Abstract
This study examines a new wave of populisms arising in the digital era using Pastor Evan Mawarire’s #ThisFlag movement: What are they, and how do they express themselves? How does the hegemony react to them? Non-mainstream, digitally born movements, especially in dictatorships, are dismissed by the political elite as ill-mannered disruptors whose political interventions are detrimental. To analyse the cleric’s populism and its meaning to the Zimbabwean body politic, we use three specific themes: (a) personality and influence of movement leader(s); (b) populist communication and messaging; and (c) recreating an involved citizenry. We used digital ethnography to gather and analyse data.
Keywords
Introduction
This study examines populism from below and argues that it shaped anti-Robert Mugabe sentiments through the #ThisFlag movement in Zimbabwe. The study further submits that populism was functional in its use by an ordinary cleric, and it allowed for a coalescence of ordinary voices in protesting the then Mugabe-led hegemony. In various public and academic debates on populism as a concept, what comes up prominently as characteristics are the tension-filled political styles (Ernst et al., 2019; Hameleers, 2018; Nai and Coma, 2019). However, a gap exists in analysing a new wave of populism arising in the digital era: What are they, and how do they express themselves? How does the old guard react to them? Non-mainstream populists such as digitally born movements, especially in dictatorships, are dismissed by political elites as ill-mannered disruptive “dinner guests” whose political interventions are side-shows detrimental to nationalist projects.
Using Pastor Evan Mawarire’s fronted and Zimbabwe’s #ThisFlag movement as a case study, we examine populism within discourses of citizen-driven movements. Scholarly work on the movement agrees that the #ThisFlag movement was started by Mawarire in 2016, after recording a video in which he passionately decried the country’s decline, which immediately trended on social media leading to a fractious engagement between Mawarire and the then Mugabe regime (see Gukurume, 2017; Karekwaivanane and Mare, 2019; Mastilele, 2019; Matsilele and Mutsvairo, 2021; Mpofu and Mare, 2020; Nenjerama, 2020a, 2021; Oberdorf, 2017; Sacks, 2020). Mugabe was later dethroned (November 2017) in a coup following intra-party factional battles and military intervention. The coup saw Mugabe’s long-time assistant and enabler, Emmerson Mnangagwa, taking over the presidential seat. Thereafter, military generals who helped get rid of Mugabe were accorded posts in the presidency and cabinet. Thus, the #ThisFlag movement was influential in feeding discontentment against Mugabe, who had been generally viewed as Zimbabwe’s problem. However, we argue that Mugabe was not the only problem – the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) has always been a Zimbabwean problem.
Though there are scientific agreements about the ideational core of populism (separating the pure people and corrupt elite), disagreements on the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of populism still exist (Hameleers, 2018). In Western politics, the concept is traced from Jacobinism after the French Revolution, Peronism in Argentina, Soviet-style regimes, the Polish anti-socialist Solidarność and fascist regimes (Custodi, 2017). In the 19th century United States and Russia, populism came through political movements (Kortboyer, 2018). In the 21st century, it is referenced to politicians such as Donald Trump. Politicians use various discourses in garnering support, thus populism in political spheres (Aslanidis, 2017; Taggart, 2000), and populism as a form of political communication and mobilisation is studied. These perspectives consider populism to be an exclusively top-down concept where political party leaders mobilise diverse constituencies to reap electoral benefits (Aslanidis, 2017). However, what of ordinary citizens who emerge as populists driving mass action?
Although the minimal definition of populism as the antagonistic relationship between the “ordinary people” versus the “corrupt elites” has merits when applied to the supply side of political parties (Engesser et al., 2017), it does not capture how populist ideas are expressed between ordinary citizens in social movements’ formation, especially in digital populism contexts. Therefore, we utilise Mawarire’s status as an ordinary citizen and the movement’s independence from political parties’ influence to further understand populism from below. To achieve this, we use three specific themes: (a) personality and influence of movement leader(s); (b) populist communication and messaging; and (c) recreating an involved citizenry. These themes are generated from the videos that Mawarire used to communicate with the masses and participants in the movement.
In attaining and analysing data, the study uses digital ethnography. The growth and increase in the use and penetration of the Internet and subsequent new information and communication technologies have made it unavoidable that digital media contributes to research as an ethnography site (Murthy, 2008). Ethnography, as an offline qualitative methodological approach, encapsulates telling human stories and lived experiences. Ethnography involves a researcher going to the field, interacting with the research subjects, and making observations as part of the data gathering process. There are different ways they do this: they can participate in the phenomenon they are researching; observe without participation but with the participants acknowledging the researcher’s presence; or researchers may observe the participants without interfering with them. Digital technologies allow researchers to interact with subjects online as they gather data or by cyber stealth, whereby the researcher’s presence is not known and acknowledged by the researched (Ebo, 1998). This research relies on Mawarire’s online #ThisFlag campaign and how he formulated his messages, for what intended consequences and how they were (likely) received by Zimbabweans in the country and diaspora. The researchers dug the archive of Mawarire’s online posts for this research project and therefore could not have participated in any other way in debating and shaping the content of the movement. The posts used in this research were purposively sampled.
The Zimbabwean context and the emergence of the #ThisFlag movement
Before proceeding, a mapping of Zimbabwe’s post-colonial history is instructive. The country’s independence in 1980 introduced new possibilities for governance and national growth from the nationalist perspective, with social gains being deemed accessible to the masses. The first decade was misnamed a “honeymoon period” (Sachikonye, 1999) because of the stable economy characterised by booming industrial production, built to serve colonial interests. The regime utilised populist methods to garner mass support through command economy frameworks and redistributive economic objectives that necessitated a large public sector and increased government spending on health, education, and other social welfare programmes (Makina, 2010). In addition, the government co-opted development-oriented civil society organisations (CSOs) to deliver developmental benefits to a previously marginalised population (Masunungure, 2019).
