Turkey’s Foreign Policy to Africa: The Role of Leaders’ Identity in Shaping Policy

Abstract

The shift in bearing on the traditional status quo Turkish foreign policy orientation has recently been studied through various approaches commonly associated with changing trends, to seek the theoretical and methodological pillars that underpin the state’s policy behaviours towards new regions, including Africa. Accordingly, over the last two decades, ideas, linguistic constructs, identity, and religious and cultural factors have been added to an overarching and homogenous vision of Turkish foreign policy. Although identity-based theoretical studies explain dynamic changes in the Turkish foreign policy paradigm towards new regions, several of them fail to touch on how Turkish identities are translated into state policy. This article aims to address this by arguing that the effect of personality and leadership on the policymaking process of Turkey has become more visible over the last two decades, in tune with Turkey’s identity (neo-Ottomanism, Islam), which then evolves into state policies. The article opens avenues for further academic studies on two fronts. It accounts for the theoretical background of Turkey’s attachment to Africa through a constructivist approach, while responding to how Turkey’s identities are translated into state practice, an issue not sufficiently addressed in current literature.

Keywords

Constructivism foreign policy neo-Ottomanism Africa identity

Introduction

Perceptions of Turkey’s foreign policy (TFP) orientation are firmly entrenched in orthodox international relations (IR) theories, from realism to liberalism, as well as their neo-variants. Since 2000, however, the mainstream explanation of TFP has not only been challenged at the systemic-, but also at the implementation level. Accordingly, several academic studies now commonly acknowledge a changing trend of this process by focusing on new regions, including Africa. Turkey’s Africa policy in the post-2000s represents a stark deviation from mainstream foreign policy, as Africa had hitherto failed to register on the TFP radar. Despite being classified as an Afro-Eurasian state, Turkey’s outreach to Africa was late to awaken, since Africa was considered geographically distant and economically stagnant, as well as secondary to its foreign policy priorities (Afacan, 2013: 10). However, since the beginning of the millennium, Turkey’s Africa policy has undergone profound change, demonstrating considerable enthusiasm after a long hiatus, for following the course it had been on during the Ottoman era. Compared with Turkey’s undulating regional-oriented policy practice in the Middle East and Europe, which moves in a wave-like pattern, TFP towards Africa (sub-Saharan Africa in particular) from 1998 onwards has encapsulated persistence and continuity.

Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy has much broader geographical coverage, as opposed to the initially limited areas included. The driving forces behind this foreign policy transformation have been addressed by several scholars, considered within the frames of systematic change in global politics (Sayari, 2000: 170) to domestic factors (such as European conditionality) (Aydın and Acıkmese, 2007) and security aspects or material interests (Ipek, 2015: 174). The role of leadership, particularly in shaping identity which turns into a state policy as a foreign policy instrument, has been largely ignored. This article argues that the leadership factor, under the Justice and Development Party (JDP)-led government, has influenced change in Turkey’s Africa policy. This argument does not underplay the structural, historical forces in operation that have had a transformative impact on agency in the context of Turkey–Africa relations. However, the political weight of the structural forces (e.g. military or bureaucratic tutelage) has been undermined over the last decades through various instrument guided by the policy actors. The bottom line in this new political landscape is the centralization of power by leader. In this new conjuncture, the role of leaders in policy-making process becomes much clearer. On top of that, ideational forces maintained by the political elites offer a plausible explanation for the change in Turkey’s Africa policy. For the empirical investigation of how leaders’ ideas matter in foreign policymaking, this article has selected the case of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose principled and causal beliefs appear to be the driving forces behind the change in Turkey’s Africa policy.

This article is organized in three parts: it starts with an analysis of the main premises of constructivism by identifying certain assumptions that make this approach stand out from other theories. The aim of this section is to set a theoretical insight for the subsequent discussion, in order to spotlight to what extent Turkey’s Africa policy is compatible with constructivism. The second section highlights the essential pillars of traditional TFP paradigms from various theoretical standpoints and changing contexts. It encapsulates a theoretical analysis of TFP in which positivist and post-positivist approaches’ basic assumptions are underlined with specific reference to Turkey. The third section covers the implications and praxis of the principles of constructivism on TFP orientation. Particular concepts such as Islam, ummah, neo-Ottomanism,¹ and cultural and civilizational hinterlands, perceived by Ahmet Davutoğlu and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a renewed form of the former Ottoman identity into state policy, are underlined in accordance with constructivism. In conclusion, the extent to which the main premises of constructivism converge with or diverge from Turkey’s Africa policy, and how the leadership factor has leveraged Turkey’s neo-Ottoman identity into foreign policy towards Africa is discussed.

Theoretical background: The premises of constructivism

The term constructivism comes from Nicholas Onuf’s seminal work World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Onuf, 1989), which referred broadly to a range of post-positivist perspectives (Dunne et al., 2007: 183). Later, Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (Wendt, 1999) elaborated on this theory and its relationship to other approaches. However, the place of constructivism within IR theories is still contested: whether it is a theory or an approach. Taking the middle ground between rationalism and post-structuralism, Onuf claims that constructivism is not a theory but a way of studying social reality; yet Wendt’s work builds on theory. Accordingly, Finnemore contends that constructivism is a social and not a political theory (Finnemore, 1996: 27) that ‘makes claims about the nature of social life and social change’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393). Despite the English School’s and Copenhagen School’s considerable contribution to its ontological substance, constructivism is still seen as a theoretically informed approach to studying IR. Even though its ontological issues have been questioned, constructivism undoubtedly opened up a new phase in IR theory that had long been set around the state–anarchy–power triplet. However, within the various forms of constructivism, this article in general relies on moderate constructivist premises, particularly the account of Alexander Wendt.

