Traditional Values and Political Trust in China

Abstract

Chinese traditional culture is viewed to sustain political trust in the authoritarian regime. Given that Chinese cultural traditions are complex and multi-dimensional, it is ineffective to deal with this notion by a single index. This study divides Chinese traditional values into a non-political dimension (traditional family and social values) and a political dimension (traditional political values). Then, I empirically test how different dimensions of Chinese cultural traditions shape the ordinary people’s orientations toward their political institutions and government officials. The results show that the impact of traditional values on political trust varies by its different dimensions. Traditional political values and social values are positively correlated with both institutional trust and trust in government officials. Traditional family values are positively correlated with trust in government officials but do not have an effect on institutional trust. Liberal democratic values negatively correlate with trust in government officials, but this effect on institutional trust is not significant.

Keywords

Confucianism cultural tradition liberal democratic values political trust China

Introduction

Chinese traditional culture has been considered to sustain non-democratic systems because of its “hierarchic and deferential social authority relations of Confucian traditions” (Dalton and Ong, 2005: 1). Confucianism functions as a de facto religion that emphasizes ritual actions beyond the formal sacrifices and religious ceremonies (Chang, 2012; Fetzer and Soper, 2010; Yao, 2000). Chinese people bring Confucianism into their everyday lives. Confucian culture is the most influential cultural tradition in China, and has been an enduring factor in shaping ordinary Chinese people’s political attitudes. De Bary (1998: 164) states that Confucianism has become “the claimed ideological justification for one-party rule, for openly rejecting peaceful evolution to democracy, and for suppressing demonstrations.”

However, Confucianism is not the only cultural tradition in China. Chinese cultural tradition may include Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism. Chinese traditional values conceive of the social orders and behavioral norms in accordance with respect for authority, preference for harmony, and group orientations (Rozman, 2002; Shin, 2012; Tu, 1996; Zhai, 2016b). These traditional values continue to exert an enormous influence on society in China today. Meanwhile, a number of public opinion surveys also show the current Chinese regime enjoys a high level of political trust (Li, 2004; Shi, 2008; Shi and Lu, 2010; Wang, 2005). Do Chinese traditional values increase political trust in the authoritarian regime? As Chinese cultural traditions are complex and multi-dimensional, it is problematic to deal with this notion by a single index. To explore the impact of Chinese traditional values on ordinary citizens’ political trust, this article divides traditional values into traditional family and social values in the non-political sphere, and traditional political values in the political sphere. Empirically, this study investigates whether and how Chinese cultural traditions affect ordinary Chinese citizens’ political trust through an analysis of the Chinese dataset in the Asian Barometer Survey (2006–2008).

Based on careful examination of empirical evidence, this article argues that traditional values are still dominant in China despite their influence declining in the young generation and the educated. In comparison with other Asian societies, it shows that traditional values in both the non-political and political spheres maintain an enduring influence in China. Not only traditional values in the political sphere positively correlate with political trust, traditional values in the non-political arena, like family and the workplace, also have contributed to political trust. The results also show that the mechanism by which Chinese cultural traditions affect political trust varies by the specific types of political trust (institutional trust or trust in government officials).

A cultural approach to political trust studies

Political trust is critically important for the survival of a regime. It is regarded as a cornerstone of the legitimacy of a political regime, which determines the scope of the government’s power (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983; O’Connor, 1973; Wong et al., 2009). Culture and religion have occupied a longstanding central position in the research into political trust. Lipset (1981: 64) defines political trust as “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.” Mass confidence in a political system and specific institutions offers legitimacy for the survival of a given political system (Easton, 1965; Gibson and Gouws, 1997; Klingemann, 1999; Seligson, 2002). Political trust reflects evaluative and affective orientations toward politics, linking ordinary citizens to politics (Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974; Mishler and Rose, 2001). The cultural bases of political trust are subjective evaluation, commitment, and voluntary acceptance of the authority’s ruling. Political trust is “a power relationship justified in terms of people’s beliefs” (Beetham, 1991: 11).

