President Moon Jae-in at Midterm: What Affects Public Support for Moon Jae-in?

Abstract

Despite the unsuccessful outcomes of his policies on economic growth and North Korea, Moon Jae-in at midterm has received relatively high levels of job approval ratings compared to his immediate predecessors. What made it possible for him to maintain these ratings? To analyze this puzzle, we employed the three commonly noted leadership qualities—effective communication, political skill, and organizational capacity—suggested by presidential study scholars. We found that Moon Jae-in’s leadership qualities are not the compelling reason for his relatively high approval ratings. Instead, there are three alternative reasons for Moon Jae-in’s relatively high approval ratings: (a) better handling of the media; (b) collapse of the conservatives; and (c) multiple summit meetings with Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un. The latter two reasons are contextual factors, which are our theoretical contribution to the literature.

Keywords

Moon Jae-in approval ratings leadership qualities collapse of conservatives summit meetings

Introduction: The puzzle

In November 2019, President Moon Jae-in marked the 30th month in office of his five-year term. He came to office in a dramatic way: his predecessor Park Geun-hye was involved in a corruption scandal in 2016, and nationwide candlelit protests followed. Eventually, Park Geun-hye was impeached and ousted from the office. A special election was held in May 2017, and Moon Jae-in was elected the 19th president of South Korea.

Since Moon came to office, he has focused on three policy initiatives: (a) liquidation; (b) resolving the North Korean nuclear issue; and (c) economic growth. Liquidation was to clean up the corruption identified in the Park Geun-hye administration, but critiques have questioned the fairness of the indictment and potential abuse of power. As per the North Korean nuclear issue, there has been little progress toward North Korea’s denuclearization, despite multiple summit meetings with US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. As a result, public support for the reconciliation with North Korea has gradually waned.

For economic growth, the Moon administration employed an “income-led growth” policy. The logic of the policy is that an increase in wages will enhance aggregate demand, resulting in more jobs. To this end, the Moon administration raised the minimum wage annually. However, the expectation was not fulfilled. During the Park Geun-hye administration, annual economic growth rate was between 3.2% and 2.8%. Moon came to office in May 2017, and the growth rate of that year was 3.2%. With the income-led-growth policy, growth went down to 2.7% in 2018. The growth rate for the first quarter of 2019 declined further, recording ‒0.4%, the biggest economic contraction since the 2008 global financial crisis (Korea Herald, 2019b). Although the economy expanded modestly by growing 1.1% and 0.4% for the second and third quarter respectively (Korea Times, 25 October 2019a), the Financial Times (2019) reported that South Korea is set for the worst growth period since 1954 with the expected growth rates for 2019 and 2020 below 2.3%.

Unemployment did not improve either because businesses, particularly smaller ones and the self-employed, laid off workers to reduce labor costs incurred from a steep rise in the minimum wage. In the manufacturing and construction sector, the number of jobs went down by 130,000 (Joongang Ilbo, 2019). To reduce unemployment, the Moon administration has spent a lot of its fiscal resources for job creation, but the number of jobless people reached 1.15 million in May 2019, the highest since 2000.

Despite the unsuccessful outcome of his signature income-led growth policy, Moon has shown no signs of abandoning the policy. Moreover, despite the lack of progress in the North Korean nuclear issue, he continues his conciliatory policy toward North Korea. Thus, critiques began to believe that Moon is not going to change his policies regardless of the outcome.

Although his policies have not been fruitful, Moon has maintained relatively high approval ratings compared to his immediate predecessors Park Geun-hye, Lee Myung-bak, and Roh Moo-hyun. Although the rating has declined over time, it has been steadily higher than a percentage in the mid-40s; his public approval ratings have ranged between 39% and 51% as of the end of 2019 (Gallup Korea, 8 November 2019). By contrast, former President Park Geun-hye’s (2013–2017) approval rating had been consistently higher than 30% until her 45th month in office. But her rating dropped to 4% after the “Choi Soon-sil gate” broke out in December 2016. Lee Myung-bak’s (2008–2013) approval rating declined to 21.6% only four months after his inauguration, and Roh Moo-hyun’s (2003–2008) third year (30th month) rating was 24.7% (Hahm and Heo, 2018: 650). Moon is the only president who enjoys higher positive assessments than negative ones in the third year in office since South Korea was democratized in 1987 (Sisa Week, 2019).

What made it possible for Moon to receive these relatively high approval ratings? To this end, we explore Moon’s personal background and leadership qualities along with other factors. The findings of this study will help us better understand Moon Jae-in’s leadership and public response.

