Wavering Sudan as Key to Resolving the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Conflict

Introduction

The water resources of the transboundary Nile River have been the subject of bitter controversy for quite some time. A key factor complicating relations between the countries of the Nile Basin region has become their hydrotechnical projects, which change the level of river flow and thus can cause an acute shortage of fresh water in the lower reaches.

The main tributary of the Nile, the Blue Nile, which flows through Ethiopia and Sudan, contributes about 85% of the total water volume to the lower reaches of the river. Therefore, the construction of dams on this river will inevitably cause concern for Egypt, which is extremely vulnerable to a possible reduction in river flow. The issue of the shortage of fresh water has become a national security issue in this country, and therefore dams and reservoirs created in the upstream countries are perceived as a challenge or even as an existential threat. The importance of the issue is underlined by the words of the President of Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi: “Water security is of the utmost importance for the Egyptian people as it is a matter of national security” (Daily News Egypt, 2020).

Egypt’s extreme dependence on the Nile and vulnerability to a possible reduction in flow is the reason for its desire to control the Nile by creating its own regime, as pointed out by N.B. Akinyemi (1994: 220). J. Waterbury and D. Whittington (1998: 161) revealed that the clash of Egyptian and Ethiopian strategies to launch their own hydrotechnical projects could pose a threat to the basin-wide regime. At the same time, they predict the establishment of cooperation between Sudan and Ethiopia on the use of the Nile waters, since this is most in line with its interests.

The situation around the Nile is well illustrated by the concept of hydrohegemony by M. Zeitoun and J. Warner (2006). In this concept, hydropolitics is considered from the point of view of the power capabilities of states, but elements of the constructivist approach are also used. The dominant actor uses the mechanisms of coercion, incentives, and the creation of norms (contracts that secure the position of the hegemon). Hegemony is built, among other things, on discursive power—the construction by the hegemon of appropriate knowledge (values and norms that are accepted by other subjects). A. Cascão and M. Zeitoun (2010: 31–32) give the concept of power a geographic character—the position in the upper reaches of the river and the ability to control the water flow. In addition to material instruments, other characteristics of the power of the state are “bargaining power” and the ability to impose its ideas and norms regarding the equitable distribution of water.

According to J. Kalpakian (2000), water conflicts are closely related to issues of national identity. This is especially true for the decolonized countries of Africa, which are still experiencing problems with the formation of a national identity and have unresolved territorial disputes with their neighbors. Using the case of Nile as an example, J. Kalpakian shows that the water dispute is not a clash of military and economic forces, but a clash of identities, primarily Egyptian and Ethiopian. Therefore, Egypt is ready to cooperate with Sudan, just as Sudan is inclined to orient itself toward Egypt because of its close identity (Kalpakian, 2000: 153–154).

Egypt’s and Sudan’s status quo

Egypt has traditionally been the hegemon in the Nile basin, but over the past 20 to 30 years, we can observe the Ethiopian challenge to this hegemony, which has become the main aspect of the change in the political situation in the region (Cascão, 2009; Lawson, 2017; Rahman, 2013).

The main demand of Ethiopia and other upstream countries was the revision of the old agreements on the division of water resources of 1929 and 1959, which were beneficial to Egypt. These bilateral treaties fixed Egypt’s “natural and historical rights” while excluding other riparian countries and their needs. The 1929 treaty established Egypt’s veto over any hydraulic engineering work that could reduce its share of water resources, and the 1959 treaty established fixed water quotas: 55.5 billion cubic meters for Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters for Sudan. In fact, both agreements guaranteed a sufficiently large water quota for Egypt and consolidated its dominant position in the region. The revision of quotas to take into account the countries of the upper Nile will inevitably reduce the Egyptian share, but it is unclear how much water is sufficient to maintain the economic and social status of modern Egypt. The existing treaty basis puts Sudan in a dependent position from Egypt and therefore Sudan is forced to support Egypt’s hydrohegemony and compete with Ethiopia (Beyene et al., 2018: 152).