Political trust has two main dimensions: the evaluative and the affective dimensions, corresponding to the institutional approach and the cultural approach. The distinction between the two sorts of political trust stems from previous studies on political culture. Almond and Verba (1963) distinguish political beliefs into evaluative beliefs and affective beliefs. Stokes (1962) defines political trust as a basic evaluative or affective orientation toward government. Similarly, in the study of political support, Easton (1965) and Norris (1999) employ the same method of distinction. The evaluative sources of political trust are based on government outputs and officials’ performance. Policy performance-based political trust may fade rapidly and constitutes no more than a temporary legitimate foundation of the regime. Conversely, the affective sources of political trust are independent of the specific operation of government and they come from social identities and ideological loyalties (Bianco, 1994). The cultural studies of political trust state that longstanding and deep-rooted orientations provide a wide repertoire of political trust; these studies focus on the “trusting” or “distrusting” process of political trust in the affective dimension, rather than the “trustworthiness” of political trust in the evaluative dimension. The affective dimension of political trust stresses the cultural effect of internalized norms or sentiments about politicians or political institutions (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005).

Furthermore, the rational evaluations of government performance are mediated by cultural traditions (Shi, 2001). People with a particular set of value orientations tend to have a higher level of political trust regardless of the actual performance of political institutions and incumbent politicians. As political trust has a hierarchical structure, political trust varies if the object of that trust shifts from politicians to the political process or from institutional trust to general democratic principles (Budge and Newton, 1997: 132; Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999). This study will probe how traditional values affect two types of political trust (institutional trust and trust in government officials) in China.

Political trust in the governments in advanced industrial countries has invariably undergone a decline in recent decades, which evokes considerable concern. Some researchers argue that weakening political trust indicates a “crisis of democracy” (Chanley et al., 2000; Hetherington, 2005; Miller and Listhaug, 1990). However, other researchers regard the decline of political trust as the result of rising liberal democratic values. Liberal democratic values incorporate several fundamental principles, such as rule of law, fairly competitive election, political pluralism, civil liberties, separation of powers, and political equality (Bollen, 1980, 1986, 1990; Dahl, 1971; Diamond and Plattner, 2006; Schumpeter, 1950). A well-functioning democracy has its roots in the aforementioned liberal democratic values. From the perspective of political culture, liberal democratic values facilitate “the emergence of less deferential, more elite-challenging publics in modern societies” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 253). With liberal democratic values, critical citizens are more likely to challenge authority and engage in civic protests (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). It is “essentially healthy” for “critical citizens” who adhere to liberal democratic values to voice dissatisfaction with the current government (Norris, 1999).

Multidimensional Chinese cultural traditions

Chinese cultural traditions stress paternalism, hierarchical obedience, harmony, and group primacy (Kon, 1993; Thompson, 2001; Zhai, 2016b). These traditional values remain influential in China today. Lee Kuan Yew states that there is a “fundamental difference between the Western concept of society and government and the East Asian concepts” (Zakaria, 1994: 113). One of the concepts is that the individual exists in the context of his family in East Asia. To Lee, Singapore’s cultural heritage manifests itself through traditional values, such as the belief in thrift, family solidarity, hard work, filial piety, and a balance between individual interests and collective interests; “It is not misguided to speak of general differences between Asian and Western cultural tendencies and dispositions” (Chan, 1997: 42). In contrast to Western civilization, Chinese traditional values are seen as favorable to authoritarian political regimes (Inglehart and Baker, 2000).

Chinese cultural tradition has multiple dimensions. Chan (1997) states that we should distinguish Asian statesmen’s arbitrary detention of dissidents and suppression of freedom of speech with their rhetoric articulation of traditional values, such as the importance of family, concern for ethics, individual responsibility and social harmony. Subramaniam (2000) separates traditional values into social values and “the effect of those values in the political–economic sphere.” Social values include respect for authority, strong families, reverence for education, hard work, frugality, teamwork, and a balance between the individual’s interests and those of society. The political–economic outcomes incorporate: (a) social order and political stability; (b) collective social norms; (c) instruments of democracy for social good; (d) consensus building and trust in political leaders; and (e) responsibility of the government. Social values should be distinguished from the political–economic consequences. Park and Shin (2006) separate traditional values into two distinct dimensions: the dimension of social values; and the dimension of political values. The social dimension of traditional values has four categories: social hierarchy; social harmony; group primacy; and anti-pluralism. The political dimension of traditional values includes family–state relations, moral state, and anti-adversarial politics. Their findings suggest that anti-adversarial politics distract from support for democracy and other traditional values (social hierarchy, anti-pluralism, family–state relations, moral state, and anti-adversarial politics) and keep the masses oriented toward authoritarian politics.

