The New Language Policy of the Nigerian Army: National Integration or Linguistic Imperialism?

Introduction

This article explores the (mis)fortunes of the new language policy of the Nigerian Army that requires officers and soldiers to become proficient in Nigeria’s three major languages – Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba – within a period of one year. Knowledge of the three major languages is also compulsory for recruitment and commissioning into the army. The Nigerian Army represents the strength and efficiency of the Nigerian nation and its people. It has a constitutionally defined role of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria. However, the prevailing internal security challenges in the country have made it imperative for the army to design a new language policy to improve on its internal operations. From the perspective of a linguist, the new language policy is unlikely to serve the interest of a highly multilingual army. It does not guarantee an effective social mechanism to foster peace and unity or promote national cohesion and social inclusion.

A language policy is a decision-making process, formally stated or implicit, used to decide which languages will be taught to (or learned by) whom and for what purposes (Baldauf, 1994; Cooper, 1989; LaPonce, 1987). Similarly, Ramanathan (2010: 1) views language policy as ‘rules’ and ‘mandates’ about language use – its governance, maintenance and reproduction at a variety of levels. It is a deliberate intervention strategy aimed at expanding the functions of a language or languages within specified social or institutional domains. Given the importance of language as a fundamental element in national consciousness (Svoljsak, 2012: 70), it often generates some controversy, especially in enacting macro-level language policy in a country where its citizens are linguistically diverse and culturally heterogeneous. In such circumstances, Wardhaugh and Fuller (2015, 267) argue that language planning, which is an output of language policy, is often done to benefit already powerful sectors of the society, as opposed to benefiting all members of the society equally. Such planning decisions are usually based on hegemony, or what Boada (2002: 2) describes as ‘a classical situation of minoritization by larger majoritization groups’.

In Nigeria, the question of language policy and planning at the macro level has been a recurring debate that is often relegated to the educational sector, which is a vital site for social and linguistic reproduction (Phillipson, 1997: 240). There is no robust or clearly articulated language policy in the country. There is a language-in-education policy that is embedded within the National Policy on Education (NPE) framework, which is still a subject of controversy among linguists, educators, teachers and policy planners and implementers. Recently, the focus of the debate on the politics of language in Nigeria has shifted to the Nigerian Army, which has initiated a micro-level language policy that requires its officers and soldiers to learn the three major languages simultaneously within one year in order to enhance intelligence gathering and community relations. Though this policy seems to share a history of domination or hegemony with the language-in-education policy in Nigeria, the army believes that it is reactive, positive and promotional in projecting its unification ideals and national cohesion. ¹ The introduction of this policy at a critical period when the Nigerian Army is facing internal security challenges in different geographical locations in the country – such as insurgency by Boko Haram (North-east), self-determination agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) (South-east), pipeline vandals and kidnappings for ransom threats by the Niger-Delta Avengers (South-south) – anticipates how the new linguistic reality could be explored to provide the necessary panacea for internal security operations. Based on the perception of the army, it is a problem-solving–language-change strategy to meet specific linguistic needs (Baldauf, 1994: 82).

The notion of linguistic imperialism is related to linguicide or linguistic genocide, which Skutnabb-Kangas (1988: 13) sees as ‘ideologies, structures and practices, which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and non-material) between groups which are defined on the basis of language’. The concept of linguistic imperialism defines the interplay of language, power and exploitation. Phillipson (1997: 238), however, describes the phenomenon as a social construct, devised to account for linguistic hierarchization, to address issues of why some languages come to be used more and others less, what structures and ideologies facilitate such processes, and the role of language professionals. In this study, I aim to examine how the new Nigerian Army language policy fits into the relevant linguistic imperialism paradigms, which are manifest in social injustice, linguistic hegemony/domination, exploitation and marginalization of speakers of minoritized languages. The main thrust of the argument of this paper is that the Nigerian Army should develop and expand the status of Nigerian Pidgin to promote national integration and sustain effective social solidarity among its officers and soldiers, rather than imposing the major languages on them.

