Transformation of National Identity,Geo-politics and Nation Building in Post-colonial African States: The Cases of Cameroon and Senegal

Conceptual framework of strategic identity

In this subsection, we explain a simple and clear theory or concept of strategic identity that builds on our ideas and those of earlier scholars on the subject. The concept strategic identity is a new and emerging concept that we coined in the discipline of international relations (Ngwa 2020). Here, we manage to present a more detailed account of what is strategic identity, outline the major factors or proposition that shape and define the concept, how it is formed, and its significance to issues of peace and nation-building in countries born out of colonialism. We equally illustrate how it can be measured or used within the context of academic research. Strategic identity is considered in this paper to mean strategic calculation of elites that describe the population’s relationship and sense of belonging to a nation-state, and the individual nation-state’s relationship and sense of belonging to the international world.

The concept of strategic identity was drawn primarily from the perspective of social constructivism offered by Alexander Wendt (1994), and the realist approach on strategic culture put forward by Colin Gray (1981). Put simply, the ideas of these scholars led to a simple but unassailable concept of strategic identity, one that properly explains the evolving nature of national identity and geo-politics and its significance to nation building in post-colonial African states. The key assumptions of constructivist thoughts that widen our understanding of strategic identity rest on the claim that identities of all forms be it collective, state, national, international, strategic etc. are regularly constructed (Wendt, 1994). Therefore, from a social constructivist standpoint, the concept of strategic identity entails the following: (a) strategic identity is constantly constructed and therefore is dependent on agents that construct it; (b) strategic identity is dynamic, and it depends on the social context and the agents that construct it; (c) strategic identity rests on a “tradition”, in which it has a particular legitimacy of its own, and it depicts a particular connection to history and ancestral heritage; (d) strategic identity sustains a close relation to the system of political values in which it takes place; and (e) strategic identity strives to narrow borders that produce in-group and out-group biases. In light of the above social constructivist assertions, one can observe that strategic identity has two important features: firstly, it is constructed in relation to shared tradition, history and political values; and secondly it is dynamic.

Strategic culture is an old concept linked to the discipline of international security and strategic studies. The concept has always attracted much attention within the realist theoretical framework and in the last two decades it has been increasingly employed to explain how and why states go to war. The concept has been employed to explain the strategic behaviour of states in times of war. Thus, it plays an important role in explaining the unique or strategic behaviour of states with reference to their domestic and geo-political interests. The most important explanation of strategic culture that informs our understanding of strategic identity is that presented by Colin Gray. He defined strategic culture as a dynamic mode of thought, actions and behaviours that elites display in domestic politics and geo-politics (Gray, 1981: 21–47). The word strategic refers to a set of dynamic modes of thoughts, actions and behaviours of a particular elite or group of elites.

A proper understanding of the word strategic can also be traced from Alastair Iain Johnston’s (1998) ideas on his study of strategic culture. By and large, Johnston (1998) used the concept of strategic culture to study the different United States and Soviet responses during the Cold War period. The word strategic comes from the powerful calculating capability that national elites employ to determine the status, image, personality and position of their states in domestic politics and geo-politics. Strategic illustrates dynamic modes of thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of behaviour adopted by elites in response to their domestic and geo-political interests. Therefore, this study holds that an identity cannot be strategic if it is not dynamic to the extent that it can permit the people and elites of a particular state to make personal choices based on their national and geo-political characteristics such as culture, history, and geography. Strategic identity is concerned with dynamic patterns of ideas that reflect the public and elite’s domestic and geo-political perceptions. Accordingly, strategic identity refers to “strategic calculations that elites employ to consolidate or build the population’s relationship and sense of belonging to a nation-state, and the individual nation-state’s relationship and sense of belonging to the international world order”. The concept should be perceived in two ways: on the first count, it represents the way the public and elites perceive themselves in domestic politics; on the second count, it relates to how they perceive their country in global politics. Hence, it is assumed as a nation-state’s self-constructed image based on its status, and national interest in the national and international community. Strategic identity is characterized by dynamism and globalism. It provides conditions for new centres of power and opportunities to change the existing structure of the international system. The current study maintains that strategic identity is a more dynamic and enduring identity which is salient in post-colonial societies as it seeks to offer opportunities for post-colonial African states to diversify their international connections, increase their bargaining power and strive for emergence.

Dimensions and determinants of strategic identity

Strategic identity has two dimensions, the internal and external dimensions (Ngwa 2020). The former refers to a population’s relationship and sense of belonging to their nation-state. This describes the representations and corresponding beliefs held by elites and the general public about who they are as citizens of a particular nation-state. The latter refers to the beliefs held by elites and the public about where they belong in the geo-political landscape. As witnessed in Wendt’s (1994) constructivist approach, the current study rejects the rigid distinction between the internal and external dimensions of national identity – it does not support the idea of privileging one against the other. It synthesizes both accounts to form a new type of national identity theorized in this article as strategic identity.