Previous studies on leadership qualities

Despite a plethora of studies on presidential leadership qualities, there is no consensus about what leadership qualities are necessary to become a successful leader/president. According to Rockman (1996: 326), there is no formula for successful presidential leadership as success may not mean the same for all presidents, given the diversity in their political and economic circumstances. Hahm and Heo (2018: 651–652), however, argue that although there are various leadership qualities offered in presidential studies literature, there are some similarities and overlaps. According to them, there are three commonly noted leadership qualities that are important to become a successful president.

First, the ability to communicate effectively with the public (e.g. Greenstein’s effective communicator; Hargrove’s public leadership; and Neustadt’s perceiving public view and ability to persuade others) is critical to be a successful leader. This ability is necessary for any president to be successful in a modern democratic system because the president’s articulation of his/her policy initiatives shows his/her ability and experience to communicate with the public. Moreover, modern technology forces politics to be exposed to the public, and public opinion affects policy decision-making to a considerable extent (Burstein, 2003; Cohen, 2015; Page and Shapiro, 1983). Since it is virtually impossible to have successful policy outcomes without public support, presidents need to have effective communication skills to persuade the public. In other words, effective communication is a necessary condition for any president to become a good leader (Greenstein, 2004; Hargrove, 1995; Neustadt, 1980).

The second ability needed by a president to succeed is the ability to negotiate with opposition leaders (Greenstein’s political skill; Hargrove’s manipulative skill; and Neustadt’s ability to perceive other’s expectation and persuade them). Political skill is a critical ability for presidential success because, in the presidential system, separation of power among government branches is embedded for check and balance. If the president’s ruling party gets a majority in the legislature, the president can prevail in legislating his/her policy initiatives. However, if the opposition party takes a majority in the legislature, which is rather common, political gridlock may occur because of the divided government (Greenstein, 2004; Hargrove, 1995; Neustadt, 1980). In this case, the president needs to become an effective negotiator to prevent political impasse and to improve the effectiveness of government functions (Greenstein, 2004: 219). Without negotiations with the opposition party leaders, it will be difficult for presidents to legislate their policy initiatives as they will be stalled in the legislature.

Third, presidential studies scholars (Greenstein, 2004; Hargrove, 1995; Rockman, 1996) note that it is extremely important for the president to have the ability to organize a good team of cabinet members and presidential staff in order to become a successful leader. Organizational skill includes two dimensions: (a) the president’s ability to recruit quality cabinet members and presidential staff and make them work effectively as a team; and (b) the president’s ability to facilitate an effective institutional system. Building an effective team of presidential staff and cabinet members involves selecting competent staff and cabinet members who will assist the president to make good policy decisions based on their expert advice. It also involves coordinating the working relationship between government agencies and departments so that they can function effectively. Making an effective institutional arrangement provides a good working environment for the president to perform (Greenstein, 2004: 218).

Among all the leadership qualities, good team-building is particularly important for a president to become a successful leader. The reason is that presidents need a team of experts who will provide adequate support (i.e. good advice and fair assessment) instead of telling the president what he/she wants to hear. The cabinet should also be able to explain presidential policy initiatives clearly to public employees so that bureaucrats can implement them effectively. Thus, management is central to political leadership because the president’s ability to transform his/her ideas into policies is essential to his/her success (Arnold, 1986; Pfiffner, 2007).

Next, we assess Moon Jae-in’s leadership style/qualities based on the three frequently suggested leadership qualities by presidential studies scholars.

Analysis of Moon Jae-in’s leadership qualities

Moon’s background

In order to analyze Moon Jae-in’s leadership qualities, we first explore his background. He was born in 1953, the son of North Korean refugees. Since his parents went into exile to escape the Korean War, Moon’s family had financial difficulties while he was growing up. He was a stellar student until middle school but became rebellious after he went to high school. While in college, he participated in student activist movements for democracy. At that time, Park Chung-hee was the president. He was an authoritarian leader and the father of Moon’s predecessor Park Geun-hye. Due to his role in the protest, Moon was arrested and expelled from university. After he was released from prison he was drafted to join the South Korean Special Warfare Forces. Following completion of his military duty, he was permitted to return to college to finish his education. He majored in law as he wanted to become a judge. Although he passed the bar exam with a very high score, he could not become a judge or prosecutor due to the record of imprisonment resulting from activism against the authoritarian government. He moved from Seoul (South Korea’s capital city) to Busan (the second-largest city in South Korea) where he met the late President Roh Moo-hyun and became a human rights lawyer.

