The Democratizer Army Paradox: The Role of the Algerian Army in Impeded Democratization

Abstract

The main paradox of the civil–military relations theory has been the protection of the political sphere from the military, which is administered by the politicians. The new dilemma lies under the paradox that occurs when the political sphere is entirely co-opted by the military, which is legitimized through democratization instead of protection of the civilian sphere. The question regarding the continuity of the pathology, the military superiority over the civil administration, has been largely omitted. This study is an attempt to respond to this conundrum related to the continuity of pathological civil–military relations. The main focus is the pathology that occurs when the military is the modernizer or the democratizer in a country. The study uses process tracing to collect the data as research attempts to unravel the rationale behind the continuity of military dominance in politics. In doing so, it will attempt to trace the causality between the lack of democratization and military dominance over politics in the case of Algeria.

Keywords

Civil–military relations Algeria army Boumédiène democratization co-optation

Introduction

The peaceful transition from the military governments to civilian bureaucrats has usually posed a potentially difficult issue for the states that gain independence after a long armed struggle. Algeria was no exception in this as the army tried to keep control of the decision-making process through Colonel Houari Boumédiène’s appointment as the Minister of Defense in 1962. Boumédiène’s leading position in the armed struggle against French colonizers led the way for his presidency in 1965 which also denoted the inception of the imbalanced civil–military relations (CMR) in Algeria. There have been many cases of an army taking control over civilians after wars of independence but the puzzling part of the Algerian case, similar to the case in Egypt, is that the civilians have never been able to redeem their previous position. Although there was an attempt to peacefully transfer power to the civilian realm in 1991 through multi-party elections, the process resulted in a canceled election and a civil war that left 150,000 dead (Cavatorta, 2015; King, 2007: 452).

There have been several studies (Addi, 2001; Mortimer, 2006; Welch, 2003) that explicated the pathological structure of the Algerian CMR. This endeavor has preoccupied the literature of Algerian CMR from the past to the present and perhaps the most neglected part of this issue has been an explanation of the reasons behind this continuity. The CMR theory contributes to the scholarly debate on why CMR sometimes develop an imbalanced structure. However, answers regarding the protracted incapability of resolving this issue usually require case analyses. Although a study on a single case is going to be very limited in terms of articulating a new paradox, Algeria is considered one of the cases for which this issue is the most salient. Therefore, to elaborate on how military dominance maintains its superlative status in Algerian politics, case-specific components should be analyzed with a theoretical orientation. The most distinctive part of this study is that the continuum of pathological CMR is going to be scrutinized rather than the causality behind the pathology.

In order to research with these premises, this article is organized in the following structure: first, the theoretical orientation of the research is explained and then the methodological approach will be briefly presented. Additionally a brief introduction of Algerian civil–military affairs since the country’s independence will be epitomized to illustrate the inception of the pathology. As the literature on Algerian CMR is categorized in a focus-wise approach, the two-dimensional analysis of Algerian CMR is going to be visualized by original schemata. After articulating each of the inferences the study will present its conclusions.

Theoretical orientation

The CMR theory has bifurcated into two main approaches where one side focuses on the military itself and the other scrutinizes the interactions between the military and the civilian spheres. The scholars following the first approach (Burk, 1993; Janowitz, 1964; 2017; Moskos, 1977; Sarkesian, 1975; etc.) have analyzed the armed forces and the sociological characteristics of the military. Moreover, these theoretical debates are elaborated by case studies (Balcı 2011; Finer, 1962; Frazer, 1994; Huntington, 1968; Kardas, 2005; Nordlinger, 1977; Perlmutter, 1977; Welch 1976; Yesiltas, 2016) from developing countries.

Since this study focuses on the power struggle between the military and civilian leadership in Algeria, the main theoretical arguments employed in this research are of the second approach. The scholars following the approach that focus on the interactions between the civilian and military spheres have diversified on solutions. On the one hand, a group of scholars led by Huntington proposed “professionalism” (Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006; Feaver, 2003; Huntington, 1968; Welch, 1976) as a remedy for the armed force’s ambition for control. Huntington (1968: 83) offered “militarizing” the military, which means providing the necessary autonomy to the military, in order to transform this entity into a tool of the state. However, the specifics and boundaries related to questions such as “How much power is enough for the military to be autonomous?,” and “Does the militarization of military directly dictate the military to restrain themselves?” were ambiguous.