Putnam’s (1988) two-level game best explains the process that binds domestic and international politics or geo-politics. He offered one of the best explanations for the interaction between domestic and geo-political interests. According to him, in formulating policies, stakeholders take into consideration the domestic and geo-political considerations (Putnam, 1988). Much of the literature on the relations between domestic politics and international politics or geo-politics have often been entangled in the debate about whether domestic politics influence geo-politics or vice versa. However, Robert Putnam’s pioneering work provided a different interpretation to this problem. He considered the process of arriving at political decisions as a two-way game. In similar manner Sadik (2009: 77) notes that “it is futile to debate whether domestic politics really determine geo-politics, or vice versa”. The current research claims that both domestic politics and geo-politics influence each other, and are therefore coherent. Though it is likely that participants in identity politics may come from both within and outside the states, domestic political actors have more sovereign power to influence the people’s sense of belonging and feelings of affinity at home and abroad. The perception of political elites is a sine qua non for determining how changes in national identity influence geo-politics or vice versa.

As explained in the constructivist theoretical framework, ideas and interests are fundamental factors that influence the construction of all forms of identities, be it collective, state, national and international identity. Strategic identity is largely determined by the domestic and geo-political interests of elites in post-colonial states. This work, therefore, submits that since strategic identity is understood as a nation-state’s self-constructed image at home and abroad, it is intimately connected to both domestic and geo-political interests of the public and national elites. The term geo-politics is often employed to describe an approach in international politics that stressed on how territories and resources are vital in shaping the interests of sates. Geo-politics describes the status, position and influence that states possess and wield in international politics (Spykman, 2017: 219). It includes economic, political, cultural, historical, security and diplomatic interests that shape the image, status, and position of states in the international arena (Dodds, 2007: 24–25).

Geo-political configurations in the changing global era

Since the end of the Cold War bipolar system, sweeping changes have occurred in the way that elites in post-colonial African states perceive the geo-politics of their countries. New geo-political spaces have emerged in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Cold War bipolar system. As explained by Leonova (2012) the emerging pattern of geo-politics or the new geo-political trend in the globalized world could be divided into four main blocs: traditional; emerging; regional; and sub-regional blocs. In our contemporary global era, the architecture of geo-politics is represented into a four-level structure that includes: the traditional bloc comprising Western states; emerging blocs comprising non-Western and industrializing states; the regional blocs comprising states found in a particular continent; and sub-regional blocs that comprise immediate neighboring states. As far as geo-politics is concerned, Leonova (2012) argued that in the current global era new geo-political features have emerged, the world is no longer bipolar but multipolar. Global political processes are creating new political alliances and new centres of power. Alliance or identification with a specific pattern or bloc accounts for new theories and rules that govern the world. Geo-political axes or features that form the structure of the globalized world could be presented as follows: the traditional bloc that includes France, the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Spain, Portugal, etc.; the emerging bloc that constitutes the People’s Republic of China (China), Turkey, Brazil, India, Japan, South Korea, etc.; the regional bloc that comprises South Africa, Libya, Togo, etc.; and the sub-regional bloc which is made up of countries within the immediate borders of a country.

As long argued by Ikenberry (2014), the geo-political imagination in post-colonial countries was largely determined by external players. Profant (2010) had earlier claimed that the Western bloc dictated the image and international identity of post-colonial states. One of the central arguments in this research rests in the claim that national identity and geo-politics in post-colonial African states are coherent. A change in domestic features of national identity may, as well, affect the pattern of geo-politics in political societies. Therefore, the analysis advanced here traces the origin of geo-politics and strategic identity from below, from within the state, and not just from the perspective of external geo-political players. It hypothesizes that the change in the composition of national identity in Cameroon and Senegal implies that alternative and diverse versions of geo-political thoughts are emerging at the regional and global scenes (see Figure 1).

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Figure 1.

Grand strategy of a state.

First level of analysis: Elites and public perception of national identity

This subsection sets out to answer the three main questions guiding this research; who are Cameroonians and Senegalese? Where do Cameroon and Senegal belong in the international geo-political landscape or global politics? How and why is Cameroon and Senegal transforming their national identity into a form of strategic identity? Previous research largely demonstrated that national identity and geo-politics in Cameroon and Senegal depended on colonial cultures and the will of external actors. However, in an attempt to safeguard peace, stability among the diverse ethnic cleavages, promote national unity, and attain their common goal of becoming an emerging nation that is united in their diversity by 2035, the leadership of both states introduced institutional reforms that have reconstructed their country’s image at home and abroad. The self-constructed political vision that inspired the change in national identity and geo-politics in Cameroon could be evident in President Paul Biya’s nation-building vision launched in 2009. The new nation-building vision labelled “Cameroon: An Emerging, Democratic and United Country in Diversity by 2035-EDUD” aimed at: (a) forging a better future for Cameroonians that will deepen their ability to assert their identity; (b) build national unity while respecting diversity; (c) creating an economy based on sub-regional, regional and global integration; (d) promoting an attractive Cameroonian culture united in diversity, and assertive at the international level; and (e) in like manner, in 2014, President Macky Sall of Senegal introduced a novel vision that aimed to transform Senegal into an emerging nation by 2035. The new vision was termed “Plan for an Emerging Senegal-PES”, hence, it is envisioned that Cameroon and Senegal share a similar nation-building plan of becoming emerging nations that are united in diversity by 2035. In effect, this article explaines how the 2035 emerging vision guides both states to reconfigure the perception of their national identity and geo-politics.

