‘Hustling Out of Unemployment’: Livelihood Responses of Unemployed Young Graduates in the City of Bulawayo,Zimbabwe

Abstract

Youth unemployment has emerged as a major policy issue in the recent past. Within policy circles two solutions have been proposed: first, investing in youth education, and second, incorporating youth into agriculture. Our thesis, backed by a long history of proletarianisation, is that perceptions of work and agriculture, which have become deeply entrenched in society, tend to undermine any prospects of educated youth engaging in agriculture-based livelihoods. We develop our argument by focusing on the experiences, responses and livelihood pathways of young university graduates in the city of Bulawayo. We show that young graduate youth prefer livelihood activities which maintain their status as educated citizens, and that agriculture does not confer such status. We argue that young graduates’ aspirations and livelihood pathways are often dictated by societal attitudes and views of what is an acceptable occupation. In this regard, our thesis contradicts the widespread faith in agriculture placed by policymakers in Africa.

Keywords

Agriculture employment livelihoods unemployment youth Zimbabwe

Introduction

Absorbing youth into agriculture has long been considered a solution (one generally accepted by policymakers and governments) to the youth unemployment crisis in poor countries (Van der Geest, 2010; White, 2012). The main contention of this article is that such optimism is not backed by evidence, which to the contrary points to a general disinterest in agriculture by youth, who often do not view it as a decent occupation (Bezu and Holden, 2014). From another perspective, young people are presented as lacking the basic skills for successful careers in farming.

This has particularly been the case in Zimbabwe where education levels among youth are relatively high, and agriculture has long been denigrated and viewed as an occupation for pensioners. This is exemplified by the weak participation of youth in the land reform and resettlement process, which we may regard as a potential platform for youth empowerment and development (Chipenda, 2020; Scoones et al., 2019; Thebe, 2018). Through education reforms introduced by the postcolonial state, Zimbabwe has a demographic profile of educated and urbanised youth who are ill-equipped for careers in agriculture.

While the formal education system mostly prepares graduates for traditional occupations in both the private and public sectors of the economy, Zimbabwe has experienced massive deindustrialisation and job cuts since the mid-1990s (Bond, 2000; Carmody and Taylor, 2003), while the unemployment rate was above 80% in 2008 (Mhike, 2017). What are these young graduates’ experiences with formal employment given the current economic climate? How do they negotiate the current economic environment in order to construct livelihoods that improve their quality of life and maintain their status as educated members of society? What influences their employment choices?

This article uses a case study of young graduates in the city of Bulawayo as a basis for exploring the situation of youth in Zimbabwe: their aspirations and experiences with unemployment, how they negotiate their precarious situation, and the dynamics guiding alternative livelihood choices. The article also seeks to address notions that incorporating youth into agriculture can provide a solution to youth unemployment – these notions are also supported in Zimbabwe (at least in government circles). Although the case is a specific one, it raises critical issues about assumptions around the youth and agriculture question.

For the purposes of this article, the term ‘youth’ can be taken to mean a life stage in a person’s development – a stage of transition to adulthood, characterised by a young person’s relative autonomy. In other words, such an individual can establish his or her own household, become more independent from family and increasingly rely on peers for advice and approval (Morch, 2003). This life stage is also associated with the transition to marriage.

In adopting this definition, we are aware of the complexity of the concept of youth, together with the difficulties encountered in trying to define youth as a category. We are also aware of the various definitions applied with varying connotations and their implications. Our definition emphasises the life stage and moves away from the general tendency to use age categories, which further complicates the definition because of the different age categories used by different entities.

In certain cultures, the stage is often associated with an individual having undergone and completed certain cultural rituals. These rituals mark an individual’s transition from childhood to adulthood (Abdullah, 1998; Sedibe, 2019). We agree with others about the importance of employment for this group, and therefore we focus on the livelihood options available to youth graduates in the context of high youth unemployment and economic collapse.

Our thesis (backed by a long history of proletarianisation) is that perceptions of work and agriculture, which have become deeply entrenched in some Zimbabwean societies, tend to undermine any prospects of youth empowerment through agriculture.¹ Educated youth aspire for specific occupations, and their education and aspirations cannot be accommodated in denigrated occupations like agriculture. In this regard, our thesis contradicts the widespread faith in agriculture placed by policymakers in Africa and the donor community.

Methodology

This article draws data from an extended study of youth graduates conducted in the city of Bulawayo between August and November 2018. The study included interviews and informal discussions with 40 graduates from different higher education institutions in the country, who were living in Bulawayo after graduating. The interviews sought to understand their employment experiences, understanding of employment and livelihood choices in a context of high unemployment, as well as their perceptions about agriculture as an occupation.

The young graduates, who were selected through a snowball process, were visited more than three times during the course of the research: first for an initial interview, which was arranged and conducted through an interview guide, and later, informal visits, where discussions were informal and were conducted without an interview guide. In total, over 200 interviews and discussions were conducted.

To gain a deeper understanding of what young graduates did, how they did it and where, we also used participant and non-participant observations by spending time with these young people as they went about their daily business. We engaged in some of these activities as we kept them company and also observed their everyday livelihood activities. We also spent a weekend of sports at a betting hall in the city centre, where we not only observed players bet, but we were also assisted with our own bets.

