“Do not Disturb the Peace!” Identities,Livelihoods and the Politics of Post-War Discontent in Sierra Leone

Abstract

Although the collective memory of war is frequently invoked in post-war societies, who chooses to invoke it and to what effect has been less studied relative to other aspects of such societies. In this article we employ a case study of Sierra Leone to address this deficit in the post-conflict scholarship by illustrating how the collective memory of that country’s civil war is appropriated by diverse actors in the post-war society. Drawing from field interviews, we present evidence showing how, and why, several societal groups constituted as distinct post-war identities such as victims-rights groups, former defenders of the state, or perpetrators of the violence during the Sierra Leone civil war articulate dissatisfactions with their livelihoods and the reactions of state officials to their demands. The article explains why, and how, successive governments have selectively suppressed the discontent of some groups over livelihood insecurities that are construed as threats to public order while ignoring violent protests from other groups over similar issues, in spite of a 1965 public order act restricting protests. Thus, the article argues that state officials in Sierra Leone have not demonstrated superior commitment to peacebuilding than societal groups that make demands on the state.

Keywords

Politics Africa Sierra Leone peacebuilding post-conflict societies political science

Introduction

We will deal with anyone who disturbs the peace! We do not expect people to cheer us when we are enforcing the law but the general populace will vindicate us as people still have confidence in us. Brima Acha Kamara, former Inspector General of the Sierra Leone Police. ¹

On Friday, 10 June 2016 commercial motorbike riders who provide transportation services to a large segment of the public in Sierra Leone protested violently at attempts by the police to enforce a ban restricting them from plying routes in the central business districts (CBD) of the city of Freetown. Imposed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the ban was purportedly intended to reduce traffic congestion. However, the motorbike riders, some of whom are demobilized combatants following the end of the Sierra Leone civil war of 1991–2002, saw the ban on commercial motorbikes from plying lucrative districts in the CBD as a threat to their livelihoods. In their view, the ban was a harsh imposition aimed more at controlling the activities of those among their ranks whose collective identity is cast as “ex-combatants,” than the declared purpose of controlling traffic and reducing congestion in the commercial and administrative capital of Sierra Leone. To suppress the protests, the government adopted a heavy-handed approach by deploying paramilitary forces and riot police who fired shots and made numerous arrests to disperse the angry mobs.

The clashes were the latest incidents in a long list of popular expressions of discontent with livelihoods by groups whose collective identities in post-war Sierra Leone were partly engendered by the unsatisfactory outcomes of the civil war settlement in 2002. Although an increasing volume of scholarship has examined and offered theories on the articulations of such post-war grievances, and other issues in post-war societies in West Africa (see for example, Cubitt, 2011; Enria, 2015; Millar, 2012; Mustapha and Bangura, 2010; Shepler, 2014, 2010; Sola-Martin, 2009), and elsewhere, such as South Sudan, Uganda, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia (see for example, Amusan, 2014; Angucia, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Bogner and Neubert, 2013; Ensor, 2013; Lindemann, 2011; McDonough, 2008; Paris, 2004; Schomerus and Titeca, 2012; Spears and Wight, 2015), very little is still known about how the collective memory of war is appropriated in state-society relationships, and why and where various disaffections with livelihoods intersect or clash with the quest for order and security as societies that have experienced civil war strive to build peace.

Thus, this article explains the variation in how several groups in Sierra Leone organize to express discontent as identities and concerns over livelihood insecurity clash with issues of security in the shadow of the country’s peacebuilding efforts. It also describes the conditions, agency, and issues that produce and structure discontent in post-war Sierra Leone, and explains how, and why, such discontent is addressed or disregarded by politicians. Scholars have explained key elements of the dynamics of post-war Sierra Leone, such as the “political economy of youth violence” (see Enria, 2015), or the politicization of the livelihoods and identities of some groups in the country, such as commercial bike riders (see for example Christensen and Utas, 2008), but, to wit, the collective and often strategic structuring and articulation of discontent as groups seeking rights for victims of the war or those who defended the state or even perpetrated violence against it have not been equally explored; neither has the principal role of the state in post-war politics been illuminated.

The focus on society and societal groups has been useful but ultimately limited in fully explaining the dynamics of post-war societies such as Sierra Leone and peacebuilding processes, generally, because the state frequently plays an inordinate role in appropriating the collective memory of war as it mediates between diverse societal groups (see for example, Igreja, 2013). As we show, elite perceptions of the sources and structures of discontent in Sierra Leone shape the policies of the state and its response to the disaffections registered by various groups in the post-war society. For instance, political leaders decided to use force to confront the protesters during the protests of 10 June, 2016, whereas they chose to negotiate with another group, the Wounded in Action (WIA), in 2009 when that group protested violently and forcefully occupied government buildings to demand back pay (see Concord Times, 2009).

Drawing upon focus group discussions, archival research, personal interviews with various stakeholders, and participant observation across Sierra Leone, we explain how politics in the post-war country has been structured by its peace settlement and how, in turn, the structures shape the discontent various groups feel about the peace settlement. The explanation involves three key and interrelated arguments:

First, state officials summon up the collective memory of war in the name of keeping public order to selectively deter societal groups considered threats to their rule.

Second, two types of discontent define the post-war environment in Sierra Leone. The first source of discontent is traceable to the conditions that caused the war, whereas the discontent of other groups stems from the peace agreement that ended the war and its perceived failure to sufficiently provide for post-war livelihoods. We show that the convergence of several institutional and programmatic opportunities with the interests of political actors have caused differences in how the state has reacted to and addressed the consequent sources of discontent, and each requires unique policy directions and institutional inputs that political elites have neglected or manipulated for partisan interests.

Groups have forged their collective identities and attempted to renegotiate the social contract in post-war Sierra Leone in direct relation to the civil war and its aftermath.

Thus, we show that discourses of discontent in post-war societies and the way they are handled by political actors reflect a complex balance between the demands of disaffected groups and the state’s interests. Although some groups in post-war Sierra Leone, such as the commercial motorbike riders, have tangible grievances pertaining to their livelihoods or the attempted marginalization of their collective identity, state officials, on the other hand, have construed such expressions of discontent contrarily as direct threats to public order and the peacebuilding process instead of legitimate disaffection over insecure livelihoods that should be addressed.