However, ZANU–PF’s drive towards a one-party state went ignored even after doing so via the Gukurahundi genocide (Mpofu, 2016). The Zimbabwe African People’s Union was co-opted into ZANU–PF through the Unity Accord 1 of 1987 at the end of the genocide and cemented Mugabe’s authoritarian rule and one-party state ideology. The agreement challenged CSOs since ZANU–PF defined itself as the only legitimate and all-encompassing organisation to represent the people and all social movements; thus, it challenged CSOs to join the ruling party to prove their revolutionary and patriotic commitment (Moyo, 1993). ZANU–PF’s political conception redefined its relationship with CSOs since it defined itself as inviolable, and perceived its policies as frameworks to address all anti-government institutions and activists challenging human rights violations as in the Gukurahundi genocide case.
The failed economic projects inspired by the International Monetary Fund’s economic liberalisation frameworks, such as the 1990–1996 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), and the 1996–2000 Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation, to continue the unfinished business of ESAP (Makina, 2010), resulted in liberals and radicals becoming united in proclaiming civil society as a viable alternative to the failed state and a voice for regime change – identifying the state as bad while everything outside it was good (Moyo, 1993). The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), a 1983 government brainchild operating under the guidance of and in tandem with ZANU–PF party structures (Manyuchi, 2012; Moyo, 1993), shifted its focus to criticise the government’s failed populist frameworks and provided pro-democratic activists with a voice against authoritarianism and deteriorating living standards. Protests deemed “mass stay-aways” broke out under ZCTU, led by Morgan Tsvangirai (Taundi, 2010). The coalescence of the ZCTU, CSOs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), unions and White farmers resulted in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, with Tsvangirai as its president. The MDC challenged ZANU–PF’s dominance and created a platform whereon CSOs/NGOs could now participate in national politics (Manyuchi, 2012). The National Constitutional Assembly, ZCTU and MDC collaborated to challenge the government and organise outreaches to campaign against the new constitution in a 2000 referendum with which Mugabe sought to extend his presidential powers. The opposition won the day as the ZANU–PF-fronted constitution was rejected, handing the ruling party its first-ever loss in the ballot.
The trend in civil society protests invariably transformed in the face of post-2000 repression, mislabelled the “Zimbabwe Crisis”. Zimbabwe has been in crisis since independence. The perspective by Mugabe and the state that CSOs were fronts for an anti-ZANU–PF regime-change agenda supposedly driven by their Western donors meant to abet the MDC (Gutsa and Mandizadza, 2014) sustained a rift between the state, MDC, and pro-democratic activists. The paranoia by the state is somewhat valid since some of the CSOs relied on Western funding, thereby justifying Mugabe’s populist rants (Nenjerama and Sibanda, 2019). The state–CSO dichotomy existed on an antagonistic basis: MDC and its supporters were imagined as democratic and viable substitutes for Mugabe’s despotism.
The inconclusive presidential elections of 2008 that Mugabe allegedly lost but refused to yield power to the opposition saw a rerun between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. What ensued was an onslaught on Tsvangirai and MDC party supporters, resulting in the former withdrawing from the rerun. The Southern African Development Committee and African Union intervened under the headship of South African former president, Thabo Mbeki, leading to the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in late 2008 – Morgan Tsvangirai assumed the office of Prime Minister with some of his subordinates becoming government ministers, and Mugabe retained the presidency (Mlambo, 2016). The coalition revived hope in Zimbabwe, as it established a people-driven constitution – there followed economic revival through the multicurrency economy, and basic commodities became available in shops and were accessible because of an increase in real wages (Karekwaivanane and Mare, 2019; Southall, 2017).
However, after the 2013 elections, ZANU–PF regained power, and the socio-economic decline characterised by liquidity crunch and high unemployment rates resurfaced. The prospects for future growth were undermined by low investor confidence in a government widely regarded as hostile to foreign capital – salaries were delayed, and cash shortages in the banks resurfaced, posing a challenge in cash withdrawals (Karekwaivanane and Mare, 2019). The MDC’s defeat was a sobering experience for civil society and a prompt to introspect, to reinvent itself and recalibrate its role in a changing political economy (Masunungure, 2019). Additionally, belief in Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC party as the viable solution to Zimbabwe’s broader problems was declining due to infighting and schisms – politicians from both the ruling party and the opposition were viewed as contributing to the problem leading to a loss of faith in political elites, and thus influencing the rise of citizen-led campaigns (Karekwaivanane and Mare, 2019). Consequently, the end of the GNU and declining confidence in the opposition party meant the reinvention of protest culture by a hitherto castrated civil society.
The post-2013 period has seen a manifestation of a reimagined protest culture with ordinary citizens taking centre stage in Zimbabwe as surrogates in challenging political exploitation by ZANU–PF. Notable cases include the Occupy Africa Unity Square (OAUS), #Tajamuka/Sesijikile and #ThisFlag movement. The OAUS, headed by Itai Dzamara, used central Harare as its venue for anti-government protest resulting in his abduction presumably by state security agents and his disappearance in April 2015 (Sachikonye, 2017). The #ThisFlag movement and #Tajamuka/Sesijikile emerged in 2016, protesting socio-political and economic deterioration. Both movements used social media in organising online and offline protests.