How do multi-dimensional traditional values work in China? Chinese society functions on the basis of relationalism, in which behavioral patterns change according to different relationships. The interpersonal relationships in Chinese society have been characterized as the differential mode of association that was originally proposed by an esteemed sociologist – Fei (1947). This theory argues that Chinese people build their social relations by placing themselves in the center of different interactive circles and forge different patterns of interpersonal relationships based on intimacy. The most intimate relationship lies in the family circle and a clan community. Members share the same ancestors and connect to each other by a blood relationship (Hu, 2007). Next, the Chinese form their geographical relationship in their communities and their occupational relationship in their workplaces. The most distant relationship is that with strangers, which is considered of least importance by Chinese people. Fei (1947) describes this personal relationship as a myriad of ripples sent out by a stone thrown in the water. The differential mode of association indicates that particularism is a core principle in Chinese personal relationships. Behavioral modes make sense only in the specific settings. For example, with respect to group primacy, one is willing to sacrifice one’s own interests for the sake of family, but that does not necessarily mean one will consider the collective interest as a priority in the workplace or in the local community. The differential mode of association can be equally applied to a hierarchical relationship and harmony orientations. Personal relationships are forged in a specific circle and the behavioral modes make sense only in this circle.

Based on the differential mode of association, this article divides Chinese cultural tradition into two broad patterns: traditional values in the non-political sphere; and traditional values in the political sphere (Ikeda and Richey, 2012; Park and Shin, 2006; Zhai, 2016b). On the one hand, traditional values in the non-political sphere consist of traditional family and traditional social values. Traditional family values demand that children respect and obey their parents and put family interests as a top priority. This research considers the school, workplace and community as social situations in which Chinese cultural traditions shape ordinary people’s social behavior. Traditional social values include obedience to teachers in school, maintenance of harmony in the community and workplace, and putting collective interests before personal interests. On the other hand, traditional values in the political sphere are authoritarian political values. They indoctrinate people to support the government unconditionally, pursue political harmony, put national interests as the top priority, and enhance paternalism.

Assessing the political impact of traditional values

Traditional values in the non-political sphere

There is not a consensus in theory as to whether conformity and orientation of harmony in the non-political sphere will favorably contribute to a higher level of political trust. Pye (1968) argues that there is an interdependent relationship between the family and government. “[F]amily authority was peculiarly closely associated with attitudes and images about authority in the political culture” (Pye, 1968: 89). According to the congruence theory, traditional family and social values in the non-political sphere affect and shape public attitudes in the political arena. In other words, Chinese cultural traditions in the non-political sphere help to buttress political trust. Unlike normative analysis, this study will empirically examine whether traditional values in the non-political sphere sustain political trust in China.

Traditional family values require people to conform to parental authority and put personal interests after family interests. A popular assumption states that the logic of filial piety in the family relationship can spill over to the political arena and shape one’s political loyalty. Kaji (1990) argues that filial piety in the family shapes an individual’s character and it can enhance political loyalty. Familism is regarded as one of the core foundations of Chinese cultural tradition; “The state is just a large family, as aptly suggested by the term guojia or state which is formed by joining the two characters ‘country’ and ‘family’ in Chinese” (Kuan and Lau, 2002: 302). Filial piety at home is supposed to form the basis of political trust in the government. Chan (1997: 44) argues that respect for the elderly and filial piety might easily be made to serve authoritarian purposes, “if they are embedded in a culture that does not recognize human rights or basic human equality.” Hahm states that there is a linkage between the family ethics and political orientations in the family-and-state system. “The virtue highly valued in family is filial piety, correspondingly political allegiance is the state’s due” (Hahm, 2004: 98). This study posits that traditional family ethics have a spillover effect on political trust.

Hypothesis 1 Traditional family values positively correlate with political trust.

Traditional social values may also spill over to the political sphere and sustain political trust. Besides the family, people adopt the codes of behavior and social norms in social activities. Internalization of traditional values in the social sectors takes place in the school, community, and the workplace. Traditional values in social relationships were under fierce attack for their defense of authoritarian governments in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The behavioral codes of authority relations in the social area can spill over to state–people relations. There is probably a link between traditional social values and political trust. Conformity to social authority, pursuit of social harmony, and prioritization of collective interests may contribute to increasing trust in political authority. Being socialized by traditional social values, the Chinese people are used to a hierarchical structure and respect for authority. This study hypothesizes that traditional social values spill over to the political area and increase political trust.

