“We Sleep with One Eye Open”: Exploring the Experiences of Churches in Rivers State,Nigeria

Abstract

In instances of insecurity in many societies, churches “also” suffer. Yet there is a dearth of literature exploring the experiences of churches in connection with situations of insecurity. This study, therefore, explored the experiences of churches in the face of the high rate of insecurity in Rivers State, Nigeria. Information was elicited from 16 church leaders of different denominations in different communities in Rivers State. Using a descriptive narrative approach, the study found that churches’ experiences in some communities in the state are reflections of helplessness and despair due to the incidences of cultism, kidnapping, armed robbery, etc. Many churches in some of the embattled communities have been deserted or left with a few older people. This has had negative impacts on evangelism and the churches’ economy, with the clergy at the receiving end. The implications of findings for the government and churches are discussed.

Keywords

Churches experiences Rivers State insecurity cultism Amnesty program

Introduction

As one of the foremost states in the Niger Delta, mentioning Rivers State rejuvenates, among other things, a tale of an oil-rich coastal area where militia groups fight against what they deem injustice and marginalization on the part of the Federal Government. These militia groups include the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, the Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta, who blew up oil facilities, kidnapped and held foreign oil expatriates hostage, built local oil bunkering dumps and so on to register their dissatisfaction with the current situation, especially with respect to natural oil resource management in the country (Amadi et al., 2016; Ibaba, 2008; Osaghae et al., 2011; Ukiwo, 2007). However, although this seems to have been relatively contained by the Federal Government through the Amnesty program and other policy-driven approaches, Rivers State is bedeviled with another challenge: the insecurity occasioned by the scourge of cultism.

The rate at which cultists are terrorizing Rivers State is indeed overwhelming. These cultists are a group of individuals who subscribe to an oath of allegiance and secrecy, and rely mostly on violent means to achieve their ends. Their membership, mode of operation, and initiation rites remain a secret (Osaghae et al., 2011). Also, some of them possess and display mystical powers while carrying out their heinous activities (Chebli et al., 2007). Of all the cult groups in Rivers State, such as Red Squad, Ku Klux Klan, Mafia Lords, Germans, Vultures and so on, the Icelanders (also called Deywell) and the Greenlanders (also called Deygbam) seem to be the most notorious in the state as most of the reported violent cult clashes have been between the two (see Iheamnachor, 2016a; Iheamnachor and Oguji, 2016; Onoyume and Iheamnachor, 2016). It is contended that some are pro-state or pro-government, others are anti-state, whereas some have no clear political objectives (Amadi et al., 2016; Osaghae et al., 2011).

Cultism in the Niger Delta, especially in Rivers State, has inextricable ties with militancy. According to Amadi et al. (2016) most leaders of the militia groups were cult leaders who rebranded their organizations or groups with pro-emancipation proclivities following the disappointment they experienced from political elites for whom they served as thugs during electioneering periods. Also, Ukiwo (2007) historically showed how the perceived economic and political marginalization of the Ijaw people resulted in a violent mobilization among various Ijaw youth cult groups against the Federal Government. Certainly, in a crisis-tone environment such as the Niger Delta, with its high rates of youth unemployment, poverty, feelings of economic and political marginalization and of arms proliferation, it is expected that many youths will take to crime and is difficult to differentiate “arms-carrying” cultists from insurgents or militants. However, a slight difference can be made on the basis of their objectives. For instance, whereas cult groups seek supremacy and personal economic benefits, militia groups make political demands such as the release of imprisoned leaders, cash reparations for communities, change of electoral candidates, and a greater share of oil revenues, among other things (Amadi et al., 2016; Osaghae et al., 2011). This indeed highlights the complexities of the security situation in the Niger Delta, especially in Rivers State.

Nevertheless, these cult groups frequently engage in supremacy wars resulting in the killing of innocent people, kidnapping, armed robbery, and hostage taking in many communities in the state. For instance, four people were reportedly killed on August 26, 2016, during a cult clash between members of the rival cult groups, the Icelanders and Greenlanders, in two communities of Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni local government areas (LGA) of Rivers State (Iheamnachor and Oguji, 2016). Also, in a reprisal attack members of the Greenlanders reportedly killed six people on May 31, 2016 in Ibaa community in Emohua LGA, after they had shot four people in Odhuaje in Ahoada East LGA on the same day (Onoyume and Iheamnachor, 2016). On June 17, 2016, the members of the Greenlanders reportedly attacked Omoku town, the headquarters of Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LGA of Rivers State, killing 11 people. It was also reported that two people, including a popular medical doctor from the area, Dr. Erike, were kidnapped by the invaders during the raid (Iheamnachor, 2016a). Yafigborhi and Iheamnachor (2018) reported that following the New Year’s Day massacre on January 1, 2018 in Omoku, Egbeda, a neighboring community in Emohua LGA, was invaded by cultists resulting in the killing of 11 people. Similar killings have also occurred in communities such as Rumuodogo 1 in Emohua LGA (four people killed), Omudioga in Emohua LGA (one person), Omademe in Ikwerre LGA (two people), Ozuoba in Obio/Akpor LGA (one person), Oduoha in Emohua LGA (eight people) and many others (Iheamnachor, 2016b; 2017a; 2017b). In fact, a number of communities, especially in Ahoada East and Ahoada West LGAs of Rivers State, have been reportedly overturned, occupied, or controlled by cultists (Iheamnachor, 2016c). Although the government (state and federal) and security operatives have been making some efforts to curb the trend (see Amobi, 2017; Azubuike, 2018; Iheamnachor, 2017c; Ofiebor, 2018; Onwukwe, 2016), these incidences have heightened insecurity in Rivers State.