The #ThisFlag movement emerged out of a citizen-populism that employed social media in mass mobilisation techniques. Evan Mawarire, a Baptist pastor, recorded and uploaded a video on his Facebook timeline on 19 April 2016, criticising poor governance and the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The video went viral on social media, from 10,000 views in a day to almost 200,000 hits after a week (Gukurume, 2017). The video also attracted local and international coverage. Mawarire used the Zimbabwean flag and its symbolism to demonstrate how the ruling ZANU–PF had wrecked the country. The pastor utilised and questioned the flag’s ethos because of its portrayal of values such as shared prosperity, democracy and the country’s agriculture and mining potential being jeopardised by the government (Matsilele, 2019; Matsilele and Mutsvairo, 2021; Nenjerama, 2020a). The flag allowed Mawarire and the participating citizens to reclaim pride in being Zimbabweans and castigate ZANU–PF for failing to address endemic corruption, economic crises, unemployment, poor governance, and police brutality (Gukurume, 2017). Mawarire rallied ordinary citizens to his side and formed an alternative nationalism deviating from ZANU–PF’s tired one, which had caused an identity crisis, marginalisation, economic mismanagement, and human rights abuses (Nenjerama, 2020a). The movement describes itself as a “citizen movement” (Mungwari and Ndhlebe, 2019) and is active on Facebook and Twitter – on Facebook, it uses the names Evan Mawarire and ThisFlag/Ifulegi Leyi/Mureza Uyu – on Twitter, it uses #ThisFlag, E Mawarire @PastorEvan Live (Matsilele, 2019; Matsilele and Mutsvairo, 2021).
There have been misconceptions about the movement’s objective – some deemed it a mere social media campaign or an Arab Spring-like revolution call to dislodge Mugabe from power – however, it mobilised citizens to hold the government accountable for the poverty, corruption and injustices bedevilling Zimbabwe (McGrath, 2016). It firstly manifested as the citizens’ nonviolent challenge against the government; secondly, showed the possibilities of social media in democratisation ideals and its tandem implications on activism; and, thirdly, the possibilities of voices independent of political party influence to amass public support in agitating for social change. The success of the first video initiated a 5-day campaign which morphed into a 25-day campaign where Mawarire urged citizens to buy Zimbabwean flags, and move around wearing them to compel the government to address their plight (Gukurume, 2017). In a video on 5 July 2016, the clergyman exhorted Zimbabweans to abscond work the next day as part of the nationwide shutdown, and on 6 July, the call was successful, leading the government to arrest and charge Mawarire with treason, an offence punishable by death in Zimbabwe (Matsilele, 2019). The movement ideologised the flag as a site of contention and developed a binary framework that utilised cyberspace and physical street protests.
Populism: Review of the literature
Populism, invariably and inherently, captures core characteristics of a separated society based on elite–masses power dynamics. It claims the abuse and betrayal of people by the elites who engage in power abuse; hence it calls for restoring the people’s sovereignty (Ernst et al., 2019). Nonetheless, whatever the context, midway between the descriptive and the normative, “populism” intends to grasp significant elements about the political and ideological realities to which it refers (Laclau, 2005). With this reference to the socio-political realities, populism dominantly focuses on political and economic access, and policy frameworks viewed as skewed towards a particular group, especially the oligarchy.
The established social and political institutions’ inability to confine and regulate political subjects into a relatively stable social order produces populist practices that form part of a struggle over hegemonic power (Filc, 2010; Panizza, 2005). Thus, populism presents itself as an alternative to institutional systems, elitism, and the crisis it attempts to restore. Consequently, the society becomes ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004). In some uses of populism there are allegations of corruption, malpractice by a self-serving political elite, typifying populism with the “politics of anti-politics”, as politicians and political parties become the “other” of the people – thus populism becomes a mode of identification rather than to individuals or parties (Panizza, 2005). The identification process is “naturalised” by a list of grievances submitted by the populist to coalesce people or groups affected by the same grievances.
Populism is also analysed as an ideology, discursive, or political style (Mudde, 2004), discourse (Laclau, 2005), a political communication method (Bonikowski et al., 2018), and as based on political leaders and political conditions (Weyland, 2001). Character and personality are also examined to understand who and what a populist is (Nai and Coma, 2019). We focus on the person of Mawarire to understand his populist discourses and how citizens sympathised with and engaged in co-creating the #ThisFlag movement. A common aspect between the different approaches to populism is the centrality or monolithic will of the pure, ordinary people as its minimal requirement (Hameleers and Vliegenthart, 2020). In whatever way populism is defined, the “pure” people are a crucial component used in its definition as used in various political communication methods and formation of antagonistic movements.
As an ideology, populism distinguishes the “evil” elite from the “pure” masses trying to redeem the status quo (Mudde, 2004). With such a distinction, differentiation becomes an element of labelling between the elite and the masses, their political positioning, and its power. However, this ideological understanding of populism is problematic because it does not fully articulate the theory of society with extensive prescriptions for social reform, nor a deeply held set of beliefs that shapes politicians’ policy behaviour (Bonikowski et al., 2018). Populism is an attribute of political claims: political messages’ formation as imbued in party literature, public manifestoes or internal party publications, are helpful in classifying the political actors who produce the literature as either populist or not (Bonikowski et al., 2018). Bonikowski and colleagues’ suggestion helps define populism as a communication model employed by politicians and political parties. However, the applicability of such views is problematic when assessing populism advanced by ordinary citizens who do not produce publications nor have political party structures needing communication to garner political support.
The concept is also analysed as a discursive or political communication technique that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy (De la Torre, 2015). It establishes politics and political narratives showing the variance between the oligarchy and the masses. It emphasises the unique contribution of communication processes to construct populist ideas and the communicative styles that systematically co-occur with it (de Vreese et al., 2018). It is characterised by programmatic minimalism but with remarkable symbolic plasticity making it a vector conducive to forging multiple and heterogeneous indignations – ethnocultural, anti-tax, and anti-elitist (Hastings, 2013). This populism constitutes messages expressing the populist’s ideology on power dynamics as defined by politics and social strata. Message framing and communication styles become the core point in this populist outlook.
