirt side has been to establish a genuine democratic system that ensures equality for Thai citizens and fairness in the distribution of resources and power in the country.
In part, this is a reflection of changes that have taken place in rural areas in Thailand over the past few decades in the wake of the country’s rapid economic development. This created new economic and political groupings or classes, often called “cosmopolitan villagers” and “political peasants” (Walker 2012) as well as the “new middle class” (Satitniramai 2012). Urbanization has increased rapidly and people seasonally migrate to the city for better earnings, and thus the changes have affected both urban and rural populations.
Naruemon Thabchumpon (2014) argues that most people nowadays no longer depend solely on agriculture as a source of income. The State’s budget and policies are perceived to be political goods to which people can claim their rights of access. The political and economical changes were fuelled by Thaksin’s social policies, with such examples as the universal health care scheme, the village fund, and scholarships. Chaisukkosol (2011) argues that the policies took power away from the bureaucracy and as a result weakened Thai bureaucratic politics. People benefited directly from the government’s policies and provisions; for instance, they could receive loans and subsidies directly from the government through the Village Development Fund and manage money by themselves. Thaksin’s government created better follow-through policies and eliminated many complicated and irksome bureaucratic procedures, allowing people to feel they had more control over their lives. 1 The interviews suggest that Red Shirts now give importance to electoral politics because it can have a direct effect on their quality of life and economic status. These changes have also had an impact on political participation; significantly, voter turnout in Thailand has increased from 59.28% in 1992 to 75.03% in 2011 across all economic classes (IDEA, 2011).
Thaksin’s social policies, alongside with the current political conflicts, have encouraged large numbers of women to become more active in political affairs in various roles: as adherents, protesters, contributors, activists, and even politicians-to-be. Women’s perceptions and attitudes toward politics and elections have changed as they are more aware of their power as citizens. They want now to share in steering the nation, as indicated in the following quote from a female farmer from a Red Shirt village in Singburi (FGD, July 10, 2013): Women cannot be idle about politics. If we want our kids to go to school we cannot live in poverty. We need to pay attention to the policies each political party offers. We need to assess and compare them. We are entitled to have the government we elected in power. They have to deliver on the policies they promised.
Another woman supported this new sense of awareness, saying: In each election, it is different for us now; women get together to discuss about policies offered by each political party. We did not tie ourselves to only one party. It depends on the policies and the commitment of that particular political party.
It is useful to point out that the attitudes of women who were interviewed for this study are very similar to those found in studies such as those by Nongyao Nawarat (2010 as cited in Tantiwiwat), Laungaramsri (2011) and Phongpaichit (2011). The women have been engaging in political activities with purpose and in a thoughtful way, and certainly not simply as passive followers.
Within the two movements, women have been constant and active participants in demonstrations; they have gradually come to play a key role in building networks and mobilizing participants in most of these events. Male leaders and fellow participants have often praised women’s enthusiastic support for the cause. “Women are our main force. They sustain our protest site. This is an enduring fight. It’d be difficult to remain this long without women,” stated a Yellow Shirt leader (interview with Chaiwat Sinsuwong, a former PAD leader and a top leader of the Thai Patriotic Front, an anti-Thaksin organization, May 25, 2013). This has also been true in the Red Shirt movement: male leaders interviewed at provincial levels in the north, northeast, and central parts of the country repeatedly said women were more active than men in creating Red Shirt protestors’ networks. In a call for demonstrations, women are said to quickly get organized, mobilizing their friends and relatives. Generally, women have been focal points at the community and provincial levels, and some male leaders who were interviewed noted the women’s dedication and the fact that women have so actively volunteered to participate in demonstrations (interview with a male leader of UDD from Chiang Mai Province, May 19, 2013).