We structure this article as follows: we first contextualise the concept of youth in postcolonial Zimbabwe, before discussing the roots of the youth employment crisis. Next, we provide the setting and context and discuss the situation of young graduates in the city of Bulawayo. We then discuss the options available to young graduates outside formal employment. We discuss the significance of these options to an educated youth population and why agriculture-based occupations are not considered as options.

Youth in post-independence Zimbabwe

With its long history of struggle against social injustice and inadequate life chances, youth provide a valuable case study of unemployment and alternative livelihoods. In contemporary Zimbabwe, the economic context and their relationship with the state continue to inform young people’s responses to a lack of formal economic opportunities. Following Henrik Vigh’s concept of ‘social navigation’, Oosterom (2018: 486) explained how for many youths ‘everyday life continues in the absence of stability and functioning state institutions’.

This can be equated to what elsewhere is referred to as ‘hustling’ (Di Nunzio, 2012; Thieme, 2013). In Zimbabwe, Jones (2010) has referred to kukiyakiya or the kukiyakiya economy, which provides survival opportunities in the context of socio-economic crisis. Thus, youth responses basically stem from economic adversity arising in the 1990s (an economy in free fall and unable to provide formal jobs) (Addison and Laasko, 2003; Brett, 2005), partisan politics (where certain actors have informal control of resources and use them for patronage) (Mhike, 2017; Oosterom, 2018; Rupiya, 2005) and failed public policies (which have tended to limit opportunities for youth) (Oosterom, 2018; Richardson, 2007).

For example, youth have been presented as highly calculative in their search for opportunities. While some youth have been victims of patronage politics and got caught in inter-political party violence (Mhike, 2017; Rupiya, 2005; Rutherford, 2008), others have tended to stay out of party politics and avoid access to opportunities through partisan actors (Mhike, 2017; Oosterom, 2018; Oosterom and Pswarayi, 2014).

In addition, youth (particularly students) have been in the forefront of protests against the government in struggles for political and economic transformation (Mlambo, 2013; Zeilig, 2008). Such action, however, attracted accusation of betrayal and lack of appreciation of ‘the privilege of being ‘born free’ by the government and ruling party (Oosterom, 2018: 490). These perceptions of a lack of patriotism resulted in enormous efforts to mobilise youth, and sometimes involuntarily institutionalise and inculcate patriotic values on young people (Mhike, 2017; Oosterom, 2018).

Others have identified the establishment in 2000 of the Ministry of Youth and Employment Creation and the National Youth Service (NYS) as central components of such efforts (Mhike, 2017; Oosterom, 2018; Oosterom and Gukurume, 2019; Rupiya, 2005). This was a programme that was expected to curb ‘youth delinquency’ (The Herald, 13 October 2000). Mhike (2017: 246) stated: ‘Ironically, the state used the NYS programme as a de facto “rite of passage” for youth access to tertiary education, jobs in the civil service and state-funded youth economic empowerment programmes’.

More than anything, the programme was meant to empower youth through education and employment. To a large measure, the programme focused on vocational training (Oosterom, 2018). Thus, the curriculum revolved around occupations like building, carpentry and, more importantly, agriculture (Mhike, 2017; Rupiya, 2005). The political climate in the early 2000s definitely favoured agriculture in terms of employment of livelihoods, although nationally there was no pronouncement on youth in the land reform policy. Rhetoric abounds: the land was presented as the economy and the economy as land (Moore, 2001).

Through mobilisation by powerful political figures, youth were already playing prominent roles in violent farm occupations and invasions in the 2000s (Chaumba et al., 2003; Rutherford, 2008). Beyond farm occupations, scholarship has documented how youth (under the programme) championed the agenda of the ruling party (Mhike, 2017; Oosterom and Gukurume, 2019; Rupiya, 2005).

To further reinforce this position, the programme became highly exclusionary, with urban youth effectively left out by the geographical location of training camps and a bias towards rural youth (Mhike, 2017; Rupiya, 2005). Many of the urban youth supported and voted for the newly formed Movement for Democratic Change, which was increasingly becoming a threat to ZANU (PF) (Addison and Laasko, 2003; Mhike, 2017). As a result, ZANU (PF) labelled these youth as opponents of the struggle and consistently targeted them for violence by the NYS (Rupiya, 2005).

In the years following the suspension of the NYS in 2007, youth empowerment rose in the priorities of ZANU (PF) and government and featured prominently in the party’s 2013 Election Manifesto, which singled out youth as specific targets for scholarships and employment creation (Oosterom and Gukurume, 2019).

However, despite the rhetoric on youth empowerment and the post-Mugabe administration expropriating the ‘rhetoric on youth as instrumental to economic development’ (Oosterom and Gukurume, 2019: 15), and other programmes (including awarding youth mining claims), these were hampered by partisan politics (Oosterom, 2008). It is within this context, significantly contextualised by a long history of proletarianisation, that we need to understand the economic and livelihood responses of urban young graduates.

Roots of the youth unemployment crisis in Zimbabwe

Youth unemployment, the subject of the study, is part of the broader Zimbabwean crisis which has forced multitudes of migrants into stable economies in the region (Bloch, 2010a; Crush et al., 2015; Worby, 2010) and abroad (Bloch, 2006, 2010b; Chikanda, 2005). The crisis is entangled in a web of economic, social, political and natural factors, which have a long pedigree in the country.