Exploring global accounts of language policies in the military

In the military, knowledge of languages – particularly foreign languages – plays important roles in alliances, occupations and peace building. While many countries have well-established and clearly articulated language policies for their militaries or defence departments, others do not seem to adequately define the role of language in their military operations, intelligence and strategies. In the USA, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap is the new language policy for the US military. According to Wible (2013: 125), the roadmap aims to propose actions that will cultivate a new attitude towards language skills in the US military culture, and also ensures that the right language skills are developed to shape events, respond rapidly and operate globally in the twenty-first century. The essence of the roadmap is to enable military professionals to develop high-level competencies in reading, listening and speaking critical-need languages, and it suggests the infusing of a deeper linguistic and cultural understanding into all levels of the military to enhance its ability to improve effectively, both nationally and internationally (Wible, 2013: 125). In South Africa, the language policy for the Department of Defence (DOD) elaborates that English shall be the thread language, while the status of the 11 official languages shall be recognized, respected and used as link languages. According to the language policy of the Department of Defence, (Goussard-Kunz (2009: 168), the use of appropriate link languages shall support English to facilitate communication further in the context of language diversity and to overcome the challenges of command and control. The South African case study reveals how functional multilingualism is encouraged and promoted. English has a special place in international communication and for training purposes, while the country’s indigenous (official) languages are relevant in military operations, information gathering and departmental correspondence.

In Kenya, Swahili plays a leading role as the national language while English and Swahili are the official languages of the military and government. Current realities in military and diplomatic operations have made it imperative for Kenyan Army officers and soldiers to learn French. This is an initiative of the Kenyan government in collaboration with French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and its Directorate of Security and Defence Cooperation. According to the collaboration, the learning of French as a foreign language by Kenyan soldiers has two primary objectives: first, it aims to train liaison officers who are involved in peace-keeping operations with other contingents who speak French, and second – more importantly – to aid the training of high-potential Kenyan officers to pursue further studies at the Warfare School in Paris. This initiative is in line with Britain’s Defence Language Capability Policy, which states that ‘the ability to communicate effectively is a prerequisite for the successful application of military and diplomatic influence’.

In 2015, the British military initiated a policy that makes the acquisition of language skills compulsory for senior officers. This policy states that no officer will be promoted above captain unless they can speak a foreign language. The Ministry of Defence Centre for Languages and Culture offers training to soldiers across the language skills: reading, speaking, writing and listening in foreign languages, especially French and Arabic, aimed at providing regional knowledge and cross-cultural training (Jones, 2014). According to the British Defence chief, ‘better language skills will be at the forefront to carve a new, more nimble but sophisticated role for British’s land forces’ to gain a deep cultural and social working knowledge in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the defence cut in the UK. ² The move, according to the officer, came as part of the British Army’s international defence engagement order, whereby individual brigades were assigned different geographic areas of the globe in that to gain a deep cultural and social working knowledge.

In India, the official languages of education, administration and All-Union business are English, Hindi and a language of the state in which one resides (Laitin, 1989: 415). English and Hindi share many sociolinguistic domains in the national life of the country. However, the Indian Army has a language regulation that is based on Hindu/Urdu mixed with English and written in Roman characters (Benedikter, 2011: 62). It is further argued that this linguistic tradition is an offshoot of British colonialism, which preferred the most common language to be used by soldiers, while the officers added English and the Roman script. It is a policy that has been sustained since independence in India. Conversely, in Israel, English is not considered an important language of operation for the Israel Defense Forces, as its army is popularly known. Spolsky and Shohamy (1999: 90) maintain that in the realm of language policies and practices, the Israeli Army has had an important impact in three major areas: in the teaching of Hebrew to those who do not speak it; in the teaching of Arabic; and in the attempt to provide a large proportion of the population with basic mother tongue skills. Among the Arab Druze and Bedouin soldiers, it is reported that Arabic–Hebrew code switching is prevalent (Amara and Mar’i, 2002: 85). The entire linguistic orientation of the Israeli Army is geared towards Hebrew language proficiency. Practical Hebrew language instruction is organized at three levels – basic, intermediary and advanced – for non-native-born recruits to enable them acquire literacy and oral competences, primarily in Hebrew.

Alshebab (2013: 62) investigates the impact of language planning, terminology planning and arabicization on the policy of military terminology and translation in Jordan. He argues that the Jordanian Army lacked accurate Arabic equivalent translations for the abundant new military terminology, which is modelled to modern western armies, and provides a guide for the application of language policy and planning on military terminology in stages. The implication of this kind of micro-level language policy is to arabicize emerging western military terminology, especially those expressing new scientific and technological innovations. The aim has been to enable Jordanian soldiers to cope in understanding new dynamics in weaponry operations, combat in armed conflict and peace support operations. From the foregoing review, we can make some assumptions about contemporary military language policies, namely, that planning decisions are often aimed at promoting multilingualism in all its ramifications; greater priority is given to the learning of foreign languages, and the learning of indigenous languages greatly depends on the linguistic demography of a particular country or the socio-political relevance of a particular language to warfare, politics and national economy, in the case of Hebrew in Israel.