Political socialization enhances women’s confidence and agency
For many women involved in this study, politics – once discussed only in relatively elite venues and in universities – came to be discussed on the streets, in rural areas, through social media, cable television, and the internet, and in households throughout the country, thereby permeating whole communities. Reflecting on these changes, a number of women in this study, who came from different socio-economic backgrounds, reported that they were more confident to discuss politics with their husbands. A housewife, who only had access to an elementary level education, said that: I am full of self-confidence. I believe that I am doing good and right things. I’m not afraid of anyone. I can express my opinions freely with my husband. Together, we have been in the movement’s fight for a long time [they joined the Red Shirt Movement in 2006]. Politics is now part of our daily conversation. Once, he gave me advice and attempted to dictate what I should do with my group’s activities. I told him I wanted to do it my own way; he listened and sat back.
In this case, the husband, who is a retired engineer, was present during the interview and said he was surprised by her confidence and pleased to witness this positive change. They both agreed that her engagement in movement politics has enhanced her understanding of power and resistance. This couple was engaging in political activism at the same time in 2006 after the coup d’état. This could be an explanation for why women and men seemed to be on par in terms of political information, knowledge, and experiences. This cultivated an atmosphere of partnership, rather than a leader–follower relationship.
A similar story is related by a Red Shirt woman who reported that she asserted her rights and bargained with her partner to end an abusive personal relationship. Ratanawan Sooksala was a teacher at an elementary school in Udonthani province. Ratanawan viewed herself as a passive partner, as she described in the following quote: Before I had to take care of him closely, he was so demanding. For example, I cooked his meals, and he expected only me to iron his clothes, saying that no one could iron as well as I could. I had to obey and follow his wishes. My husband never listened to me. To him I am a little person. (Ratanawan Sooksala, a provincial chair of Udonthani Red Shirts, interviewed on August 4, 2013)
She first joined the Red Shirt Movement by acting as an informal coordinator. Her main task was to persuade people she knew to join the protests organized by UDD. Working as part of a political movement that emphasized justice and a balance of power helped her to improve her sense of fairness and bargaining power in order to redress inequality in her personal relationships as well as in society overall: Through participation in the Red Shirt Movement, I learned about oppression and exploitation done by powerful elites against the poor. I have a strong sense of justice that makes me stand up for people. I am awakened. I then questioned and reflected on the relationship with my husband. Eventually, I had the courage and decided to tell him that if he does not change his behavior I won’t stay with him any longer. Today, we are not divorced but live in separate houses. We live like friends and support each other but do not intrude in our personal lives. I feel free, so comfortable with myself. (Ratanawan Sooksala, interviewed on August 4, 2013)
Many women from both political camps in this study reported that before the emergence of this political conflict they had no interest in acquiring in-depth political information and knowledge. After engaging in movement politics, they started discussing and debating issues such as the Declaration of the People’s Party from the 1932 democratic revolution (declaring the need for a modern democracy in Thailand), the appropriateness of the military’s political intervention, voting and tax-related rights, political monopolies versus the rights of a minority, and the accountability and transparency of the government and related state agencies. Politics has become part of the women’s daily conversations within their households and communities. Political conversations were no longer limited to male circles and women could now talk and take part in political activities.
In addition, there were cases found in this study according to which some supporters were inclined to support a political side (e.g., the Red Shirt side) but would not blindly follow the movement or political party associated with that side. One example is that of local Red Shirt women who challenged some political agendas of the Phue Thai Party that they were supporting (the party is affiliated with the Red Shirt side). In this case, the solidarity with people who had the same political stance encouraged female farmers to initiate a mass action against a prospective change in the rice subsidy policy put forward by their own party. The women mobilized their immediate community to join other farmer groups who were their allies. This incident occurred in June 2013, when Yingluck’s administration announced the reduction of the pledging-price of rice subsidy from 15,000 baht to 12,000 baht per ton, for the sake of alleviating the government’s fiscal burden (China Daily, 2013). Women in Singburi were active in that mobilization because they felt that the subsidy responded to their immediate practical needs. This was expressed by a woman from a focus group discussion: Rice price is very important. This is the highest price we have ever got. The change of pledging-price would affect our income a lot. [In our province], we cultivate rice three times a year. Women are concerned with daily income. Women have to ensure household security and well-being. We need money to send our kids to school, to buy food, and to pay debt. Men do not care about these issues. Men also have jobs, but they give us a certain amount of money. They never ask us whether the money is adequate for household expenses. We have to manage and balance our income and expense, oftentimes money from husband is not enough we need to search for extra income or try to save as much as possible. (A female farmer from Singburi during focus group discussion on July 9, 2013)
The organization of female farmers in Singburi aimed at defending the policies that had a direct impact on their livelihood even though it meant opposing a policy of a political party they were supporting. Women were aware of the linkages between their practical needs and the political process. Another woman from this group added an explanation regarding their newfound influence: We had to make sure that the schemes that had an impact on us would remain the same. The policies implemented by this government, for instance the rice scheme, the flood prevention, and the time prolongation for farmer’s loan payback, were important. We did not come from the Jurassic [out-of-date] era. We were modernizing and we always followed political news. The Phue Thai is our government: we gave our votes for them to be in power. They could not arbitrarily alter the policies they had promised to implement. We had no direct power to force the government to solve our problem, except our rights to vote. However, we have our strong and well-organized mass base. Collectively we became widely awakened to politics. Therefore, we got mobilized quickly in this village and connected ourselves with our allies in other provinces.