Basically, constructivism claims that the world system is created through the repeated interactions of states and other actors. It focuses on norms, rules, languages, shared ideas and their emergence by social interaction and learning processes (Dunne et al., 2007: 183), rather than as given, or defined by structure. Questioning the social reality of world politics and reversing the causal arrows placed by neorealism and neoliberalism, constructivism tries to reveal the endogenous processes of facts that are socially constructed (Dunne et al., 2007: 182). Therefore, one of the most common notion of Constructivism is that social facts are what we mean and the value attributed to them, and anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992: 391), that is, it is socially constructed and shaped by the beliefs and attitudes of states. States and individuals ‘act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of meanings that the objects have for them’ (Wendt, 1992: 396). That is to say, the social construction of reality emerges through intersubjective meanings. In constructing social facts, Onuf uses the ‘speech act’ in which the social world is constructed through discourse (Onuf, 1989). Thus, language is central in his analysis insofar as it enables humans to construct their social world. If this happens frequently it turns into a rule, so language does not represent reality or describe it, it creates that reality (Onuf, 1989: 183).

Insisting on the fact that interpretations produce social reality, constructivist scholars claim that what makes a material thing what it is, is what meaning the human attributes to that object. For instance, a dollar is simply a piece of paper if a human does not place any value on it. Therefore, it adds a social dimension to Verstehen (a Weberian concept of understanding that refers to the hermeneutic theme) that is missing in rational approaches (Adler, 1997: 326), whereas Fierke sets it on subjective ontology through emphasizing the importance of norms, rules and languages (Dunne et al., 2007: 179). Based on previous assumptions, there are three premises that constructivism makes: states are the principal units of analysis; in the state system the structure is not material but rather intersubjective; and the interest and identity of states are crucial factors in part constructed by social structure, not given exogenously.

Accordingly, Wendt claims that shared ideas, not material objects, constitute the structure of human association. He further notes that ‘national interest and identities of purposive actors are constructed by these respective shared ideas rather than given by nature’ (Wendt, 1999: 1). In fact, the realist notion also emphasizes the importance of national interest; however constructivists disassociate from realism with regard to the point that national interest is not materially defined, accepting that identities are crucial in defining national interest. By the same token, constructivism argues that agency and structure are mutually constituted (Dunne et al., 2007: 182), as agency is influenced by spatial, social and historical contexts. In that sense, state as an agency does not define its policy orientation based on ontological priority.

The most striking issue that constructivism raises is ‘social identity’. The identity of a state prioritizes its interest, which in turn affects its social, political and economic actions. In this regard, Wendt distinguishes between corporate and social identity, which are two different facets of agent identity. Unlike corporate identity, where material, ideological, human and cultural factors are core issues that set the identity of a state, social identity refers to role, status or personality that global society ascribes to a state, being constructed through interactions at the global level (Wendt, 1994: 385). According to Wendt, identities are relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self. They exist in a socially constructed world. In short; ‘actors do not have a portfolio of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead they define their interests in the process of defining situations’ (Wendt, 1992: 398).

Analysis of Turkish foreign policy through constructivism

TFP has long been analysed by rationalist paradigms such as realism or liberalism (and their neo-variants). The work of prominent scholars, such as Tarik Oğuzlu’s realist perspective (Oğuzlu, 2007) and Fuat Keyman’s liberal left (Keyman, 2010), can be framed within positivist explanations for the TFP praxis. In fact, the realist-oriented TFP was sourced from exogenous (Turkish War of Independence) and endogenous (domestic revolts in the early days of the Republic) factors. Oran claims that there are two fundamental pillars to TFP (Oran, 2009: 46): the first is the status quo policy, which aims to protect the existing borders of Turkey, and the second is pursuing a balance of power within the global system. Therefore, balance of power, fear, threat, alliance, interest, foe and security have always been major factors in shaping the frame of TFP. Similar to foreign policy, Turkish political identity has a mutually constitutive relationship between (in)security and identity (Bilgin, 2009: 112) that is associated with Kemalism (Çiftçi, 2010: 187); implemented immediately after the actions of the Turkish National Movement, this resulted in the modern Republic of Turkey.

However, a review of the literature reveals an abundance of articles on TFP, bringing about alternatives to the conventional positivist-based approaches. In this regard, constructivism (Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, 2016; Bozdağlıoğlu, 2004; Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2011; Uzer, 2011), post-structuralism (Coş and Bilgin, 2010; Yenigün et al., 2010), critical realist approaches (Yalvaç, 2014), the Copenhagen School’s approaches to TFP (Balcı, 2012) and even post-international theory (İpek and Biltekin, 2013) have been proposed by several IR scholars in Turkey. Among these approaches, constructivism represents one of the most eloquent theories, taking the lead along with post-structuralist approaches.

Constructivism has gained popularity within Turkish academia where scholars emphasize differences in the Turkish identity to explain certain patterns, such as the conflict between Greece and Turkey or Turkey’s relationship with the European Union, where each side has a different perception of their respective identities (Cizre, 2003: 213; Gündoğdu, 2001: 106). Other groups of scholars, particularly Üzer in Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy, argue that ideologies and national interest are significant factors in defining state behaviour (Üzer, 2011: 9). Üzer further notes that an eclectic paradigm is applied that falls between realist-centre analysis and identity-based constructivism. Despite his marked assumptions, which combine the rationalist epistemology of conventional constructivism and the subjectivist ontology of constructivism, this argument has diametrically opposed positions within IR circles (Yalvaç, 2014: 124).

To broaden perceptions of TFP within constructivism, Bozdağlıoğlu proposes a different analysis, underlining the significance of the domestic construction of identities to describe foreign policy interest and preferences (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2004). According to Bozdağlıoğlu, three polar forces constructed Turkey’s identity: Kemalists, Nationalists and Islamists, who, even before considering the state, interacted with each other, so explaining the perceptions of the Turkish identity within different foreign policy stances. To a certain degree, Bozdağlıoğlu attributes power to domestic affairs and their effect on state identity, in tune with liberal–pluralist understandings, noting that ‘the state’s identity emerges as a result of domestic struggles amongst various groups – each pressing for an identity that would conform to their identity conceptions’ (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2004: 27). One of the major criticisms of his assumption is that he does not comment on the nature and scope of these domestic struggles, nor how they relate to wider social relations (Yalvaç, 2014: 27). In contrast, following empirical analysis of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), İpek proposed both ideas and material interest as exogenous factors that constituted policy within the domestic structure (İpek, 2015). Building on JDP’s moderate Islamist background, Sadik analyses how religion has become an appealing ground for constructing identity-based TFP practices (Sadik, 2012).