It is within this atmosphere of insecurity that churches in Rivers State operate. Generally, churches have been acknowledged for their transformative role in societies (Bosch, 1999). In fact, throughout the ages, churches have been involved in the life of humankind, in the making of nationhood, building of culture, structuring of society with its functions and institutions, and in shaping the form and quality of political systems (Pillay, 2017). Even in specific times of crisis and insecurity, churches have served as sources of relief to many (see APJN, 2008; Babalola, 2019; Kpughe, 2017). However, unfortunately churches are now victims, especially in Rivers State. There have been cases where churches have had some of their members murdered, kidnapped, harassed, robbed, and raped by some cultists in the state. For instance, the New Year’s Day Omoku massacre by the Red Squad cult group, which claimed about 20 lives in addition to injuring 52 people, took place in a church (Chinwo, 2018; Enenche, 2018; The Nation, January 2, 2018). Several churches, especially in the embattled communities in the state, have also had their routine activities disrupted. In fact, there are numerous ways through which churches have suffered the impacts of the insecurity in the state. Yet, this has unfortunately received little or no attention especially from scholars. Scholars such as Nnodim and Ochogba (2018), Dialoke and Edeja (2017), Ajibola et al. (2014), Ogbugo-Ololube (2016), and Uriah, Egbezor, and Ololube (2014) have assessed the impact of insecurity occasioned by militancy and cultism in Rivers State but have only focused on economy, property value/infrastructure, and education. Little or no attention has been given to the impact on or experiences of churches in the state. Hence, this study explored the experiences of churches in the face of the high level of insecurity occasioned by the incidences of cultism, kidnapping, armed robbery, etc. in Rivers State. The focus of this study on the experiences of churches in situations of insecurity will not only contribute to achieving a comprehensive picture and assessment of the impact of insecurity in Rivers State, but will also highlight the vulnerability of churches and other similar organizations in situations of insecurity in societies. The choice of Rivers State was informed by the prevalence of cult-related violent activities in the state. Although cultism, cult-related killings, and kidnapping have been widely experienced in other parts of the country, they seem to be more prevalent in the Niger Delta region, particularly in Rivers State (see Akasike, 2018; Eyo, 2015; Rilwan, 2018). In fact, the prevalence of these menaces in Rivers State has led to the state being declared as one of the most volatile areas in the country (Dikewoha, 2016).

Conceptual framework

The experiences of churches in Rivers State, Nigeria can be weaved around the concept of human security. Until recently, security was traditionally viewed (especially after the Westphalia Treaty of 1648) from the perspective of national security built around the state and guaranteed by the military (see Aduloju and Okwechime, 2016; Korhonen, n.d; MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). This perspective overlooked the security of the individual citizens in favor of the state. This perspective was, however, reconsidered at the end of the Cold War following the rise of global socio-political and economic challenges such as poverty, massive flow of refugees across borders, human rights violations, AIDS and other infectious diseases, environmental crises (such as climate change), terrorism and other organized crimes, and so on (Edstrom, 2011; Yamamoto, 2003). These challenges threatened the survival of human beings, their daily lives, and their dignity, and, as a result, formed the new or nontraditional security agenda (Stares, 1998, 2000). This led to the emergence of a human-centered security perspective heralded by the 1994 report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

In this light, human security is defined as safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime, and repression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the pattern of peoples’ daily lives—whether in their homes, in their jobs, in their communities or in their environment (Korhonen, n.d; UNDP, 1994). The concept of human security binds traditional concepts of security with human development and human rights (Korhonen, n.d). It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people and communities as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments (Commission on Human Security, 2003). It stresses values such as safety, wellbeing, and dignity (Edstrom, 2011). As a global and inclusive concept, it deals with a universal concern for which national boundaries are irrelevant, and concerns itself with security of people, not just of territory; security of individuals, not just of their nations; security through development, not through arms; and security of all people everywhere—in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, and in their environment (Mahbub, 1995).

Human security, according to the UNDP’s report, has seven essential dimensions: economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty); food security (e.g., access to food); health security (e.g., access to health care and protection from diseases); environmental security (e.g., protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and depletion); personal security (e.g., physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); community security (e.g., survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups and their physical security); and political security (e.g., enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression) (Gomez and Gasper, 2013; Paris, 2001; UNDP, 1994). However, these dimensions are summarized under the two broad complimentary perspectives: “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” (Gomez and Gasper, 2013). Whereas the former perspective addresses the need to protect individuals from violent conflicts and crimes, the latter focuses on the need to protect individuals from hunger, disease, and natural disasters.

