Transhumant Pastoral Economy and Human Security in Nigeria: Whither Civil Society Organisations?

Abstract

The limited access to land in most African states has engendered a fierce competition, especially among various agricultural user groups. The two major groups of agricultural land users are transhumant pastoralists and sedentary peasant farmers. The internecine conflict between these agro-user groups has grave implications for human security in Nigeria and beyond. Explanation of the conflict has centred on climate change and environmental security, population growth and urbanisation, and insecurity. However, the transnational character of this conflict, often made possible by relevant regional protocols, has not received adequate scholarly attention. This paper argues that networking of regional bodies and other stakeholders is the panacea for tackling the tension-soaked relationship between these land users.

Keywords

Transhumance pastoral economy peasant farming human security regional security complex theory Nigeria

Introduction

In the last two decades, violent conflicts between nomadic pastoralists and crop farmers have been on the increase in Nigeria and indeed the West African sub-region (Blench, 2010). The conflict initially consisted of disputes over natural resources between peasant crop farmers and transhumant pastoralists. Admittedly, what started as mere land use skirmishes between these agricultural user groups have crystallised into internecine warfare, with attendant threats to human security through loss of lives and economic opportunities as well as destruction of individual and communal properties (International Crisis Group, 2017). Militant herdsmen of Fulani ethnic extraction, who are widely regarded as the aggressors in this conflict, have been ranked the fourth most dangerous terror group in the world due to the scale of their offensives, especially in Nigeria (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). Consequently, the security situation in Nigeria and the West African sub-region has become increasingly volatile and terrifying, particularly because insecurity easily conduces to underdevelopment.

This article argues that the pastoral crisis and its attendant threat to human security in Nigeria are implicated in the ineffective implementation of relevant regional protocols in West Africa. Human security, which refers to freedom from fear and want, has come under severe threat in Africa through a combination of both natural and anthropogenic forces. While these factors, which are not mutually exclusive, vary according to the countries or contexts, there are certain cross-cutting ones such as extreme poverty, social exclusion, human rights violations, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), food insecurity, environmental degradation, illiteracy, endemic diseases, failure of governance, climate change, terrorism, as well as transhumant pastoralism.¹ These threats move beyond traditional notions of security that focus only on external military aggressions. Although they are very endemic in West Africa, the threat of transhumant pastoralism appears to have burgeoned and gained currency mainly because of the politico-security environment. Transhumant pastoralism as a herding tradition is commonly associated with nomadic Fulani of Central, East, North and West Africa, particularly in countries such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and South Sudan. With over 20 million Fulani living across West Africa (Levinson, 1996; Okoli, 2017), nomadic pastoralism in the region is almost exclusively associated with the Fulani ethnic nationality. This herding practice is as old as recorded history. Although significant cultural and technological variations exist across the globe, the underlying practices for taking advantage of remote seasonal pastures are largely similar.

The primacy of livestock rearing, both nomadic and sedentary pastoralism, to economic sustainability and food security in West Africa cannot be overemphasised. Together they provide about 44% of agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and also boast 60 million head of cattle, 160 million small ruminants and 400 million poultry. In comparison to the entire sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa contains 25% of the cattle, 33% of the sheep and 40% of the goats (SWAC-OECD/ECOWAS, 2008). West African transhumant pastoralists and sedentary peasant farmers have long coexisted in mutually supportive relationships that have also witnessed contentious encounters. They have had established practices of trade and symbiotic production that allows herders’ cattle to fertilise the farmers’ land in exchange for usufructuary rights over land and landed resources. However, both population growth and increasing commodity production have led to the expansion of agriculture on formerly shared grazing lands. Although the relationship between these two groups of land users in most jurisdictions outside Africa is not prone to widespread violence (Gentle and Thwaites, 2016; Sendyka and Makovicky, 2018), Nigeria’s case is extremely conflictive and tension-soaked.

Academic and grey literatures are awash with reports of violent and frequently fatal clashes between herders and farmers (Agyemang, 2017; Assessment Capacities Project, 2017; Bello, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2017, 2018; Moritz, 2006, 2010). Although widely regarded as resource-use conflict in the intellectual tradition of neo-Malthusianism (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Hussein et al., 1999; Moritz, ‎2010; Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998), clashes between nomadic herders and peasant farmers in Nigeria have not only become very frequent, sophisticated and well-coordinated, but have also continued to acquire ethno-regional, religious and political tinge. In Nigerian states of Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba, attacks by armed Fulani nomadic pastoralists have been focused rather selectively on non-Muslim communities, while similar attacks in places such as Zamfara and Kebbi states have targeted non-Fulani villages (Okoli, 2017). Thus, most of the attacks would seem as if people are victimised on religious and ethnic grounds.

Divergent scholarly perspectives and explanations exist on the causes, drivers and consequences of violent clashes between nomadic herders and peasant farmers in Nigeria. First, recurring violent conflicts between these two groups of land users have been attributed to climate change and environmental scarcity (Cabot, 2017; Odoh and Chilaka, 2012; Onuoha, 2010; Onuoha and Ezirim, 2010). Second is the Malthusian perspective that urbanisation and the explosive growth in population relative to available resources in Africa can explain the clashes between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists (Fratkin, 1997; Neupert, 1999; Onuoha, 2010; Oyama, 2014). Third, other studies focus on the contributions of insecurity within the Lake Chad area to the worsening relationship between transhumant herders and their host communities in the savannah belt of Nigeria (Fabiyi and Otunuga, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2017). While extant literatures on this topic are very instructive, they have paid scant attention to the transnational character of the conflict. In other words, these studies are yet to give sufficient attention to the role of regional conventions in the crystallisation of the conflict between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary peasant farmers in Nigeria.