This part of the analysis examines the role of education in the transformation of national identity and geo-politics, and it particularly measures the extent to which elites have introduced changes in secondary schools’ and high schools’ curriculum to give a new meaning to who they are and where they belong in the geo-political landscape. There are many ways through which elites use education to represent their national identity – one of the most common ways has been to re-adapt the secondary school curriculums to reflect the civic and cultural components of the state. The analysis here particularly relied on secondary school syllabuses and interviews conducted during field work research. The findings were further strengthened by public discourse extracted from statements made by prominent elites, especially Presidents, Pedagogic Inspectors and Curriculum Designers in the Ministries of Secondary Education in Cameroon and Senegal. We examined four main elements of national identity spelled out by Smith (1991: 13) and Anderson and Imagined Communities (1991: 14). These authors defined national identity as a sense of belonging to a particular political community and sharing a common history, culture, language, and civic values. Thus, the four main variables that define national identity in secondary school syllabuses include: shared language; history; culture; and citizenship. In order to determine changes in elite perception of national identity over time the study measured the following: (a) the degree to which elites adapt their curriculums to the diversity of local and international cultures; (b) the extent to which official and national languages are formally recognized by elites in secondary schools and high schools; (c) the degree to which elites formally recognized other foreign languages in secondary schools and high schools; (d) the extent to which elites authorized the teaching of civic values in secondary schools and high schools; (e) the extent to which elites prioritized Cameroon, Senegal, Africa and world histories in secondary schools and high schools. Answers to these questions revealed how elites perceive what it means to be a Cameroonian or Senegalese. This demonstrates how the underlying civic and cultural features of national identity have been indigenized, Africanized and globalized by elites to represent the new nature of Cameroon’s and Senegal’s national character.

To begin with the extent to which indigenous or national languages are valorized by elites of both states, it was established that before the attainment of independence colonial administrators in Cameroon authorized only colonial languages in schools while indigenous languages were outlawed. In the period between 1960 and 2000 secondary schools and high schools maintained French and English languages at the expense of indigenous languages. However, following the 2012 syllabus review, a total of 35 national languages was approved and added in the curriculum for secondary schools. In Senegal, before and after independence French was the only language authorized as a medium of instruction in middle schools and high schools. Unlike in Cameroon, the Senegalese elites were much more conscious of the importance of indigenous language as a feature of national identity and unity. As far back as 2002 six indigenous languages were authorized and taught in schools. There has been a significant change in the teaching of indigenous languages in Senegalese schools.

The research further investigated the degree to which other foreign languages are formally recognized and taught in schools. In the aftermath of the 2012 curriculum revision in Cameroon, five foreign languages (German, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, and Italian) were taught in secondary schools. Whereas in Senegal three languages (English, German, and Russian) were taught before the year 2000 and seven (Arabic, English, German, Russian, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish) as from 2012 (see Table 1). The revision of the language curriculum partly answers the research questions – it demonstrates that in recent years ruling elites in both states no longer perceive their country and national character in purely anglophone and francophone terms, and it appears that they are now appreciating the ethnic basis of their national identity. Also, the change at the domestic level has a spilled over to effect the international landscape, and has reconfigured the geo-political thoughts of the ruling class to no longer perceive their country as an overseas territory of France or part of the greater francophone community. By teaching other foreign languages and interacting with other cultures and civilizations, both countries promote unity in diversity at national and international levels. The elites preserve their inherited colonial cultures, yet ensure that their citizens are deeply rooted to their indigenous cultures and open to the rest of the world. Though the ruling elites in both states assumed an ambitious language policy in the domestic and geo-political arenas, the information gathered from the interviews revealed that the lack of political will in Cameroon stalls the implementation process.

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Table 1.

Shared language as an indicator of national identity.

Language	Before independence (colonial period)	After independence (1961–2000)	Advent of globalization (2000–2019)	Results
Official languages
Cameroon	French and English compulsory	French and English compulsory	French and English compulsory	No change
Senegal	French compulsory	French compulsory	French compulsory	No change
Indigenous languages
Cameroon	Not authorized and not included in curriculum	Not authorized and not included in the curriculum	35 authorized and taught	Significant change since 2012
Senegal	Not authorized and not included in the curriculum	Authorized but not included in the curriculum	Six authorized and taught in primary schools as a pilot programme and in universities	Change since 2002
Foreign languages
Cameroon	Not authorized	Not applicable	Nine authorized in 2012 and five taught	Significant change since 2012
Senegal	Not authorized	Three authorized and taught	Seven authorized and taught	Significant change since 2012

Source: Data collected by the authors.