Emphasizing the interactions between the civilian and military spheres, Kamrava (2000: 68–69) argues that professionalism has a bitter repercussion in positioning the military as the most advanced and modern section of the social sphere. However shaky the basis of the professionalist arguments, an alternative remedy which is the idea of “convergence” and concordance between the civilian and military spheres was developed (Andreski, 1968; Coleman et al., 1962; Hopkins, 1966; Janowitz, 1964; Luckham, 1971; Schiff 1995, 2008). The literature which focuses on the interactions between the civilian and military entities often resorted to the civilianization of the military (Hopkins, 1966; Janowitz, 1964; Luckham, 1971). However, it should be noted that mutating the nature of any part of this conflict would not be a solution but co-optation.

Opposing the pure professionalism in the second approach, this study examines the Algerian case with an alternative approach that is an articulation of professionalism arguments. Since several studies have proved that professionalism does have side effects (Kamrava, 2000; Luckham, 1971), this study adopts a broader approach that accepts the fact that hierarchy between the civilian and military agents are sometimes impractical. The approach used for analyzing Algerian CMR in this research emphasizes the necessity of concordance between the two entities with a cautious attitude towards high risk of co-optation in idiosyncratic ways specific to certain political cultures. Finer (1962: 120; 1974: 119) was keen on the interaction between two entities as he exemplified this by saying “Who rides the tiger can never dismount.” This study takes Algeria as the case for its research to prove that a lesser number of coups (only two in Algeria) does not imply the military’s professionalism. The cohesionist approach, which highlights the importance of convergence and concordance (Janowitz, 1964; Schiff, 1995), omits the fact that the loosened boundaries sometimes lead to co-optation. Through the theory-oriented case research of Algerian CMR, this study will both present a full picture of Algeria’s process of civil–military conflict, which has been only partially covered to date and applies a congruence test to the interactionist assumptions in the literature.

Methodology

This study examines the Algerian CMR within a two-stage framework demonstrated in Table 1. The pathological CMR is a condition variable for the independent variables (IVs) of the second dimension. In this sense, the CMR become an IV for the second stage of the analysis as for several studies the phenomenon is portrayed with the same methodological approach (Aguero, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; Perlmutter, 1977; Welch, 1976). For both dimensions, the independent and dependent variables (DVs) are clearly denoted and each variable is indicated accordingly with the dimension to which they belong. The variables of the Continuum Dimension are denoted with the prefix CD while the variables of the Pathogenesis Dimension are denoted with the prefix PD.

Table 1.

The literature on Algerian civil–military relations (CMR) categorized according to research focus.

Note: the studies that do not methodologically utilize CMR theory are also included in Table 1 as long as they deposit a certain position on which part of the CMR in Algeria is more pathological.

The study will utilize the process tracing method using a detailed case analysis to illustrate how causal mechanisms affect the continuity of the issue. This article will articulate on how pathological CMR survive and regenerate while linking generalizable causal mechanisms to the outcome of the continuity of military dominance. Process tracing has been selected because the Algerian case bears historical luggage and this method enables the researcher to make strong causal inferences. Moreover, this study is designed to be applicable to other case studies where the military either controls the political sphere or is dominant in the decision-making process.

Algerian CMR since independence

The character of CMR in Algeria has been analyzed by a few studies (Addi, 2001; Arshad, 2017; Boumediene and Kaci, 2016; Chennoufi, 2015; Kelly, 1964; Mortimer, 2006) usually lacking a holistic perspective examining both spheres simultaneously on an elaborated scale.¹ The Algerian state of CMR has been alluded to only as a part of the typologies constructed or utilized only as an example. This may have been the result of the attractiveness of other case studies with several coups or military interventions, whereas in Algeria there have been only two. However, some states in the Middle East have accumulated remarkable literature such as Israel despite having no coups (Barak and Schaffer, 2007, Ben-Ari, 2018; Ben-Meir, 1995; Klein, 1999; Peri, 1983; Perlmutter, 1968; Sheffer, 2018) and Iran with only one externally organized coup (Abootalebi, 2001; Eisenstadt, 2001; Hashim, 2001; Hashim, 2018; Sinkaya, 2015; Zaker, 2018). In a broader perspective, many of the studies in CMR have focused on the empirical determinant of military interventions which is the coup d’état (Frazer, 1994; Luttwak, 1979; Nordlinger, 1977; Perlmutter, 1977; Zimmerman, 1983). But Algeria did not pose much as proving material for the literature nor did the state individually grasp utmost attention. Breaking through the dichotomous approach of “coup–no coup,” the process of the Algerian army’s domination of the civilian sphere will be examined with almost little to no inductions based on coups.