The crisis can be traced back to the 1990s, when the government signed up to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (IMF and World Bank stimulus package), when the unemployment rate almost doubled from about 10% in the mid-1980s to about 20% in the 1990s (Marquette, 1997). ESAP is particularly linked to a slowdown informal sector employment in the 1990s (Daniels, 1994; McPherson, 1991).

Specifically, after the adoption of ESAP, there were staff freezes in the public sector, less formal job creation and more job cuts (Marquette, 1997). ESAP mostly affected urban jobs. Among the job cuts were the 50,000 retrenchments in the private sector and 20,000 from the public service within the first six years of the programme (Crush et al., 2015). While in 1991 there were 939,900 formal non-agriculture-based jobs, these had reduced to 915,800 in 1996 (Potts, 2000).

In the context of liberalisation and foreign competition, deindustrialisation in the manufacturing sector accelerated (Bond, 2000; Gibbon, 1995). In the 1990s, the country experienced zero economic growth, while the economy struggled to create the ‘types and quantities of jobs needed to reward continued investment in human capital’ (Alwang et al., 2002: ix).

Although ESAP set in motion the crisis, still witnessed today, the government also spurred on the process through what Brett has termed ‘counterproductive political decisions . . . taken from late 1997’ (Brett, 2005: 94). Brett identified the following:

award of lump sums in pensions to war veterans;

funding of the costly Congo War;

reintroduction of corporatist controls on exchange rates and other prices (which compromised the viability of firms and discouraged investment);

violent farm occupations and seizures.

Among their costs, these policy decisions contributed to further declines in the economy, wherein the crisis deepened, setting the country back more than half a century (Moss, 2007). After 1999, the country’s economy shrank annually and had shrunk by around 18% in 2003, while inflation reached triple figures in 2007 (Moss, 2007).

Meanwhile, the acquisition of commercial farms contributed to the loss of as many as 250,000 farming jobs and the displacement of over 900,000 farmworkers and their families between 2000 and 2002 (Waeterloos and Rutherford, 2003). Since the majority of these were of foreign ancestry, and in most cases were seen as sympathetic to the opposition, they were never considered for land in the settled farms.

This does not mean, however, that farmworkers were not considered for land in the occupied farms as some were allocated land. Studies have shown that farmworkers that were deemed loyal to ZANU (PF), or had supported and joined the occupations, were allocated land (Chaumba et al., 2003; Thebe, 2018).

With the loss of formal jobs, the informal economy grew and absorbed the greater population as the economic crisis deepened and deindustrialisation accelerated. Despite signs of economic recovery after the adoption of a multi-currency system after 2009, economic woes returned as the country experienced severe foreign currency and cash shortages. By 2015, the economy had declined drastically and was characterised by weakened demand for key exports, tighter liquidity conditions, low domestic savings and investment inflows, and a lack of competitiveness.

Most local industries struggled for viability and closed shop, while others continued operating at sub-optimum capacity, affecting the jobs of thousands of people. The loss of jobs as a result of deindustrialisation was felt more in the city of Bulawayo where livelihoods have long been dependent on urban jobs in the context of the restricted agricultural potential in the Matabeleland region (Musemwa, 2006; Thebe, 2019).

The city was a livelihood centre for the region’s worker-peasantry and once housed some of the country’s biggest industries: the National Railways of Zimbabwe, the Cold Storage Commission, the Treger Group, National Blankets, the Zimbabwe Engineering Company (ZECO), Merlin, G & D Shoes, Hunyani Holdings, Radar Metals and Dunlop (Thebe, 2019).

Some of these industries relocated to the capital city, Harare; others closed down, while others operated at minimum capacity, affecting over 20,000 jobs (Mwase, 2012; Ndou, 2011). Results from a 2009 Ministry of Industry and Commerce study revealed the closure of 100 companies, while in 2012 alone, over 100 companies closed down, and the remainder were in great distress and still waiting for relief through the government initiated Distressed and Marginalised Area Fund (Dimaf) (Bhebhe, 2012; Karimakwenda, 2012).

Setting the context

The study was conducted in the city of Bulawayo in the Matabeleland region, the country’s former industrial capital, situated about 490 km from the capital city, Harare. Bulawayo was chosen to represent an industrialised area, with a long history of employment of both low skilled and professionals. But, also, the city of Bulawayo hosts graduates from a number of tertiary institutions including the National University of Science and Technology and nearby universities like Gwanda, Lupane and Solusi.

This allowed us to explore youth graduates, their circumstances in the context of economic crisis and unemployment, and the livelihood pathways they have taken after graduating from university. This setting is in contrast to rural areas elsewhere in Matabeleland, where agriculture is still practised despite unfavourable weather patterns. In a study of 40 young graduates, 22 were male and 18 were female, all aged between 24 and 35. Almost three-quarters had graduated from university in the past five years, while the remainder had been out of the education system for at least five years. Half of the youth reported being independent and staying on their own, but only about a third reported ever having been formally employed.

