Street-hawking in a Foreign Land: Social Dynamics of Migrant Petty Traders’ Livelihoods in Nigeria

Abstract

This article investigates how migrant petty trading populations confront social systems/perceptions of their host localities and the effects on the sustainability of their trading activities. I examine clusters of long-term migrant petty traders (LTMs) and very recent migrant petty traders (VRMs) (i.e. from Lake Chad region: Chad, Cameroon and Niger) found in Nigerian peri-urban areas. Adopting Kaufman’s symbolic-analytic model, I argue that a mix of socio-economic factors – peri-urban residents’ negative perception of migrant petty traders, divergence in symbolic attachments, and a low patronage system – affect the growth of the migrant petty trade sector in specific localities.

Keywords

Nigeria Lake Chad migration petty trade long-term migrants (LTMs)very recent migrants (VRMs)social labelling

Introduction

The world’s migration flows are heavy, with an estimated 266 m migrants, or 3.4% of the global population, contributing 9% to the global GDP. Migrants’ families peg their hopes and futures on windfalls derivable from remittances, which constitute a significant share/source of their livelihoods and household income (UNDESA, 2017). According to World Bank records, an estimated US$429 bn in remittances were sent home by migrants from developing countries in 2016. Officially recorded remittances to low and middle-income countries reached US$466 bn in 2017, an increase of 8.5% over US$429 bn in 2016 (World Bank, 2018). In 2018, it further rose to US$528 bn (an 11% increase), exceeding total foreign direct investment inflows from developed countries. In 2017, Nigeria was rated as a top remittance country in Africa with US$22 bn, followed by Egypt’s US$20 bn. In 2018, India and Nigeria became the world’s largest recipients of remittances, amassing US$80 bn and US$22 bn respectively (World Economic Forum, 2019). More than half of migrant populations do not move to developed countries but migrate within nearby (low and middle-income) countries (World Economic Forum, 2019). In 2017, 74% of international migrants were aged 20 to 64 years. Only 14% of all migrants were under the age of 20. In 2017, the share of women migrants fell slightly, from 49.3% in 2000 to 48.4% (UNDESA, 2017).

Nigeria’s immigrant community comprises over 1.235 m people of which 45.1% are female (UNDESA, 2017). A two-thirds majority of Nigeria’s migrant population is drawn from its neighbouring countries: ECOWAS nationals (51.4%), other Africans (16%), and non-Africans (32.7%) (IOM, 2016). In 2014, Nigeria had 938 asylum-seekers drawn from Congo (49.9%), Mali (15.1%), CAR (9.5%) and Chad (8.8%), and hosted a total of 1,679 refugees – with Congo (35.6%) and Cameroon (32.6%) as top refugee contributing countries to Nigeria (IOM, 2017). The immigrant annual growth rate remains high and unstable. This is mainly attributable to poor, easily circumvented border controls, including Nigeria’s 1,497 illegal migration points/land borders (IOM, 2016), and management challenges that continue to hamper and undercut the Nigerian migration system (Adegoroye, 2015). This makes effective policing against clandestine cross-border migration very difficult (Nigeria Migration Policy, 2015).

A fraction of migration studies in Africa focus on factors and social conditions that motivate and sustain migration (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2015; Potts, 1995; Reinhold and Thom, 2013; Wahba and Zenou, 2012), while others concentrate on recent patterns of migration in the region (Awumbila et al., 2009; De Haas, 2007, 2010; Devillard et al, 2015). Some portions of migration analysis further dwelt on conceptual and contextual nuances of the term ‘migration’ and its various sub-types, including the meanings and extrapolations of ‘transborder’, ‘internal’, ‘external’, ‘intraregional’, ‘interregional’, ‘long’, ‘short’, ‘temporary’ or ‘permanent’ migration, etc. (Barbier et al., 2009; Boyle et al., 2014; Poot et al., 2016). Oyeniyi (2013) reflects on the complex trajectories of internal migration, which involves rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-rural and urban-urban dynamics. Meagher (2003) depicts transborder migration as movement of people across state boundaries, especially in search of greener pastures; while intraregional migration involves more expansive mobility of persons within a given sub-region. On the other hand, interregional or external migration describes people’s mobility from one regional location to the other (Abdulahi and Afolayan, 2013). Awumbila et al. (2009) observe that a key feature of recent migratory patterns within the sub-region is that many states now double as immigration, emigration and transit countries. Some scholars see transborder migration as a common practice that forms an integral part of social organization and the formations of societies (Adepoju, 2002, 2015; Bahar and Rapoport, 2017; McCormick and Wahba, 2001). While internecine conflicts, trade, religious education, demographic and environmental changes resulting from the search for natural resources constitute key drivers that propel and encourage migrant populations’ mobility (UNDESA, 2017), the advent of colonial leadership fuelled mercantilist trade, which stimulated growth of cities and urbanization (Adaawen, 2017). However, most illegal migrants, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), are generally more inclined to engage in petty trading activities than formal trade or other labour activities in their host countries (Abdulahi and Afolayan, 2013). This is to refrain from implicating themselves and being perceived as ‘illegal migrants’ or ‘refugees’ by their host society.

Migration studies interpret the proliferation of petty traders in urban areas as an unhealthy symptom of economic underdevelopment, unemployment/low income, and an increase in migrant and refugee populations (Abdulahi and Afolayan, 2013; Bosiakoh, 2019; Ndawana, 2018; Nwajiuba, 2005; Oyeniyi, 2013; Williams and Baláž, 2002). However, these studies are yet to fully demonstrate why most migrants’ petty/street trade remains stagnant and lacks sustainable growth potential. Extant literature is, however, patchy on correlates between the intraregional shifts of large migrant populations, their trading activities and their embeddedness in the sociocultural diversities and social systems of their host localities. The lacuna arising from the dimensions, consequences and changing interactions of these complexities is a major concern that warrants and propels this study.

Many thousands of migrants in search of livelihoods are found at the margins of the petty trade sector of their host countries. The nature, involvement, scale and organization of migrant petty trading have changed markedly and grown over time in response to shifting economic conditions. Whereas migrants’ petty trades were initially merely sources of supplementary income, these trades have now generally become their main income source. Again, migrants’ petty trading is more sophisticated, as some of the petty traders could buy entire containers of goods from different countries (Williams and Baláž, 2002). The socio-economic pathways of migrant petty traders are diverging and such divergence will undoubtedly continue. This is possible as migrants’ host communities enjoy cultural diversity extracted from migrants who become dynamic members of their society.

However, it is observed that despite migrants’ significant socio-economic contributions to their host communities, they constitute the most vulnerable members of society (Ruben et al., 2009). They face abuses and discriminations of different kinds: job losses, less pay for longer hours of work, human rights violations (Campbell, 2003; David, 2017), and – as this study will show – very low business patronage. Most migrant petty traders are commonly perceived by their host society as informants, spies, dirty people, wanderers, fugitives, thieves, cheats and hawkers of inferior items. Migrant petty trading women and children are often the highest victims of human trafficking and heinous forms of exploitation (UNDESA, 2017). Ogawa (2006) maintains that urban social relationships and knowledge of urban life sometimes function to deepen or sustain unstable petty trading environments. It is therefore difficult to balance, reconcile or exchange social norms with migrants’ trading activities and economic profit. Inherent social systems and norms affecting migrant petty traders tend to be incongruous with economic rationality.

Extant legal frameworks that shape migration trends in Nigeria include the Immigration Act of 1963 (Chapter 171 – stipulating the conditions for entry, stay and departure of immigrants to and from Nigeria); the Immigration (Control of Aliens) Regulations of 1963; the Passport (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1990; the Labour Act of 1974, now Labour Act CAP L1, LFN, 2004 (Chapter 198); Child Rights Act 2003; and Nigeria Migration Policy 2015. Nigeria ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in 2003. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children (the Palermo Protocol), has been incorporated into Nigerian national legislation through the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law, and Enforcement and Administration Act of 14 July 2003. Unfortunately, existing fragmented migration policies have failed to effectively identify and manage both licit and illicit migrant populations and much less seize the opportunities to spur socio-economic development and growth potential linked with migrants’ economic activities.

This study examines the direct implications, dynamics and interferences of sociocultural systems on the economic activities of migrant petty traders in their specific host localities in Nigeria. Why are most migrants’ petty trades stagnated and lacking sustainable growth potential? What is the nature of ‘social labelling’ or (negative) perceptions of local natives about migrant vendors in specific localities, and how does this interrupt/interfere with their interrelationships and patronage system? How do migrant petty trading populations confront social systems/norms of their host localities and how do these affect their capital formations and reinvestment plans? I ironed out important sociopolitical factors that underpin the diverse interactive effects of these complexities on the growth of the migrant petty trade sector in specific localities, which are: urban dwellers’ negative perception of migrant populations (‘social labelling’), divergence in symbolic attachments to migrant vendors (trades), and the low patronage system. I contextualized these factors as deep-rooted, intrusive socio-environmental interferences/obstacles that long-term migrants (LTMs) find insuperable and invincible. Thus, LTMs are more susceptible to ‘change trade’ or ‘divert’ into other trade lines than very recent migrants (VRMs).

I present a distinct level of analysis which identifies, extricates and isolates only perceived ‘illegal’ migrant petty traders as targeted victims of the ‘negative perception/discrimination’ or ‘social labelling’ by the locals of the Aba, Okigwe and Owerri urban areas in Nigeria. This depicts a refocus and clear-cut paradigm shift from the extant analyses on xenophobic attitudes of locals against migrant populations. This study is significant and aims to offer valid accounts on the nexus, interrelationships and interactive effects relating to migrant populations’ informal petty trade sector and their socio-environments. This will contribute significantly in shaping and strengthening migration policies and urban governance in Nigeria. It will also raise adequate consciousness and awareness among host communities as well as migrant populations on the consequences and viable alternatives to illegal migration. Additionally, the study will contribute to the development of evidence-based policies and programmes that will assist national and local authorities as well as development partners in providing access to data on the trajectories of migration flows and dynamics of socio-economic forces that inhibit migrants’ trading activities in specific localities in Nigeria and elsewhere.

Key drivers to cross-border mobility and escalating migrant populations: The context of Lake Chad countries

The Lake Chad region is the centrifuge of critical socio-economic and ecological activities within a transboundary zone that bounds four countries – Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – with a population estimated at 246 m in 2017. Nigeria itself, with a population of 200 m, accounts for 75% of the entire Lake Chad population, compared to 10%, 8% and 6% respectively for Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The sub-region records one of the highest population annual growth rates worldwide: Cameroon – 2.5%, Chad – 3.3%, Niger – 4% and Nigeria – 2.7%. The lakes’ shallow freshwater and tributaries, covering 2,434,000 km, are for public consumption; the grasses encircling the lake shores and intertidal zones are used as fodder, and the raw materials used for handicraft industries are important strategic and natural endowments that converge in the region.

Despite its vast economic potential, and visible in its enormous and exploitable mineral resources (oil in Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad and uranium in Niger), the Lake Chad region is confronted by a diverse and complex interaction of migration-induced environmental, socio-economic and security challenges (IOM, 2019). Poverty levels in the region, as depicted by populations living on less than US$1.90 a day, are thus: Nigeria – 53.5%, Niger – 46%, Chad – 38% and Cameroon – 24% (United Nations Population Fund, 2017). Habitual patterns of climatic (constant drought) and demographic changes upset the socio-economic routines and livelihoods of inhabitants with resultant repercussions on poverty and insecurity (ACLED, 2018; OECD, 2016; Lemoalle et al, 2012; OCHA, 2018; Onuoha, 2008; Onyima and Iwuoha, 2015; Sarch, 2001; Scheffran et al., 2012; Yengoh, 2012).

While intersocietal migration has a long history and has occurred largely among people in search of new and safe arable lands, both for cattle grazing and farm settlements, colonial regimes’ introduction and enforcement of various blends of political and economic structures altered the motivation and composition of intraregional migration (Ndongko, 1991). Fall (2005) observes that African boundaries are very tenuous. The 1884–1885 Berlin Conference did not take into account the tribes and ethnic groups living along the arbitrary boundaries. It therefore supervised the indiscriminate apportionment and clustering of tribes and ethnic groups to different countries, making it extremely difficult to determine ethnic originality of citizens. For example, ‘the Yoruba and Borgu ethnic groups live in both Benin and Nigeria; the Ewes live in Togo and Ghana; Vais and Kroos in Liberia; the Hausa, Mandara, Kanuri, Fulani and Kotoko groups live in Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria; the Kanembu and the Shuwa Arabs are found in Nigeria and in Chad; and the Hausa and Fulani live in Niger as well as in Nigeria’ (Adejo, 2005: 93).

Expulsion of migrant populations in the 1960s and 1970s in West Africa further intensified migration crises that overflowed into the Lake Chad region. Ivory Coast expelled over 1,000 Beninese and also Togolese in 1958, as well as 16,000 Beninese in 1964; Chad expelled over 1,000 Beninese in 1960–1962; Senegal expelled Guineans in 1967; Sierra-Leone and later Guinea and Ivory Coast expelled Ghanaian fishermen and farmers in 1968; Ghana expelled over 1 m Nigerians in 1969 as well as Togolese farmers in early 1979; Nigeria expelled over 2 m Ghanaians in 1983’s ‘Ghana Must Go’ revolution; Nigeria also repatriated 16,738 illegal migrants in 2012; Nigerian traders were expelled from Cameroon, Zaire and Ivory Coast from the 1970s to 1990s (Adaawen, 2017; Nwanolue and Iwuoha, 2015; Tiemoko, 2003).

The adoption of a quasi-transport system intensified labour mobility by condensing the distance and risks of journeys that hitherto inhibited long-distance migration. Lake Chad migration, which is essentially short-term and male-dominated, includes temporary cross-border workers, cattle herders, petty traders, farm labourers, peasant professionals, clandestine workers and refugees (Carling, 2002). Importantly, Nigeria remains the main traditional recipient or immigrant country.

Vulnerability and porosity of transborder routes further define the flexibility of migrant populations in Lake Chad. The large uncontrolled and un-policeable borders facilitate the influx of illegal immigrants who mostly cross over for illegal activities other than legitimate trade (Nwanolue and Iwuoha, 2015). A study conducted by Ibeanu (2007) revealed that only 72% of transborder travels are completed by commercial road vehicles; some 20% of travellers use a motorcycle or bicycle, while 6% travel on foot. Simpler forms of transport enable traders to bypass border crossings and avoid delays. In Ibeanu’s study, up to 80% of travellers did not know there were official transit registers and logbooks, only 9% had filled such registers, and only 9.8% travelled with an interstate travel booklet. There was also inadequate knowledge among both travellers and law enforcement officials about extant laws regulating migrant movements relating to proper documentation of persons, goods and vehicles (Ibeanu, 2007). As a result, many migrant traders had devised strategies to cross borders with their goods illegally (Adegoroye, 2005). Migrants sometimes pay agents huge amounts both to traffic and to secure jobs for them abroad, ranging from US$1,000 to US$5,000 (World Bank, 2015).

In the case of Nigeria, there could be as many as 1,400 illegal transit routes which form a network of roads: in the south-west, Idi-Iroko in the Egbado area of Ogun state and Seme in Lagos state; in the south, the port city of Warri in Delta state; and in the north-east, the borders of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states which are shared with Niger and Cameroon (Agboton-Johnson et al., 2004). Despite mounting control posts, the laxity and corrupt practices by some immigration officials, who often collude with illegal immigrants to gain entry, continue to undermine effective control and checks on migrant populations (Adaawen, 2017; Adegoroye, 2005).

Roitman (1990) conceives that the rise in informal markets in sub-Saharan Africa is as a result of the activities of the state, which diversifies the economic statuses of traders in African societies. This is linked to the increase in transnational trade and migrant populations in most African states. Guyer (1995) presents a historical analysis depicting specific societies in West Africa where informal transborder trading activities have resulted in complex changes in material life in the region. Meagher (2003) believes that the deepening and expansion of ‘unofficial’ transborder trading systems in West Africa are attributable to economic restructuring and the globalization of trading activities in the region. Meagher insists that even though transborder trading activities represent important contributions to the national economy, they lack appropriate structural and institutional regulatory frameworks that would integrate the West African economy into the global economy.

The key propellers of the migration crisis – fragility and conflict scenarios – remain unsolved. A refugee crisis that originates from diverse regional circuits continues to spill over and spread out to the Lake Chad region (IOM, 2016). In 2016, the worldwide refugee population rose by 1.4 m to 16.5 m, close to the post-Cold War figure of 17.8 m in 1992. Africa is estimated to have more than 11.4 m IDPs, 4.7 m refugees, and 1.4 m asylum seekers in 2017 (World Bank Group, 2017b). Data from UNHCR indicates that the refugee population in Nigeria declined from 9,010 in 2005 to 6,006 in 2008, then rose to 9,160 in 2009, and later took a sharp downward trend in 2012, reaching 1,694 in 2013 (UNHCR, 2014). This included some of Chad’s 14% (World Bank, 2017a), DR Congo’s 35.6% and Cameroon’s 32.6% refugee populations.¹

Boko Haram conflict-related displacement is central to the ongoing debates on the global migration crisis, especially with specific impacts on Lake Chad countries. Violent extremism affecting an estimated 26 m people (Zenn, 2018) and acts of terror perpetrated by Boko Haram since 2002 continue to spearhead regular attacks against border communities, with growing vulnerability of local communities in the region as a whole (Iwuoha, 2019). Boko Haram attacks directly displaced over 40,500 people in 2015 (IDMC, 2017). Locations of the vulnerable populations are: Nigeria – 3,669,298 individuals (82%), Cameroon – 387,035 individuals (9%), Niger – 249,813 individuals (5%) and Chad – 165,313 individuals (4%). In 2018, the total number of displaced individuals increased by 22% or 812,733 individuals compared to 2016 figures (IOM, 2019). As of July 2018, across the conflict-hit region, some 5 m people were food insecure (OCHA, 2018).

Again, displacements from climate change, floods and natural hazards particularly affect boundary homes and families who are forced to leave their homes. This constitutes the highest per capita disaster-induced migration worldwide (IRIN, 2013; UN OCHA, 2012; IDMC, 2017; IOM, 2017). Most migrant populations therefore prefer to resettle and integrate in host communities than return to their own countries (IDMC, 2013, 2017).

Extant legal frameworks and migration policies attempt to recreate a pre-colonial borderless, visa-free and homogenous society (Adepoju, 2015) that would encourage regular cross-border movements. Article 59 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993, p. 36) outlines that ‘Citizens of the Community shall have the right of entry, residence and establishment and member states undertake to recognize these rights of community citizens in their territories in accordance with the provisions of the protocols relating thereto’. Other relevantly binding ECOWAS protocols adopted to facilitate intraregional mobility and cooperation among member states in all spheres include ‘A/P1/5/79’, ‘A/SP2/7/85’, ‘A/SP1/7/86’, ‘A/SP1/6/89’, and ‘A/SP2/5/90’ (see Ademola, 2016; Awumbila et al., 2014: 62–64; ECOWAS, 1999; Nwanolue and Iwuoha, 2015). The protocols highlight the right and freedom to enter, reside and establish for the purposes of employment or engaging in economic activities (Adaawen, 2017). Almost all the countries have ratified the protocol for free movement with the abolition of visa and entry requirements up to 90 days, although this provision stresses the possession of valid and proper travel certificate/documentation. However, most migrant travellers do not often have any form of identification or documentation (Adaawen, 2017). This reveals the vagueness, indeterminateness and unpredictability masking the nationalities of intraregional migrant populations in their neighbouring immigrant or host countries.

Migrant populations and the petty trade sector in Nigeria

Nigeria is prominent and significant both as a regional economic hub and a typical rapidly growing economy in Africa (Iwuoha, 2018). It is the most populous country in Africa, and one of the 10 most populous countries in the world (IOM, 2016). Thus, Nigeria is a hothouse of labour migration and serves as a pivot and focal magnet for migrant populations attracted from diverse state origins. The IOM (2016) asserts that labour migration can serve as an engine of growth and development for migrants, both in their originating and their destination countries. It notes that in host countries, migration has rejuvenated the workforce, improved the economic viability of traditional sectors such as agriculture and services, encouraged entrepreneurship, fulfilled the demand for skills by high tech industries and met unmet labour needs. Countries of destination also benefit considerably from migrants who close up critical labour gaps, create jobs as entrepreneurs, and pay taxes and social security contributions (UNDESA, 2017; Bijwaard and Wahba, 2014). In trade and investment, positive contributions from migrant workers are particularly reflected in cash remittances flows, transfer of capital investments, increased technological innovation and skills by return migration, and improved international trade facilitated by transnational communities (Bijwaard and Wang, 2016; Marcheta, 2012; Mesnard, 2004; Nekby, 2006).

Nigeria has a large number of immigrants, whose livelihoods depend not only on daily work but on trade and investments in different sectors of the economy. Migrants’ trade and investments have thus pushed the frontiers of economic development in Nigeria (IOM, 2016). Therefore, higher numbers of migrant populations have coincided with economic growth (IOM, 2009). This is because migration is implicated in labour supply and surplus, labour demand and shortages, skills stock and domestic wages, trade and investments, capital formation and economic growth. The majority of foreign labour migrants are employed in the informal sector in Nigeria. They work in mining, construction, manufacturing, transport and other services. Others are engaged in small-scale private economic activities such as tailoring, baking, hair styling, pedicures/manicures, artistry/painting, carpentry, masonry and retail trade.²

Migrant petty traders’ embeddedness in local socio-economic and political systems underscores an uneven legacy of capital and social networks (Williams and Baláž, 2002). This credits Smith’s (2000) conclusion that locally institutionalized practices of economic life emerging from social relations condition outcomes of migrant trades. A study by Nwajiuba (2005) on rural-urban migration x-rays the dynamic nature of migrant populations and livelihoods in south-eastern Nigeria. He argues that migrant populations did not only enhance livelihoods, but contributed to the growth and expansion of non-farming activities in rural areas across the region. Oyeniyi (2013) concurs that some of the created opportunities for non-farming activities had taken many rural dwellers to urban areas. This is underlined by Bosiakoh’s (2019) study which explored how Nigerian immigrant entrepreneurs/traders have contributed to Ghana’s significantly growing economy.

Abdulahi and Afolayan (2013) examine trading activities of transborder petty traders in Idiroko and the Ajegunle area of Ogun state, Nigeria. The majority of the migrant traders/border crossers from Cotonou who used illicit routes (70.7% for Idiroko and 98.8% for Ajegunle) speak the Yoruba language, which facilitated their trading activities. The study further reveals that these migrants benefitted immensely from the locals’ hospitality/accommodation (51.3%), help with currency exchange (27.9%), gifts (1.6%), offer of credit facilities (15.1%) and help with haggles to strike a favourable bargain (1.4%). Hence, interpersonal relationships among migrant traders and their host localities have direct implications on the development of the migrant petty trade sector economy in Nigeria.³ In contrast, a few studies depict a negative perception on migrant populations and their livelihoods in Nigeria (De Haas, 2007; Ndawana, 2018). However, these studies mainly spotlight labour migrants found in both formal and informal sectors of the economy. Specifically looking into the inadvertently overlooked/neglected case of migrant petty traders and the effects/outcome of their interrelationships with host localities on their trading activities thus offers more credence to the present study; such novel attention stirs and steps up intellectual debates to much extended limits and pushes the frontiers, gateways, access points and forays of knowledge and research.

Theoretical context of migrant traders: Host residents’ complex interrelationships

This study reflects on the migration network theory to capture the linkages between pioneer or long-term migrant petty traders (LTMs) and their cumulative influence on very recent migrant petty traders (VRMs). This helps in understanding and explaining why and how migrants cluster and cope in unfriendly environments. Kaufman’s (2006) symbolic-analytical model also helps the study to frame and depict the dynamic complexities of these ‘unfriendly environments’ and their effects on migrant petty traders.

Massey (1988: 396) defines migration networks as ‘sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin’. Lee (1966) argues that pioneer migrants attract new migrants, often friends and relatives, to their own destination points through a coordinated flow of information, thus serving as connecting ‘bridgeheads’. Sometimes pioneer or long-term migrants do not necessarily act as ‘bridgeheads’ that prompt subsequent migration, but serve as restrictive ‘gatekeepers’, and could be hesitant in assisting prospective migrants (Böcker, 1994; De Haas, 2010).

Pioneer migrants reduce the overall risks, including the psychological and material costs of subsequent migration (Böcker, 1994). This means that the formation of a migrant community at any destination point will spur an increased concentration of subsequent migrants to that particular place (Appleyard, 1992) and create social bonds and the feeling of being part of one (transnational) community (De Haas, 2010; Djajic, 1986; Taylor, 1999). Migrant network connections in a particular host community/destination may reach critical levels and create autonomous social (local) structures that self-perpetuate and sustain it (Massey, 1989). Older migrants build network connections that offer wide-ranging assistance to newer (co-ethnic) migrants, such as arranging transport, finding housing and jobs for them, and helping them adjust emotionally to difficult situations of cultural marginality in the host communities (Light et al, 1989). It is, however, possible for migrant networks to locate new destinations of settlement in their host localities. With extreme migrant saturation in one destination/locality, newer migrants may divert their livelihoods to other unsaturated localities. This may increase demographic pressure on the economies of host localities. But migrant networks help integrate new migrants to their livelihood preferences that could modify the local economy. These networks could reliably increase earning opportunities of new migrants by encouraging non-immigrant entrepreneurs to patronize migrants in their locality (Massey, 1990).

These insights explain why a collection of LTMs traditionally attracts large numbers of VRMs to their destinations/host localities on daily bases. The LTMs in Nigeria integrate VRMs into the new society and introduce them to the petty trading business. Both the LTMs and VRMs form thick concentration (‘co-ethnic migrant ties’) and saturate their host localities in Nigeria. However, migration network theorists fail to unravel the social factors that crumble or weaken the system of migration networks. It is unclear whether such counteracting social factors and tendencies are external, structural, or internal processes (Klaver, 1997).

More importantly, migrant populations face multi-level dimensions of unwarranted but deep-seated discriminatory treatments from their host communities (Bahar and Rapoport, 2017; McCormick and Wahba, 2001). This could manifest in diverse ways, including hatred, intolerance, mistreatment, disdain, human rights abuses and, in worse cases, violent attacks against migrant populations.⁴ Campbell (2003) unravels the discriminatory and xenophobic attitude of Botswana. This is linked to a combination of nationalism and economic factors which play out among citizens who strongly desire to preserve the ‘fruits’ of economic prosperity for themselves alone. They view migrant populations with considerable suspicion, disdain and dislike; some would even resort to violent attacks against migrants. Hence, migrant populations are linked to disruptions in the social cohesion of rural and urban areas, human trafficking, prostitution and forced child labour, and are regarded as causes of urban unemployment and pollution (Oyeniyi, 2013).

Kaufman’s (2006) symbolic-analytical model identifies group myths and fears of collective extinction as key causes of ethnic grievances which can lead to hatred and discriminatory actions against perceived strangers. These hostile perceptions produce emotion-laden symbols that negatively affect sets of interrelationships existing in human society. The diverse levels of contacts, interactions and interrelationships that exist between migrant pretty traders and their host communities are bound by embedded and inherent perceptions that not only negatively affect such interrelationships but consequently distort socio-economic development potential. Herbert Blumer’s (1986) theory of symbolic interactionism informs that human activities and social relationships are shaped by socially constructed ‘symbols’ (i.e. meanings) attached to them. The symbols/meanings are ever changing and responsive to the social environment as it exists (Sorensen et al., 2017).

Victor Turner’s (1980) theory of social drama and symbolic interactionism holds that divergence in symbolic attachments to social groups and their elements are fundamental to the eruption of social hostility. Salawu (2010) argues that the reasons for lack of mutual coexistence and intolerance in Nigeria are mutual suspicion and fear, contextual discrimination and feelings of cultural and ethnic superiority. Migrant petty traders are often viewed with a negative perception by host communities/residents with diverse symbolic attachments (‘social labelling’ or ‘group myths’). This largely affects migrant petty traders’ economic activities and willingness to expand their trading lines. Affected LTMs opt for a change of trade while VRMs who elect to stay and surmount the ‘myths’ fail to overcome in the long run.⁵

Do migrant petty traders have potential for sustainable growth and expansion? Can migrant petty traders spur economic development in their host communities if treated well and decontaminated of ‘social labelling’ and ‘group myths’? Capital formations and reinvestment plans of LTMs who opt for changes of trade lines show that they truly have strong potential for expansive and sustainable growth in their current petty trading business. Unfortunately, most host residents commonly view migrants’ petty trades as permanently insignificant and small in scale with limited expansive growth potential.⁶ This shapes host residents’ interrelationships and interactions with migrant petty traders, and it particularly forms/moulds their attitudes, perceptions and contexts of ‘social labelling’ or ‘group mythicization’ of migrant petty trading populations. This, in turn, is what largely constitutes the poor adaptation of migrant petty traders to their host communities.

Methodology

The research data for this study was collected during a three-month-long fieldwork between February and April 2019 and subsequent call-back trips to urban areas spread across three south-eastern states in Nigeria. The population and locations of urban areas selected for the study were Aba (897,560) in Abia state; Awka (167,738) in Anambra state, and Owerri (215,038) in Imo state (World Population Review, 2018). The purposive sampling method was adopted in the study to select peri-urban areas in South-eastern Nigeria whose settings and surroundings are thickly dotted with petty traders. Three distinctive strata of petty traders are found in about 15 peri-urban areas/roads investigated in the study (see Table 1). They include indigenous/home-based petty traders, Hausa/Fulani petty traders and migrant petty traders.⁷

Table 1.

Category of migrant petty trading activities.

City or town (urban area)	Peri-urban areas/roads harbouring migrant petty trading activities	Average number of residents/households found on each road	Average number of petty traders found on each road by category (per day)	Classification of MPTs, by year of arrival	Classification of MPTs, by country of origin found on each urban area/city (per day)	Distribution of economic activities/livelihoods on each road
Aba	Port Harcourt, Osisioma, Umungasi, Old Umuahia, Ogbor Hill	2100	(a) IPT – 60 (b) H/F PT – 200 (ci) MPT – 10 -VRMs - 5 - LTMs - 5	VRMs – less than two years LTMs – two years and above	28 MPTs interviewed: Cameroon – 6 Chad – 12 Niger – 7	laundry supermarket food items harbour saloon tailoring roadside mechanic business centre, retail shop artisans etc
Awka	Ifite, Kwata, Okpuno, Umuokpu, Amansi	900	(a) IPT – 30 (b) H/F PT – 50 (c) MPT – 10 -VRMs - 5 - LTMs - 5	VRMs – less than two years LTMs – two years and above	22 MPTs interviewed: Cameroon – 6 Chad – 12 Niger – 7	laundry supermarket food items barbing saloon tailoring roadside mechanic business centre, retail shop artisans etc
Owerri	Orji, Orlu, Urata, Egbu, World bank	1300	(a) IPT – 100 (b) H/F PT – 150 (c) MPT – 10 - VRMs - 5 - LTMs - 5	VRMs – less than two years LTMs – two years and above	25 MPTs interviewed: Cameroon – 6 Chad – 12 Niger – 7	laundry supermarket food items barbing saloon tailoring roadside mechanic business centre, retail shop artisans etc

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2019).

Legend: Indigenous petty traders (IPT); Hausa/Fulani petty traders (H/F PT); Migrant petty traders (MPT).

These peri-urban areas/roads intimately adjoin or link up with the urban areas, having shared an urban lifestyle with little or no clear differentiations. Purposive sampling technique was used to select respondents clustered in five key sub-sectors/specialities dominated within the petty trade sector (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Classification of migrant petty traders.

City or town	Peri-urban roads harbouring migrant petty trading activities	Subsectors/specialities within the petty trade sector by category	Negative perceptions/‘social labelling’ of MPTs by residents	Average volume/score of patronage MPTs (receive from residents), by each road and category (per day)	Comparison of average volume/score of patronage for all category of petty traders, by each road and category (per day)	Average ratio of VRMs and LTMs opting for change of trade/reinvestments options, by each road and category
Aba	Port Harcourt, Osisioma, Umungasi, Old Umuahia, Ogbor Hill	- shoe makers - tea makers - kiosk owners - secondhand clothing (Okirika) hawkers - general merchant-petty traders	- informants - spies - dirty people - wanderers - fugitives - thieves - cheats - hawkers of inferior items	VRMs – poor LTMs – very poor	IPT – excellent H/F PT – average MPT – poor	LTMs –VRMs: 5:1
Awka	Ifite, Kwata, Okpuno, Umuokpu, Amansi	- shoe makers - tea makers - kiosk owners - fruit hawkers - wristwatch hawkers - secondhand clothing (Okirika) hawkers - general merchant-petty traders	- informants - spies - dirty people - wanderers - fugitives - thieves - cheats - hawkers of inferior items	VRMs – average LTMs – poor	IPT – excellent H/F PT – average MPT – poor	LTMs –VRMs: 5:0
Owerri	Orji, Orlu, Urata, Egbu, World Bank	- shoe makers - tea makers - kiosk owners - secondhand clothing (Okirika) hawkers - general merchant-petty traders	- informants - spies - dirty people - wanderers - fugitives - thieves - cheats - hawkers of inferior items	VRMs – very poor LTMs – very poor	IPT – excellent H/F PT – average MPT – poor	LTMs –VRMs: 5:2

Source: Author’s compilation from fieldwork (2019).

Note: Legend for patronage system score/percentage: (a) excellent (b) good (c) average (d) poor (e) very poor.

The specified five sub-sectors/specialities within the petty trade sector are particularly dominated and controlled by Hausa/Fulani origins/settlers and immigrants from Lake Chad countries (i.e. Cameroon, Chad and Niger). The initial respondents (i.e. mainly Hausa/Fulani petty traders) were purposively selected and interviewed, and upon further requests they provided the researcher with referral on their ‘foreign friends’ (i.e. migrant petty traders). The researcher moved from one referral to another to gather respondents with similar characteristics, thus creating a snowball effect and maintaining a social network of migrant populations. This method was quite useful for the study as it solved the initial challenge in which migrant petty traders found it very difficult to reveal their identities and divulge sensitive information.

The qualitative method of data collection was used for the study. The qualitative method was based on in-depth formal and semiformal interviews and focus-group discussion with different classes of petty traders (i.e. indigenous/home-based, Hausa/Fulani (H/F), LTM and VRM petty traders) and residents of the peri-urban areas. I made thick descriptions of all observed phenomena using a qualitative descriptive method of analysis. I conducted key informant interviews across the three study areas in which first-hand information was elicited from a range of actors and stakeholders such as government officials, Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) officials, security officials and the landlord’s association. About 186 in-depth and cross-sectional interviews (involving 128 males and 58 females) were conducted across the three peri-urban areas (i.e. Aba – 67, Awka – 56 and Owerri – 63 respondents). Distribution of migrant petty traders interviewed and their countries of origin were clearly identified.⁸ The open-ended in-depth interviews consisted of respondents who were 18 years and above. The researcher always began by establishing friendly relations and serious interest in the petty traders’ services/goods – this encouraged the petty traders to feel very free and divulge useful information. The interview method was useful to accommodate the majority of the uneducated (i.e. petty traders) and educated or semi-educated/educated middle class (peri-urban residents). Most of the migrant petty traders and their host residents have only little, shallow or no knowledge about extant migration policies. The recorded interviews were complemented with informal conversations/discussions. I lived and intermingled with the peri-urban residents, immersing myself in their daily activities during the fieldwork. I maintained basic human research ethics, such as seeking informed consent by written/oral methods and upholding anonymity of respondents.

Background and context

Aba

Aba is a commercial hub of south-eastern Nigeria (Orji, 2011). Aba is well known for its craftsmen. It lies along the west bank of the Aba River, and is situated at the intersection of roads leading to Port Harcourt, Owerri, Umuahia, Ikot Epkene and Ikot Abasi (Hoiberg, 2010). Ariaria international market, shopping centre (Ekeoha market – known for its textile fabrication); Ngwa road market, or Ahia Ohuru (new market)/cemetery market; and Alaoji (known for indigenous spare parts market) are the major markets in Aba (Izugbara and Umoh, 2004). The entrepreneurial city has well over 30% graduates from Nigerian universities (mostly civil servants), who combine their jobs with itinerant businesses, and 70% of whom are trained artisans, shop owners, keke/minibus riders, petty traders, etc.

Awka

Awka is the capital of Anambra State, Nigeria. It is the place of the blacksmiths. Awka dwellers are mainly civil servants with over 58% educated dwellers. The city has large rudimentary informal markets where everything from basic food produce to clothes, cosmetics and household items are sold. The largest market in the town is Eke Awka.

Owerri

Owerri is located in the Niger Delta area as it sits on huge crude oil and natural gas reserves, like most of the Igbo land areas. It serves as the entertainment capital of Nigeria because of its high density of spacious hotels, numbering over 3,000, high street casinos, production studios and touristic, high-quality centres of relaxation. Alaba international market and relief market are the main markets in Owerri after the demolition of Eke Ukwu Owerri. Owerri has a very high percentage of learned graduates and teachers – over 60%. There are also a number of trained artisans, shop owners, business moguls, etc.

Sociopolitical factors implicated in migrant petty traders’ livelihoods and security

Peri-urban residents’ negative perception of migrant populations/petty traders

Negative perceptions of migrant populations are prevalent and rampant among peri-urban residents in south-eastern Nigeria. This is generally attributed to a number of factors, such as migrants’ legal status, security issues, ethno-religious concerns and language/communication barriers. De Haas (2007) notes that migrant populations in Nigeria are still primitively viewed in a negative sense rather than a constituent part of broader social and economic transformation processes.

A group of residents⁹ insists that their neighbourhood has been infiltrated by perceived ‘illegal’ migrant petty traders and that they feel unsafe and threatened about the rising influx and clustering of ‘strange/unlawful persons/migrants’ into their community. It is revealed that only very few migrant petty traders (i.e. less than 5%) may have legal permits in Nigeria.¹⁰ While many migrant petty traders cannot confirm or refute this assertion,¹¹ or know nothing about it,¹² others strongly claim that more than half of the total migrant petty traders in Nigeria acquired authorized legal permits and therefore are not illegal immigrants.¹³ However, this collection of migrant petty traders is not only oblivious of Nigeria’s migration policy but could not clearly give account of the extant processes involved in acquiring such legal permits both in Nigeria and their home countries.¹⁴ This clearly suggests that most migrant petty traders in Nigeria (i.e. those emigrating/originating from Cameroon, Chad and Niger) are most likely to be illegal migrants both at their destination country and at home. This affirms Ibeanu’s (2007) findings that only few migrants originating from nearby countries (i.e. about 9.8%) possess relevant documents and have access to a passport; hence, the so-called illegal migrants are not only illegal at destination but also at home, since they may have left their countries illegally without appropriate exit documents (passport, visa, health certificate, etc.) and failed to use designated official departure posts.

Most residents express deep fears and apprehensions over their personal security, claiming that some migrant petty traders move about with dangerous weapons such as daggers and jack-knives.¹⁵ Although only very few residents can clearly identify immigrant persons/petty traders operating/residing in their neighbourhoods,¹⁶ others strongly believe that both migrant and Hausa/Fulani petty traders are lookalike/indistinctive and therefore ignorantly share similar mythical feelings about both groups.¹⁷ A deep-seated negative feeling towards migrant petty traders is born out of ethno-religious myths and grievances.¹⁸ The residents (who are largely of the Igbo ethnic group and Christian religion) do not see the above-stated revelation as an accusation; they accept this fact and even defend it vehemently. It is alleged that migrant Igbos/Christians are terribly discriminated against and exploited in their home countries and the countries of the migrant petty traders including Cameroon, Chad and Niger.¹⁹

Again, a language/communication gap forms a gulf impeding residents’ and migrant petty traders’ interrelationships. While residents complain that the language/communication barrier makes it very difficult/impossible to socialize or intermingle with migrant petty traders,²⁰ or accept and integrate them into their own social life,²¹ migrant petty traders themselves vouch that they feel unsafe, threatened and highly insecure in their host communities as a result of language/communication barriers.²² These complexities and incompatibilities not only undermine effective resident-migrant social relationships, but deepen intolerance and mutual/non-violent hostility between the two parallel groups.

Divergence in symbolic attachments to migrants’ petty trade

There are typical differentiations and divergences in residents’ symbolic attachments on migrant petty traders. These social ascriptions, attributions and ‘name calling’ (i.e. ‘social labelling’) cut across host communities and are loosely tied to all migrant petty traders.²³ This seriously affects migrants’ petty trading activities and their sociability or acceptability in the wider social system of host communities.

A circle of residents reveal that they rebuff migrant vendors because they offer very poor-quality and inferior products even though they sell their items and articles at cheap prices.²⁴ Others have strong convictions that some kiosk owners and shoe makers – aboki – are spies and informants who aid and abate crime in their neighbourhoods.²⁵ One resident remarks that ‘every migrant hawker is a suspect’.²⁶ This claim is corroborated by one LTM petty trader, who acknowledged: ‘Even among us there are bad people. I know one or two of them that do bad things – you know, but they don run away. Yes, they have run back to Chad.’²⁷ A security official insists: ‘Look, make I tell you crime has no tribe or origin. Yes, some strangers you talk about and even some natives here are informants to criminals. We punish them no matter where they come from.’²⁸

Generally, most residents loathe and spurn migrant petty traders of all kinds because of their poor hygiene.²⁹ One resident stated:

Everybody knows that these people [migrant petty traders] are not neat at all. Their hygiene is zero! Some don’t even take their baths, brush their teeth or change their clothes for many days and yet they expect us to bring them close and patronize their business. They irritate me oh. I can’t buy things I eat from them or even things I use from people that are too dirty and live in dirty environments.³⁰

A migrant tea maker confirms that ‘they [residents] don’t like us, they don’t come here. Na only my people come here buy tea. Your people say me I no clean and smell, but me put perfume, me wash body – but I no lie, not everyday. No plenty water anywhere, habba! I no get plenty money.’³¹ Many VRMs and LTMs of all kinds of trading lines concur that their host residents’ opinions and impressions about them generally affect their trading activities. For instance, both VRMs and LTMs still find it difficult to secure comfortable accommodation and safe places to store/pack their wares³² due to perceived ‘stigmatization’ or ‘social labelling’.

Peri-urban residents’ low patronage system and capital formations/ reinvestment plans of migrant petty traders

Migrant petty traders experience/record very low patronage in their host communities as a result of negative perceptions and ‘social labelling’ from the residents.³³ Most residents hardly patronize migrant petty traders but prefer to buy from their own people engaged in petty trading. This long-lived reality primarily configures the nature of capital formations and reinvestment options/plans of these migrant traders. While VRMs have a serious urge to become powerful entrepreneurs and contribute meaningfully to economic development of their host communities, LTMs report that they are currently saving money for reinvestment in other sectors. The LTMs generally believe they are socially discriminated/unaccepted and poorly patronized; thus, they feel they will be economically insecure if they reinvest their capital in expanding their petty trade. A LTM disclosed:

I have stayed long here. I notice they don’t like us. Many of your people [residents] treat us bad; they avoid us; few of them buy things from us. Why? Are we bad people? Not at all. My old friends [LTMs] have abandoned this small business [petty trade] for new people [VRMs]. See, me too, I’ll leave this business soon. I have saved enough money now. I want to join my friends to sell big ram, goat, fowl, cattle . . .

The LTMs persist that they have saved enough money to reinvest or diversify their trading activities in other informal subsectors of the economy.³⁴ This means that a preponderance of VRMs would likely consider a change of trading line in the future when they become LTMs. This will be more likely if the residents’ negative attitudinal patterns towards migrant petty traders continue to increase to higher levels undistorted.

Conclusion

This study extricates the social dynamics of migrant petty traders and how they confront, resist or handle social systems/perceptions (‘social labelling’) bottled/tied up in their interrelationships with host residents. The study links a combination of socio-economic factors such as peri-urban residents’ negative perception of migrant populations, divergence in symbolic attachments to migrant petty traders, and low patronage system to explain the poor growth and sustainability of the migrant petty trade sector in specific localities. Migrant petty traders are commonly perceived as informants, spies, dirty people, wanderers, fugitives, thieves, cheats and hawkers of inferior items. Many denominations of LTM petty traders (such as shoe makers, tea makers, kiosk owners, fruit hawkers, wristwatch hawkers, secondhand clothing (Okirika) hawkers, and general merchant-petty traders) find it difficult to survive or live above social/negative attributions and treatments meted out or attached to them and their trading activities by residents and thus opt for change of trade lines, even though the petty trade sector offers strong potential for sustainable economic growth.

Effective urban governance remains key in addressing the myriad socio-economic challenges faced by migrant populations in the petty trade sector, as well as fleshing out potential for sustainable growth of the sector. The state should first and foremost institutionalize its role in the petty trade sector by reconstructing/redefining migrant petty traders’ and residents’ interrelationships through collective networking, open interactions, one-on-one contacts, etc. The needs of the various denominations and sub-groups found in the petty trade sector must be met through capacity building, counter-human trafficking, advisory services, developing database of migrant petty traders, and provision of technical/financial assistance/loans to migrant petty traders.

Footnotes

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Victor Chidubem Iwuoha

Notes

Author biography

Victor Chidubem Iwuoha is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He also teaches peace and conflict studies in the School of General Studies of the same University. His research interests include security and strategic studies, international politics, political economy, foreign policy and diplomacy, peace and conflict studies, and development studies.

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