Populism as a political strategy subsumes policy choices, political organisation, and forms of mobilisation (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013), capturing the fundamental goal of populist leaders to acquire and exercise power and utilising economic and social policy to this effect (Weyland, 2001). It is a political appeal seeking to change political discourse, articulate new social relations, redefine political frontiers and constitute new identities (Panizza, 2005). Though the articulation and redefinition of social relations and identities are essential to populism, this perspective overlooks two significant factors common to most populist movements: the centrality of economic grievances; and the style of campaigning (Cheeseman and Larmer, 2015). The style of campaigning includes the weaving of people’s grievances into populist messages incorporating frustrations over socio-economic affairs. Therefore, whether right-wing or left-wing, populists present themselves as “one of the people”, ready to use their common sense and lived experience to defend the “common man” against manipulative elites (Cheeseman and Larmer, 2015). Explicitly, populism presents itself as subversive of the existing social order and as the starting point for radical change reorganisation of social structures whenever the previous regime has been shaken (Laclau, 2005). The populist thus captures prevalent issues common to the masses and objectifies them by presenting him/herself as suitable in redeeming the status quo.
Changes at economic, cultural, and societal levels, such as urbanisation and economic modernisation processes, shifts in demographic balances between social classes and between regional and ethnic groups, inspire the emergence of populist politics (Laclau, 2005). Due to colonial practices in Zimbabwe, Black populists and nationalists embarked on liberating projects which highlighted issues of nativism and identity. The nationalists advanced a populist movement utilising indigeneity and natural/traditional rights to the economy and natural resources to subvert the colonial system (Nenjerama 2020b). The ideologisation of rights was a mobilisation strategy employed to conscientise the masses on issues of economic prosperity as embedded within nativist narratives. While we do not intend to explore the colonial era, it is vital to understand nativism and populist movements targeted at reaping mass support in overthrowing the colonialists. The same issues were perpetuated post-independence with the ZANU–PF-led government creating discourses based on natural resources and Black identity in legitimising its rule.
The ZANU–PF’s post-colonial ideology centred on “patriotic history” and made incessant references to Mugabe, his image and persona. The same ideology depicts the 1970s national liberation war as ZANU–PF’s highest expression of commitment to the Black liberation mission, and the 2000s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in the government’s perspective as a continuation of the liberation struggle of the 1970s (Gwekwerere et al., 2019). The FTLRP aimed at gaining support from “some black elites desperate for quick embourgeoisement, war veterans, and landless peasants” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). The project was meant to abet the momentum gained by the MDC as an organised body responding to the economic crisis and ZANU–PF’s deteriorating political influence.
The ZANU–PF’s political discourses synonymised the image of Mugabe with nation-state making and its historicity. Resultantly, the government fetishised and mythologised Mugabe’s power and person (Siziba and Ncube, 2015) through populist messaging based on the president’s image. State media projects were also instrumental in creating a ZANU–PF and Mugabe-centred narrative of selfless leadership and heroism in the fight against colonisation (Siziba and Ncube, 2015), which is averse to all other perspectives on the Zimbabwean story except the one sanctioned by ZANU–PF (Gwekwerere et al., 2019). The populistic portrayal of Mugabe was expressed through pictures that adorned all public buildings making him omnipresent in Zimbabwe, and his biography and hagiography were made inextricably intertwined with the political rise and economic collapse of Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015).
We acknowledge economic and social realities as part of the preconditions shaping populist discourses. For this study, populism is a “thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic group, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 53). We define populists as “bad-mannered provocateurs” (De Landsheer and Kalkhoven, 2014), aboding personalistic traits that shape citizens’ participation, mobilisation and communication of protest against the elite. That is, populism places citizens at the spectrum of political power as dictated by social strata – of political leaders and the “power” of ordinary masses.
Analysis and discussion of the #ThisFlag movement
To analyse the populism of Mawarire’s #ThisFlag movement and its meaning to the Zimbabwean body politic, this study uses three specific themes: (a) personality and influence of movement leader(s); (b) populist communication and messaging; and (c) recreating an involved citizenry. These themes maintain the argument in this study that populism from below functioned as an inclusive concept in the movement, and it also sheds light on understanding non-mainstream populism.
Personality and influence of movement leader(s)
Populists have been described as having detrimental characteristics, acting against social norms (Nai and Coma, 2019), and displaying bad manners (Moffitt, 2016). The very “detrimental” character of populists threatens those they protest against. To reach this conclusion is to assume that there is a certain normative behavioural standard expected in the political space such that if one does not act accordingly, then they are deviant. This assumption, in the case of Mawarire, comes from the government which the pastor protested against. In response, the then former Minister of Information, Jonathan Moyo, tweeted that the movement was nothing that could shake the core of Zimbabwe’s political system. Moyo dismissed the movement saying, “only idiots think publicity stunts, hashtag protests, pastoral farts, and rented demos will grab power in Zimbabwe!” (Moyo, 2016 on Twitter). In populist behaviour, personality traits of political leaders are hard to hide and are stable over time and closely related to behaviour. They thus seem to be a perfect yardstick to predict what to expect from a candidate if elected (Nai and Coma, 2019). However, in the case of Evan Mawarire, it was nearly impossible to have known much of the man until after and during the occurrence of the #ThisFlag movement. Therefore, to predict his traits before the movement would be to do injustice; hence for this study, we analyse his traits as those portrayed within the making of the movement. We argue that his charismatic personality, portrayed in the first video where he adorned the Zimbabwean flag with a sad violin background music, enabled him to emotionally reach and relate to the masses who were enduring the same crisis as him.