None of the women graduates mentioned family circumstances as a constraint to mobility, which meant that all the young graduates were freely mobile. Of the 40 youth, none had been formally employed for a period exceeding three years. Thirteen had never been formally employed since graduating from university. They had struggled to find jobs, even outside their fields of specialisation.

Others had worked as temporary teachers in high schools but were released after qualified teachers became available.² Five females and three males were in this category, having held short-term teaching contracts since 2016. While such jobs are temporary, university graduates receive better salaries, reflecting the general need for such skills, particularly in the teaching of advanced level classes.³

Around half of those who had never been formally employed held qualifications with very clear career pathways including qualifications that were seen as appropriate in a developing country context, like Environmental Management, Development Studies, Development and Disaster Management, and Wildlife and Tourism Studies.⁴

Some of these graduates had qualifications from two of the country’s flagship universities – the University of Zimbabwe and the National University of Science and Technology. There were also some who had qualifications in fields that are generally in demand in other countries including South Africa, and in the past, they would have acquired jobs even before graduation in Zimbabwe.

A good example was Jeremy Ndlovu, who graduated from the National University of Science and Technology in 2016, with a Fibre and Polymer Engineering degree. This qualification was tailored for the city’s industrial sector, but because of deindustrialisation, Jeremy has been at home without formal employment since graduating.

The remaining youth had qualifications in either humanities or business, fields that have been identified by ILO (2010), as being dominated by unemployed youth in the continent. Of those who had been unemployed for a period longer than five years, the majority had qualifications in Arts or broader social sciences. These included Vicky, who had qualified with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Linguistics, and Peter Ngwenya with a Bachelor of Arts in Translation Studies.

These qualifications were not relevant to the job environment in Zimbabwe at the time. While the economic environment was hostile, such degrees were not helping issues as such graduates could not be placed within any job category in industry. Maybe they could be employed in some government departments like the courts, or in some media houses, but even in these areas, there were specific qualifications which were identifiable and available in Zimbabwe.

When asked how their qualifications had impacted their employment prospects, these youth still believed that the education they had received was appropriate and was of good quality, and their failure to gain employment should not be attributed to the quality of their education. Not surprisingly, all those who participated in the study blamed their failure to land a job on other issues, which upon closer analysis, had substance. One of the graduates reasoned:

I still believe education is of good quality though it has not made much of a difference in Zimbabwe because there are no jobs for us young graduates. Positions are available at the top where we do not have the necessary job experience needed. Also, it is all about being connected with the right people. (Reward)

The youths had a specific understanding of employment. From our interaction, it was clear that they saw employment as work for which one is remunerated at the end of the day. Such employment should be secure, with a binding contract. In the words of one of youth, ‘rewards should be guaranteed and regular, and one should not worry about whether he/she will be rewarded at the end’ (Clement).

This thinking is in line with the general thinking in society, where anything outside the formal sector is not considered as employment. From this viewpoint, ‘employment is characterised by job security and monetary returns on a regular basis’ (Sindiso). These youth graduates were also specific on what constitutes employment, and what does not constitute employment. In their world, working for oneself was not being employed. They had a term for such activities – hustling – which means to make ends meet.⁵

Hustling was considered by the youths to be unsustainable and a stopgap of temporary activities to ensure their survival until they could secure ‘real’ jobs. One youth explained: ‘Hustling may occur as a legal and moral grey area and may involve circumventing some of the regulations, which a formal business is expected to adhere to’ (Joseph).

These graduates’ perception of employment as opposed to hustling appears to be informed by their current life experiences, which have pushed them into occupations they would otherwise have avoided if opportunities existed in the formal sectors of the economy. A few of the statements below are evidence of the conceptions of employment by the youth:

Working for someone or under someone for money is employment. To me, work is when you are working for someone or under someone in the formal sector, not informal things. When you are working someone needs to be accountable for you. Working for yourself is not employment, I am personally working for myself, but you can’t say I am employed, I am just hustling, because I need to make a plan to survive. (Ndaba)

Employment is work; it is being employed by someone else. It is work that is formal. I don’t think working for myself in the formal or informal sector is something that can be regarded as employment. It is just hustling, honestly, because I am just trying to strive and get food for the day. (Martin)

Employment is working for an organisation or another person in the formal sector and your education must assist you with doing that job. If you are just working for yourself then you are just hustling, we cannot say you are employed. (Suzan)

Very few young graduates reported having an interest in agriculture. Rather, the majority considered agriculture as an occupation for pensioners.

Some who had initially considered agriculture as they had the necessary training said they were discouraged by the logistics that were time-consuming, and the challenges with the land reform process and changes in climatic conditions.⁶ They had hoped that they would be considered for farmland after the completion of land audits, but this did not happen. It should be noted that young graduates also desired immediate earnings, whereas agricultural pursuits may take time before generating a return for participants.

Many youths identified the need to further their education as a possible solution to gaining employment in the country. For example, a Master’s was seen as a significant qualification which would improve their chances in the job market. Many youths also felt strongly about emigrating to improve their chances of getting appropriate jobs. This is hardly surprising, given the value attached to formal employment in Zimbabwean society.