The literature that generated new theories and typologies (Kamrava, 2000; Luckham, 1971; Perlmutter, 1968) had little space for Algeria, as the country was only a unit in a group or just a case for a typology. However, these categorizations of the Algerian CMR provide a fruitful basis when utilized in a comprehensive manner. The accumulated works on the pathological CMR in Algeria may be presented in a triad of groups, namely the studies that categorize Algerian CMR with the civilian sphere, the military sphere or the external factors in focus. This categorization might be useful in terms of presenting the tendencies of research on Algerian CMR when diagnosing the pathology.

Skimming through Table 1, it can be argued that a fair amount of research has been endeavored for both the civilian and the military entities regarding the Algerian case as the focus on external factors has attracted fewer scholars. It should be indicated that although the studies which focus on the civilian sphere have brought up important aspects of the case such as Islamist–secular conflict (Aktürk, 2015; Mortimer, 1991), social cohesion (Derrida and Regan, 2003), identity dilemmas (Zack, 2002), the in-depth studies which provide a potential remedy are in the military-focused research category. Moreover, the studies that generated a typology have focused on the Algerian military and tried to remedy the pathology from that dimension. For example, Perlmutter (1968: 398–399) categorized the Algerian army as a “praetorian” one with a “ruler” mentality. The author asserted that the Algerian army was an “anti-traditionalist radical army” with a tendency to control political organization in order to legitimize and maximize its power. On the other hand, Luckham (1971: 25) did not categorize the Algerian army as a praetorian but a “revolutionary army in arms” implying that civil power was higher than the military power at the time. Luckham (1971: 24–25) also argued that the boundaries between the civilian and military dimensions are fragmented implying that the Algerian case was prone to a movement for higher military power or weaker civil power. Through a more recent study, Kamrava (2000: 71) argued that Algeria was a “military state” governed by “autocratic officer-politicians” which shows little had changed for them from their independence to the 2000s. Almost little to no change was the notion for the Algerian CMR as Bellin (2004: 143) cited Algerian historian Mohamed Harbi who said that the Algerian army has co-opted the state. Updating the accumulated literature Cook (2007: 38–40) has argued that Algerian politics was not able to shake off the authoritarian nature effected by the officer-politicians, while Lutterback (2013) asserted that the armed forces ruled the state and was intimidated by pro-reform attempts due to a lack of institutionalization.

This study opposes the single focal approach which usually dictates researchers to zoom into one aspect in-depth while succumbing to omitting other meaningful causalities. However, this should not mean the influx of determinants and a research scope that encompasses every possible aspect. For instance, one aspect that is omitted in this research is the international influences due to the fact that when the study has an external subject this trivializes the case-wise determinants.

Making sense of the current mode of CMR in Algeria

Many studies both in the past and recently have endeavored to diagnose the symptoms of pathology in the CMR of Algeria while the causality behind its continuum was not the focal point. The balance in the relationship between two entities may sometimes fluctuate but it is a certain transformation when this imbalance becomes the new balance of that relationship. This was exactly what happened in Algeria after Boumédiène’s coup against the Ben Bella government, which had been established after the war of independence. This study will analyze the causality of pathological CMR in Algeria within a two-dimensional framework, the first of which is the pathogenesis symptoms and the latter being the causes of the continuum. Through this two-dimensional approach, the literature which has diagnosed certain causes will be elaborated with articulated symptoms and the transitions between each of the army Generals are going to be under the scope for explicating the causes of the continuity.