2
This group of female farmers stated that they had never imagined that they would participate in street protests, nor organize protests. They were able to do so because of the collectively stated political stance of the Red Shirt villages that had expanded their sense of citizenship. Another woman from the same province added, “We learned that being a group would help us to have power and protect our rights.”
Political socialization has developed women’s perception, values, and believes about politics. They perceived themselves as having legitimate power in steering government policies. In other words, to them governance is no longer solely the government’s business as it also involves practicing their duty as awakened citizens. Women interviewed in this study believe in the legitimacy of movement politics which served as a means or mechanism to monitor and make political institutions and politicians responsive to people’s demands and interests.
Women form groups within the movements to enhance their participation
Women in both political camps have also attempted to establish and support women’s groups within their respective movements. For example, during Abhisit Vejjajiva’s premiership (leader of the Democrat Party), a group of Red Shirt women, led by Jitra Cotchadet, founded a group called the “Palang Ying Phue Prachatipatai” or “Women Power for Democracy.” The group aimed to demonstrate that women are active and competent in politics, though again not as yet toward explicitly promoting gender justice. 3
On the Yellow Shirt side, a group called “Woman Thailand” made up of anti-Thaksin protesters was formed and supported by a group of businessmen and women. There were about 50 members in the group, not counting their political supporters and networks. The founders of the group were involved in political activism since the occupation of the Ratchprasong intersection in 2010 by the Red Shirts and UDD to prevent the Red Shirts from occupying Silom Road. One of the founders later attempted to form a more organized group, and in 2013 she and other women protesters started a women’s group. This group did not explicitly intend to promote women’s rights and gender equality, but rather to raise people’s political awareness by using information and knowledge.
4
Nevertheless, this woman’s group not only facilitated opportunities to engage in political activities but also enhanced women’s confidence, as stated by Honey Lochanachai, another key female co-founder of the group: The women’s group provides me with an opportunity to use my competence more than before and it is also sharpening my political skills and knowledge. I have to prepare sound information to use in political advocacy. I have more opportunities to engage in activities than simply sitting at the protest site as I used to do before. Having a group also, I think, helps improve women’s confidence – confidence in themselves and in women in general. We need to help each other. (Interview on May 25, 2013)
The presence of women’s groups also enhances women’s visibility in politics. Mr. Somboon Supanaphai, one of the key leaders of Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF), acknowledged the importance of women’s contributions, stating that: Even though they don’t promote gender equality, they are performing their duty as citizens. They represent women as a whole. This directly promotes women’s roles in politics, as women’s capabilities become more visible in society. (Interview on July 20, 2013)
Mr. Somboon Supanaphai’s quote echoes what Dr. Varaporn Chamsanit, a gender scholar, points out, which is that the newly established women’s groups under these social movements are different from earlier women’s groups and NGOs in Thai society that aimed mainly at promoting gender equality and women’s rights. 5 Women in color-coded movements were earlier not affiliated with women’s groups, but through their participation in the movements they started to create a space of their own to speak out. Although their agenda is not explicitly to promote gender equality, the new movement-based women’s groups have the capacity to enhance the recognition of women’s political roles by increasing political awareness and opportunities for political engagement.