We also met some youth who were making preparations to leave for South Africa and Botswana. They indicated that they became educated so that they could increase their chances of landing good jobs. The majority of those we interviewed had aspirations for white-collar jobs. Ben Moyo, for example, had dreams of an air-conditioned office, with a computer, where he would be working with figures at one of the accounting firms in the city.

Thus, formal employment was considered by some of the interviewees to be a route to better remuneration and to a better life. Some of the youth were very passionate about what they studied at university, and still hoped that they would one day get a job they had studied for. They still made applications to big organisations in the country, while those with relatives in South Africa had given their CVs for circulation.

The desire to land jobs related to their areas of study, their continued search for formal employment and their views that certain occupations were not befitting of a university graduate support the idea that increased investments towards education raise the aspirations and dreams of these youths.

Alternative strategies of survival for unemployed young graduates

Most young graduates anxiously tried to survive, finding ways to generate income through a range of activities. For example, every young graduate was involved in one income-generating activity or another, and in the words of one graduate ‘no one was hungry’ (Martin). When we take stock of the activities these young people adopted in their quest for a living, they were commonly income-generating activities in the country and elsewhere in developing Africa. Some of these income-generating activities were part of the informal economy, which was the dominant economic sector in Bulawayo and the country at large.

The country has the largest informal sector and the second-largest informal economy as a percentage of its total economy in the world, and currently 95% of the working population in Zimbabwe is believed to be earning a living from the informal sector. Our graduates indicated that they had joined this growing sector after encountering frustrations in the formal sector. Some of these economic activities, like dealing in foreign currency in the black market, could be considered illegitimate and illegal. Yet, almost everyone was involved in black market foreign currency exchange. In a context where foreign currency was scarce and most commodities were imported from neighbouring countries, those who were importing wares and commodities for resale in Zimbabwe sourced foreign currency by selling Zimbabwean dollars in the black market.

These youths sourced their wares mainly from Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia, and needed Botswana pula, South Africa rand and US dollars. There were also a few others who earned income from the mainstream economy, particularly through sports betting. A few who had the knowledge of the operations of the stock exchange were involved in speculation activities. A detailed account of these activities is discussed next.

Imports of commodities for resale

Whereas the economic crisis created hardship for consumers and the high costs of locally manufactured commodities had increased consumption of imports, this had opened livelihood opportunities for certain individuals. A number of young graduates were trading in imported products, mainly from South Africa and Zambia, which were either scarce or expensive in Zimbabwe. These included basics like grocery items, clothing, electronics and cosmetics. They were also selling an assortment of items including new and second-hand clothing from bales bought in Mozambique, books, building materials, jewellery, stationery and crafts. Some were selling pirated movies, popular TV series, CDs and DVDs. There was a gender difference, with men more likely to sell electronics (cell phones, laptops, TVs, radios, cameras, video recorders, CDs and DVDs), building materials, craft, vehicle parts; and women selling cosmetics, fabrics, clothing and carrier bags.

Ben, for example, held a Bachelor of Commerce (Accounting) degree from the National University of Science and Technology. He had been unemployed for the past two years. He was selling cell phones, TVs, radios, CDs, and DVDs (both originals and pirate copies). He was also repairing electronic gadgets like cell phones, TVs and radios. He was renting a small office space at the Bulawayo CBD, where he accesses uncapped Wi-Fi to download television and TV series for customers using a laptop.

He said he operated on orders and requests from clients. ‘Clients ask for certain movies or series, which I download from some websites, copy them onto DVDs.’ He said the demand for his services was high because most of the shows were only available abroad and were not aired on local television and DSTV channels. Margret, on the other hand, was buying cosmetics from Zambia for sale in Zimbabwe. She was also buying and selling clothes from South Africa. She also said she had been to Mozambique to buy bales. At the time of the study, she was planning another trip to Mozambique to buy bales of jackets to sell during the winter season. Similarly, Vengai was selling grocery items bought from South Africa, but she also had a cosmetic stall where she sold items bought from Zambia. She said, ‘hustling means dealing in everything. You cannot choose . . . you go with whatever items are on demand at the time’. Six others said they were buying and selling diesel and petrol from Botswana.

At the time of the study, four males were also involved in buying and selling fuel. Fuel from Botswana and South Africa was thought to be strong and motorists preferred such fuel to the blended fuel sold in the country. One of those involved, Peter, had been selling fuel since 2017. He had an advantage because he had a truck, which allowed him to buy the commodity in bulk and sell it at black market rates.

Pirate passenger commuting services

As alluded to earlier, hustling means doing anything that can generate income, and some economic activities of our graduate youths depicted this aspect. In line with their definition of hustling, a section of this cohort of educated youths had entered the transport business, by offering a parallel transport service to the official commuter service. Young graduates with access to small vehicles were taking advantage of increased demand for day and after-hours transportation and the failure of the public passenger transport system by transporting people on short hauls and sometimes offering a door-to-door service. This was an informal pirate passenger commuter service, which operated outside the traffic and city bylaws, but was allowed to flourish due to the corruption within the traffic control department.

Graduates who could access vehicles had joined this thriving business, transporting people during the day and night. Six were involved in this business. They were operating on different routes in the city during the day, but mostly operated a night service that delivered night revellers from the city to their doorsteps. Those involved did not own any vehicles but were operating vehicles belonging to relatives. For example, 26-year-old Robin had graduated from the National University of Science and Technology in 2017 and had been using his mother’s Honda Fit vehicle to provide commuting services from the CBD to Burnside and nearby suburban areas. He also provided a hire service to the airport and for weddings, and a night service from pubs around the city.