To visualize this two-stage analysis a causality schema (Figure 1) focused on IVs that hold a potential to explicate the pathology in Algerian CMR can be useful. However, it is essential to construct the causality chain with each variable being employed to its operational position. In the pathogenesis dimension, the IVs are: (a) military autonomy; (b) army’s role in independence; and (c) lack of civilian authority. These three conditions caused the pathological CMR which led to the 1965 coup d’état against Ahmed Ben Bella. This event initiated the second stage which is the continuum dimension including: (a) military control of political parties; (b) civilian disguise; (c) anxiety of Islamist co-optation; and (d) military prerogatives in the constitution as IVs for the continuum of the pathology. For the latter stage in this causality chain, the pathological CMR become a condition for the continuity and the impeded democratization which are the DVs. On the micro level, the two stages should be examined in their own context and their stage-wise characteristics should not be exchanged. There are some variables such as military control of political parties, military prerogatives in the constitution, and pathological CMR that possess both independent and DV positions but considering them as intervening variables may reduce some of the ambiguity in terms of their function in the puzzle.

Figure 1.

The two-dimensional schemata of Algerian civil–military relations (CMR) since independence.

Pathogenesis dimension

One of the first causes indicated for pathological CMR in Algeria ab ovo is the armed force’s significant role in the war of independence. For chronological reasoning, it might be argued that the transition of the army’s leading role, in the war of independence in the pathogenesis dimension, to the political sphere was the crux of the problem. In this sense, the army’s role in independence is marked as the first IV of the pathogenesis dimension, PD1. For PD1 there have been voluminous numbers of studies conducted (Abi-Mershed 1998; Arshad, 2017; Bouandel, 2004; Gafaiti, 1999; Tessler et al., 2004;) which can be briefly epitomized by the fact that the army became the most legitimate representative of Algerian society with a certain monopoly of coercion at its disposal. Having the authority at hand the army then swiftly channeled its interests to potential rents both for its sake and allocation in terms of more influence and legitimacy.

Military cohesion (Feaver, 2003: 299; Hopkins, 1966: 172–174; Janowitz, 1964: 67; Luckham, 1971: 18–20) has been perceived as a benevolent character for armed forces that prevent them from intervening into politics. Moreover, the autonomous structure of the military was argued to transform the army into a more specialized force focused only on military matters (Huntington, 1957: 55). However, the situation for most of the developing countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Algeria was quite the opposite due to the lack of adequate social cohesion. Through establishing a free and independent homeland for the Algerians, the army has succeeded in improving its cohesive character and became more autonomous (PD2). Kamrava (2000: 68) argued that the armed forces in “exclusionary” states such as Algeria used PD2 in their own favor as the military became dominant. This study suggests that the military has become so dominant that it has co-opted almost all of the civilian authority existent in a democratic environment. During the war of independence, the Armé Liberacion de Nationale (ALN)’s public distress against the Evian Accords was one of the reasons that brought the civil and military entities together. It was Houari Boumédiène and Abdelaziz Bouteflika who conveyed negotiations with the jailed members of Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and trumped Ahmed Ben Bella as the single candidate for the presidency (Mortimer, 2006: 156–158). Thanks to the cohesion and autonomy, that the military developed with the war of independence, the Algerian army was able to swiftly take over when the civilian leader Ben Bella tried to distance Abdelaziz Bouteflika from the defense minister Houari Boumédiène. It can be understood that after establishing his dominance in FLN, Boumédiène was perceived as a threat by Ben Bella as the civilian leadership tried to weaken him by reshuffles and forcing resignations of his comrades.

It can be argued that the cohesive character of the Algerian army is still feeding the organizational unity of the army shaped under the influence of the struggle for independence. So far, this has backfired on the civilian authority with the help of the army’s autonomous organizational structure. Moreover, the institutionalization of the military authoritarianism seems to be consolidated by military education (Chilcoat, 1999; Franke, 1999; Higham, 2000; Simons, 2000). After the pathogenesis period, the impact of military education on the cadets in terms of legitimization of the authoritarian rule may have played a useful role in generating the next generations of the ex-army rulers.