The next section will consider the contending explanations on the outbreak of nomadic pastoralists’/peasant farmers’ clashes. The following section interrogates the transhumant pastoral crisis from the prism of the regional security complex theory (RSCT). Thereafter, the study investigates the link between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocols, transhumant pastoralism and human security in Nigeria. The penultimate section argues that the complex and transnational character of farmers’/herders’ clashes in Nigeria requires the collective action of state and non-state actors. Lastly, more general conclusions relating to the regional security implications of transhumant pastoralism in Africa are drawn.

Contending explanations on the outbreak of nomadic pastoralists’/peasant farmers’ clashes

There has been a groundswell of scholarly discourses on the causes of nomadic pastoralists’/peasant farmers’ conflicts, especially in Africa. The existing studies can be broadly segmented into three schools of thought. First, recurring violent conflicts between these two groups of agro-land users have been attributed to climate change and environmental scarcity (Cabot, 2017; Odoh and Chilaka, 2012; Onuoha, 2010; Onuoha and Ezirim, 2010). Studies on the security implications of climate change in Africa gained traction since 2007 following debates by the African Union, the United Nations Security Council, and the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Although climate change in itself cannot lead to conflict in the sense of direct violence, scholars in the field of environmental security see causal links between climate change-induced environmental scarcity and violence (Bachler, 1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – the foremost global expert body on climate change – the evidence of climate change and global warming is not only increasing but is likely to translate into more frequent and severe weather-related shocks alongside rising temperatures and increasingly irregular rainfall in West Africa (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 2007). Thus, the environmental impacts of climate change pose a challenge to vulnerable communities in Africa by reducing the availability of water and food. Drawing from her study of the conflicts between peasant farmers and nomadic herders in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, Cabot (2017) argues that farmers and herders in West Africa belong to the most vulnerable groups because of their overwhelming dependence on natural resources, which makes them historically prone to come into conflict with each other. As a result, she argues that conflicts between farmers and herders living in the climate change-impacted area of West Africa often make them compete violently for natural resources such as land and water. Along this line of thought, Odoh and Chilaka (2012) posit that climate change accounts for the worsening incidence of conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in northern Nigeria. Although the relationship between climate change and conflict is apparently weak, they argue that the immediate cause of this agro-conflict in northern Nigeria is natural resource scarcity, while the remote cause is climate change which continues to manifest through drought and desertification. Beyond this narrow focus on the impact of climate change on the pastoral crisis in northern Nigeria, Onuoha and Ezirim (2010) examine the nexus between climate change and national security in Nigeria. They contend that non-violent and gradual dynamics of manifestation of climate change serve only to disguise its impact on livelihoods, social order, peace and stability in Africa. However, political ecologists, especially Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, have rejected this simplistic nexus often created between environmental scarcity and violent conflicts by the Malthusian perspective without reference to complex empirical realities. Rather than being the source of conflict, they conceptualised the environment as ‘a theater in which conflicts or claims over property, assets, labor, and the politics of recognition play themselves out’ (Peluso and Watts, 2001: 25).

Second – and closely aligned to the above – is the Malthusian perspective that urbanisation and explosive growth in population relative to available resources in Africa can explain the clashes between peasant farmers and nomadic pastoralists (Fratkin, 1997; Neupert, 1999; Onuoha, 2010; Oyama, 2014). There has been an unprecedented expansion of public infrastructure and the acquisition of land by large-scale farmers and other private commercial interests. Thus, both population growth and increasing commodity production have led to the extension of farmlands to grazing reserves, thereby increasing the tension between these land users in many parts of the world (Fratkin, 1997). Within the context of the Lake Chad area, Onuoha (2010) argues that the surge in human and livestock populations led to overgrazing, unhealthy agricultural practices, intense fishing and pollution of the lake. This has significantly undermined the lake’s carrying and replenishment capacity. Consequently, the receding water of the lake has accentuated the occurrence of violent conflict between different categories of agro-land users in the north-east and other parts of Nigeria. As Onuoha (2010) further submits, cattle herders have moved deeper southwards, where they are competing for the available scarce resources such as fresh water and grazing lands with other economic groups and host communities. Overall, the explosive growth in human and livestock population, especially within the context of shrinking Lake Chad water, has made the seasonal movement of the Hausa/Fulani cattle breeders to the southern part of Nigeria more permanent. Many of them are now settled in some parts of southern Nigeria such as Ilorin, Ogbomoso, Oyo, Shaki, Ubakala, Umuahia and Uzo-Uwani (Onuoha, 2010). Among others, the increased competition for landed resources by these agro-pastoralists and sedentary farmers accounts for the frequent occurrence of clashes between them in various communities in the Middle Belt and southern Nigeria. Within the context of the Mongolian Plateau, Neupert (1999) posits that the relationship between demographic factors and ecological outcomes is not a simple one. Accordingly, the difference in resource depletion and environmental degradation in the Plateau is mainly the result of different population dynamics, which has resulted in different human and animal population densities (Neupert, 1999). In spite of being a large country with enormous pasturelands, the carrying capacity of the Republic of Mongolia’s grasslands is limited by rapid human and animal population growth with attendant environmental and ecological instability.