Hypothesis 2 Traditional social values positively correlate with political trust.

Traditional values in the political sphere

Traditional values in the political sphere indoctrinate the masses with political loyalty, paternalism, political harmony, and so on. These authoritarian political values have been employed to increase political trust. The effect of traditional political values on political trust is direct. For example, unconditional support for authority does not allow average people to question the decisions made by authority. The masses are indoctrinated with blind loyalty. What the government does is for the people’s welfare and is in their fundamental interest. The only thing left to the average person is to trust the government.

Traditional values in the political sphere have been criticized for justifying authoritarian ruling. Welzel (2011: 2) criticizes Chinese traditional values for its political instrumentality – “an ideologically motivated rhetoric to legitimize oppressive power,” and Thompson (2001) states that traditional values in the political sphere shape the masses’ blind loyalty for maintenance of authoritarian regimes. Empirically, Park and Shin (2006) find that traditional political values make it difficult for the public to reject authoritarian rule. Traditional political values reduce an individual’s agency, and indoctrinate people with orientations of unconditional trust in the government. Traditional values in the political sphere are still prevalent in China. This study posits that traditional political values facilitate political trust in the Chinese political system.

Hypothesis 3 Traditional political values positively correlate with political trust.

Liberal democratic values

The cultural bases of political trust evolve dynamically in an open space. Considering the growing influence of Western culture following modernization, this article examines the impact of liberal democratic values in the investigation of the cultural foundation of political trust in China. People with liberal democratic values tend to have a high level of expectation on politics and appear to be critical of the practice of politics. Norris (1999) argues that critical citizens are committed to democratic principles but dissatisfied with the practice of democracy. They express a high level of distrust in political institutions and incumbent office holders. In the Chinese context, the negative correlation between liberal democratic values and political trust is because Chinese government fails to meet liberal democrats’ expectation. As liberal democratic values are incompatible with the current Chinese political system, this study posits that those who hold liberal democratic values have a low level of political trust.

Hypothesis 4 Liberal democratic values negatively correlate with political trust in China.

Data and methods

Data

This study used the Chinese dataset in the second wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (2006–2008).¹ The Asian Barometer Survey is the comparative survey of political values, democracy, and governance in Asian countries. Chinese data were collected in accord with probabilities proportional to size measures. The project was finished in December 2008, and 5075 valid cases were obtained. The age of respondents ranged from 18 to 95. There were 2598 male respondents (51.19%) with 2477 females (48.81%). Multiple imputation (MI) is used to address missing values.

Dependent variables

Political trust: Political trust was divided into two types: institutional trust, and trust in governmental officials. Institutional trust was measured by a battery of items about confidence in parliament (q11), political parties (q10), the national government (q9), and courts (q8). A principal component analysis was performed, and the first component score was extracted as the indicator of institutional trust (eigenvalue: 3.156; percentage of explained variance: 0.789).² Trust in government officials was measured by the question (q130) that generally speaking we can trust the people who run our government to do what is right. Responses were recoded as a dummy variable (0 = “distrust”; 1 = “trust”).

Independent variables

Traditional family values

Traditional family values incorporate two components – conformity in family and prioritization of family interests. Conformity in family was measured by the statement that even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, children should still do what they ask (q56). Prioritization of family interests was measured by the statement that one should put personal interests after the interests of the family (q60). I performed factor analysis to condense variables into a smaller set of latent factors. A scree plot indicates that there is a latent factor that accounts for the maximum amount of variance as a single variable. I extracted this latent factor as the indicator of traditional family values.

Traditional social values

Traditional social values incorporate four components – conformity in school, harmony in community, harmony in the workplace, and prioritization of collective interests. Conformity in school was measured by the statement that being a student, one should not question the authority of one’s teachers (q57). Harmony in community was measured by the statement that when one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person (q58). Harmony in the workplace was measured by the statement that a person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him (q59). Prioritization of collective interests was measured by the statement that if a government policy serves the interests of the majority of people, one should support it even if it jeopardizes one’s private interests (q72). I performed factor analysis. A scree plot indicates that there is a latent factor that accounts for the maximum amount of variance as a single variable. I extracted this latent factor as the indicator of traditional social values.