The last IV of the pathogenesis dimension is the lack of civilian authority along with a consolidated industrialist class (PD3) which has been one of the main reasons why the army was able to co-opt and dominate the civilian sphere in Algerian politics. The first conflict between the civilian and military entities was embodied in the struggle between the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA), including the wilayat leaders, and ALN, over the post-independence leadership of Algerian politics. The legitimate governance entities during the independence war were the GPRAs, which had the de jure recognition by the French politicians. However, GPRAs and the leaders of the six wilayat in ALN did not support the idea of full independence to the same extent as the FLN members Boumédiène and Ben Bella,² as the main reason behind the PD3 is this friction between ALN and GPRA leaders, which led to a military conflict over almost two months resulting in the absolute victory of the better armed and organized ALN (Willis, 2012: 45–46). The erosion of GPRA and the leadership from the rural tribes, which may have functioned as political rivals to FLN in the political arena, led to a single party regime with little to no contestation. Moreover, Boumédiène’s leadership of the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP – former ALN) transmitted into FLN’s organizational structure which contributed to General Boumédiène’s absolute authority following the military intervention of 1965 (Sorenson, 2007; Willis, 2012).

Having established the argumentation on the inception of the pathology in Algerian CMR, the main question for the rest of the study is how this imbalance has continued for almost eight decades until today. The time until Boumédiène’s death in 1978 is not the focus for the latter parts of the study but rather how his administrative culture was transmitted to the next president. Therefore, the IVs of the continuum of pathological CMR and the intervening variables of impeded democratization, with few exceptions, mostly explicate Algerian politics after Boumédiène’s death.

Continuum dimension

In this dimension, the pathological CMR are considered as the status quo. Moreover, the causes for the status quo are no longer the focus of research but rather the reasons why there is no improvement, nor a civilian backlash against the military’s dominance. As has been previously mentioned in the methodology section, the IVs for this dimension become intervening variables for the most general DVs, which are the impediments to democratization. However, articulating each dimension in its own idiosyncratic context reduces the ambiguity that potentially occurs from the double employment of a variable.

The first IV in the continuum dimension is the military control of political parties denoted as CD1. This variable points to the co-optation of the most powerful party in Algerian politics, FLN, as one of the primary reasons why this ill-constructed civil–military relation has survived. CD1 is not a challenge in terms of measuring. The level of control can be traced through the appointments in the party, the leader of the party, the speaker of the party, and the campaign processes. In the Algerian case, these provide very useful and reliable data on how much the party is controlled by the military. To begin with, CMR literature lends significant importance to the civilian nature of political parties and argues that strong civilian parties are the most lucrative tool for increasing social cohesion (Bruneau and Matei, 2013; Feaver, 1999; Feaver, 2003; Jensen and Kværnø, 2008; Kamrava, 2000; Luckham, 1971). For example, Hopkins (1968: 175) proved that having no effective civilian parties leads to military intervention with an astonishing 83% probability. Moreover, through a comprehensive study, that includes the civilian and military-related variables in theorizing ideal CMR, Finer (1967) argued that one-party regimes such as the Algerian case should make it more difficult for the army to intervene as the party is likely to transform into an effective political center. Despite posing a theoretical potential, Finer seems to omit the cases where this single party gets co-opted by the military.