Turkey possesses various social identities due to its diverse population with multiple social groups, including secular and Islamic strands. Thus, this article assumes that Islamic identity is one of the longstanding identities of Turkey alongside Kemalist and Nationalist identities. It has long been argued that individuals and ruling elites in Turkey hold multiple identities that are invoked in a context-dependent way, meaning TFP can be pursued within a secular or islamic identity. As Hornung et al. underline ‘Individuals can converge their cross-cutting identities to one identity (intersection), decide on one superordinate identity to follow (dominance), have a salient identity depending on context (compartmentalization) or merge multiple social identities’ (Hornung et al., 2019: 214). Therefore, different aspects of the Turkish identity have been brought to fore, depending on the region and issue in question.

The interpretations of Turkish identity and foreign policy do explain a certain pattern of TFP through constructivism, however, many of them fail to touch upon how identities are naturally, or exogenously, translated into state policy. Likewise identity-oriented Turkish foreign policy is less dependent on geopolitical consideration leading, in particular if security of the state is at stake (Yalvaç, 2014: 124). Therefore, this study fills this gap by arguing that the leadership factor played a ground-breaking role through imprinting its identity onto policy and orienting TFP in line with that identity.

Focusing on the internal dynamics of the state’s identity and policy, this article seeks to explain Turkey’s Africa policy through borrowing neoclassical realism’s leadership paradigm (Lobell et al., 2009) and applying it from a constructivist point of view. According to Gideon Rose, who coined the term neoclassical realism,

a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. Such power capabilities on foreign policy are indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level (Rose, 1998: 152).

In this definition, systemic pressures and unit level variables, including domestic political structure and decision maker’s perceptions, as influences on a state’s foreign policy represents a certain premise of neoclassical realism (Devlen and Özdamar, 2009: 137). Following an eclectic conceptual approach, this article accepts multiple theories (constructivism and neoclassical realism) to gain a complementary vision of Turkey’s newfound interest towards Africa in the early 2000s. Therefore, this research puts forward the leader’s identity as well as leader’s own behaviours, as a new tool for explaining Turkey’s policy approach to Africa. In doing so, this article limits itself to Turkey’s Africa policy context, and does not claim the leadership factor would be applicable in other regional orientations.

As devout Muslims, believing that Turkey’s global power aspiration can best be achieved by rejuvenating its age-old ties to former Ottoman lands, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan might be perceived as the best agents to transform the state’s identity into policy. Based on the premise that a nation’s history is inherent in its foreign policy discourse, which constitutes its identity, this article proposes a constructivist approach that is blended with neoclassical realism (leadership) for Ahmet Davutoğlu’s and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reinterpretation of Turkey’s Africa policy. The leaders’ identity ‘Muslim and Ottomanism’ which shape foreign policy is not exogenously given, but rather affected by individual internal responses and accepted as the continuity of an age-old Ottoman identity. That is to say, it is the reinterpretation and resurrection of a previously existing identity. In that sense, both leaders pursued the same inherited identity, albeit in rather different forms and methods. They sought to reconcile modernization/civilization philosophy with Islamic theology and bestowed the party (JDP) with the label of ‘moderate Islam’ (Kinacioğlu and Oktay, 2006: 263). The central roles of leaders putting state identity into policy is consistent with the latest studies, which now commonly associate the changing trend of TFP at the hands of leaders (Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, 2016; Görener and Ucal, 2011; Kesgin, 2020) with Turkey’s policymaking process. The most positive contribution of this article is thus widening and deepening the Turkish IR perspective, addressing new areas through various interpretations.

Analysis of Turkey’s Africa policy through constructivism

This article explicitly takes the constructivist approach, by specifying the causal mechanisms and contingent conditions for leadership influence on TFP change towards Africa. Committing this research output to one theory might have been seen as being at risk of selecting historical/empirical material on the basis of the preconceived theory, reporting only facts that validated that theory. Following the line of moderate constructivist premises, this article, however, does not claim that other theories or approaches are inconsistent with analysing change in Turkey’s Africa policy. Nor, does it posit a zero-sum game approach to other theoretical explanations. In the light of this discussion, a theoretical background on constructivism and neoclassical realism’s leadership paradigm focusing on the role of leadership factors in constituting policy change is highly relevant for understanding change in Turkey’s Africa policy.

Though Africa was classified within the hinterland of Turkey’s cultural, religious, economic and civilizational sphere in the Ottoman era, Turkey–Africa relations suddenly receded in 1923. This was primarily related to the new identity priorities of the ruling elites, in which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk set out his ‘Westernization/modernization’² as a part of Turkey’s bicentennial efforts to reach the highest level of contemporary civilization. He advocated the modernization of Turkey, effectively adopting a Western-oriented identity and way of life, resulting in the predominance of the secularism principle in TFP, which led Turkey to detach from its previous legacy. Walker emphasizes that Turkey’s close relationship with Europe and its subsequent quest for a European identity is related to three factors: historical (the West represents modern civilization), economic (the bulk of its lucrative foreign trade) and geopolitical (Turkey’s territorial link to Europe) (Walker, 2007: 35). Throughout the early period, Turkey’s outreach to Africa was downgraded and this continued during the Cold War, albeit with a slightly different dimension.

Throughout the 1950s, the security-seeking principle had the major role in framing Turkish policy towards Africa. Due to the Soviet threat, Turkey’s engagement with the Western Bloc, such as joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952, framed TFP to a form coherent with Western-oriented policy. Therefore, with the United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution on the independence of Tunisia, Turkey followed Western government perspectives. Furthermore, when Algeria’s independence was voted upon in the UN, Turkey chose to abstain.³ In the following year (1956), Turkey opposed Egypt over the Suez Canal, again due to its anxiety over the Cold War. Its failure to join the Non-Aligned Movement, in which many African states were actively participating, further reduced Turkey’s credibility among African leaders (Tepeci̇kli̇oğlu, 2012: 71). Moreover, several African states saw Turkey as a ‘Satellite of the USA’ and ‘Police of the Western Imperialism’ (Sönmezoğlu and Bağcı, 1994: 120), hence they often preferred less, if not any, cooperation with Turkey. All in all, the 1950s and the ensuing decades until the end of the Cold War, can be considered the lowest points in the bilateral relationship. Apart from new Turkish embassies opening in Nigeria (1962), Senegal (1962), Kenya (1968) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1976), and Turkey’s support for the independence of African nations, the continent in general was neglected to a great extent by the Turkish government, except in the 1970s as Turkey turned its attention to the Non-Aligned Movement and African states to ward off its isolation due to straitened relations with Western powers over the Cyprus dispute.