Shared indigenous culture is the second main variable examined in the curriculum of secondary schools (see Table 2). In the first four decades after independence, indigenous culture was not authorized or nor included in the curriculum of secondary schools and high schools in Cameroon. However, following changes in the 1996 Constitution, the 1998 law on the reorganization of education in Cameroon, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) convention to safeguard cultural heritage, the 2009 Growth and Employment Strategy Paper for an emerging and diversified Cameroon, in 2012 indigenous culture was authorized and included as a separate subject in the curriculum of secondary schools. Indigenous culture is now taught for 50 hours in the first two classes of secondary schools (that is forms 1 and 2). The curriculum emphasizes on three main areas, first on Cameroon’s cultural diversity, second on cultural practices related to ways of life and third on cultural practices related to important events such as birth, marriages and death. Since 2012, there has been a change in the nature of shared culture in secondary schools. Governing elites have made strides to socialize young Cameroonians to be deeply rooted in their cultures and to be opened to the rest of the globalized world. The Pedagogic Inspector for Culture during the in-depth interviews submitted that through the discovery of their country’s cultural riches, youths will tend to appreciate their country’s national heritages and not confine themselves to colonial cultural practices.

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Table 2.

Shared culture as an indicator of national identity.

Culture	Before independence	Status after 1960–2000	Status after 2000–2019	Nature of change
Indigenous culture in Cameroon secondary schools	Not authorized nor included in the curriculum	Not authorized nor included in the curriculum	Authorized and taught only in the first two classes (taught for 50 hours)	Slight change since 2012
Indigenous culture in Senegal middle schools	Not authorized nor included in curriculum	Not authorized nor included in the curriculum	Not authorized nor included but taught as part of history and citizenship	Change

Source: Data collected by the authors.

An assessment of the middle school curriculum in Senegal demonstrated that culture is neither taught as a separate subject nor included in the curriculum of “Le Brevet de fin d’Études Moyennes” examinations. Nonetheless, a deeper scrutiny of the curriculum indicated that Pedagogic Inspectors in middle schools combined issues of indigenous culture with other subjects. Indigenous culture is taught as part of history and citizenship. For example, some of the cultural concepts incorporated in the curriculum and taught as part of citizenship include: precolonial, colonial and post-cultural influences in Senegal; the construction of the Senegalese nation – origin and evolution; and the Senegalese nation – unity and diversity. Consequently, in Senegal, shared national culture is included in the middle school curriculum and taught as part of citizenship and history.

It is therefore essential to note that the elites in both countries have in recent years taken stock of their country’s culture and redefined the national culture bequeathed to them by the colonial powers. The actions of the elites in both states show that they no longer perceive themselves solely as francophones at home and abroad. Information drawn from the in-depth interviews provides reasons that justify the change in the cultural composition of national identity. Firstly, some respondents posited that in the period of transition and the search for a new world order, Senegal and Cameroon have the opportunity of determining the composition of their national identity, one that is consistent with their deepest aspirations, philosophy of life and vision of the world. Secondly, some respondents underlined that in order to safeguard national unity in diversity it is necessary to demand for a cultural renaissance by importing precolonial images. Nonetheless, in comparative terms, Table 2 demonstrates that Senegalese elites tend to appreciate their indigenous culture more than those of elites in Cameroon.

As considered in the theoretical framework, shared history is a major determinant of national identity, national unity and nation-building. We measured the extent to which history education has been indigenized, Africanized and globalized. In the case of Cameroon, prior to independence, Cameroon and African history were not included in the syllabus of the London Matriculation Overseas School Certificate Examination. In the first four decades after independence, the history curriculum for the General Certificate Examination (GCE) was entirely dominated by European history while a shared indigenous and Africa narrative was less represented. Nonetheless, following a series of legal and educational reforms initiated by the ruling elites, in 2012 the curriculum was redesigned to reflect the shared national, African and global realties. The findings indicate that since 2012 there has been a significant change in the narrative of shared history taught in schools (see Figure 2).

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Figure 2.

General Certificate Examination (GCE) history syllabus prior to 1996 GCE history syllabus 2012 edition.

As demonstrated in Figure 2, the GCE curriculum for history in secondary schools and high schools was entirely based on European history. The two questions designated for Cameroon history featured under Africa and the Middle Eastern section. Hence, prior to changes initiated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, history education in secondary schools was detached from the society it was meant to serve – to a great extent, the syllabuses reflected those inherited from the British colonial administration in the 1950s. On the contrary, in 2012 the structure of the harmonized and revised curriculum of Cameroon GCE includes separate sections on Cameroon history since 1800, African history since 1800 and world history since 1848. In terms of percentages, Cameroon history constitutes 40% of the GCE while African history and world history cover 30% each.