Moreover, it should be underlined that almost all of the single-party regimes formed after independence struggles were led by the military-politicians or officer-corps, which is more likely to be the reason why single parties were not challenged. In this sense, challenging a party that is directly controlled by current or former military officials would in effect mean challenging the only source of the legitimacy which has the utmost monopoly of coercion. Additionally, the second-reverse wave of democracies theorized by Huntington (1991) was mostly related to these challenges to the single parties and thus the military. Using the façade provided by single parties the civilian entities challenged the dominance of the army and pushed them to the opposition. In many cases, this steered the military to resort to coup d’états as they endeavored to cling on to control. CD1 is not limited to the co-optation of a party by the military officers; it can also occur in other ways such as impeding the development of a strong opposition party. In the Algerian case, a strong opposition with the potential to take control of the civilian realm was first presented by the Islamic movement during the General Chadli Benjedid presidency. The riots and demonstrations forced Benjedid into an arguably free and contested election for the first time in Algeria in 1990 as the first phase covered the municipalities. Under the leadership of Shaykh Ali Abbasi al-Madani, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won a landslide victory with 54% of the popular vote against FLN’s 28% and 850 municipalities out of a total of 1550. For this specific election Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, a politician jailed by both the French during the war of independence and by Benjedid, boycotted the process and this in effect left the FIS as the only strong entity in the opposition (Gafaiti, 1999; Mortimer, 1991; Tahi, 1992; Zoubir and Aghrout, 2012). However, this election generated the fear of Islamist co-optation, which is another IV for the continuum dimension, and the military backlash was immediate, banning any parties that based their campaign on religion, identity, ideology etc. This not only ostracized the FIS, causing a civil war which killed over 150,000 people but also neutralized other parties such as FFS and the radical off-shoot of FIS, the Groupe Islamique Armé. As has been demonstrated, the CD1 is not seen in Algerian politics through merely co-opting FLN but it was also implemented by using the legislative advantages to impede the development of strong opposition parties even though this meant a bloody civil war. Moreover, Bouteflika’s administration has spurred a multitude of political parties both on the Islamique and the secular side which have caused a limited and fragmented representation exacerbated by the low turnout rates in elections that are almost always below 50% (Zoubir and Aghrout, 2012: 74). Despite having held successive legislative elections since 1997 the political participation of individuals in these parties is controlled by the authoritarian regime proving the existence of CD1.

The second IV of the continuum dimension is one of the strongest reasons why the imbalance between the civilian and military entities was institutionalized. The term operationalized for the transition of the officer-corps into a civilian appearance is the civilian disguise (CD2). This implies that in fact there is not a transition to civilian norms but this intention is used as a façade to placate public opinion. The authoritarian perspective and nature of the military still prevails while features of clientelism and rent allocations continue to be tools of legitimacy instead of representation, votes, and consent (Bouandel, 2017; Gafaiti, 1999; King, 2007; Maerhofer, 2010; Zoubir and Aghrout, 2012). This phenomenon can be epitomized as leaving the powerful uniforms for more legitimate suits. This is to say that after a certain level of institutionalization the army Generals did not necessarily need to resort to the power of the army and started to seek more legitimacy from the demos. Measuring CD2 depends on qualitative analysis of the background of the leading politicians, party cadres and ministers which in the Algerian case reveals that almost all of the appointed political posts are occupied by ex-military officers or active service personnel. These individuals have exchanged their powerful uniforms for a more legitimate civilian suit. For example, every president of the FLN, with the exception of Ahmed Ben Bella and Mohammed Boudiaf, has been a military general who served at least 20 years in the army. However, the two exceptions named above only served as presidents for a combined time of four years.

The hierarchy of rank in the army directly reflected itself on the presidential inquiry and this is factual data that helps in proving the impact of CD2 on the continuum dimension. Following Boumédiène’s unexpected death Chadli Benjedid, who was then the longest-serving and highest ranking official in the army, was selected as the president and the leader of the FLN (Mortimer, 2006: 157). The president after Benjedid, Lamine Zeroual³ was a teenager when he joined the army at the age of 16, and he served almost thirty years in the army before he was appointed as an ambassador to Romania, shortly after which he became the defense minister in 1993. Even Muhammad Boudiaf who was assigned as the president in 1992, was a soldier in the French army who had been close to Ahmed Ben Bella when he commanded the revolutionary forces. Lastly, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was an officer in the ALN and fought in the war of independence but he is one of the very few individuals who has switched to civilian politics during the pathogenesis dimension. The civilianization of the military in the post-revolutionary phase which is indicated as the continuum dimension in this study has been briefly touched on by previous studies (Arshad, 2017; Bruneau et al., 2013; Feaver, 1996; Feaver, 2003; Gaub, 2016; Kamrava, 2000; Schiff, 2008) but a detailed analysis of the individuals is not existent in the literature. The CD2 is existent in many states, especially Turkey, Egypt and Iraq which shows that this phenomenon has enough of both literature and case studies for further inquiries.