The year 1998 was a milestone in Turkey–Africa relations when Turkey adopted a new policy document called ‘Opening up to Africa’. This policy vision was initiated by former Foreign Affairs Minister İsmail Cem who proposed the Africa Action Plan as a new policy vision towards Africa (Ercan, 2017: 10). Although İsmail Cem, who is no neo-Ottomanist, initiated Turkey’s Africa opening, this policy did not take into a concrete policy and practice, so remained passive until JDP came to power in the early 2000s. Furthermore, due to the defensive foreign policy praxis stemming from the Sèvres Syndrome,⁴ Turkey could not pursue an overarching policy to Africa in this period. The period from 1998 to 2005, therefore, can be considered the ‘resurgence years’, given the fact that the prolonged disintegration of Turkey’s relationship with the continent was steadily changing direction. The resurgence was furthered boosted by Erdoğan and his cabinet decisively coming to power with a two-thirds majority in the Assembly in 2002. However, initially Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government faced domestic (criticism from the secular elites for being conservative democrats, Islamists, or reformist Islamists) as well as foreign policy hurdles (Afghanistan and Iraq Wars), which led to less focus on Africa. Therefore, Turkey’s opening to Africa did not significantly come into play until 2005. This continued with high-level diplomatic visits in March 2005 by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who visited Ethiopia and South Africa – one of the rare diplomatic visits in the Republican era, particularly to the southern part of sub-Saharan Africa. The official visit bore fruit with the success of Turkey’s appointment to ‘observer status’ in the African Union on 12 April 2005. This was followed by the accreditation of Turkey’s embassy in Addis Ababa to the African Union on 5 May 2005. Turkey–Africa relations moved to a higher level when Turkey was declared a ‘strategic partner’ at the 10th African Union Summit in January 2008. Subsequently, Turkey’s diplomatic success was confirmed when it was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council on 17 October 2008, where 50 out of 151 votes came from African countries (only three African states did not approve Turkey’s membership). This was indeed an essential gesture by African states in favour of Turkey, when one considers Turkey’s diplomatic attachment to Africa was quite limited, since at that time there were only 12 Turkish embassies on the continent.

In fact, Turkey’s opening up to Africa was expected, since the Republic is the de facto continuation of the Ottoman Empire, which indeed ruled parts of the continent for many generations, particularly in Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, known as Garp Ocakları or the final territory of the Ottomans in North Africa. This came into existence with the fresh policy of the new government, Erdoğan and his cabinet as of the early 2000s. Soon after, the African issue become one of the well-liked agenda among various groups including those business circles, academia, politics and civil society organizations. State organisations and civil society actors have fully or partially attached to Africa amid harsh criticism raised by mainstream media about wasting Turkey’s limited energy in vain (Ozkan, 2012: 115).

During this rapid change, the decision maker’s leading role became more visible. Accordingly, a new mindset within the political leaders prioritized Africa in terms of political and economic leverage. As constructivism demonstrated the importance of the social dimension of IR, through emphasising Gorbachev’s New Thinking in bringing an end to the Cold War (Dunne et al., 2007: 179), Turkey’s opening to Africa was accompanied by this new approach brought about by Erdoğan’s party leaders. As a matter of fact, previous leaders such as Turgut Özal (neoliberal political vision) and Necmettin Erbakan (the idea of an Islamic union) had also applied revisionist policies to attain new geographical coverage. However, ethnocultural proximity and Muslim sensibility towards former Soviet regions and the Balkans were essential variables in shaping the scope of TFP and little attention was paid to non-Turkish countries in the 1990s.

The change in TFP towards Africa in the early 2000s was due to a match between leaders and the premise of new thinking that facilitated the change on Africa policy into practice. In this regard Ahmet Davutoğlu is considered an arbiter of Turkey’s renewal policy change. He was initially chief foreign policy advisor to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2002–2009), then appointed foreign affairs minister (2009–2014) and finally led as prime minister of Turkey (2014–2016). In his book, Strategic Depth, published in 2001, he drew together the main tenets of foreign policy paradigms as a kind of outline for ongoing foreign policy praxis. The book is considered a reinterpretation of Turkey’s history and geography in adherence to a changing global system and international context. In the book, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey possesses a strategic depth that it has hitherto failed to exploit, but Turkey can no longer pursue isolation or a passive policy in its culturally and historically dependent regions of the Middle East, Asia, Transcaucasia, the Balkans and Africa (Davutoğlu, 2001: 10). He further explains the main pillars of the new TFP, based on the country’s historical assets and geographical depth that make Turkey a unique country. Historical depth is related to Turkey’s identity and cultural nexus with the Ottoman Empire, which was terminated when the modern Turkish Republic was established. In this regard he remarks that Turkey’s IR sphere cannot be analysed without penetrating its historical depth; doing so would be similar to a psychological analysis neglecting a person’s memories. In that sense, he linked Turkey’s historical assets with its geographical depth. The geographical position of Turkey, which lies at the crossroads of many geopolitically dynamic areas, affords great advantage in accessing the continent. Africa therefore is perceived as part of Turkey’s sphere of geopolitical depth due to its historical ties with the Ottoman era, as well as its current shared Islamic beliefs. A newly defined retrovision of Ottomanism acknowledges that the Ottoman Empire had successfully managed a multicultural mix of ethnicities where various groups with different identities lived harmoniously (Bacik and Afacan, 2013: 487). This discourse emphasizes ‘Turkey’s Ottoman past and mixes it with geographical uniqueness to justify an active foreign policy’ (Yanık, 2011: 81). Ottomanism is therefore categorized as one of the five clusters of Turkey’s grand narratives in foreign policy, in addition to those of Westernism, Dialogue, Islam and Security (Bacik and Afacan, 2013: 486). As a re-forming, neo-Ottomanism naturally addresses wider geographical coverage and thus found solid ground during Davutoğlu’s tenure.