Illegal money exchange (osphatheleni)

One of the negative consequences of Zimbabwe’s economic crisis was the emergence of a black market for most commodities including money. The market was initially dominated by members of the Apostolic Faith Mission, a popular religious sect in Zimbabwe, but later opened up to the general public. Trading in foreign currency was without question an important pathway to wealth in the early 2000s. In 2018, it became a major occupation following shortages of cash and began to attract large sections of the urban population.

A number of youths, particularly those involved in imports, street vending and passenger transportation, had joined this lucrative market, mostly taking the pula, rand and US dollar in exchange for the local currency at black market rates. These were conveniently placed for such activities because they operated on the streets, had the clientele and had legitimate businesses as cover, which made it difficult for police to disrupt these illegal activities. Those involved said they needed foreign currency to source wares and commodities from neighbouring countries. For example, Reward needed the pula to source fuel from Botswana. While he sold his fuel in the local currency, he would buy the pula from his customers or people who needed to exchange the pula for the local bond currency at lucrative rates.

Similarly, Violet was a well-known foreign currency dealer and operated from her stall in the city centre. She said she used US dollars to source cosmetics from Zambia and the rand for her South African orders. She was very open about her money changing activities, and would joke, ‘even the police know that ngiyaphathelisa (I change money)’ (Violet).⁷

Sports betting

A few others were involved in sports betting. At the time of research in 2018, sports betting was one of the few legal gambling activities, and was widely popular and offering opportunities for easy money. It had become an important livelihood activity for both adults and youths. A number of graduates were involved in sports betting, and five reported being entirely dependent on the activity for a living. Young women were less engaged in sports betting than men and were not as knowledgeable of major leagues in Europe. While those involved confessed to placing huge sums in bets and sometimes winning, like in every bet, they also confessed to losing huge sums of money. Even those we may refer to as career gamblers confessed to losing money, but due to their experience and knowledge, they had won more than they had lost.

For people like Chesta, 27 years of age and an Environmental Sciences graduate from Solusi University, sports betting was like a business where you either win or lose, but even when you lose ‘you do not close shop, you continue operating’. He had been gambling for the past three years and saw the betting halls as production plants:

At 27 years, I cannot be seen asking for money from my parents. I have to be independent and find work. I work here. I spend around 45 dollars daily depending on the games. I have won and lost, but I am able to support myself and my family. I have won about 3,000 dollars in the past six months, which is a good thing about gambling. There are a lot of us with degrees who earn a living in these betting halls. We have to gamble because we do not eat qualifications, but food. So, gambling has come [in] handy. (Chesta)

Betting takes place in a number of betting halls in the city and townships where branches have been established. These halls offer recreational facilities where players watch different sports and monitor their bets. Also, sports betting has become an occupation which ‘guarantees cash in an environment where cash is in short supply even in banks’ (Moses).

Artisanal mining

In mineral-rich regions in Zimbabwe, economic activities are dominated by artisanal gold mining activities. Some of our young graduates had entered this lucrative sector by hiring artisanal miners to prospect for gold in decommissioned mines, river banks and virgin land in the Esigodini and Inyathi areas. Such an arrangement was a huge gamble and the returns were uncertain, but sometimes it paid off:

On a good day, you can hit a jackpot and the gamble pays off. However, sometimes the gamble fails to bear fruits and you make a huge loss. Since we started the business, we have made networks, which are generally helpful. Through these networks, we are able to hire career gold panners, who are often happy to do the job because of a guaranteed income. We often sell the gold in the black market, here or in South Africa. (Terrance)

These young men also bought gold from artisanal miners at cheaper rates, mainly before it was processed. This guaranteed a flow of income even when their miners had failed to find any gold. Although the proportion of young graduates that reported active involvement in artisanal gold mining was relatively small (5 out of 40), a large number of youths reported participation in the artisanal gold value chain, mainly as intermediaries. They mostly negotiated the sale of gold with buyers in South Africa for a commission. A few others confessed to smuggling gold into South Africa when they crossed the border to source materials.

Conclusion

This article contributes to the growing scholarship on the youth unemployment crisis in poor countries. Incorporating youth in agriculture has long been seen as a viable solution to the youth unemployment problem, at least where land is abundant. It is clear, however, that in much of settler Southern Africa, ‘where conditions of successful capitalist development’ were satisfied, livelihoods have long been built on a complex process of proletarianisation.

Our thesis, backed in this case by the long history of proletarianisation, was that perceptions of work and agriculture, which have become deeply entrenched in society, tended to undermine any prospects of youth involvement in agriculture-based livelihoods. We developed our argument by focusing on the experiences and responses of young university graduates, who encountered frustrations with formal employment opportunities after graduation and marginalisation by the government, in the city of Bulawayo.

By focusing on graduate youths and their livelihood choices outside the formal employment system, in a city once considered as the country’s industrial capital, we linked the aspirations and livelihood pathways of young graduates to society-wide perceptions of what is an acceptable occupation. As we have seen from the study, the youths had a specific understanding of what is ‘employment’, they all had aspirations to be employed, but these could not be accommodated in a context where resources’ access was guided by partisan politics.

Almost without exception, the young graduates were involved in informal economic activities which guaranteed not only quick money but conferred status closer to that which they would have had if they had been formally employed. Not only did they shun agriculture, but they never saw it as an occupation. This allowed them not only to stay clear of partisan actors (using land reform as a mobilisation tool) but also to navigate towards livelihood activities that did not undermine their status as educated members of society. While the recourse to informal activities could be considered a huge trade-off, the youth saw them only as a temporary measure but which still guaranteed a decent life. These activities enabled these youths to maintain the dignity, self-esteem and self-worth of graduates and to uphold their status as educated people, while also exploiting the economics of disorder.

Significant implications emerged for development policy and for any solutions to the youth unemployment crisis. The literature on youth unemployment assumes that incorporating young people into agriculture would solve youth unemployment, and the ZANU (PF) government certainly emphasised youth empowerment through vocational training (Oosterom, 2018). But such emphasis ignores local cultural practices and perceptions that develop over time, which for educated urban youths guides aspirations and understanding of what can be termed acceptable forms of employment.

In our case study, these youths appeared to understand their place in society and societal expectations, and their livelihood choices were often guided by such understanding. Their understanding of employment was shaped by a long history of proletarianisation and the denigration of agriculture. In this regard, our thesis contradicts the widespread faith in agriculture placed by policymakers in Africa and the donor community.

Footnotes

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Vusilizwe Thebe

Notes

Author biographies

Tafadzwa Mhazo is a postgraduate student in the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of Pretoria, South Africa. She has completed a dissertation on educated youth, unemployment and agency.

Vusilizwe Thebe (PhD) is an Associate Professor of Development Studies. He teaches and coordinates the Development Studies programme at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. His research interests include migrant labour societies and their transformation: the worker-peasantry, the context of its existence, its relationship to land and work, its transition overtime and its interaction with state institutions and policy, gender dynamics within these societies and migration, and agrarian transformation. He has published several articles on migrant labour societies, agrarian change, gender, youth and migration.

References

Abdullah

(1998) Bush path to destruction: The origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone. Journal of Modern African Studies 36(2): 203–234.

Addison

Laasko

(2003) The political economy of Zimbabwe’s descent into conflict. Journal of International Development 15: 457–470.

Alwang

Mills

Taruvinga

(2002) Why Has Poverty Increased in Zimbabwe? Washington, DC: World Bank.

Bezu

Holden

(2014) Are rural youth in Ethiopia abandoning agriculture? World Development 64: 259–272.

Bhebhe

(2012) Bulawayo’s dying industry: Is there hope for revival? Newsday, 22 November. Available at: www.newsday.co.zw/2012/11/bulawayos-dying-industry-is-therehope-for-revival/ (accessed 21 August 2019).

Bloch

(2006) Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant perspectives. Social Policy and Administration 40(1): 67–87.

Bloch

(2010a) Transnational lives: The experience of Zimbabweans in Britain. In: Crush

Tevera

(eds) Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival. Ottawa/Kingston: IDRC and SAMP, 156–178.

Bloch

(2010b) The right to rights? Undocumented migrants from Zimbabwe living in South Africa. Sociology 44(2): 233–250.

Bond

(2000) Zimbabwe’s economic crisis: Outward vs inward development strategy for post-nationalist Zimbabwe. Labour, Capital and Society 33(2): 162–191.

10.

Brett

(2005) From corporatism to liberalization in Zimbabwe: Economic policy regimes and political crisis, 1980–97. International Political Science Review 26(1): 91–106.

11.

Carmody

Taylor

(2003) Industry and the urban sector in Zimbabwe’s political economy. African Studies Quarterly 7(2&3): 53–80.

12.

Chaumba

Scoones

Wolmer

(2003) From jambanja to planning: The reassertion of technocracy in South-eastern Zimbabwe? Journal of Modern African Studies 41(4): 533–554.

13.

Chikanda

(2005) Nurse migration from Zimbabwe: Analysis of recent trends and impacts. Nursing Inquiry 12(3): 162–174.

14.

Chipenda

(2020) The youth after land reform in Zimbabwe: Exploring the redistributive and social protection outcomes from a transformative social policy perspective. Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines 54(3): 497–518.

15.

Crush

Chikanda

Tawodzera

(2015) The third wave: Mixed migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa. Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines 49(2): 363–382.

16.

Daniels

(1994) Impact of drought and reform on small-scale enterprises in Zimbabwe: Results of a nationwide survey. GEMINI Report 7 1. Michigan: USAID/Development Alternatives, Inc. and Michigan State University.

17.

Di Nunzio

(2012) ‘We are good at surviving’: Street hustling in Addis Ababa’s inner city. Urban Forum 23: 433–447.

18.

Gibbon

(1995) Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in Zimbabwe. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

19.

International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2010) Global Unemployment Trends for Youth. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_143356/lang—en/index.htm#:~:text=The%20ILO%20forecasts%20a%20continued,a%2012.7%20per%20cent%20rate (accessed 5 August 2019).

20.

Jones

(2010) ‘Nothing is straight in Zimbabwe’: The rise of the kukiyakiya economy. Journal of Southern African Studies 36(2): 285–299.

21.

Karimakwenda

(2012) Government breaks promise to fund companies in Bulawayo. SW Radio Africa, 11 May. Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/201205140162.html (accessed 5 August 2019).

22.

Marquette

(1997) Current poverty, structural adjustment and drought in Zimbabwe. World Development 25(7): 1141–1149.

23.

McPherson

(1991) Small-scale enterprises in Zimbabwe: Results from a nationwide survey. GEMINI Report 25. Michigan: USAID/Development Alternatives, Inc. and Michigan State University.

24.

Mhike

(2017) Political violence in Zimbabwe’s National Youth Services, 2001–2007. In: Oinas

Onodera

Suurpaa

(eds) What Politics? Youth and Political Engagement in Africa. Leiden/Boston: Brill, pp.246–264.

25.

Mlambo

(2013) Student activism in a time of crisis-Zimbabwe 2000–2010: A tentative exploration. Journal of Contemporary History 38(1): 183–204.

26.

Moore

(2001) Is the land the economy and the economy the land? Primitive accumulation in Zimbabwe. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 19(2): 253–266.

27.

Morch

(2003) Youth and education. Advance 11(1): 49–73.

28.

Moss

(2007) Zimbabwe’s meltdown anatomy of a peacetime economic collapse. The Fletcher Forum for World Affairs 31(2): 133–148. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10427/77130.

29.

Musemwa

(2006) Disciplining a ‘dissident’ city: Hydropolitics in the city of Bulawayo, Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, 1980–1994. Journal of Southern African Studies 32(2): 239–254.

30.

Mwase

(2012) Death of Zimbabwe’s industrial hub. Sunday Mail, 12 May. Available at: www.sundaymail.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28657:death-of-zi..#.UcAUt9iTXTM (accessed 27 August 2019).

31.

Ndou

(2011) 20,000 workers lost their jobs in Bulawayo. Bulawayo 24 News, 6 June. Available at: https://bulawayo24.com/index-idnews-sc-local-byo-3841-article-20+000+workers+lost+their+jobs+in+bulawayo.html (accessed 12 September 2010).

32.

Oosterom

(2018) Youth and social navigation in Zimbabwe’s informal economy: ‘Don’t end up on the wrong side’. African Affairs 118(472): 485–508.

33.

Oosterom

Gukurume

(2019) Managing Zimbabwe’s born-free generation: Zimbabwe’s strategies for dealing with the youth. CMI Working Paper 02. Bergen: CHR Michelsen Institute.

34.

Oosterom

Pswarayi

(2014) Being a born-free. Violence, youth and agency in Zimbabwe. IDS Research Report 79. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

35.

Potts

(2000) Urban unemployment and migrants in Africa: Evidence from Harare 1985–1994. Development and Change 31: 879–910.

36.

Richardson

(2007) How much did droughts matter? Linking rainfall and GDP growth in Zimbabwe. African Affairs 106(424): 463–478.

37.

Rupiya

(2005) An examination of the role of the National Youth Service/Militia in Zimbabwe and its effect on the electoral process, 2001–2005. Journal of African Elections 4(2): 107–123.

38.

Rutherford

(2008) Conditional belonging: Farmworkers and the cultural politics of recognition in Zimbabwe. Development and Change 39(1): 73–99.

39.

Scoones

Mavedzenge

Murimbarimba

(2019) Young people and land in Zimbabwe: Livelihood challenges after land reform. Review of African Political Economy 46(159): 117–134.

40.

Sedibe

(2019) Exploring traditional male initiates at an initiation school in Limpopo Province, South Africa: Cultural health practice. Advances in Higher Education 3(1): 1–8.

41.

Thebe

(2018) Youth, agriculture and land reform in Zimbabwe: Experiences from a communal area and resettlement scheme in semi-arid Matabeleland, Zimbabwe. African Studies 77(3): 336–353.

42.

Thebe

(2019) Ethnopolitics and regionalism, discipline and punishment: The Matabeleland development question in postcrisis Zimbabwe. In: Mpofu

Ndluvu-Gatsheni

(eds) Rethinking and Unthinking Development: Perspectives on Inequality and Poverty in South Africa and Zimbabwe. New York: Berghahn Books, 152–172.

43.

Thieme

(2013) The ‘hustle’ amongst youth entrepreneurs in Mathare’s informal waste economy. Journal of Eastern African Studies 7(3): 389–412.

44.

Van der Geest

(2010) Rural Youth Employment in Developing Countries: A Global View. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

45.

Waeterloos

Rutherford

(2003) Land reform in Zimbabwe: Challenges and opportunities for poverty reduction among commercial farmworkers. World Development 32(3): 537–553.

46.

White

(2012) Agriculture and the generation problem: Rural youth, employment and the future of farming. IDS Bulletin 43(6): 9–19.

47.

Worby

(2010) Address unknown: The temporality of displacement and the ethics of disconnection among Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg. Journal of Southern African Studies 36(2): 417–431.

48.

Zeilig

(2008) Student politics and activism in Zimbabwe: The frustrated transition. Journal of Asian and African Studies 43(2): 215–237.