Methodology

Data for the study were obtained in Nigerian Army formations in Abuja, Kaduna (North), Lagos and Calabar (South). In Abuja, respondents were consulted at the army headquarters, Garki. This is where the Chief of Army Staff is housed. The establishment is the administrative headquarters of the Nigerian Army in Nigeria where important decisions and policies such as the new language policy are implemented. In Kaduna, data were sourced from lecturers in the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA). In Lagos and Calabar, the sampled respondents were consulted at the Ikeja Military Cantonment, Bank Anthony Way, Ikeja and Eburutu Barracks, Ikot Ansa respectively. The two army barracks have accommodation for officers and soldiers, facilities for drill, training, mammy markets (a special market in army barracks where products for soldiers are sold), schools, healthcare centres and worship centres for residents. Twenty-five officers and soldiers and five civilian lecturers participated in the study: five in Abuja, 10 in Lagos and Calabar each and five in Kaduna. While the respondents in Abuja represented the initiators and implementers of the policy, the respondents in Kaduna were the drivers of the new policy, and the respondents in Lagos and Calabar were the potential beneficiaries of the policy. The military personnel were 21 males and four females in addition to five lecturers (four males and one female). The ages of respondents range between 28–65 years. Their educational background, religious affiliation, cultural identity and linguistic affinity vary. For those in the army, their years of service and ranks also vary. Only senior officers from the rank of Major and above were interviewed in Abuja. Low-ranking officers from the rank of Private and above were engaged in Lagos and Calabar.

Personal interviews, observations and metalinguistic conversations were the primary elicitation techniques. For the military echelon in Abuja, I asked questions on the motivations for the new policy, the practicability of learning three languages within a year, the implications of the policy for internal security in the country, and the Nigerian Pidgin question. For the Lagos and Calabar respondents, I sought to know their level of preparedness to embrace the new policy, their perception of the policy, and the Nigerian Pidgin option. For the non-military Kaduna respondents, I attempted to understand their perceptions, attitudes and opinions on the new language policy. I aimed to know the facilities and infrastructures they have put in place to commence the implementation of the policy, and how they intend to tackle the problem of scarcity of teachers. Interviews were scheduled at respondents’ convenience given the nature of their duty schedules. Their consents were sought for all the interviews and recordings. An audio recorder and field notes were used to record and document data. Data were coded into appropriate categorical frames, and the conceptual framework guided the kind of data that were elicited. Some other primary data were obtained as printed matters and documents. These include the army press bulletin, the House of Representatives’ position paper on the new language policy of the Nigerian Army and the Lagos State House of Assembly press release. The descriptive approach has been employed in the analysis and interpretation of data.

Analysis and discussion

In the analysis that follows, I undertake a linguistic profile of the Nigerian Army to assess the role each language plays in its community of practice in an attempt to properly situate the new language policy in its proper perspectives. I examine the main distinguishing characteristics of the new language policy, critically evaluate its merits and demerits and weigh its provisions against the options of linguistic imperialism framework. Finally, I recommend the elaboration of the functions of Nigerian Pidgin to serve the emerging linguistic challenges of the army.

The linguistic ecology of the Nigerian Army

The Nigerian Army is an important national institution in Nigeria and is the largest component of the Nigerian armed forces that had ruled the country undemocratically for over twenty-five years since independence in 1960. Abdullahi et al. (2012: 271) maintain that the military has played significant roles in the economic and socio-political development of the country through reorientation and the pursuit of positive values aimed at producing disciplined and self-reliant citizens who would have a positive impact on the economy. Conversely, Ajayi (2013: 138) believes that there is a low level of national development and integration achieved during the military era as a result of coercion and strict authoritarian control that elevated violence, corruption, intolerance and selfish pursuit in the polity. In spite of the barrage of criticisms against the military rule in Nigeria, it is on record that it prevented the division of the country during the civil war that ravaged Nigeria from 1967–1970. The military and the army in particular is still relevant in contemporary Nigeria’s democratic system, particularly in the fight against insurgency and ethnic militias.