Moon began his political career as a friend and supporter of Roh Moo-hyun. Moon’s rather short political career as President Roh’s chief of staff, lawmaker, and the leader of Democratic Party of Korea gave him a reputation for being gentle and good-willed but lacking in political charisma. His overall impression to the public was positive (Lee, 2016).

Effective communicator

Although Moon has difficulties enunciating his opinions, he has shown that he can be an effective communicator. Unlike his predecessor Park Geun-hye, who avoided the press and did not hold a single press conference in her first year in office, Moon tried to run the government in a transparent manner. To this end, he increased media appearances by making public announcements and holding press conferences and interviews with reporters. For example, Moon himself made the announcement of some of his first cabinet members including the Prime Minister. He also held a press conference on 17 August 2017, his 100th day in office, to explain his policy initiatives to the public. Unlike previous press conferences where the president read what his/her staff members wrote, and responded only to scripted questions, Moon took random questions from domestic and foreign reporters. Thus, Moon’s press conference was refreshing. It was clearly different from previous ones. He also appeared on TV programs to explain to the public his policy goals and achievements during his first 100 days in office.

Moreover, Moon’s handling himself in an informal and easygoing manner in various situations made a significant appeal to the public, which increased his popularity (Reuters, 2017). His conduct at the ceremony commemorating the Kwangju Democratization Movement in May 2017, giving a hug to comfort the daughter of a victim who could not stop crying after her talk, touched many people’s hearts. His popularity reached a high point, with an approval rating of 87% (OhmyNews, 2017).

Moon also held a televised one-on-one interview with a reporter from the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) on the second anniversary of his inauguration in May 2019. The interview lasted almost 90 minutes and Moon responded to questions on various issues including domestic politics, the economy, and denuclearizing North Korea. The public was amazed by the changes brought in by Moon. In November 2019, Moon even held a type of townhall meeting aired on TV under the title of “Dialogue with the People,” although some criticized the fact that the participants were selected though pre-screening (New Daily, 2019).

Moon’s handling of the media in general has received favorable assessment from international and local media (Korea Times, 2018c). Anna Fifield of the Washington Post even wrote on Twitter that, “A welcome development from Moon Jae-in: this press conference is a free-for-all. Journalists are not pre-selected to ask questions, unlike previous administrations.”¹ He clearly bore the semblance of being an effective communicator, a key feature to become a successful leader, unlike his predecessors.

In summary, Moon distinguished himself from his predecessor Park Geun-hye by increasing his media exposure to portray himself as a good communicator. Since Park Geun-hye minimized contact with the press, Moon’s relatively frequent appearances in the media were intriguing to the public, resulting in high job approval ratings.

On the other hand, Moon has also shown his stubborn side, which led to the reputation that he does not pay attention to different views. For example, he proclaimed that he will open an “era of zero irregular workers” during his term. However, converting all irregular workers to regular employees requires budgetary, managerial, and economic consideration. It can also raise social equity/fairness issues. To achieve the goal, the government needs to analyze what led to the current situation and what it would take to make the change in terms of time, preparation, financial resource, and public discussions. Yet, despite all this, Moon made the public announcement. Thus, critics expressed serious concerns, but Moon ignored them, which led to strikes and labor-management conflicts (Donga Ilbo, 2019a).

Another example is the income-led growth policy, the Moon administration’s signature economic policy. Despite strong objections from the opposition parties and economists, Moon continued the policy. As the economy became sluggish, he avoided public discussion of the policy. Despite all the negative data, Moon boasted the success of the policy in a type of townhall meeting in November 2019. He cited a report by Statistics Korea that the monthly income of the top 20% went up by mere 0.7%, while that of the bottom 20% increased by 4.3%, meaning that the wealth gap had been reduced. However, the same statistics revealed that monthly business income decreased by 4.9% compared to the previous year, the largest decline since 2003. He also did not mention that the increase of the income of the bottom 20% came partially from the government subsidies, which increased by 19.1% compared to the previous year (Chosun Ilbo, 2019b).

Kim Myung-sik, a regular columnist of the Korea Herald, wrote that the policy “has by now earned an F in terms of the nation’s economic and industrial performance and against which millions have raised cries of despair—Moon and his economic team need to cast away their apologetic masks and give up their attempts to hide behind manipulated statistics” (Korea Herald, 2019c). The main opposition Liberty Korea Party (LKP) labeled Moon “show-tong,” meaning no meaningful communication while focusing only on self-promotion. Even the centrist People’s Party dubbed it as a “show without content” (Chosun Ilbo, 2019b).

