Unpacking the Roles of Religion and Partisanship on Support for Same-Sex Marriage: Evidence from South Korea

Abstract

We ask to what extent opposition to same-sex marriage in South Korea is driven by Protestant identification and how this differs from Catholic and non-Christian views. Furthermore, is there a separate demographic, partisan or ideological influence beyond that captured by religious identity? Analysis of the 2016 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) data finds not only clear perceptual distinctions between Protestants versus Buddhists and Catholics, but that partisan distinctions endure, even after controlling for the more popular non-LGBT-specific anti-discrimination legislation. In addition, younger and female respondents were more supportive of legalization, while education did not have the same effect as in the broader LGBT literature.

Keywords

South Korea same-sex marriage public opinion religion discrimination

Introduction

What explains the lack of support for same-sex marriage rights in South Korea? While value shifts would be expected with both economic development and democratization,¹ East Asia’s developed democracies have lagged behind in terms of LGBT rights. In fact, Taiwan remains the only country in the region to move towards marriage legalization, and even their path has not been without conservative backlash.² In contrast, homosexuality remained taboo to discuss openly in South Korea until recently (e.g., Seo, 2001) and was classified as “harmful and obscene” until 2003 (Tai, 2018). While legalization in South Korea is unlikely in the short term, understanding the factors influencing support now aids in broader comparisons with other countries, as well as in identifying which demographic groups are most likely to push for such reforms in the future.

Organized LGBT groups slowly developed following the formation of Chingusai, a gay men’s rights group in 1994, while LGBT activism expanded online (e.g., Chase, 2012). However, only in 2017 could LGBT groups be recognized as legally registered charities able to receive tax-deductible donations (Human Rights Watch, 2017), after several were denied charity status in 2015 (Heo and Noh, 2015). Furthermore, in 2018, while Taipei hosted the largest LGBT rallies in Asia, over 200,000 Koreans signed an e-petition to South Korea’s President Moon Jae-In to cancel Seoul’s LGBT pride festival (Ryall, 2018) and over 1,000 anti-gay protesters, many of whom were affiliated with Christian groups, delayed the 2018 LGBT pride festival in Incheon for more than eight hours (Lee, 2018).

A growing literature covers LGBT rights in South Korea (e.g., Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Bong, 2008; Kim and Hahn, 2006), with a particular focus on the experiences of the South Korean LGBT community (e.g., Bong, 2008; Na and Choo, 2011; Park-Kim et al., 2007), while also reflecting a broader public shift away from viewing homosexuality as a foreign phenomenon (e.g., Kim and Cho, 2010). Yet little attention falls on public perceptions of same-sex marriage. Previous research suggests that economic development corresponds with more tolerant views on homosexuality (e.g., Stulhofer and Rimac, 2009), but South Korea’s economic modernization has not led to similar shifts viewed in the West. Traditional values, often lumped as Confucian influences, emphasize filial piety and expectations that have led non-heterosexuals to conform to expectations of marriage and procreation (e.g., Cho, 2009). Such influences potentially discourage public support for same-sex marriage and LGBT issues more broadly.

South Korea also sees considerable religious diversity. Approximately one-third of the population identifies as Christian, with Protestant adherents outnumbering Catholics. Meanwhile, roughly a quarter of the population identifies as Buddhist. The extent to which religious preference influences views on LGBT issues has been covered extensively in the West, with less attention in East Asia, and the influence of Christianity in East Asia is rarely disaggregated or compared to other religions in the region. Some research suggests that a higher proportion of Buddhists in a country increases its tolerance (e.g., Adamczyk and Cheng, 2015), but such studies are limited in number. Furthermore, South Korea’s lack of major ethnic divisions potentially simplifies identifying causal mechanisms and making broad claims about the Korean public.

Cursory analysis suggests a slow evolution of views on the LGBT community, especially from a media perspective. For example, in 2000, Hong Seok-Chun became the first Korean entertainer to come out publicly as gay. At that time, this revelation forced him to forfeit all media, film and television contracts (Borowiec, 2014). In 2018, by contrast, openly gay K-pop stars, such as Holland, were revered as pop idols and remained beloved among fans (Tai, 2018), although this may be more indicative of generational differences in acceptance rather than broad societal change.

The influence of Christian lobbying groups has also impacted broad public opinion of the LGBT community as well as policy makers’ decisions in South Korea (e.g., Hu, 2017). In the last 20 years, notable politicians of many South Korean parties have rejected gay rights, especially the right of same-sex marriage. The Christian Liberal Party specifically targeted same-sex marriage as Christian oppression in the 2016 National Assembly election campaign, while Christian protesters instituted a text-bombing campaign against members of the liberal Democratic Party of Korea and centrist People’s Party after President Moon Jae-In nominated justice that was perceived to be supportive of LGBT rights (e.g., Choi, 2017).