However, Bacık and Afacan claim that Ottomanism is inapplicable in sub-Saharan Africa for two reasons (Bacik and Afacan, 2013: 487). First, these narratives are the products of historical–cultural milieu, which emerged in the early 18th century, but the Turkish perception is generally a result of the Turks’ own experience of Westernization. Second, the Ottoman Empire was not a truly global power in the sense of the Spanish or British Empires that comprised geographically extensive regions and wielded huge political power. That is to say, Turkey’s grand narratives are likely to be meaningless to societies living in far-off regions, including sub-Saharan Africa, which was never a subject of the Ottoman or the Republic of Turkey’s political imagination (Bacik and Afacan, 2013: 487). What has been overlooked in their analysis is the third dimension of the equation. Bacik and Afacan (2013) attribute global power through a material sense, including economic and military. Yet, Ottoman leaders set strong power relations based on an ‘alliance of civilisations’ in Africa as the third model, mixed from India’s soft- and China’s hard power (Mazrui, 2013). Even in the final period of the Ottoman reign, most Arab elites in Africa could speak fluent Ottoman Turkish. Furthermore, there was no a priori identity in the Ottoman ruling system towards people; rather there was a sense of belongingness in which people differentiated between Muslim and non-Muslim. One of the most intriguing aspects of this is based on the concept of ummah (meaning the wider Muslim community), which had a strong influence over most of the African regions, including sub-Saharan Africa. Sending its imam (religious leader), Abu Bakr Effendi, to the Muslims in the Cape of Good Hope in 1863, in response to a request from the Muslim community in South Africa (Uçar, 2007: 213) was a pure reflection of how Ottoman leaders viewed far-reaching parts of the world as being within the ummah sphere. Moreover, Ottoman soldiers fought Portuguese invasions over the Red Sea to help Ethiopia and Sudan (Orhonlu, 1996), and signed a defence pact with the Kanem–Bornu Empire in 1575 (Ozkan, 2012: 116) proving that Africa was central in the political imagination of the Ottomans as a part of their identity.

Constructivism prioritizes historical background as a defining tool for shaping identity and interest. Related to this, Davutoğlu’s historical depth paradigm constitutes Turkey’s choices, friendship and attachment to Africa, which has been mutually set by historical roots. This is where a new form of relationship between the two actors has the most bearing, since friendship can be traced back to long before the Ottoman period, to a time when several Turkish clans settled in Northern Africa in the 9th century (Kavas, 2006: 27). From the 16th century onwards, the interaction and relationship between Turkey and Africa were reinforced through trade and intermarriage, which constituted a strong cultural, religious and commercial link among the Africa nations that prepared the backbone of internal solidarity of the anti-colonial movements of the 19th century (Davutoğlu, 2001: 207).

Although constructivism would not reject the significance of interest, it would tie it more directly to the identity of the subject. Turkey has long perceived itself as a ‘conveyor belt’ for diffusing the norms of the Western world (Altunişik, 2014: 336), by presenting itself as a part of it to the newly independent countries in post-Soviet regions. Such an identity disregarded Turkey’s important civilizational and religious advantages in its foreign relations. Thus, Davutoğlu’s conception was based on re-enacting and renewing this link, disconnected from 1923 until the late 1990s. He brought a distinctive sense of responsibility to Turkey, towards its historical background, cultural identity and geographical nexus:

Davutoğlu has developed a new and rival identity for Turkey, with particular implications for Turkish foreign policy. This new definition emphasizes Muslim and democratic identity and places Turkey in a different civilization – that is, Islamic – and yet in harmony with western civilization. This is a dramatically different definition of Turkey’s identity [as a result] Turkey’s new position has both an ideational and geographical basis (Altunışık, 2009: 190).

Davutoğlu’s geographical basis, similar to the historical concept, is based on Turkey’s identity and location, which Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire. As Yurdusev highlights Turkey, in contrast to those 35 states who become independent after the Ottoman Empire collapsed, is the only heir and the direct continuation of the Ottoman Empire (Yurdusev, 2010: 47). Within this understanding, Davutoğlu confined the theoretical frame of TFP to three basins: first, the near land basin in which the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus locate; second, the near maritime basin where the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Gulf exist; third, the near continental basin in which Europe, Northern Africa, the Middle East and Far East and Southwest Asia exist, the regions where Turkey must seek a proactive, constructive and realist policy with its own assets (Davutoğlu, 2001: 199). The full motivation drives from the leader’s role, which becomes prominent in TFP, as Davutoğlu constantly maintains, to seek a proactive policy due to Turkey’s geographical position and historical assets.

In relation to Africa, being one of the ‘continental land basins’ of Turkey, Davutoğlu also highlighted the need to deepen and enrich its engagement, similar to other regions like Central Asia, Europe and Asia. As a result, Turkey redefined its policy objectives, paradigms and main tenets toward Africa under seven main headings during Davutoğlu’s tenure (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). The first was to construct more in-depth political relations through increasing bilateral high-level visits and, by acting as the voice of Africa in the global arena, defending the legitimate rights and interests of African countries when Turkey engaged in bilateral and multilateral talks at the UN and other international platforms. Second was supporting African states in the economic sphere to enable them to overcome their challenges and difficulties, through mutual support, trade, investment and humanitarian assistance. Third was providing diplomatic and personal assistance when requested, for example, in the peace-building process for the settlement of disputes. The fourth was sending Africa foreign aid to alleviate obstacles and to make further progress in the areas of democracy and good governance. Fifth was supporting regional integration processes of African states. The sixth involved active participation in peacekeeping missions in Africa. The seventh embraced the principle of upholding ‘African solutions for African problems’ in accordance with the policy of the African Union. These principles, which can be called values in the constructivist sense, have opened varied opportunities in relation to the emergence of a new Africa foreign policy orientation.