In the rest of the paper, we discuss key elements of the relevant literature situating our work within the general scholarship on peacebuilding and related challenges in post-war African societies. We point out that scholars have paid less attention to the sources of the biases of political elites in addressing or ignoring post-war grievances, relative to the focus on the failures or inadequacies of externally driven peace processes (see for example, Bah, 2010); the effectiveness of reintegration programmes (see for example, Gilligan et al., 2013); the political economy of post-war society (see for example, Christensen and Utas, 2008; Enria, 2015; Fanthorpe and Maconachie, 2010); or the pathologies in ideas about reconstituting governance and re-establishing the state’s monopoly over coercion (see for example, Englebert and Tull, 2008). Next, we provide a brief background to post-war society in Sierra Leone after the Lomé Peace Accord of 1999. Following this section, we explain why some groups have been more likely than others to express discontent with the peace settlement. This section is followed by descriptions of how key groups have registered disaffections with their livelihoods springing from either the pre-war years or the post-war settlement and what the Lomé Accord promised, delivered or failed to provide. We also describe the interests and demands of the groups showing how they have structured their discontent in direct relation to the war using that status to achieve various political and policy goals. Finally, we illustrate the varying responses of political actors to the demands of groups showing that the state itself has not always demonstrated that it is more committed to peacebuilding in handling post-war discontent.

Indeed, although it has been over a decade since the war ended and studies have shown that the risk of recidivism by ex-combatants and total recourse to war in Sierra Leone is minimal (see for example, Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007), politicians have still used the collective memory of the conflict to deter political adversaries and ordinary citizens alike who wish to protest or register their dissatisfaction with basic economic conditions or livelihood insecurity. One such example was the clampdown on the protests by Okada bike riders on 10 June 2016. Another instance of the invocation of the collective memory of war to deter potential adversaries in the name of maintaining ‘public order’ can be found in the state’s decision to ban jogging on the streets of Freetown on 27 July 2017. The All Peoples Congress party in power issued this public notice only after Kandeh Yumkella’s (one of the leading opposition candidates heading into the presidential elections of 2018) daily routine of jogging on the streets of Freetown was emulated by youths across the city. In the public noticed signed by Francis Munu, the Inspector General of the Sierra Leone Police, the government claimed ‘…the police is therefore putting an immediate ban on such activities in line with the constitutional consideration for public order and safety…’ (Government of Sierra Leone Public Notice, 2017). The move was widely condemned, and the New York Times characterized it as an attempt to ‘suppress political opposition’ (Barry, 2017). However, it can be seen as part of a wider attempt by state officials to regularly invoke the memory of war against real or imagined political adversaries, civil society activists and members of the public alike. Thus, ‘do not disturb the peace’ has emerged as a strategic refrain in the post-war society whether an issue or protest poses a direct threat to the peacebuilding process or not. We conclude the paper with some caveats and recommendations for understanding and addressing discontent in post-war societies.

The promise and challenges of peacebuilding

The challenges to peacebuilding, the causes of successful or failed peace processes, and the political economy of post-war societies in Africa have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention around a broad constellation of ‘post-conflict studies’ (see for example, Bah, 2010; Bell and O’Rourke, 2007; Enria, 2015; Berghs and Dos Santos-Zinagale, 2011; Collier et al., 2008; Elbadawi et al., 2008; Englebert and Tull, 2008; Paris, 2004; Sola-Martin, 2009). This study engaged portions of this vast scholarship, especially with regard to the literature on the aftermaths of the relatively recent ‘new wars’ in West Africa that erupted following the end of the Cold War (Willett, 2005). This frame encompassed other risks to post-conflict societies, such as unemployed and underemployed youth in the post-war economy or what Enria (2015: 645) refers to as ‘…post-war narratives surrounding the dangers of unemployed youth’, and the related literature and theories on post-conflict development. It is a voluminous body of work that cannot easily be incorporated into a short review. Thus, we summarize some of the key issues, such as post-conflict reintegration of ex-combatants, governance, transitional and post-conflict justice, child soldiers, and youth unemployment and engagement that are most pertinent to the explanatory gap about the central role of the state in post-war society that this article seeks to address.

Regarding peacebuilding, some of the most influential contributions in the literature have diverged in their accounts about externally driven and internally driven processes. One school of thought, for example, emphasizes an externally driven process led by an ‘external military presence sustaining gradual economic recovery’, followed by other milestones such as elections (see for example, Collier et al., 2008; Kumar, 1997), as the best steps to consolidate peace. Conversely, other studies discount externally driven processes arguing, instead, for local ownership (see for example, Bah, 2010; Spears and Wight, 2015; Young, 2005). In an article on the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire, Bah (2010: 597) argued:

peace agreements engineered by the international community failed to end the conflict… [whereas] the peace agreement forged by Ivoirians themselves [was] relatively successful because it directly addressed the citizenship issue and restored domestic ownership of the peace process.

Writing about the aftermath of the Sudanese war of liberation and the conflict in South Sudan, Amusan (2014: 121) identified potential disputes over ‘…boundary issues, fossil fuels, and integration and citizenship’, in the new state that potentially could ‘germinate’ new conflicts as post-liberation elites seek to consolidate their rule in the shadow of the fear of ethnic domination by the Dinka majority. In a similar vein, Branch and Mampilly (2005) identified the rupture between Dinka and Equatorian peoples over local government issues as the most significant fissure in post-conflict South Sudan that would likely endanger the peacebuilding process in the new country, almost six years before it achieved independence. Examining trade along the South Sudan–Uganda border following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in 2005, Schomerus and Titeca (2012) found that increased trade along both sides of the border did not help strengthen peace because such trade was dominated by unscrupulous and over assertive South Sudanese military actors to the disadvantage of Ugandan traders on the Ugandan side of the conflict-ridden border. Githigaro (2016) studied the collapse of the peace process in South Sudan in 2013 following clashes between factions in the power-sharing government loyal to Salva Kiir, president of South Sudan and his vice president, Riek Machar, and found that ethnically based power struggles between the Dinka and Nuer and ‘weak governance mechanisms’ are the primary reasons why Africa’s newest country has found it much harder to consolidate its hard-won peace.

Another strand of the post-conflict and peacebuilding scholarship has written about the problems of transitional justice in the West Nile region of northern Uganda (see for example, Bogner and Neubert, 2013), child soldiers (see for example, Angucia, 2009), and post-conflict economic recovery (see for example, Rohner et al., 2013). Other studies have sought to explain why peace has eluded Ugandans for much of the three decades since the Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement ascended to power in 1986. Lindemann (2011) concluded that the lack of regional and ethnic inclusivity in governance under an ‘elite bargain’ has hindered the country’s ability to consolidate peace and move forward from several small-scale civil conflicts. Studying the political legacy of violent conflicts, Blattman (2009) examined the political behaviour of ex-combatants in northern Uganda and found that there was increased political participation by members of such groups in terms of voting and community leadership because of elevated exposure to violence. Indeed, we found similar corroborative evidence that members of the ex-combatant community in Sierra Leone were also much more likely to vote and engage in some forms of political protest than others, although we did not find a similar level of propensity towards community leadership.