Language plays a crucial role in the day-to-day operations of the Nigerian Army. Each language is useful within a specified sociolinguistic domain or community of practice. Based on the hegemonic ideology of the policy, English and Nigeria’s major indigenous languages (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) are the dominant languages in the army. Nigerian Pidgin is the non-official language of wider communication, while French and Arabic are required for sub-regional, transnational and international operations and peace keeping. However, they are not among the official vehicles for ‘professional literacy’ in the army (Samuelson and Freedman, 2011: 211). In the discussion that follows, I examine the role of each language in the context of official and unofficial communication in the army.

Abdulrahman and Mang (2017: 21) opine that the Nigerian Army emerged from an inherited Colonial Army. The English language was a part of this inheritance. In most African countries, English was imposed as the language of British imperial rule before the attainment of independence. In South Africa, for instance, Hamel (2005: 19) records that military conquest, combined with massive immigrant settlements, decimated the local population and made English the national language. English remains the official language of the army in administration, education, recruitment and international engagements. Reiterating the importance of English in international politics, Boada (2002: 2) remarks that English is the language used most often as a code for relations between different linguistic groups, and most habitual in international, scientific and commercial communication. A credit pass in English in a national examination (West African School Certificate (WASC) or National Examination Council (NECO) is a mandatory requirement for admission to the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) where potential army officers are trained. It is also a compulsory requirement for the lower-level recruitment of soldiers into the army. English is the language of official business of the army, of its correspondence and documentations. In terms of linguistic landscape, English is the only code of visible texts in billboards, road and navigation signs, and shops signage, particularly in the army headquarters and barracks. Information bulletins and press releases are usually disseminated in English. Proficiency in the English language is therefore required professionally by the army to meet the linguistic demands of its culturally diverse officers and soldiers. It is the courier of many cultures and values and promises access to a much wider knowledge base and socio-economic relations (Hamel, 2005: 7). It is central to the linguistic ecology of the army, which represents a microcosm of the Nigerian state.

Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba are the major languages spoken in Nigeria. Wardhaugh and Fuller (2015: 290) opine that these languages have an official status but only on a regional basis. Hausa is the predominant lingua franca in Northern Nigeria, Igbo is the majority language in the east and Yoruba is spoken predominantly in the western part of the country. Of these languages, Hausa is most often identified with the army. It is claimed that after independence, there were more Northerners at junior levels in the army and, hence, Hausa was often used to aid communication between lower ranks and officers (BBC, 2017). Akande (2016: 47) maintains that Hausa is considered the most important (language in army barracks) because of the presumed historical link it has with the formation of the army in Nigeria. Further prominence of Hausa in the armed forces is seen in the code names of its operations. These include: Operation Lafia Dole (Peace by all means), Operation Gama Aiki (Getting the job done), Operation Awatse (Scatter), Operation Sharan Daji (Sweeping the bush) and Operation Harbin Kunama II (Scorpion sting). Hausa is the only language that is used to designate these operations.

Yoruba and Igbo have confined roles in the army barracks. They are mainly spoken at home and in interaction with other speakers. In Lagos barracks, where Yoruba is the dominant language of the barracks’ environment, I discover that Yoruba is a viable medium of socialization among children. Children from other ethnolinguistic groups speak and understand Yoruba fluently. This is, however, not the case with Efik in Calabar barracks. The study also discovered the use of international languages such as Arabic and French in the barracks. Arabic is closely tied to Islam (Akande, 2016: 47) and is spoken by a few Muslims in Calabar, but has more speakers in Lagos. French has the most negligible number of speakers in the army barracks. I observed during the fieldwork that only soldiers who participated in international peace-keeping operations speak French. A few of them claimed to have learned it formally outside the country, while others learned it in Nigeria.