Mawarire’s charismatic personality allows us to recognise a reconceptualisation of populism and its deployment in the country. The personality portrayed the “people-centrism” approach (Hameleers and Vliegenthart, 2020). On the one hand, people-centrism considers people as central and whose voices need recognition in political discourses. On the other hand, it invites reaction from power holders and the hegemony. The late former president Mugabe and the government labelled Mawarire a project of the West (a common term used against anyone who protests against the hegemony in Zimbabwe) and one who should leave the country. Thus, Mugabe labelling Mawarire an ill-mannered pastor and the movement as a pastoral fart by Professor Jonathan Moyo is similar to the characterisation of dissenting voices and journalists such as Hopewell Chin’ono as “bad apples that should be flushed out” for exposing corruption within the government by President Mnangagwa in 2019. This elite’s characterisation of protest voices helps us to recognise the space in which Mawarire created the #ThisFlag movement. The consequences of being labelled a protest voice by the government shed more light on the prevailing realities the citizenry finds as affecting them, and thus identifying them as one with the populist. Citizen-centred populism considers the citizens’ place of emergence as marginal spaces segregated by the elite. In the #ThisFlag movement, populism emerged from a marginal space (politically and economically) intending to seek structural and institutional reforms.
Populists are associated with qualities of leadership and charisma (Nai and Coma, 2019). We advance that charisma, coupled with communicative abilities, were essential for Mawarire to influence the citizens to action and engagement. Populism has been suggested in an institutional form to incorporate partisan groups intending to translate political statements into political regeneration projects by mobilising the imagination of a virtuous people, who symbolise the last repository of national values, ready to follow a strong leader embodying the axioms of transparency, proximity, similarity, and truthfulness (Hastings, 2013). However, Mawarire approached the concept in a non-institutional manner coupled with charisma. This charisma is expressed in the following statement: I want to do an official invitation to you, wherever you are in Zimbabwe or outside Zimbabwe. We want them [our politicians] to know taneta vakomana, tine nzara, hatina mabasa (we are tired, hungry and jobless) . . . we want everybody to begin to work together for a better Zimbabwe. (Mawarire, 2016a)
Karekwaivanane and Mare (2019) observed that in his attempt to use social media in mobilising the masses, Mawarire, in the #ThisFlag campaign aimed to embolden citizens to challenge government malfeasance thereby helping the campaign gain unprecedented traction across the political, ethnic, class and racial divides. They further state that aided by the creative use of emotive videos, memes, text and audio content, the campaign used social media to produce and distribute its action and consensus mobilisation frames. In its focus to coalesce people from various divides, Mawarire embedded a message that resonated with the masses. In the first video that propelled the movement, the pastor utilised the emotive element as he used the sad violin background music while exploring nationalistic matters embedded in the flag. The pastor’s charisma captured common and collective experiences of suffering by the citizens.
This study defines Mawarire’s populism as citizen-centred populism transcending ideological cleavages, fused with either left-wing or right-wing appeals as dependent upon the socio-political context within which the populist actors emerge and mobilise (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). This type of populism is divergent from those created and led by populist leaders, being typically confrontational and exclusive rather than collaborative and inclusive (Dalio et al., 2017). Intersecting this perspective with charisma, Mawarire magnified the independence of the movement from political party influence to motion citizens to action. The campaign was framed on a broad-based appeal deriving from the non-partisan nature of its message, as well as the identity of Mawarire as a religious figure such that in the absence of coherent opposition from opposition parties, the pastor temporarily assumed the status of Zimbabwe’s “surrogate opposition leader” (Karekwaivanane and Mare, 2019). The legitimisation and accordance of “surrogate opposition leader” came through statements such as: “I want to invite you timbomira tese semaZimbabweans (for us to unite as Zimbabweans), take your flag with you and let us make a statement that our politicians will hear whether they are the ruling party, or opposition party” (Mawarire, 2016b). Understanding the complexities within the political space and its dividing nature among citizens according to affiliation and allegiance, Mawarire sought to present an inclusive movement regardless of any distinguishing factors. Thus, though populism called for accountability by political leaders, it did not focus on the institutionalisation of power in the hands of the citizens but defined hegemonic legitimation as manifesting through popular involvement. The non-institutionalisation of political power allowed the #ThisFlag movement to navigate the politics of affiliation and allegiance to political parties and leaders.
Citizen populism was utilised as an emancipatory alternative from below (Murisa, 2018), focusing on collecting a wide range of homogeneous voices sharing resonant themes common at the societal base of socio-political and economic power. This utilisation of citizen populism was based on the movement’s independence from political party influence, its appeal to citizens in Zimbabwe and the diaspora, and a bid to coalesce political voices from both the left and right, together with the citizens voices. The concept allowed the marginalised to utilise the spectrum of marginality to contest power institutions. The concept has twofold implications: it widens the gap between the citizen-populist and the elite; or it bridges the gap between the two in redressing grievances by merging voices from both sides. Whereas the latter is ideal, the former characterises trends in Zimbabwean activism – the conflict between the citizens and the elite further intensifies as the state engages in systemic oppression, repression, and ideological state apparatuses to silence ordinary voices.
The charisma and personality of the pastor can be traced to his communicative demeanour. In his campaign videos, Mawarire used the phrases “Hatichada, uye hatichatya/We do not want this anymore, and we are no longer afraid”. Matsilele and Mutsvairo (2021) trace and liken the statement to those found in instances of resistance where those resisting White dominance used bold statements amid threats to their life in Zimbabwe. The authors refer to the spirit medium of Mbuya Nehanda, who, when facing death, declared “Mapfupa angu achamuka/My bones will rise again” and in the Second Chimurenga where guerrillas sang “Amai naBaba/musandichema kana ndafa/nehondo” (Mum and dad, do not weep for me if I die in this struggle). Matsilele and Mutsvairo (2021) further state that these are statements of resolve, and when the pastor says “hatichatya”, he could be evoking historical precedence of dying in pursuing freedom and justice. The statement by Mawarire, being reminiscent of the past, also sought to encourage the participating youths. Mawarire’s character and background were crucial in his charismatic outlook because they assisted in packaging his messages. The pastor is a seasoned and charismatic orator and motivational speaker who had studied and worked in marketing and public relations before becoming a religious minister (Karekwaivanane and Mare, 2019; Mungwari and Ndhlebe, 2019). His personality allowed him to strategically use social media to mobilise geographically dispersed Zimbabweans and initiate online and offline conversations between politicians and citizens (Mpofu and Mare, 2020).
