Contextualizing Russia and South Asia Relations through Putin’s Look East Policy

Abstract

Since donning the mantle of authority, President Putin has taken actions which have uninhibitedly been geared at reasserting Russia’s hegemony around the world. Putin’s Look East policy stems from his schematic geopolitics, a plan which was formally announced in 2010. Through the prism of Putin’s Look East policy, the paper contextually analyses Russia–South Asia relations, with reference to India and Pakistan. By cross-examining Russia’s official foreign policy documents, the paper establishes why South Asia is paramount to Russia’s economic and geostrategic reassertion. Every new policy has its challenges, and the same holds true for the Look East policy vis-à-vis South Asia. Premised on the unfolding geopolitics in the region, the paper surmises that striking a balance between New Delhi and Islamabad will be problematic for Moscow, just as it has always been for Washington.

Keywords

Putin’s Look East policy Russia–South Asia relations Indo-Russia relations Pakistan–Russia relations Russia’s global reassertiveness

Introduction

The end of the Cold War was not just the dawn of a new era; it also precipitated the lifting of ideological layers and eventually resulted in the renaissance of leadership in the Russian political landscape. President Vladimir Putin rose to the pinnacle of power and became the symbol of Russia’s resurgence in global politics. Since 1999, when he succeeded Boris Yeltsin, Putin has not merely been reshaping and resetting Russia’s power structure, but has been equally invested in rebuilding and restoring the glory of an empire that had supposedly collapsed with time (Gel’man and Starodubtsev, 2016; Kanet, 2007; Leahy, 2000; Stent, 2008; Stratfor, 2014). Putin’s Look East policy is arguably part of an overarching geopolitical scheme and ‘is largely consistent with historical Russian (and Soviet) thinking about security interests and foreign policy’ (Oliker et al., 2015: 32). This geopolitical analysis reckons with Stratfor’s (2012a) assessments of Russia. While historical factors play a significant role in understanding the external actions of Russia, that alone does not capture the entire picture. Contemporarily, Russia’s political reassertiveness and global influence over the last several years can be situated in the political re-engineering and reconfiguration that characterized the country’s post-Cold War political landscape. Defining the landscape without Putin’s idiosyncrasy, personality cult and domineering leadership style renders any critical study of modern Russia an incomplete assessment. His personality is heavily written on Russia’s public and foreign policy on one hand, and is inextricable from the recent Russian economic resurgence and growth on the other (Aleksashenko, 2012; Hancock, 2007; Myers, 2015; Oliker et al., 2015: 8–9; Stuermer, 2009; Van Herpen, 2015).

Long before the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was an important player in the east. Its influence in the region went beyond ideologically supporting the pro-Soviet Union or socialist governments, but also included diplomatic and socio-economic cooperation. While the end of the Cold War consequently dwindled the Soviet Union’s influence globally, it also sapped its sway in the east. However, post-Cold War Russia saw the rise of Putin’s leadership, geared at rewriting Russian history and at regaining Russia’s lost influence the world over. Interestingly, Putin’s schematic geopolitics and his craving for the east is principally reflected through his Look East policy, a plan long nurtured but formally announced only in 2010 (Storey, 2015).

Unlike the US ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy or the East Asia Strategy, Putin’s Look East policy is far-reaching and encompassing, incorporating the breadth of all that comes under the definition of Asia. This comes amidst the growing pre-eminence of China and at a time when Beijing is hoping to repeat the Flying Geese Model which is an industrial and technological development model designed by Kaname Akamatsu, a Japanese economist, in the 1930s, that only came to prominence in the 1980s. The model encompasses a ‘catching-up’ process of industrialization in latecomer economies. Launched by Japan in the 1980s to propel and enhance industrial and technological development amongst Southeast Asian countries, it envisions Japan at the head, as the leader, while other ‘geese’ follow on the path of industrial and technological development being shown to them (Fang, 2015: 74–75; Kojima, 2000; Korhonen, 1994: 95; Poon and Rigby, 2017: 105). Russia is returning to this region even as China entertains hopes of acting as the leader showing the way, and thus is entering a game of either confrontation or cooperation with other regional and global actors (Kolotov, 2008; Mankoff, 2015).

Putin’s Look East policy has generated a plethora of writing and discursive geopolitical debates. Yet, if one is asked to condense the debates and underscore the pivotal themes, it will not be surprising to say that the Look East policy encapsulates Russia’s calculated effort to rebrand itself, expand its diplomatic and political tentacles, gain more economic clout, look beyond traditional European markets and, most importantly, mark a niche for a country that needed to reaffirm its global relevance and regain its lost superpower status.

Ideologically, Putin’s Look East policy should be seen through the lens of three strands within the competitive kaleidoscopic makeup of the Russian policymaking circle in post-Cold War Russia. The three strands, namely liberal westernism, fundamental nationalism and pragmatic nationalism, envision Russia differently, but not without a certain degree of overlap. While the pragmatic nationalist espouses a balanced vision for Russia’s foreign policy, the other two strands believe Russia is as relevant as ever and not ill-prepared to rebrand itself and mark a niche in the evolving globalized world (Charnysh, 2009: 32). President Putin’s Look East policy arguably resonates with the other two.