Traditional political values

Traditional political values incorporate four components – blind loyalty, paternalism, political harmony, and prioritization of national interests. Blind loyalty was measured by the question of whether people should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with them (q65). Paternalism was measured by how far the relationship between the government and the people mirrors that between parents and children (q64). Political harmony was measured by two items. One item is that conflict among political groups is a bad thing for our country (q71); the other is that open quarrels among politicians are harmful to society (q63). Prioritization of national interests was measured by the statement that for the sake of the national community, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice his/her personal interests (q76). I performed factor analysis. A scree plot indicates that there is a latent factor that accounts for the maximum amount of variance as a single variable. I extracted this latent factor as the indicator of traditional political values.

Liberal democratic values

Liberal democratic values were measured by a battery of items incorporating nine fundamental principles of liberal democracy: the rule of law (q141); respect for diversity (q140); elections (q139); legislative checks (q138); judicial independence (q137); political pluralism (q136); freedom of speech (q135); self-determination (q134); and political equality (q133). I performed factor analysis. A scree plot indicates that there is a latent factor that accounts for the maximum amount of variance as a single variable. I extracted this latent factor as the indicator of liberal democratic values.

Control variables

Family economic situation, political efficacy, and assessment of government responsiveness influence average people’s political trust. Political efficacy here refers to internal political efficacy. It indicates citizens’ belief that he or she can understand and influence political affairs. It was measured by two questions: “I think I have the ability to participate in politics” (q126), and “Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on” (q127). People with a good family economic situation may be those who benefit the most from the policies of the current regime. Consequently, they tend to have higher levels of political confidence. In contrast, people with higher political efficacy are more likely to distrust the repressive regime, while people who feel government effectively responds to their demands are inclined to trust the current political system. Therefore, family economic situation, political efficacy, the government’s responsiveness, and demographic variables (age, gender, and educational level) were controlled in regression analyses.

Findings

A comparison between China and other East Asian counties

In order to evaluate Chinese citizens’ traditional values in the non-political sphere, I compare mainland China with other East Asian societies (Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) that are seen to share common cultural traditions with China (Shin, 2012: 21–49). Table 1 displays the national differences of traditional values in the non-political sphere across five Asian societies.

Table 1.

National differences of traditional values in the private sphere in five East Asian societies.

%	Traditional family values		Traditional social values
%	Conformity in family	Prioritization of family interests	Conformity in school	Community harmony	Workplace harmony	Prioritization of collective interests
China	54	94	69	66	57	84
Japan	47	82	56	79	73	72
Singapore	48	92	51	75	79	71
South Korea	41	80	—	62	—	—
Taiwan	28	89	40	30	60	76

Source: The Asian Barometer Survey (2006–2008).

Note: Entries are the percentage of respondents indicating their attitudes toward traditional family and social values.

Despite the percentages of traditional values in the non-political sphere held by the Chinese being relatively high in comparison with other Asian societies, Chinese citizens are located at the middle or low levels in terms of harmony orientation in the community and harmony orientation in the workplace. In general, there is not a remarkable gap between the Chinese and citizens of other Asian societies with respect to traditional values in the non-political sphere.

Traditional values in the political sphere are authoritarian political values. They indoctrinate people to support the government unconditionally, pursue political harmony, place national interests as a top priority, and enhance paternalism. Table 2 presents national differences of traditional values in the political sphere across five Asian societies. It is clear that the percentage of the Chinese who hold traditional political values is significantly higher than people in other Asian societies.

Table 2.

National differences of traditional values in the public sphere in five East Asian societies.

%	Traditional political values
%	Paternalism	Blind loyalty	Avoidance of quarrels	Avoidance of conflicts	Prioritization of national interests
China	89	88	75	79	87
Japan	39	23	39	12	47
Singapore	64	56	65	41	75
South Korea	59	—	61	—	43
Taiwan	78	34	83	56	56

Source: The Asian Barometer Survey (2006–2008).

Note: Entries are the percentage of respondents indicating their attitudes toward traditional political values.

The survey data above show that traditional values are still dominant in China. With respect to traditional values in the non-political sphere, China ranks top in terms of conformity in family, prioritization of family interests, conformity in school, and prioritization of collective interests in comparison with other Asian societies. However, the gap is small. At present, Chinese people seem to attach less value to harmony achieved by avoidance of conflicts with others. Chinese respondents’ scores are relatively low in terms of community harmony and workplace harmony. One possible explanation for less emphasis on harmony in China may be the anti-harmony campaigns in the Cultural Revolution, in which class struggle was a Maoist revolutionary doctrine. Aggression replaced harmony in mainland China. In recent years, the Chinese government has advocated the value of harmony and proposes to build a harmonious society.