In exclusive interviews with Nkemasong (2019), the National Pedagogic Inspector for History and Geography and with Orok (2019), the National Pedagogic Inspector for History and Citizenship, posited that before the changes initiated in the early 2000s, Cameroon possessed an outdated syllabus in the discipline of history, and schools taught aspects of history that the mother country such as France and Britain were no longer teaching. More emphasis was on European history while Cameroon history was relegated to a small part within African history. So, Cameroon as a sovereign country did not really feature in most parts of the syllabuses. Teachers and students studied in the light of what they inherited from the colonial administration. Anglophone Cameroon adhered to the syllabus of the London GCE while francophone Cameroon adhered to the syllabus that was signed in 1963 following the Dakar accord on education. Nkemasong stated as follows:

Before the year 1998 Cameroon was under neocolonial influence in the domain of education. But by the year 1995 onwards stakeholders realized that if Cameroon must evolve then they must redefine themselves through education, the country must promote an education system that builds on the minds of the learners. An educational system that enables them to valorize what is around them before presenting themselves as part of the global community. (Nkemasong, 2019)

It is evident that since 2012 the narrative of shared national history in Cameroon has changed. Before then it was taught according to the European narratives, for instance freedom fighters in the likes of Ruben Um Nyobe and Enerst Ouandie who were labelled as “rebels” are now perceived as national heroes. They are today viewed as nationalists or freedom fighters because they fought for the independence of Cameroon from the hands of the colonialist. This is a typical example, highlighted by the Pedagogic Inspectors, of changes that have decolonized the teaching of history in Cameroon. These changes are, therefore, enabling elites to build a foundation of the new type of national identity theorized in this study as strategic identity. Another important factor that influences change within the context and narrative of history in secondary schools are textbooks. It is a well-established fact that he/she who writes the textbook dictates the nature and manner in which knowledge is transmitted. In an effort to decolonize the teaching of history and change the colonial narrative practised in previous decades, Nkemasong (2019) underpinned that the textbooks sector has been liberalized. He stressed that now more than 80% of history textbooks used in secondary schools across the national territory are written by Cameroonians. Even if they write in partnership with foreign publishers, he maintained that the content comes from Cameroon historians. With this, elites can now guarantee that the narrative of national history is that which fosters national unity with diversity. Though important changes have been recorded in the past two decades, the Pedagogic Inspectors were quick to admit that there is still more scope for improvement.

An assessment of the middle school and high school curriculum by Chafer (2002) revealed that after independence Senegal inherited the history curriculum used in colonial schools. Despite some modifications in the curriculum in the early years after independence, the Ministry of National Education and the Pedagogic Institute for History in France still exerted much influence on the narrative of history education in Senegal. They particularly did so through the moderation of the Brevet De Fin d’Études Moyennes and baccalaureate examinations. As far as history syllabuses prior to the year 2000 are concerned, some respondents explained that there was a popular demand and pressure from the community to change the curriculum to reflect issues of African and Senegalese realities. Despite numerous attempts by governing elites to change the history curriculum, the content of history in middle schools and high schools were still largely copied from the French model.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of history content in middle schools. The topics were classified and rated according to the number of hours taught. The result of the evaluation indicated that history as a subject in middle school is now divided into four main branches: European/French history; Senegalese history; African history; and Asian history. The topics were assigned 2 hours each and in exceptional cases 3 hours. As illustrated in Figure 3, in all the four classes combined, 20 lessons were devoted to the narrative of European/French history, 30 to Senegalese history, 35 to African history, and 15 to Asian history. The outcome of the analysis reveals that unlike in previous years, the content is now dominated by Africa and Senegalese narrative. Lessons such as, the construction of the Senegalese nation, origin and evolution, unity and diversity, were assigned 3 hours each and given a pride of place within the curriculum.

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Figure 3.

History content in Senegal middle schools (2012 edition).

The results from the interviews highlighted some constraints that prevented Senegalese elites from instituting meaningful reforms in the content of history education in the first four decades after independence. It was largely argued that overreliance on French funding in middle schools and high schools discouraged the initiatives of meaningful reforms. Some of the respondents noted that history textbooks produced in France to reflect the guidelines of the French baccalaureate undermined the narrative of native authors. Nonetheless, in the past two decades Senegalese governing elites have made great strides to alter the colonial narrative in history. As explained by a middle school history teacher:

Africa was portrayed in the past as a continent with no civilization, history of its own and or culture, so it was necessary to colonize it. Today we try to teach students to understand that Africa is an integral part of world history because it is the birthplace of civilization. (respondent)

Another history teacher asserted that though the pedagogic approach which although still akin to that of the French system, there have been obvious changes which correspond to African and Senegalese realities. They posited that unlike in the past, the curriculum lay emphasis on Senegal and the history of its communities, environment and immediate neighbours. Another respondent also contended that in recent years history lessons have diminished the focus on France. He uttered the idea of “enracinement et ouverture” as he explained that though the history syllabus has been enriched with issues of Senegalese and African realities, it nonetheless remains open to other parts of the world. In like manner, Senegal President Macky Sall’s lecture entitled “Africa in Contemporary International Relations” delivered at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, United States, opposed the pedagogic approach that marginalized African history and civilization. He asserted:

I refute the prejudice and ideologies that depict Africa as a continent on the margin of history. Africa, is the cradle of humankind, is at the beginning and not on the margin of history. Many scientific studies, including those of our compatriot Cheikh Anta Diop, a prominent Egyptologist, give sufficient proof of the historicity of African civilizations. (Sall, 2019)

Speaking in an international forum in Morocco (Forum for the South) organized by the Amadeus Institute, President Sall (2019) again noted that in order for African states to succeed in their goals of attaining unity in diversity, peace and development, there is need to redefine the course of history. He proffered:

As nations and as individuals, we cannot realize our destiny by letting other people write our history and interpret it in our place. Our success will depend largely on our state of mind. We must remain combative. It’s up to us to take our destiny into our own hands. It’s up to us to tell our story to enlighten our present and invent our future. (Sall, 2019)

The analysis from the interviews and public statements in both countries revealed that in the past two decades governing elites and stakeholders have made enormous efforts to eliminate the colonial mentality that made Cameroon and Senegalese citizens perceive themselves as francophones at home and abroad. It appears that since 2012, there has been a reset in the narrative of shared history in both countries.