However, even among politicians, advocacy of LGBT rights is improving over time. The most notable shift in support occurred following the 2017 South Korean presidential election. During Moon Jae-In’s campaign, he stated that he was opposed to homosexuality. In 2019, however, President Moon stated that sexual minorities “should not be socially persecuted or discriminated against.” The unprecedented statement could portend more positive shifts in the future (Shim, 2019).

Still, political leaders across party affiliations openly oppose gay rights. As a presidential candidate in 2007, Lee Myung-Bak of the conservative Grand National Party referred to homosexuality as “abnormal.” Ten years later, Hong Jun-Pyo of the conservative Liberty Korea Party claimed during his candidacy for president that homosexuals were responsible for the spread of HIV (Quartz, 2017). Further, of the fourteen 2017 presidential candidates in South Korea, only one, Justice Party leader Sim Sang-Jung, explicitly supported equal rights for sexual minorities and proposed anti-discrimination legislation (Steger, 2017).

Survey data further illuminates a shift in public opinion over time. Over six waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), the percentage of South Korean respondents claiming homosexuality to be never justifiable has declined by half since 1990, from 89.3% down to 42.2% in 2010. In 2013, Pew found that 57% of surveyed South Koreans agreed that homosexuality was morally unacceptable (Pew Research Center, 2013a). Likewise, the 2008 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) found 71.86% of respondents stated homosexual sex was always wrong, which declined to 61.46% in 2014. In addition, cursory evidence finds clear majorities opposing legalization, although Kim et al. (2015) find a gradual increase in support for same-sex marriage, from 16.9% of survey respondents in 2010 to 28.5% in 2014. Similarly, Gallup Korea polls from 2014 to 2017 see support for same-sex marriage legalization increased from 25% to 34% (SOGILAW, 2018: 133; Tai, 2018). Moreover—and similar to patterns elsewhere—clear generational differences have emerged in support of LGBT issues in South Korea over the past 15 years (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2013b), with Kim et al. (2015) finding 60.2% respondents in their twenties supported legalization of same-sex marriage.

The 2016 KGSS allows for a clearer examination of South Korean public support for same-sex marriage. Whereas questions related to the LGBT community and perceptions of homosexuals are increasingly common among surveys in South Korea, publicly available raw data related to questions on same-sex marriage still remain rare. The 2016 survey is the first in the KGSS series to include an explicit question on same-sex marriage and allows us to control not only for standard socioeconomic variables, but also to disaggregate religious identification. Furthermore, the KGSS includes a question regarding support for broader anti-discrimination legislation beyond the LGBT community, allowing us to see how support for such efforts potentially influences support for same-sex marriage.

This article first provides a brief summary of the literature related to public opinion on same-sex marriage and LGBT rights, and connects this to evidence from South Korea. The explanation of the survey and research design follows. Regarding same-sex marriage perceptions, empirical analysis finds a clear distinction in perceptions of Protestants compared to both Catholics and Buddhists as well as non-religious respondents. Meanwhile, less of a distinction emerges when the focus shifts to anti-discrimination legislation. Regression analysis finds the Protestant divergence endures even after controlling partisan identification and support of a broader anti-discrimination law. Moreover, consistent with research elsewhere, we find younger and female respondents to be more supportive of legalization, although education does not seem to play a similar role. The conclusion expands upon the implications for same-sex marriage and non-discrimination legislation, identifies the limitations of the study, and suggests possibilities for future research.

Factors influencing public opinion

To condense public opinion on LGBT acceptance into a coherent narrative is daunting and risks homogenizing differences not only across perceived rights but also across subgroups within the LGBT community. For instance, while public opinion data on perceptions of gays and lesbians has increased in East Asia, remarkably little research in this area addresses bisexuals or the transgender community (e.g., Lee et al., 2018; Na et al., 2014; Yi and Phillips, 2015). Similarly, much of the literature still focuses on measures of tolerance more broadly (e.g., having a homosexual as a neighbor) rather than views on extending rights such as marriage to the LGBT community. Despite these limitations, the literature on public perceptions, whether focused on the acceptance of a segment of the LGBT community or a specific right, such as same-sex marriage, generally finds the same broad class of variables as the primary influence on perceptions and positions.

Cultural influences would also be expected to impact perceptions of LGBT issues and same-sex marriage, specifically. However, identifying and measuring cultural influences remains nebulous, with many scholars defaulting to more easily identifiable traits, such as religious identity (e.g., Huntington, 1996; also see Geertz, 1966). One would expect religions with doctrinal opposition to homosexuality to influence the attitudes of adherents and discourage support for LGBT rights in most forms, just as research consistently finds religiosity in western countries to influence perceptions on LGBT issues (e.g., Olson et al., 2006; Schwartz, 2010).