However, the percentage of Chinese citizens who hold traditional values in the political sphere is significantly higher than for people in the other Asian societies. These results indicate that it is meaningful to distinguish between traditional values in the non-political and the political spheres. Traditional values in the political sphere that highlight paternalism, blind loyalty to authority, political harmony, and the prioritization of national interests are rooted in Chinese society.

A demographic analysis of traditional values in China

Traditional values vary across groups with different demographic characteristics in China. In particular, I surveyed the variances in terms of age, gender, education, and living area. Table 3 displays the demographic distribution of traditional values in the non-political sphere. It shows that the younger generations and those with higher education have become detached from traditional family and social values. The difference in gender is not significant. Moreover, urban residents hold onto traditional family and social values in lesser degree than their rural counterparts.

Table 3.

Demographic distribution in the percentages of attachment to traditional values in the non-political sphere.

%	Traditional family values		Traditional social values
%	Family conformity	Family interests	Social conformity	Community harmony	Workplace harmony	Collective interests
Age
18–29	42	92	54	59	49	78
30–39	48	93	65	62	53	81
40–49	53	94	70	66	55	82
50–59	58	94	74	71	63	88
60 +	63	96	77	70	64	89
Gender
Male	53	94	67	66	56	85
Female	55	94	70	65	58	83
Education
Incomplete primary	64	96	79	69	64	85
Primary school	55	95	70	68	58	83
Incomplete secondary	52	94	71	67	61	85
Secondary school	47	93	64	64	52	83
College above	41	90	47	49	40	80
Living place
Large cities	49	90	61	56	47	81
Middle or small cities	52	90	68	65	53	83
Rural areas	55	95	69	67	59	84

Source: The Asian Barometer Survey (2008).

Note: Entries are the percentage of respondents indicating their attitudes toward traditional family and social values.

The trend of traditional values declining in the Chinese population has been observed in the political sphere as well. Table 4 shows that the younger generations and educated citizens have become detached from traditional political values, despite their scores being higher than the average scores in other Asian societies.

Table 4.

Demographic distribution in the percentages of attachment to traditional values in the political sphere.

%	Traditional political values
%	Paternalism	Blind loyalty	Avoiding quarrels	Avoiding conflict	National interests
Age
18–29	87	80	71	73	82
30–39	86	84	72	78	85
40–49	91	90	75	80	87
50–59	89	92	77	80	89
60 +	93	92	79	83	91
Gender
Male	88	88	74	79	87
Female	90	88	76	80	87
Education
Incomplete primary	94	91	79	78	88
Primary school	91	90	76	83	88
Incomplete secondary	87	89	74	82	82
Secondary school	88	86	73	79	87
College above	75	86	72	75	81
Living place
Large cities	83	85	76	77	81
Middle or small cities	85	85	76	84	83
Rural areas	91	89	75	79	88

Source: The Asian Barometer Survey (2008).

Note: Entries are the percentage of respondents indicating their attitudes toward traditional political values.

The effect of traditional values on political trust

A multiple regression analysis (ordinary least squares (OLS)) was performed to test the impact of traditional values on institutional trust. As the dependent variable, trust in government officials, is a dichotomous variable, a logistic regression model was an appropriate method as it uses a maximum likelihood estimation rather than the OLS estimation used in traditional multiple regression. Table 5 shows the results.

Table 5.

Multivariate analyses of cultural bases of political trust in China.

	Institutional trust	Trust in government officials
	(Ordinary least squares)	(Logistic regression)
	Coefficients	Coefficients	OR
Traditional values
Traditional family values	−0.063 (0.092)	0.424 (0.156)**	1.528
Traditional social values	0.206 (0.033)***	0.325 (0.056)***	1.383
Traditional political values	0.162 (0.032)***	0.242 (0.054)***	1.274
Liberal democratic values	−0.015 (0.029)	−0.346 (0.052)***	0.707
Economic–political factors
Family economic situation	0.100 (0.019)***	0.056 (0.032)	1.057
Political efficacy	0.117 (0.032)***	0.059 (0.054)	1.061
Perceived responsiveness	0.577 (0.033)***	0.251 (0.057)***	1.285
Demographic attributes
Age	0.003 (0.002)	0.014 (0.003)***	1.014
gender	−0.020 (0.042)	−0.191 (0.071)**	0.826
Education	−0.038 (0.006)***	−0.078 (0.011)***	0.925
Intercept	−1.797 (0.149)***	−0.259 (0.251)
R ²	0.145
Adjusted R²	0.143
LRχ²		482.04***
Pseudo R²		0.092
N	3891	3894

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001, two-tailed test.