Third, other studies focus on the contributions of insecurity within the Lake Chad area to the worsening relationship between transhumant herders and their host communities in the savannah belt of Nigeria (Fabiyi and Otunuga, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2017). For instance, the members of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders’ Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) reportedly lost over one million cattle and other livestock to Boko Haram insurgency and cattle rustling in the north-east (Okogba, 2017). The prevalence of the insurgency and cattle rustling in Lake Chad has forced nomadic herders into the savannah belt where high population growth has already heightened pressure on farmland, thereby increasing the frequency and lethality of disputes over crop damage, water pollution and cattle theft. By the same token, the proliferation of SALW, weak state capacity, and weakening of informal conflict resolution mechanisms also heighten the conflictual relationship between nomadic pastoralists and their host communities. In this context, transhumant pastoralists are perceived as violent and deliberately armed to deal with unsuspecting crop farmers and intentionally destroy their crops. Conversely, pastoralists see themselves as victims of circumstance, of political and economic marginalisation and lacking voice within the Nigerian state (Aderinoye-Abdulwahab and Adefalu, 2012).

It is deducible from the foregoing that there is widespread availability of literature on the contending explanations for the outbreak of nomadic pastoralists’/peasant farmers’ clashes. While the existing discourses are useful in their own right, they fail to account for the role of regional protocols and conventions in the crystallisation of the conflict between these agro-land users in Nigeria. Such conventions, especially within the framework of the ECOWAS, including the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol of 1998, the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Goods and Persons in West Africa, the Regulations of Transhumance between ECOWAS Member-States of 2003 and the ECOWAS Strategic Plan for the Development and Transformation of the Livestock Sector, have been leveraged by herders to move across national borders in search of pastureland upon fulfilling the conditions laid down in the protocols. The tendency to exploit the loopholes in these protocols by the pastoralists has led to the progressive deterioration of human security in some pastoral economies in West Africa, especially in Nigeria.

Interrogating transhumant pastoral crisis: Regional security complex theory

In analysing the complex and transnational character of the threats posed by transhumant pastoral economy to human security, this article employs the regional security complex theory (RSCT). This is informed by the fact that analyses in extant scholarly discourses have revolved mainly around resource use and environmental scarcity, especially within the intellectual tradition of neo-Malthusianism (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Hussein et al., 1999; Moritz, ‎2010; Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998). However, the narrow and reductionist character of this analytic perspective has posed serious theoretical and methodological problems in certain formations where the conflict has become a regional contagion. The RSCT is a relatively new approach in international relations. It was originally introduced by Barry Buzan in 1983 in his work People, States and Fear, but later presented as a grand systematic theory in Buzan and Waever (2003). Other studies that have contributed to the advancement of the theory include Buzan (1991, 1995, 2008), Buzan et al. (1998), Nnoli (2006), among others.

The RSCT was developed to reflect the complex nature of international security in the post-Cold War era. It questions the primacy of the military elements alone in the conceptualisation of security. According to Buzan et al. (1998), this questioning has come from diverse sources rarely coordinated with each other. Some have come from the policy side, representing organisations (including the state) trying either to achieve recognition for their concerns or adapt themselves to circumstances. Other questions have come from academia: peace research, feminist scholarship, international political economy, and security and strategic studies. The RSCT balances the realist and the constructivist views of security. The theory maintains that the realist view of security as a derivative of power reduces the complex nature of security to a mere synonym for state power (Buzan, 1991). The realist scholarship which has dominated the international system evolved from the Westphalia state system after 1648. This view is mostly relevant during the world wars where states were in a constant struggle for power. In the post-Cold War era, however, the concept of security has become much more multifaceted and complex (Buzan, 2008; Buzan and Waever, 2003; Nnoli, 2006; Nwangwu and Ononogbu, 2014; Stone, 2009; Wolfers, 1952). Thus, the RSCT is a counterpoise to the overwhelming influence and dominance of the orthodox state-centric conceptualisation of security (Ononogbu and Nwangwu, 2018). It surveys the debate between the traditional and dynamic approaches to security studies with emphasis on people-centred security also known as human security (Ugwueze, 2017). It therefore follows that the theory emphasises human empowerment, promotion of the entire gamut of human rights (including economic, social and cultural rights), equal opportunities and good governance.

The complex nature of security stems from looking at various sectors of the security architecture so as to identify specific types of interaction that guarantees effectiveness in security management. According to Nnoli (2006: 17), ‘security demands military power sufficient to dissuade or defeat an attack; but so many non-military elements are required to generate effective military power that a concern for security can never be restricted solely to the final military end product’. Thus, the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere (Buzan et al., 1998).

There are three components of essential structure in a security complex analysis. The first is the arrangement of the units and differentiation among them. The second is the patterns of amity and enmity, while the third is the distribution of power among the principal units. According to Buzan et al. (1998), major shift in any of these components would normally require a redefinition of the complex. This approach allows one to analyse national, regional or international security in both static and dynamic terms. The RSCT contains elements of neo-realism and globalism, but gives priority to a lower level of analysis (Buzan and Waever, 2003). In this theory, the logic of territoriality continues to operate strongly. However, non-territorial connections are also possible and permissible. The theory is useful for three reasons. First, it tells us something about the appropriate level of analysis in security studies; second, it can organise empirical studies; and third, theory-based scenarios can be established on the basis of the known possible form of, and alternatives to, regional security complexes. This third reason opens the space for theoretical application of regional security complex in line with the following basic assumptions of the theory:

Security is both a national, regional and global phenomenon and it will be very difficult to comprehend the security dynamics of one country without inserting it into a broader context and without grasping the conflicting or cooperative patterns that define the foreign policy of that country with its neighbours. Thus, the theory assumes that security is a complex phenomenon that must be addressed as such if solutions were to be found.

The theory assumes that the best way of approaching security problems is through cooperation and integration of various security architectures, including the civil society.

It also assumes that approaching security problems holistically must take into consideration both the traditional military and non-military strategies. This presupposes that security problems will remain in an environment where only military strategies are prioritised in fighting violent crimes.