Populist communication and messaging
We submit that populist communication and messaging is imbued in populism whose content refers “to the public communication of core components of populist ideology such as people-centrism and anti-elitism with a characteristic set of key messages or frames” (de Vreese et al., 2018: 425). Similarly, for citizen-centred populism to function, it adopts the personalistic, plebiscitarian style of political leadership used by some scholars to define populism (Weyland, 2001) but further centralises the collectiveness of the segregated in-group within the society. There is also a stylistic approach to communication wherein the messages expressing populist ideology are associated with using a characteristic set of presentational style elements (de Vreese et al., 2018). Charisma and personalistic traits are a part of populist message reception by the receivers, thus, implying a relationship between the leader and their followers and how the former is perceived by the latter (McDonnell, 2016). The leader’s reputation and image become important in populist communication processes (Nai and Coma, 2019). While Mawarire, in his communication, refrained from being viewed as a leader representing the masses, he arguably represented the masses to some degree. However, in his representation, he further used populist messaging to emancipate the masses to take ownership of the movement based on congruent issues affecting them.
The populist messaging frame entails the utilisation of communicative methods to appeal to one’s audience or followers. It depicts various forms of communicative and discursive engagements imbued in language. Language is compulsive in politics and can be manipulated to compel one’s followers into allegiance, and it differentiates political leaders, their parties, and followers. To exploit language as an all-inclusive method that traversed the challenge of political party identification, Mawarire used citizenship language instead of political party affiliation (Kortboyer, 2018). The pastor used various phrases such as “my fellow citizens” 2 and “this flag is a citizen’s movement. Citizens own this movement. . .” (Mawarire, 2016b). Such phrases are part of the “unified nativist” (Otjes et al., 2018) approach to issues of structural reformation. An all-inclusive language engaged and provided the citizens with an imagined and idealised political space where their voice holds power.
Zimbabwe is branded by tribalism and ethnic contestations when it comes to political power. The country consists of various ethnic groups, with the Shona and Ndebele being the largest and second-largest, respectively. The country’s political history consists of the much ignored 1983–1987 Gukurahundi genocide, wherein ZANU–PF unleashed the fifth brigade on the Ndebele ethnic group who they deemed dissidents in the newly democratic state. Theories forwarded concerning the genocide cite Mugabe’s objective to force Nkomo into a power-sharing deal which would allow him to establish a one-party state, and the need to wipe out the Ndebele group and force them into submitting to the Shona as supreme power holders in Zimbabwe (Yap, 2001). Populist communication demanded the need for Mawarire to recognise such historicity, enabling him to manoeuvre tribalism as a politically indicted issue since it may have determined whether the people from the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces would have followed and participated in the movement.
In populist discourse, the following elements are essential: reference to “the people or citizens”; contestations against the “corrupt” elite; and the identification of an out-group (Otjes et al., 2018). These three elements foregrounded Mawarire’s message formulation in citizenry communication and citizenry response on his Facebook page: I’m absolutely embarrassed . . . to report back to you citizens, that last night Professor Jonathan Moyo responded . . . he said that ThisFlag (movement) is being funded by the West, hanzi murikupihwa mari nevarungu, kuti mutaure zvamuri kutaura (he said we are being funded by the West for us to protest and speak out). [U]p to today this is how you think? I am so ashamed at your response that you think that Zimbabweans cannot think for themselves to complain that enough is enough. (Mawarire, 2016c)
In response, one citizen, Tawanda Chikwanha, wrote on Facebook: Our politicians have no accountability and always find a scapegoat to blame for their incompetence. They chase away white farmers after failing to fulfil promises, they continue even now to blame the West for every shortfall and wrongdoing. You are right; we are of right sound minds to be sidetracked or fooled by propaganda. REGISTER TO VOTE #ThisFlag
Mawarire’s sentiments consist of the three elements that characteristically have been used to identify populist communication. The pastor and the citizen firstly identify themselves as the “people” and secondly, as having been exploited by the elite, and thus they are a segregated group resisting elitism. Fundamentally, the populist communication process portrays Mawarire’s ability to identify thematic issues resonant with the masses and identify propagandist thinking portrayed by the elites to which the masses are now accustomed.