Accordingly, in the Egyptian discourse, there was a so-called “securitization” of water resources, the reason for which was the desire to minimize the risk of reduced runoff and, consequently, negative impact on the economy (El-Sayed and Mansour, 2017: 235). This securitization is a consequence of the hegemony of Egypt, which seeks to maintain the status quo in the East Nile Basin. Egyptian officials often state that the country has “historically acquired rights” to the Nile due to the use of water resources since ancient times and extreme dependence on them (Akwei, 2015: 41). The reason for the difficulties is the “prior appropriation” of the resources of the Blue Nile sub-basin by Egypt and Sudan based on past use and a high degree of dependence on river flow. The main threat to cooperation lies in Egypt’s desire to maintain the status quo: “no agreement is the best alternative” (Yacob, 2002: 112).

In contrast to the Egyptian discourse of securitization, Ethiopia actively uses the principle of “equitable use,” taking into account the current needs of each country (Beyene et al., 2018: 152). And the economic growth of the country and the increase in its international influence contribute to the implementation of its strategy of “counter-hegemony”—the termination of Egypt’s monopoly on the water of the Nile.

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a new stage in the conflict around the Nile

The year 2011 was one of the turning points in relations between the countries of the Blue Nile sub-basin. This year, Ethiopia announced the construction of the “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” (GERD) or the Hidase Dam (Renaissance). The dam should become the largest in Africa and the hydroelectric power station will generate enough electricity to not only cover Ethiopia’s domestic needs but also ensure exports to neighboring countries. Export revenues can stimulate economic development and prevent a crisis associated with a large number of internal problems (population growth, droughts, food shortages). The issue of development in the country is very acute and some researchers associate it with the issue of the survival of Ethiopia as a state (Qansouh, 2015: 2–3). GERD is a national development project designed to not only ensure economic growth but strengthen the unity of the nation. Any opposition from neighboring countries is perceived as attempts to impede the “revival” of the nation, as neocolonial efforts to put Ethiopia in a dependent position. Contemporary Ethiopian discourse emphasizes that the country is the main contributor of water resources to the Nile, while underutilizing them. The critical importance of the Blue Nile for Ethiopia and the vital need to develop water resources are substantiated (Akwei, 2015: 40). Opposition to the GERD project from Egypt and other countries is positioned as a challenge to the Ethiopian people themselves, their desire for modernization and prosperity. For example, “The Grand Dam identity combines the sanctioned discourse of the Ethiopian Renaissance with a geopolitical imagery of the downstream states as opponents or enemies” (Kraak, 2012: 168). Thus, the elites intend to unite the nation and strengthen its identity.

Over the past 10 years, negotiations have been under way between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia with the aim of settling the dispute and creating a comprehensive agreement. In particular, the Declaration of Principles was signed in 2015, meetings of technical committees were held, but the contradictions between the parties have not been resolved. A compromise was reached in the Declaration of Principles: Ethiopia agreed to the principle of no harm, while Egypt agreed with the very fact of building the dam and did not invoke historical and natural rights to the Nile. The declaration noted that the three countries will conduct joint impact studies of the GERD project and use them in developing guidelines for the first filling of the reservoir. But at the same time, the owner of the dam (Ethiopia) can adjust these rules in unforeseen circumstances, but with the obligatory notification of the downstream countries. This point, as expected, became the subject of controversy (Tawfik, 2016: 77). Ethiopia believes that only the drafting of guidelines with the right to unilaterally amendments will be sufficient, Egypt and Sudan insist on the implementation of the principles of no harm and prior notification and in the prospect of a binding agreement.

R. Tawfik (2016) notes a change in the hydropolitical order away from the hegemony of Egypt due to the fact that Ethiopia and all the countries of the upper Nile are consolidated in favor of revising the current situation. In general, Tawfik positively assesses the 2015 Declaration of Principles, which will be able to resolve the situation, but only if Ethiopia refuses to take unilateral actions.