OR reports the estimated coefficients transformed to odds ratios. If the regression coefficient of logistic regression is β, then the OR for 1 unit increase in independent variable is exp (β). The OR represents the constant effect of a predictor on the likelihood that one outcome will occur.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 state that traditional values in the non-political sphere exert a spill-over effect on political trust: the results demonstrate that traditional social values had a positive effect on both institutional trust (β = 0.206, p < 0.001) and trust in government officials (β = 0.325, p < 0.001). Traditional family values positively correlated to trust in government officials (β = 0.424, p < 0.01) but did not have a significant effect on institutional trust. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was partly confirmed and Hypothesis 2 was confirmed. Despite the family and social sectors being in the non-political sphere, traditional family values and social values have a distinct effect on political trust.

Hypothesis 3 was confirmed as well. Traditional political values had a positive effect on both institutional trust (β = 0.162, p < 0.001) and trust in government officials (β = 0.242, p < 0.001). This was a direct effect of traditional political values on boosting political trust. Conformity, anti-pluralism, and paternalism weakened the activities of the masses and created a relationship that was hierarchical and deferential to political authority. The domination of authoritarian political values helped in maintaining dictatorships.

Moreover, a one-unit increase in traditional family values, social values, and political values increases the odds of occurrence of the outcome variable (trust in government officials) by 53%, 38%, and 27%, respectively (see Table 5). It indicates that traditional values are associated with higher odds of the outcome variable. Among these traditional values, family values have the most significant effect on increasing trust in government officials. Even though traditional political values are normally seen as a major cause for sustaining political authority, family values and social values in the private sphere are relevant factors that closely correlated with the degree of trust in government officials.

Liberal democratic values negatively related to trust in government officials (β = −0.346, p < 0.001), but this effect was not significant in institutional trust. Odds ratios also suggest that a one-unit increase in liberal democratic values is associated with 29% lower odds of the outcome variable (trust in government officials). Hypothesis 4 was partly confirmed. The results indicate that a rise in liberal democratic values among Chinese citizens have effectively undermined trust in government officials but rarely challenged the current political institutions.

With controlling influence of other variables, the senior generation and female Chinese are more likely to trust in government officials. Educated citizens tend to distrust the current political institutions (β = −0.038, p < 0.001) and government officials (β = −0.078, p < 0.001), but the Chinese with a good family economic situation trust the current political system (β = 0.100, p < 0.001). Political efficacy increases institutional trust rather than trust in government officials (β = 0.117, p < 0.001). In addition, people who view the political system as effectively responding to their demands tended to have a higher level of institutional trust (β = 0.577, p < 0.001) and trust in government officials (β = 0.251, p < 0.001).

Discussion and conclusions

This study shows that traditional values are still dominant in China. With respect to traditional values in the non-political sphere, Chinese citizens place the highest value on respect for authority in family and school, and prioritization of family and collective interests in comparison with other Asian societies. At present, Chinese people seem to value less the harmony that emphasizes the avoidance of conflicts with others. Chinese respondents have relatively low scores in the pursuit of harmony in community and the workplace (Zhai, 2016b). On the other hand, the percentage of Chinese citizens who hold traditional values in the political sphere is significantly higher than people in the rest of Asian societies. Traditional values in the political sphere that stress paternalism, unconditional support, political harmony and prioritization of national interests have been influential in Chinese society and empirical evidence shows that Chinese people have not been detached from these authoritarian political values until today.

Traditional values are likely to be part of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimation strategy (Thompson, 2001). This study demonstrates that traditional values indeed positively correlate with Chinese people’s political trust. Traditional values provide a foundation for regime legitimacy, which does not depend on its practical performance. These traditional values take effect in the political and non-political spheres respectively. Traditional values in the political sphere (authoritarian political values) positively correlated with institutional trust and trust in government officials. Table 2 reveals higher levels of traditional political values in China. The results of this study indicate that, in China, an authoritarian political system has been matched with a corresponding authoritarian political culture permeating society.