Women create new types of political representation outside the electoral establishment
Interviews indicate that through their participation in movement politics, many women have learned to act as informal representatives, particularly on the Red Shirt side of the color-coded movements. Findings show that some women decided to improve their own communities and to address local problems by acting as a liaison between the movement they represent and formal political actors and institutions. They were making use of connections they established with politicians after repeatedly taking part in demonstrations with the movements as well as with social movement leaders to seek help in assisting their communities.
As an example, two of the Red Shirt-affiliated women interviewed for this study opened up part of their residential compounds to others in order to provide a space for people to submit petitions and discuss local environmental, infrastructural, or other problems. One of the women who opened up her home is a retired teacher and a former traditional dance instructor in Udonthani Province. She became a local leader by joining the Red Shirt movement in 2006, and finally acted as an informal representative serving her immediate community. She mobilized groups from various communities to join numerous protests in Bangkok and Udonthani. Later, after she became a Red Shirt provincial liaison for political advocacy, she used her own community radio station for broadcasts. She also acted as a mediator to solve problems: Once a group of farmers was about to block the road. Their resentment stemmed from the falling price of sugarcane. Someone from the farmer’s group called me at our community radio station so I contacted our local politician and arranged a meeting between them. The problem was solved immediately. It spared the residents the effects of the blockade. (UDD provincial leader interview on August 4, 2013)
She stated that her association with the Red Shirts and her attendance in various protests had enhanced her understanding of people’s needs. Before that, she never had the opportunity to have such discussions and learn about social problems. She criticizes politicians for their poor performance and believes that she can do a better job, even replacing them in helping solve important problems faced by people in the community.
Another woman, a homemaker from the central part of Thailand, also became a local coordinator and informal representative. She worked as deputy chair of the provincial UDD, with her husband who was chair. Together they founded a group called “People’s Voices.” They hear people’s grievances and problems such as the lack of paved roads, waste, drugs, and other important issues, referring cases to relevant local authorities and even to the ministry. They also follow up on cases to ensure there is a solution. 6
Many such efforts to solve local problems by using their newly acquired networks through their participation in social movements were found during fieldwork. These illustrate some of the ways women are able to engage in activities normally controlled by government and other institutions such as local administrative organizations, by creating alternative political organizations and networks that link social movements with the state.
The cases discussed above suggest that women have become involved in the public sphere by creating a participatory political space of their own in several distinct ways. First, they increasingly adhere to, participate in, and support social movements, taking on important local and national roles. Second, they have been networking with key figures of the movement as well as local and national politicians, bridging these two sectors. Third, they have created channels to reach a larger audience and legitimize their position or agenda in their provinces using such means as community radio channels. As a result, they have gained recognition among people in their communities, as well as with key figures in the social movements and politicians who are interested in supporting social movements. Even without an explicitly feminist agenda, representing local needs will include promoting women’s concerns in a way that is much less likely to occur in traditional representative institutions in Thailand that have long been dominated by men.
The color-coded movements pave the way for women to engage in electoral politics
Besides engaging in political activism within informal political arenas, participation in movement politics has also cultivated women’s readiness and confidence to engage in formal politics. As an example, on the Yellow Shirt side the feeling against Thaksin was high during 2006 and 2007 and thus created a political opportunity for a PAD member to win a seat in the national election in 2007.
Pojanart Tokpaleuk became a member of the Democrat Party through the persuasion of both the Democrat Party’s deputy leader and the PAD leader at that time. Pojanart was a former elementary teacher who later became an entrepreneur, running her own business, from Chonburi province in the Eastern part of Thailand. She won a seat as a constituency Member of Parliament the first time she ran in an election in 2007. Pojanart was the only woman MP out of the seven constituency MPs from Chonburi (Nuamsawat, 2007).