The theory assumes that modern approach to insecurity goes beyond direct military action against non-state violent groups to include addressing all the conditions that give rise to violence, including poverty, poor governance, human rights violations, political exclusion, religious intolerance, and a host of others.

Finally, the theory assumes that security is no longer the business of the state alone. It therefore follows that where the state is the only institution responsible for managing national and regional security, insecurity will continually assume prominence.

The RSCT is significant for the analysis of how Nigeria’s transhumant pastoral economy impinges on its human security for many reasons. It identifies some basic units of analysis such as the state, post-realist emphasis on human security, security agencies and other critical stakeholders (including the civil society) within the security architecture, as well as the treatment of national and regional security as a complex phenomenon that is not only far-reaching in impact and geography but requires the collaborative participation of different stakeholders to tackle. No doubt, the threats of transhumant pastoralism in the country can hardly be addressed conclusively without the organic integration of both military and non-military strategies. This involves the effective integration of forces in managing regional security concerns as well as cooperation of groups within and beyond territorial boundaries, given the infectious nature of the security situation.

ECOWAS protocols, transhumant pastoralism and human security in Nigeria

Transhumant pastoralism as a herding practice in West Africa has spanned several centuries. It is a very important livestock production strategy in the region generally and Nigeria in particular. Besides serving as a veritable source of food security in the region, transhumant pastoralists have remained an integrating factor in a culturally diffused and disparate region like West Africa. Despite this integrative role and centrality of pastoralism to food security in the region, many African states have favoured the development of crop growing over agro-pastoralism as reflected in their policies/programmes and legal systems (Bennett, 1991; Moritz et al., 2002). According to Moritz (2006), pastoral usufruct rights over grazing land have generally not been recognised in state laws as a legitimate form of land use because the so-called ‘vacant and ownerless’ lands were considered public lands to be administered by the colonial government during the heyday of colonialism. In Nigeria, for instance, the implementation of the Land Use Act of 1978 allows the state or federal government the right to lease land and also gives indigenes the right to apply and be given a Certificate of Occupancy to claim ownership of their ancestral lands. This places the Fulani pastoralists in a difficult position, because recurring transhumant movement will inadvertently lead to encroachment on the properties of others. Although the Nigerian government designated some areas as grazing routes, it has not reduced clashes between transhumant pastoralists and sedentary crop farmers in places such as Adamawa, Benue, Enugu, (Southern) Kaduna, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba states. It is noteworthy that this apparent bias in favour of crop farmers does not presuppose that states have always supported them in their conflicts with herders. Instead, this predisposition has become a colonial hangover in many West African states. With the exception of Mauritania and Chad (where pastoralists are represented in government), Côte d’Ivoire (where the government has been supportive of pastoralists by creating a livestock development agency) and Niger (where the government created pastoral and agricultural zones by drawing a cultivation limit at latitude 15^°10’), state policies have generally been detrimental to pastoral rights over land (Moritz, 2006).

The vast majority of countries in West Africa are experiencing cross-border transhumance either as countries of origin, or as host or transit. Depending on the season, two types of route can be distinguished: ‘(a) the north-south routes (the more numerous) which indicate the transhumance movements of the dry season in the starting zones, and (b) the south-north route (less numerous) which materialise during the wet season transhumance movements’ (FAO/ECOWAS, 2012: 25). Accordingly, ECOWAS has recognised the pre-eminent place of livestock production in food security and economic sustainability. It has created the enabling environment for livestock breeding through the formulation of harmonious regulations on transhumance within the Community. Among others, the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Goods and Persons in West Africa, the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol of 1998, the Regulations of Transhumance between ECOWAS Member-States of 2003, the ECOWAS Strategic Plan for the Development and Transformation of the Livestock Sector, and the 2005 ECOWAS Agricultural Policy, have been ratified by the member-states of the Community. According to Article 3 of the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol, ‘all animals of the bovine, caprine, cameline, equine plus asinine species shall be allowed free passage across the borders of all member states, under the conditions set out in this Decision’ (ECOWAS, 1998: 4). Article 5 of the protocol further states that ‘all transhumance livestock shall be allowed free passage across points of entry into and departure from each country on the condition that they have the ECOWAS International Transhumance Certificate’.² Similarly, the ECOWAS Strategic Plan for the Development and Transformation of the Livestock Sector in West Africa also harps on the creation of a favourable environment for the development of the livestock sector. This includes the promotion of intra-regional trade in animal products, provision of security and facilitation of cross-border movement of persons and livestock (Nwangwu et al., 2019).

Unlike in the past when West African nomadic pastoralists needed strict documentation and visa requirements to travel to any West African country, relevant ECOWAS protocols have liberalised migration of people and livestock from one state to another in the region. These supranational conventions of the Community are the driving force behind Fulani transhumant pastoralism in the region. The implication of the protocols is that nationals of any of the 15 member-states of ECOWAS are permitted to cross each other’s borders and reside for a maximum of 90 days without a visa.³ However, Armah et al. (2014) argue that the increasing rate of migration of Fulani herdsmen to littoral states of West Africa has assumed a worrisome dimension due to ineffective implementation of ECOWAS protocols by various member-states of the Community. Needless to say, Article 5 of the Transhumance Protocol, which provides for the certification of transhumant pastoralists, is the most poorly enforced by the member-states. Thus, the complexity of transhumant pastoral economy in West Africa is such that nomadic pastoralists have leveraged the general ineffective enforcement of these protocols to perpetrate acts of criminality in the region. Overall, the internecine conflicts between native farmers and Fulani herdsmen have not only leveraged these treaties but have also benefitted from an environment riddled with illegal and porous borders.