However, the concept of human security has come under criticism. For instance, Korhonen (n.d.) notes that although human security is a progressive concept, it is problematic to put into practice because the feeling of security or lack of security is a subjective experience. Furthermore, security or lack of security is connected to the surrounding community. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, people living in the province of Kivu may have very different causes for fear than the people who live in the capital, Kinshasa. The same applies to the people living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and those living in Kenya. This is of course not to say there are no types or causes of insecurity that are common to all people (e.g., violent crime). Also, Paris (2001) questions the usefulness of the concept of human security for academic research or governmental policy making. According to him, two problems, in particular, limit the usefulness of the human security concept for students and practitioners of international politics. First, the concept is vague and lacks a precise definition. Second, due to the numerous security issues or threats that are often associated with the concept, policy makers find it difficult to prioritize issues that need to be addressed urgently with the available resources.

Nevertheless, although these positions contain some truth about the concept of human security, their concerns are peripheral compared to the human realities that the concept addresses. Also, the observed difficulty in prioritizing a security issue/threat in the list of the numerous human security related issues is a suggestion that all the issues/threats that are associated with the concept of human security are equally important and deserve policy attention. It is also a suggestion that human security is a holistic and inclusive concept, which is a strength, not a weakness. Moreover, there seems to be no basis for prioritization of issues or security needs as the “overlapping categories do not represent a hierarchy of security needs from personal to national, international, and environmental rights. On the contrary, each realm impinges upon the others and is intrinsically connected to wider political and economic considerations” (Reed and Tehranian, 1999, p. 53). These therefore suggest that any policy effort at addressing human security needs should be holistic.

Yet, the difficulty in prioritizing security needs does not suggest impossibility in identifying pressing security needs. In real-life situations, for instance, communities’ experiences of insecurity are usually not “uncaused” or based on a vacuum. There are always root causes for the situations of insecurity, which are rarely difficult to identify. A results-oriented and effective approach or solution to socio-political and economic problems is, of course, that which majorly addresses root causes of such problems. Hence, the first port of call for policy makers in their efforts to identify, prioritize, and address human security issues can be identifying root causes of such issues.

In the context of the present study, which explored the experiences of churches in the face of the high rate of insecurity occasioned by violent cult activities in Rivers State, Nigeria, one would easily think these churches and, by extension, the people of Rivers State majorly need to be protected from violent crimes (which falls within the freedom from fear dimension of human security). However, this would amount to oversimplification of the security situation in the area. In fact, behind these violent cult activities are issues bordering on environmental injustice, political marginalization, economic deprivation, human rights abuse, youth unemployment, and poverty, which deserve the government’s attention. These issues have been shown to be at the root of the high rate of violent crimes in the whole of the Niger Delta including Rivers State (see Ejibunu, 2007; Ibeanu and Luckham, 2007; Nnodim and Ochogba, 2018; Nwogwugwu et al., 2012; Obi and Rustard, 2011; Ojakorutu, 2010; Oronto et al., 2003; Owabukeruyele, 2000; Ukiwo, 2007; Uyang et al., 2016). It is more accurate to say these churches and the people of Rivers State lack both the freedom from want and freedom from fear. This is because the current high rate of insecurity (i.e., lack of freedom from fear) experienced by these churches is largely a fallout or consequence of the socio-political and economic situations (e.g., environmental injustice, political marginalization, economic deprivation, human rights abuse, youth unemployment, and poverty) in the State (i.e., lack of freedom from want), which largely explains why many young people engage in violent crimes such as cult-related killings, kidnapping, armed robbery, etc. So, the best-policy approach to solving the security problems in Rivers State needs to be holistic in that, although it needs to attempt to protect people from fear, it should focus on tackling the root causes of insecurity in the area. It is in this sense that the concept of human security is applied in this study.

Methods

The study area

Founded on May 27, 1967, Rivers State has become one of the foremost states in Nigeria. It is located in the South of Nigeria and categorized under the Niger Delta states. It has a total area of 11,077 km² (4277 square miles), making it the 26th largest state in Nigeria. The surrounding states are Imo, Abia, and Anambra to the North, Akwa Ibom to the East, and Bayelsa to the West. To the South, it is bound by the Atlantic Ocean. Its topography ranges from flat plains, with a complex network of rivers to tributaries. Rivers State has a population of about 5,198,716 people (City Population, 2018; Rivers State Government, 2016). With abundant crude oil and natural gas reserves, the state constitutes an important revenue source for the country. Its capital and largest city, Port Harcourt, is economically significant as the center of Nigeria’s oil industry. In 2014, the state ranked second nationwide with a gross domestic product of $21.07 billion and a per capita income of $3965 (Subair, 2014).

Being a culturally and linguistically pluralistic state, Rivers State houses many indigenous ethnic groups such as Ikwerre, Ekpeye, Eleme, Okrika, Kalabari, Abua, Ibani, Ogba, Opodo, Ogoni, Engenni, Obolo, Egbema, Ijaw, Andoni, Nkoroo, and many more (Rivers State Government, 2016). With respect to religion, Rivers State is predominantly Christian. There are about 1299 registered churches in the state (www.vconnect.com). With eight deaneries, over 500 parishes and over a million faithful, Roman Catholics make up a significant portion of the Christian population in the state (Ihejirika, 2009; The Catholic Diocese of Port Harcourt, 2018). There are other Christian denominations/churches such as Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Evangelical, and Pentecostal churches that are spread across all the communities in the state. Very few residents are Muslim (Ihejirika, 2009).