Before all of this happened (before joining PAD), Pojanart had never been interested in nor adhered to politics. After regularly attending the protests, she became a focal point and volunteered to mobilize more people from Chonburi province to participate in the PAD’s demonstrations in Bangkok. Originally Pojanart did not contemplate engaging in formal politics. She thought of herself as an “ordinary” woman, lacking in experience about formal politics. At the beginning she was somewhat reluctant to run for election. However, the strong support from male leaders of the PAD and the Democrat Party boosted her confidence and helped her decide to be a Democrat Party candidate. More importantly, she was confident that she would receive a great deal of support from her network on the ground. During the voting campaign, she did get the support of both her family and the PAD watchdog group in Chonburi (Manager Online, 2008).
After Pojanart won the election, she gave credit to the political group forged to support PAD rather than to the Democrat Party. Pojanart’s unexpectedly victory was historical and captured media attention because she had won over influential political groups and the party in the area that the Democrat Party had not won in a long time (Nuamsawat, 2007). This led her to believe that the Democrat Party contributed less to her victory than had the mass-based PAD (Manager Online, 2008). In this way she extended her role from the Yellow Shirt movement coordinator for mass mobilization to being elected as a Member of Parliament.
This is an example of the ways in which participation within movement politics can cultivate a woman’s resources and capability and allow her to engage in formal politics. This is an unusual political route for a person who decides to run for election, given that aspiring politicians normally use political or family connections in Thailand.
Conclusion
In recent years, amidst the protracted political conflict that has deeply divided Thai society, new political spaces for women have emerged. As this expanded terrain for women in Thai politics has the capacity to embrace women’s roles, aspirations, and interests, as well as to promote women’s political competence, this can be seen as a very significant development as it can also encourage women to increasingly participate in and challenge a political arena that has been male-dominated for its eight decades of intermittent democratic development.
For some women interviewed for this study, a sense of patriotic duty, together with a growing recognition of women’s political competence in the color-coded movements, has helped bridge the private–public divide. These developments have helped chip away at the portrayal of women as apolitical and incapable of being politicians, as well as the image of women as belonging strictly to the private sphere (Nawarat, 2009).
We can thus see the ways in which the color-coded movements served as a political platform that accommodated women’s grievances and agendas. The political opportunities and socialization within this political arena have increased women’s sense of citizenship, transforming them from simple voters into dynamic political actors. Moreover, a number of women have gone beyond this and have carved out an expanded political space in order to realize their political goals in three different ways. First, women created political opportunities within the color-coded movements by setting up women’s groups within their respective movements. This allowed them to have the freedom to exercise political activism and demonstrate their competence. Moreover, in the case of female farmers, women mobilized amongst themselves to increase their negotiating power to intervene in the government’s decision-making processes regarding socio-economic policies.
Second, women created political spaces in between movement politics and electoral politics – acting as a bridge between the two – that enhanced women’s political participation and recast a new type of political representation. This was justified by their recognition and networks cultivated during their active participation in movement politics.
Finally, the color-coded movements became springboards for women to expand their political participation into formal political arenas. They provided women with an opportunity to build up their constituencies, which allowed them to pave their way to becoming candidates within the realm of national politics.
These alternative routes to political activism serve well women’s different interests and preferences for doing politics. Moreover, through these routes women no longer have to depend solely on the gendered nomination process that has worked against them in the past and effectively discouraged them from entering the formal political sphere.
At the same time we see that gender equality in politics does not have to depend solely on mainstream women’s organizations. The experience of women’s significant presence in the color-coded movements and the fact that they occupy new areas of political life through these informal, semi-formal, and formal political activities during this period have already helped justify and legitimize their political engagement in Thai politics.
It is expected that the effect of this experience will continue to be felt in the future under more democratic regimes. Even though the military coup of 2014 is viewed as a significant setback for Thai participatory politics as well as in part a return to a male-dominated authority, this is anticipated to be a short-term hurdle as the political experiences women have gained in these new social movements will not only matter in the next elections, but in the long run will likely help make the system far more democratic and responsive to women’s political demands.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on the first author’s doctoral research. She wishes to acknowledge gratefully that this was made possible through a scholarship given by the Government of Japan.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