The transnational character of this conflict has further exacerbated the situation. For instance, President Muhammadu Buhari and some security chiefs have repeatedly alluded to the transnational character of the worsening pastoral crisis in Nigeria. In April 2018, President Buhari told the Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, that the killer herdsmen who streamed out of the Sahel to West Africa were trained and armed by late Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (Ogundipe, 2018). Similarly, the Department of State Service (DSS) – Nigeria’s domestic intelligence agency – revealed that the Islamic State in West Africa network were behind the killings in Benue State (Wakili, 2018). The service stated this after the arrest of several suspected armed Fulani herdsmen and militias who were allegedly sponsored by Benue State government. By the same token, the spatial and geographical spread of the Fulani ethnic stock who have predominated pastoral economy in West and Central Africa presupposes that any major confrontation between them and other groups could have regional repercussions, drawing in fighters from adjoining states. Thus, the protracted attacks often launched by armed herdsmen on various communities have endangered human security in West Africa. The attacks, which often assume a scorched-earth approach, especially in Nigeria, have engendered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, thereby making the country a leading storehouse of one of the worst humanitarian conditions in Africa (International Crisis Group, 2018; Okoli, 2017 ). The increase in frequency, intensity and geographical spread of the attacks, often with illicit firearms,⁴ has correspondingly exacerbated existing humanitarian and economic conditions in West Africa. An estimated 10,000 deaths have been recorded since 2005 in different farming communities in West Africa. While the West African states of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal have had their fair share of the onslaughts, Nigeria has remained the hotbed of the attacks. According to the Global Terrorism Index (2017), between 2010 and 2016, Fulani extremists were responsible for 466 terrorist attacks and 3068 fatalities in four countries, with 92% of fatalities taking place in Nigeria (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Incidents and fatalities from Fulani extremists’ attacks in four countries.

As expected, most regional bodies established to tackle insecurity in West Africa, as well as treaties and/or memorandum of understandings signed by ECOWAS countries, have adopted or emphasised the strategy of regional trans-border cooperation. However, the political will by ECOWAS member-states and other adjoining countries to commit to effective regional trans-border cooperation is poor. This has exacerbated the vulnerability of the countries concerned, which are already beset with weak public institutions. As argued by Adibe et al. (2019), this tendency can be attributed to the imbalance in the effect of insecurity on their various domestic economies. Thus, the capacity of the regional bodies to effectively coordinate strategies aimed at promoting human security is severely undermined. While insecurity in West Africa affects economic activities and development in the short term, no country in the region is completely immune from the long-term effect of undermining their national security. Although various regional protocols and bodies that emphasise free movement of persons and goods as well as commitment to trans-border cooperation have been signed and formed in the region, lack of cooperation and the absence of serious involvement by the member-states of regional institutions, especially ECOWAS, has made peace and security a mirage.

The longstanding clashes between nomadic herders and sedentary peasant farmers in Nigeria have increased exponentially since 2015. Report by the International Crisis Group (2017) suggests that fatalities have reached an annual average of more than two thousand between 2011 and 2016, often exceeding the toll from Boko Haram insurgency. In corroboration, Assessment Capacities Project (2017) reports that about 2500 persons were killed nationwide in 2016. It also notes that tens of thousands have been forcibly displaced, with property, crops and livestock worth billions of naira destroyed, at great cost to local and state economies. These attacks are very pronounced in about 22 states of the federation, drawn mainly from southern Nigeria and the Middle Belt.⁵ Figure 2 shows the states in the Middle Belt that are most adversely affected by these attacks. Particularly in 2016, no fewer than 800 people were killed in southern Kaduna and 1269 in Benue State, where at least 14 of the 23 Local Government Areas (LGA), including Agatu LGA, were invaded (Egbejule, 2017). Although military operations such as Exercise Ayem A’Kpatuma (Operation Cat Race) and Operation Whirl Stroke have ostensibly reduced the carnage in the area, low-profile attacks and killings have persisted (Duru, 2018).

Figure 2.

Map of Nigerian states with high incidence of herder-farmer casualties.

The lethality and scale of the offensives by armed herders accounted for the ranking of Fulani militant herdsmen as the fourth most dangerous terror group in the world, after Boko Haram, ISIS and al-Shabaab (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). The offensives by these militant pastoralists are characterised by large-scale destruction of farmlands and property, rape, robbery, abduction, and population displacement of farmers. As reported by Soriwei et al. (2016), the pastoralists are often found with pump action guns, cartridge dane guns, cartridge ammo, cutlasses, jackknives, sticks, torchlights, certificate of occupancy, assorted charms and hard drugs. Although herders argue that they carry weapons to defend themselves and their herds against heavily armed rustlers and other criminal gangs in farming communities (International Crisis Group, 2017), the increasing prevalence of unlicensed weapons has amplified the threats to human security. One of the landmark attacks by the militant herders took place on 21 September 2015, with the kidnapping of Chief Olu Falae, former Minister of Finance and a chieftain of Afenifere – a pan-Yoruba socio-cultural organisation – by seven herdsmen from his farmland in Ondo State. Other major incidents perpetrated by armed pastoralists (as shown in Table 1) include the February 2016 attack on 10 villages in Agatu LGA of Benue State; the Ukpabi Nimbo Massacre in Enugu State on 25 April 2016; the August 2017 gang-raping of a 72-year-old grandmother, Victoria Akinseye, on her farm in Ore, Odigbo LGA of Ondo State; the 2018 New Year killings in Benue State; the killings in Lau LGA of Taraba State on 5 January 2018; and the attacks of 24 June 2018 on no fewer than 11 villages in Plateau State.

Table 1.

Some high-profile attacks by armed Fulani pastoralists since 2015.