While English has a formal written function in the army’s community of practice, Nigerian Pidgin is used informally in oral communication. It has been described as the most efficient means of communication among the densely cultural and linguistically diverse people of Nigeria, given its structural simplification and wide-ranging acceptability (Mensah, 2011; 2013). In a fluid multilingual setting like the army, where soldiers and officers belong to different ethnolinguistic groups, Nigerian Pidgin serves to integrate them into a unified linguistic group. Emenanjo (1985: 127) recognizes Nigerian Pidgin as one of the four commonly spoken languages in Nigeria, competing with the national languages: Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. An observation of the mammy markets, where soldiers usually relax and refresh themselves after a day’s work, reveals that Nigerian Pidgin is the dominant language for commercial and casual communication among officers and soldiers. So, in the social context of the army barracks, officers and soldiers are receptive multilinguals, speaking English (with varying degrees of competences), Nigerian Pidgin and at least an indigenous language or two. From the account of variationist sociolinguistics, language is a shared property of the community and a correlation of linguistic and social factors (Drummond and Schleef, 2016; Heller, 1984; Labov, 1977). Individual languages used in the Nigerian Army community of practice vary and undergo changes based on the characteristics of speakers and their social distribution. Yoruba, for instance, has various dialects such as Ikale, Oyo, Ijesha, Ondo and Egba, with varying degrees of mutual intelligibility. Identity among soldiers is expressed and constructed ideologically first with a speaker of one’s own dialect, who may be referred to as a ‘brother’ or a ‘sister’, thus demonstrating a stronger social bond, cultural allegiance and belonging. In this regard, such a language practice can serve as a frame of reference to judge the success or failure of the new language policy.

The new Nigerian Army language policy

In a press release by the Director of Nigerian Army Public Relations (Usman 2017) the new language policy of the Nigerian Army was officially released and articulated as follows.

The first policy statement offers some justifications for the introduction of the new micro-level language policy. It claims that it is a global practice for army officers and soldiers to embrace multilingualism as an inherent linguistic practice. It goes on to enumerate the benefits of multilingualism in the context of the military’s internal and external operations, especially in the execution of their professional and constitutional duties of defence and intelligence service. The second policy statement emphasizes the position and status of English in the army as the official language, which is supplemented by Nigeria’s major indigenous languages. It maintains that even with the new requirement, the status of English will not change. It also states the core policy objective, which compels soldiers to learn Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba within one year. It specifies the level of language skills and proficiency required and provides a motivational structure to undertake language instruction for officers and soldiers who attain competent level and fluency in these languages within the specified time frame. The next policy statement stresses the importance of the new language policy in future employment and recruitment into the army and restates the need for prospective soldiers to be functional multilinguals. The final policy statement reiterates the acquisition of skills in foreign languages, which is vital for regional and international peace-keeping operations. It emphasizes the role of the French language, which is the second official language in Nigeria, as an examinable language skill in some of the army’s career courses and examinations. Generally, this policy tends to deal with the social distribution of Nigeria’s competing indigenous languages (by giving the major ones more power, influence and prestige), thus pursuing extralinguistic objectives (Daoust, 1997; Rubin, 1984) as opposed to any individual linguistic goal.

Merits of the new language policy

The Nigerian Army itself has made frantic efforts to defend the new language policy as a tool that will foster national unity and integration. According to one respondent, the policy will help to improve communication and understanding during military operations. Furthermore, the policy will facilitate the handling of top secret issues and in checking leakage of information. It is also believed that language skills are key to successful modern military operations, engagement with allies and for the building of mutual understanding and friendship. The Lagos State House of Assembly has been the first public institution to publicly commend the army for the introduction of the new language policy that tends to place the country’s major indigenous languages on the front burner. The Speaker of the Assembly maintains that the army has been passionate about ensuring internal peace and unity in Nigeria. He argues that security operatives should function effectively in areas where they understand the language, culture and traditions of the people and applauds the policy as a way of helping Nigeria’s indigenous languages to regain their pride of place in the scheme of things in the country. He also believes that the introduction of the new language policy would give vent to the fight against terrorism and other issues threatening Nigeria’s collective peace as a nation.

The policy aims to facilitate cross-cultural communication, allowing soldiers to connect with tribal communities in exciting new ways and to gain new experiences. One respondent believes that access to the three major languages will strengthen the army’s internal security apparatus and strategy. It will also improve understanding and help the army to fight the menace of brainwashing and indoctrination, which for some of the insurgents is ideological. According to the respondent, young men are brainwashed into believing they will be hosted by seven virgins in heaven when they die in the course of their ‘struggle’. Soldiers’ knowledge of the indigenous languages will be a potent tool to counteract such radical beliefs.