Populism and the recreating of an involved citizenry
This subsection looks at how Mawarire rallied the citizens behind the #ThisFlag movement. On day 16, he introduced a strategy of engagement: I want to introduce you to a very simple strategy based on three simple things: Speak, Ask and Act . . . That is what it means to be a citizen . . ., I want to invite every citizen to start that journey . . . start where you are with the people that you have, find your voice again, Speak, Ask, Act. We are also going to run with this Speak, Ask, Act campaign, we want to push it as far as we can kuti munhu wese azive kuti Zimbabwe ndeyake (for every citizen to know that this country is theirs), this country is yours, and this country does not belong to a few people only. Voter registration, the elections are coming up, it is our job to start to teach each other how to register for voting so that we have the outcome that the citizens want. (Mawarire, 2016d)
Citizen action and political participation have been critical in Zimbabwe’s political space. The democratisation of political life brought a fundamental shift in imagining and identifying the people as the holders of sovereignty, and the term became coextensive with the citizen (Panizza, 2005). Considering the shifts in labour movement and activism in Zimbabwe, post-2010 saw the rise in citizen-led movements calling for social change. Some scholars define populism as toxic for democracy because of the insistence on equating part of the people with all the people, and the urgency with which those who wish to implement the will of the people react are reminiscent of several dictatorial regimes claiming legitimacy from below (Panizza, 2005). However, it is essential to note that the Constitution of Zimbabwe, by allowing the articulation of divergent voices and public protests and populism, in a sense, becomes a part of democratic expression. Mawarire utilised populism from a citizen-centred perspective as an explicit, inclusive, collaborative, and nonviolent confrontation method functioning on a representative basis amalgamating the represented voices into one profound wave of opposition. The element of weaving and incorporating a people’s disquiet and interests often lead to unification and protests by the concerned people, thus falling within the citizen-centred perspective. In this weaving, whether belief, tool or style, what is essential about this populism is precisely the ideal type of society of democratic politics that it envisages, a vision of legitimating collective choice (Bonikowski et al., 2018).
Mawarire introduced the “Speak, Ask, Act” trichotomy, which goes beyond representation (as stated by other theorists in populist discourses). Populism is considered not to be just about a crisis of representation in which people are weaned off their old identities and embrace a new “popular” identity, but it fosters representation, allowing the unrepresented because of their class, religion, ethnicity, or geographical location, to be acknowledged as political actors (Panizza, 2005). We contend that the trichotomy has an agency in recreating an engaged and emancipated citizenry suffering disenfranchisement. Utilising social media, the #ThisFlag movement “furnished a gathering place for concerned citizens, and realised on the ground, where collective action put pressure on the government” (Sacks, 2020: 243). The citizen response on the pastor’s Facebook page sheds light on the primacy of citizenship as a basis on which Mawarire urged citizens to participate. Figure 1 shows Mawarire’s engagement with the citizens and their interpretation of his message in understanding their place as inherently powerful within the nation-state.
Pastor Evan Mawarire’s engagement with the citizens of Zimbabwe and their interpretation of his message.
The citizen approach to populism emancipated the masses to understand themselves as legitimate holders of power in holding the government accountable, and thus their protests are justified on that basis. The approach consists of elections and voter registration as a critical issue well debated in Zimbabwe. While there have been many claims about inconsistencies in electoral processes, both Mawarire and the citizens understand that for credible and legitimate change, citizens should be educated on the electoral processes. The primacy for this understanding is that Zimbabwe is a constitutional quasi-democracy, and citizens should participate in elections for legitimate change.
The movement added to the reinvention of civic action and informal protests in Zimbabwe. It further exemplifies the nexus between finding citizen voice as relevant in the post-democratic turn within the wake of a progressive, emancipatory process that has profoundly remoulded both core principles of liberal democracy, such as the principle of liberty and self-determination, equality and the egalitarian distribution of power, resources, and social opportunities (Bluhdorn and Butzlaff, 2019). In this light, Mawarire developed the “Speak, Ask, Act” model as countercultural and resistive to the dogma propagated by the regime. Thus, at a time when most citizens had been forced into silence through political intimidation, the campaign was encouraging citizens to participate in relatively small actions, including posting selfies and publicly wearing the flag, thereby having a crucial political symbolism and challenging a critical aspect of the ruling party’s political discourse (Karekwaivanane and Mare, 2019). The movement was resistive because protest culture was facing repression and silencing from the government.
In challenging ZANU–PF’s political discourse, the movement magnified the narrowmindedness of concepts such as “patriotic history” to which Mugabe and ZANU–PF subscribed. Patriotic history celebrated ZANU–PF’s role in Zimbabwe’s liberation from colonial rule. Furthermore, the concept proclaimed the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition by reaching out to “youth’’ and the general populace, all regarded as having forgotten or betrayed revolutionary values (Ranger, 2004; Tendi, 2010). However, while celebrating and upholding a culture of resistance from colonial rule, patriotic history also dictated that any contrarian voice be regarded as a “sell-out”. On this basis, and ZANU–PF’s rendition of its role in the liberation struggle, Mawarire was a sell-out or, according to Matsilele (2019), a “dissident” jeopardising the gains of the struggle. Because the ZANU–PF party legitimises its rule on bearing the marks of the liberation war, Mawarire and the youth participating in the movement were deviant to the ruling party’s definition of patriots. That is, although the ruling elite had deployed patriotic history and similar nationalistic paraphernalia, the creative use of the national flag by the #ThisFlag protestors allowed them to be countercultural and positioned them as having the agency to mount oppositional and revisionist historiography (Mpofu and Mare, 2020). Similarly, the #ThisFlag campaign allowed the participating youths to openly perform their citizenship and redefine themselves as patriots, thus having their voices and aspirations legitimised because they were rightful citizens of Zimbabwe (Karekwaivanane and Mare, 2019).
The “Speak, Ask, Act” model establishes and invokes the idea of a homogeneous people with a unified collective will and claim. It defines people as the sole source of political legitimacy, whose discourse is shaped by a logic of othering, exclusion and portraying the good people as victims of corrupt elites, sinister conspiracies, and parasitic social free-riders (Bluhdorn and Butzlaff, 2019). “Speak” implies (re)finding citizens’ voices in challenging authoritarianism. “Ask” encourages introspection while “Act” is a call to action. The model falls into the continual swings of activism in Zimbabwe, where citizens seek emancipation in challenging the government, thereby extending the work of human rights and governance-oriented CSOs and NGOs.