S/N	Date	Nature of attacks	Location	Source
1	21 September 2015	Kidnapping of Chief Olu Falae, former Minister of Finance and a chieftain of Afenifere – a pan-Yoruba socio-cultural organisation	His farmland in Ondo State	Punch (Nigeria) (2018). ‘Five herdsmen attacks that shocked Nigerians’, 11 January. Available from: https://punchng.com/five-herdsmen-attacks-that-shocked-nigerians/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
2	February–March 2016	Massacres of no fewer than 400 persons and displacement of at least 7000 others	10 villages in Agatu LGA of Benue	Punch (Nigeria) (2018). ‘Five herdsmen attacks that shocked Nigerians’, 11 January. Available from: https://punchng.com/five-herdsmen-attacks-that-shocked-nigerians/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
3	25 April 2016	Massacre at Ukpabi Nimbo	Ukpabi Nimbo in Uzo-Uwani LGA of Enugu State	Punch (Nigeria) (2018). ‘Five herdsmen attacks that shocked Nigerians’, 11 January. Available from: https://punchng.com/five-herdsmen-attacks-that-shocked-nigerians/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
4	August 2017	Gang-raping of a 72-year-old grandmother, Victoria Akinseye	Her farm in Ore, Odigbo LGA of Ondo State	Punch (Nigeria) (2018). ‘Five herdsmen attacks that shocked Nigerians’, 11 January. Available from: https://punchng.com/five-herdsmen-attacks-that-shocked-nigerians/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
5	6 January 2018	Raiding and killing of about 55 villagers	Lau LGA of Taraba State	Punch (Nigeria) (2018). ‘Five herdsmen attacks that shocked Nigerians’, 11 January. Available from: https://punchng.com/five-herdsmen-attacks-that-shocked-nigerians/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
6	April 2018	Killing of two Catholic priests and 17 parishioners	St Ignatius Catholic Church, Ukpor-Mbalom Parish, Gwer East LGA of Benue State	Eyoboka, S., Abdullah, W., Agbakwuru, J. and Duru, P. (2018). ‘Fresh bloodbath in Benue, 2 Catholic priests, 17 others killed by herdsmen’, Vanguard, 25 April. Available from: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/04/fresh-bloodbath-benue-2-catholic-priests-17-others-killed-herdsmen/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
7	16 May 2018	Invasion of five villages, killing of no fewer than three persons and burning down several houses, huts and food barns	Ukemberagya community, Gaambe-Tiev council ward of Logo LGA of Benue State	Duru, P. (2018). ‘Benue: Timeline of latest killings after launch of last military operation’, Vanguard, 16 June. Available from: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/06/benue-timeline-latest-killings-launch-last-military-operation/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
8	18 May 2018	Killing of six persons, including the head teachers of Makurdi Primary School and Makurdi Junior Secondary School, Mr Stephen Tavaku and Mr Christian Anankpa, respectively. The victims were among the 10 persons who went to survey and acquire farmland for rice cultivation under the umbrella of their teachers’ cooperative society	Mbatonbo community in Gwer LGA of Benue State	Duru, P. (2018). ‘Benue: Timeline of latest killings after launch of last military operation’, Vanguard, 16 June. Available from: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/06/benue-timeline-latest-killings-launch-last-military-operation/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
9	6 June 2018	Killing of 15 persons, including two candidates of the 2018 National Examination Council (NECO) examination	Communities in Logo and Guma LGAs	Duru, P. (2018). ‘Benue: Timeline of latest killings after launch of last military operation’, Vanguard, 16 June. Available from: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/06/benue-timeline-latest-killings-launch-last-military-operation/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
10	23 June 2018	More than 200 people left dead after coordinated reprisal attacks	11 villages in Plateau State	BBC News (2018). ‘Nigeria’s Plateau state clashes leave 86 dead’, 25 June. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44597409 [accessed: 20 October 2018]; Inuwa, J. (2018), ‘More than 200 people killed in weekend violence in central Nigeria’, Reuters, 27 June. Available from: https://af.reuters.com/article/nigeriaNews/idAFL8N1TT2B4?feedType=RSS&feedName=nigeriaNews [accessed: 20 October 2018].
11	5 October 2018	About 19 persons, including a family of seven, confirmed dead after armed herders’ attack	Ariri community in Bassa LGA of Plateau State	Olokor, F. (2018). ‘Herdsmen kill 19 in Plateau midnight attack’, Punch (Nigeria), 5 October. Available from: https://punchng.com/herdsmen-kill-19-in-plateau-midnight-attack/ [accessed: 20 October 2018].
12	5 February 2019	Killing of 26 persons in attacks and reprisals by armed gunmen	Seven villages in Zamfara State	The Defense Post (2019). ‘Gunmen kill 26 in seven villages in Zamfara state, northwest Nigeria’, 5 February. Available from: https://thedefensepost.com/2019/02/05/nigeria-gunmen-kill-26-zamfara-mada-bukkuyum/ [12 July 2019].
13	11 February 2019	Attacks in Ungwar Bardi by armed herders and reprisal	Ungwar Bardi in Maro, Kajuru LGA of Kaduna State	Busari, K. and Udo, B. (2019). ‘How 66 people were killed in Kaduna in two days’, Premium Times (Nigeria), 16 February. Available from: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/313348-how-66-people-were-killed-in-kaduna-in-two-days.html [12 July 2019].

Source: Compiled by the authors.