Before the official announcement of Putin’s Look East policy, Russia-eastward policy had always been primarily Sino-centric. For fear of living in the shadow of China and being a lesser, dependent partner, Putin’s Kremlin opted for a broader policy that spans from Southeast to South Asia, up to the Middle East. Since 2010, when Putin’s Look East policy was formally announced, it has repeatedly been placing significant emphasis on the ‘exceptional economic growth displayed by China and India’ (Mahajan, 2018) and has accorded importance to the emerging economies of the Asia Pacific and South Asian regions (Storey, 2015: 1–10). Countries in these regions constitute a sizeable proportion of the ‘Post-China16’ (PC16) economies identified by George Friedman (2013). Caught in a cobweb of US and China competition in East and Southeast Asia, Russia’s strategy in the region transcends mere rivalry of great powers, but aims at maintaining the status quo: the balance of forces between the major powers, a renewing of ties with traditional allies, and the creation of a niche for itself in an energy net-importing region (Friedman, 2013). Pundits of geopolitics would further argue that the impetus for Russia’s Look East policy was Moscow’s bid to lessen dependence on the west, guard itself against the impact of falling oil prices and seek markets through multilateral trade deals and cooperation for the pressurized Russian energy and military hardware economy (Pant, 2017a).

Adding to the discourse, Alexander Lukin does not dispute the Sino-centrism that has long shaped Russian relations in the region, though he adds that the relations were predicated on achieving ‘international order, based on the idea of global multipolarism . . . favoring the current system of international law’ through a promising international organization like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) under the banner of the United Nations (UN) (Lukin, 2012: 2).

The vitality of Putin’s Look East policy merits a broader understanding, particularly in two parallel contexts. First, the Look East policy resonates with Russia’s foreign economic policy, which does not only aim at enabling a favorable economic environment and attendant conditions for Russia, but also seeks to mark a niche for Russia in the progressively globalized economy. Hence, tapping into a foreign market (eastern market) that transcends countries once under the Russian sphere of influence is a calculated move pursued by the Putin administration in an attempt to ensure socio-economic and political stability (at home) and maintain considerable high approval among the growing Russian middle class. Second, given how western powers have a long tradition of engaging countries the world over – systematically proceeding to serenade semi-autocratic, semi-democratic and autocratic regimes in different parts of the world – it must be asked whether Russia’s choice to emulate the actions of others warrants any serious concern. Though Russia, under Putin, strives to reap the dividends of globalization and reassert Russian influence, looking eastward is likely to generate some concerns among critics and skeptics, critical of Russia’s global pursuits. Lately, certain western countries have considered Moscow’s machinations and global outreach as threats to their sovereign integrity that must be stopped (Berlinger and Dos Santos, 2018; Crerar et al., 2018; Jamieson, 2018; Volz and Gardner, 2018). This, in turn, gives birth to the question of whether any containment of Russia is still a possibility (Poghosyan, 2018). While Russia would reject such insinuation, recent hegemonic displays by Moscow in Ukraine, Syria, Montenegro and beyond the former Soviet space raise geopolitical and geostrategic concerns and give one reason to assume that Moscow is either resurrecting its Cold War status or is bent on redefining its position in the ever-growing global political landscape (Mahmood and Baloch, 2013: 54).

When looking into the larger canvas of Putin’s Look East policy, it might not be difficult to fathom that Moscow is reassessing its relationships with several countries in the Middle East, Southeast and South Asia. Long-established relationships with Syria and Iran have been subjected to varying degrees of geopolitical stresses. Steering the Syrian crisis by protecting Bashar Asad’s presidency and supporting Iran’s nuclear program and ambition within the framework of international consensus has served to satiate Russia’s Middle East policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). Hence, it is pertinent to pay serious attention to Russia’s larger eastward policy, with the aspect of South Asia demanding closer scrutiny in order to ensure that events in the region do not pose a great and direct threat to Russia’s national and security interests (Younus, 2018).

Why South Asia?

Moscow’s increasing romance with South Asian countries is not an isolated development, but rather a carefully calibrated policy decision that stems from the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Russian Federation to 2020 (Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018) and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (FPCRF) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). Both documents assert that Russia must respond vociferously to the new threats and risks for the development of the individual, society and the state and must act as a guarantor of safe national development through state policy in the field of national security (Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018). Premised on the NSS, it requires no grand leap of the imagination to understand Russia’s global behavior, which is arguably geared at consolidating its influence within and beyond the post-Soviet space. Even though Andrew Kuchins asserted that ‘Russia is currently pursuing a multi-vectored policy in South Asia in response to shifting geopolitical realities’ (2014: 4), Russia–South Asia policy should be understood and judged between what Moscow says and does, though the policy rationale is ‘in full recognition of the fundamentally new geopolitical situation in the world’ (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, nd). Therefore, Putin’s Look East policy is one of the manifestations of the Russian Federation’s understanding and response to global politics, seemingly cognizant of the Russian NSS’s stance asserting that ‘Russia must implement systemic measures to respond to the changing situation in the world’ (McDermott, 2016).