Yet another strand of scholarship has extensively debated the determinants of successful post-conflict elections (see for example, Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Lyons, 1999; Paris, 2004; Sisk and Reynolds, 1998), and successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes (see for example, Berdal, 1996; Boas and Bjorkhaug, 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Jennings, 2007; Kingma, 1997; LeBeau, 2005; Leff, 2008; Metsola, 2006; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Peters, 2005, 2012; Spear, 2002) incorporating evidence and comparative insights from other parts of the world such as Latin America to support their arguments. In the latter set of studies, scholars have largely emphasized structural background conditions as they describe opportunity structures for the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of DDR processes (see for example, Jarstad and Sisk, 2008), and how the choice of reintegration programme affects the short term and long term welfare of ex-combatants in Namibia (see for example, LeBeau, 2005). One of the most intense debates in this scholarship, however, has been about whether and how the choice of DDR programmes affects the motivations of ex-combatants to fight again (see for example, Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007).

Another active area of scholarly interest has been engaged with explaining shifting identities, the political economy of livelihoods, marginality, youth unemployment and under-employment, and the everyday in post-war society (see for example, Enria, 2015; Shepler, 2010; Sola-Martin, 2009). These studies have shown how a diverse range of citizens, who live on the margins of post-war society largely ignored or selectively appropriated by political actors, survive such marginality in the tough post-war economy. Enria (2015), for example, provides a compelling account of how ex-combatants ‘navigate an exclusionary labour market’ in the sparse post-war economy using the help of political patrons known as ‘sababu’. Relatedly, Sola-Martin (2009: 291) identified one of ‘two key challenges to the sustainability of peacebuilding as insufficient opportunities for the reintegration of ex-combatants’, and Shepler (2010) explores youth music as a key variable in identity formation of a marginalized subaltern youth identity with a ‘moral universe’ that is in stark opposition to the political status quo in post-war Sierra Leone.

However, despite the extensive scholarly interest and output around peacebuilding and post-war societies, comparatively less attention has been paid to the ways in which individuals and groups try to renegotiate the social contract after war and the ways in which the state chooses to engage or not, with these actors, not against a blank canvas, but in the shadow of war. Understanding who wins and loses from the political economy of post-war interventions, who is considered a threat, (and therefore a worthy recipient of aid) and who is not and is therefore excluded, as well as also how political actors capitalize on some of these distinctions, is a valuable addition to the literature on post-war reconstruction and, in particular, reconciliation, with a focus on the micro-dynamics of post-war identities and experiences. To wit, studies have not illustrated how discontent is structured over livelihood insecurities and how this affects commitment to ‘peace’, as articulated by the state. We examine the relations between groups and political leaders in post-war Sierra Leone to show how the way diverse groups structure their discontent interacts with the preferences of politicians to impact peacebuilding efforts in a post-war society that is often controversially held up as a model of successful peacebuilding (Boersch-Supan, 2009).

The recommendations derived from the extensive peace literature on Africa and the mounting empirical evidence from multi-country experiences such as Mozambique, Angola, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, to cite a few examples, do not appear to have made the task of consolidating peace in post-conflict societies any easier. Policymakers still address peacebuilding as if the end of combat operations connotes peace and the immediate tasks include best practice policies on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The evidence from the civil wars in Uganda, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and recently South Sudan, to cite some examples, suggests the international community has appeared to prioritize the cessation of hostilities and the demobilization of combatants only for some conflicts to flare up again.

Indeed, the triumphs or frustrations of societal groups, such as the examples we describe in this paper, and the roles and interests of state actors, are equally important as numerous interests are reoriented in what is expected to be a post-conflict environment that strengthens peace and reduces the likelihood of the reoccurrence of war. The interactions of a multitude of stakeholders also helps to produce the conducive relationships that are necessary for post-war economic, social and political developments (see for example, Appel and Loyle, 2012). Following Jenkins (2013: 22) who notes that ‘peacebuilding’ is a contested and evolving concept that is difficult to pin down, we consider peacebuilding within the context of our analysis as ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ which, in his, are ‘actions following the termination of armed conflict,’ especially in the areas of security, governance, civil society and development. In the next section we discuss the Lomé Peace Accord and Sierra Leone’s transition to a post-conflict country as the background to this analysis.

Background

Following protracted negotiations between the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, the Sierra Leone rebel war was officially declared over on 18 January 2002 under the terms of the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord. Brokered and overseen by the international community, including the United Nations, the United Kingdom, regional hegemon Nigeria and other countries, the accord was supposed to dissolve the RUF, demobilize and reintegrate members of other belligerent forces into society, extinguish all major combat operations and provide a roadmap for the reconstitution of Sierra Leone. It has done so, some scholars argue, but barely (see Mustapha and Bangura, 2010). Over 15 years since the last shots in the war rang out, a lingering dissatisfaction with the peace agreement and its implementation remains and continues to dominate the post-war political discourse. The interactions have also transformed life in Sierra Leone into a contentious, crime-ridden but surprisingly resilient and stable post-war society that scholars have conceptualized as ‘no war, no peace’ (see for example, Mac Ginty, 2006).

Although the likelihood of recidivism and relapse into outright war is minimal, some groups of ex-combatants and other stakeholders are not enthusiastic about Sierra Leone’s peace agreement (see for example, Berghs and Dos Santos-Zingale, 2011; Sola-Martin, 2009). To cite some examples, the ex-RUF still question the death in detention of their leader Foday Sankoh and the consecutive life sentences handed down to his successor Issa Sesay and other senior RUF leaders such as Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao by the United Nations Special Court for Sierra Leone (see for example, BBC World Service, 2000). Ex-Kamajor express regret and discontent over the death of their leader Chief Hinga Norman in UN detention in 2007 (see for example, Tiyama, 2007). Members of the amputee community who were maimed by RUF rebels and others during the war claim they have largely been abandoned and have never received reparations and the compensation they were promised (Berghs and Dos Santos-Zingale, 2011; Personal Interviews, 2012). In fact, among former perpetrators and victims of the violence, it is the rare encounter that produces a satisfied stakeholder in post-war Sierra Leone.

Notwithstanding the wide-ranging discontent with the peace settlement, several groups have elicited substantial benefits in post-war Sierra Leone by leveraging their role or status in the war either as perpetrators or victims of the violence. To cite some examples, in 2007 former members of the West Side Boys, soldiers of the Sierra Leone military who ‘went rogue’ during the war, were reinstated into the security forces by President Ernest Koroma as part of his personal protection and security detail following his election as president. During the same elections, political parties recruited ex-combatants as bodyguards and for other roles with their campaigns in return for various promises (Christensen and Utas, 2008). This practice reoccurred during the 2012 election (Enria, 2015). In 2011, Koroma signed a disability act into law that was expected to benefit war amputees and coalitions of other physically challenged Sierra Leoneans. Several war amputees were subsequently recruited into the Sierra Leone police force following the passage of the act (see for example, BBC World Service, 2012).