Although Christianity, in its many variants, includes such doctrinal statements and Christian followers often constitute organized political interests, we should avoid homogenizing Christian influence on perceptions of LGBT issues. For instance, among Christian sects in the United States, there is clear variation in perceptions between Catholics and Protestants, with the former more supportive of LGBT rights in general (e.g., Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996; Sherkat et al., 2010). Research on increased Catholic tolerance more broadly in recent decades suggests multiple causes, including declining acceptance of papal authority (see D’Antonio, 1999; Hoffmann and Miller, 1998). Meanwhile, limited studies (e.g., Burdette et al., 2005; Hicks and Lee, 2006; Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005) identify variation between mainline Protestant identifiers (e.g., Methodist, Presbyterian) and more conservative variants (e.g., Baptist, Pentecostal), although such studies have not included South Korea as a case study. Research on South Korea identifies a common narrative among Evangelical Christians that frames LGBT rights as persecution of religious ideals, while empathy narratives are less common (Yi et al., 2017).³ In many respects, this mirrors similar trends viewed in the West (e.g., Dobbin et al., 2007; Simmons et al., 2006).

Furthermore, Protestants remain more politically active in South Korea compared to other religions, with the Christian Liberal Party a predominantly Protestant organization, although it is unclear whether this is a function of self-organization to pursue political ends or a history of political parties and candidates actively recruiting Protestants as a voting bloc. We see a similar pattern in Taiwan, where the main organized opposition to LGBT rights is Protestant-led (e.g., Adamczyk, 2017). However, Protestantism has played a greater role in South Korea not only due to Protestants constituting a larger share of the population compared to their East Asian neighbors, but the growing size of evangelical Protestant churches, such as the largest Pentecostal congregation in the world, the Yoido Full Gospel Church.

Until recently, the influence of eastern religions on LGBT issues received little attention (e.g., Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009). Buddhism lacks doctrinal opposition to homosexuality, with existing work often finding that adherents are more tolerant than other religions of homosexuality, if not tolerant outright (e.g., Adamczyk and Hayes, 2012; Bao, 2012; Detenber et al., 2007; Hinsch, 1992). From a western perspective, the Buddhist Churches of America (BCA) maintain that “all beings are equally embraced by Amida Buddha” (Wilson, 2012) and that Buddhist ministers began administering same-sex services in the United States over 40 years ago. Gleig (2012), by contrast, found that Buddhism could function both conservatively in support of heteronormativity and in support of the LGBT community depending upon one’s individual interpretation. However, Gleig’s study took place in California and included converts to Buddhism, not those who lived in a primarily Buddhist community within East Asia. The results suggest that Buddhism’s influence on same-sex marriage requires, at the very least, additional attention. Regarding gay and lesbian parenting abilities in South Korea, Rich (2017) finds that perceptions of gay and lesbian parenting are largely explained by the same sociodemographic variables as seen elsewhere, with Protestants—but not Catholics or Buddhists—corresponding with a statistically significant decline in support. However, a similar analysis of religious identification and support for same-sex marriage remains elusive in South Korea.

H1: Protestant identification should negatively correspond with support for same-sex marriage legalization, compared to other religious and non-religious groups.

While not a religion, Confucian influences arguably serve a similar moral and philosophical function. Although lacking doctrinal opposition to homosexuality, Confucian societal expectations may discourage support for LGBT rights due to the emphasis on distinct male and female gender roles (e.g., Brainer, 2018; Yang and Yen, 2011) as well as filial piety, obedience and conformity. In this context, same-sex marriage could be viewed as an affront to traditional family values. In accordance with Confucian values, the prioritization of traditional family values and “marriage as an institution,” encompassing both the ability to produce children within a marriage and the stigmatization of divorce, are the “best predictors of whether or not a country recognizes gay marriage” (Adamczyk and Cheng, 2015: 279). In addition, instead of “coming out,” which is common in western countries, some individuals choose to reveal their sexual orientation through implicit rather than explicit discussion (Brainer, 2018; also see Engebretsen, 2013). However, the stigma against overt conversation of homosexuality and same-sex relationships does not induce an environment receptive to the legalization of same-sex marriage, a problem that likely extends to South Korea as well.

The Confucian context does not preclude space for homosexual relationships if relations are consistent with broader Confucian patterns. In China, for instance, “the one with power, stereotypically the upper-class adult male, could sexually dominate social inferiors” including women, younger men and servants (Chou, 2001: 30). However, if same-sex relationships occurred between two men of the same social status, the relationship was not considered acceptable (Chou, 2001). Furthermore, despite limited tolerance of certain same-sex relationships, men and women were still expected to get married and have children. Traditional values, whether explicitly Confucian in nature or otherwise, should thus permeate perceptions and behaviors, even among populations within society with divergent value systems (e.g., Adamczyk and Hayes, 2012) and where limited LGBT tolerance may exist.