The other aspect of constructivism is that it ‘utters’ deeds and language as both representative and performative (Zehfuss and Maja, 2002: 153). Based on Onuf’s speech act theory, speaking is an activity with normative consequences, therefore language creates a reality that will have an effect on the state of affairs (Onuf, 1989). Setting the African agenda within Turkish domestic affairs came to the fore with JDP’s new Africa rhetoric. With the intention of building a new language on African issues, the leaders have employed a more affirmative and benign Africa discourse, built around specific concepts including those of ‘value-based foreign policy’, ‘a new geography of imagination’, ‘civilization understanding’, ‘conscience and humanitarian aid’ and ‘international system criticism’ to place Africa firmly in TFP (Sunar, 2014: 337). Expanding the scope of Turkey’s spheres of influence through constructing a new language, Erdoğan often starts his speech ‘our African friends’ in addressing press conferences with African leaders, to underline the mutual, non-hierarchical relations. Calling globalization a new form of colonialism and modern slavery, he also criticized the West for colonial policies in Africa, saying that both Turkey and Africa refused to become colonies or ‘second class citizens’ (Daily Sabah, 2016). His chastisement of Europe’s colonial past through underlying Turkey’s non-dependent, bilateral, political and economic cooperation with African states can be interpreted as a new form of discourse to expand Turkey’s natural sphere of influence, motivated by a responsive and pragmatic pursuit of available resources. As constructivism pinpoints how language is central to shaping reality, which turns into a state of affairs, Erdoğan’s rhetoric, thus can be abstracted by the state’s identity, and cultural and historical background within the framework of constructivism. Essentializing the Turkish state’s fixed identity, the reason why it failed to influence other policy makers in the same way is related to the socio-Islamic background of both leaders, as well as Turkey’s favourable political atmosphere for leadership influence in foreign policymaking.

From the beginning of his tenure, Erdoğan devoted much time to cultivating a revival of relations with African countries. Emphasizing a moral responsibility towards fellow Muslims and societies within the former Ottoman region, he acknowledged that an artificial structural boundary within the Middle East countries divided the ummah. Similar to Davutoğlu, who echoed that Turkey was ‘the last castle of resistance’ against imperialist designs, Erdoğan stated ‘this nation is the hope of the ummah and the world’ (Daily Sabah, 2016), as a part of his moral and humanitarian values of the Ottoman civilization, and urged Turkey to take up its historical responsibilities. The ideas that underpin Erdoğan’s foreign policy to Africa, therefore, arguably stem from the conception of common history, culture, religion and destiny (being exposed to the wild ambitions of the West). Since Erdoğan assumed the presidency on 28 August 2014, he has spearheaded visits to 77 countries between 2014 and April 2020, in addition to 37 countries that he had visited previously as prime minister, which gives a total of 114 countries visited by him as the head of the Turkish government. With his African tour in January 2020, Gambia become the 28th country in the 49 visits to Africa during his tenure as both prime minister and president (TRT World, 2020). This is a significant leader-oriented policy action, considering the fact that there had only been four visits to Africa from Turkey at both prime ministerial and presidential levels throughout the period of 1923 to 2003 (İpek, 2016). During his official visit to Somalia in 2011, a crowded delegation including celebrities accompanied him, leading to an immense domino effect on a large proportion of Turkish society, spanning the political, business, media and entertainment spectrum, raising awareness of Somalia’s most enduring drought and food scarcity of the last 70 years.

In contrast to realism and liberalism, which underline the material capabilities of power, constructivism focuses on the social power of the state. Social power is defined as ‘the ability to set standards, create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment’ (Ham, 2010). Contrary to physical power, which relies upon coercive strategies and strength, this power can be applied by non-state actors or media. Therefore, Turkish non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs’) social power has been much exercised since Turkey declared a renewal of its relationship with Africa (Boztas, 2011: 148), using participatory and cooperative methods with respect to mutual development targets, while working hand-in-hand with the state. The number and overall role of NGOs multiplied in 2005 with the adoption of the new legal framework Law on Associations⁵ issued by Erdoğan’s party. With this law, NGOs were privileged with forming partnerships with foreign NGOs, the eligibility to access financial support from abroad and were allowed to collect from lucrative sources (such as collecting raw hides during Eid-ul-Adha). NGOs ensured this advantage by pursuing activities mainly at the grassroots level. Verifying this point, one of the high-level workers at the NGO Yeryüzü Doktorları stated,

in the field, governmental bodies support us. Now we do not enter our embassy building nervously, we go there with pride. The attitude of the diplomats has changed; they have begun to show hospitality. They have become like facilitators. This change started in Ankara (Çelik and İşeri, 2016: 438).

Due to their active engagement in foreign aid, the total development assistance of NGOs, which was USD 56.7 million in 2005 increased to $826.5 million in 2018 with the bulk of aid directed to less-developed regions in sub-Saharan Africa.

Therefore, it can be seen that the hallmark of the current TFP to Africa has been shaped by leaders (Davutoğlu and Erdoğan), representing a stark deviation from orthodox Turkish policy. As Hale states, “with Davutoğlu a new page on TFP was turned” (Hale, 2009: 144) with a transformation that relies upon the growing embrace of the philosophy of neo-Ottomanism, which can be considered similar to the vision that American neoconservatives pursue (Murinson, 2006: 946). Although Davutoğlu was at the forefront of shaping Turkey’s Africa policy, based on his strategic depth paradigm, he gained the power from Erdoğan who legitimized his policy in the eyes of the general public; without him, the implementation of Davutoğlu’s policies would have been out of the question.

However, the Syrian crisis and Arab Fall were a litmus test for Davutoğlu’s paradigm (Bağcı and Açıkalın, 2015: 15), and received strong criticism for undermining Turkey’s appeal in the international community when the ‘zero problem’ policy turned into ‘precious loneliness’ (Çoşkun, 2015). Davutoğlu’s paradigm seemed to have lost ground following the end of his tenure, yet it is still being employed by several state agencies including the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurt Dışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluğu; YTB), particularly in Africa.