Participant recruitment

The study involved 16 purposively selected participants. These participants were church leaders who were drawn from different denominations in Rivers State. The choice of church leaders was not only informed by the fact that they wield influence in their respective churches, but are also better placed to know and communicate the experiences of their churches with respect to the state of insecurity in the state. A referral sampling technique was employed to enable the researchers locate church leaders who are very knowledgeable and capable of narrating their experiences. One major criterion for selecting a participant was that one must be residing in one of the embattled communities or areas where the incidences of cultism, kidnapping, killings, armed robbery, and so on are prevalent in the state. Another criterion is that one must have lived in any of these communities for more than 5 years. The participants comprised 13 males and three females. Their ages ranged between 34 and 62 years with a mean age of 48.9. See Table 1 below for details.

Table 1.

The socio-demographic information of participants.

S/N	Name of participant	Sex	Age	Educational qualification	Position/status	Denomination	Location when interviewed
1	Uche	M	45	MSc	Bishop	First African Mission	Ogba/ Egbema/Ndoni
2	Fina	F	60	MSc	Education Secretary/ Director, Research and Strategy, CAN	Anglican	Ikwerre
3	Chike	M	62	MBA	Clergy	Anglican	Okrika
4	Ben	M	54	PhD	Clergy	Roman Catholic	Port Harcourt
5	Emeka	M	35	BSc	Clergy	Seven Day Adventist	Port Harcourt
6	Stanley	M	56	MA	Clergy	Anglican	Ndele
7	Tony	M	60	BSc	Clergy	Pentecostal	Omoku
8	Fred	M	34	BSc	Clergy	Seven Day Adventist	Port Harcourt
9	Chukwuka	M	45	BSc	Clergy	Pentecostal	Port Harcourt
10	Nkwachukwu	M	40	MA	Clergy	Roman Catholic	Isiokpo
11	Timothy	M	44	MA	Clergy	Pentecostal	Port Harcourt
12	Dubem	M	38	MA	Clergy	Roman Catholic	Ibaa
13	Tochukwu	M	46	MA	Clergy	Anglican	Port Harcourt
14	Joy	F	53	BSc	Women Group Leader	Anglican	Ikwerre
15	Blessing	F	49	BSc	Women Group Treasurer	Pentecostal	Omoku
16	Henry	M	50	MA	Clergy	Roman Catholic	Umudioga

The names in the table are pseudonyms.

Data collection

The primary technique for data collection was the Key Informant Interview (KII). The KII was carried out over the phone and audio recorded. This was necessitated by the current state of insecurity as well as the unbearable cost of travelling to conduct face-to-face interviews with informants in Rivers State. Yet there was no discernible deficiency as all the interview questions were exhaustively addressed. Although two of the researchers are indigenous to the state, all they could do was provide names and the phone numbers of informants there. Still, not all people whose names and phone numbers were provided were able to grant the researchers interviews. One participant refused to talk about any issue related to the study because he insisted on seeing the interviewer face to face. Two other people could not grant interviews due to their consistent indisposition at each time they were called. Hence, of the 19 people who were referred to the researchers, only 16 were interviewed.

Before each interview, informants were informed of the nature of study and how and why we chose to speak with them. They were also assured of our commitment to handling their responses with a high sense of confidentiality. They were particularly assured that their real names would not be included in the study. This paid off, as all the participants were expressive and confident during conversations with the researchers. In complete understanding of the nature of the study, all the researchers actively participated in conducting the interviews. The interviews were conducted in English and each lasted between 38 and 53 minutes.

Data analysis

The study adapted Colaizzi’s guide for data analysis as cited in Shosha (n.d.) and Morrow et al. (2015) in the analysis of the generated data. This guide includes the following steps:

Each interview audio recording was carefully transcribed by the researchers. Each transcript was verified afterwards by the researchers who listened to each interview audio recording to ensure accuracy.

Each transcript was read and reread to obtain a general sense of the whole content.

For each transcript, significant statements that pertain to the phenomenon under study were extracted. These statements were written on a separate sheet, noting their pages and lines numbers.

Meanings were formulated from these significant statements in line with the major objective of the study.

The formulated meanings were sorted into categories and clusters of themes.

The findings of the study were integrated into an exhaustive description of the phenomenon under study, which is the experiences of churches in the face of insecurity in Rivers State.

Finally, validation of the findings was sought from the research participants to compare the researchers’ descriptive results with their experiences. There was, however, no need to modify any of the steps as the participants were satisfied with the results of the analysis.

Findings

The experience of churches in the face of insecurity

Participants expressed despair over the level of insecurity in Rivers State, which is occasioned by incidences of cultism and kidnapping. In fact, when asked about the security situation in the state, Fina reports thus:

The issue you just raised is a very serious matter in Rivers State. We sleep with one eye open. It is just by God’s grace. There is no day you don’t hear of a kidnapping or armed robbery case in Rivers State. . . Like yesterday when we were in a meeting, one matter was reported to us about a case in which someone was beheaded at Ibaa in Emohua and they kept the head on a table at the marketplace. I don’t know whether they want to sell it. . . In fact, the rate of cultism is high in the state.

Stanley narrates the same ordeal thus:

Ours here are these cult boys disturbing us, Icelanders (or Deywell) and Deygbam (or Greenlanders). They are the people controlling this area I am now (Ndele, Emohua LGA), where I am pastoring. . . Every day, we must hear gunshots around us. It’s just like now we are in a day time, so everywhere, people are moving around but once it is 6pm, you don’t see anybody around, except people like them that will be walking around. . . Yesterday, when I was travelling, someone was telling me about the place they call Umudioga. There were some killings there last week. People are packing up and leaving. Even here in Ndele, some people who were living here, those who are not indigenes are packing looking for a better place. . . It is all over, not even only in this place I am staying. In Ikwerre and Emohua LGAs, people are not resting.

In the words of Henry:

My brother, it is not easy. We are not sleeping. . . Everybody is scared because cultism is very rampant in the state. There are gunshots almost on daily basis. . . People are killed by cult boys who are always fighting between themselves. . . These are members of Deygbam and Deywell cult groups. These boys also kidnap people who pay money before they are released. The boys also rob people like traders in broad daylight at the market.

These cultists are believed to be behind the militancy in the area as well as several cases of kidnapping in the state. Little wonder Ben notes thus: “I don’t know any militant who is not a cultist; neither do you talk about kidnappers without linking them to cult groups”. These cult groups are reported to have sophisticated networks that make the crime almost intractable and challenging. Attesting to this, Chike says “Talking of kidnapping, generally, we don’t know. It is a network, so, you cannot say where the incidence is located is where the kidnappers are residing, that is, where their stronghold is. You can never know”.

Interestingly, unlike those days when kidnapping in Rivers State and Niger Delta as a whole was targeted at foreign oil workers, now the indigenous people of Rivers State, according to the participants, are victims of the crime. According to Fred, “if you are talking about kidnapping of foreign expatriates, that was long before now. It has not been recorded in the past 5 years. . . But every other kidnapping now are local kidnappings, as in, kidnapping of indigenes”. This change in focus, for one of the participants, could be attributed to the relocation of some oil companies from Rivers State to other neighboring states. Emeka notes that:

Perhaps, the relocation of some of these (oil) companies, because a lot of companies have relocated or moved out of the state because of insecurity. So, when you don’t have anybody to kidnap, who do you want to kidnap? So, they now fall back on the indigenes, they now start feeding on them (i.e., kidnapping indigenes for ransom).

Emeka went further to identify another possible reason for the change in focus, which is corruption among the indigenous politicians and local chiefs. According to him, some of the indigenous people who fall victims of kidnapping are those who embezzle the money they receive from oil companies as compensation for polluting the environment.

Some of the indigenes are now kidnapped because these are some of the people these companies are paying the money and these monies are not getting to the people. . . I know the multinational companies that operate in the oil industry. . . pay for pollution, when they emit pollution. . . and these compensations, where are they going? They are going nowhere (i.e., they are not usually remitted to the communities by these people).

Furthermore, when asked about the relationship or the connection that exists between the militants and the cultists, Stanley replies thus:

You know the militants, just like when it happened before, were fighting for justice because the oil companies were taking oil and not giving the communities anything. But these cult boys are not fighting for that. They are only fighting for supremacy—that is, which cult is supreme?

The participants reported the frequent clashes between the major cult groups in the state. Usually, these violent clashes that result from the struggle or desire for supremacy spill over to ordinary citizens in the state. Uche notes:

Just of recent, we experienced series of clash. . . between young people. . . These cult groups . . . I think they’re called Icelanders and the other, Greenlanders. . . They have great enmity between themselves and that extends to other members of the community. Some persons were affected through. . . some flying bullets.

Ben also elaborated on the connection between these cult clashes and the security of ordinary members of the communities in the state.

Now, you know the cult war is a kind of supremacy war, and when one group needs arms or ammunitions, or vehicles with which they go to operate, then the victims will become the common ordinary citizen who is going about his/her lawful business in the day.

Chukwuka, Joy, and Fred also attested to the existence of this enmity between these cult groups who in most cases take it out on innocent citizens in the state.

The impacts of insecurity

This high level of insecurity has had tremendous impacts on churches. Chike, for instance, reported how a Diocesan official of the Anglican Church in Okrika LGA, alongside two other members of the church, was kidnapped and released between November and December 2017. The fear that looms has also tremendously affected the activities of Churches in various ways. Tony, for instance, reported how the activities of Churches such as the Anglican church and Assemblies of God church in Ibaa Community have been adversely affected due to the fear occasioned by the high or frequent cases of killings in the community. This is also buttressed by Nkwachukwu’s personal experience in which some routine church activities such as evening masses were temporarily put on hold as a result of the incessant cases of cult-related killings in Omoku community in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LGA. In fact, there have been cases where some people have been kidnapped along the road to church. Specifically, “2 years ago, one woman was hit by a flying bullet on her way from church”. In Ndele community in Emohua LGA, Stanley reported how difficult it is to hold their routine church services, especially in the evening, as members, from Port Harcourt in particular, no longer attend for fear of being killed or kidnapped. Even when members attend services, according to Stanley, “they hurriedly go back”.

Narrating the same ordeal, Ben elaborated on the various ways churches are suffering in several communities in the state:

Right now, you can hardly do an early morning program in some such communities (where the activities of cultists are prevalent), like we have morning masses in the Catholic church. If for any reason the priest has the courage to go to church for a morning mass, only very few people will come, three, four, five persons, unlike before where there is a crowd, a large congregation gathering for morning mass. Many Catholics grew up with the tradition that going to church in the morning is a very wonderful way to begin a day, but for the fear of their lives, they will stay back. . . So the church is actually in trouble.

Ben also highlighted the effect the security situation has had on the ministerial and evangelistic aspect of the church:

And then, the pastors in such communities where. . . congregations have run away from home, whom are you going to minister to? Ministering becomes very difficult. So, the church is suffering it tremendously. . . The other one is that the young people who are supposed to be part of this evangelisation process, as the pastor cannot function alone. . . are not there because the ones there are already bad boys. Those who don’t want to be contaminated have left home. So, you see the church of the old, elderly people. Because as a young person, if you stay at home and you are not a member of the cult, then you are in trouble. It is either you join or they kill you. By the time they threatened you two or three times, you run out of the town. So, the church is. . . in trouble in our communities here in Rivers State, I must tell you.

These have some implications on the economic survival of the church in these communities. According to Ben:

The other part is that the church needs money to survive; anyhow you want to put it, the church needs money to survive. Now, the pastor is there, he has nothing to eat because there is nobody there . . . It is part of our law that the priest cannot go into business (i.e., buying and selling). So, how do you survive? The people that are supposed to feed you are not there, and you cannot do business yourself. So, that again, is another major stab on the faith of today in these communities.

Discussion

The aim of this study was to explore the experiences of churches in the face of the high incidences of cultism, kidnapping, armed robbery and so on in Rivers State. The study found that the high rate of insecurity has led to situations in which people desert their communities for fear of being killed or kidnapped. Some participants in the study reported some of the deserted communities included Ndele, Umudioga, Ibaa, and Ubima. The cult groups are reported to be occupying some of these deserted communities in the state. This reinforces the report by Adeniyi et al. (2017) of how some communities in Ogba, Egbema, Ndoni LGA such as Aga, Omoku, Okposi, Ukwunsi, and other communities in Ahoada have been deserted. Iheamnachor (2016c) also reported how cult groups have taken over the affairs of some communities in Ahoada East and West LGAs of Rivers State. Cultists, according to Iheamnachor, now assume the position of headship of communities in Omoku and determine who gets a job and whose business can operate in the area. People do not go to farm anymore because farmlands have become “no-go areas as different gangs use them to hold kidnapped victims” (Adeniyi et al., 2017). Stanley, a participant in the present study, explained how money is being collected from businessmen and women in Ndele community before they are allowed to open their stores or businesses. Iheamnachor (2016c) reported about a similar situation in Ahoada East and West LGAs. According to him, cultists have now taken these local governments hostage as the communities in these LGAs contribute money on monthly basis to cult gangs to allow them to live in peace. Before a resident of the area is allowed to hold an event, such as burial or wedding ceremonies, the organizers first meet with the cult groups controlling the area and pay a certain amount of money. Iheamnachor also reported of how the boys call prominent indigenes on phone, demanding they pay a “ransom” so they are not kidnapped.

All these have affected communities, especially their socioeconomic and infrastructural development. Scholars such as Nnodim and Ochogba (2018), Dialoke and Edeja (2017), Ajibola et al. (2014), Ogbugo-Ololube (2016), and Uriah, Egbezor, and Ololube (2014) have already documented the impact of this insecurity on the economy, property value/infrastructure and education in Rivers State. Of course, there can hardly be socioeconomic development in conditions of insecurity (Ewetan and Urhie, 2014).

The study also found the various ways through which churches are suffering or feeling the impacts of the insecurity in these communities in Rivers State. Participants explained how some church members have fallen victim to kidnapping and cult clashes in some communities. The impact of this insecurity on church attendance and the demography (i.e., age distribution) of congregations was also reported. According to some participants, due to fear of being kidnapped or killed, many members do not attend routine church services such as morning mass. In cases where they attend, they hurriedly leave. Again, some of the churches in some of these embattled communities are deserted or populated by the old or elderly following the relocation of people, especially the young, to relatively safe places. The economic implications of these were also highlighted by a participant who put the clergy in these communities at the receiving end. These reports correspond with that of Alabi (2012), who reported similar situations with the Anglican church in the north due to insecurity occasioned by the Boko Haram terrorist groups. According to this author, the effect of the series of bombings coupled with reprisal killings in Kaduna state led to church attendance dropping by 30%, whereas financial support for ministries dropped by 60%. A similar situation was reported in northern Cameroon where the activities of Boko Haram have created fear, caused deaths and property loss, and have had huge psychological and evangelical impact on churches (Kpughe, 2017). This may add to the commonalities between Niger Delta militancy/cultism and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria that Aghedo (2015) listed and examined.

Furthermore, the study found that kidnapping, which was initially carried out by militants and targeted at foreign oil expatriates, is now being carried out by cultists and targeted at the indigenous people of the state. Yet it was reported that virtually all the so-called cultists who are terrorizing many communities in the state through kidnapping and armed robbery are the same militants who had been involved in the insurgency some years ago in the state.

These changes can be largely explained by the relocation of some oil companies from the state as suggested by one of the participants. The changes can also be explained by the introduction of the Amnesty Program in 2009 (which still runs to date) in the Niger Delta, including Rivers State. This is possible because for two reasons. First, some militant groups were/are not captured in the Amnesty program. This was confirmed by Davidheiser and Nyiayaana (2011) and Ushie (2013), who reported that due to the balkanization of the militant movement by the Federal Government and the resultant mistrust of the government’s motives, certain militant groups withheld their arms and refused to partake in the Amnesty program. Second, the Amnesty program has not been generally effective, especially in providing a lasting solution to the insurgency in the Niger Delta region (see Ushie, 2013). Hence, it is possible that some of these cases of killing and kidnapping in Rivers State are being perpetrated by some cultists who are also members of these militant groups and were either left out of the Amnesty program or unsatisfied with the provisions of the program.

Implications of findings for policy makers and churches

The general state of insecurity of lives and properties occasioned by cult-related violent activities in Rivers State implicates the government in some ways.

First, the situation suggests there is a lack of freedom from fear in the state. For instance, the study showed how the fear of being robbed, kidnapped, or killed by cultists has, on the one hand, prevented churches from holding some of their routine services and, on the other hand, prevented people and residents from attending some routine activities of their churches in some communities in the state. This falls short of a major principle of the concept of human security (i.e., freedom from fear), which is ensuring or guaranteeing that people are protected from violent conflicts and crimes everywhere—in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, and in their environment (Mahbub, 1995). The government (both state and federal) therefore needs to live up to their responsibility of protecting the lives and property of citizens in Nigeria.

Second, the situation points to the fact that previous efforts by the government (both federal and state) such as the Amnesty program (both from federal and state governments), the deployment of security agencies, among others, have failed to achieve the desired results in the state (see Aduloju and Okwechime, 2016; Ashiru, 2017). Beyond the fact that this lack of success could have been caused by factors such as the complicity of some government officials (politicians), corruption and insincerity on the part of the Amnesty program executors, non-inclusive and comprehensive nature of the program, lack of adequate resources and follow-up and so on, the current situation fundamentally makes a point that a problem as complex as youth restiveness in the Niger Delta, especially Rivers State, cannot be successfully addressed through military might and “shallow” policies and programs. At best, such arrangements would achieve unsustainable success only in the short term. The current level of cultism in Rivers State has an inextricable connection with militancy, just as one of the participants noted. This is also buttressed by Amadi et al. (2016) and Ukiwo (2007), who have shown that militancy has been carried out by cultists in the Niger Delta, including Rivers State. This highlights the complexity of the insecurity situation in Rivers State. Hence, there are cases where the government tends to address cultism the same way militancy is being addressed. The Amnesty program set up by the Rivers State government for repentant cultists is a case in point (Channels Television, 2016). Also, the Federal Government is reportedly planning to grant amnesty to 32 suspected cultists who were declared wanted recently by the Rivers State government (John and Eze, 2018).

Nevertheless, to achieve a sustainable peace and order with respect to the problem of insecurity in Rivers State, the government (both federal and state) needs to address the root causes of the menaces of militancy/cultism and kidnapping. Deprivation seems to be one of the root causes. Scholars such as Aaron (2005), Ibeanu and Luckham (2007), and Obi and Rustard (2011) have treated deprivation as the major cause/reason around which other causes of youth restiveness in the Niger Delta, including Rivers State, revolve. Over the 50 years of crude oil and gas exploration in the Niger Delta region, which has provided estimated earnings of over US$400 billion (Amundsen, 2010) and US$600 billion (Amnesty International, 2009), there is no discernible positive impact on the development of host communities in the region (Aaron, 2015). This is despite the unbearable environmental damage, described by Amnesty International (2009) as “a human rights tragedy” that the residents face on a daily basis. Aduloju and Okwechime (2016) have also described these developmental and environmental issues in the Niger Delta as human security threats. According to Aaron (2015), the situation in the region can be attributed to a range of obnoxious petroleum development laws and policies, part of which rest the oil mineral rights with the Federal Government and not oil-producing communities or states. Yet the formula for sharing oil revenue in the country has, under successive administrations, been unfavorable to these communities and states. These are some issues that the government, especially the Federal Government, needs to squarely address to calm the spate of youth restiveness in the Niger Delta, especially in Rivers State.

Although employment opportunities could arise following an efficient approach in addressing the root causes of youth restlessness in the Niger Delta, especially in Rivers State, a conscious effort in creating these opportunities for the youths in the state is imperative. This is because most of the young people who are terrorizing communities in the state are unemployed. It is a fact that some ex-militants were offered jobs, especially in the reintegration phase of the Amnesty program. For instance, in 2012, about 89 ex-militants were reportedly offered employment by training centers at home and abroad after completing skills acquisition on maritime activities, welding, and fabrication (Ushie, 2013). Also, as at March 12, 2018, the coordinator of the Presidential Amnesty program, Paul Boroh reportedly said that the Federal Government had offered employment to 350 ex-militants who graduated from various tertiary institutions across the world (Adetayo, 2018). However, although this is commendable, its impact on the general wellbeing of Niger Delta youths is extremely insignificant. The number of employed ex-militants is even far less commensurate to the total number of ex-militants already trained under the Amnesty program. It should be noted that a total of 26,358 ex-militants were enrolled in the program between 2009 and 2011 (Ushie, 2013). And according to the recent report of Paul Boroh, all the ex-militants, except about 10,000 of them, completed their training and education under the program (Adetayo, 2018). This is not to mention the teaming youth population, especially the non-combatant ones in the region and Rivers State in particular, who are jobless. Hence, youth unemployment is an important issue that needs to be addressed for peace to reign in the Niger Delta and in Rivers State.

Churches are also implicated in this. Crime in the form of cultism, kidnapping, and armed robbery are largely ethical or moral issues (see Ajayi et al., 2010; Anasi, 2010; Kpae, 2016) and, given that churches are largely sources of moral values, they therefore cannot evade blame. The security situation in Rivers State points to the failure of churches in carrying out their spiritual and social responsibilities. This is because a morally upright youth is less likely to engage in crime. It follows to say that if the youths in Rivers State are led by morally sound and upright people, the overwhelming incidences of cultism, kidnapping, armed robbery, and the like could be prevented in some way. The current number of registered churches in Rivers State is about 1299 (www.vconnect.com). This of course does not capture the number of branches of these registered churches in the state. Hence, Rivers State is awash with churches of different denominations and almost on a daily basis more are appearing. Yet there is no corresponding or commensurate moral and spiritual effect on the residents, especially the youths in the state. Although insecurity in the state might have impaired the churches’ ability to effectively carry out some of their social and spiritual responsibilities in some way, the current deteriorated situation would have been prevented if churches had been proactive. This of course calls for serious reflections or further research on the moral impact of churches on the moral and spiritual development of the youths in Rivers State.

Apart from the moral bankruptcy as one of the causes responsible for the spate of insecurity in Rivers State and Niger Delta as a whole, there are other factors such as poverty, unemployment, ignorance etc. (see Nnodim and Ochogba, 2018; Uyang et al., 2016). Churches are also expected to intervene in some of these issues as part of their social responsibilities in the state. They can address some of these issues through the organization of workshops, seminars, and symposiums to enlighten the youths on the dangers and futility of crimes like cultism, kidnapping, armed robbery, etc. Youths could also be empowered with relevant information and skills on the platform of these seminars, workshops or symposiums to enable them engage gainfully in personal businesses. This will greatly augment the efforts of the government especially by capturing some non-combatant youths who are not captured in the Amnesty program in the state and the whole of the Niger Delta.

Regarding the security of churches in the embattled communities, churches are advised to make special arrangements for the security of members, especially during routine services. They could apply for policemen to be temporarily assigned to them. Alternatively, the local vigilante groups could be contracted to render these services. Moreover, local vigilante groups have been shown to be relatively effective in the state (see Godwin, 2017; Iheamnachor, 2018).

The limitations of this study, as with most qualitative studies, lie in the numbers and characteristics of its participants. This, of course, determines or affects the level to which its findings can be generalized. Hence, generalization of the findings of this study needs to be done with caution. Another limitation emanates from using phone calls to collect data for the study. This is because phone interviews may not have captured some relevant physical or facial expressions that perhaps would have enriched the study. Despite this, the findings of the present study are genuine, reliable, and provide important insights into the experiences of churches in violent crime-ridden communities in Rivers State, Nigeria.

Conclusion

This study has uncovered the unpleasant experiences of churches in the face of the high rate of insecurity in Rivers State. It has also shown the impact the activities of cultists have on the churches in the state. In all, these findings implicate the government (state and federal) as well as churches. Although the security situation in the state points to the failure of the government in guaranteeing human security, especially by addressing the root causes of cultism and youth restlessness in Rivers State, it suggests churches in the state have been resting on their oars, especially in the area of moral development of youths. It is on this basis that the study calls on both the government and the churches to rise to their respective duties by collaboratively addressing the root causes of insecurity in the Niger Delta, especially in Rivers State.

Footnotes

Authors’ note

George C Nche is currently affiliated to the Department of Religion Studies, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author biographies

George C Nche is a Lecturer and holds a PhD in religion and society at the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is currently a post doctoral fellow in the Department of Religion Studies, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. His research foci are religion and ecology, security, and conflict.

Chikodi Wachukwu is a priest in the Church of Nigeria, Anglican Communion (Diocese of Ikwerre, Rivers State, Nigeria). He holds a PhD in religion and society at the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Chinyere T Nwaoga is a staff in the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. She teaches entrepreneurship at the Center for Entrepreneurship and Development Research (CEDR), UNN.

Ekene M Mokwenye is a Lecturer and holds a PhD in African Traditional Religion at the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Prince Agwu is an academic staff in the Department of Social Work and also shares affiliation with the Health Policy Research Group, all in the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His key research interests are in social policy and social determinants of health.

Daniel I Alagboso is a pharmacist. He also studies law at the Faculty of Law, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Anambra State, Nigeria.

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