Nevertheless, with the beginning of the filling of the GERD reservoir, a new aggravation of the Egyptian–Ethiopian relations took place. In the absence of an agreement, Ethiopia has been unilaterally filling since 2020, forcing Egypt to turn to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Egypt proposed a draft resolution providing for broad international assistance to the negotiation process and urging Ethiopia to refrain from uncoordinated actions (ABC News, 2020). Following the meeting on June 29, 2020, all members of the Security Council expressed support for the mediation actions of the African Union (AU), but abstained from adopting a resolution. In connection with the proposed second stage of filling the reservoir, Egypt continues to insist on the adoption of a UNSC resolution condemning Ethiopia’s unilateral actions. However, during the discussion in the UNSC in July 2021, the draft resolution submitted by Tunisia (calling for Ethiopia to stop filling the reservoir for 6 months until a legally binding agreement is reached) did not receive support.

The positions of Egypt and Ethiopia in the negotiation process are generally stable and can be clearly defined. Of much greater interest is the Sudan, which is located between the two poles of the conflict. And we cannot say that it gives preference to any side. Many researchers note the ambiguity and variability of Sudan’s position on the GERD (Farah, 2020; Wraae, 2018). It is forced to balance between Egypt and Ethiopia, trying not to destroy relations with them and at the same time to protect its interests related to the Nile. These interests are related both to maintaining high water quotas and to obtaining the benefits from GERD, which are necessary for the development of industry and agriculture. How can Sudan behave in the negotiation process? What is its current position and can it change in the near future? Can its position weigh down the scales of either side and decide the question in its favor?

The Nile and the problems of Sudanese statehood

In order to understand the modern attitude of Sudan to the problem of Nile water resources, it is necessary to turn to its internal problems, to understand the place of the water issue in domestic politics and its influence on the Sudanese statehood. This approach is reflected in a number of theoretical studies of developing and post-colonial countries. Ayoob (2002) in his theory of subaltern realism notes that the new states of the Third World are in the initial stages of state building, and this is inextricably linked to the “predatory” strategy of the regime to consolidate the state. It is faced with internal unrest and therefore the challenges of internal security are the determining factors for the foreign policy formation. Thus, there is a priority of internal variables for explaining interstate conflicts.

As Thies (2004) shows, in developing countries, there is an interdependence between state building, internal competition, and foreign policy. One of the leading indicators of the state power is the efficiency of collecting taxes from all its territory. The presence of external and especially ethnic internal rivals (which is relevant for Sudan) increases the state’s ability to effectively “extract” resources. At the same time, as Barnett (2002) has shown, external threats to the state can reinforce national identity. Therefore, the elites can form a confrontational agenda to strengthen their control over the entire territory of the country.

Farah (2020) notes that Sudan’s position was not formed under the influence of objective criteria (the balance of benefits and threats from GERD), but rather depended on foreign policy relations with Egypt and Ethiopia. Farah calls internal processes another factor. After 2019, Sudan is faced with the need to build a new democratic regime. However, the division of the ruling elite into military and civilian causes the vagueness of the current course and the volatility of foreign policy.

After all, the choice of a water policy strategy depends precisely on a set of internal issues, contradictions, and conflicts. The Nile and its tributaries, the Blue Nile and Atbara, play a huge role in the lives and well-being of millions of Sudanese, especially in the northern, drier part of the country. The problem of limited water resources is associated with a number of internal conflicts that exacerbate the already difficult socioeconomic conditions in some regions of the country.

Sudan is quite heterogeneous in its ethno-confessional structure. This structure developed during the period of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in Sudan (1898–1956), when the country was actually a British colony. The Arab-Muslim population and Black Africans, mainly Christians and adherents of traditional beliefs, found themselves within the borders of one country.