Conclusion

The emphasis on strengthening Turkey–Africa relations is both new and at the same time reminiscent of a historic past and now constitutes the leading TFP orientation. Despite the deep-seated historical, cultural and religious ties with the continent during the time of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey’s attachment to Africa only started evolving in the late 1990s. Turkey’s policy orientation now addresses a much broader geographical coverage and scope. As this article has examined, in the case of Turkey’s policy toward Africa, there has been a break in the traditional TFP paradigm over the last decades, a period that can also be seen as a reassembly of the previous legacy under a different name. Modern Turkey in fact represented a break from its historical continuity, so the TFP launched by Erdoğan’s party, ruling since 2002, is reconnecting with the nation’s historical assets and geographical depth. Therefore, Turkey’s break off from its policy, as implemented during the best part of the 20th century from 1923 to the 1990s, is actually the re-enacting of its Ottoman policy vision into the new TFP in the changing context of the international system over the last two decades. In this new engagement, certain factors motivated Turkey’s interest in Africa. As constructivism emphasizes, state behaviour can be explained not only by the distribution of material power but also by ideas, identities and state policies (particularly the facilitating roles of the leader and NGOs), which affords space to observe the agency of the individual who in turn influences foreign policy doctrine. Therefore, Turkey has been raising the significance of its historical background in defining interests and behaviours through a historical and geographical hinterland paradigm, which is related to its cultural nexus with those areas where the Ottoman Empire ruled or had significant interaction.

To summarize, this article does not consider the role of Africa in constructing Turkish identity formation as an exogenous element; rather, it underlines the place of the political leader’s identity in shaping Turkey’s Africa policy. Taking into consideration the leadership role in shaping identity as a theoretical basis for Turkey–Africa relations is justified on the strength of these premises. In contrast to other constructivist interpretations of TFP, which mostly fail to discuss how identities are translated into state policy, this article has attempted to rectify this by arguing that leader-oriented TFP, as demonstrated by Ahmet Davutoğlu and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has become more visible. This is consistent with identity, notably with the identity of neo-Ottomanism, Islam of the certain ruling political elites who have taken a leading role in defining the interest of the state, which in turn has become state policy. Therefore, it can be said that the state’s renewal of interest in Africa is a clear example of the significance of taking individual-level variables and their identity seriously in foreign policy analysis.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author is indebted to Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç, Dr. Şerif Onur Bahçecik and the reviewers for their constructive comments on the manuscript.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Yunus Turhan

Notes

Author biography

Dr. Yunus Turhan is an international relations lecturer at Osmaniye Kokut Ata University. During his PhD at Middle East Technical University, he has also affiliated at Oxford University Department of International Development as visiting fellow researcher from 2017 to 2018 period where he involved in Changing Structures of Islamic Authority and Consequences for Social Change: A Transnational Review (CSIA), a five-year research project funded by the European Research Council. Besides his interest on the State-NGO relations, he also focuses on Turkey–Africa relation, Development Studies, and Peace and Conflict Studies. He has previously published in All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, and Turkish Studies.

References

Adler

(1997) Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics. European Journal of International Relations 3(3): 319–363.

Afacan

(2013) The African Opening in Turkish Foreign Policy. İstanbul: ORSAM Publication.

Akıllı

(2016) Türkiye’de ve Dünyada Dış Yardımlar. Ankara: Nobel Akademik Publication.

Altunışık

(2009) Worldviews and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. New Perspectives on Turkey 40(1): 169–192.

Altunişik

(2014) Turkey as an ‘emerging donor’ and the Arab uprisings. Mediterranean Politics 19(3): 333–350.

Arkan

Kınacıoğlu

(2016) Enabling ‘ambitious activism’: Davutoğlu’s vision of a new foreign policy identity for Turkey. Turkish Studies 17(3): 381–405.

Aydın

Acıkmese

(2007) Europeanization through EU conditionality: Understanding the new era in Turkish foreign policy. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9(3): 263–274.

Bacik

Afacan

(2013) Turkey discovers Sub-Saharan Africa: The critical role of agents in the construction of Turkish foreign-policy discourse. Turkish Studies 14(3): 483–502.

Bağcı

Açıkalın

ŞN

(2015) From chaos to cosmos: Strategic depth and Turkish foreign policy in Syria. In: Erçetin

ŞŞ

Banerjee

(eds) Chaos, Complexity and Leadership 2013. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, pp.11–25.

10.

Balcı

Kardaş

(2012) The changing dynamics of Turkey’s relations with Israel: An analysis of ‘securitization.’ Insight Turkey 14(2): 99–120.

11.

Bilgin

(2009) Securing Turkey through western-oriented foreign policy. New Perspectives on Turkey 40(1): 103–123.

12.

Bozdağlıoğlu

(2004) Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach. New York: Routledge.

13.

Boztas

(2011) Türkiye’nin Afrika ile ilişkilerinde proaktif politikalarının teorik analizi: Konstrüktivist teori, eleştirel teori ve uluslararası toplum teorisi. Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 31: 139–158.

14.

Çelik

İşeri

(2016) Islamically oriented humanitarian NGOs in Turkey: AKP foreign policy parallelism. Turkish Studies 17(3): 429–448.

15.

Çiftçi

(2010) Türk Dış Politikası: Tarih Kimlik ve Eleştirel Kuram Bağlamında. Ankara: Siyasal Publication.

16.

Cizre

(2003) Demythologyzing the national security concept: The case of Turkey. Middle East Journal 57(2): 213–229.

17.

Coş

Bilgin

(2010) Stalin’s demands: Constructions of the ‘soviet other’ in Turkey’s foreign policy, 1919–1945. Foreign Policy Analysis 6(1): 43–60.

18.

Coşkun

(2015) Neighbourhood narratives from ‘zero problems with neighbours‘ to ‘precious loneliness’: Turkey’s resecuritized Middle East policy after the Arab Spring. In: Monier

(ed.) Regional Insecurity After the Arab Uprisings. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.187–203.

19.

Daily Sabah (2016) Globalization new form of colonialism. Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2016/11/02/globalization-new-form-of-colonialism-president-erdogan-says (accessed 15 July 2020; 20 April 2020).

20.

Davutoğlu

(2001) Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin Uluslararasi Konumu. Istanbul: Küre Publication.