An evaluation of the content of citizenship in secondary schools showed that during the colonial era neither civics nor citizenship was taught in colonial schools. The inclusion of civics would have created more anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments, which colonial powers did not relish. In the first four decades preceding independence, civics as a subject was less valorized in the curriculum as it was taught for fewer hours and had a lower coefficient compared to other subjects. Though it was taught as a secondary school subject, in the period between 1960 and 2000 it was not considered as a subject for the Cameroon GCE nor its predecessor the London GCE. It was only in 2012 that the entire curriculum was revised and the hours and coefficient for civics increased. Also, in later 2015 the Cameroon GCE board considered citizenship as an examination subject to be written by students sitting for GCE ordinary level examinations. The findings indicate that since 2012, there has been a significant change in the way elites perceive and valorize civic values.

Similarly, in Senegal, in 1998 though civics was compulsory, it was assigned fewer hours and credits compared to other subjects. Due to UNSECO’s advocacy on global citizenship the syllabuses in Senegal were redesigned by elites to reflect the realities in the contemporary global world. The syllabuses reveal that there is an increased emphasis on the discourse of national citizenship alongside an emerging trend on global civic values in Cameroon and Senegal (see Table 3). Elites in both countries are trying to build a strong civic bond between their citizens and the global community. In comparative terms, Cameroon’s secondary schools and high schools valorize the civic element of their national identity more than in Senegal where the subject was taught for fewer hours and assigned a lower coefficient. Coefficient in a school syllabus denotes the value or degree of importance attributed to a subject or course.

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Table 3.

Shared civic values.

Civics/citizenship	Before independence (colonial period)	After independence (1961–2000)	The advent of globalization (2000–2019)	Results
Shared civic values
Cameroon	Not authorized nor included in the curriculum	Coefficient 1	Coefficient 2	Significant change
		Less hours	More hours (176)
Senegal	Not authorized nor included in the curriculum	Less coefficient	Less coefficient	No Change
		Fewer hours	Fewer hours (78)

Source: Data collected by the authors.

Public perception of national identity (Afrobarometer survey)

The Afrobarometer is a non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on national identity, democracy, governance, economics, conflicts, citizenship, and other related issues about Africa. Between 1999 and 2019 seven rounds of national surveys were conducted in 37 African countries. Afrobarometer national surveys provided a good opportunity for us to trace the public perception of national identity in Cameroon and Senegal. The surveys were administered through face-to-face interviews using the respondents’ choice of language. The sample size for each country was nationally representative relative to its population. In May–June 2018 the research team in Cameroon interviewed 1200 adult Cameroonians. The sample size satisfied the requirement of a nationally representative sample with a margin error of ±3% and a confidence level of 95%. The team in Senegal interviewed a random and stratified sample of 1200 Senegalese adults in November–June 2018. The representative sample gave results with a margin of error of ±3% and a confidence level of 95%. The survey broadens our understanding on how the masses perceive the notion of national identity in Cameroon and Senegal. As a measure of national identity, we used the following question from the seventh round Afrobarometer survey:

Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Cameroonian/Senegalese] and being a [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to? The respondent’s ethnic group was determined before the question was being asked.

1 = I feel only [respondent’s ethnic group]

2 = I feel more [respondent’s ethnic group] than [Cameroonian/Senegalese]

3 = I feel equally [Cameroonian/Senegalese] and [respondent’s ethnic group]

4 = I feel more [Cameroonian/Senegalese] than [respondent’s ethnic group]

5 = I feel only [Cameroonian/Senegalese]

The Afrobarometer surveys asked respondents in both countries to state whether they identify more with their ethnic group or with their nationality. Figure 4 revealed that in Cameroon, while 35.60% of the respondents identified only with their national identity, over 38.40% attested that they identify equally with their national and ethnic groups. This again shows the degree to which the public valorize or consider their ethnic and cultural heritage as an essential facet of their national identity and what it means to be a Cameroonian. In the case of Senegal, the results took a similar trend with a higher proportion of Senegalese who admitted to the same view. While 38.1% of the respondents stated that they identify only with their national identity, about 43.2% of them confirmed that they equally identify with their national and ethnic groups.

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Figure 4.

Public opinion about national identity in Cameroon and Senegal.