These victories for some groups have come at the same time as others, such as the Kamajor militia, have continued to demand compensation that dates back to their role in the war without success (see for example, Sola-Martin, 2009). The variations in which groups have received what, when, and how partly illustrate politics in post-war Sierra Leone and, more important for understanding post-conflict societies, as we illustrate in this article, they offer invaluable insight into the context, processes and outcomes of the structuring of discontent during peacebuilding and how political leaders manage the collective memory of war.

The origins and structure of post-war discontent in Sierra Leone

The aftermath of the civil war structured society in post-war Sierra Leone into visible multi-ethnic and multi-regional coalitions of distinct identities and competing livelihood interests. Under one categorization, the collective identities of ex-combatants, victims and unharmed civilians were established. Under other categorizations and several sub-categorizations, combatants who participated in the war at various stages could be viewed as RUF rebels, loyalist members of the Sierra Leone army, coupists who participated in several military coups d’état, members of the West Side Boys who defected to join rebels and members of several civil defence militias, such as the Kamajor in the southeast, the Donsoh in Kono district and the Tamaboroh in the northwest of Sierra Leone.²

In the eight-part accord that was signed by stakeholders at Lomé on 7 July 1999, the Kabbah government consented to several provisions for members of the RUF such as immunity from prosecution and inclusion in a government of national unity. Kabbah’s government also promised to facilitate the transformation of the rebel movement into a political party to participate in national elections within a stipulated time frame. The status of other collective identities of victims or perpetrators of the violence were largely ignored leading to downstream issues of implementation of the peace agreement as the country transitioned from war. As some observers have argued, the post-war welfare of victims of direct violence in the conflict and members of the general civilian population of Sierra Leone were not adequately addressed in the agreement (see Francis, 2000; Zack-Williams, 2010).

Except for a few articles on humanitarian relief and post-war rehabilitation of the education system, the details of the accord were remarkably silent on matters pertaining to non-combatants. With regard to human rights violations, Article 26 of the Lomé Accord (1999:15 ) specifically provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with the following mandate:

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.

In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict in 1991. This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.

Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Sierra Leonean society with the participation and some technical support of the International Community. This Commission shall be established within 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement and shall, not later than 12 months after the commencement of its work, submit its report to the Government for immediate implementation of its recommendations.

Implementing the Lomé Accord became the baseline for numerous post-war political and socio-economic issues. Subsequently, both the Kabbah and Koroma administrations were held to the contents of the document in terms of how their respective policies adhered to its contents and spirit, especially in the case of Kabbah whose government signed the accord and was the first to implement its provisions. In February 2002, the first post-war general elections were held, which the SLPP and Kabbah won. Kabbah formed a cabinet of national unity noticeably excluding the RUF, in what became one of the first violations of the expectations that emerged from the peace agreement. Consequently, this was one of the earliest sources of discontent in post-war Sierra Leone as the international community and domestic civil society pressured Kabbah to fully implement the details of the accord and include the RUF in his cabinet.

In 2002, the UN and the Sierra Leone government established a special court for war crimes. This was a step that was not discussed directly at Lomé; neither was it included in the signed accord. Subsequently, the government established a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) and a human rights commission, in keeping with provisions in the Lomé Accord.³ The TRC delivered its much-awaited findings in 2004. Ex-RUF, ex-Kamajor and ex-West Side Boys disapproved of these institutional changes making them major issues of post-war discontent, especially the Special Court which convicted the senior leadership of all three groups and Charles Taylor, the ousted president of Liberia.

Although the final TRC report was anticipated, victims-rights groups did not find closure in the commission’s findings. Of particular concern for those directly affected by the war was the implementation of recommendations for reparations in the TRC report. The process was delayed for many years, beyond the 12 months stipulated in the accord , due to a lack of funding and bureaucratic red tape. When reparations to victims finally commenced in 2010, over six years following the conclusion of the TRC report, the payment system was mired in allegations of corruption and the amounts that were ultimately paid out commanded less purchasing power in the economy because there was no cost of living adjustment to control for inflation.

Thus, as an institutional provision that was intended to offer some closure, the TRC’s work soon became another source of post-war discontent as controversy erupted over potential recipients of the initial amount of USD100 that was offered to those who were designated as amputees, war wounded and victims of sexual violence.

Groups and their discontents

War amputees

The number of individuals in Sierra Leone with physical impairments and disabilities as a direct outcome of the civil war or otherwise varies widely (Berghs and Dos Santos-Zingale, 2011) There is also no clear definition of what disability means in the context of the everyday in post-war Sierra Leone. According to Edward Conteh, the president of the Amputee and War-Wounded Association (AWWA), there are about 1,285 registered civilian war amputees and about 4,675 registered war-wounded in post-war Sierra Leone whose interests are directly represented by his association. Civilian amputees and war wounded are a diverse but collective identity that was established in the war’s aftermath. There are female and male amputees, the elderly and the young, who hail from all regions of Sierra Leone and from different ethnic groups.⁴

The discontent of amputees is mainly rooted in insufficient or non-payment of reparations, inadequate rehabilitative infrastructure, and the perception that combatants who carried out atrocities against them have received better treatment in post-war Sierra Leone. As one of the most visible victims of the war, the Lomé Accord did not make direct mention of amputees. There are no explicit references to the condition or the word ‘amputee’ in the entire document. Instead, the accord lists a broad categorization of victims that are supposed to be rehabilitated using a special fund that was never set up. Although amputees bore the brunt of the war, they have not been offered restitution and financial compensation similar to the efforts at Lomé to appease ex-combatants who perpetrated violence against them. Members of the AWWA believe that life is better for perpetrators of the violence than for victims in post-war Sierra Leone. Summarizing their grievances from a focus group:

We have been forgotten. In Sierra Leone today, it is better to be a former rebel than to be an amputee because former rebels have their freedom, they are feared and can get anything they want. We see some of them every day riding around on their bikes as they please. Sometimes we even have to pay them transportation. Yes, those who tried to kill us during the war, now take us where we want to go. We have to go to Freetown to beg for survival. Only NGOs give us food and care about us. The government does not care. (Focus Group, 2012)

In 2002, with help from several international non-governmental organizations, the SLPP government constructed what were intended as amputee communities around Freetown and the rural Western area. However, most amputees refused to live in the special communities built for them citing long distances to basic public amenities such as markets and hospitals. Some of the special homes that were constructed are not easily accessible to the physically challenged. To compound their disappointment, the site of the designated communities near Freetown was distant from the traditional communities of origin for some who resided in other areas of the country before the war, further discouraging many amputees from residing in the locations designated for them.