In summary, he has shown two different sides of himself in terms of being an effective communicator. Unlike his predecessor Park Geun-hye, he does not mind contact with the press. In fact, he seems to enjoy and take advantage of media exposure to publicize his policy initiatives and achievements. At the same time, he refused to communicate with the opposition parties. He also spurned compromising or amending his policies despite the unsuccessful outcomes. As a result, the country is politically divided, and protests are rampant.

Political skill: An aloof leader

Moon has yet to show his political skills, if he has any, given that political gridlock is the keyword that describes the relationship between the Moon administration and the opposition parties thus far. In general, as noted above, he refused to work with the opposition parties. He was not open to different views and showed a tendency only to listen to the people he trusts. As a result, there have been few meaningful dialogues between Moon and opposition party leaders. Opposition party leaders often went to the streets demanding dialogue and compromise.

That said, he made some attempts to negotiate or persuade the opposition lawmakers when he had a dire need. In June 2017, a month after his inauguration, Moon gave an address at the National Assembly to persuade the lawmakers to pass a supplementary budget bill for job creation. At that time, unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, was a serious issue, and Moon was pushing for expanding government consumption to create jobs. The supplementary budget bill eventually passed in late July 2017 after Moon made a conciliatory political gesture toward the opposition parties by renouncing his nomination of the Labor Minister who faced vehement opposition from the opposition parties.

The passage of the supplementary budget bill reminded Moon of the importance of the opposition parties because the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is short of an absolute majority. Unfortunately, however, Moon has made few efforts to work with the opposition parties since that time. As a result, the national budget bill for 2019 was stalled in the National Assembly. Moon and the ruling party leaders called it the “tyranny of the majority” but still did not try to communicate with opposition leaders (Korea Times, 2018c). In that respect, he was not a good communicator. Even a progressive newspaper editor, Park Rae-yong, wrote that “I have never heard of President Moon contacting opposition party lawmakers. Few senior members of the ruling party have met the president” (Park, 2018).

There is another example. In April 2019, the ruling DPK and three opposition parties submitted two controversial bills: an election law reform bill that introduces a new proportional representation system, and a bill to establish a new agency to investigate wrongdoings by high-level government officials. The LKP staged a massive rally in central Seoul and asked for public support to fight what they called the “authoritarian rule” by Moon (Korea Times, 2019b). Despite the strong opposition from the main opposition LKP, the four parties passed the bills in December 2019 (see Hahm, 2020).

Management: Rampant cronyism

A group of presidential studies scholars (Lowi, 1985; Moe, 1985; Weingast, 2005) argue that presidents typically want to appoint their friends and/or close aides as senior executive officers because of the discrepancy between public expectations and presidential authority. Since senior executives make policy decisions and manage government agencies, they can significantly affect policy outcomes. For this reason, previous presidents in South Korea have filled many of the senior executive government posts with their friends, aides, and supporters.

Indeed, personnel administration is critical for presidential success given the importance of their role. These positions require expertise and management skills. Thus, placing qualified people in important government posts has long been said to be one of the most important presidential tasks in South Korea (Hahm and Lee, 2008: 198). Nevertheless, previous presidents in South Korea made appointments based on their loyalty rather than expertise or merit. The media thus used terms such as “parachute appointments” or “code appointments” to criticize presidential appointments when the candidates were not qualified for the job. Moon also severely criticized his conservative predecessors for this kind of appointment (Korea Times, 2018d).

However, Moon has not been any different from his predecessors as he has done the same thing. In fact, cronyism in his administration is worse than previous administrations. South Korea transitioned to democracy in 1987, but the National Assembly did not have a measure to check the president’s authority to make appointments. To improve the legislature’s ability to check the president, the National Assembly passed a law that requires a legislative hearing to verify the candidate’s qualification. The hearing for the Prime Minister’s appointment began in 2000 and that of the cabinet members in 2005 (Hahm et al., 2013). Yet, it does not require the consent/confirmation of the National Assembly except for the appointment of the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chairman of the Board of Audit and Inspection, the President of the Constitutional Court, and Supreme Court Justices. When lawmakers raise issues due to the candidate’s lack of expertise or an ethical lapse, the candidate resigns, or the president rescinds the nomination. In some cases, however, presidents ignored the concerns and made the appointment without the legislature’s endorsement.