Problems with the new language policy

Nigeria’s House of Representatives has been the most vociferous critic of the new language policy, which it describes as derogatory and harmful to the cohesion of the army. It argues that compelling soldiers and officers to learn the three major languages is unfair and may give some undue advantage to those people who are speakers of these languages in the army. It maintains that foisting linguistic and cultural hegemony of the major languages on speakers of other languages will breed factionalization and marginalization, as well as ambush the legitimate aspiration of speakers of other languages, because it will not guarantee equal opportunities. It further argues that given the heterogeneous nature of the army and indeed the Nigerian society, the policy will infringe on the fundamental human rights of the speakers of the minority languages. The House further argues that the whole idea of initiating a new language policy by the Nigerian Army is misplaced and wrongly timed, given the challenges of insurgence and terrorist attacks that are ravaging parts of the country. The army’s priority, according to the parliamentarians, should not be a new language policy but an investment in strategy and intelligence gathering.

Language policy is a way of changing established linguistic practices and projecting a vision of a future sociolinguistic situation that should be brought about in an attempt to solve language or communication problems (Daoust, 2004: 440). One respondent argues that the army’s language policy seems to lack any clearly defined goals that should drive its implementation. Rubin (1984: 9) points out that setting out the goal can help to minimize the distortion of the original goals as well as any backlash or boomerang effect, which sometimes happens during the implementation phase. The respondent emphasizes that the policy seems to lack wider language planning consultation as the army did not identify, in explicit terms, its current language or communication problem that the policy aimed to remedy. This has also made it difficult for the policy to be properly assessed and evaluated in the light of its introduction. Yet another respondent maintains that the policy’s goals and justifications are feeble and the means to achieve these goals are not clearly articulated in the document. For instance, one does not know if the army intends to collaborate with linguistic departments of Nigerian universities for this project or is setting up a language institute for this purpose. My interaction with some lecturers in the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) shows that there is no facility on the ground to expedite the immediate implementation of the policy. They rather suggested that, perhaps, the army intends to use its newly established Nigerian Army University, Biu, Borno State, to implement the policy. One wonders what efforts the army is making with respect to teachers’ supply; there is already a dearth of teachers of these languages in Nigerian universities and colleges of education, and efforts to recruit them have been yielding poor results. Based on my findings, there is no deliberate effort by the army to recruit teachers who will drive this language instruction process.

The level of proficiency the army hopes its officers and soldiers to attain within the limited time frame is also a problem. The act of compelling its officers and soldiers to learn three languages within a period of one year is a formidable task. Although the policy clearly states that basic proficiency in each of the major languages is the requirement, empirical evidence (Griffiths, 2008; Harley, 1986) has shown that it is a herculean task to acquire three languages with practical literacy in such a short period of time. Younger learners acquire language effortlessly as a biological endowment. Older learners who have crossed the critical acquisition period require a longer, more gradual process in addition to motivation, enthusiasm and experience. This is clearly a ‘top down’ language planning framework, where the language policy makers and planners are people with power and authority who make language-related decisions for groups, often with little or no consultation with the ultimate language learners and users (Kaplan, 1989; Mansoor, 2005). Language policies do not need to be imposed since they are much more a matter for negotiation and persuasion, especially in the postcolonial era (Phillipson, 1997: 240), and because the present policy is an imposition, it will require strong administrative force to ensure implementation (Yang and Wang, 2016: 63).

Another criticism of the new language policy is that it is not targeted, per se, at contributing to curbing the internal security challenges the army is facing right now in Nigeria. For instance, one respondent notes that the hotspot for the Boko Haram insurgency has Kanuri, a minority language, as the language of the immediate environment, while Ikwere, Abua, Kalabari and Izon (Ijaw) are the other minority languages spoken predominantly in the Niger-Delta region, where pipeline vandalization and kidnapping for ransom are the order of the day. Knowledge of the majority languages will not have much impact in these kinds of situations.

Weighing the policy against linguistic imperialism framework

In this section, I discuss the level of conformity—or, otherwise, of Phillipson’s (2012: 214) linguistic imperialism model—with the new Nigerian Army language policy. The analysis reveals that the new policy is in consonance with six out of seven defining features of the framework, as I discuss below.

The first parameter for measuring linguistic imperialism is favouring the dominant languages over the less powerful languages. The policy merely seems to align with the mainstream linguistic hegemony of imposing the major languages on speakers of minoritized languages in Nigeria, which according to Skutnabb-Kangas (1989: 8) creates ‘systematic inequality’. This has a number of negative consequences for the army as a national institution with diverse cultural affiliations and linguistic backgrounds. The policy does not portray the army as an equal opportunity institution as a result of this language-based discrimination in the area of employment. The policy does not favour the three dominant languages based on linguistic merits but largely on ideological, demographic and socio-political bases. The majority population in the army speaks these languages, hence it has been easy to influence the policy to favour their languages. The implication is that speakers of the minoritized languages are compelled to learn all of these languages, while speakers of one dominant language only need learn the other two. In this way, greater cognitive pressure would be mounted on a set of soldiers and officers, while others will enjoy some relative advantage.