Traditional values in the non-political sphere consist of traditional family and social values. Traditional family values positively correlate with trust in government officials but have no effect on institutional trust. Those who are obedient in family relationships tend to trust in officials who possess power instead of trust in political institutions. Fukuyama (1995) insightfully points out an unexpected outcome of Chinese familism. On the surface, the Chinese and the Japanese are group-oriented. Both are described as collectivistic cultures. However, the Chinese are hardly concerned about collective interests. What they care about are their families. Respect for authority becomes weaker outside of the family: “Chinese families have traditionally been suspicious of government authority” (Fukuyama, 1995: 27). Fukuyama argues that the Chinese family-centered orientation has undermined the generalized moral obligation to society and has discouraged sacrifices for the sake of national unity. In other words, the traditional family ethic does not contribute to increasing trust in political institutions.

Traditional social values work to increase both institutional trust and trust in government officials. It indicates that conformity and the desire for harmony formed in the social relations extend into the political arena and eventually enhance political trust. The results are inconsistent with the effects of traditional social values in other East Asian societies. There is no evidence that traditional values in the non-political sphere lead to an increase in political trust in Japan or South Korea where social hierarchy and group harmony are flourishing as well (Ikeda and Richey, 2012; Park and Shin, 2006). Table 1 clearly reveals that the Japanese and the Koreans still hold onto traditional family and social values. On the other hand, citizens in Japan and Korea resist authoritarian political values. Why do traditional social values have a spillover effect on political trust in China? One of the possible reasons is that the state’s authoritarian power has penetrated into the social relationships of Chinese people. On the surface, the degree of traditional social values in China is as high as it in other East Asian societies. However, traditional social values in Japan and Korea might be acquired and shaped in an extended process from family to society. But traditional social values in China have been shaped in a top-down process with the government’s indoctrination of paternalism. In the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese were mobilized to challenge authority and abandon orientations of harmony. Since the 1980s, harmony and social authority have rapidly revived and it has never been challenged that personal interests are secondary to the collective interest. In general, it is obvious that government plays a great role in affecting social values. This is a possible reason why traditional social values in China result in an increased trust in an authoritarian political system.

A dynamic perspective shows that traditional values are weakening in the younger generation and among educated people. An intergenerational shift of traditional values is appearing in both the non-political and the political spheres. The continuous declining trend is irreversible. Therefore, political trust rooted in traditional values is going to weaken. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the declining trend is developing in an unbalanced manner. A decline of traditional values is more remarkable in the non-political sphere than in the political sphere. The radical decline of traditional values in the non-political sphere will certainly undermine institutional trust and trust in government officials. Nonetheless, traditional values in the political arena change slowly and their authoritarian nature sustains the political trust in the current regime.

Liberal democratic values are spreading in China but their influence is limited (Zhai, 2016a). This study shows that liberal democratic values reduce the trust in government officials but have no effect on institutional trust. It implies that even those who adhere to liberal democratic values still trust political institutions. Indigenous pro-democratic citizens are indeed dissatisfied with the current Chinese political situation and withdraw their trust in officials, but they expect the central government to launch a democratic reform. They trust central government and expect it to solve all problems facing contemporary China. This is the underlying reason why the central government enjoys an extraordinarily higher level of political trust than local governments. This is opposite to the general pattern of political trust in its Western counterparts where local governments earn more trust.

In conclusion, this research sheds light on the current situation of traditional values in China and its future transforming trend. The results demonstrate that traditional values do closely correlate with the level of political trust in China. As affective legitimate sources, political trust sustained by traditional values is more stable and persistent, which is able to stand up to the risk of erosion of legitimacy because of poor government performance. The current regime is resilient in part benefiting from this cultural factor. Nevertheless, traditional values are declining in the younger generation and educated persons in China. In the future, the Chinese government’s legitimacy rooted in traditional values is going to weaken.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Professors Ken’ichi Ikeda of Doshisha University, Yukio Maeda of the University of Tokyo, Chong-Min Park and Hyung-min Joo of Korea University, the co-editor of JAAS Professor T. Y. Wang and anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author biography

Yida Zhai is an Assistant Professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China. He received his PhD from the University of Tokyo. His research interests include political psychology, civic engagement, and East Asian comparative politics. His work has been published in Issues & Studies, International Political Science Review, Pacific Review, and other Chinese and Japanese journals.

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