Since the hearing system was adopted in 2000, the percentage of presidential appointments made against the National Assembly’s wish is 12.3% for Roh Moo-hyun, 44.2% for Lee Myung-bak, and 41.4% for Park Geun-hye. Moon, however, has already made 48.3% of his appointments against the National Assembly’s opposition at his midterm (Donga Ilbo, 2019c). Focusing only on ministerial-level appointments since the personnel hearing system was adopted in 2005, there have been 48 cases where the president made appointments in spite of the objection of the opposition parties. As of November 2019, Moon has done this 17 times. According to National Assembly Secretariat’s Korean Serials, Roh Moo-hyun did it three times, Lee Myung-bak 17 times, and Park Geun-hye 11 times. In other words, at midterm, Moon has made as many appointments against the National Assembly’s wish as Lee Myung-bak did (Media Today, 9 September 2019).

In fact, most of Moon’s nominations faced objections, and the qualifications of the candidates were questioned. The following are some examples. Moon’s nomination for the President of the Constitutional Court in May 2017, one of his very first nominations after inauguration, was rejected by the National Assembly. It was the first time that the president’s nominee for the President of the Constitutional Court failed to get the National Assembly’s confirmation since the court was founded in 1987.

Moon’s nominations for his first cabinet had to change multiple times because of the issues and problems of the nominees, which delayed forming the cabinet by more than six months (195 days). As of November 2019, 14 of Moon’s nominations for cabinet positions has been withdrawn before or during the National Assembly’s hearing due to ethical issues or qualification problems (Media Today, 9 September 2019).

A prime example is the appointment of Cho Kuk for Minister of Justice, former Senior Secretary to the President for Civil Affairs. Because of the allegations of ethical lapses and criminal acts, such as fraud, obstruction of business, and financial wrongdoings by his family members, there were mass protests against the nomination for weeks. In response, Moon’s supporters organized protests supporting the nomination. Public opinion in the country was seriously divided over the issue (New York Times, 2019). Due to strong objections from the opposition parties, the Korean National Assembly did not endorse the appointment, yet Moon went ahead and made the appointment. Cho’s wife, brother, and nephew were arrested and indicted for various illegal activities, and Cho resigned after a little over a month in the post.

Furthermore, Moon has been under fire for appointing his supporters as heads or auditors of public enterprises, the so-called “parachute appointments” or “code appointments.” For example, Moon appointed Kim Sung-joo, a former lawmaker who worked for Moon during his campaign, as the chairman of the National Pension Service (NPS), South Korea’s largest institutional investor. The NPS chairman makes decisions on investing over 600 trillion won (US$537 billion) in retirement savings. Yet, Kim Sung-joo had no financial management or fund investment experience. His only experience related to the job was serving on the public health and welfare committee in the National Assembly. Due to the lack of prior fund managing experience, his appointment raised serious concerns (Korea Herald, 2017). Another example is the appointment of Kim Jo-won as the President of Korea Aerospace Industries. Kim Jo-won was a public employee of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. Later in his career, he became a high-ranking official at the ruling Democratic Party. He had no expertise or work experience related to the defense industry prior to the appointment.

Ironically, as an opposition party leader, Moon heavily criticized his conservative predecessors for placing their cronies in the top posts of state enterprises and public organizations. Given his history of criticizing cronyism, he publicly announced after he came to office that his appointment would be based on expertise. However, his proclamation turned out to be an empty promise, given his record of rewarding his supporters for loyalty by appointing them as heads of public enterprises or organizations. Considering the seriousness of cronyism, the Bareunmirae Party, a minor opposition party, analyzed all the presidential appointments. According to the analysis, 161 of the 364 heads and auditors of public organizations that Moon appointed, 44.2% of the appointments, were the so-called parachute or code appointments, which is higher than those of Lee Myung-bak or Park Geun-hye (Korea Times, 2018a).

Moon has a limited number of people he trusts and tends to keep them in his administration by moving them from one position to another, the so-called “revolving door” personnel administration. For example, Moon appointed Cho Kuk to the post of Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs. After two years, Moon appointed Cho as Justice Minister. Ironically, when President Lee Myung-bak appointed Kwon Jae-jin, Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs, as Justice Minister in July 2011, the then-opposition DPK and Moon vehemently opposed because there was no precedent. Kim Sang-jo is another example. Moon appointed Kim as Chief of the Fair Trade Commission. Two years later, a year before his term ended, Moon appointed Kim as his Senior Presidential Secretary for Policy.