The second defining feature of linguistic imperialism is when more resources and infrastructure are given to the dominant language. Since the statuses of these languages have been elevated as working languages by the army, educational tools, technologies, materials and resources have to be deployed to meet the potential learners’ expectations, develop linguistic competences and grow new expectations. Importantly more teachers of these languages will have to be recruited and motivated. These are the most critical actors to drive the implementation of this educational process. Course materials, modules and software have to be developed to support this access to knowledge. A stronger learning environment and classroom infrastructure have to be provided. The implication is that more financial resources would have to be appropriated by the army for the promotion of these major languages.

The next parameter is ideologically believing that the dominant languages are superior and more prestigious. The choice of the three major languages by the army may be hinged on Weber and Horner’s (2012: 16) notion of ‘hierarchies of language’, which clearly defines an ideology of dominance that entails the promotion of certain languages above others in a multilingual setting. Since Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba are already regional lingua francas in Northern, Eastern and Western Nigeria respectively, they have attained some reasonable degree of status and corpus development. They have recorded wide range socio-communicative functions in different sociolinguistic domains such as home, education, the media and politics. The teaching and learning of these dominant languages is compulsory in their respective regions. In Lagos State, for example, a day is usually set aside every week for legislative functions to be carried out in Yoruba only. Yoruba is a compulsory, ,examinable subject in primary and secondary schools in the state. The Nigerian constitution and important government documents have been translated into these languages. This is usually to facilitate prompt information dissemination, particularly that affecting healthcare, rural agriculture and mass literacy, to the grassroots. These languages are, therefore, conferred with prestige, power and influence, to the detriment of the minoritized languages (Mensah and Inyabri, 2016: 13). This is why Groff (2017: 157) argues that language ideologies legitimize the power dynamics favouring some perspectives – such as linguistic varieties, some forms of linguistic practices and linguistic categorization – over others. The new army language policy only provides a new legitimate role for the dominant languages and this can only project the continuous minimization of Nigeria’s rich cultural and linguistic diversity.

The fourth characteristic of linguistic imperialism is when policy is intertwined with the same structure as imperialism in culture, education, the media and politics. The adoption by the army of the three major languages in Nigeria as its working languages is a planning focus that reflects the existing linguistic and cultural hegemony in the country. In the area of culture, mainly cultural artefacts from these languages’ groups are reflected in the country’s currency notes. In education, at least one of these languages is a compulsory examinable subject in the federal government’s unity schools across the country, where speakers of other languages are compelled to learn them. The National Policy on Education (2013) specifically spelt out that the three major indigenous languages are to be used as languages of national culture and integration and are compulsory examinable subjects in federal government-owned post-primary schools. In the media, especially federal government-owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and Radio Nigeria, broadcasters usually end the day’s news by greeting viewers and listeners in these languages, thus using the dominant language for social exclusion and inclusion.

The fifth principle is when a policy has an exploitative essence, which causes injustice and inequality between those who use the dominant language and those who do not. Knowledge of the dominant languages can confer rights and privileges and other material and social mobility benefits in terms of employment, as the new policy has clearly articulated. In this connection, the dominant languages will function as tools of empowerment of the majority languages speakers at the expense of the dominated languages speakers who are alienated. The army does not encourage equal opportunity principle in its employment framework, neither does it value diversity nor have a proactive and inclusive orientation towards equitability. This could be a source of complaint that is linked to social injustice and cultural inequality. The three major languages, therefore, are imperialistic in scope, nature and function, because speakers of other languages are not given the same opportunity to grow and develop their careers.

The sixth parameter is when a policy has a subtractive influence on other languages, in that learning the dominant language is at the expense of the others. The inclusion of educational opportunities for the three major languages by the army will contribute to their further growth and development – a privilege or an opportunity that is deliberately denied the minoritized languages. The new Nigerian Army language policy displays subtle forms of discrimination against the speakers of the minority languages. It has some adverse effects on the linguistic and social make-up of the army. It represents pre-existing preferences in the larger scope of the Nigerian society. The choice of the dominant working languages by the Nigerian Army is a way of ‘legitimization of linguistic superiority’ (Hamel, 2005: 8).