Amputees were also supposed to be fitted with prosthetics but some were not fitted or given occupational or rehabilitative therapy. This neglect left them to fend for themselves without state support. Many are vagrant beggars on the streets of Freetown and other major towns in Sierra Leone (Berghs and Dos Santos-Zingale, 2011). Certainly, amputees are the hardest hit group in the post-war society and some would say they are doubly victimized given their extraordinary circumstances. Many young victims who were fitted with prosthetics immediately following the war have since outgrown those fittings but no longer have the means of getting replacements. Consequently, the shortage of prosthetics and rehabilitation facilities in the country are two of the major demands of this group. The failure of both the SLPP and the APC governments to address these demands constitutes one of the major sources of discontent for members of this group (Focus Group, 2012).

In acting upon their discontent, war amputees have attracted sympathy and solidarity from influential civil society groups and international and local non-governmental organizations in what is described as the ‘disability business’ (Albrecht, 1999; Berghs and Dos Santos-Zingale, 2011). Despite their marginalized identity, the international attention members of this group have received gives them some leverage in post-war society by turning their cause into an international cause célèbre for global stars such as Hollywood actress Angelina Jolie, who once visited one of the amputee communities around Freetown in her capacity as a UN ambassador, to highlight their cause.

Commercial bike ‘Okada’ riders

A ubiquitous presence across urban landscapes in Africa, commercial motorbike riders or ‘Okadas’, became increasingly visible across Sierra Leone following the war. To be clear, some commercial motor bike transportation existed before the war commenced in 1991 but this was largely restricted to the rural areas, especially in the mining district of Kono in eastern Sierra Leone, an area with high economic activity but poor road networks. On a scale, Okada service in pre-war Sierra Leone never approached the widespread mode of transportation now used all across the country. The main reasons for this proliferation of motorbikes following the war is because they provide an alternative source of livelihood for a vast number of unemployed young Sierra Leoneans in a difficult economy. The motorbikes are preferable for navigating the poor road conditions around the country and are cheaper to maintain than cars. They also offer affordable fares for passengers. Efforts by the state to regulate any aspect of the activities of the commercial motorbike industry have resulted in numerous clashes, such as the riots of 10 June 2016 in Freetown.

Numbering in their thousands, Okada riders are one of the most visible collective identities with organized interests to emerge in post-war Sierra Leone. The group consists of ex-RUF, ex-SLA, ex-Kamajor, other ex-militia who were once adversaries, and civilians who never participated in the rebel war. Upon realizing the relative lucrativeness of the industry, many young civilians who did not fight in the war also invested in commercial bike riding and appropriated the identities of ex-combatants adding to a growing, visibly lawless, and sometimes violent Okada identity and subculture in post-war Sierra Leone. Many of the original Okada riders, however, were ex-combatants who used seed money from the disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programmes following the war as start-up money. Others started out with investment from what bounty that was left over from looting or ‘operation pay yourself activities’ during the war (Personal Interviews, 2012).

Although many Sierra Leoneans concede that Okada riders provide an invaluable service by easing the critical transportation shortage, they are also quick to point out that they are lawless young men who engage in unsafe riding practices. Each year, there are several fatal road accidents involving Okada riders. Some Okada riders have been found guilty of robbing or attacking their passengers at night, while others have been victims of violent attacks themselves. Many Okada riders report that they have never taken formal lessons to ride commercial bikes and most do not obtain the required professional riders’ licences to commercially transport people on motorbikes. Thus, simultaneously, Okada riders are constant sources of risk and convenience for those who use their services.

Although there is a great deal of tension between Okada riders and local communities, and some are involved in numerous scuffles each day, the risks of collective recidivism among the group is minimal, as several studies have noted (see for example, Leff, 2008). Okada riders, however, are recruited frequently by political parties to transport supporters during elections campaigns, hoard advertising banners, and provide numbers at campaign rallies, to list but a few ways in which they have been co-opted into Sierra Leone’s post-war politics (Christensen and Utas, 2008).

The major sources of discontent for Okada riders include lack of opportunities for better jobs, high and unfairly levied road taxes, the cost of licences, police corruption and brutality during frequent and sometimes violent clashes with law enforcement, and the high economic costs of surviving in the post-war economy. Ex-combatants who constitute the core of the Okada industry report that the money they were given at demobilization was inadequate compensation for their willingness to lay down arms and abide by the peace process. As they put it:

The money we were given was not enough to last anyone for even a month. We accepted the peace and laid down our arms for our country because we love Sierra Leone. But now the people do not appreciate us and the government does not care about us. Our condition is still the same as before the war. The police harass us daily with fines for every minor offence and sometimes no offence. Sometimes people call us ‘rebels’. What kind of peace is this if we do not forgive each other and learn to live as one? Sierra Leone today is the same as before. Same corruption by police and government big men. That’s why sometimes when it gets too much we protest and demand our rights. (Focus Group, 2012)

Although many among the Okada fought for social mobility, as marginalized subalterns, their lot in post-war society has not changed because they are still resented by the public.⁵ The most violent and disruptive riots in post-war Sierra Leone, such as the one on 10 June 2016, have been organized by associations of Okada riders in protests against illegal police detentions.

Structurally, Okada riders are organized under the Sierra Leone Motor Bike Riders Association (SLMBRA), the Sierra Leone Bike Riders Union (SLBRU) and several other smaller associations.⁶ Most towns and villages in Sierra Leone have at least one association that collects membership dues from members of the Okada community. The collective funds are used to offer low-interest loans to members of the Okada community and to provide bail for those who are held in police custody. The rest of the money is put to several other social and commercial uses. Riders’ associations also help organize the funerals of their colleagues. Many have used their old networks from the war years to navigate civilian life (Focus Group, 2012).

In response to police brutality, Okada riders have adopted a variety of strategies to register their discontent ranging from riots to withholding their services. Strike actions by the group inflicts severe hardship on the economy for those who depend on their services for daily transportation. At other times, they have sent ‘peaceful delegations’ to government authorities seeking redress (Focus Group, 2012).

Although they are resented by the public and frequently harassed by law enforcement, depending on who wields political power, endorsements by the SLBRU or the SLMBRA have, ironically, given Okada riders an influential position in the post-war politics of Sierra Leone as one of the most coveted endorsements sought by local and national politicians during elections.⁷

The Wounded in Action (WIA)

The Wounded in Action (WIA) consist of former military personnel of the Sierra Leone army. Discharged from the military following the war, this group has often demonstrated violently and resorted to creating public disorder to demand back pay and draw attention to their cause. Their discontent has primarily stemmed from their disappointment over delayed compensation and benefits for their services and sacrifice during the war. As a collective identity, the efforts of the WIA are productive because their complaints are taken much more seriously by successive governments than the complaints of other groups such as Okada riders. For example, in 2010, members of the WIA rioted in Freetown demanding and receiving back pay from the government in a matter of days (Awoko Newspaper, 2010).

In spite of demonstrations for overdue compensation, however, the WIA has collectively expressed their commitment to peace in post-war Sierra Leone. When they have publicly demonstrated to draw attention to their cause, governments in power have not invoked or threatened the Public Order Act of 1965 to deter them from disturbing the peace, as is the case for other groups such as Okada riders, or trade union and labour groups, whose actions are frequently suppressed.

Ex-service women and ex-servicemen

Ex-service women and ex-servicemen are decommissioned soldiers who are represented by the inappropriately titled Ex-Servicemen Association. Unlike members of the Wounded in Action, this group includes much older former soldiers who served and retired from the military even before the start of the rebel war in 1991.

The main issues of discontent for this group are dissatisfaction with retirement compensation, the reputation of the Sierra Leone army and the politicization of officer appointments by politicians (Personal Interview, 2012). These concerns have remained largely unaddressed since the war ended. For example, in a front page headline report in The Exclusive, 14 July 2015, the chairman of the Ex-Service Men Association, Rtd. Sergeant Ahmed Turay wrote President Koroma pleading that his government address pertinent issues for ex-SLA. Quoting from the report in the paper:

‘As one of the oldest, if not the oldest in Sierra Leone, we have been left unnoticed due to several challenging issues for which we have decided to write His Excellency, the commander of the Armed Forces, said Rtd. Sgt. Turay; adding that they are sure that as a listening father of the nation, he will hear their cry and respond. One of the burning issues affecting the association, he said, is the low pension remuneration of retired officers, which cannot last for even a day. The association, he said, also needs office space to facilitate the affairs of members of the association for the future of their offspring. Rtd. Sgt. Ahmed Turay on behalf of the association pleaded for an increment in the government subsidy, saying that it is not enough to maintain the association’s operations. Meanwhile, he said, the association has a membership of over 45,000. He pleaded with President Koroma to look into their plight by acting accordingly as they have families to take care of’ (The Exclusive, 14 July 2015).

Older ex-RUF

Older ex-RUF, typically over the age of 50, also referred to as ex-combatants, picked up professions other than commercial bike riding, such as farming. Many among this group reported that they no longer met or identified with their younger former comrades, such as ex-combatants who are Okada bike riders. Through focus groups and snowball sampling, many reported that they were very concerned about the lack of reconciliation in post-war Sierra Leone. They have no representative association through which they collectively voice their interests and concerns. Several were reluctant to share their experiences and preferred to ‘put everything behind them’, as they put it, including their identity as ex-RUF. Those that agreed to share their opinions revealed that successive governments have not strengthened the reconciliation process as promised under the Lomé Accord or as recommended by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. They also claimed that some government officials have, in fact, provoked persecution of former RUF in their public pronouncements. This has added to the mistrust and tension with the civilian population even after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission published its findings (Personal Interviews, 2012). Many considered the arrest and imprisonment of Foday Sankoh and his successor Issa Sesay a betrayal of the spirit of reconciliation following Lomé.

Older ex-RUF are also dissatisfied with economic conditions in post-war Sierra Leone and insufficient economic opportunities to earn their livelihoods. In their view, the same political and socio-economic problems they fought to eradicate in their 11-year insurgency are still present. Some pointed out that they are active in the Revolutionary United Front Party that was formed to contest multiparty elections under the conditions of the Lomé Accord, as an indicator of commitment to ‘peaceful politics’. As a former senior commander put it:

Every day people try to take advantage of us. We have not seen anything they promised us at Lomé. The corruption is too much. But we want peace. We shall never again go to the bush because war is not the answer but we are suffering greatly and we keep asking the government to help us. (Personal Interview, 2012)

Ex-civil militia

The primary source of the discontent of ex-Kamajor stems from the arrest and detention of their leaders Chief Hingha Norman, Allieu Kondewa and Moinina Fofana (Personal Interview, 2012). Chief Norman died in UN detention in 2007. Fofana and Kondewa were convicted of war crimes and are serving their sentences in Rwanda. Ex-Kamajor also report that Sierra Leoneans have been ungrateful to them for their sacrifices in helping end the rebel war. Following the peace agreement, there was no formal demobilization programme for members of the militia, as was the case with the RUF or the SLA. No formal ceremony was held to thank the Kamajor, or a national commemoration for their role in bringing peace (Personal Interview, 2012). Although some remained in Freetown, many simply returned to farming or mining in their rural communities. Just after the war, there was a great deal of tension and frequent clashes between Kamajor who stayed in Freetown and residents of some parts of the city who accused members of the former militia of petty crimes and ‘uncivilized behaviour’. The situation between Kamajor and residents of Freetown escalated until Kabbah’s government intervened and evicted the Kamajor in 2003 from their main base at the Brookfields Hotel in Freetown. The eviction, the death in detention of Chief Hinga Norman and the imprisonment of other Kamajor leaders were major sources of discontent and a turning point between the militia and the SLPP government. For the 2007 elections, some factions of the group withdrew support for the SLPP and threw it behind Charles Margai’s newly formed People’s Movement for Democratic Change, which was one of the key factors why the incumbent SLPP lost the 2007 elections to the APC.

To date, in spite of reconciliation efforts, some Kamajor are still distrustful of the SLPP for what they claimed was the party’s ungratefulness and betrayal of their cause and leadership. As a former Kamajor put it:

the SLPP is an ungrateful party. They are our brothers, but they are ungrateful. All that fighting we did for them to bring them back to power and they betrayed Chief Norman, Kondewa and others. The APC does not forget their people like the SLPP. We brought peace to this country. (Personal Interview, 2012)

Sola-Martin’s research (2009: 297–298) unearthed a similar sense of discontent among the Kamajor that is both typical and illustrative of how this particular group and others have established a collective post-war identity in relation to the unsatisfactory outcome of the post-war settlement and the varying reactions of political actors.

In 2002, the CDF maintained 10,200 personnel in 19 battalions that refused to be demobilized unless the ex-combatants received reintegration benefits, and these structures remained a threat to the internal security of Sierra Leone for several months. CDF cadres were disappointed over the government’s unfulfilled promise to issue medallions and certificates to the Kamajor fighters and erect fitting monuments in recognition of their role in the war. CDF spokesperson Arthur Koroma recalled the government’s promise to provide special reintegration packages for demobilized CDF military instructors, the so-called ‘initiators’. Pledges made by the CDF were not fully fulfilled and this issue resurfaced during the 2007 presidential and parliamentarian electoral campaign. During this campaign, many ex-Kamajors expressed discontent regarding the SLPP government’s unmet promises, while some former Kamajor initiators were allegedly co-opted and rewarded by being invited to join the SLPP presidential candidate Solomon Berewa’s runoff electoral campaign in the Southern Province by taking part in acts of intimidation against political opponents.

Former members of other civil militia, the Donsoh and the Tamaboroh, have mostly expressed dissatisfaction with post-war compensation; however, their efforts to seek recompense have not been as organized or as sustained as ex-Kamajor. In terms of political support, the Donsoh and Tamaboroh largely support the APC and other smaller political parties, whereas most Kamajor still support the SLPP, despite feeling betrayed by that party.

Women in Sierra Leone

Another group that has repeatedly expressed discontent with the post-war arrangements in Sierra Leone are women’s groups. While the category of ‘women’ is expansive and hides the various differences in women’s experiences during the war, from combatants, to victims and war widows, as a group, women have been continually marginalized in post-war arrangements. Although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission specifically pointed to a deep-rooted patriarchy and structural inequalities against women as an explanatory factor for the ways in which women were abused during the war, and recommended that post-war arrangements should ensure their participation not just in peace building but in politics, women have failed to secure commitment to a 30 per cent quota in parliament, unlike many other post-war African countries such as Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda, that were able to use the cessation of violence as an opportunity to restructure their constitutions in ways that ensured a threshold for women’s inclusion. Women have expressed their discontent in various ways, including an effort early in 2018 to register their discontent with the low numbers of women nominated for political positions and to encourage parties to nominate more women as a way to increase women’s overall political representation. Despite such measures, the numbers of women elected in the 2018 elections did not change percentage-wise. Moreover, under the new SLPP regime, despite the ‘New Direction’ manifesto’s commitment to increasing women’s political participation, the number of women given ministerial positions remains similar to those under Ernest Koroma.

The politics of addressing discontent in post-war Sierra Leone

The SLPP and the APC have interchanged power in Sierra Leone since the end of the war, the SLPP from 2002 until 2007, and the APC from 2007 until they lost elections to the SLPP in 2018. The two parties have responded in different ways to some of the sources of discontent described above while reacting similarly to the discontent of amputee groups. The variation helps illustrate post-war politics in Sierra Leone in terms of who has gained what and why. Before describing how the two parties have responded to the sources of discontent described above and what roles the collective memory of war has played in their responses, it is necessary to first provide a brief history of the attempts to maintain public order in Sierra Leone.

In 1965, following what they perceived as persistent threats to public order partly emanating from a fledgling and radical APC party that was frequently calling for strikes and demonstrations in newly independent Sierra Leone, the SLPP under Albert Margai, championed the passage of a bill into law that gave the government of Sierra Leone sweeping powers to detain, without warrant, any individual or group deemed a threat to ‘public order’. The law was as broadly conceived as it was arbitrary giving the government enough powers to detain anyone on mere suspicion of ‘propensity to riotous conduct’.⁸ Some scholars argue that the act was designed to stifle dissidence within the ranks of the SLPP itself following the contest between Dr. John Karefa-Smart and Albert Margai over who should succeed Sir Milton Margai after the latter’s death in 1964 (Cartwright, 1971). Various governments in power have since used the Public Order Act to detain a quite expansive list of potential troublemakers, opposition candidates, journalists, students and anyone deemed a threat to public order in Sierra Leone. Human rights groups, civil society and even some government officials have tried for years to get the parliament of Sierra Leone to revoke the act without success.

Thus, when groups expressed their discontent political leaders had sufficient constitutional powers to deal with any potential threats that such groups posed to public order, if they wanted to do so under the sensitive peacebuilding process since 2002. The selective ways in which politicians have accommodated discontent emanating from some groups while repressing others using the 1965 Act in the name of peacebuilding and preserving public order under the act is key evidence that supports the central argument in this paper.

Both the APC and the SLPP have similarly acceded to the demands of amputee groups. In 2010, for example, the APC passed a National Disability Act which, for the first time, formally recognized the status of the disabled with accompanying rights such as affirmative action in employment (Berghs and Dos Santos-Zingale, 2011). The similarity, however, ends with their response to the demands of amputee groups. With Okada riders, the APC and the SLPP have favoured different factions. The APC treats discontent from ex-Kamajor Okada riders with a heavy hand, whereas the SLPP was ambivalent towards ex-Kamajor who were once their closest allies.

Following the contested elections results of 2007, the eastern wing of the ex-Kamajor threatened to march to Freetown and demand a recount of the votes. They were partly dissuaded from doing so by a rumoured counter force of southern ex-Kamajors who threatened to demonstrate violently in alliance with former West Side Boys and other groups in support of the APC. Ultimately, Ernest Koroma was elected president with support from one faction of the ex-Kamajor in one of the rare cases in which a challenger defeated an incumbent party in an African election.

A second reason why the responses of governments in power have varied, however, with regard to sources of discontent that are construed as threatening the peace in Sierra Leone is whether the issue of contention originated before or after the war. It is necessary to provide some background here as well, in order to put this explanation into context. As a democratic wave swept across the world in 1990 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the SLPP thought its time had finally come to regain power in Sierra Leone. By that time, the SLPP had been out of power for over two decades following their electoral loss to the APC in 1967. In 1990, Joseph Momoh, the incumbent APC president established a constitutional review commission to write a new constitution and set a timetable for holding the first multiparty elections in Sierra Leone since 1977 promising to return the country to a multiparty system. Before he could implement any changes, however, which many observers believe would have benefitted the opposition SLPP, the RUF commenced their rebel war and soon after junior officers in the military took advantage of the war to seize power in a coup on 29 April 1992. The soldiers established the National Provisional Ruling Council junta and governed Sierra Leone until 1996 when they ceded political power to the SLPP.

The SLPP never forgot the sequence of events that, in their view, conspired to deny them power and always attributed the war to the APC. As a senior member of the SLPP said, ‘the RUF war was created by the APC because Foday Sankoh was one of them. He just grew disgruntled and fed up with the system. The APC perpetuated the corruption and mismanagement that dragged this country to war’ (Personal Interview, 2012). Besides Kabbah and a few others, senior SLPP members perceived discontent arising out of the pre-war years as something the party was unfairly tasked to deal with following the excesses of APC misrule. Consequently, Kabbah often came under pressure from within his own party to ignore several provisions for the RUF and other groups under the terms of the Lomé Accord if such provisions dealt with discontent with matters from the pre-war years. In contrast, although Kabbah did not include the RUF in his 2002 cabinet, the SLPP was much more amenable to addressing other matters in post-war Sierra Leone attributable to the post-peace accord years, such as the restructuring of governance.