All researchers agree that the main cause of internal conflicts in Sudan is the consequences of colonialism. But some of them focus on the issues of ethnicity, actualized during the period of colonial rule. That is, a confrontation between the “northern” identity (Arab-Muslim) and the “southern” (African, Christian/traditional) has been formed. Another group rejects ethnic and confessional differences as the cause of conflicts, giving preference to the political and economic inequality of the regions (Bassil and Zhang, 2021: 252–259). In their opinion, since independence, there has been a dominance of the northern elite (living in the central region of the Nile Valley), which has been placed in a leading position by the British authorities, leaving the peripheral elites in a marginalized position (Copnail, 2019; Idris, 2019).

In many developing countries, political regimes are aimed not at developing the economy but at the “predatory” exploitation of resources in their territory (Bates, 2001). According to L. Wise (2020), instead of colonialism, “internal colonialism” appeared as a system of exploitation of the periphery by the center. Within this system, political elites use the discourse of “developing backward regions” as a pretext to seize resources. Arab nationalism plays a special role as a means of mobilization. The appeal of the authorities to the Arab identity of the Sudanese serves as a tool to attract pastoral tribes to fight the disloyal population of the non-Arab periphery. It was the Arab tribes of the north that were considered the “carriers of civilization” that needed to be instilled in the underdeveloped African population. And the construction of hydrotechnical objects is a powerful tool for such “civilizing.” However, it is facing resistance and an upsurge of violence.

D. Chigudu (2019) concludes that the conflicts in Sudan are not a consequence of its multi-ethnicity and, therefore, interethnic and sectarian enmity. The main reason is the economic and political inequality of the regions, established during the period of colonialism. In the current situation, there is the granting of privileges to some groups and the marginalization of others (mainly on the periphery). This is a source of conflict (Idris, 2019).

Water resources in domestic political discourse

In the history of independent Sudan, various regimes have shaped a discourse of accelerated modernization with the aim of increasing control over the resources of the periphery by the center. For example, in the era of J. Nimeiry, the project of turning Sudan into the “breadbasket of Africa” was actively promoted, which required a sharp increase in agricultural areas, and, accordingly, the creation of branched irrigation systems. The implementation of these projects provided for the creation of a number of dams, canals, and reservoirs, inevitably changing the way of life in the peripheral territories (Verhoeven, 2012). Thus, the water problem began to be mentioned in the context of the country’s economic development, and its solution was directly associated with the construction of a new developed society and even a new nation.

Omar al-Bashir, who came to power in 1989, with the support of the National Islamic Front party, embarked on a course of gradual Islamization. At the same time, the goal was to create a “new Sudan,” or even a new people living according to the laws of Islam (De Waal, 2021). Particular importance was attached to hydropower, intended to become the locomotive of the new Islamic economy. The features of this course were assimilation, unitarianism, and the construction of a single Arab Islamic identity, which was repeatedly declared by al-Bashir (Kuol, 2019). Despite the declared changes, the traditions of the domination of the northern “river” elite and the marginalization of the ethnically and culturally different population of the periphery continued. This was clearly manifested in the implementation of oil industry projects in the Kordofan and Abyei regions in the 1990s (Jansen, 2018). They were accompanied by massive displacement of people and violation of the traditional way of life of the tribes. The construction of the Merowe Dam in northern Sudan (in a region that is not ethnically different from the center) in 2006 led to similar consequences. In addition to the above, there was extensive flooding of arable land that hit traditional agriculture in the region. The aggravation of the social situation during the implementation of these projects led to mass demonstrations, which were suppressed by force.

The accumulated contradictions between the center and the periphery and the “colonial” (Wise, 2020: 146) policy of the authorities led to serious riots in South Sudan and Darfur, which turned into protracted hostilities and put the country on the brink of collapse. The conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan (intra-Arab and intra-African) show that differences in identity are not the main factor in the emergence of internal Sudanese conflicts. Thus, the separation of South Sudan is not a unique case of incompatibility of two nations within the borders of one country. It was to be followed by other peripheral regions (Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile), which eventually happened.