Like every major power, Russia takes a premium in being one of the players that control and benefit from major water passages. South Asia is indisputably surrounded by important oceanic and sea routes (the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea) that are clearly and understandably important for Russia’s national interest and security as documented in the Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation (Centre for Strategic Assessment and Forecasts, 2001). In a larger context, the increasing pre-eminence of Russia in the region is aimed at overcoming the emerging stagnation in relations with India; Moscow plans to offer its good offices to prevent any confrontation between India and China in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

South Asia presents a glaring niche in most of Russia’s official documents. This underwrites the importance of the region to Russian policymakers and particularly to President Putin, who does not consider South Asia as a far-flung neighbor, but rather as part of its proximal neighborhood. In Russia’s strategic calculations, political instability and conflicts in South Asia carry negative ramifications not just for the neighborhood, but also for international security and Russian interests in both the short and long term (Topychkanov, 2013). According to the NSS, President Putin rejects any insinuation that Russia will take a lukewarm attitude towards global and regional affairs. While addressing regional issues, the document, under articles 11 and 18, underlines South Asia as one of the hotspots of global tension, requiring Moscow’s closer attention – and hence Putin’s Look East policy:

International attention to the long-term perspective will be focused on the possession of energy sources, including in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and in other areas of the Arctic, in the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflicts in the Middle East, in many countries in South Asia and Africa, on the Korean Peninsula will continue to harm the international situation in the medium term.

(Article 11, Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018).

The practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes and provoking intrastate instability and conflicts is becoming increasingly widespread. In addition to the persisting seats of tension in the Near and Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula, new ‘hot spots‘ are emerging, and zones that are not controlled by any states’ authorities are expanding. Territories affected by armed conflicts are becoming the basis for the spread of terrorism, interethnic strife, religious enmity, and other manifestations of extremism. The emergence of the terrorist organization calling itself Islamic State and the strengthening of its influence is the result of the policy of double standards to which some states adhere in the sphere of the fight against terrorism.

(Article 18, Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018)

Other than India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran were two other Islamic countries within the neighborhood of South Asia mentioned in the same policy:

The persisting instability in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of all but a few international contingents poses a major security threat to Russia and other members of the CIS. The Russian Federation, together with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, other interested States and relying on the possibilities offered by the UN, CIS, CSTO, SCO and other international organizations will be consistent in its efforts to resolve as soon as possible the problems this country is facing while respecting rights and legitimate interests of all ethnic groups living in its territory so that it can enter post-conflict recovery as a sovereign, peaceful, neutral State with a sustainable economy and political system. Implementing comprehensive measures to mitigate the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan against other States, including neighboring countries, as well as eliminate or substantially reduce illicit production and trafficking of narcotic drugs is an integral part of these efforts. Russia is committed to further intensifying UN-led international efforts aimed at helping the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and its neighboring States counter these challenges.

(Article 97, Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018)

The dynamic of post-Cold War and 9/11

The Look East policy exposes the political dynamics in the region in many ways. First, it unveils that Russia is not a dead polar bear; it remains a formidable player in areas that have undergone a great deal of US influence. Second, the policy enunciates the strategic motives of Moscow in instrumentalizing certain countries in the region to leverage the US and the west; this holds particularly true for Indo-Russia relations. Irrespective of the dimensions and intensity in Indo-US relations since the end of the Cold War, New Delhi will always be prudent and wary of making perilous decisions that could either undermine Moscow’s interests or jeopardize its strategic cooperation and interest with the west, particularly Washington. Third, the policy exposes the importance of some countries to Russia’s commercial interests. Aside from being the top buyer of Russian weapons, New Delhi holds the equally essential status of being the second-largest trade partner of Russia across the Middle East and South Asia. No country in South Asia comes ahead of India in terms of trade and commerce with Russia. According to the data of the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, the trade volume between India and Russia stands around $8.3bn, which is conspicuously far behind $132bn trade volume between the US and India (Pant, 2017b; Economic Times, 2019). Table 1 spells out the figures from 2009–2010 to 2019.

Table 1.

India’s total imports from and exports to Russia (in US$m).

Year	Total imports	Total imports from Russia	Total exports	Total exports to Russia
2009–2010	288,372	3566	178,751	980,69
2010–2011	369,769	3600	249,816	1689
2011–2012	489,31	4764	305,964	1778
2012–2013	490,736	4231	300,400	2296
2013–2014	450,199	3894	314,405	2121
2014–2015	448,033	4249	310,338	2097
2015–2016	381,006	4585	262,290	1588
2016–2017	384,357	5552	275,852.	1937
2017–2018	465,581	8574	303,526	2113
2018–2019	514,078	5840	330,078	2390

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Government of India (nd).

Fourth, the policy re-echoes Lord Palmerston’s understanding of international affairs when in the 19th century he claimed: ‘states have no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests’ (Kung, 1998: 10). It is true that regardless of the animosity between Pakistan and Russia at the end of the Afghan war, interests override sentiments. The instrumental role of Pakistan in purging Russia out of Afghanistan remains an indelible historical fact, yet the unfolding Pakistan–Russia relations corroborate and underscore Lord Palmerston’s sentiment and demonstrate how interests shape and reshape relations amongst states.

Indo-Russia relations

India remains the undisputed ‘big brother’ of the South Asian region in many respects. It also has a long history of partnership with Moscow. At the dawn of independence, the geopolitical reality in the region presented India with the premise to ally with the Soviet Union. The nexus of Sino-Pakistan and Pakistan–US strategic cooperation on the one hand, and the Indian leadership’s disposition for socialist agenda and Sino-India unfriendliness on the other, incentivized a perfect alliance between the Soviet Union and India. This occurred at a time when India claimed to be one of the forerunners of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which was against global ideological polarization and imperialism. Over several decades, the Indo-Russian relationship has undoubtedly demonstrated that the two nations enjoy robust bilateral cooperation. Successive Russian policy towards the region, especially towards India, demonstrates the depth of the cooperation. For instance, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev, believed that ‘Russia had evolved its South Asian policy with India as an epicenter’ (Pramod, 1990: 29). The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and Soviet support for India during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan lend ineffaceable proof of the Indo-Russia ties (Mahajan, 2018; Mahmood and Baloch, 2013).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the unceremonious purge of Russia from the region, particularly the exit from Afghanistan, never amounted to the total evaporation of Russia’s sway in the same way. Through sustained Indo-Russia relations, Moscow kept its presence alive and hence any discussion of Putin’s Look East policy is rooted in the annals of the region’s history (Stratfor, 2012b). At the dawn of the 21st century, Indo-Russia cooperation reached a new height in the form of a strategic partnership that later morphed into a ‘special and privileged partnership’ in 2010 (Sajjanhar, 2016). To embody and embolden the latter, Russia believes India is worthy of accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), despite the unreserved reservations of China and Pakistan towards New Delhi being granted membership (Jacob, 2018).

Russia is one of the major suppliers of weapons to many countries and India is at the forefront of its clientele. For time to come, Russia will continue to have a salient preponderance in the Indian arms market at a rapid scale and to an extent that the US and other weapon exporters would have to muster sizeable effort to match up with Russia in the Indian arms economy. Therefore, Russia’s Look East policy and particularly Indo-Russia relations will be shaped by prudence and caution; losing the Indian market would be tantamount to huge loss and cast a severe impact on the Russian defense industry (Stratfor, 2016). Russia has promised New Delhi unadulterated relations irrespective of the unfolding realities in the region (Joshi, 2017). Indo-Russia cooperation has never been confined to arms sales; it has always been multifaceted cooperation. Both countries have steadily worked together at both global and regional levels. At the UN, Russia has been an advocate of India’s bid for the Security Council’s permanent seat (Jabeen, 2010: 243). Similarly, Russia’s support for India’s accession to the SCO does not stem from ill-judgment, but it is a part of a larger strategy to balance the equation of power within the organization – an argument which holds equally true for Pakistan vis-à-vis its relations with China. While Indo-Russia cooperation also includes collaborative efforts to contain conflict in South Asia from escalating beyond the region, Russia, under the leadership of Putin, believes that the Indo-Russia relations can be upgraded to creating a poly-centric world (Pant, 2006; Topychkanov, 2013). Such upgrading will, in Russia’s view, pen countless opportunities between the two countries and eventually result in the fulfillment of projects such as the North–South Corridor Project (Russian International Affairs Council, 2018).

An excerpt from the NSS underscores the special status of India to the Russian Federation. Article 94 of the NSS states: ‘The Russian Federation assigns the privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India an important role’ (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015). Article 85 of the FPCRF unequivocally elaborates the partnership as cooperation that matters to the federation:

Russia is committed to further strengthening its special privileged partnership with the Republic of India based on shared foreign policy priorities, historical friendship, and deep mutual trust, as well as strengthening cooperation on urgent international issues and enhancing mutually beneficial bilateral ties in all areas, primarily in trade and economy, with a focus on implementing long-term cooperation programs approved by the two countries.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016)

In addition to how the Russian Federation sees India and in the context of Russia and South Asia relations, article 25 of the FPCRF places India in the bracket of regional powers having the propensity to contribute to global governance and leadership:.

Russia attaches great importance to ensuring the sustainable manageability of global development, which requires collective leadership from the major States that should be representative in geographic and civilization terms and fully respect the central and coordinating role of the UN. To these ends, Russia has been expanding its ties with its partners within the Group of Twenty, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and the Republic of South Africa), the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), RIC (Russia, India, and China) alongside other organizations and dialogue platforms.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016)

Russia will increase cooperation in such multilateral formats as the G8, the G20, RIC (Russia, India, and China), BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), as well as use the capabilities of other informal international institutions.

(Article 13, Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018)

Though the two countries have registered a high level of diplomatic and strategic cooperation, varying degrees of setbacks continue to exert pressure on the evolving relationship; hence the anxiety embedded in headlines such as ‘Relations with Delhi souring’ and ‘Has Russia lost patience with India?’ (Soami, 2018; Topychkanov, 2013). Similarly, the withdrawal of New Delhi from an ‘11-year joint program to develop a 5th generation fighter jet with Russia’ came as a huge surprise for any close observer of India–Russia relations (Gady, 2018). The apprehension feeds on the growing sentiment and suspicion that the India-centric policy of Russia is dwindling and is further complicated by the recent developments in Pakistan–Russia relations on the one hand and Moscow’s renewal of attention towards Afghanistan on the other (Pant, 2017b).

Pakistan–Russia relations

At the earliest stage of its independence, Pakistan was faced with enormous existential threats and, hence, had to devise an ideological-cum-pragmatic niche in global affairs. For its survival and strategic positioning, the new state rationally decided to align closely with US global and regional interests. Pakistan played a significant role in the strategic alliance of Cold War politics through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The strategic cooperation was a clear-cut policy meant to safeguard and ensure the survival of Pakistan, and, by extension, show Soviet Russia the cold shoulder. Pakistan’s choice of a US-led alliance over the USSR transcended a rational decision; it demonstrated how Pakistan had to respond to the then – global wave of realpolitik on account of the ideological – bipolar world order. Since the choice of allying with the US was precipitated by Pakistan’s strategic and existential necessities, this made Pakistan dependent on the US security umbrella. In return, Pakistan acted as a proxy to protect US strategic interest and containment policy in South Asia vis-à-vis India–Soviet relations; and Russia’s incursion into Afghanistan. As the Cold War wound down and the Soviet Union suffered defeat in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategic utility to the US also dwindled, and eventually the US abandoned its non-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally (Akhtar, 2011: 9; Javaid, 2010: 67). The utility of Pakistan re-emerged as the US sought to advance its policy in the region, particularly in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. The actualization of that policy demanded that Pakistan should be an effective and crucial partner in the US-led war on terror (Fair et al., 2010). Such oscillation in US–Pakistan relations explicates why some political observers dubbed the relations between the two ‘a marriage of convenience’: momentary, inconsistent and thus a disenchanted alliance (Kux, 2001; Shakoor, 2001). Ordinarily and understandably, the strategic alliance between the US and Pakistan in the 1950s, 1960s and even 1970s became an impetus for Indo-Soviet relations.

Few observers argue that Pakistan’s relations with Russia have always been shaped through the lens of the US and India (Mahmood and Baloch, 2013). While such an assertion might carry some semblance of truth, the current unfolding realities (Pakistan–Russia relations) in the region reinforce the nuance and flexibility in geopolitics. Moscow is redefining its relations with Islamabad vis-à-vis the compelling realities in Afghanistan – the search for peace in the war-ridden country. In December 2016, China, Pakistan and Russia held a trilateral meeting with a focus on finding a mutually acceptable solution to the protracted Afghan conflict (Pant, 2017b). If Pakistan had been instrumental in shattering the Soviet Union’s image in the region during the 1980s, the same Pakistan can strategically be useful for Russia’s interest broadly in South Asia and particularly in Afghanistan. In terms of Pakistan’s strategic importance and its relevance to Russia, Korybko (2015) referred to Pakistan as the ‘zipper of Pan Eurasian Integration’ – situated in a location that strategically integrates the three regions of South, Central and West Asia ‘through which the future of oil supplies of Moscow can be guaranteed’ (Kaushiki, 2019: 49). Other than that, Pakistan has also strategically approved the use of Gwadar by Russia. Through Gwadar, Pakistan will be connected to Russia through Afghanistan and Central Asia (Kaushiki, 2019: 52). With particular reference to Afghanistan, Kabulov acknowledged Pakistan as ‘a key regional player to negotiate with’. Such acknowledgment further underscores how much Islamabad can contribute to the fulfillment of Russia’s strategic interest in the region (Kaura, 2018).

Additionally, the recent diplomatic and strategic romance between Islamabad and Moscow is generating serious concerns within and outside the region, particularly in Washington, as Pakistan–Russia relations find convergence with larger China’s interest in the region and beyond. This may also be construed by Washington through the prism of realignment and realization by Islamabad for an alternative ally other than Washington, whilst for India, Pakistan–Russia relations herald suspicion and apprehension that years of exclusive Indo-Russia affability are drawing to a close (Mahajan, 2018). For Pakistan, Russia’s rebalancing in Asia (Putin’s pivot to Asia – Putin’s Look East policy) is a welcome development, especially amidst growing US–Pakistan strained relations. Looking at the flip side of these strained relations, both Moscow and Islamabad can harness the situation to their advantage in a couple of ways. One, the US–Pakistan strained relations present Russia with an opportunity to cautiously draw closer to Islamabad. Two, they equally offer Islamabad a relief and a propensity to act beyond the shadow of Washington. Between the two countries, there has been a gradual upsurge in the curve of defense cooperation, marking the diversification of the Pakistan–Russia cooperation which also includes Pakistan’s arms imports from Russia.

In 2014, the two countries inked a defense cooperation agreement during the high-level visit of the Russian Defense Minister, Sergey Shoygu, to Islamabad. This was soon followed by the participation of Kalashnikov Concern (a Russian defense manufacturing concern and joint-stock company) in the trials of the new assault rifle for Pakistan’s infantry. A joint and friendly military exercise dubbed ‘DRUZHBA – Friendship’ was held in Mineralnye Vody, Russia’s North Caucasus Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia, in 2017, and in Cherat, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan, in 2018, and these events made international headlines. In addition to US-made weapons, Pakistan’s military arsenal now includes Russia’s Klimov RD-93 engine which is instrumental in the making of JF-17 Thunder aircraft, a multi-role fighter, co-produced and developed by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (PAC/CAC) (Jalalzai, 2017: 43). Originally, the RD-93 engine was one of China’s procurements from Russia, bound by a clause that requires Beijing to seek Moscow’s permission before re-exporting to a third country. However, given the depth of Sino-Pakistani relations, Beijing supplied Islamabad with the engine. Even when India categorically protested the deal as a violation of the end-user agreement between Russia and China, Moscow eventually lifted the clause and thus the Russia–Pakistan agreement that permits Islamabad to directly buy the Klimov RD-93 engine from Russia for use in its domestically manufactured JF-17 fighter jet (Ansari, 2015; Gady, 2015; Purushothaman, 2015; Stratfor, 2018). Similarly, the purchase of Russian-made Mi-35 Attack Helicopters by Pakistan further consolidates its military hardware cooperation with Moscow (Moskalenko and Topychkanov, 2014: 10). Expanding its military hardware economy arguably allows Moscow to try to circumvent the pressure of sanctions placed on the Russian economy following the Crimean annexation.

Cooperation between the two transcends the realm of defense; it also includes other significant forms of cooperation such as the Pakistan–Russia economic deal signed in 2015. The $2bn deal was aimed ‘to develop a 1,100-kilometer gas pipeline from Karachi to Lahore – the largest economic deal between the two countries since the Soviet Union built the Pakistan Steel Mills in the 1970s’ (Younus, 2018). Two years earlier, in 2013, Moscow had expressed its willingness to upgrade the same steel mills. In a similar direction, Moscow has been equally interested in the Muzaffargarh power project with the intent of transforming the station from oil and gas to coal energy (Azeemi, 2017). At present, the trade volume between Islamabad and Moscow is struggling to achieve a firmer footing. Alarmingly, Moscow has no place among the top 10 export countries from Pakistan (Uroos, 2017), though recently, both countries have shown determination to facilitate greater and deeper economic and commercial cooperation. Figure 1 indicates where trade between the two countries stands.

Figure 1.

Pakistan–Russia trade statistics.

Since 2013, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been celebrated as presenting Pakistan with colossal economic benefits, although, more importantly, the corridor equally underpins the importance of Pakistan’s strategic location and capacity to contribute to the global economy through its transitory vantage point. Other than China, Russia is also cognizant of Pakistan’s transitory niche and pivotal position in the South Asia neighborhood. Pakistan’s neighbors, namely Afghanistan and the Central Asian States, are historically – and to date – strategically important for Russia. This is also true for the part of China that is neighbor to Pakistan. By this account, Pakistan is the heart of the region, for both Russia and China. It is thus not surprising that Moscow expresses interest in being part of China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), which will allow it, by extension, to gain access to the warm waters where Gwadar port is situated (Mustafa and Zaafir, 2016). Through the participation of Russia in CPEC, Pakistan–Russia cooperation might eventually be further cemented and consequently lead to the trilateral cooperation of China–Pakistan-Russia. The eventual alliance of the three carries huge economic and commercial advantages for all parties, as it holds the potential of easing trade barriers between Russia and Pakistan, increasing the trade volume between the two countries, and in due course bringing Pakistan more proximal to Russia’s market. Strategically, the question remains whether Pakistan should be wary of Russia’s resurgent interest in Afghanistan. While the experience of the Cold War between the two countries might be hard to forget (Topychkanov, 2017), the unfolding reality (new Russo-Pak romance) could dilute such apprehension, most particularly when both countries are mutually working to benefit from a peaceful Afghanistan. Considering the mutuality between Islamabad and Moscow, Pakistan would be benefiting from Moscow’s technology and industrial help; Moscow, meanwhile, will be fulfilling its obsession with warm seawaters through Pakistan’s Gwadar port, if the geostrategic analysis of certain observers is to be considered (Hilali, 2005; Jamil, 2017; Moskalenko and Topychkanov, 2014). Against this backdrop, Pakistan will be within the bracket of countries that satiates Russia’s strategic motives. While India is contributing to Russia’s weapon industry, Pakistan conversely will be fulfilling the strategic and long-term Russian inclination for warm waters, which dates back to Peter the Great (Girardet, 1985: 27). Therefore, closer Islamabad–Moscow ties are neither coincidental nor a novel idea attributable to Putin.

Another strategic issue for Pakistan, other than Gwadar, is the protracted Kashmir conflict. It remains a matter for further research whether the burgeoning Pakistan–Russia relations can mark a shift in Moscow–Kashmir policy. On the lingering Kashmir conflict, Pakistan will have to work arduously to convince Russia not just for a rethink, but on how best the Kashmir conflict can secure a peaceful resolution. For too long, the position of the Russian foreign ministry has been that the status quo around the Line of Control (LOC) should be maintained and that neither Pakistan nor India should lose anything as per the prevailing situation. Even during the Cold War, the Soviet Union never relented to vetoing UN resolutions aimed at undermining India’s position on Kashmir (Kaura, 2018: 63). Meanwhile, the recent revocation of articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution exacerbates an already volatile issue (Al Jazeera, 2019; Malek, 2004). While Moscow might seemingly claim neutrality, its position vis-à-vis the Kashmir conflict is entangled in Moscow–New Delhi shared economic interest, regarding which there is no indication of Moscow being desirous of fundamentally jeopardizing the burgeoning economic cooperation. This offers an explanation as to the difficulty for Moscow to either act as an impartial mediator or counsel New Delhi for Kashmiri’s freedom and independence. Moscow’s position on Kashmir, however, exposes its double standards. Elsewhere in Abkhazia – Georgia, Crimea, Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic – Ukraine and Moldova, Russia has been actively supporting separatism, even though under Russian criminal law, separatism is a criminal offense (Luhn, 2014).

As aforesaid, a comprehensive picture of Russia–South Asia policy would be wanting without understanding and judging Moscow between what is said, written and done. Regardless of the latest developments in Pakistan–Russia relations, the following section presents excerpts from official Russian documents enunciating Russia’s perspective on Pakistan.

While the NSS has generally marked Pakistan as one of the hotspots of tension, in contrast, the FPCRF particularly considered Pakistan as a country where a terrorist threat is imminent. It further elucidated that Russia was not just seriously concerned, but also closely monitors the situation. Article 15 of FPCRF states:

The global terrorist threat has reached a new high with the emergence of the Islamic State international terrorist organization and similar groups that have descended to an unprecedented level of cruelty in their violence. They aspire to create their state and seek to consolidate their influence on a territory stretching from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean to Pakistan. The main effort in combating terrorism should be aimed at creating a broad international counter-terrorism coalition with a solid legal foundation, one that is based on effective and consistent inter-State cooperation without any political considerations or double standards, above all to prevent terrorism and extremism and counter the spread of radical ideas.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016)

In the interest of the burgeoning relations, both countries would have to mutually cooperate on issues of terrorism and extremism, given the intersection of development and political stability. While Russia is critical of seeing conflict in the region transmigrate into the border of Russia, it is also imperative for Islamabad to showcase itself as an economic and commerce-friendly country, where the menace of insurgency and militancy would not constitute a threat to potential foreign investors. Nonetheless, Putin’s Look East policy presents Pakistan with an opportunity to reset its foreign policy objectives and interests. The policy accords Pakistan a certain degree of introspection; if Pakistan has failed to achieve certain national and strategic objectives through Russia in the past (Hussain, 2012), such failure and miscalculation can be corrected and redeemed in view of Pakistan’s future approach towards Russia. Therefore, Pakistan should seize the opportunity of the Look East policy for sustainable Islamabad–Moscow relations. One area of serious attention should be the resuscitation of the Dushanbe Four Initiative (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia and Tajikistan – PART). With the Look East policy, Pakistan must not only satiate its national interest, but utilize it to diffuse the perception that Islamabad is regionally and globally isolated. Working with Russia as a member of the SCO will invariably raise the profile of Islamabad as a country strategically equipped to help resolve the protracted conflict in Afghanistan and to facilitate the induction of Russia into the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).

Challenges to the Look East policy

Putin’s Look East policy would not be altogether insulated from the following challenges:

Since the Look East policy is geared at competing, rebranding and making some gains for Russia, it will be confronted by a certain degree of challenge. For instance, at the global level, Russia has consented to participate in China’s BRI projects, and regionally, Moscow plans to join the CPEC, the flagship project of the BRI. Regionally, CPEC highlights the importance of Pakistan and accords the latter huge benefits, though since the inception of CPEC and its mother project (BRI) India has remained critical of the entire project, considered as China’s geopolitical and geo-economic strategy to undermine New Delhi’s strategic interest. The position of Russia is critical in this scenario. While Russia is part of the Chinese project, one of its very important economic partners (India) is not, though Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has implored New Delhi to set apart politics from the economic gains BRI or CPEC will be offering (Miglani, 2017).

Even when Moscow is part of the Chinese BRI and there are talks of a ‘strategic triangle’ comprising China–India –Russia, it is not unlikely to see the divergence of interest amongst the three, especially on how best to steer the region. Individual national interest will ever remain a defining factor that would determine whether these states would pursue a common or divergent regional policy. Besides, the Look East policy could add to the apprehension over Russia’s interests in the world. Such fear might not be unfounded, given Russia’s recent imperialist proclivity in its neighborhood and elsewhere around the world. Therefore, it is in Russia’s best interest to allay any insinuation of imperialist policy in the region.

Moscow needs to come up with a clear-cut policy that is easily and clearly understood by players in the region; otherwise, the Look East policy will remain a vague policy, short-term in nature, and with the dubious potential to irritate existing regional equations.

Moscow will have to compete harder to convince the eastern (Asian) countries of its friendliness and positive intentions for healthy cooperation and development.

Countries in the region need to be assured and reassured that Russia will not be making U-turns. Certain analysis considers the Look East policy as the product of pressure that Russia is facing. Hence, when the pressure evaporates, would Moscow rescind its commitment to the region? Similarly, under external (third party) pressure, should Pakistan expect a new (unfriendly) face of Russia, as was the case with Moscow–Tehran relations where a third party swayed Moscow against Tehran?

Maintaining a deeper connection will have to mature over time. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, former communist countries have not disengaged entirely (in politics, diplomacy and economy) from Moscow; therefore, there is some degree of influence and Moscow still weighs amongst these nations. This might be uniquely different in the case of the non-communist states; Moscow has to deal with that within its Look East policy.

As an integral part of the east, South Asia is an important region for Putin’s eastward policy. The mentioning of South Asia in various Russian strategic documents does not just signal the importance but equally underlines the strategic niche of the region in Russia’s overall global objective. Regardless of the dividends the eastward policy presents, one thing is clear: striking a balance between New Delhi and Islamabad will be as problematic for Moscow as it has always been for Washington.

Given the depth of the US’ and China’s influence in the region, with the Look East policy Moscow will have to muster more strength and be pragmatic to convince countries that it can make a difference.

Conclusion

Remaining in the corridor of power and steering the foreign policy of Russia in a particular direction has greatly influenced Putin’s strategic worldview. The dividends of such foreign policy have overwhelmingly influenced Russia’s domestic and international politics. On both fronts, Putin’s political stamina has been strengthened. As a consequence of Moscow’s foreign policy, its economy is grappling with sanctions imposed by western powers which have increased the urgency to secure alternative markets. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Russia decided to look eastward and is romancing the emerging economic powerhouses in the east. Beyond economic and trade relations, looking eastward is a concerted attempt by Moscow to revive its traditional (ideological) relationship with the east. In addition to the ideological fraternity that characterized the Cold War era, the region was a traditional recipient of Russia’s weapons and other forms of facilitation.

For India, Putin’s eastward policy is promising and might deepen the existing multi-vector nature of Indo-Russia relations. Conversely, the growing Pakistan–Russia ties further prove that efforts to isolate Pakistan have been less efficacious. Against all odds and amidst determined efforts to regionally and internationally isolate Pakistan, Islamabad has refused to be cowed; rather, it has stood tall and resolute, and demonstrated its resilience to weather all forces bent at undermining its national integrity and interest. Arguably, both Pakistan–China and Pakistan–Russia relations are indicative of this reality. Though Putin’s Look East policy for South Asia has been largely reduced to India and Pakistan, it is interesting to note that other countries in the region have been equally touched by the wave of the policy, most especially the increasing interest of Russia in Afghanistan (Mahajan, 2018). Arguably, India and Pakistan are two important tools for regional and international players. During the 1950s and 1960s, the US inducted Pakistan into its strategic realm. The strategic cooperation of the Cold War era helped Washington to consolidate its position against Soviet communism in the region. The same is true for the Indo-US strategic partnership in the post-Cold War era – a partnership tailored to encircle China’s influence and checkmate the long-standing Indo-Russia relations. It is not unlikely that the Indo-Russia pact is another strategic calculus meant to counterbalance the US and Chinese interests in South Asia, respectively. The recent Pakistan–Russia new beginning shares the same motive, though, more to fill the increasing vacuum in Pakistan–US relations. It is undeniable that more concerted and consolidated Pakistan–Russia relations will take considerable time to blossom, whilst the already cemented Moscow–New Delhi relations will always be a crucial and deciding factor. In current geopolitics and geo-economics, New Delhi presents a much more valuable partner than Islamabad, and there is no sign of Moscow wanting to alienate India to consolidate its friendship with Islamabad. Yet, by and large, India and Pakistan both fit well into the strategic toolbox of regional and international powers.

Footnotes

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Najimdeen Bakare

Author biography

Najimdeen Bakare is currently teaching at the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) National University of Sciences and Technology Islamabad. In addition to observing Great Power politics in the global south, he is also interested in the politics of European Union and the issues of European Muslims.

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