Finally, Moon said during his campaign that “A blacklist is a form of state violence that tramples on the foundation of democracy.” He vowed not to do such a thing (Korea Herald, 2019a). To this end, he launched an investigation after he was elected president. All those involved in the blacklisting of cultural figures in the Park Geun-hye administration were put behind bars. However, Moon’s first Environment Minister, Kim Eun-kyung, has been charged for power abuse. She is suspected of forcing senior executives of public organizations that her ministry supervises to resign from their posts only because they were appointed by the Park Geun-hye administration. Apparently, she collaborated with the Office of the Senior Presidential Secretary for Personnel Affairs, to open spots for Moon’s “parachute appointments.”

Overall, Moon’s personnel administration has been unsuccessful as he made appointments based on personal ties and loyalty rather than qualifications. Despite repeated nomination problems, Moon’s appointment did not improve. Moreover, no one has taken responsibility, a serious accountability issue (Korea Times, 2019c).

Lack of political alternative: Collapse of the conservatives and weak opposition parties

As discussed, Moon’s Jae-in’s leadership qualities are not the reason for his relatively high approval ratings. His policies have been largely fruitless, and his pledges turned out to be empty promises. Nevertheless, he still maintains relatively high approval ratings, particularly compared to his immediate predecessors. One of the reasons may come from the lack of good alternatives from the public’s point of view.

The two former conservative presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye were arrested and indicted. Lee Myung-bak was charged for abuse of power, embezzlement, and bribery. The court sentenced him 15 years of imprisonment and KRW 21.2 billion (US$ 19.3 million) fine. Lee claimed innocence and argued that the indictment was political retaliation by Moon because former president Roh Moo-hyun committed suicide while he was under investigation for bribery during the Lee Myung-bak administration (Heo and Yun, 2019).

Park Geun-hye was impeached and ousted from office because of involving Choi Soon-sil, Park’s longtime friend, in government policy-making and personnel decisions, although Choi held no formal position. Choi Soon-sil had no security clearance, but she accessed classified material as well as President Park. Park Geun-hye was also charged for abuse of power, enforcing some big coorporations for monetary contributions to the foundations Choi founded. The court sentenced Park Geun-hye to 24 years in prison along with a fine of KRW 18 billion (US$ 16.4 million). Park protested against the indictment and repeatedly complained about the unfairness of the trial.

Nevertheless, the public viewed the indictment of these two former conservative presidents as more examples of corruption committed by conservative politicians. Given the record of previous corruption scandals by conservative politicians, the fall of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye intensified public questions about the integrity of conservative politicians, resulting in a low support rate for conservative political parties.

The impeachment of Park Geun-hye also had unexpected fallout. Because of the disagreement over the support/objection of the impeachment, the then ruling conservative LKP was divided. Those who supported the impeachment eventually left the party to create a new party, although some came back later. As a result, conservative politicians have not been united in the same party since that time. Hwang Kyo-ahn, the main opposition LKP leader, has been trying to unite all conservative politicians under one umbrella before the general election in April 2020. However, there have been so many obstacles in uniting all conservatives under one umbrella because of the friction between Park Geun-hye supporters and those who supported the impeachment.

In summary, the conservatives lost public support because of repeated corruption scandals. In addition, conservative politicians have been divided. Thus, there is a general consensus that the impeachment of Park Geun-hye not only gave way to the rise of Moon and progressives but also the collapse of conservatives (Yoon, 2018). Support ratings for the LKP clearly show the decline of the conservative LKP. For example, support for the conservative Grand National Party in November 2005 was 41.6% (Joongang Ilbo, 2005). In June 2009, the rate declined but was 31.9% (Public Opinion Briefing, 2009). In October 2016, when TV station JTBC first reported on Choi Soon-sil, support for the LKP was still 28% . But, after the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, the support rate for the LKP significantly declined. In May 2017 when Moon inaugurated, it was a mere 10%, while that of the progressive DPK was 45% (Munhwa Ilbo, 2018).

With the unsuccessful outcomes of Moon’s policy initiatives along with personnel administration disasters, support for Moon and the ruling DPK gradually decreased. According to a poll conducted in November 2019 by Donga Ilbo and Research and Research, 39.5% supported the ruling DPK, whereas only 22.4% of the respondents supported the main opposition LKP and 5.3% supported Bareun Mirae Party, a minor conservative party. However, 32% of the respondents said they would support the unified conservative party if created. In that scenario, support for DPK declined to 37%, reducing the gap between the two parties to only 5% (Donga Ilbo, 2019b). The poll results indicate that disappointment in the Moon administration and the ruling DPK did not convert to the support of LKP. Yet, some voters may turn to support conservatives if they are united.