The economic toll of the protracted attacks has been very overwhelming. According to Mercy Corps (2015), Nigeria was losing US$13.7 billion in revenue annually because of herder-farmer conflicts in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states. The study found that the average annual loss in internally generated revenue of these states stands at 47%. In corroboration, the federal government states that Nigeria loses about US$14 billion (₦5.04 trillion) annually to the farmers’/herders’ conflict in the country (Adeyemo, 2018). In March 2017, Governor Samuel Ortom of Benue State asserted that attacks by herders from more northerly states, as well as other adjoining countries including Cameroon, Chad and Niger, had cost his state ₦95 billion (about US$634 million at that time) between 2012 and 2014 (Agabi, 2017; Uja and Ehikioya, 2017). The loss of large cattle herds, crops, as well as increases in transport and labour costs in post-conflict environments, tends to increase poverty and food insecurity in the country.

Beyond the state: Whither civil society in the farmers’/herders’ clashes in Nigeria?

Although the farmers’/herders’ crisis in Nigeria has persisted, the responses from relevant federal authorities have been uncoordinated and tokenistic in nature. Under the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan, the federal government inaugurated an inter-ministerial technical committee on grazing reserves, with the mandate of ending the conflicts. Concurrently, the government set up a Committee on Grazing Reserves, which recommended ranch construction and the recovery and improvement of all grazing routes encroached upon by farmers (International Crisis Group, 2017). However, the defeat of Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 presidential election interrupted their implementation.

Since May 2015, when President Buhari’s government was inaugurated, attacks by armed herdsmen have become more frequent, coordinated and sophisticated, and perhaps comparable only to the conflicts in the Western Sudanese region of Darfur in which the Sudanese government-supported Janjaweed militia murder, rape, mutilate, plunder and displace local populations (see Table 1). Beyond intermittent words of condemnation, the government has failed to formulate effective strategies to address the attendant dangers of transhumant pastoralism in the country. Soon after assuming office in 2015, President Buhari directed the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to formulate a comprehensive livestock development plan, including measures to curb farmers’/herders’ clashes. In August 2015, the ministry recommended short, medium and long-term strategies, including the development of grazing reserves and stock routes (International Crisis Group, 2017). On 25 January 2016, the president announced his government’s intention to present a plan to the Nigerian Governors’ Forum to map grazing areas in all states as a temporary solution for cattle owners until they could be persuaded to embrace ranching (Premium Times, 2016). No doubt persuading herdsmen to embrace ranching is an undisguised avowal that the president has a soft spot for the nomadic pastoralists. This pro-Fulani herders’ slant of the plan partly accounted for its vehement rejection by most states in the Middle Belt and southern Nigeria when it was proposed as Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) initiative by the Buhari-led government.

Meanwhile, reliance on state security forces has not been able to resolve the problem. The federally controlled police force, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps and the Nigerian military are not only thinly deployed in rural areas but often lack early-warning mechanisms. Even when community and civil society groups get involved, the response to distress calls is often late. The more typical response has been to deploy the police, and sometimes the army, after clashes had taken place. For instance, President Buhari ordered the Inspector General of Police, Ibrahim Idris, to relocate to Benue State following the gruesome New Year day attacks and killings of 73 persons in Logo and Guma LGAs of Benue State by armed herdsmen⁶ (Channels Television, 2018; Gesinde, 2018). By the same token, the military reluctantly deployed its special force code-named Exercise Ayem A’Kpatuma in February 2018 in affected communities in the Middle Belt who had already resorted to self-protection and the formation of ethnic militia (Ojewale and Appiah-Nyamekye, 2018). Unlike other sectarian uprisings and movements such as Boko Haram insurgency, Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and the Indigenous People of Biafra, the Buhari administration’s responses to coordinated attacks by armed herdsmen have been lacklustre. Accordingly, President Buhari is often accused of deliberately failing to stop herder aggression because of his pastoral Fulani background and his position as the life patron of MACBAN (Igata, 2016). While the incidents of attack in other West African social formations are not totally dissimilar to Nigeria’s situation, they have been largely proactive by strengthening their relevant security and early-warning apparatuses to confront the clashes between these two groups of land users. In Ghana, for instance, Operation Cowleg I, II and III and Operation Livestock Solidarity were all designed to curb the marauding activities of armed Fulani herders in the Agogo area of the Ashanti region of the country. Although Operation Cowleg III, which was launched in May 2001 with the mandate to expel alien Fulani herdsmen from Ghana, has been widely criticised (Bukari and Schareika, 2015; Tonah, 2002), the operation has substantially brought armed attacks by Fulani herders on food crops and host communities under control.

The complex nature of the clashes between these agro-land users and the uninspiring responses by relevant state authorities in Nigeria has increased the urgency of action from different civil society organisations. However, the relative poverty of the Middle Belt, the hotbed of armed herdsmen attacks in Nigeria, partly accounts for why a very few civil society organisations operate in the area. Thus, most of the existing organisations are championing one ethnic- and community-based interest or the other. For instance, ethnic- and community-based groups defending farmers’ interests typically have organised press conferences and protests, seeking to draw global attention to their plight. Also, the Movement Against Fulani Occupation has instituted legal actions at the ECOWAS Court in Abuja, demanding a compensation of ₦500 billion (about US$1.6 billion) from the federal government because of its failure to protect its citizens (International Crisis Group, 2017). In the south-west, Afenifere has set up arrangements to monitor both herders and cattle thieves (Dada, 2017; Makinde and Dada, 2017). Conversely, livestock producer groups and pastoralist organisations vigorously defend herders’ interests and are of the view that media reports of incidents are often lopsided and politically motivated (Kayode-Adedeji, 2016; Leme, 2017). Pastoralist umbrella groups such as the Confederation of Traditional Herders Organisation (CORET), MACBAN and Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore also tend to downplay herders’ involvement in the violence.