The emancipative perspective of populism maintains an idealised notion of creating better citizens, increasing their political knowledge, confidence, and their sense of citizenship, contesting the idea that in many societies, citizens may be unaware of their rights, lack the knowledge to engage, or not see themselves as citizens with the agency, and power to act (Bluhdorn and Butzlaff, 2019). The #ThisFlag movement functioned in tandem with notions of emancipation, broadening citizen political participation and reclaiming citizen power. A crucial first-level impact of citizen engagement is developing greater civic and political knowledge, and a greater sense of awareness of rights and empowered self-identity, as prerequisites in deepening action and participation (Gaventa and Barretta, 2012; Merrifield, 2012). On day 11, Mawarire states that: We are not a political party . . . we are citizens exercising our right to challenge those in public office . . . You need to deal with a failed indigenisation policy that only that ever worked for you. I know you are surprised, why are people so united. We are not a political party; you are used to political parties coming to you; this time it is the citizens resisting you. When injustice becomes the order of the day, resistance becomes the norm. Macitizens (citizens), wherever you are, join this movement, they are hearing us, the whole world is hearing us, we do not want anymore, unite citizens, join your voice to this flag, speak out where you are, teach others to speak out, share this video. . .. (Mawarire, 2016e)
Mawarire displayed a marginal space as consistently “naturalised” by the ZANU–PF hegemony. The populist exploited the relationship between citizen understanding and elitist thoughts, which in Zimbabwe’s case, the state ideologically creates an identity incessantly revolving around historicity and ZANU–PF. Analysing the first video that gave birth to the movement, Sacks (2020) states that the video dissects the idealistic, official symbols of the flag, which project a rosy picture of Zimbabwe at odds with many of its citizens’ experiences and moves on to reclaim authentic patriotism by reframing what the country could be. Mawarire does this by accepting some aspects of the national symbols – the importance of the flag, the meaning of its colours, and the value of memorialising martyrs while also rejecting the official reading of those symbols (Sacks, 2020). However, there is a fundamental precept in Mawarire’s imagination of the nation: His rhetoric focuses on the future he imagines for the country rather than the present he rejects. The shift in pronominal power reflects the new balance, as ‘they’ who tell at the outset become ‘they’ who have passed, subtly transferring authority from the false prophets of the regime to the true martyrs of the nation and, thence, to the speaker who imagines and ventriloquises their responses, and from him to the protestors who would take up his call. (Sacks, 2020: 245)
The use of “they” carries two meanings: the first meaning refers to the ZANU–PF elite who propagate their version of the nation that is divergent from the second meaning, which refers to those who partook in the country’s liberation wars. The juxtaposition of these meanings creates an understanding that there is a variance between what the liberation war heroes envisaged and the transpiring situation in post-independence Zimbabwe. For Mawarire, the post-independence nation should function based on the principles that ignited the native Zimbabweans to wage war against colonialists. Thus, through citizen-centred populism, Mawarire questions how history and citizenry rights function in post-independent Zimbabwe.
The marginal position of Mawarire allowed him to imagine an idealised Zimbabwe where every citizen must have access to political economy. He contests ZANU–PF’s political philosophy that Zimbabwe is synonymous with the party and all its practises. As in many videos of the movement, the first video carries this disposition of Mawarire, who used language meant to create an involved citizenry. Mawarire positions himself as one with the people, brought together by shared experiences of suffering. In his poetic video, Mawarire “reframed ‘this flag’ as ‘my,’ ‘your,’ and thus implicitly ‘our’ flag – not an abstraction of the state, but rather a possession to be claimed and managed by its people” (Sacks, 2020: 246). The pastor sought to embolden the masses to understand that nation-making is not a reserve of the political elite – it is a collective process with an active citizenry.
We understand that “nation” and “nationalism” must be deliberately constructed or “invented” by somebody – nationalism comes before the nation, not the other way around (Zimelis, 2003). Though met with different reactions, one can assume that the objective and identity carried by the movement exemplified the compelling power with which nationhood and identity carry in political and democratic terrains. The movement presents a connection between populism, democracy and nationalism, with a common thread being “the people” rather than the elite as the fount of political legitimacy (Bonikowski et al., 2018). Statements such as “learning to speak again” (Mawarire, 2016e) and “. . . unite citizens, speak out where you are, teach others to speak out. . .” (Mawarire, 2016f) present the citizens as sources of power in questioning political power and the meaning of democracy for an imagined Zimbabwe. Mawarire portrays the importance of an informed citizenry who can participate in democratic life, hold the state to account, and exercise their rights and responsibilities effectively (Gaventa and Barretta, 2012). Mawarire’s movement emerged as part of protests congruent in the idea of imagining a Zimbabwean identity envisaged on the liberation struggle with ideas of Black sovereignty and “power to the Black people”.
Conclusion
In this study, we set out to engage and understand a new wave of populism manifesting in the advent of technological advancement in Zimbabwe. The #ThisFlag movement, we argue, had all the hallmarks of populism from below. The movement shook Zimbabwe even though this non-mainstream, people-centred, and anti-elitism digitally born movement was deemed unsuitable for the country’s narrative by the hegemony. Such viewpoints came through elites who considered protesting citizens to be elements extending the regime change agenda. In creating the movement, Mawarire utilised features of his profile as a pastor to advance a populist narrative on the crisis facing Zimbabwe. This person specification rendered him a form of legitimation as an “upright” leader standing up for citizens’ rights. The preconditions of the crisis offered the pastor the ability to resonate with the masses from either side of the political divide. These preconditions, coupled with creative communicative methods, allowed the movement to manoeuvre politically tabooed issues with a long history in the body politic, such as the unresolved Gukurahundi genocide and tribalism (Mpofu, 2019). The movement’s independence from political party influence facilitated a conflation of diverging voices in speaking against all political parties and the CSOs and NGOs who find it challenging to initiate significant change in Zimbabwe.
Footnotes
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