The seventh framework is the possibility of a policy to be contested and resisted. This is the only parameter of Phillipson’s (2012) linguistic imperialism that does not align with the aspirations of the new army language policy. The policy was not an outcome of negotiation or consultation with the relevant stakeholders in the army or speakers of dominated languages, especially the low-ranking officers who are its key drivers. It was an imposition in the established military fashion, where orders are not questioned or resisted. The policy was handed down by the powers that be for all and sundry to comply ‘with immediate effect’. Such an imposition becomes hegemonic when it is accepted as the ideological norm of all social classes (Vassey, 2013: 22). Such a policy represents an effective ideology, which means that things are accepted as given, the powerful remain powerful and the powerless remain powerless (Eagleton, 2007; Vassey, 2013).

In the light of the principles of linguistic imperialism as related to the new army language policy and given the barrage of criticism against the policy, which is framed so as to benefit already powerful sectors of the army as opposed to benefiting all members of the army equally (Wardhaugh and Fuller, 2015: 267), I suggest the adoption of Nigerian Pidgin as the national language of the army. Nigerian Pidgin is already known and popular in the linguistic ecology of the army. It would not require formal or explicit learning, given the assertion that maintaining multilingualism comes with a price (Spolsky, 2004: 185). It is neutral in terms of ethnic affiliation and enjoys a wide degree of acceptance among the majority of Nigerians – more than any of the majority languages in the country. Mensah (2011, 2013) remarks that NP is the most efficient means of inter-ethnic communication in Nigeria. Ethnologue (2017) records that NP has over 30 million speakers (as at 2005) and greater communicative potential than any indigenous Nigerian language. Adopting NP by the Nigerian Army will be an excellent opportunity to draw attention to the status planning of the language by expanding its social functions and internal resources. According to one respondent, it will be an excellent tool to improve professional development and workflow, especially in sustaining and promoting intercultural communication. NP should be adopted as the primary link language beside English. It may also be relevant in military operations within the region where other varieties of Pidgins, such as Cameroon Pidgin English or Ghanaian Pidgin English, flourish. In this way, it can help to promote regional co-operation and transnational integration. However, other respondents argue that Nigerian Pidgin is a ‘bastardized language’ and no one will take the army seriously with such a choice. Some maintain that NP is not mature enough to be accorded such a status in Nigeria and that it is still mostly seen as a street language. In spite of these criticisms, Mensah (2011: 236) believes that NP is the only language of true national consciousness in Nigeria and a robust or explicit policy framework by the army can re-energize its functionality and reposition it to meet its contemporary challenges.

Conclusion

In Nigeria, most efforts and debates on language policy and planning have always concentrated on the education sector. However, the introduction of a new language policy by the Nigerian Army for its officers and soldiers has added a fresh dimension to the discourse of politics of language in Nigeria. The said policy has been formulated to promote multilingualism in the army and it has enormous social, cultural and political implications (Clyne, 1997: 304). The policy gives vent to the official acceptance of multilingualism as the social practice in the army and one of its viable strategies for success in addressing diversity within its rank and file. The policy anticipates an ideology of language and national cohesion and identity in the army in an integrative way. It shows evidence of positive multilingualism, which directly correlates with the representation of multiculturalism as a new form of identity for the army. It also demonstrates collective engagement towards promoting military–civil relations. In spite of the justifiable merits of this language policy, I have also identified its apparent weaknesses, especially when it is weighed against Phillipson’s (2012) linguistic imperialism paradigms. Results show that the adoption of the three major Nigerian languages as working languages of the army is a mark of domination and exploitation of the minoritized languages in the army and, by extension, Nigeria as a whole. This evidence reveals that linguistic imperialism is alive and kicking (Rose and Conama, 2017: 16) in the professional context of the Nigerian Army.

I therefore recommend the adoption of Nigerian Pidgin as the language of wider communication in internal operations of the Nigerian Army. It is already a familiar language among officers and soldiers that can best suit its culturally and linguistically heterogeneous composition. The army can promote Nigerian Pidgin in its quest to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of its internal operations by expanding its social utility and enriching its internal resourcefulness. This can be achieved to meet the demands for its standardization, and to facilitate production of educational materials in it. It is the only communicative medium that can neutralize the effects of discrimination, marginalization and social exclusion posed by the adoption of the three major languages.