A previous study from Browning and Ferraz de Oliveira (2017) revealed that in the past national identities in both states were primarily connected to colonial cultures and determined by them. Furthermore, these results revealed that national identities in Senegal and Cameroon today are increasingly connected to the peoples’ ethnic and cultural heritage. The ethnic component is fixed, enduring and unchallengeable. People belonging to a particular ethnic or cultural group share a common national identity because they share common ancestry. This analysis partly discloses what it means to be a Cameroonian and Senegalese, showing the extent to which in an increasingly globalized world elites and the public have indigenized, Africanized and globalized, underlying the civic and cultural features of national identity to reflect their national character.

Second level of analysis: Elites perception of geo-politics

The previous section analysed how elites in the area of education and the public define who they are and where their country belongs in the geo-political landscape. The outcome of the analysis succinctly answered the first research question but could not provide a valid and succinct response to the second and third questions. The analysis below proffers a more reliable and valid response to the question, where do Cameroon and Senegal belong in the international geo-political landscape or global politics and why do they transform their national identity into a form of strategic identity? The findings here reveal how the change in elite and public perception of national identity influence the choice of geo-politics and international identities of Cameroon and Senegal. The analysis uncovers the geo-political position and international identities of Cameroon and Senegal. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used to analyse the data abstracted from the World Bank and the KOP. To determine whether there are statistically significant differences between the independent and the dependent variables, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used. ANOVA is usually employed to test any statistically significant difference between two or more variables. The statistically significant p value was less than or equal to 0.05 (⩽0.05). Global economic, political and cultural interactions represented the independent variable while the geo-political blocs embody the dependent variables.

The KOP globalization index

The KOP measured the degree of global interconnectedness or integration into the world economy. With the increasing trend of global interdependence, it is very evident that the change in national identity in post-colonial societies is permeating territorial borders and extending to the geo-political landscape. National identity in post-colonial states is becoming global. Its permeable nature in the advent of globalization makes it a powerful and explosive force in domestic politics and geo-politics. Hence, the KOP globalization index established by the Swiss Economic Institute provides a valid response to the questions, where do Cameroon and Senegal belong in the international geo-political landscape? Do they belong to the traditional, emerging, regional or sub-regional bloc in geo-politics?

The KOP globalization index measures the degree of economic, social and political interconnectedness. KOP defines globalization as:

a process of creating networks of connections among actors at intra- or multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital, and goods. Globalization is a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies, and governance, and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence. (KOP Globalization Index, 2019)

The KOP globalization index focused on measuring the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization. Globalization in the economic, social, and political fields had been on the rise since the 1970s; however, a particular boost was received in the period after the Cold War. The economic variable measured the degree of openness to trade in goods and services together with financial liberalization. Thus, openness to trade was measured using values of imports and exports in goods and services while financial interconnectedness was measured by the flows and stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. The social variable measures interpersonal, informational and cultural interaction at global levels. It captures the rate of interaction among citizens living in different parts of the globe. For instance, while the interpersonal component measured the level of personal interaction between Cameroonians and citizens from other parts of the world, the informational element captured the rate at which information was shared across diverse countries, and it measured the actual flow of ideas, knowledge and images between Cameroonians and citizens from other countries. The cultural elements centred on openness towards and ability to understand, adopt, recognize and tolerate other foreign cultures and civilizations. It measured the transmission of cultural values by means of sharing cultural goods and services. It considered trade in cultural goods based on UNESCO’s definition. The political variable or political globalization refers to the rate at which states engage in international political cooperation. It was measured by using the number of multilateral treaties signed since 1970, the rate of treaty partner diversity, the number of embassies at home and abroad, the number of memberships in international organizations, number of non-governmental organizations in the country, and rate of participation in United Nations peace-keeping missions. The KOP globalization index covers 203 countries and territories and it is calculated on a yearly basis from 1970 to 2018. The selection of countries and territories is based on the World Bank’s criteria. The KOP globalization index in Cameroon and Senegal from 1970 to 2017 is illustrated in Figure 5.

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Figure 5.

KOP globalization index in Cameroon and Senegal from 1970 to 2017.

The result of the KOP globalization index revealed that in the period between 1970 and 2017, Cameroon and Senegal experienced a gradual increase in the degree of global interconnectedness or integration into the world economy. In both countries it was particularly observed that economic, political and social interconnectedness received a particular boost in the period after the Cold War, especially as from the year 2000 onwards. While both countries registered a gradual increase in the degree of interconnectedness and integration into the global economy, Senegal recorded a higher rate of interconnectivity than Cameroon. In 1970, both countries registered 31.7 on the KOP globalization index and by the year 2000, Senegal’s KOP global index score stood at 49.31 while that of Cameroon was 42.18. By 2017, the gap between both states further widened with Senegal recording 61.32 on the KOP globalization index against 51.38 in Cameroon. The outcome of the KOP globalization index conforms with the results of the field research. It indicates that both countries are economically and politically opening to the world, likewise appreciating their international cultural diversity. Furthermore, the KOP globalization index shows that Senegal appreciates its strategic identity more than Cameroon – Senegal is more open to the world and more diverse in the geo-political space. From the very beginning after attaining independence, Senegal tried to distinguish itself from the other independent African states by appreciating the indigenous features of their national identity. Unlike Cameroon, Senegalese political elites passed decree N0 68-871 of 24 July 1968 that recognized indigenous languages and culture as national culture and envisioned multicultural nationalism as a constituent feature of Senegalese national identity. It is highly probable that the change in the composition of national identity gradually transcended national borders and spilled over to the geo-political landscape or global spaces.