Disentangling Confucian values from broader Asian or traditional values remains difficult (e.g., Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Monkhouse et al., 2013), but this cultural context may partially explain the low levels of LGBT tolerance even among those who are not religious. Since Confucian values prioritize procreation within marriage in order to have children, homosexual relationships are irreconcilable with such a philosophy. Additionally, in South Korea, only married couples can legally adopt (NQAPIA, 2018).⁴ In addition, LGBT children may be afraid of how their parents will react if they come out or concerned about bringing shame to their family, which is a strong motivator for hiding their identity (Hu and Wang, 2013). For sons, continuing the family line for another generation can be seen as a responsibility to one’s ancestors, so failure to do so would go against traditional expectations (van de Werff, 2008). Confucian societies also place high emphasis on harmony within families and groups and coming out as homosexual could disrupt relations (Chow and Cheng, 2010), if not bring shame to the family’s social status (Chou, 2001). While not inherently unique to Confucian influence, such cultural expectations should discourage greater support for non-traditional relations.

Although religious and cultural values impact public opinion of same-sex marriage, cross-national research suggests other demographic factors should also be applicable to the South Korean case. For example, research finds higher LGBT support among women compared to men (e.g., Brewer, 2003; Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2005), while education positively corresponds (e.g., Anderson and Fetner, 2008; Herek, 1984; Loftus, 2001) and age negatively corresponds with support (e.g., Lax and Phillips, 2009). Existing work also finds those who are single—whether never married, separated, or divorced—historically appear more supportive than their married counterparts in terms of LGBT rights, including same-sex marriage (e.g., Brumbaugh et al., 2008; Sherkat et al., 2010). Finally, those that identify as a member of the LGBT community have little reason to oppose legalization, although a segment of this population may still oppose marriage in general or view it as a heteronormative institution. Unfortunately, few surveys in South Korea or East Asia ask more broadly about sexual orientation.

The role of political ideology and partisanship also typically influences views. Although religious identification may influence partisan leanings and religious traditionalists may in effect sort by party, it is important to identify the extent to which the separate factors of religious identification, ideology and partisan identification influence views. Research has long identified parties as a filter for political information (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960) and how party positions and cues aim to shape public perceptions (e.g., Carmines and Wagner, 2006; Ray, 2003; Slothus and de Vreese, 2010). Conversely, partisans often are driven towards conclusions consistent with their partisan predispositions (e.g., Taber et al., 2001).

Partisan attachments likely play a role even where debates over party system institutionalization endure (e.g., Hellmann, 2014; Park, 2010). Similarly, while one may expect a division according to ideological placement on a liberal-conservative continuum and for conservatives to, in essence, own the issue of opposing LGBT rights on grounds of traditional values, the links in East Asia appear less pronounced. In South Korea, members of the center-left Minjoo (Democratic) Party have consistently backtracked on initial claims which support LGBT rights, including same-sex marriage, while other members opposed anti-discrimination policies outright (e.g., Han, 2016). In 2014, some Minjoo members introduced a bill to legalize same-sex marriage, but the bill was never brought up for a vote, likely due to opposition both within the party and among the then-conservative majority. In addition, Seoul mayor Park Won-Soon initially endorsed the legalization of same-sex marriage, only to soften his stance after conservative backlash (e.g., Engardio, 2017). Similarly, as a presidential candidate, Moon Jae-In voiced his opposition to homosexuality as well (Straits Times, 2017) before moderating his position again once in office. Only in 2019 did the Minjoo Party have a presence at the Seoul Queer Culture Festival with legislator Keum Tae-Sup in attendance (Park, 2019).

Conservative parties opposed President Moon’s Supreme Court chief justice nominee Kim Meong-Su in 2017, with the Liberty Korea Party adopting a party line stance against the nomination, while the leadership of the centrist People’s Party told members to vote according to personal beliefs (Yonhap, 2017). Kim was ultimately confirmed by a 160–134 vote. Of electorally viable parties to date, only the Democratic Labor Party (active 2000–2011) explicitly advocated for LGBT rights and supported same-sex marriage, although of the 2017 presidential candidates, only the Justice Party’s Shim Sang-Jung appeared supportive of broader anti-discrimination laws (SOGILAW, 2018: 97). Nevertheless, we should assume variation across the political spectrum similar to that of other democracies, even if baseline levels of support are lower than many other developed democracies.

H2: Identifying as a liberal-progressive as well as identifying with a liberal-progressive party should positively correspond with view on same-sex marriage legalization.

Several aspects of support remain largely unaddressed. For example, one would expect a link between support for anti-discrimination legislation and support for same-sex marriage, although no research appears to test this directly. Indirect evidence from a November 2017 survey by MBC and the Office of the Speaker of the National Assembly suggests a connection, with similar rates of support for anti-discrimination legislation (46.5%) and same-sex marriage (41.3%) (see SOGILAW, 2018: 134)). In addition, segments of the public may be supportive of general non-discrimination efforts, yet still view marriage primarily through a religious lens. To equate opposition to one as opposition to both could be misleading. For instance, research on Hong Kong has found that a slim majority of Hong Kong residents support both homosexuality and anti-discrimination protection, but fewer respondents support same-sex marriage (Yeo and Chu, 2018). Furthermore, proponents of LGBT rights rarely start with same-sex marriage, but rather identify less contentious routes first.

Measuring South Korea’s commitment to LGBT rights remains difficult due to conflicting measures. According to a 2014 study in the Guardian regarding five LGBT rights—legalization of same-sex consensual sex, workplace non-discrimination, marriage, adoption, and protection against hate crimes (Cage et al., 2014), South Korea meets the first. Meanwhile, the 2019 report of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) lists South Korea as maintaining broad protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation (ILGA, 2019). The Williams Institute at the UCLA School of Law also constructs a measure of LGBT acceptance called the Global Acceptance Index. This index is based on data compiled from many cross-national and regional surveys (e.g., Eurobarometer, Pew, World Values Survey). In 2004–2008, South Korea was ranked 78 of 141 countries with a score of 3.42, while in 2009–2013 it was ranked higher, at number 76, but with a worse score of 3.19 (Flores and Park, 2018).

The National Human Rights Commission of Korea Act, passed in 2001, includes sexual orientation as an area for non-discrimination; however, the independent commission appears to lack enforcement abilities. Additionally, conservative groups have attempted to remove this commission, while legislators from the conservative Liberty Korea Party, namely Kim Tae-Huem, and the centrist People’s Party supported amendments to remove sexual orientation from the act (Choi 2017; SOGILAW, 2018: 96). Kim et al. (2015) state that efforts in South Korea to promote anti-LGBT discrimination bills remain domestically controversial, with proposals failing in 2007, 2010 and 2013, although some provincial and local governments have passed anti-discrimination laws that include sexual orientation, starting with South Gyeongsang province in March 2010. Meanwhile, limited efforts to expand the rights of life partners in medical care, as proposed by Jin Sun-Mee of the New Politics Alliance for Democracy in 2014 (e.g., Park, 2014), failed to receive a floor vote. Furthermore, polling data by Gallup in 2014 and 2017 find overwhelming majorities (85–90%) state they believe homosexuals should have the same employment opportunities as others. The assumption remains that one supportive of broader anti-discrimination legislation would be more open to same-sex marriage legislation as well.

H3: Support for anti-discrimination legislation should positively correspond with support for same-sex marriage.

Research design and empirical analysis

We analyzed the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) in 2016, a nationally representative survey of 1,051 South Koreans.⁵ While previous KGSS waves occasionally address LGBT issues, the 2016 wave is the first wave to ask directly about same-sex marriage. It provides the benefit of including the main independent variables of interest, allowing specifically for religious and party identification to be taken into consideration.

Our main variable of interest measures support for same-sex marriage. The 2016 KGSS asked respondents to evaluate the following statement on a five-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5): “same-sex couples should be allowed to marry legally or guaranteed similar rights.” While this measure does not allow us to identify distinctions between support for same-sex marriage and alternatives which are often somewhat more acceptable to religious conservatives (e.g., civil unions), employing this measure does not underestimate support for LGBT rights. Figure 1 presents a histogram of support for same-sex marriage. Slightly over half of all respondents (50.91%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with rights for same-sex couples, with only 27.33% agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement.

Figure 1.

Histogram of responses to same-sex marriage legalization.

Another question on the same five-point scale asked about discrimination more broadly: regarding enacting a law against discrimination based on gender, age, race, religion and sexual orientation. Admittedly, the wording of the question makes it difficult to determine the extent to which the inclusion of sexual orientation limits broader support; however, it does allow us to identify a general baseline for anti-discrimination efforts. According to Figure 2, a clear majority support such efforts (58.19%), while less than one-fifth of respondents opposed (17.31%). Additionally, a chi-square test identifies that this variable and support for same-sex marriage are highly correlated (p ⩽ .001), consistent with H3.

Figure 2.

Histogram of responses to anti-discrimination law.

Breaking down support on both measures by religious identification finds clear variation. In the KGSS survey, Buddhists comprise 34.41% of respondents, Protestants 20.84%, Catholics 9.23%, and the mostly non-religious “Other” category comprise the rest.⁶ In terms of same-sex marriage, support (4–5 on the scale) ranged from 14.29% among Protestants to 33.75% among the mostly non-religious “Other” category, with Buddhists and Catholics exhibiting similar levels of support (26.53% and 26.80% respectively). Meanwhile, clear majorities in all four groups supported anti-discrimination legislation (Buddhists: 55.97; Protestants: 56.88; Catholics: 67.01; Other: 61.09).

A cursory analysis further shows the extent of the variance in same-sex support across other demographic factors. Overall, women supported legalization more than men (29.72 versus 24.41%). Age predictably corresponds with opposition, with almost half of the youngest cohort (18–29 years) in support (45.6%) compared to less than 15% for cohorts 60 years and over. Those that attended college likewise were more likely to support (36.75% versus 15.45%). Surprisingly those living in rural areas were marginally more supportive (24.91% versus 29.07%). Meanwhile those identifying as progressive or liberal were predictably more supportive than conservatives (35% versus 18.24%).

Table 1 summaries chi-square tests for both support of same-sex marriage and support for anti-discrimination legislation among the four groups across the five previously mentioned variables. This includes a dummy for female respondents (gender), age cohorts (18–29, 20–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69, 70–79, 80–89, 90–99), a nine-point measure of level of education, a measure of the type of community in which one lives (a five-point scale from a country home to a big city), and a five-point ideology measure (very progressive to very conservative).

Table 1.

Chi-square summaries of same-sex marriage and anti-discrimination legislation broken down by religion.

		Buddhist	Protestant	Catholic	Other
Same-sex narriage	Gender	10.84**	7.17	4.07	9.70**
	Age cohorts	52.43***	49.32***	52.40***	108.15****
	Education	38.47*	33.45	44.20**	90.68****
	Community size	15.58	17.28	16.59	44.56****
	Political ideology	29.78**	17.59	31.29**	32.40***
Anti-discrimination legislation	Gender	0.77	4.57	0.93	2.21
	Age cohorts	43.77**	28.09	42.66**	36.27
	Education	45.23**	33.38	25.27	38.12
	Community size	18.24	20.66	7.08	21.58
	Political ideology	20.80	18.38	18.05	13.34

****p < 0.001, ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p <.10.

Starting with same-sex marriage, we find statistically significant differences in support across all five variables for those labeled as “Other,” while age is the only variable with a similar pattern across all three religious identification groups. In particular, age was the only variable to reach significance among Protestants, suggesting a rather uniform opposition to legalization, but also the potential for a generational shift over time. Turning to anti-discrimination legislation, no statistically significant difference emerges among Protestants on any of the five variables, although the same also applies to the “Other” category. Moreover, compared to views on same-sex marriage, views on anti-discrimination legislation vary little across the demographic variables.

To evaluate which factors influence same-sex marriage support, we employed a series of ordered logit regressions, using the five-point same-sex measure as the dependent variable (Table 2). The first model includes basic socioeconomic variables as earlier, including the same gender, age (as a continuous measure), education and community size, along with monthly household income (a 21-point scale), and a dummy variable for those who never married (25.10% of respondents). The second model simply adds the five-point measure of political ideology. The third model, to disentangle ideology from party identification, adds dummy variables for the four parties listed by name in the survey: the center-right Saenuri Party (36% of respondents), the center-left Minjoo Party (25.24%), the centrist People’s Party (12.33%) and the progressive Justice Party (4.21%), leaving as the baseline those without a party identification. The fourth model includes the measure of support for anti-discrimination laws mentioned previously.

Table 2.

Ordered logit regression of support of same-sex marriage.

	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Female	0.492****	0.125	0.463****	0.126	0.443****	0.128	0.496****	0.13
Age	–0.034****	0.005	–0.033****	0.005	–0.030****	0.006	–0.029****	0.006
Education	0.095*	0.054	0.072	0.054	0.07	0.055	0.092*	0.056
Income	0.004	0.012	0.006	0.012	–0.002	0.012	–0.011	0.012
Community sSize	–0.031	0.062	–0.046	0.063	–0.037	0.064	–0.054	0.065
Buddhist	–0.139	0.155	–0.116	0.157	–0.029	0.161	–0.001	0.163
Protestant	–1.347****	0.172	–1.329****	0.174	–1.269****	0.177	–1.232****	0.179
Catholic	–0.329	0.216	–0.354	0.217	–0.416*	0.219	–0.488**	0.224
Never mMarried	0.23	0.179	0.25	0.181	0.234	0.184	0.261	0.185
Political iIdeology			–0.202***	0.069	–0.076	0.074	–0.041	0.075
Saenuri ID					–0.337*	0.178	–0.206	0.182
Minjoo ID					0.485***	0.183	0.499***	0.183
People’s ID					0.149	0.216	0.207	0.219
Justice ID					0.877***	0.335	0.818**	0.332
Support for aAnti-dDiscrimination lLaw							0.534****	0.061
Cut 1	–2.174	0.471	–2.889	0.512	–2.373	0.54	–0.269	0.592
Cut 2	–1.367	0.467	–2.07	0.507	–1.521	0.536	0.622	0.59
Cut 3	–0.278	0.466	–0.97	0.504	–0.39	0.535	1.82	0.593
Cut 4	1.228	0.474	0.553	0.511	1.191	0.543	3.501	0.608
N	950		925		907		904
Pseudo R2	0.078		0.08		0.09		0.119

****p < 0.001, ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p <.10.

In terms of basic socioeconomic factors, across all five models, we find women more supportive of same-sex marriage, corresponding with an increase of about half a point on the five-point scale. Age negatively corresponds with support, significant in each model but with small substantive influence. Meanwhile, education—often corresponding with LGBT support elsewhere—is only weakly significant in two models. Furthermore, regarding religion, only the Protestant variable reached statistical significance in every model (p ⩽ .001), corresponding with a decline of around 1.2–1.3 points on a five-point scale. As expected, the Buddhist variable fails to reach significance in any model, while only the models that control for ideology and partisan identification find Catholic identification statistically significant, corresponding with a decline of about half a point. Regarding the party identification variables, Saenuri Party supporters negatively corresponded with support, but only significant in model 3, while supporters of the Minjoo and Justice Party corresponded with a statistically significant increase in support in both models. Lastly, the inclusion of a measure of support for an anti-discrimination law positively corresponds with support for same-sex marriage, corresponding with a half a point increase in support on the five-point scale.

Additional variables tested as robustness checks did not fundamentally change the key findings of these models (omitted for brevity). First, a series of regional dummy variables (e.g., Seoul, Honam, Yeongnam) were tested to capture regional variation, including the passing of regional anti-discrimination efforts, but none of these additions reached significance. A measure of interest in politics also was insignificant and did not change the core findings. Stark and Finke (2000) suggest that religions like Christianity with a single God encourage higher levels of religious comment. We attempt to address this through measures of religious ceremony attendance and religiousness to see if these explain the Protestant divergence. Models tested these variables⁷ separately and together. Separately, both negatively corresponded with support (p <.001), with the religiousness only test resulting in the Buddhist variable positively corresponding with support (p <.05) and the Protestant variable failing to reach statistical significance. The model including both attendance and religiousness has a similar effect on both the Buddhist and Protestant variables, but may be a result of the two additions being highly correlated (.723).⁸ The KGSS also includes a battery of Likert-scale questions regarding family values,⁹ opinions of gender roles,¹⁰ and on patriarchy.¹¹ We combined the questions in each battery to create an index and ran additional models including each separately and one with all three. Only the addition of the patriarchy index reached statistical significance (p = .001), with no substantive change in the original models’ findings.

As an additional test, we ran separate models based on religious identification (see Table 3). Here, gender and age are significant in three of the four models, while education only reaches statistical significance in the “Other” category. While only the support for the anti-discrimination law variable is significant across all four models, the size of the coefficient varies considerably. Of particular note, the Protestant model was the only model in which all of the party identification variables were insignificant, again suggesting views consistent with Protestantism’s active organized role against LGBT issues in South Korea.

Table 3.

Ordered logit regression of support of same-sex marriage broken down by religious identification.

	Buddhist		Protestant		Catholic		Other
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Female	0.922****	0.275	–0.439	0.315	1.159*	0.613	0.486***	0.186
Age	–0.026**	0.013	–0.031**	0.014	–0.050**	0.025	–0.021***	0.008
Education	–0.03	0.108	0.069	0.13	–0.156	0.244	0.206***	0.082
Income	–0.003	0.025	–0.049*	0.029	0.013	0.047	0.002	0.019
Community sSize	–0.171	0.134	–0.078	0.156	0.168	0.277	0.015	0.093
Never mMarried	0.19	0.46	0.683	0.483	0.241	0.939	0.331	0.244
Political iIdeology	0.132	0.149	0.155	0.194	–0.472	0.305	–0.11	0.108
Saenuri ID	0.263	0.395	–0.36	0.422	–0.544	0.774	–0.491*	0.265
Minjoo ID	0.707*	0.418	0.301	0.457	1.195	0.705	0.319	0.25
People’s ID	0.554	0.528	–0.172	0.507	0.694	0.878	–0.017	0.304
Justice ID	1.715***	0.79	0.383	0.805	2.455**	1.016	0.031	0.5
Support for aAnti-dDiscrimination lLaw	0.611****	0.131	0.496****	0.136	0.438*	0.234	0.551****	0.091
Cut 1	0.58	1.331	0.133	1.388	–1.924	2.798	0.387	0.825
Cut 2	1.496	1.331	0.892	1.387	–0.926	2.775	1.406	0.825
Cut 3	2.421	1.333	2.126	1.398	0.734	2.78	2.784	0.833
Cut 4	4.009	1.357	4.008	1.459	3.497	2.867	4.44	0.856
N	214		182		84		424
Pseudo R2	0.09		0.118		0.276		0.112

****p < 0.001, ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p <.10.

In sum, our findings are consistent with the hypotheses. South Korean Protestants are less supportive of same-sex marriage compared to Catholics, Buddhists, and those without a religious identification. While increased acceptance is seen in younger cohorts across groups, the substantive differences remains small. Partisan differences predictably emerge as well, but do not explain the Protestant divergence. Finally, we see a clear positive correspondence for broad anti-discrimination legislation and support for same-sex marriage.

What does this mean for same-sex marriage legalization in South Korea? First, while liberal and progressive parties may be more supportive, as seen in other countries, this support remains tepid and does not constitute a majority of supporters even within these parties. Thus, in the short term we should expect liberal and progressive parties to be hesitant to support legalization and not play the role of priming supporters to alter their positions until generational shifts push parties to see support not as an electoral liability. Second, the variation by religious identity suggests that pro-legalization efforts may have better success making inroads with Buddhists and, to a lesser extent, Catholics than Protestants. One way to increase support, especially for Catholics, might be semantic—offering an alternative (e.g., civil unions) that lacks the connotation of marriage as a religious rite. Third, proponents could focus on incremental efforts to expand anti-discrimination, which include LGBT protections in areas where there is greater public consensus already, for example, employment discrimination. Such successes, especially if spreading awareness of South Korea’s LGBT community first-hand to the general public (e.g., through their own workplace), may further aid efforts and marriage legalization.

Conclusion

While religious conservatives have opposed legalization in South Korea, as seen elsewhere, this analysis provides for a disaggregation to show Protestants as the most opposed to legalization, with limited distinction between the other religions and non-religious respondents. The Protestant divergence endures after controlling for partisan and ideological factors as well as other attitudinal variables, and appears to be tied to their higher rates of religious service attendance and perceived religiousness—aspects that would reinforce LGBT issues such as same-sex marriage as a politically salient issue. Meanwhile, claims of Buddhist tolerance are somewhat supported, although this analysis finds little difference in opinions between this group and the non-religious.

Doctrinal beliefs resist change, so rather than focusing attention on altering the views of Protestant opponents to same-sex marriage, a more fruitful path for proponents may be to develop appeals consistent with religious traditions such as Buddhism that lack the doctrinal opposition. Likewise, proponents could focus their efforts on identifying demographic division among both religious and non-religious Koreans. Younger Koreans remain more supportive of legalization and if regional and global trends apply, support among this demographic will continue. This group can be crucial in the framing of the issue in ways that if not increasing support among the broader population, may reduce explicit hostility and be a catalyst for further generational shifts. Likewise, why women are more supportive of legalization deserves greater attention and suggests the possibility that efforts to frame legalization in terms of pro-gender equity or pro-family may be persuasive.

It is not particularly surprising that support for non-discrimination legislation not specifically aimed at the LGBT community corresponds with support for same-sex marriage. However, the underlying motivation for this pattern deserves greater attention. For example, the assumption remains that the inclusion of sexual orientation likely decreased support for such legislation, especially among Protestants, but this cannot be tested within the limitations of KGSS data. Future studies may wish to identify the extent to which respondents pay attention to the inclusion of orientation within non-discrimination efforts and whether this varies by religious identification. Similarly, those supportive of legalization could seize upon the more generalized support for non-discrimination by focusing on an incremental strategy of non-discrimination, which could provide the stepping stone for broader support for same-sex marriage in future.

Admittedly, this analysis is limited by the data available. The 2016 KGSS does not ask about other LGBT issues, so it is unclear whether the issue of same-sex marriage is a deal breaker or if asking about other rights or protections would garner similar results. In addition, the 2016 KGSS does not allow for disaggregation of Protestants into mainline and more conservative variants, although the vast majority of South Korean Protestants fall within the mainline camp. A distinction may also provide insight into where young Koreans more tolerant of legalization may be more successful at religiously targeted campaigns.

Another unmeasured factor is contact with the LGBT community. South Korean religious and social pressures have likely discouraged many from openly identifying as LGBT and, as such, limited exposure for most Koreans to the community, other than the rare and often negative portrayals of LGBT members in media. This lack of contact may partially explain why education levels failed to correspond with more acceptant attitudes. Research suggests that contact with minority groups tends to improve evaluations of that group (e.g., Pettigrew, 1986; Powers and Ellison, 1995). A recent survey of South Korea has shown that only 10% of the population knows a homosexual person (Rich and Eliassen, 2019). Such a low level of contact limits the opportunities South Koreans have to meet LGBT Koreans, limiting opportunities to increase tolerance (e.g., Herek and Capitanio, 1996). However, religious and social pressures that discourage people from coming out likely limit contact, creating a negative feedback loop that depresses support for LGBT rights. Yi and Phillips (2015) suggest bridging strategies whereby individual Korean LGBT members connect to larger non-LGBT groups as a means to build tolerance and legal protection, but the impact of such efforts remains unclear.

More broadly, whereas limited research in Taiwan suggests the narratives of proponents and opponents influence public perceptions of same-sex marriage (e.g., Rich et al., 2018), this has not been fully extended to the South Korean context. Organized conservative groups in South Korea, as elsewhere, have been effective in framing legalization as a challenge to traditional values and a sign of moral decay. However, the influence of positive framing, not only from younger generations but also from female perspectives, as a counter-balance remains understudied.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Academy of Korean Studies grant (AKS-2020-R01).

ORCID iDs

Timothy S Rich

Isabel Eliassen

Notes

Author biographies

Timothy S Rich is an Associate Professor of political science at Western Kentucky University and director of the International Public Opinion Lab (IPOL). His research focuses on public opinion and electoral politics, with a focus on East Asian democracies.

Andi Dahmer is a 2018 Harry S. Truman Scholar and recent graduate of Western Kentucky University.

Isabel Eliassen is an Honors undergraduate researcher at Western Kentucky University majoring in International Affairs, Chinese, and Linguistics.

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