21.

Demirtaş-Coşkun

(2011) Turkish foreign policy toward the Bosnian war (1992–1995): A constructivist analysis. Center for Karadeniz Research Report 28: 1–18.

22.

Devlen

Özdamar

(2009) Neoclassical realism and foreign policy crises. In: Mouritzen

Freyberg-Inan

Harrison

, et al. (eds) Rethinking Realism in International Relations. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

23.

Dunne

Kurki

Smith

(2007) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

24.

Ercan

(ed.) (2017) Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

25.

Finnemore

(1996) National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

26.

Finnemore

Sikkink

(2001) Taking stock: The constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science 4(1): 391–416.

27.

Görener

AŞ

Ucal

MŞ

(2011) The personality and leadership style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish foreign policy. Turkish Studies 12(3): 357–381.

28.

Gündoğdu

(2001) Identities in question: Greek-Turkish relations in a period of transformation? Middle East Review of International Affairs 5(1): 106–117.

29.

Hale

(2009) Turkey and the Middle East in the ‘new era.’ Insight Turkey 11(3): 143–159.

30.

Ham

(2010) Social Power in International Politics. London, New York: Routledge.

31.

Hornung

Bandelow

Vogeler

(2019) Social identities in the policy process. Policy Sciences 52(2): 211–231.

32.

Ipek

(2015) Ideas and change in foreign policy instruments: Soft power and the case of the Turkish international cooperation and development agency. Foreign Policy Analysis 11(2): 173–193.

33.

İpek

(2016) President Erdoğan’s 2016 Africa visits. ORSAM Ortadoğu Analiz, August.

34.

İpek

Biltekin

(2013) Turkey’s foreign policy implementation in sub-Saharan Africa: A post-international approach. New Perspectives on Turkey 49(2): 121–156.

35.

Kavas

(2006) Osmanlı-Afrika İlişkileri. TASAM. Available at: https://tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/383/osmanli-_afrika_iliskileri (accessed 12 February 2020).

36.

Kesgin

(2020) Turkey’s Erdoğan: Leadership style and foreign policy audiences. Turkish Studies 21(1): 56–82.

37.

Keyman

(2010) Globalization, modernity and democracy: Turkish foreign policy 2009 and beyond. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 15(3): 1–20.

38.

Kinacioğlu

Oktay

(2006) The domestic dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus policy: Implications for Turkey’s accession to the European Union. Turkish Studies 7(2): 261–273.

39.

Laçinok

Demir

(2007) Turgut Özal’ın Liderlik Profili ve Dış Politika Bakışı. In: Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler. Istanbul: Bağlam Publication.

40.

Lobell

Ripsman

Taliaferro

(2009) Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

41.

Mazrui

(2013) Türkiye Afrika’da Bir Medeniyetler İttifakı Modeli Oluşturabilir, SETA. Available at: https://www.setav.org/ali-mazrui-turkiye-afrikada-bir-medeniyetler-ittifaki-modeli-olusturabilir/ (accessed 20 April 2020).

42.

Murinson

(2006) The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy. Middle Eastern Studies 42(6): 945–964.

43.

Oğuzlu

(2007) Soft power in Turkish foreign policy. Australian Journal of International Affairs 61(1): 81–97.

44.

Onuf

(1989) World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

45.

Oran

(2009) Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar. İstanbul: İletişim Publication.

46.

Orhonlu

(1996) Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Güney Siyaseti Habeş Eyaleti. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publication.

47.

Ozkan

(2012) A new actor or passer-by? The political economy of Turkey’s engagement with Africa. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14(1): 113–133.

48.

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) Turkey–Africa Relations, General Outlook. Available at: www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa (accessed 20 April 2020).

49.

Rose

(1998) Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics 51(1): 144–172.

50.

Sadik

(2012) Magic blend or dangerous mix? Exploring the role of religion in transforming Turkish foreign policy from a theoretical perspective. Turkish Studies 13(3): 293–317.

51.

Sayari

(2000) Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era: The challenges of multi-regionalism. Journal of International Affairs 54(1): 169–182.

52.

Sönmezoğlu

Bağcı

(1994) Türk dış politikasının analizi. Istanbul: Der Publication.

53.

Sunar

(2014) Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin Dış Politikasında Afrika Söyleminin İnşası. In: Fahri

(ed.) Suriçi’nde Bir Yaşam: Toktamış Ateş’e Armağan. İstanbul: Bilgi Uni. Publication.

54.

Tepeci̇kli̇oğlu

(2012) Afrika kıtasının dünya politikasında artan önemi ve Türkiye-Afrika ilişkileri. Ankara Üniversitesi Afrika Çalışmaları Dergisi 1(2): 59–94.

55.

TRT World (2020) What makes Erdogan’s Africa tour so significant? Available at: https://www.trtworld.com/africa/what-makes-erdogan-s-africa-tour-so-significant-33263 (accessed 1 January 2020).

56.

Uçar

(2007) Unutulmayan miras: Güney Afrika’da Osmanlılar. Istanbul: Çamlıca Publication.

57.

Uzer

(ed.) (2011) Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

58.

Walker

(2007) Learning strategic depth: Implications of Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine. Insight Turkey 9(3): 32–47.

59.

Wendt

(1992) Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. International Organization 46(2): 391–425.

60.

Wendt

(1994) Collective identity formation and the international state. The American Political Science Review 88(2): 384–396.

61.

Wendt

(1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

62.

Yalvaç

(2014) Approaches to Turkish foreign policy: A critical realist analysis. Turkish Studies 15(1): 117–138.

63.

Yanık

(2011) Constructing Turkish ‘exceptionalism’: Discourses of liminality and hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy. Political Geography 30(2): 80–89.

64.

Yenigün

Efegil

Balcı

(2010) 1990 Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Bazı Notlar: Avrupa Birligi ve Kıbrıs Örnegi. In: Türkiye’nin değişen diş politikası. Ankara: Nobel Publication.

65.

Yurdusev

(2010) Osmanlı Mirası ve Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine. In: Yeni dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri. Ankara: USAK Publication.

66.

Zehfuss

Maja

(2002) Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.