Geo-political changes in Cameroon and Senegal

Table 4 presents a detailed picture of geo-political changes in Cameroon and Senegal before and after the year 2000. The analysis is centred on two pertinent issues: first, it discloses the global or geo-economic, geo-political and geo-cultural positions of Cameroon and Senegal; and second, it determines if the change in geo-politics were statistically significant or not. By doing so, the analysis succinctly answers the question; where do Cameroon and Senegal belong in the geo-political landscape or global politics?

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Table 4.

Comparative analysis of geo-political changes in Cameroon and Senegal.

Geo-political factors	After independence 1 (1961–2000)	After independence 2 (2000–2019)	Results
Geo-economic interaction	Cameroon	Cameroon
	Traditional	Traditional	Insignificant change
	Emerging	Emerging	Significant change
	Regional	Regional	Insignificant change
	Sub-regional	Sub-regional	Insignificant change
	Senegal	Senegal
	Traditional	Traditional	Significant change
	Emerging	Emerging	Significant change
	Regional	Regional	Insignificant change
	Sub-regional	Sub-regional	Significant change
Geo-political interaction	Cameroon	Cameroon
	Traditional	Traditional	Insignificant change
	Emerging	Emerging	Change
	Regional	Regional	Insignificant change
	Sub-regional	Sub-regional	Change
	Senegal	Senegal
	Traditional	Traditional	Insignificant change
	Emerging	Emerging	Significant change
	Regional	Regional	Change
	Sub-regional	Sub-regional	Significant change
Geo-cultural interaction	Cameroon	Cameroon
	Commonwealth	Commonwealth	Insignificant change
	La Francophonie	La Francophonie	Insignificant change
	Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)	OIC	Change
	Pan-Africanism	Pan-Africanism	Change
	Senegal	Senegal
	Commonwealth	Commonwealth	Change
	La Francophonie	La Francophonie	Insignificant change
	OIC	OIC	Significant change
	Pan-Africanism	Pan-Africanism	Change

Note: statistically significant p value ⩽0.05.

In terms of global economic interactions, the World Bank data on trade showed that both countries have experienced changes in the pattern of economic interaction with emerging and sub-regional partners. In the first four decades after independence Cameroon and Senegal’s trade relations highly depended on their interaction with their traditional partners (France, United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Spain, and Portugal). However, in 2018, Cameroon’s overall top three trading partners included the PRC, France, and Italy while those of Senegal included the PRC, India, and Nigeria. However, the degree of economic interconnectedness was more significant in Senegal than in Cameroon whose trade interaction is still highly dependent on traditional partners, particularly France and Italy. As is evident in the world bank data on trade, a major fault line of geo-economic interaction in Cameroon rests on stagnated trade interaction within the regional and sub-regional blocs. Nonetheless, diversified economic relations with new geo-political actors show that both states are gaining a new image and position in the international geo-political landscape.

As concerns the degree of political interconnectivity, the outcome of the analysis in recent years indicated that while both countries preserved political relations with their traditional partners, in Cameroon change in political interaction with emerging partners was insignificant, and that of Senegal significant. Though Senegal witnessed a significant shift in political interaction with new partners in the international geo-political landscape, political interaction with traditional partners persisted without any significant change. By interacting with traditional partners in tandem with emerging, and sub-regional partners, the Senegalese elite no longer perceived themselves primarily as francophones and their country as part of the dominant French community in global politics. The major limitation observed in both cases rests on the fact that the degree of changes in political interaction at regional or continental levels were insignificant. Nonetheless, unlike Cameroon, Senegal has undertaken a more dynamic status and identity in global politics which is multidimensional in nature and is neither fixed nor can be reduced to a single geo-political bloc or partner. It was observed that Senegal’s new dynamic international image is multidimensional, non-confrontational, and complementary.

Moving forward to international cultural diversity, Cameroon has preserved her inherited colonial cultures through increased interaction with the International Organization of La Francophonie and the Organization of Commonwealth States while Senegal has done the same with International Organization of Francophonie. Worthy of mention is the fact that both countries have embraced new cultures and civilizations. Senegal, has registered a significant change in the level cultural exchange with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and pan-Africanism, whereas Cameroon has not. Though the results showed that Senegal has employed more primordial arguments to defend its stands on interculturalism than Cameroon, both countries have in the past two decades made strides to recognize their distinctive cultural heritage and have equally stepped-up interaction with other civilizations in the world.

Significance of geo-political dynamism to change to nation building

As concerns the significance the dynamic approach in geo-politics to nation-building, the outcome of the face-to-face interviews with Senegalese and Cameroonian diplomats mapped out a range of primary and secondary economic, political and socio-cultural reasons that redefined where their country belongs in global politics. Motivations outlined by foreign affairs officers in both states rest on the shared belief to foster the vision of becoming emerging nations by 2035 while the secondary incentives include: