Implications of Protest and Reform for Domestic Governance in Ethiopia

Political transition

Schumpeter (2003) defines democracy by considering its concrete expressions, forms, and methodological and procedural elements as a phenomenon adopted for attaining the common good. Others such as Mainwaring (1989) premised their work on the efficacy of political transition for rolling out mechanisms for the betterment of societal life. While Mainwaring underlined the ramifications of the “democratic method” as essential, for Schumpeter (2003) democracy is a useful institutional arrangement for contesting elections and making decisions on major issues of public concern by the winner/s. In so doing, he underlined the role of “indivduals” rather than citizens’ collective action as key in public affairs management. In real political life, however, such dichotomy is artificial, since the popular view of democracy does not alienate the procedural from the substantive elements. In its recent report, the International Institute of Democratic Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2017) critiqued the artificial differentiation between the two by emphasizing their inseparability. The report also highlighted Africa’s relative success in building democratic institutions and associated procedural elements such as periodic elections, constitutional rule and multiparty system without registering progress in entrenching the substantive elements. It thus suggested the need to ensure substantive democracy while concurrently consolidating the procedural elements. Examination of the current Ethiopian transition to democracy should, therefore, take the progress made in regarding to realizing the substantive aspects as an entry point.

In light of the unfolding of new modes of engagement in contemporary Ethiopian politics, substantive and procedural elements of democracy must be viewed as closely intertwined. This is in line with the adage that transition deserves more attention than limiting itself to the study of institutionalized democracy or authoritarianism (O’Donnell and Schmitter, cited in Mainwaring, 1989). Accordingly, the ongoing Ethiopian transition should be viewed as a distinct historical episode that facilitates charting a genealogical background and major watersheds of the occurrence. Transition is thus understood as a process of neutralizing or reversing fabrics of authoritarian rule, on one hand, and purposively constructing the edifice on which positive changes could flourish on the other.

The tenacity of popular protests in Ethiopia resulted in relative progress as regards achieving procedural democracy, whereas attainment of the substantive elements remained rather limited. In the literature, discussions on transition to democracy primarily focused on factors that contribute to or impede efforts of installing a corresponding level of socioeconomic and political dispensation. Huntington (1991a) sheds light on the global and domestic cultural, political and economic dynamics in accelerating or arresting the enterprise of democratic transition. Accordingly, transition as a political phenomenon is shaped by the activities and dispositions of both mainstream and subaltern forces competing to influence the workings of a country’s political economy. More importantly, it is worth noting that political parties and civil society organizations interact in due course to play meaningful roles that impact on efforts of discerning the pace and typology of transition. Huntington (1991b) deals with typologies of democracy that feature in the course of embarking on transition, whereas typologies of transition are classified based on who is involved in the process rather than the associated structural and contingency factors (Share, 1987). Hence, Share’s classification simplifies the task of theorizing transition where the consensual type involves incumbents’ willingness to introduce cosmetic changes to existing modes of governance (Sartori, cited in Share, 1987).

The classical articulation of democracy is distinct from the “modern maximalist” version. These are respectively presented as popularized, liberalized and highly inclusive versus an extensively open political system (Dahl, 1971) that necessitates the existence of a political community that enjoys “political equality” (Held, cited in Ishiyama, 2012). Such differentiation is often either used or abused in understanding democracy as reflected in the literature on comparative politics (Ishiyama, 2012). The problem surrounding the conceptualization of democracy becomes clearer when looked at from the vantage point of popular protests. While the perspective that links popular protests to the quest for reform aimed at entrenching minimalist democracy falls under the domain of the “civil society model,” the “political society model” associates popular protests with the urge for attaining substantive democracy (Branch and Mampil, 2015). If a transition is consensual, it should reflect the political imaginations of actors involved in a complex constellation.

In consensual transition, incumbents often tolerate the quest for democratic change by refraining from exercising active stewardship over the process, but they strive to either control or forestall it (Share, 1987). When ruling elites lend support to the enterprise of transition to democracy, some form of political continuity between authoritarianism and democracy could be exhibited. Political scientists designate this phase of political liberalization as a precursor to democracy characterized by easing repression and extending civil liberties under the auspices of liberalized authoritarian rule (Mainwaring, 1989). Nevertheless, liberalization does not necessarily beget authentic democratization, since disruptions leading to renewed despotism could occur. In light of this, liberalization is only one aspect of procedural democracy and hence the need to examine how popular demands for substantive democracy could be met is worthwhile.

The non-consensual mode of transition is expressed by incumbents’ reluctance to buttress even minimum democratic change despite extreme intolerance of the democratic forces against continuity of authoritarianism. Regardless of whatever is achieved under this model, the role of the forces of change usually remains marginal due to the rupture of political institutions, unifying symbols and cultural facades. While the non-consensual model is dubbed transition through rupture, the consensual variant is designated as transition through a transaction. Huntington (1991b) identifies three types of transition mediated by transformation, replacement and transplacement. Hence, what is consensual for Share is either transformational or transplacement for Huntington. Whereas incumbent-supported transition is mediated by transformation, transition through transplacement as a collaborative project is jointly owned by the incumbent and the opposition. It is worth mentioning that aspects of procedural democracy in the past in Ethiopia were rolled out either by ruling elites or subaltern groups posing as change agents, as the case may be. However, most of the recent radical reforms were driven by protests that assumed a revolutionary posture. The current Ethiopian political transition that forced EPRDF to accede to popular demands has thus a feature of the transformational model. However, the liberalization of the Ethiopian transition processes in Ethiopia can be adequately appreciated only if the popular masses are meaningfully involved.

Popular protests and political transition in Africa

Different variables are used as units of analysis in the literature on the transition to democracy in Africa. While some focus on protest (Bratton and De Walle, 1996) and international pressure and donor conditionality (Huntington, 1991a), others consider economic development (Przeworski, 1991) and interaction between actors (Mainwaring, 1989) as vital for creating equilibrium. Moreover, several also take structural factors as causes and consequences of democratic transition despite their difference in identifying the key variables. Bratton and de Walle (1996: 198) argued that in the 1990s, “African governments introduced political reforms primarily in response to spontaneous and organized demands of a loose multi-class assemblage of indigenous protest groups.” For them, the nexus between protest and political reforms cannot be analytically differentiated without involving the roles of the power elite and the popular masses. Accordingly, political reform is defined as politico-economic liberalization spearheaded by power holders that support political competition based on freedom of expression, association, and free and fair elections. For Bratton and de Walle (1996), the political transition in Africa of the 1990s was triggered by three factors: protests mediated by contingent (relative strength, skills, and cooperation between regimes and opposition groups), structural (economic crisis and relative loss of regime legitimacy), and diffusion effects (collapse of authoritarian regimes elsewhere). As a result, the protest–reform dynamic remains incomplete in the absence of free and fair elections, which constrain efforts for even realizing minimalist procedural democracy. However, the third wave of democratization in Africa taking effect led to at least entrenching semblances of procedural democracy and democratic values (IDEA, 2017).

The link between protest and political reform is generally derived from lived experiences of societies elsewhere in general and the West in particular, where processes are based on the “civil society model.” According to this model, the ultimate goal of popular protests is to “pressure the state into reform” using non-violent means and “clearly articulating political demands” (Branch and Mampil, 2015: 8). The same source presents an alternative embedded in the “political society” model for examining the ramifications of popular protests in Africa. Under this model, the protest should not be limited to liberalizing transition processes but rather should aim at transforming political structures and modes of operation by resolving underlying dilemmas in the course of embarking on democratic change (Branch and Mampil, 2015). This is relevant for understanding the Ethiopian transition as a negotiating space in dealing with major political issues surrounding the attainment of both substantive and procedural democracy.

Governance and the protest–transition nexus

Governance as a buzzword frequently appears in African political discourse. Given its featuring in political exchanges in Ethiopia too, governance is often reflected in discussing the link between protest and reform. For long governance was used interchangeably at the levels of macro politics and micro corporate management gradually implying “a process of managing public resources for development” (World Bank, 1992). Most conceptualizations on governance originated from various sources: international organizations or European scholars (Asaduzzaman and Virtanen, 2016), the European Union (Cajvaneanu, 2011), or the World Bank. International organizations such as the World Bank propounded the concept as an easy fix to development challenges that countries face. Accordingly, governance is presented as a prescriptive notion that denigrates the role of the African state of the 1980s as a justification for structural adjustment and neo-liberalism. The need for entrenching governance prescribed by the World Bank in the 2000s emanates from preconceived doubts regarding the authenticity of African states in spearheading political and economic engagements (Harrison, 2004; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1998). In this manner, governance is presented as a technical-managerial panacea for depoliticizing the popular masses (Ferguson, 1994) and excluding citizens from participation, thereby limiting efforts to the sole goal of realizing procedural democracy at best.

In the Ethiopian case, the EPRDF regime viewed governance as a state-led developmental notion associated with delivering efficient and effective public service. However, governance is currently used as a concept related to articulating the causes advanced by popular protests on one hand and associated regime responses on the other. Despite internal rifts within its ranks, EPRDF used “lack of good governance” and willful acts of hostile domestic and foreign forces as causes for the experienced protests. As opposed to this, the protests in Ethiopia are attributed to widespread corruption, derailment of the rule of law and unbridled mass deprivation, which eventually led to the quest for transforming Ethiopia’s political economy through regime change (Addis Standard, 2017). In light of the foregoing, the transition to democracy entailed a shift from closed, top-down and elite-led to relative openness, enhanced participation and inclusive mode of operation. Nevertheless, what is currently at stake is the extent to which the dynamics of popular protests could inform and shape the Ethiopian transition. As Ishiyama (2012) notes, democracy is the product of both long-term trends and short-term institutional choices.

Overview

Karl Marx’s maxim, “...secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the political- not at the economic and cultural- level of society” (cited in Anderson, 1974: 11), is relevant to the ongoing Ethiopian transition. It is to be recalled that pre-modern (Berhanu, 2018) and modern state formation processes shaped the multinational polity and contemporary Ethiopian politics located in the global political economy arena (Addis, 1975; Teshale, 1995). The protest–transition–reform nexus in Ethiopia should thus consider the effect of the legacy of the process that culminated in the formation of the modern state. Gebru (1996: 25) stated that “an adequate explanation of the causes, processes, and outcomes of popular protest in contemporary Ethiopia must begin with an account of the rise of the modern state.” For Kassahun (1998: 77), “Ethiopian politics [in general] has essentially been about how the different ‘nations’ that make up the Ethiopian state” came together through incorporation.

Concerns surrounding the urge for democratizing the Ethiopian state revolve around on how best the constituent units of the polity could amicably interact in rolling out good governance platforms as common sites of engagement. The said interaction involves challenging undue state hegemony vertically through forging cordial rapport between stakeholders. Maimire (2008: 76) argues that this necessitates creating “multiple networks of associations” striving towards reducing lack of freedoms and enhancing capabilities for addressing bottlenecks. That is why legitimate claims and demands of peasants (Gebru, 1996) and students (Balsvik, 2005) could be taken as entry points in the study of protests in Ethiopia. Our conceptualization of the protest–transition dialectical link is thus focused on the primacy of political imaginations over political reform. As Sorenson (cited in Gros, 1998: 1) claims, democratization is “a transitional phenomenon involving a gradual and elite-driven transformation of formal rules that govern political systems.” In light of this, transition to democracy in Ethiopia is examined from the vantage point of the protest–transition–reform dynamics under three successive Ethiopian regimes.

Transition through rupture under imperial rule

Transition as a brief interlude between authoritarianism and democracy did not apply to Ethiopia under the monarchy due to the evident absence of elements of democracy. The protest–transition dialectical link during the period in question was primarily conditioned by the urge for centralized state-building anchored in rudimentary modern infrastructural development and development projects. In due course, peasant, workers’ and students’ resistance featured in the complex venture of state-building. Gebru (1996: 11) argues that “political behavior began to change noticeably after the 1930s and this was the outcome of innovations taking place at the national level.” The twin processes of introducing a modern governance system spearheaded by the centralized state, on one hand, and the taking shape of political protests, on the other, ultimately led to the 1974 revolutionary upheaval. Before the onset of the 1974 revolution, the monarchy embarked on several measures with a flavor of seemingly liberal overtones, to enhance the monarch’s personal rule while at the same time lending a positive image to absolute rule (Bahru, 2014). The measures taken in the 1960s and 1970s were thus aimed at prolonging the life span of the status quo rather than ushering in a new politics that could transform state-society relations (Kassahun, 1998).

Protests against imperial rule were haphazardly expressed in various forms as aforementioned, including critical writings and songs and sporadic mutinies. The creeping reform and modernization attempts under imperial rule were, therefore, a reflection of resistances using different forms and tactics (Bahru, 2014; Gebru 1996). Democratization as an outcome can thus be viewed as a gradual and non-linear process that is invigorated by contingent factors (Bratton and De Walle, 1996). In this vein, Kassahun (1998: 77) argues that the “quest for democratic governance in Ethiopia did not begin with the fall of the Berlin Wall . . . it has been at the heart of modern Ethiopian political life.” The central weakness of the imperial regime’s response to popular demands for change lies in its focus on gradual reforms introduced from above that barred local actors from exercising “any collective expression of grievances let alone [enable] public voice to be heard” (Dessalegn, 2009: 327). It is worth noting that the issues raised by forces of change emphasized structural transformation in the structure of the Ethiopian state in a manner that accommodates diverse legitimate interests. Bahru (2002) states that imperial rule’s reform measures even failed to satisfy the proponents of the establishment who generated and authored reformist ideas. Hence, lack of foresight and inability and unwillingness on the part of imperial rule rendered efforts for ensuring consensual, incremental and gradual transition to democracy futile. Consequently, transition through violent, non-consensual and disruptive mechanisms gained ground and precipitated the demise of the imperial status quo.

Transition under military rule (1974–1991)

With the ouster of imperial rule, the onus of rolling out political transition was left to a committee of servicemen who seized power in September 1974. However, terminating the monarchy by no means guaranteed the realization of democratic consolidation but instead institutionalized uncertainty. Przeworski (1986: 58) states that under such circumstances groups subject themselves to “alienation of control over outcomes.” Given uncertainties in Ethiopia of the mid-1970s, the new politics of change had to be negotiated between diverse stakeholders comprising ethnonational liberation movements and multinational leftist groups (Andargachew, 2015). Subsequently, the proactive involvement of these stakeholders in the new politics of the time led to radical measures that remodeled vertical and horizontal state–society and intra-society relations respectively. The military regime’s Land Reform Act of March 1975 is among the most outstanding innovations of the post-revolution years, which abolished landlordism and the concomitant multifaceted ills. This took place in response to one of the major popular demands of the time.

Even though the military regime introduced wide-ranging socio-economic forms, these were gradually geared to serve purposes of consolidating power through the unsparing use of instruments of violence. According to Dessalegn (2009: 324), the Land Reform Act was subsequently used to “regulate, manipulate and mobilize rural society” and subordinating the peasantry. Concurrently, rural and urban administrative structures designed for enhancing local and grassroots self-governance turned into instruments of control of the urban masses. Above all, the failure to address problems associated with ethnic rights and other political concerns proved to be the military regime’s original sin. Between the late 1970s and the 1980s, disaffected ethnonationalist insurgent forces staged a protracted armed resistance against the regime’s authoritarianism by aggregating old and new demands of diverse sections of Ethiopian society. The insurgency gathered momentum since the mid-1980s by articulating the need for another round of regime change as vital for restructuring the country’s political economy, culminating in the molding of the post-1991 transition.

Transition under EPRDF (1991–2018)

The post-1991 transition was envisaged to serve as a pathway to subsequent democratization during the first few years of EPRDF’s rule (Lyons, 1996; Ottaway, 1995). Despite the enduring quest for substantive democracy in Ethiopia, its procedural aspect began to surface following the 1991 regime change that coincided with the advent of the “Third Wave.” Ottaway (1995: 68) articulated this by dubbing the episode “instant democratization.” The first post-transition election resulting in the advent of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was held in August I995. Occurrences that transpired during the transition period (1991–1995) involved multiple processes that were signified by dismantling the major elements of military rule, political liberalization, and reinstituting the electoral management body, among others. Prior to EPRDF’s ascendance, the US administration brokered talks between different political and armed protagonists aimed at charting the path of change during the post-revolution years (Vestal, 1999) by excluding other political actors that were not viewed in favorable light. In this manner, the issue of Eritrea’s accession to independent statehood was affirmed through the consent of EPRDF and OLF buttressed by EPLF’s unilateral action (Kassahun, 1998; Merera 2007). Consequently, EPRDF took upon itself the onus of addressing the complex issues surrounding the Ethiopian transition, whereas others such as the OLF participated marginally during their brief tenure.

The Transitional Charter, enacted as an interim constitution, stipulated the need to adhere to the universal declaration of human rights, engage in periodic multiparty competitive periodic elections as a means of assuming power, and uphold the right of ethnic groups to self-determination. At face value, these signaled prospects for transforming state-society relations. The transition also exhibited a departure from the Ethiopian state’s traditional disposition of safeguarding territorial integrity as a sacrosanct value (Kassahun, 1998). Nonetheless, there were of the turn that events took following the transitional period for fear that in as much as the military regime instrumentalized the land reform, a repeat of the same cannot be ruled out under EPRDF rule. However, the post-1991 transition initially ushered in relative betterment that initially reduced unbridled subordination of society to preferences of officialdom. The mode of operation of the EPRDF regime gave way to new super-imposed horizontal relations expressed in the formation of “self-governing” regional states. These came into force without considering complex patterns of settlement and identity formation by tailoring ethno-regional jurisdictions to ethnic markers whose enforcement proved a daunting task. This is because the arrangement overlooked the long history of citizens’ coexistence facilitated by population movements, trade and other forms of economic interaction, and multiple episodes of sociocultural exchange. Moreover, the design and implementation of Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federal system by excluding several political forces led to complications in smoothly expediting the project of self-government. In light of the above, the prospect of the transition to lead to democratization was jeopardized, thereby serving as a harbinger of a one-party system in a framework of a pretentious multiparty setting.

If pluralism is understood as a means of measuring the performance of the Ethiopian transition, exclusionary practices that accompanied the July 1991 conference and thereafter limited prospects for entrenching a genuine democratic dispensation. It could thus be argued that the exercise of bringing together a distorted congregation of ethno-nationalists inhibited prospects for forging national consensus (Vestal, 1999). The Non-consensual model of transition in Ethiopia thus occurred under a shadow of the military prowess and dominant role of victors who strove to monopolize outcomes of the transitional process. EPRDF’s commitment to for furthering democratic transition through self-styled transformative orientation constrained its posturing as a midwife of democracy despite the liberal gambit. Hence, EPRDF understood transition as a controlled process of building a dominant party state rather than making it a vehicle for institutionalizing the foundations of new participatory governance. Nonetheless, the major external stakeholders such as the US were interested in securing EPRDF’s perpetuation to ensure short-term stability rather than endorsing fulfillment of the requisite elements of democratic transformation (Ottaway, 1995).

While elements of procedural democracy were brandished to camouflage the advent of new authoritarianism, radical reforms comprising restructuring of state-society relations were concurrently expedited through politicizing ethnicity. Even though the proliferation of political parties was witnessed, the regime applied its advantage of incumbency by weakening them to ensure its dominance. This is ascertained by the fact that while officialdom repeatedly preached the advantages of political pluralism, the ruling Front continued to make unilateral political decisions. Lyons (1996: 142) stated that “the Ethiopian transition began with a broadly inclusive national conference and ended, four years and three elections later, with a single-party dominant political system.” Pausewang and Tronvoll (2002) dubbed the state of affairs during the post-1991 transition pretentious by referring to the adoption of democratic forms and procedures in the absence of commensurate democratic values and norms in practice. It should be noted that introducing procedural democracy alone without paying attention to the substantive element renders efforts towards betterment farfetched. Mamdani (1992) argues that procedural democracy expressed in formal multipartyism is not a sufficient condition to qualify any transition as robust and rewarding, which applies to the situation in post-1991 Ethiopia. Gradual and piecemeal accumulation of widespread discontents and disaffection led to overt and covert popular resistance and eventually determined the course that the post-2018 transition took.

Pre-2018 popular protests

Whereas protests serve as harbingers of transition, political parties use elections as a site of expressing dissent by linking their demands to the popular will. In light of this, the study of reforms in a transition must consider how these address genuine popular demands for democratizing vertical and horizontal relations in society. It is to be recalled that the governance crisis in post-1991 Ethiopia, by selectively excluding legitimate stakeholders, shaped the advent of resistance against the status quo. In addition to open popular resistance, less-pronounced but widespread dissent too was commonplace, forming the protest–transition–reform dialectical linkage in Ethiopia’s contemporary politics. The protest–transition nexus that ushered in the new politics of the 1990s culminated in controlled politics marked by formal liberalization, democratization, decentralization and privatization. In due course, EPRDF transformed itself into a bewildered self-proclaimed hegemonic party operating under the façade of a de jure multiparty system. Subsequently, the reform measures of the 1990s facilitated the enterprise of superimposing political certainty enforced under EPRDF’s vanguard role.

The formation of ethno-regional self-governing states as second tiers of government is part of the long process of decentralization as a response to popular demands (FDRE, 1995). Kidane (2019) opined that such an arrangement is presumed to enable the country’s ethnic groups to enhance their development, cultures and common sense of belonging. However, Semir (2019) contends that upholding ethnic politics led to a proliferation of radical ethnonationalist trends that bred violent horizontal conflicts. The major challenge that resulted from this denotes the failure of the system to enhance a peaceful process of nation-building in a manner that runs counter to establishing an integrated political and economic community, as stipulated in the FDRE Constitution. Inadequacies that underlie the design of the post-1991 Ethiopian federalism thus cannot be explained without considering the inherent deficits in the structures of control and manipulation. It is now widely agreed that the structuring of Ethiopia’s federal system in the aforementioned manner is driven by the urge for furthering self-serving ulterior motives through fusing the structures of the ruling party and government.

The protests that accompanied the outcome of the controversial 2005 elections entailed a process of reversal that tilted the state of political engagement towards centralization and de-politicization. This was signified by subordinating legitimate aspirations of society and other stakeholders to the dictates of officialdom. The ramifications of the new politics of post-1991 Ethiopia should, therefore, be viewed as embedded in the contradictory political process: recasting state structures through introducing federalism and decentralized governance, on one hand, and building a hegemonic developmental state, on the other (Yonas, 2018). Post-2005 developments thus correspond to what Ferguson (1994) claims that the enterprise of building developmental states in Africa often end up in imposing exaggerated omnipotence of the state over depoliticized societies and render development an exclusive enclave of authoritarian regimes. Processes involved in the course of holding the 2005 elections seemed to have created a superficial commencement of another round of transition. As subsequent developments attested, Harbeson’s (2005: 158) anticipation that the relaxed atmosphere of the time could provide opportunities that can put “Ethiopia on a [new] transitional path” proved misplaced.

Similar to using the liberal reform measures of the 1990s to conceal its authoritarianism, EPRDF opened up the political space in 2005 in anticipation that its dominant position could hold. However, it resorted to naked force when the turn of events tended to neutralize the legitimacy of the status quo at risk. Given this, writers on the subject (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008, 2009; Abbink, 2006) dubbed the situation discomfiture and reversal of democracy. The political economy of Ethiopia’s transition of the 1990s is thus underpinned by a formally decentralized governance arrangement that unfolded by combining liberal and illiberal overtures, which resulted in producing a domineering party that imposed itself on a divided society. Unemployed urban and rural youth that were mobilized and controlled as objects that support EPRDF’s domination was criminalized in instances of behaving and acting contrary to the wishes of the ruling coalition (Di Nunzio, 2012). The same was also true of those who passionately pursued practicing the right to self-determination without being aware that this was pledged to only serve as a locus of evolving authoritarianism. It could thus be stated that political exclusion and the imperative of control best explain the rationale behind introducing federalism and distorting it at the same timer (Assefa and Fiseha, 2019). This is illustrative of the confusion embedded in the effort of intermarrying ruling party dominance and decentralized governance that precipitated EPRDF’s fragmentation (Kidane, 2019; Lyons, 2019).

The project of entrenching an authoritarian developmental state under the aegis of an overarching ruling party was countered from the outset through the agency of counter-hegemonic forces comprising disparate social and political movements. Resistance against the developmental state enterprise gradually gathered momentum, culminating in widespread popular unrest between 2015 and 2018. The popular demands advanced during the period in question were centered on the need for empowering citizens against the overbearing and unbridled dispensation. These ranged from the quest for genuine party and electoral politics to overhauling the mode of governance by effecting regime change (Addis Standard, 2017). The recent blending of counter-hegemonic movements in this manner coalesced in the course of the unfolding of post-election protests (Carter Center, 2009) that were primarily expressed in June 2005 in the capital city, subsequently escalating to other regions. In response, EPRDF came up with a discourse on terrorism as justification for its crackdown, reinforced by enacting prohibitive legislations for silencing dissent (Awol, 2017).

The 2015 protests were mainly staged by the youth in Oromiya triggered by the regime’s quest for implementing the Addis Ababa Master Plan by expanding the confines of the capital city to localities in the adjacent Oromiya Region. This necessitated the forceful eviction of town dwellers and peasants from their respective holdings. The major slogans of the Oromo youth that staged the resistance included “No to the master plan” and “down with EPRDF,” thus articulating the popular quest for fundamental political change through terminating the dominant party state (Addis Standard, 2017). The popular protests triggered by the Addis Ababa Master Plan project are perceived as an entry point to other grievances that led to the unfolding of disaffections in the different localities of the Oromiya regional state. For example, the protest in Ginchi was fuelled by the decision of the local authorities to sell forestland in the area to an investor through an illicit deal. Unwarranted and illegitimate land allocation to political elites and investors, to the detriment of the interest of youth groups in the locality, served as a harbinger of unrest premised on ethnonationalists’ agitation and mobilization. The youth in the Amhara Region and other constituents of the federation subsequently followed suit, thereby signalling that radical change in state-society relations was inevitable. Unemployment and marginalization of the youth in Amhara was conditioned by exclusion from having a modest share in the relatively burgeoning economy, presented as a structural contradiction that paved the way for the unfolding of popular protests in the region. State response to widespread protests was expressed through declaring rounds of state of emergency in October 2016 and February 2018 (Human Rights Watch, 2016). In doing so, the regime pursued a two-pronged strategy for offsetting the challenges posed against its perpetuation in power: disproportionate use of instruments of violence, on one hand, and co-opting protestors, on the other. Despite these, the unabated persistence of popular protests caused rifts and intense power struggles within EPRDF, ushering in a change of leadership signified by the ascendance of a pro-reform group in April 2018.

Post-2018 developments

The direction that the post-2018 transitional process was bound to take is broadly articulated by the new head of government (Abiy, 2020), presented as a manifesto of the reformed EPRDF designated as the Prosperity Party (PP). The post-2018 transition thus evolved without ousting EPRDF from power, which could be explained by the emergence of a pro-reform leadership from its ranks, on one hand, and fragmentation of the opposition, on the other. Moreover, robust civil society organizations were either completely absent or co-opted in the past. In light of this, popular protests that speeded up changes took shape in the absence of a coherent and integrated organizational milieu. As a result, prospects for introducing a fully consensual transitional process were largely absent (Lidetu, 2020). This mode of transition, as discussed earlier, allows for creative use of political continuity in reforming the system (Share, 1987). Political liberalization commenced with EPRDF’s apology to victims of violent repression and reconciliatory speech made by the new prime minister. The introduction of new concepts and political language heralded the advent of the period of liberalization marked by the lifting of the state of emergency, releasing political prisoners, revoking and amending draconian laws, and inviting all insurgent groups and exiled opposition parties and individuals to join the transitional process. The inclusion of all stakeholders signified the coming on the scene of transactional transition, which seemed to galvanize Ethiopian political forces behind national unity and solidarity politics.

The Ethio-Eritrea peace deal that cemented the new rapprochement put an end to the rivalry that lasted for about two decades between the two countries. The geopolitical ramifications resulting from this historic episode brought the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia on board as major actors in the Horn politics as partners of the reformed Ethiopian regime (Elleni, 2020). The new Ethiopian leadership thus introduced a fresh discourse associated with regional economic integration by revisiting its foreign policy drives and effecting shifts in orientation at a regional level. Accordingly, the prime minister successfully mediated conflicts and rivalry between estranged regional actors, including breaking the stalemate that affected smooth transition in the Republic of Sudan. As Mainwaring (1989) noted, progress at this stage of political liberalization could be viewed as the phase of honeymoon in political transition, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for consolidating transition. Irrespective of the euphoria that political transition signals, the onset of democracy, however, “is a very complex, contested, endangered, and sometimes reversible process” (Adejumobi, 2015: 3). Without subjecting it to what could transpire at a later stage, political liberalization in Ethiopia could be viewed as a commendable achievement for putting right the distorted state-society relations of the past. This notwithstanding, however, challenges associated with the opening up of the political space could entail mobilization of diverse political actors that inevitably polarizes diverse political positions, rendering the governance arena problematic.

Prospects for transition: Consensus, transformation or transplacement

The ongoing Ethiopian transition through transformation commenced with the opening up of the political space. However, the process faced challenges that inhibited prospects for the consensus-based transition by transplacement. Transition to democracy by transplacement is consensus-based, peaceful and rapid, and requires the incumbent’s willingness to initiate democratization as well as demonstrate its ability to implement reforms. As the incumbent tried to liberalize and shift its logic of rule and power anchored in authoritarianism, it significantly rocked the sense of unity that prevailed within the previous ruling coalition. As a result, EPRDF became a victim of its internal contradiction as the consequent political opening and liberalization gradually worsened. TPLF immediately opted to stand against the tide of reform ushering in one aspect of the current polarization. Escalation of mutual and reciprocal disapproval of each other’s disposition on the part of the currently ruling Prosperity Party and TPLF tended to threaten prospects towards successful democratization and peaceful coexistence in the country.

If a transition is consensual, the inclusion of the masses is central, since reducing their role to voting and instrument for introducing liberal methodological democracy does not suffice to imbue a dispensation with substantive elements. We argue that the polarization of horizontal relations evolving in the country is too wide to be contained and transformed through electoral politics alone. In light of this, the prospect for entrenching transition by transplacement based on consensus and all-inclusive dialogue is indispensable. However, the model chosen by the incumbent in Ethiopia is a transition by transformation. This is viewed by several opposition parties as an attempt to monopolize the transition process. In this manner, mutual suspicion and mistrust made the road to transition an uphill stride. This appears the culmination of moments of tansition in Ethiopia and once again we also reafirm that “the country has thus to come to grips with and move beyond this legacy if it is to have any hope of redemption” (Bahru, 2014: 280). As illustrated in the era of the revolution and the transition of the 1990s, the political elite failed to exercise dialogue and compromise as a foundation for entrenching democratization. The unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic laid bare the constitutional gap forcing electoral deferment that put the Ethiopian transition at the crossroad.