The conflict in Darfur, which began in 2003, only at first glance was an ethnic clash between the Arab and African populations. Indeed, land and water disputes between different communities were the reason for the ethnic cleansing carried out by the government’s proxy militia Janjaweed. However, the real reason can be called the political and economic marginalization of these regions, which was expressed in the exclusion of local communities in the distribution of power and income (Belanger, 2013; De Alessi, 2013). The economic policy of the center called for the removal of land from local communities for mining and the introduction of mechanized farming instead of traditional one. And Janjaweed has become a key tool in the fight against local communities in the interests of the center, which has been used in many provinces (Wise, 2020: 145). The conflict in Kordofan and Blue Nile began shortly after the secession of South Sudan in 2011. It was accompanied by problems in establishing the border between Sudan and South Sudan and a dispute over the ownership of areas with oil fields. Local insurgent movements joined the larger South Sudanese movements (such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) fighting the central government. The dissatisfaction of the local tribes can also be attributed to the policies of Khartoum, including land grabs, Islamization, and discrimination (De Alessi, 2013: 80). Thereby conflicts over territory have led to violence and the emergence of rebel groups. Only after the regime change in 2019, a ceasefire was signed, and in 2020 a comprehensive peace agreement was signed.

Sudanese position and political context

The internal political discourse has shaped the approach of Sudan to the solution of the external problem of GERD. And in the same way, the position of Sudan was determined not by the objective reasons for the lack of water resources but rather by foreign policy issues of relations with neighboring countries.

Until now, the only treaty regulating the consumption of the Nile waters is the Egyptian–Sudanese treaty of 1959. This treaty excluded other riparian countries and their needs, although it was allowed to be included in the work of a technical committee to establish water needs. Article 5 states that in case of claims of the upstream countries to their share of water, Egypt and Sudan will work out a common position on a possible revision of the agreement.

Naturally, Egypt and Sudan became opposition to the countries of the upper Nile and Ethiopia in the 2000s, demanding a revision of the old agreements and taking into account their needs for water resources. The main interest of Egypt and Sudan was the preservation of the status quo and, consequently, the high shares of the Nile waters. The partnership of these countries was facilitated not only by the well-established treaty base and significant experience in negotiations on transboundary waters but also by a common Arab-Muslim identity. In 2010 in Entebbe, at the conclusion of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), Egypt and Sudan consolidated their opposition to the revision of the old agreements. The “stumbling block” was Article 14(b), which uses the concept of “water security”: “Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation: . . . (b) not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State.” Egypt and Sudan proposed to change the wording to the following: “not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State.” That is, they demanded that the existing agreement of 1959 and their “historical rights” be taken into account. As a result, the governing structures of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) decided to exclude Article 14(b) from the text of the agreement and leave it for the consideration of the future commission on the Nile, which did not suit Egypt and Sudan. According to D. Mekonnen (2010), the concept of “water security” is a tool for maintaining the status quo for these two countries (pp. 438–439).

However, Egypt’s hopes of unconditional support for Sudan in the dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD project did not materialize. Under Omar al-Bashir, Sudan maintained a dual position, trying to preserve the benefits of good relations with each country. On one hand, it continued to support Egypt on the revision of the treaty base (refusal to sign the CFA), and to retain close ties between the elites of the two countries, represented mainly by the military. On the other hand, Sudan supported the Ethiopian GERD project as mutually beneficial for both countries and not posing a threat to the security of Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2013b). Sudan also took into account the benefits of having seaports of interest to landlocked Ethiopia.

In April 2019, al-Bashir’s regime was overthrown in Sudan as a result of a military coup. Power passed to the Transitional Military Council, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. As a result of an agreement between representatives of the army and leaders of the opposition forces, a government consisting of both military and civilians was formed. During the 3-year transitional period, democratic reforms must be carried out, general elections held, as a result of which power will be transferred to a civilian government.

In these circumstances, it is of interest to establish the correlation between regime change and a possible change in position in the dispute over the GERD, as well as the dynamics of bilateral Sudanese–Egyptian and Sudanese–Ethiopian relations. Each of the two countries hoped to attract the new Sudanese authorities to their side. In 2020, the Arab League, at the initiative of Egypt, adopted a resolution condemning Ethiopia’s unilateral actions to launch the GERD. Sudan joined to it but expressed a number of reservations (believing that it could increase tensions between the two countries; Ahram Online, 2020). Egypt was extremely wary of this; such a move was seen as the beginning of rapprochement between Sudan and Ethiopia. Egyptian officials appealed to the Arab identity of Sudan, calling support the united position of the Arab countries. Ethiopia, in turn, declared a common African identity back in 2019, supporting the transition process in Sudan (Farah, 2020: 441–442).

R. Farah in her article notes the continuing instability of the position of the Sudan. In her opinion, this is due to internal political processes, disagreements within the ruling coalition of civil and military personnel. In this coalition, the decision-making mechanism is complex, unstable, and subject to external pressure. The multitude of actors, groups of interests, which can influence the government, cause the ambiguity and inconsistency of the official Sudanese position on the GERD (Farah, 2020).

Chekol (2020) also notes the wavering nature of Sudan’s position. On one hand, it can get significant economic benefits through the import of cheap electricity from GERD and develop his own agriculture. On the other hand, Sudan fears falling into dependence on Ethiopia. Beyene et al. (2018) examine Sudanese–Ethiopian relations through the lens of hydropolitical issues and conclude that the benefits of Ethiopian dams are of paramount importance to Sudan and therefore it will prefer cooperation.

GERD project in Sudanese media

To identify a change in Sudan’s position, 130 news articles were analyzed. These articles were published on sites Sudan News Agency (SUNA), Sudan Tribune, and Radio Dabanga; mentioned the Renaissance Dam (GERD); and contained statements from officials about the project. Sample time interval is from 2012 to 2021.

These messages can be divided into two time periods: 2012–2018 (before the change of government during the coup on 11 April 2019) and 2019–2021 (from the coup to the present). The main difference between them is the change from the pro-Ethiopian vector, aimed at supporting GERD, to the pro-Egyptian vector, aimed at opposing the Ethiopian plans to fill the reservoir.

The main theses of the statements of the period 2012–2018:

The position of Sudan is clear and we have already called on Egyptian officials to take advantage of the central role that Sudan could play regarding the crisis, but the arrogance of the previous government did not allow them to accept this idea. (Sudan Tribune, 2014)

The main theses of the statements of the period 2019–2021:

Ethiopia is mistakenly believing that an agreement to fill and operate the dam would restrict its use of the Nile water in the future, while Sudan and Egypt affirmed their respect for Ethiopia’s right to develop the use of its water resources in the future in accordance with the principles of international law. (Sudan Tribune, 2021a)

Ethiopia’s unilateral actions have undermined mutual trust between the two countries. (Sudan Tribune, 2021b)

They further agreed to coordinate bilateral efforts at the regional, continental and international levels to press Ethiopia to negotiate in good faith and true political will to reach a comprehensive, fair and legally binding agreement on filling and operation of the Renaissance Dam. (Sudan Tribune, 2021f)

Worthy of note is the shift in rhetoric: after 2019, it became more confrontational, security threats were clearly positioned, and Ethiopia was directly called an “aggressor.” At the same time, earlier reports spoke mainly of cooperation and mutual benefits, while the Egyptian approach was weakly criticized and there was no harsh rhetoric.

Analysis of messages (2019–2021) also allows us to highlight the features of Sudanese–Ethiopian relations, and the GERD issue in particular, as well as the attitude to this problem in Sudanese society. The main speakers transmitting the main theses of Sudanese policy on this issue are Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (head of the Transitional Council), Abdullah Hamdok (prime minister), Mariam al-Mahdi (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Yasir Abbas (Minister of Irrigation).

a serious development and a change of position that undermines the continuity of the negotiation process which is led by the African Union, and a violation of the Declaration of Principles which was signed by each of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan on the 23rd of March 2015. (Radio Dabanga, 2020)

Therefore, a legal agreement is needed obliging Ethiopia not to carry out any action on the Nile without the consent of the lower countries: “Hamdok told CNN that, without reaching an agreement, they will always be in Ethiopia’s power to give them water today and take it from them by their choice, therefore they require a binding agreement in accordance with international law” (SUNA, 2021b).

Al-Burhan expressed regret over the escalation of the conflict with Ethiopia and stated that Fissaki territory is Sudanese by virtue of these documents, urging Ethiopia to withdraw from Sudanese territory, emphasizing its readiness to coordinate their actions on the border. (SUNA, 2021a)

The Sudanese government has strongly condemned “the aggression committed by Ethiopia on Sudanese territory” and the “direct violation of its sovereignty and the safety of the Sudanese lands.” (Radio Dabanga, 2021c)

The Minister assured the American delegation that the Renaissance Dam can become the core of comprehensive regional cooperation for the benefit and prosperity of all countries and nations of the region through the exchange of benefits, however this is due to the cooperation between the three countries in the filling and operation of the Renaissance Dam with a binding agreement that must have political force to achieve and implement it. (SUNA, 2021f)

Sudan hopes to reach a binding legal agreement on filling and operation prior to the second filling of the Renaissance Dam, and this Sudanese vision has gained a strong national consensus between the components of the transitional government and the Sudanese street. (SUNA, 2021c)

Abbas noted that the meeting discussed the need to intensify the work of the media to unite the internal front in Sudan in a unified position on the security of water supply in Sudan, support for the national negotiating position, and contacts with civil society organizations, political parties and all Sudanese forces interested in the country’s water security. (SUNA, 2021b)

Discussion

Thus, we can track a clear change in the attitude of the Sudanese elite toward GERD. But what are the possible reasons for the change in the foreign policy vector?

In our opinion, the attitude of the Sudanese elite toward GERD is determined to a greater extent through the prism of relations with Egypt. The two countries have a common history, religion, a close identity, and one way or another, Sudan focuses on Egypt as its closest partner. However, relations between them did not always remain allied. There are two key variables that determine the nature of their relationship: Islamism and military elites.

The Omar al-Bashir regime declared its Islamist nature and supported the Muslim Brotherhood party, persecuted in Egypt under H. Mubarak. This complicated relations with Egypt. The leader of the ruling National Islamic Front party, which is in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Turabi has long been in the highest government posts.

In 2012–2013, during the presidency of Mohammed Morsi, relations between the countries warmed up and acquired an allied character. Although Sudan is cautiously backing GERD, this does not become a cause for controversy due to the moderate position of Egypt itself. During this period, there was a “desecuritization” of the water issue in Egypt and it did not actualize the danger posed by GERD (Lawson, 2016). The Morsi government was set for a constructive dialogue, despite the sometimes aggressive rhetoric of the opposition parties.

There was a gradual deterioration of relations between Egypt and Sudan after the removal of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt by the military (Wraae, 2018). This confirms the increase in the number of critical statements in relation to Egypt. Bashir takes a clear pro-Ethiopian stance and declares the benefits for Sudan from GERD and the absence of any threat from the future dam.

In a 2019 coup, the Sudanese military removed al-Bashir. According to some reports, there was an intervention by Egypt, which convinced the generals to carry out a coup (Al-Monitor, 2019). Close ties between the military elites of the two countries predetermined the pro-Egyptian vector of the foreign policy of the Transitional Council of Sudan, in contrast to al-Bashir, who leaned toward an alliance with Turkey and Qatar. Indeed, relations between the two countries improved, Egypt provided comprehensive support to the military from the transitional council (including military during the conflict with Ethiopia over the disputed Al-Fashqa region), and Sudan supported the Egyptian position on GERD and switched to confrontational rhetoric over toward Ethiopia.

The issue of water resources and irrigation of fertile lands in Sudanese–Ethiopian relations is closely connected with the aggravated territorial problems. The fertile lands of the Al-Fashqa border region are a point of contention between the two countries. In 2021, with the support of Egypt, the Sudanese army managed to take control of most of the disputed lands.

The military coup of October 2021 and the subsequent resignation of civilian Prime Minister A. Hamdok means a sharp strengthening of the military wing in the transitional government and the continuation of the previous course toward an alliance with Egypt. The Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council is M. Dagalo (Hemedti), commander of paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (based on former Janjaweed), who accused of war crimes during the conflict in Darfur and the suppression of protests in 2019. It is very likely that the internal politics of Burhan and Dagalo will complicate transition to democracy and contributes to the emergence of new conflicts. Two years after the removal of al-Bashir, the marginalization of the periphery was not overcome, which was proved by protests in the northern and eastern states demanding the elimination of economic and political imbalances (Al-Monitor, 2021a, 2022). Although the rebel movements in Darfur and Kordofan, which signed the 2020 peace treaty, supported the military coup, the situation remains fragile. A number of other movements that did not sign the agreement condemned the coup and the removal of civilians from power (Al-Monitor, 2021b). Thus, the need to maintain control over the resources of the periphery and suppress internal resistance will stimulate the military elite of Sudan to external rivalry on the issue of GERD.

Conclusion

The Nile can be called one of the main factors influencing the Sudanese statehood. All the changing regimes in Sudan have one thing in common—the establishment of a water discourse by the elite (the idea of water scarcity/future water abundance prosperity) to expand their power and obtain resources, while using the rhetoric of modernization and consolidation of the nation.

The water issue occupied one of the first places in the relationship between the core (the Nile Valley in northern Sudan) and the periphery. The traditions of “internal colonialism,” expressed in the policy of violence or patronage in relation to the periphery, provoke internal conflicts. There is a direct connection between the peculiarities of the relationship between the center and the periphery with the politicization of the water issue, which is also moving to the external level.

Since the beginning of the GERD construction, Sudan has been intermediate between the main parties to the dispute—Egypt and Ethiopia. The existing political and economic ties with each of the parties and the possible benefits predetermined the desire of Sudan to become not an ally of one side but rather a mediator between them. In general, Sudan for the period 2012–2019 sought to identify itself as a key party, and without taking into account its interests, it is impossible to reach an agreement on the GERD. At the same time, it emphasized independence from the position of Egypt and sought to preserve the benefits of relations with Ethiopia.

The situation began to change gradually after the regime change in Sudan in 2019. From a fairly balanced position of mediation and a desire to reduce tensions, the country moved to a more confrontational and anti-Ethiopian strategy. Official statements since 2020 show an increasing association of Ethiopia’s actions with national security challenges. The possibility of establishing a mutually beneficial partnership on GERD has faded into the background.

At the same time, there is no consensus perception of the balance of benefits and threats. On one hand, the possibility of obtaining significant economic benefits for the country is indicated, and on the other hand, attention is drawn to the risk of a dam collapse, which can cause serious damage.

The current position of Sudan is based on the following principles:

Sudan can profitably take advantage of its geographical position in the middle reaches of the river and become a true mediator of the dispute over water resources. The positions of Egypt and Ethiopia are still characterized by stable ideas about the importance of the waters of the Nile and ideological attitudes. In this situation, it is important to reduce tensions, involve intermediaries, and move to a more pragmatic approach—finding out the true needs of each country for fresh water and introducing new technologies for saving water. Sudan comes closest to this approach.

In our opinion, the key to resolving the dispute lies within the Sudan. The attitude to the water issue within the country depends on whether the new government will be able to create a stable regime and carry out a democratic transition. Sudan is faced with the task of overcoming “internal colonialism,” regional inequality, and the marginalization of various groups of the population. Eliminating the reproduction of an authoritarian repressive model that securitizes water resources can make a fundamental shift not only in domestic but also in foreign policy. The new Sudan can indeed become a stabilizing element in the tangle of contradictions between Egypt and Ethiopia and help to find a compromise.