Under the political environment of conservative collapse and weak opposition parties, Moon took the approach of “either with us or against us” and expected all to follow his lead without questioning. Indeed, he blamed the opposition parties for the political impasse. Moon considered the opposition parties’ objection to his policy initiatives as a political strife strategy rather than expressing legitimate concerns. As a result, the already rancorous relationship between the left and the right deteriorated and became even more contentious.

Summit meetings with Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un

Foreign relations and domestic politics are closely related as foreign policies reflect domestic political conditions. At the same time, foreign relationships also affect domestic politics. Recently, South Korea’s relationship with North Korea and the USA affected South Korea’s domestic politics to a considerable extent.

Ever since the North Korean nuclear program was first detected, the North Korean nuclear issue has been the most important security concern for South Korea. Despite the efforts of Washington and Seoul to lead to Pyongyang’s nuclear abandonment, North Korea has continued its nuclear development. Thus far, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests along with dozens of missile test-fires. In dealing with Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington have utilized engagement and pressure approaches, but neither policy worked.

Moon attempted to resolve the nuclear issue through summit meetings. Since Moon is known to be sympathetic to an engagement approach, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un responded positively. Moon and Kim Jong-un met three times in 2018 alone. US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un also had a series of meetings in 2018 and 2019. The summit meeting between Trump and Kim on 12 June 2018 was the first meeting in history between a US president and a North Korean leader. Although there have been no achievements, Trump’s perception of Kim Jong-un seems to have changed given that he downplayed North Korea’s missile tests by stating that “Kim Jong-un won’t disappoint his friend, President Trump” (Huffington Post, 2019).

The second US–North Korea summit occurred on 27–28 February 2019 in Hanoi; the two leaders only reaffirmed the differences in their positions. Another summit meeting between Trump and Kim occurred on 30 June 2019 at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Their 53-minute meeting marked the first encounter at the DMZ by the leaders of the foes in the Korean War. Both leaders agreed to resume the stalled talks, raising hopes for another breakthrough. The USA and North Korea restarted their working-level negotiations to narrow their differences over the scope and terms of denuclearization, but to no avail (Hahm, 2020).

All these meetings among the three national leaders received global media coverage, and the tension level in the Korean peninsula decreased considerably. Because of the South Korean public’s wish for North Korea’s denuclearization, Moon’s approval rating skyrocketed. For example, in May 2018, a month after his first summit with Kim Jong-un, his approval rating reached 83%. No presidents enjoyed that kind of rating a year after inauguration. Moon’s approval rating remained higher than 70% until July 2018 although it went down to below 60% in November 2018. Throughout the year 2017 and 2018, he enjoyed high job approval ratings thanks to easing tensions with North Korea.

The positive effects of the summit meetings on Moon’s approval rating gradually waned due to the lack of tangible outcome. Yet, it was one of the main factors that contributed to Moon’s high ratings in 2017, 2018, and 2019. Moreover, future meetings between Moon Jae-in, Donald Trump, and Kim Jong-un can always have a boosting effect on Moon’s approval ratings given the public wish for peace and stability in the region. The main opposition LKP’s floor leader Na Kyung-won’s request to the USA not to hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong-un prior to the next general election in April 2020 is good evidence indicating the boosting effects of summit meetings on public support for Moon and his party DPK (Chosun Ilbo, 2019a).

Conclusion and discussion

Moon defined his administration as the outcome of the candlelit revolution which led to the impeachment of Park Geun-hye (Washington Post, 2018). Since the public was extremely disappointed in Park Geun-hye and her administration’s corruption, the public had high hopes for Moon to restore the dignity of the presidency and reform political and social institutions. Moon’s supporters hailed him as the leader who would reunite the country and revamp the relationship between the left and the right. After two and a half years of the Moon presidency, however, public disappointment for the Moon administration is rising. Moon has been too stubborn with labor-friendly policies and engagement policies toward North Korea. At the same time, there has been little improvement in people’s daily lives. As a result, according to a report by Gallup Korea on 8 November 2019, the public thinks economic vitalization and job creation are the two top priorities that Moon should focus on, indicating the public dissatisfaction with the Moon administration’s policy priorities.