However, the two most important civil society groups are MACBAN, the umbrella socio-cultural group of the Fulani cattle herders in Nigeria, and the All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN). Ideally, both MACBAN and AFAN can provide the bridges for cordial and sustainable relations between herders and farmers in Nigeria. Despite being engaged in varying degrees, it appears that the two organisations have fallen short of expectations (Omotola and Hassan, 2015). For many, the central and defining characteristic of relations between the two groups is the absence of an agent that can regulate and control the behaviour of the groups towards one another. Even in Nigeria, where governments at federal and state levels supposedly bring groups together, there is no higher authority to which the two groups are answerable, except to their own leadership. The two groups are used to destabilise social relations among herders, farmers and local populations, especially social capital and peace-building efforts. This situation, which approaches anarchy, leaves individuals to their own devices. The interests, their power, the choices they make and the actions they undertake are a response to an environment where their security is not guaranteed.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international development partners have been rather conciliatory and constructive in response to the clashes between these land users. The leading ones among these partners and NGOs are the British Council, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the German Embassy, Nigeria Reconciliation and Stability Project (NRSP), Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC), Mercy Corps, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and so on. They have focused on post-conflict reconciliation and peace building, improving early-warning and strengthening relations between communities and security agencies. Some of these bodies have encouraged herder-farmer dialogues through various local initiatives. In June 2016, for instance, the British Council-sponsored NRSP supported the Bayelsa State Peace and Conflict Management Alliance in organising a dialogue between farmers and herders (Odiegwu, 2016; Punch, 18 June 2016). Similarly, on 27 April 2017, the USAID sponsored and hosted a conference on herder-farmer dialogue, involving AFAN, MACBAN, the IMC, Mercy Corps, and Research for Common Ground (Ujah, 2017; US Embassy and Consulate in Nigeria, 2017). The conference recommended, among others, that the government of Nigeria should curb illegal weapons, modernise agricultural practices, enforce demarcation of farmland and grazing reserves, utilise new technology to reduce cattle rustling, improve systems of conflict resolution, and implement new policies acceptable to both groups.

Conclusion

This article investigated the link between transhumant pastoralism and human security in Nigeria. It argued that the transhumant pastoral crisis in the country is mainly propelled by the imperatives of regional integrative instruments which often come into conflict with prevailing socio-cultural and economic realities in ECOWAS countries. This argument differs from existing explanations which hold that climate change and environmental security, population growth and urbanisation, and insecurity are implicated in the origin and escalation of the conflict. Relying on the RSCT of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, the study found that the dangers of transhumant pastoralism in West Africa have festered because of a prevailing climate of weak state-centric enforcement of relevant provisions of ECOWAS conventions. In other words, relevant state authorities usually enforce these protocols without recourse to the complexity of the crisis, which is often muddled in ethnicity, religion and politics. The security predicament confronting the two agro-land user groups can only be dealt with by a deliberate form of public policy. It will be misleading to suggest that the two groups are in accord on what that policy is or should be. A minimum adherence to the collective security ideal requires both to renounce the unilateral use of force for its own end, and to come to the aid of individuals who are targeted for aggression.

In the light of the foregoing, the complexity of transhumant pastoral crisis in West Africa should be tackled from a holistic and multi-sectoral standpoint. The transnational character of this conflict presupposes that a regional approach be adopted towards redressing the menace. Regional platforms such as ECOWAS, Lake Chad Basin Authority and the Mano River Union should synergise and step up action in the interest of regional security. This is because the movement for promoting human security should not be limited to national governments alone. Following revelations that foreign herders were involved in attacks on farming communities, Nigeria should engage the governments of Cameroon and Chad, as well as the ECOWAS Commission, to strengthen existing relations and to agree on how to collectively monitor and regulate international transhumant pastoralism, in accordance with relevant conventions, including relevant ECOWAS protocols. Above all, the movement for promoting human security should not be limited to government-based organisations alone, as it requires the collective and interlocking participation of interest-neutral civil society groups to deal with. Thus, the civil society should increase public enlightenment, peace-building initiatives and early-warning mechanisms, and remain a virile watchdog in order to promote human security.

Footnotes

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Chikodiri Nwangwu

Notes

Author biographies

Chikodiri Nwangwu is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka with a specialisation in Political Economy. His research interests straddle election studies, counterinsurgency, gender & development, and Igbo nationalism. He has published well-researched articles in reputable journals, including Review of African Political Economy, Japanese Journal of Political Science and International Feminist Journal of Politics. He has also participated in several national and international academic conferences as a paper-giver. He is a member of the NPSA, APSA and AROCSA.

Peter O Mbah holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is currently a Senior Lecturer at the University. His teaching and research interests include public policy analysis, local government administration, election studies and research methodology. He has published in reputable journals, including Review of African Political Economy and Local Environment.

Chinedu C Ike holds a PhD in Political Science and Mass Communication from the Universität Salzburg, Austria and is currently a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He was a Research Fellow on Integration of African Political Refugees into European Culture and Economy with Afro-Asiatische Institute, Vienna, Austria/Catholic Institute for Development, Justice and Peace, Enugu, 2007-2008. He is a member of the NPSA and APSA. His research interests are International Relations; Peace and Conflict Studies; and Human Security and Terrorism Studies.

Otu Akanu Otu is a Senior Lecturer at Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike Ikwo, Ebonyi State. He holds PhD in Public Administration (Human Resource Management) from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He has published in refereed journals. His research interests include Public Policy, Human Resource Management, Human Security, and Election Studies. Email: otu.otu@funai.edu.ng.

Chikwado Ezugworie is a Lecturer in the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His research interests are International Relations; Peace and Conflict Studies; Election Studies, and Human Security. He has published in refereed journals and also participated in several national and international conferences as a paper-giver.

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