The third IV in the continuum dimension is the protracted problem in the Muslim populated states as the secular armed forces were and are anxious about an Islamist co-optation (CD3). It should be clarified that CD3 only implies for the Middle Eastern cases and for other regions such as Latin America the term reverse co-optation may pose a greater competence. Measuring CD3 would imply a qualitative approach to data provided through the analysis on determinants such as the existence of religious parties in the election, lack of religiously known individuals in the government, cabinet or the ruling party. The debate on Islamism versus secularism (Abi-Mershed, 1998; Arshad, 2017; Connelly, 1995; Gafaiti, 1999; Tuininga, 2013; Zoubir and Aghrout, 2012) has been one of the focal points in analyzing the political and social aspects of life in the Middle East. Thus, it is not much different when the research focus is on CMR. In almost all of the cases, the military has sided with secularism while checking and balancing the Islamist desires of the politicians or the society in a more authoritarian sense. The civil war in Algeria after the Islamist reach to political superiority, after the municipality elections, was an example of this rigid military stance against Islamist claims, ideology, and movements. The reasons for this anxiety and the military’s rigid stance against the accession of Islamists into politics are based on practical assumptions by the military. The officers are aware that almost 60% of the population is ready to vote for Islamic leadership, as Algerian social composition is Muslim dominated at over 95%.⁴ For example, Volpi (2004: 1064–1066) argued that this Islamist versus Republicans (usually equivalent to secular) has caused a phenomenon called pseudo-democracies. In this kind of democracy, the authoritarian leaders govern the system as the groups positioned on the left and right compete for what few rents that may be allocated (Zoubir and Aghrout, 2012: 75). This type of governance, which is institutionalized especially in Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt, has led to a certain level of de-legitimization on the Islamist side which has resulted in no improvement in their political representation.

The very foundational cause of CD3 lies in the desire for power and survival of the military regimes. If the Islamist opposition is able to grasp the vast majority of the people’s votes there is no doubt that the protracted and traditional parties superficially steered by the military will succumb to regime transition. This problem seems to be the hardest one to resolve through internal procedures as the fear does not rest on the national level only but it is an international state of understanding. This may explain why the democratic or the non-Muslim regions of the world, especially the great European powers, immediately recognize these military states even though they were usually established through interference with democratic processes and military coups. Even the Tunisian al-Nahda party, which has almost transformed itself into an Islamist party with a secular agenda, was not welcomed by the European politicians and the Tunisian president has accused them of radicalism (Lounnas, 2017). Therefore, this anxiety that is fed by the illusions created by ISIS and Boko Haram seems to continue to haunt the democratization processes within the Muslim-dominated countries.

The military states have consistently institutionalized their presence in politics where there was no contestation within the political sphere that would impede this clinching attempt. Many legislative tools such as constitutions, national charters, presidential decrees under martial law, etc. have been utilized in terms of institutionalizing military dominance in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. One of the most lucrative and protracted ways of doing this was to create prerogatives for the military (CD4) which could be utilized as emergency valves in cases of necessity. To measure this variable the number of constitutional amendments and their intent, the presidential decrees during martial law, the national charters and the number of suspensions of the constitution can provide factual data. For the Algerian case, all of the army General-presidents have amended the constitution on issues regarding the presidency, elections, and party politics, and the constitution has been suspended many times and annulled two times during the military coups in 1965 and 1992. For example, the 1963 constitution had two crucial articles, firstly Article 23 designating the FLN as the “sole avant-garde party” which controls the action of the National Assembly and the government. In addition, Article 8 which consolidated the army’s inclusion to the political area, as it is defined by the constitution as providing prerogatives to the army to intervene on political, economic, and social dimensions with access to party framework. Moreover, the immensely superlative position of the president in Algerian politics has also contributed to the military maintaining control in the civilian politics once the chief of staff became the president in a democratic façade (Collombier, 2012: 2). This variable is very vivid in the cases of Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt as it may be argued that this is a bitter repercussion of unconsolidated democratic transitions.

The 1989 constitution, on the other hand, removed the sole central position of the FLN but continued the military accession to politics, economy, and party politics through Article 24. For the 1989 constitution, it was the Haut Conseil de Securité (High-Security Council) through Article 162 that consolidated the army’s supervision in politics as the president who was a member and the leader of this council was obliged to have its consensus in order to declare a state of emergency. After the partial suspension of the 1989 constitution in 1992 this body was led by Boudiaf who was to become the Algerian president before his assassination and then Zeroual took control both of the presidency and the High Council in 1994 (Abi-Mershed, 1998: 8; Lenze, 2008: 92–93; Maerhofer, 2010: 206; Volpi, 2003: 56). As has been discussed, in both of the dimensions the pathological CMR and its continuum caused impediments to democratization. The civilian leaders Ahmed Ben Bella and Mohammed Boudiaf were swiftly removed from the Algerian political sphere.

Inferences

The case study of Algeria has provided a good test for many of the hypotheses built under the field of CMR. Although the study has focused on the interactions between the two entities, there are still potential implications for the arguments on military professionalism and the military as a social phenomenon. The inferences from the civil–military analysis of the Algerian case through a two-stage process tracing can be organized as the following.

I1: Armed Forces’ role in independence increases its authority and legitimacy concurred by popular support especially if it is fought against a colonial entity.

I2: A cohesive and an autonomous character may not directly imply the professionalism of military officers and restrictions on intervention into a civilian sphere but instead the army can take a modernizing and leading role thanks to these features.

I3: Civilians who come to power after independence are dependent on the army to establish their sovereignty and this dependency provides certain advantages for the army on intervening in the decision-making process.

I4: A pathological civil–military relation is likely to continue when the military is successful in institutionalizing its prevalence through the legislative apparatus of the state.

I5: The Army usually tries to have a tight grasp on political parties, tends to civilianize after a certain time of governance and becomes anxious about losing the party control and thus its legitimacy.

Conclusion

Several conclusions articulated to theoretical ramifications result from the analysis of the Algerian CMR with a comparative agenda between the development and institutionalization periods. Firstly, it has been argued that there should be a distinction between the periodical dimensions of CMR to better understand the reasons behind the continuum. The civil–military literature intends to find the stemming causes of the pathologies in these relations, however, the reasons why it turns into a continuum are bound to be case-specific. Implying this assumption, a state with an utmost level of pathology despite having had few military coups, Algeria posed a potential in showing the case-specific nature of research on the continuum. Secondly, how and why military governance is able to transit its ideology and culture of administration to the next generation has been questioned. The answers have been found in the organizational structure of military control in political parties and it is seen that sharing the same interests and anxieties do play a certain role in increasing the military cohesion. Thirdly, the similarities and differences between the periodical stages of pathological CMR have been analyzed and it has been found that the formation and development stages have very different political environments. The most salient pattern found to be consistent for the latter stage is the necessity and determination towards institutionalization.

There are many other potential working subjects for further scientific inquiries for the Algerian case let alone the region-wise comparative studies. The model presented in this study perhaps will enable other inquiries and research that will be conducted in countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq. There are many similar points among these states regarding CMR. Comparative studies may unravel why some states achieved a certain level of democracies in the Middle East while others still face challenges in this direction.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Furkan Halit Yolcu

Notes

Author biography

Furkan Halit Yolcu is a PhD student currently working as the Head of Security Studies desk at the Middle East Institute, Sakarya University, Turkey. He has been involved in several research activities along with PhD research. His PhD dissertation is funded by TUBİTAK which is the most prominent research institution of Turkey. He is primarily interested in neo-realist international relations theory, civil–military relations, arms and security studies. Apart from his PhD dissertation, Mr. Yolcu’s research activities are focused on the area of media studies. He focuses on the uses of propaganda in Turkish politics. He has published various articles both in local and international journals, and he has also participated in various national and international seminar/conferences around the world.

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Civilian sphere	Mortimer (1991), Tahi (1992, 1995), Gafaïti (1999), Zack (2002), Derrida and Regan (2003), Bouandel (2004), Storm (2009), Zoubir and Aghrout (2012), Aktürk (2015)
Military Sphere	Kelly (1964), Hopkins (1966), Perlmutter (1968), Luckham (1971), Kamrava (2000), Addi (2001), Volpi (2003), Bellin (2004), Entelis (2005), Mortimer (2006), Cook (2007), Sorenson (2007), Jensen and Kværnø (2008), Lutterbeck (2013), Lounnas (2017)
External factors	Tayeb (1986), Pierre and Quandt (1995), Abi-Mershed (1998), Welch (2003), Maerhofer (2010)