Nevertheless, Moon has received relatively high levels of job approval ratings compared to his immediate predecessors. To this end, we analyzed what made it possible for him to maintain such ratings. First, we analyzed Moon’s leadership qualities by employing the three commonly noted leadership qualities—effective communication, political skill, and organizational capacity—suggested by presidential study scholars as necessary for a successful president. Our analysis reveals that Moon has not shown the leadership qualities commonly suggested in the literature for a successful presidency during his first two and a half years. Yet, Moon has shown that he can be an effective communicator with the ability to touch people’s hearts, a huge departure from his predecessor Park Geun-hye, who did not know how to communicate with the people. But his lack of ability to negotiate and compromise with opposition leaders has resulted in political impasse. Moreover, his personnel management has been disappointing. Moon’s repeated personnel administration disasters undermined his credibility.

So, it is clear that Moon’s leadership qualities are not the reason for the relatively high ratings. Then, what are the reasons? There are three alternative reasons for Moon to maintain relatively high approval ratings: (a) better handling of the media compared to his predecessors; (b) the collapse of the conservatives; and (c) multiple summit meetings with Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un. Unlike Park Geun-hye, who avoided the press, Moon utilized media exposure to publicize his achievements. It was a big change, and Moon’s approach has been refreshing and intriguing. Moreover, his gentle image and easygoing manner appealed to the public.

Second, although he was very different from Park Geun-hye in terms of handling the press, he was almost identical with respect to dealing with different views. A conservative politician and governor of Jeju, Won Hee-ryong, even stated that Moon seems to be a male version of Park Geun-hye.² His income-led growth policy raised concerns from the beginning. The expected outcome has not materialized. Yet, he has refused to compromise. He has rarely met with the opposition party leaders. His lack of intention to negotiate with opposition leaders resulted in political impasse. However, the main opposition conservative party has been divided over the impeachment of Park Geun-hye. The image of a corrupted party was exacerbated because of the Choi Soon-sil scandal. In other words, conservative parties have not been a reliable alternative.

Finally, the North Korean nuclear issue is the top security concern to South Korea. Multiple summit meetings with Trump and Kim Jong-un generated a false hope for North Korea’s denuclearization. Given the difficulties embedded in the North Korean nuclear issue, summit meetings themselves seemed to be a good achievement to the public. That said, the patience of the public is gradually evaporating due to the lack of tangible outcome.

In conclusion, Moon has not shown the leadership qualities commonly suggested in the literature for a successful president during his first two and a half years. As a result, his key reform initiatives on social and economic progress have been stalled in the legislature. In order to overcome the political gridlock, he should work with the opposition party leaders. In this regard, a progressive newspaper editor, Park Rae-yong, wrote that “Moon cannot reform anything by simply blaming the situation. Claiming that he is unable to carry out reforms because the opposition is not cooperating is nothing but an excuse.” (Park, 13 November 2018). Unless Moon changes his approach to deal with the opposition, public support for him is likely to decline over time.

The contribution of this study is twofold: the application of leadership qualities recommended for successful leadership to Moon Jae-in’s case for analysis, and identifying three alternative explanations for Moon Jae-in maintaining relatively high approval ratings despite his poor leadership qualities and the unsuccessful outcomes of his policies. According to Druckman and Holmes (2004), there are three categories of variables that tend to affect presidential approval: (a) approval of the president’s performance in salient issue areas: economy, war, and education; (b) perceptions of the president’s image or personality traits: leadership quality/effectiveness, integrity, and empathy; and (c) political and social predispositions: party identification, ideology, and gender.

However, these traditional factors did not explain the relatively high approval rating of Moon Jae-in. Instead, contextual factors, such as the relationship with media, domestic political condition, and foreign policy events played a significant role, which is our theoretical contribution in addition to the empirical contribution of analyzing the Moon Jae-in case. Moreover, our findings reveal that presidential popularity/approval is closely linked to concurrent, actual events and domestic and international political environments.

Although our findings are sound, our conclusion is based on a single case. Thus, it would be desirable to cross-validate our theory with other cases.

Footnotes

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Uk Heo

Notes

Author biographies

Sung Deuk Hahm is a Chairman of Korea Institute of Presidential Studies. He was Editor-in-Chief of Korea Journal, Korean Social Science Journal, and International Review of Public Administration, Co-Editor of Administration and Society and International Public Management Journal, and Managing Editor of Governance. He previously taught at Georgetown University and Korea University.

Uk Heo is a University Distinguished Professor of University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and International Studies at Kyung Hee University.

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