Ultimately, the APC found common ground with the RUF and the West Side Boys when the two dissident groups launched one of the most violent attacks on Freetown on 6 January 1999 in a failed attempt to remove the SLPP from power. Remarkably, some members of the Sierra Leone army had earlier conspired with the RUF to execute a coup against the SLPP on 25 May 1997 producing a messy political picture that scholars have since struggled to explain. When the APC returned to power in 2007, due to the events of 1997 and 1999, it was more amenable to the demands of the ex-SLA, the West Side Boys, and even the RUF, than some of the party’s core membership would have preferred. President Koroma later appointed former RUF leaders such as Omrie Golley to key positions in government. He also elevated former West Side Boys, such as Idrissa ‘Leather Boot’ Koroma, to his personal protection detail.

One final reason that can help explain differences in response is the extent to which the groups are perceived as a threat, either politically or socially. Women remain on the margins, socially, politically and economically and both governments have not acceded to their demands.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have employed a case study of Sierra Leone to illuminate state-society relations in a post-war society striving to build peace by showing not only how societal groups articulate their demands on the state by invoking the collective memory of war, but also how and why the state responds to and selectively invokes the collective memory of war to manage such demands. Although numerous studies have examined post-war societies in Africa, the sources and structures of discontent in such societies are still heavily debated and comparatively less attention is devoted to explaining how the state manages the collective memory of war, or the actions of political leaders whose interests reflect the policy directions of the state during peacebuilding. Often, it is implicitly assumed that the state is more committed to peacebuilding than societal forces, such as demobilized ex-combatants and members of the vulnerable populations in the political economy, making various demands on the state.

Drawing from personal interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders such as demobilized ex-combatants, we have shown the causes of disaffection among diverse groups in post-war Sierra Leone and the means and forms of the expressions of their discontent. We have also shown how state officials have summoned up the collective memory of war in the name of keeping public order to selectively deter some societal groups from acting upon discontent with their livelihoods in post-war society.

While the risks of recidivism by ex-combatant groups such as the Okada riders, whose livelihoods we encountered and presented in this paper, appear low, ‘do not disturb the peace’ is a constant refrain in the post-war society that is selectively used by various political leaders 16 years after the end of the war, to suppress post-war dissent while ignoring similar actions from other groups that could equally undermine peacebuilding, if the purported goal is to discourage protests that threaten public order. We have argued and shown that the dissimilar responses of state officials to post-war discontent in Sierra Leone is largely explained by a convergence of the sources and structures of discontent in society with the interests of politicians. This claim is supported by the SLPP and APC’s handling of the discontents and the demands of the various groups that we have described in this paper. The evidence shows that the SLPP has been less amenable to sources of discontent predating their return to political power in 1996 because they attributed such disaffections to the excesses of the rival APC during the latter’s long monopolization of political power in Sierra Leone. As shown, a crucial factor, then, in understanding why some peace processes might be susceptible to collapse while others survive is an understanding of the components of the peace plan for which implementers feel responsible. As the reactions of the SLPP demonstrate, political leaders are much more likely to honour and implement proposals in an agreement if they accept responsibility for the problems such proposals seek to address instead of attributing them to the failings of rival politicians.

In terms of the policy implications of our findings, if positive peace is to be realized in post-conflict societies, political leaders should be compelled to be less discriminatory in addressing discontent instead of manipulating the memory of war to deter political opposition, such as the APC’s ban on jogging in Freetown targeting opposition politician Kandeh Yumkella, because such issues constitute the structural conditions in which societal conflicts are resurrected.

This paper contributes to studies of post-war societies in Africa by illuminating state-society interactions from both ends, and the role of political actors in appropriating the collective memory of war to mediate relations between the state and various groups in society. Although the case study method that we employ limits generalization due to some of the peculiar features of politics in Sierra Leone, such as its increasingly two-party system, sustained studies of other post-war societies should eventually help build a robust body of knowledge that broadens our understanding of how identities and livelihoods structure discontent and, significantly, how and why politicians appropriate the collective memory of war to respond to discontent in post-war society and the impact on peacebuilding processes.

Footnotes

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Fodei Batty would like to acknowledge summer research travel funding from the College of Arts and Sciences, Quinnipiac University.

Notes

Author biographies

Fodei Batty is an associate professor of Political Science at Quinnipiac University in Hamden, CT, USA, where he teaches courses on International and Comparative Politics. Prior to holding this position, he was a visiting assistant professor of Political Science at Colgate University in Hamilton, NY. He previously served as policy analyst in the Office of the President of Sierra Leone under a United Nations Capacity Building Grant to the Government of Sierra Leone. He is a former recipient of the Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar Fellowship awarded by the United States Institute of Peace. He has consulted for international organizations such as the British Department for International Development (DfID) and has published articles in academic journals such as the African Studies Review and Civil Wars. His viewpoints have been published as op-ed pieces or letters in several outlets such as The Monkey Cage of The Washington Post and The New York Times.

Fredline M’Cormack-Hale is an associate professor at Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy and International Relations in South Orange, New Jersey, USA where she teaches courses in post-conflict reconstruction and state sustainability, African economic development, and international relations among others. She is a former recipient of the Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar Fellowship awarded by the United States Institute of Peace, and a Fulbright Scholar Research and Teaching Fellowship in Sierra Leone, in addition to other awards.

Newspapers

Awareness Times. March 2007

Awoko Newspaper, 4 May 2010 The Exclusive. 14 July 2015.

Concord Times. 15 January 2009.

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Focus group discussions consisting of 6–10 participants, and balanced for gender neutrality, were held with associations representing bikers, war victims and ex-combatants in Freetown, Bo and Kenema in July 2012. All participants were informed about the purpose of the information to be collected, advised about their rights, and offered the option to decline to participate. All accepted to participate under the condition of anonymity. The discussions were geared towards understanding how groups perceived their livelihoods in post-war society, their demands, and group benefits from the implementation of the peace agreement by successive governments. We also conducted unscripted personal interviews with public officials and private citizens. were also conducted. We would like to thank all those who consented to sit down for personal interviews and participate in other discussions for our study.

Focus Group Discussions with ex-Kamajor in Bo, Freetown, and Kenema, July 2012.

Focus Group Discussions with war victims, Murray Town, Freetown, July 2012.

Focus Group Discussions with Okada bike riders in Bo, Freetown, and Kenema, July 2012

Personal interviews with various senior members of the APC, SLPP and other political parties since 2006.

Personal interview with retired officers active in the ex-service association. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 July 2012.

Personal interview with senior ex-RUF member. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 20 July 2012.

Personal interview with senior ex-Kamajor. Kenema, Sierra Leone, 17 July 2012.

Personal Interviews with Okada bike riders in Freetown, Bo, and Kenema. Various times since 2006.

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